Chapter III Western Ethical Theories Though the topic of my thesis falls in the purview of ethics in the context of the Indian philosophical tradition, I venture to present my work using the established western methodology and categories where ethics is one of the branches of Philosophy. Although in the Indian tradition there have been normative discussions of human conduct, behavior and actions, I intend to place the ethical thinking of Ayurveda using the western categories and context. Hence it is necessary to prepare foundations to investigate, evaluate and examine the ethicality of the Indian tradition in the context of Ayurveda. Thus I want to sketch the prevalent and dominant ethical theories of the western tradition for the purpose of tracing, locating, identifying and evaluating the ethical concerns and foundations of Ayurveda.
3.1 About Ethics In the world that we live, we need to make decisions of several kinds, every now and then. The decisions may range between being life changing to trivial ones. These decisions can be with regards to making choices between alternatives available to us in a given situation or choosing between conflicting alternatives. We have to consider our own interests when taking decisions and sometimes interests of other individuals as well as society at large, and they may conflict, making the decision making process more difficult. It is not sufficient to merely arrive at decisions, but to act accordingly, and in order to act upon them, it is necessary to know if they are right or wrong, correct or incorrect, good or bad; especially if they are decisions involving moral considerations. We apply different rational procedures to determine right decisions, right conduct and right practice in particular situations. These rational procedures together constitute the science of Ethics.
96 3.1.1. Nature, definitions, scope and content of Ethics Prof. William Lillie gives a 'provisional' definition of ethics as "the normative science of the conduct of human beings living in societies - a science which judges this conduct to be right or wrong, to be good or bad or in some similar way."^^ Society is an alliance of people organized under a system of rules, regulations and norms; these rules aim at the good of its members as well as a harmonically fiinctioning society. The science of ethics, according to this definition is important mainly in the context of human beings in relation to the society which they live in. One of the most important words in this definition is 'science'. A science is a systematic body of knowledge about a particular set of events and objects and their relation to one another. Ethics is such a systematic science and differs from commonsense haphazard opinions about its subject matter. The word "ethics" is derived from the Greek "ethos" meaning custom or habit. Similarly, "Moral Philosophy" is derived from the Latin "mores" meaning customs or habits. Thus, it can be said that ethics deals with individuals' habits and customs or in other words, their characters, the principles on which they habitually act, and considers what it is that constitutes the rightness and wrongness of these principles, the good or evil of these habits. "^^
Though we have defined Ethics as a science of human conduct, it is not a science in the same sense as other natural sciences are called science. There are certain characteristics of Ethics which gives it a peculiar nature of its own and differentiates it from other sciences. Mentioned below are some such distinctive characteristics of ethics; (i) Ethics as a normative science Sciences can be classified in different ways depending on their subject matter and methodology. One of the classifications of sciences is into descriptive or positive and prescriptive or normative sciences. Descriptive or positive sciences are those which simply describe the facts and events which fall under the scope of
'' Lillie William, An introduction to Ethics, Allied Publishers Private ltd., New Delhi, 2013 Chapter 1, p.l ""' Mackenzie John, Manual of Ethics, 4''' edition, Hinds, Hayden & Eledrge, New York, 1901, p.l
97 their subject matter. Descriptive sciences do not involve judgments regarding the facts. They merely state and describe facts as well as relations between facts and between events. Ethics is a science which engages in both descriptions of facts, i.e. facts relating to human conduct; as well as is engaged in evaluation of the facts and relations between facts, objects and events. It also prescribes certain rules of conduct and also provides norms which are guiding principles in the realm of conduct for human beings. In case of ethics, the normative aspect is more important than the descriptive aspect, however the latter is not entirely absent and hence cannot be ignored. There are ethical facts as well as ethical laws and ideals. The science of ethics is concerned with the rightness or goodness of human conduct and hence it is also concerned with the relation of human conduct with attaining a particular end and deals with the rules with the help of which these ends can be attained.
