Solon and Thespis
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Kezar 000.FM 8/29/06 11:02 AM Page iii SOLON AND THESPIS Law and Theater in the English Renaissance edited by DENNIS KEZAR university of notre dame press notre dame, indiana © 2007 University of Notre Dame Press Kezar 000.FM 8/29/06 11:02 AM Page iv Copyright © 2007 by University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana 46556 www.undpress.nd.edu All Rights Reserved Manufactured in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Solon and Thespis : law and theater in the English Renaissance / edited by Dennis Kezar. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn-13: 978-0-268-03313-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) isbn-10: 0-268-03313-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. English drama—Early modern and Elizabethan, 1500–1600—History and criticism. 2. English drama—17th century—History and criticism. 3. Law and literature—England— History—16th century. 4. Law and literature—England—History—17th century. 5. Law in literature. I. Kezar, Dennis, 1968– . pr658.l38s66 2006 822'.309—dc22 2006023896 ∞The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. © 2007 University of Notre Dame Press Kezar 00.Intro 8/29/06 10:56 AM Page 1 Introduction Dennis Kezar In the archetypal confrontation from which our volume takes its title, the Athe- nian lawmaker blames the first man of the theater for a professional deceit that threatens to pervade society: Thespis, at this time, beginning to act tragedies, and the thing, because it was new, taking very much with the multitude, though it was not yet made a mat- ter of competition, Solon, being by nature fond of hearing and learning some- thing new, and now, in his old age, living idly, and enjoying himself, indeed, with music and with wine, went to see Thespis himself, as the ancient custom was, act; and after the play was done, he addressed him, and asked him if he was not ashamed to tell so many lies before such a number of people; and Thespis replying that it was no harm to say or do so in a play, Solon vehe- mently struck his staff against the ground: “Ay,” said he, “if we honor and commend such play as this, we shall find it some day in our business.”1 By responding anxiously to the hypocrisy of acting, Solon gives voice to what Jonas Barish has termed the “antitheatrical prejudice.” Central to this prejudice is the belief that theater confuses pointless play with purposeful business, just as an “ontologically subversive” stage debases privileged truth.2 Allegorically, Solon’s 1 © 2007 University of Notre Dame Press Kezar 00.Intro 8/29/06 10:56 AM Page 2 Dennis Kezar 2 criticism of Thespis directs us to a fundamental motivation of this volume: ex- changes between theater and law frequently take shape as an institutional antago- nism over the tenuous distinction between theater’s inconsequential fiction and the real world’s socially consequential fact. While this antagonism has often had the effect of separating theater and law as objects of study, it can itself be revelatory of their important institutional connections and interdependences. Even as they are each in their own way influenced by such antagonism, the essays collected here investigate the transactions between theater and law that Solon’s hostility seeks to prevent. By focusing on the connections between law and theater, this volume fore- grounds a disciplinary relation just beginning to emerge from Solon’s pronounce- ment. And by focusing on the professional theater of the English Renaissance, this volume engages a historical period when Solon’s distinction between “play” and “our business” had become markedly and importantly untenable, when a cul- ture’s claim that “all the world’s a stage” had stretched metaphor to tautology. Or- ganizing our study is an emphasis both generic and historical that responds to a crucial moment in England’s cultural and legal formation when both theater and law were emerging as increasingly secular and increasingly powerful institutions. If Solon feared the future relevance of drama to the real world of commerce and law, the Renaissance experienced this relevance as reciprocal. Its legal processes were subject to dramatic representation and appropriation. Its commercial theater was not simply subversive of the law but also subject to the law and often popu- lated by law students and practitioners. Indeed theater and law were not simply relevant to each other in the early modern period; they participated with each other and defined an institutional co-presence. In the following essays, we demonstrate some of the important consequences of this fact by presenting the connections between Renaissance theater and law not simply as thematic but as conceptual and substantive. The “law and literature movement” describes