Varieties of Dictatorship There Are Many Different Types of Dictatorship
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Making Autocracy Work
∗ Making Autocracy Work Timothy Besley Masayuki Kudamatsu LSE and CIFAR LSE The Suntory Centre Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE DEDPS 48 May 2007 Tel: (020) 7955 6674 ∗ The first author is grateful for support from CIFAR. The authors received much helpful feedback from members of the Institutions, Organizations and Growth program of CIFAR to which a preliminary version of this paper was presented. Useful comments from Madhav Aney, Fernando Aragon, Peter Evans, Gabriel Leon, Adam Przeworski, Konstantin Sonin, and Guido Tabellini are gratefully acknowledged. Abstract One of the key goals of political economy is to understand how institutional arrangements shape policy outcomes. This paper studies a comparatively neglected aspect of this - the forces that shape heterogeneous performance of autocracies. The paper develops a simple theoretical model of accountability in the absence of regularized elections. Leadership turnover is managed by a selectorate - a group of individuals on whom the leader depends to hold onto power. Good policy is institutionalized when the selectorate removes poorly performing leaders from office. This requires that the selectorate’s hold on power is not too dependent on a specific leader being in office. The paper looks empirically at spells of autocracy to establish cases where it has been successful according to various objective criteria. We use these case studies to identify the selectorate in specific instances of successful autocracy. We also show that, consistent with the theory, leadership turnover in successful autocracies is higher than in unsuccessful autocracies. Finally, we show by exploiting leadership deaths from natural causes that successful autocracies appear to have found ways for selectorates to nominate successors without losing power - a feature which is also consistent with the theoretical approach. -
Chapter One: Introduction
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF IL DUCE TRACING POLITICAL TRENDS IN THE ITALIAN-AMERICAN MEDIA DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF FASCISM by Ryan J. Antonucci Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the History Program YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY August, 2013 Changing Perceptions of il Duce Tracing Political Trends in the Italian-American Media during the Early Years of Fascism Ryan J. Antonucci I hereby release this thesis to the public. I understand that this thesis will be made available from the OhioLINK ETD Center and the Maag Library Circulation Desk for public access. I also authorize the University or other individuals to make copies of this thesis as needed for scholarly research. Signature: Ryan J. Antonucci, Student Date Approvals: Dr. David Simonelli, Thesis Advisor Date Dr. Brian Bonhomme, Committee Member Date Dr. Martha Pallante, Committee Member Date Dr. Carla Simonini, Committee Member Date Dr. Salvatore A. Sanders, Associate Dean of Graduate Studies Date Ryan J. Antonucci © 2013 iii ABSTRACT Scholars of Italian-American history have traditionally asserted that the ethnic community’s media during the 1920s and 1930s was pro-Fascist leaning. This thesis challenges that narrative by proving that moderate, and often ambivalent, opinions existed at one time, and the shift to a philo-Fascist position was an active process. Using a survey of six Italian-language sources from diverse cities during the inauguration of Benito Mussolini’s regime, research shows that interpretations varied significantly. One of the newspapers, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano (Youngstown, Ohio) is then used as a case study to better understand why events in Italy were interpreted in certain ways. -
Citizen Participation in Government
Autocracy, Oligarchy, & Democracy © 2014 Brain Wrinkles In each country, the people have different rights to participate in the government. •In some countries, any citizen can run for office or vote in elections. •In other countries, there are restrictions placed on who can run for office and who can vote. •There are also countries where NO citizen can vote and there are no elections. © 2014 Brain Wrinkles Types of Government are based on two key questions: 1. Who governs the country? 2. What is the citizen participation like? The way a country answers these questions determines its government type: Autocracy Oligarchy Democracy © 2014 Brain Wrinkles • Have a single ruler with unlimited power. • Citizens cannot participate in the selection of the ruler or vote on the country’s laws. • One benefit – decisions for the country can be made quickly. • However…the needs of the citizens may be ignored. • The leader may make poor or selfish decisions that hurt the citizens. © 2014 Brain Wrinkles Generally the power to rule the country is inherited (kings/queens) or is taken by military force. There are two main types of autocracies: Dictatorshi Absolute Monarchy • Thep leader uses force • The monarch has to control the citizens. absolute power (no • Example: Hitler constitution) over the citizens. © 2014 Brain Wrinkles © 2014 Brain Wrinkles • The country is ruled by a small group of people. •The group gets their power from either religion, military force, or wealth & resources. • The citizens do not select the members of this group or vote on the country’s laws. © 2014 Brain Wrinkles The citizens hold the power of the government. -