(ii) Ethics as a Practical as well as Theoretical Science Ethics has sometimes been distinguished from the natural sciences on the ground that it is practical and they are theoretical. Such a distinction however can't be maintained seriously and meaningftiUy. It is true that Ethics is more closely connected with the practical aspect of human life than other sciences like astronomy or physiology. However, the theoretical aspect of it cannot be overlooked. It is this theoretical aspect that provides ethics with a basis for being able to put it into practice. Though as a normative science, ethics is prescriptive in nature, it does not imply that it is directly grounded in practice and has the least theoretical relevance. The prescriptive or normative aspect of Ethics is firmly based on its theoretical foundation and hence Ethics can be said to be as theoretical as any of the other natural sciences. Thus, though a normative Science, Ethics cannot be regarded as a merely practical Science.
(iii) Ethics deals with human conduct We have defined Ethics as the normative science of conduct and conduct includes voluntary actions. Conduct does not include those human activities like the circulation of the blood, because normal people do not have a control over it. 98 A voluntary action is that action which one could have done differently if one would have so chosen. Voluntary actions involve a conscious process of willing. Conduct may include inward activities like motives and desires as well as outward activities like speech and action. '*" Moreover, Ethics is usually confined to the study of the conduct of human beings living in societies.
3.1.2. Branches of Ethics Meta-ethics The term "Meta" means beyond and as such the term meta-ethics involves a second order enquiry involving the origin and meaning of ethical concepts. Meta-ethics is a branch of analytic philosophy that explores the status, foundations, and scope of moral values, properties, and words. The issues that fall within the scope of meta-ethics are abstract essentially because meta-ethics deals not with the specific situations of moral relevance, but with certain debates about the very nature of morality, its assumptions, foundations and the meanings of ethical concepts like good, right, etc. Discussions about whether there can be an absolute, universal ethics or whether ethics is a subjective, individual matter of enquiry are typical examples of discussions in meta-ethics. Normative Ethics The task of normative ethics, on the other hand, is a practical one. It, strives to arrive at moral standards which help in regulating human conduct. In other words, normative ethics is interested in determining the content of our moral behavior. It provides alternative answers to the question "What I ought to do". The task of normative ethics also involves articulating the kind of good that we ought to pursue, the duties that we ought to do, etc. The moral theories of Kant and Mill are examples of such normative theories. Such theories provide guidelines for making decisions and determining the course of action. Applied Ethics Applied Ethics involves examining specific ethical issues like euthanasia, abortion, capital punishment, environmental concerns etc. which come up in the
""Lilie,2013,p5
99 practice of specific course of actions. Though the enquiry of Applied Ethics falls under the category of a philosophical enquiry, it is not solely a part of philosophy. We can enlist several disciplines for which such kind of enquiry may be done from an ethical perspective. Applied ethics is a source of resolution of disputes in a variety of fields ranging from Genetic Engineering, Medical Sciences, various professions like Teaching, Business, issues relating to Prostitution, Homosexuality, and so on.
3.1.3. Fundamental Concepts of Ethics Several terms are commonly used in judging human actions in the context of Ethics. We say that an action is good or bad, right or wrong, moral or immoral; we say that we 'ought' to perform an action, that we 'should' perform it, or that it is our duty to perform it. Similarly, for certain actions we say we 'ought not' perform it, 'should not' perform it, or it is our 'duty' to not perform it. It is important to understand the exact meaning and sense in which these words are used in any ethical judgment. Good / Bad This is the most commonly used pair of terms in the ethical context, and probably the duo used most ambiguously, too. Their use and scope is extremely indefinite and confiasing in common conversafions too, which need not be elaborated here. The word 'good', as commonly used, reflects the favorable atdtude of a person towards an object or event in the context of which the term is used. However, the ambiguity is not hidden in the ethical context, too. For example, when we say "It is good to speak the truth" or "It is bad to cause harm to any person", we are talking about good and bad actions in the context of values, but the term 'value' has a close affinity with the concept of good. We also tend to equate a 'good' action with one which produces good or favorable results and a 'bad' action as one which fails to produce such favorable consequences or which are harmfiil actions. We use them as behavioral norms indicating desirability and undesirability. It thus becomes extremely crucial to consider the scope of the word 'good' for giving an ethical theory which gives the criterion of 'goodness'
