CONGO: BRINGING PEACE TO NORTH KIVU Africa Report N°133 – 31 October 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 II. THE TRANSITION’S FAILURE................................................................................... 2 A. THE FAILURE OF ARMY INTEGRATION ....................................................................................2 B. THE RISE OF SERUFULI’S RWANDOPHONIE ...............................................................................4 1. Containment and appeasement of the insurgents.............................................................4 2. Revenge killings and mass graves: the limits of Rwandophonie...................................4 C. GENERAL ELECTIONS: THE NANDE STRIKE BACK ...............................................................5 III. MIXAGE: ANOTHER MISSED OPPORTUNITY....................................................... 7 A. A NEW REBELLION? ..............................................................................................................7 1. Nkunda’s politics ........................................................................................................7 2. Post-electoral violence ................................................................................................8 B. THE KIGALI AGREEMENT ON MIXAGE .....................................................................................9 1. Political and structural weaknesses..............................................................................9 2. The collapse..............................................................................................................11 C. A DANGEROUS WAR OF NERVES ..........................................................................................12 D. BACK TO THE BRINK ............................................................................................................13 IV. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL APPROACH ....................... 15 A. THE LIMITATIONS OF A PURELY MILITARY APPROACH ..........................................................15 B. BRINGING PEACE TO NORTH KIVU........................................................................................16 1. De-escalating the crisis and improving security .........................................................16 2. Dealing with root causes of the conflict.....................................................................17 V. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................. 19 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO ................................................................20 B. MAP OF NORTH KIVU .........................................................................................................21 C. NORTH KIVU’S HISTORY OF VIOLENCE...............................................................................22 D. RWANDAN HUTU REBELS (FDLR) IN THE KIVUS................................................................27 E. GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................................................29 F. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................31 G. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA ................................32 H. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.........................................................34 Africa Report N°133 31 October 2007 CONGO: BRINGING PEACE TO NORTH KIVU EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS North Kivu is again a crucible of conflict in Congo. Since Afraid to become the victims of revenge killings and lose fighting resumed between the insurgents of Laurent everything they had illegally acquired during the war, Nkunda and the national army in December 2006, over Goma-based Tutsi leaders accused Nkunda of betrayal and 370,000 civilians have been displaced in the province. threatened to stop supporting him. Kabila’s hardliners Due to the failure of the latest attempt to integrate attacked him over the perceived preferential treatment Nkunda’s troops into the army, the crisis has become given to the Tutsi in the army integration process and much worse since May 2007. UN attempts to impose a used the public outcry over the massive human rights ceasefire and appoint a special envoy to mediate have violations and displacement of civilians caused by the failed. President Joseph Kabila’s 15 October decision to operations against the FDLR to undermine the agreement’s suspend offensive operations and his subsequent call on legitimacy. Mixage collapsed in May 2007, leading to all Congolese armed groups in the region to present new escalation. themselves for disarmament or army integration is welcome but fighting continues, and there is no real So far, the crisis has not jumped the border to draw in dialogue with Nkunda. A comprehensive initiative needs Rwanda. Both Kinshasa and Kigali have shown restraint to be launched urgently to de-escalate the crisis and and chosen to continue with regular consultations. address the root causes of the conflict. However, on the ground, there is combat; the humanitarian situation is appalling; neither side has a good prospect of This new crisis results from failures of the Congo peace military success; and escalation continues to carry the risk process on army integration, economic governance and of destabilisation of the wider region. transitional justice. During the second half of the political transition – which formally ended with the election of To compensate for the national army’s weakness, Kabila President Kabila and a new legislature in 2006 – a policy has been trying to co-opt the UN mission (MONUC) of containment, appeasement, and international emphasis into his operations, a move the UN should continue to on the holding of elections cooled tensions but left their resist lest it be caught in the crossfire between Nkunda causes unaffected. The province remained in effect split and the FDLR. The international community should into two pieces, with Masisi and Rutshuru territories encourage Kabila to suspend his military offensive and caught in a cold war between dissidents from the former launch a comprehensive peace initiative for North Kivu, Rwandan-backed rebel group, the Congolese Rally for aimed first at de-escalating the conflict and improving Democracy (RCD), and the national army (FARDC). the general security environment in the province, then Little progress was made on disarmament and reintegration addressing the core issues related to restoration of state of Mayi Mayi militias or repatriation of the Rwandan Hutu authority such as regulation of the exploitation of natural (FDLR) rebels. The illegal exploitation of natural resources resources, return of refugees and a transitional justice continued unabated as all communities armed, animated by process facilitating community reconciliation. A prolonged deep mutual resentments over land security, mass human deadlock would inevitably result in further displacement rights abuses during the war and control of natural resources. of civilians and increased risk of ethnic cleansing and revenge killing on both sides. The 2006 national and provincial elections liquidated politically the RCD. Strengthened by his election, Kabila Over the past three years, ending the North Kivu conflict held discreet talks with Nkunda, facilitated by Rwanda, and has been repeatedly postponed in favour of efforts to concluded an agreement for the progressive integration of consolidate the transition and secure Kabila’s election. But Nkunda’s troops into the regular armed forces, a process North Kivu has been the epicentre of Congo’s violence locally known as mixage, with the understanding that they since the conflict began more than fifteen years ago. Now would not have to leave the province until the general is the time to address this major gap in the Congolese security situation improved significantly. But neither transition and end a crisis which is producing immense Nkunda nor Kabila was able to contain their hardliners suffering and continues to carry wider risks for Congo opposed to the settlement. and its neighbours. Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu Crisis Group Africa Report N°133, 31 October 2007 Page ii RECOMMENDATIONS and refugees, improve inter-communal relations and prevent renewed disputes. To the Government of the Democratic Republic of 8. Negotiate and implement with the UN High the Congo: Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Rwanda a tripartite agreement for repatriation of Congolese De-escalating the crisis and improving security refugees from Rwanda, including a nationality verification process and issuance of voter cards to 1. Suspend offensive action against Nkunda’s troops, eligible persons before planned local elections. adopt a containment strategy and appoint a respected senior military officer to lead a special 9. Encourage the provincial authorities, concerned task force (made up of officers from the Military communities and refugee associations to carry out Integration Structure (SMI) and National with UNHCR sensitisation campaigns in order Disarmament Program (PNDDR), as well as to reduce inter-communal tensions and prepare MONUC military observers) to discuss with the peaceful resettlement of refugees