Sorcerer's Apprentices
Faculty & Research The Spirit of Despotism: Understanding the Tyrant Within by M. Kets de Vries 2004/17/ENT Working Paper Series The Spirit of Despotism: Understanding the Tyrant Within Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries* * Raoul de Vitry d’Avaucourt Clinical Professor of Leadership Development, INSEAD, France & Singapore. Director, INSEAD’s Global Leadership Centre. 1 Abstract The objective of this article is to better understand the developmental history of despotic regimes and the existence of leadership by terror. To gain greater insight into this phenomenon, the unusual relationship between leaders and followers in despotic regimes is explored, and the self-destructive cycle that characterizes such regimes is examined. The price paid in the form of human suffering and the breakdown of the moral fabric of a society is highlighted. In this article, particular attention is paid to highly intrusive totalitarian regimes. The levers used by such regimes to consolidate their power base are discussed in detail. The role of ideology, the enforcement of mind-control, the impact of the media, the inception of the illusion of solidarity, and the search for scapegoats are part of the review. Finally, suggestions are made on how to prevent despotic leaders from gaining a hold on power. Observations are made about the newly founded International Criminal Court, a permanent international judicial body that has been specially set up to try despotic rulers for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. KEY WORDS: Despotism; tyrant; leadership; totalitarianism; autocracy; tyranny; dictatorship; societal regression; democracy; paranoia; narcissism; scapegoat; ideology; mind-control; aggression; violence; sadism; terror; genocide; war; crimes against humanity; war criminal; International Criminal Court. -
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Castro's Cuba and Stroessner's Paraguay: A comparison of the totalitarian/authoritarian taxonomy. Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Sondrol, Paul Charles. Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 05/10/2021 11:08:31 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185284 INFORMATION TO USERS The most advanced technology has been used to photogr2,pb and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted.. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this -reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is inciuded in reduced form at the back of the book. -
The Economic Foundations of Authoritarian Rule
University of South Carolina Scholar Commons Theses and Dissertations 2017 The conomicE Foundations of Authoritarian Rule Clay Robert Fuller University of South Carolina Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Fuller, C. R.(2017). The Economic Foundations of Authoritarian Rule. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/4202 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE by Clay Robert Fuller Bachelor of Arts West Virginia State University, 2008 Master of Arts Texas State University, 2010 Master of Arts University of South Carolina, 2014 Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science College of Arts and Sciences University of South Carolina 2017 Accepted by: John Hsieh, Major Professor Harvey Starr, Committee Member Timothy Peterson, Committee Member Gerald McDermott, Committee Member Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School © Copyright Clay Robert Fuller, 2017 All Rights Reserved. ii DEDICATION for Henry, Shannon, Mom & Dad iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Special thanks goes to God, the unconditional love and support of my wife, parents and extended family, my dissertation committee, Alex, the institutions of the United States of America, the State of South Carolina, the University of South Carolina, the Department of Political Science faculty and staff, the Walker Institute of International and Area Studies faculty and staff, the Center for Teaching Excellence, undergraduate political science majors at South Carolina who helped along the way, and the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. -
Cults of Personality, Preference Falsification, and the Dictator's