100 for an ethically right action. The complexity and ambiguity holds true in case of use of the word 'bad' too, it being exactly antithetical to 'good'. 'Ought' and 'Good' are not interchangeable terms. It may be good to do something, for e.g., go fishing on a nice sunny morning; however it does not imply that it is obligatory that one ought to go fishing on a sunny morning. Thus everything good is not obligatory, but something that one 'ought' to do, must be 'good' in at least one sense of the term 'good'. Right / Wrong The words 'right' and 'wrong', on the other hand, refer to conformity- to circumstances, to rules, to certain norms, etc. These words indicate whether the thought, speech or action conformed to the circumstances and a judgment made using these words indicates the fittingness of the action in certain circumstances, rules and norms. E.g. one may have done the 'right' thing by telling the truth in a particular situation, whereas it may be 'wrong' to do so in another situation. The word 'right' sometimes seems to involve a sense of being obligatory or suggests that the person 'ought to' have done particular actions. This 'ought to' suggests in a way that an individual must do a particular action in a given circumstance, come what may. A judgment involving an 'ought to' has a different sense from the one involving 'good'. It may be suggested that what distinguishes an action which we ought to do, from one that is merely right, is that, when we ought to do an action, the action is not only right, but there are motives and inclinations in the kind of the doer which would hinder his doing it. '"^The terms 'ought' and 'right' are not interchangeable either.
3.2. Classification of Ethical theories ^"^ Ethical theories can be classified in several ways, some completely distinct from each other, and some having certain common characteristics. A few ways of classification used very often, have been mentioned below.
'"^Lillie, 2013,p. 7 '°^ Ibid., pp. 98-101
101 Absolute and Relative theories Absolute ethics holds that there is one universal and eternal moral code which applies equally to all men of all ages and that changing circumstances or changing opinions make no difference whatsoever to this absolute moral code. Relative or Relativistic ethics holds that the moral standard varies with different circumstances, so that it may be right for an Arab nomad, but wrong for an English city dweller to have four wives at the same time. It is possible to believe in absolute standards of ethics and yet hold that particular applications of these standards are relative to circumstances. Objective and Subjective Ethics Subjective or subjectivist ethics is that form of relative ethics which holds that the circumstances which cause variability in the moral judgment are always the mental states of a particular person. E.g. The view that all that I mean by calling an action good is that I myself like it. There may be forms of relative that are not subjective, for example, the theory which holds that the rightness or wrongness of Polygamy depends on economic conditions, would be objective, but relative. All absolute standards in ethics are, of course, necessarily objective. Naturalistic and non-naturalistic theories Naturalism analyses ethical concepts in terms of Psychology. A naturahstic theory may be subjective if the analysis is such that the natures of right or good will vary with the attitude of some person. A naturalistic theory is however objective when the standard does not change with the changing attitude of any person, for example the ordinary hedonistic view that the right action is the one which causes more pleasure than any other possible action. If the moral standard is subjective, then there can be no universal moral standards and ethics would become, to a great extent, a part of the descriptive science of psychology. Attitude and Consequence theories In attitude theories, ethical terms are defined by the attitude of some being or the other. In consequence theories ethical terms are defined by reference to the consequences of actions. The theory which defines a right action as one that the agent likes is an attitude theory. Hedonism which defines a right action in terms
102 of its pleasant consequences is a consequence theory. Attitude theories however need not always be subjective or even naturalistic. Deontological and Teleological theories Theories of ethics have been divided by Prof CD Broad into Deontological and Teleological theories.'"'* A deontological theory holds that the rightness and wrongness of an action depends on the action itself and not on the consequences it produces. It is however, not always possible to say just where the action ends and its consequences begin. The simplest form of deontological theory is the theory of intuitionism, the view that we have a direct intuition of the rightness and wrongness of an action. One of the commonest forms deontological theory holds that the rightness of an action depends on its conformity to some kind of law - a law of God, a law of the social group, a law given by our own conscience, a law of nature, a law of logical consistency or even a law of evolutionary development. Teleological theories are identical with consequence theories. In teleology, the end determines what and how to do. In ethics the teleos could be Good or Virtue or Right or Welfare, etc. They hold that the rightness and wrongness of an action depends on its consequences or results. The most common teleological theory has been hedonism which holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends entirely on the pleasantness and unpleasantness which it causes.