a space in which institutional momentum and interdisciplinary inquiry meet with often intriguing but fre- quently short-lived and theoretically inarticulate results. Few can define this “field” compellingly or lastingly enough to describe what would amount to an ortho- doxy, let alone an intervention.3 The intervention intended by this volume is relatively modest in scope, but that scope is aimed at a moving target. We hope, in a sustained and unified way, to bring Renaissance law and Renaissance theater into the same interpretive realm and to insist upon the neglected scholarly importance of this nexus. But © 2007 University of Notre Dame Press Kezar 00.Intro 8/29/06 10:56 AM Page 3 Introduction 3 there is a double-barreled, much less modest claim subtending this first. We believe that theater and law (not only in the slice of historicity we cut but also transhistori- cally) require the other for themselves to be fully understood; and we believe that in the amorphous movement to which this volume appeals (the movement of “law and literature”) connections between theater and law have constituted a peren- nial blind spot. A case for this grander claim need not be made with contempo- rary bibliography.4 It could begin with Solon versus Thespis, then course through some of the entrenched positions graphed by Professor Barish, then dwell upon the vexed relations between nineteenth-century British law and that period’s drama,5 and conclude with Alan Dershowitz’s contemporary reenactment of Solon’s en- counter with Thespis. Dershowitz vehemently calls for the exclusion of literary (and specifically dra- matic) forms from the courtroom. Confusing generic and literary epistemologies with “real” forensics can only corrupt the latter. He specifically objects to the impor- tation of drama into the legal process—claiming that this “art form” is essentially scripted and prejudicial, failing accurately to imitate the chaos of the real: “[The] critical dichotomy between teleological rules of drama and interpretation, on the one hand, and mostly random rules of real life, on the other, has profoundly impor- tant implications for our legal system. When we import the narrative form of story- telling into our legal system, we confuse fiction with fact and endanger the truth- finding function of the adjudicative process.”6 Consider the timelessness of this complaint. Like Solon’s desire to exclude “play” from “our business,” Dershowitz’s insistence on a “critical dichotomy” between the form of drama and the “real life” of the law attempts to drive a disciplinary wedge between theater’s corrupting fictions and the law’s endangered fact.7 Dershowitz’s articulation of this dichotomy offers an explicit example of the way Solon’s antitheatrical legacy structures much current thinking about the proper relation between law and literature. The danger Dershowitz identifies lies in a formal or generic contagion that threatens to invade the legal system, converting its human beings into charac- ters. His “real life” is best judged without the lens of genre, his law most effective when kept discrete from the forms of literature. While some recent studies of law and literature—including several of the essays in this volume—admit and even celebrate genre’s function in the judicial process, law and literature have gener- ally been conceived as divided by the fact that one is more generic than the other. For law and literature figures such as Martha Nussbaum, to give just one example, Dershowitz’s dichotomy is simply reversed, with literature’s humanism offering an important corrective to the law’s formalism. © 2007 University of Notre Dame Press Kezar 00.Intro 8/29/06 10:56 AM Page 4 Dennis Kezar 4 Genre, in other words, is itself a contagion in the law and literature move- ment. As I wrote this introduction, I had several readers’ reports in front of me, one of which claims that the majority of the essays that follow treat Renaissance theater as “superfluous” to their interest in law, and one of which claims that these same essays are strong readings of Renaissance plays that regrettably treat law and legal history in a “subordinate” and sometimes “tangential” manner. We believe that an important value of this volume lies in its diversity, but it would be wrong for us to present that diversity as a challenge to current disciplinary divisions with- out also admitting its status as a symptom of such divisions.8 It would also be wrong for us to overstate our case. In today’s law schools and English departments there is, of course, a vital and diverse interest in law and litera- ture that attests to a general blurring of the boundaries that Solon and Dershowitz seek to preserve.9 Moreover, both literary critics and legal historians have begun to consider theater more specifically in the law and literature field.