Cults of personality, preference falsification, and the dictator's dilemma Charles Crabtreex, Holger L. Kerny, and David A. Siegelz Abstract: We provide a novel rational explanation for why cults of personality exist: they solve the dictator's adverse selection problem in assigning subordinates to roles within the regime. Participation in a cult of personality is psychologically costly whenever it involves preference falsification, with the costs varying across individuals. Importantly, low psychological costs of preference falsification are correlated with traits the dictator values, such as unscrupulousness and ruthlessness, which we collectively term disposition-based competence. Under a wide variety of circumstances, this correlation makes participation in cults of personality informative from the dictator's point of view, allowing him to hire loyal and competent subordinates for the most important regime positions. In contrast to earlier formal work, our model implies that dictators can use cults of personality to avoid the loyalty-competence trade-off when promoting subordinates. We thank Quintin Beazer, Jens Grosser, Timur Kuran, Andrew Little, Eddy Malesky, Melanie Manion, Arturas Rozenas, Rory Truex, Nils Weidmann, and participants at the 2017 MPSA Conference and the 2017 ESTA workshop at Konstanz University for their very helpful feedback. x PhD cand., Department of Political Science, University of Michigan. y Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Florida State University. z Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Duke University. In 2001, Saparmurad Niyazov, who ruled Turkmenistan from 1985 to 2006, announced the publication of his first book. Called Ruhnama (The Book of the Soul), it contained answers to \all of life's questions" and became required reading in all schools, universities, and workplaces. -
Civil-Military Relations: a Comparative Analysis of the Role of the Military in the Political Transformation of Post-War Turkey and Greece: 1980-1995
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF POST-WAR TURKEY AND GREECE: 1980-1995 Dr. Gerassimos Karabelias Final Report submitted to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in June 1998 1 ABSTRACT This report attempts to determine the evolution of civil-military relations in Turkey and Greece during the 1980-1995 period through an examination of the role of the military in the political transformation of both countries. Since the mid-1970s and especially after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the struggle for spreading the winds of democracy around the globe has been the goal of all western states and particularly the United States of America. However, taking into consideration the volatility in the Balkans and in Central Asia, the military institution of Turkey and Greece which gave the impression that it withdrew in the barracks after their last intervention in 1980-83 and 1967-74 respectively, could easily be forced or even tempted to assume a greater responsibility in the conduct of each country’s domestic and foreign affairs. Only through a better understanding of its role during the 1980-95 period, we would be able to determine the feasibility of such scenarios. Using a multi-factorial model as a protection from the short- sighted results which the majority of mono-factorial approaches produce, this report starts with the analysis of the distinct role which the Armed Forces of each country have had in the historical evolution of their respective civil-military relations up to 1980 (Part One of Chapters Two and Three). -
Corruption in Autocracies∗
Corruption in Autocracies∗ James R. Hollyery Yale University Leonard Wantchekon Princeton University September 2011 Abstract Corruption is typically depicted as a result of one of two factors: a lack of polit- ical accountability or insufficient state capacity. Nonetheless, substantial variation in corruption levels exists even within the set of politically unaccountable high-capacity regimes. In this paper, we examine a third determinant of corruption – the ideological appeal of the government – and demonstrate that this variable can explain variation in the types and levels of corruption experienced in politically unaccountable regimes. Using a model of both moral hazard and adverse selection, we predict that (1) regimes that inspire the intense ideological loyalty of the populace are likely to enjoy low lev- els of petty corruption and that (2) autocratic regimes that enjoy such intense support from only a narrow segment of the populace will erect credible anti-corruption insti- tutions. Political corruption, by contrast, need not covary with levels of ideological support. We illustrate the mechanisms of our model through a series of case studies that demonstrate the importance of ideology in driving levels of corruption – with a particular focus on low levels of corruption in ‘developmentalist’ regimes. Finally, we discuss the relevance of our findings to other – democratic – political settings. ∗We would like to thank José Antonio Cheibub, Sunkyoung Park, Peter Rosendorff, Kongjoo Shin, Alberto Simpser and participants in the 2011 APSA Panel on Audits and Government Accountability in the Devel- oping World and participants in the 2011 EPSA Conference Panel on the Political Economy of Authoritarian Regimes for comments and suggestions. -
The Effect of Franco in the Basque Nation