3.3. Postulates of Ethics Ethics, as a branch of philosophy, cannot remain isolated from its other branches, especially metaphysics. An ethicist who formulates an ethical theory has certain preconceived ideas about the nature of reality, which form the foundation for his ethical theory. E.g. a person who believes that good actions will lead him to the heaven, must, in the first place believe in the existence of heaven and hell and certain other religious and metaphysical ideas pertaining to it. Also, when an ethical judgment is made with reference to an action, stating an individual 'ought to' do something in a particular situation, it is assumed that the
'"'' Broad, CD, Five Types of Ethical Theory, Kegan Paul, London, 1944, p. 162
103 individual has the freedom to make a choice between two or more alternative actions. Such assumptions are derived out of metaphysics or philosophy in general, and are called the postulates of ethics. These postulates in a way determine the course of an ethical theory. Prof William Lillie states four ways in which ethics and metaphysics are related;"'^ (a) Ethics finds it necessary to assume certain postulates, the validity of which is a question for metaphysics. (b) Metaphysical beliefs affect ethical beliefs whether the nature of goodness actually depends on the nature of the universe or not. (c) The validity of all ethical judgments can be finally determined only by metaphysics. (d) Ethics provides judgments of value as data for metaphysics. The metaphysical postulates with which ethics is concerned are divided by Rashdall into two types;'°^ (a) There are certain postulates which are necessary for the very existence of morality and the discussions on morality in the sense of there being a difference between right and wrong actions. Three postulates can be categorized as those necessary for morality; viz. the existence of individual self which is to a certain extent responsible for its own actions, the reality of time and the existence of evil. (b) There are certain other postulates which are not necessary in the former sense; however their acceptance adds reasonableness and clarity to ethics. The existence of immortality and the existence of God are the postulates which add significance to moral life and give clarity to ethical theories. The most ftindamental postulate of morality is freedom, without which moral judgments would be impossible. Actions of human beings can be judged to be right or wrong, good or bad, moral or immoral only if it is held that human beings have the freedom to choose their actions most of the times at least up to a certain extent. If human beings are in some way not a cause of their own actions, then it would not be possible to judge them to be right or wrong, justified or
'"^Lillie, 2013, p. 293 ""^ Rashdall Hastings, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. II Clarendon Press, Oxford, 190/, _ 189- 246 /C,:'e''^.
104 unjustified. A few materialists deny this freedom to human beings and maintain that all actions are produced entirely by causes which are outside the body of the agent. This view renders morality as absurd and hence of no use. Also, some idealists ascribe all the power of producing action to one absolute principle, most of the times, God. Such views too leave moral actions as well as moral judgment meaningless. If human beings in no way are causes of their actions, the context of morality does not arise at all. An individual who does not have the freedom to choose an action which he does, cannot be held responsible, and thus can be either neither punished nor rewarded of his actions, nor can any judgment be passed in this regard. Hence it becomes necessary to accept the freedom of individuals as an essential postulate of ethics. Rashdall, in his Theory of Good and Evil, pointed out two other postulates which can be regarded as necessary, the first of which is existence of evil.' ^ If there was no evil in the universe, then moral life does not remain, as it usually appears to us, as a struggle, but would become something illusory. If everything moral is to be related to that which is good, everything immoral is always understood as evil. If evil does not exist, or never existed, the concepts of the good and the moral would have lost all their strength and vigor. It is against the contrast of evil that the struggle of the good is intended for. Without operation of evil forces the struggle for morality, perfection and goodness will all seem illusory and absurd. The second necessary postulate of morality thus is existence of evil. The third necessary postulate, and second to be stated by Rashdall is the reality of time. If time is illusory, change can have no reality. Every moral action necessarily implies some change in the outside world, brought about by the action, as well as some change within the individual performing the action. Every individual, through every moral action is taking a step towards moral perfection. If the self is incapable of change, then no effort can lead an individual towards perfection.
