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Global-Recessions.Pdf Policy Research Working Paper 9172 Global Recessions M. Ayhan Kose Naotaka Sugawara Marco E. Terrones Prospects Group March 2020 Policy Research Working Paper 9172 Abstract The world economy has experienced four global recessions crisis, was by far the deepest and most synchronized of over the past seven decades: in 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009. the four recessions. As the epicenter of the crisis, advanced During each of these episodes, annual real per capita global economies felt the brunt of the recession. The subsequent gross domestic product contracted, and this contraction expansion has been the weakest in the post-war period in was accompanied by weakening of other key indicators of advanced economies, as many of them have struggled to global economic activity. The global recessions were highly overcome the legacies of the crisis. In contrast, most emerg- synchronized internationally, with severe economic and ing market and developing economies weathered the 2009 financial disruptions in many countries around the world. global recession relatively well and delivered a stronger The 2009 global recession, set off by the global financial recovery than after previous global recessions. This paper is a product of the Prospects Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at [email protected], [email protected]. The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. Produced by the Research Support Team Global Recessions M. Ayhan Kose, Naotaka Sugawara and Marco E. Terrones∗ Keywords: Global economy; global expansion; global recession; global recovery; synchronization of cycles; financial markets; real activity JEL Codes: E32; F44; N10; O47 ∗ Kose (Prospects Group, World Bank; Brookings Institution; CEPR; CAMA; [email protected]); Sugawara (Prospects Group, World Bank; [email protected]); Terrones (Department of Economics and Finance, Universidad del Pacifico). We would like to thank Carlos Arteta, Kevin Clinton, Graham Hacche, Patrick Kirby, Franziska Ohnsorge, Christopher Towe, and Dana Vorisek for valuable comments. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent, as well as other institutions the authors belong. 1. Introduction “Global recession” has been a recurrent topic of debate over the past decade, reflecting the breadth and severity of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, the halting nature of the recovery, and recently, fears that the global economy was on the edge of another downturn. In 2009, the interest was understandably focused on the severity of the global recession and its devastating consequences. Attention shifted to the signs of a flourishing global recovery in 2010-11, but hopes that this would be sustained were soon curtailed by the possibility of another global recession due to the euro area debt crisis. Financial pressures in the euro area eased in late 2012, but in 2015-16 fears of a global recession reemerged partly because of financial market turbulence in China. Since mid-2018, concerns about a global recession have returned as the world economy experienced a synchronized slowdown largely driven by extraordinary weakness in trade and manufacturing amid elevated trade tensions and heightened policy uncertainties (Figure 1). Despite the interest in global recessions, the term does not have a widely accepted definition. It is difficult to map the most practical definition of national recessions—at least two consecutive quarters of decline in national output—to a global context, not only because reliable quarterly data for global output are unavailable without a significant lag, but also because the global economy rarely registers a contraction: 2009 was the only year in the post-war period to register a decline in annual global output. A better understanding of global recessions requires an appreciation of the growing importance of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) and of cross-border trade and financial linkages. First, the increasing role of EMDEs means that it is no longer sufficient to monitor cyclical fluctuations in advanced economies, the United States in particular, to understand the global business cycle. Advanced economies on average accounted for about 80 percent of global output and 75 percent of global growth over the period 1950-1990 (Figure 2). However, by the 2010s, the average share of the advanced economies in world output had declined to around 60 percent and their contribution to world output growth had fallen to about 40 percent (in market exchange rates). As a result, business cycles in advanced economies have become a much less reliable proxy indicator for the global business cycle. This implies that a better understanding of the global business cycle requires going beyond the usual set of advanced economies to a much broader group that also includes EMDEs. Second, cross-border trade and financial linkages have become stronger over the past seven decades. In the 1950s, global trade openness—measured by the sum of exports and imports of goods and services in percent of global GDP—was on average less than 20 percent (Figure 3). By the 2010s, it had increased to more than 55 percent. Global financial openness, defined as the sum of foreign assets and liabilities in percent of GDP, also increased, from around 50 percent in the 1970s to almost 400 percent in the latest decade. These stronger linkages have increased the feedback, in both directions, between business cycles in advanced economies and those in EMDEs. They also ultimately raise the odds of more pronounced, and more synchronous, movements in the global business cycle. 1 Against this background, this paper examines the main features of global recessions and the ensuing recoveries and expansions. Specifically, it addresses three questions. First, what happens during global recessions and recoveries? Second, how do global recessions and recoveries vary across different groups of countries, particularly advanced economies, EMDEs, and low-income countries (LICs)? Third, what happens during global expansions and how does the current global expansion compare with previous ones? The paper builds on an extensive literature on various aspects of global and national business cycles.1 A branch of this research documents the growing importance of global business cycles in explaining national cycles (e.g., Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman 2003, 2008; and Mumtaz, Simonelli, and Surico 2011). A second branch focuses on the roles played by trade and financial linkages in the cross-border transmission of business cycles.2 A third branch studies the turning points of the global business cycle and its phases.3 Our study is closely related to Kose and Terrones (2015; KT going forward), which presented the first detailed account of global recessions. KT mostly focused on global recessions and recoveries using annual data for 163 countries over 1960-2012. They presented a detailed review of the relevant literature, analyzed how financial crises lead to recessions, and examined the interactions between global and national cycles. KT’s work builds on Rogoff, Robinson, and Bayoumi (2002), which briefly examined whether the 2001 worldwide downturn was a global recession. Rogoff, Robinson, and Bayoumi (2002) focused on movements in per capita GDP growth to identify episodes that could be labeled as global recessions. They emphasized the importance of statistical and judgmental approaches to identify the turning points of the global business cycle. This paper extends the literature in four dimensions. First, it covers a longer time span of annual series (1950-2019) and a larger set of economies (180). Second, it is the first study that presents an analysis of the phases of the global business cycle with quarterly output series of 106 countries over the period 1960:1-2019:3. Third, it expands on the set of macroeconomic and financial variables that KT analyzed to present a broader perspective on the evolution of the global business cycle. Specifically, it analyzes the behavior of confidence, uncertainty, and measures of global financial conditions that have recently attracted increasing attention in research and policy circles. Fourth, it presents a detailed analysis of global expansions and puts the current global expansion in context by comparing it with previous such episodes. This study, like KT, employs global real GDP per capita to track movements in the global business cycle. This variable is a primary indicator of global well-being that takes into account variations in population growth rates
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