Salve Regina University Digital Commons @ Salve Regina Pell Scholars and Senior Theses Salve's Dissertations and Theses Summer 7-14-2011 The Effect of Franco in the Basque Nation Kalyna Macko Salve Regina University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.salve.edu/pell_theses Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons Macko, Kalyna, "The Effect of Franco in the Basque Nation" (2011). Pell Scholars and Senior Theses. 68. https://digitalcommons.salve.edu/pell_theses/68 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Salve's Dissertations and Theses at Digital Commons @ Salve Regina. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pell Scholars and Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Salve Regina. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Macko 1 The Effect of Franco in the Basque Nation By: Kalyna Macko Pell Senior Thesis Primary Advisor: Dr. Jane Bethune Secondary Advisor: Dr. Clark Merrill Macko 2 Macko 3 Thesis Statement: The combined nationalist sentiments and opposition of these particular Basques to the Fascist regime of General Franco explained the violence of the terrorist group ETA both throughout his rule and into the twenty-first century. I. Introduction II. Basque Differences A. Basque Language B. Basque Race C. Conservative Political Philosophy III. The Formation of the PNV A. Sabino Arana y Goiri B. Re-Introduction of the Basque Culture C. The PNV as a Representation of the Basques IV. The Oppression of the Basques A. Targeting the Basques B. Primo de Rivera C. General Francisco Franco D. Bombing of Guernica E. -
WORKING PAPER Legitimizing Autocracy: Re-Framing the Analysis of Corporate Relations to Undemocratic Regimes
WP 2020/1 ISSN: 2464-4005 www.nhh.no WORKING PAPER Legitimizing autocracy: Re-framing the analysis of corporate relations to undemocratic regimes Ivar Kolstad Department of Accounting, Auditing and Law Institutt for regnskap, revisjon og rettsvitenskap Legitimizing autocracy: Re-framing the analysis of corporate relations to undemocratic regimes Ivar Kolstad Abstract Recent work in political economy suggests that autocratic regimes have been moving from an approach of mass repression based on violence, towards one of manipulation of information, where highlighting regime performance is a strategy used to boost regime popularity and maintain control. This presents a challenge to normative analyses of the role of corporations in undemocratic countries, which have tended to focus on the concept of complicity. This paper introduces the concept of legitimization, defined as adding to the authority of an agent, and traces out the implications of adopting this concept as a central element of the analysis of corporate relations to autocratic regimes. Corporations confer legitimacy on autocratic governments through a number of material and symbolic activities, including by praising their economic performance. We identify the ethically problematic aspects of legitimization, argue that praise for autocratic regime performance lacks empirical support, and outline a research agenda on legitimization. Keywords: Complicity, legitimization, legitimacy, corporate political activity, democracy Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, Auditing and Law, Norwegian School of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway. Tel: +47 55 95 93 24. E-mail: [email protected]. 1 1. Introduction «China’s done an unbelievable job of lifting people out of poverty. They’ve done an incredible job – far beyond what any country has done – we were talking about mid-90s to today – the biggest change is the number of people that have been pulled out of poverty, by far. -
SS.7.C.3.1 Low Level of Complexity Sample Item Explanation
SS.7.C.3.1 Low Level of Complexity Sample Item Explanation Question Which statement correctly describes communism? The correct answer should describe communism, which is a form of government. A The central government controls all Correct – Communism is a form of government in which a single ruling economic planning. party owns and controls all production and distribution of goods. Economic planning includes the buying, selling, and production of goods and services. B Workers are considered to be the lowest Incorrect – Communism establishes a classless society. social class. C Property ownership is determined by Incorrect – Communism ends privately owned property. family status. D Wealth is distributed according to social Incorrect – Communism establishes a classless society. class. SS.7.C.3.1 Moderate Level of Complexity Sample Item Explanation Question What do an absoute monarchy and an autocracy have in common? Compare and contrast two forms of government. The correct answer should identify a characteristic shared by both an absolute monarchy and an autocracy. A a single ruler Correct – Both autocracies and absolute monarchies are forms of government where a single ruler possesses all governmental power. B a written constitution Incorrect – An absolute monarch’s power is not limited by a written constitution; a limited or constitutional monarchy would limit a monarch with a written constitution. C a national court system Incorrect – Neither form of government requires a national court system. D a single legislative house Incorrect – Neither form of government requires a single legislative house. SS.7.C.3.1 High Level of Complexity Sample Item Explanation Question The image below includes a statement influenced by an Analyze the image and text.