""Ibid.
105 The second set of postulates, as stated above is something which enhances the significance of moraUty. One such postulate is immortality. There is another assumption implicit in this postulate, that the nature of an individual is intrinsically good. Human beings, through their actions strive to bring out this natural and intrinsic goodness. It is a long process and attaining perfection might take infinite time. It is not ultimate perfection but relative perfection that we aim for. If death brings about a complete end to an individual's existence, the concern for morality would be difficult to understand. Human beings will come into being and perish, without any possibility to leave a significant effect on the states of affair through their actions. An individual's actions will have very little value. A belief in immortality certainly makes it more reasonable for a moralist to hold that a good character or a perfect personality is a thing of intrinsic value and worth achieving. The next postulate of morality is existence of God. It is believed that a virtuous action is accompanied by an appropriate amount of happiness. However, there seems to be no intrinsic connection between the two. God can be postulated as that intelligent principle which orders events in such a manner that this relation between virtue and happiness is brought about. This postulate of a Being that brings about such a co-relation might give some solace to a believer. For a non- believer, however, the same function can be performed by an impersonal principle or law, like the law of Karma. In the context of such a system, the retributive process of distribution of rewards and punishments in accordance with virtue and vice respectively can be done very effectively. The postulate of God, therefore, is not a necessary one, but does make the explanation of the relation between virtue and happiness more sound and clear. As stated earlier, ethics as a discipline cannot remain isolated and independent of certain fiandamental postulates and principles of philosophy, especially metaphysics. Without the first set of necessary metaphysical postulates, the whole enterprise of morality and ethical judgment would be ftitile and absurd. The second set of postulates which, too, are metaphysical set the grounds for sound ethical theories and arguments and add to the significance of morality in the lives of individuals. This relation that ethics shares with metaphysics
106 strengthens the grounds of ethics and relates necessarily empirical human actions to the transcendental aspect of reality, thus giving it a different dimension.
3.4. Modern relevance, concern and need Ethics as the normative science of human conduct will be relevant until human race continues to exist. Since the ancient times when ethics did not exist as a separate discourse, ethical principles were still pertinent and applied to human affairs, though probably in a very raw form. In the most primitive societies with which we are acquainted today, the good and the bad associated with human conduct were determined by the customs of the group or the particular society concerned. Individual instincts and innate tendencies to discriminate between the right and the wrong too formed the primitive level concerning morality. With the development of human civilization and sophistication of morality, the discipline of ethics is trying to cater to the needs of the emerging trends in the society. The modem world which we live in today is a complex of several different fianctions, roles and relations of human beings with their own selves, with fellow beings and with the universe as a whole. Human transactions with reference to these have become intensely complex and result in conflicting interests and an endless struggle to fiilfiU desires and aspirations. Human life at the same time has now the luxury of having at hand newer technologies to bring in more comfort, more facilities and more means of communication which are making life easy, though more on a superficial level. The modem human mind, however, is far from being at ease. Material well-being has hardly been successful in bringing about satisfaction and solace; it has rather created more craving and confusion and more disturbed minds. This has given rise to unrest, violence, constant stmggle and lack of peace in the lives of individuals as well as societies, nations, religious groups and political ideologies. The relevance of ethics in the modem times has, thus, emerged like never before. The mostly self-centered and individualistic moral agent of today's times is in an almost perpetual state of perplexity. Ethics can provide directives and guidelines for such troubled individual minds by taking into consideration the
107 context of the modem world and its particularly peculiar issues by casting itself accordingly. A strong theoretical basis can be gradually translated in terms of action. The primary concern of ethics in this process, however, can neither be solely the individual nor the society, but the interests of both these parties have to be considered. It is indeed a complex task, however not impossible to complete.
3.5. Applied ethics Applied ethics stands out as a specialized branch of ethics due to its affinity and application to the practical aspect of ethical issues. The endeavor of Philosophy traditionally has been of both, personal morality as well as morality of a group. However, it is through this relatively new branch of ethics that philosophy has been able to touch upon practical issues and controversies. The range of applied ethics includes issues both in the private and public spheres of human life. Issues in the private sphere include, e.g, matters relating to the family, close personal relationships, personal ethical issues arising at the work place, etc; whereas issues arising in the public domain can be related to life and death, population, international relations, discrimination, etc. The concepts of justice, rights, values, utility, etc are implicit in issues of these kinds. These concepts have been primarily dealt by theoretical ethics and thus demarcation between theoretical and applied ethics becomes a complicated undertaking. Sometimes the word 'applied' is regarded as redundant on the grounds that there cannot be an ethics that is not applied. It is argued that neither can concepts like justice and rights be mere abstractions without any practical import and application, nor can applied ethics remain detached from its traditional theoretical morality. It is important to consider this relationship between theoretical ethics and applied ethics however there are certain characteristics which give applied ethics the status of being an independent discipline. These are (a) its greater attention to context and detail and (b) its more holistic approach- its willingness to
108 1 ox link ethical ideals to a conception of human nature and human needs. These characteristics will be discussed in detail in the topic on the nature and scope of applied ethics. 3.5.1. Nature and scope of Applied Ethics After many decades of neglect, applied ethics has flourished in the latter half of the twentieth century and in fact, has probably undergone more growth during this time than has any other area of philosophy in the same period. Philosophical activity in applied ethics however is not a recent trend. Many philosophers since the ancient times have engaged with practical ethical questions in their writings. Many of the ancient Greek philosophers shared Aristotle's view that ethics is pre eminently a practical enterprise and this is clearly reflected in their discussions of the ethics of friendship, death and justice in public life. Medieval philosophers too treated a range of practical issues including marriage and family (Aquinas), toleration (Locke), suicide (Kant), theories of punishment (Bentham), Feminism and Paternalism (Mill) and Education (Dewey). The term applied ethics encompasses a broad range of areas in public and private life. There is the ethics of national and international justice, environmental ethics, ethics of health care, reproduction and genetics, ethics in public policy, business ethics, police ethics, engineering ethics, media ethics and the ethics of the legal profession. 3.5.2. Major branches of Applied Ethics Three areas of enduring interest in applied ethics are: (i) Bio Ethics One of the earliest areas of revival of applied ethics was bioethics. Originally coined as a term describing the ethics of population and the environment, bioethics has come to refer to the study of ethical issues in healthcare, reproduction, biology and genetics. As such, it includes in its scope, medical ethics, nursing ethics and ethical issues raised in the other paramedical and welfare professions such as the psychiatric care and social work.
'"** Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 5 (Ethics) Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge(1998)
109 The etymology of the word comprises of the Greek word bio meaning life. It is thus the study of ethical issues arising out of the practice of biological disciplines. , which include medicine, nursing, other healthcare systems and medical and other biological sciences. The term bioethics refers to a number of moral issues that arise in the context of life-saving and life-enhancing technologies, reproductive technologies and the technology that concerns with genetic engineering. It becomes particularly morally challenging when it comes to using these different kinds of technologies. More broadly and more commonly, bioethics refers to 'medical ethics' and the social, ethical, economic problems in the context of medical ethics. It includes discussion of issues in relation with abortion, suicide, euthanasia, surrogacy, informed consent, doctor-patient relationship, and many more. Since medical ethics has been perhaps the major growth area of applied ethics, this broader usage of the term 'bioethics' has become more dominant in the Anglo-American world.'"^ Even more broadly, bioethics refers to the moral, social and political problems that arise from biology and life sciences generally and that involve human well-being.
Thus, there cannot be one demarcated discipline of bioethics rather there are sets of problems ranging from individual issues to well-being of humanity as a whole. Also, discussions in bioethics draw on knowledge from a range of disciplines outside ethics and philosophy. Underlying these varied topics are some fundamental questions which tend to remain unresolved. These questions include sanctity of human life in the modem medical context of extremely advanced technology for prolonging human life, issues pertaining to justice in health care, questions about the value of privacy and maintenance of confidentiality issues concerning personal identity, etc. (ii) Business and Professional Etliics Business ethics is the application of theories of right and wrong to transactions and activity within and between commercial enterprises and between commercial enterprises and their broader environment. Generally speaking,
Stephen Post (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Third Edition, Macmillan Reference, USA, e- book, 2004
110 business ethics is the study of ethical issues in private enterprise and the conduct of commercial affairs. It includes discussion on issues like the safety of working practices, relations between business and consumers, local committees, national governments, etc, relations between employees, stakeholders, shareholders, etc. The orientation of business ethics differs from those of both bioethics as well as environmental ethics in several respects. To begin with, since business ethics is really a sub-division of professional ethics, it is comparable to such fields as medical ethics and legal ethics. Like those fields, business ethics deals with issues which are somewhat narrower than those addressed in bioethics and environmental ethics which raise fiindamental questions about the moral status of human beings and the value of life as such. Discussions in business ethics do involve applications and examinations of traditional utilitarian, Kantian and Aristotelian ethical theories and to a certain extent also involve an examination of political and economic theories like liberalism, capitalism, socialism, etc. Professional ethics is concerned with the values relating to occupations like medicine, law, the profession of teaching, etc. It also specifies the ideal kinds of relationships between the professional and his 'clients', e.g, between a teacher and a student, a lawyer and his client, etc. It discusses in detail the role of the profession in the society and talks about the values and virtues necessary for a particular profession. (iii) Environmental Ethics; Broadly speaking, environmental ethics deals with questions of rightness and value regarding our relationship with the rest of the natural world. As such, environmental ethicists discuss issues which arise in relation to pollution, the exploitation of natural resources, over population, our attitude towards and treatment of animals and the value of ecosystems themselves. Environmental ethics is the study of ethical relationships between human beings and the natural environment, including the non-human individuals that constitute it. It tries to understand the relationship between human beings and natural environment, and the values pertaining to this relationship. It also tries to provide a framework of principles and rules which give guidelines for interaction of human beings with the natural environment. Environmental ethics may claim
111 that all natural beings, things and system have an intrinsic value and are worthy of moral respect. There can be several such views which look at the environment and its value from either the anthropocentric, biocentric or ecocentric point of view. Environmental ethics also includes the discussion on moral respect for animals and issues on vegetarianism, animal experimentation, land ethics, extinction of species, etc. The movements in environmental ethics portray the broadening of our concern for different life forms corresponding to a gradual deepening in our views of what is valuable. However, there is a debate with reference to how far we must extend our ethical concerns in these directions.
3.5.3. Medical Ethics: An Introduction Medical ethics, though a part of bioethics, has now become a separate discipline in itself due to its vast area of inquiry. This thesis is closely connected to medical ethics and thus the discussion with reference to medical ethics in particular will be focused upon, hiitially the debate of medical ethics began with professional obligations of physicians grounded in fundamental practices like the Hippocratic Oath. Today it has broadened its inquiry to several areas including doctor-patient relationships, informed consent, truth telling, paternalism, confidentiality, etc. Recently, it has also spread its concern beyond individual doctors and nurses to include organizations, medical institutions and healthcare systems too. As mentioned before, medical ethics includes under its scope various problems associated with life saving technologies as well as issues like suicide, abortion and euthanasia.
3.5.3.1. General Issues discussed in Medical Ethics Here is a review of some major problems within the scope of medical ethics: (a) The doctor-patient relationship Traditionally it was the doctor who dominated the typical medical situation. It was the doctor whose opinion and decision was considered the final authority in almost all cases of treatment of any kind. The only mission of the science of medicine as well as the whole system of healthcare was to restore or protect the
112 health of the patient. The ancient doctors, wherever possible did this by taking confiding with the patient, ensuring he has good knowledge of the ailment and also expected co-operation from the patient in return. In certain cases it was not possible to follow the norm of truth telling, and in such situations the doctors concealing the real nature of the disease and the course of treatment, were yet engaged in bringing about the overall health and wellbeing of the patient. Doctors sometimes had to manipulate information so as to persuade the patient to take up a certain treatment which was very much in the interest of the patient himself Though this would not have been the preferred mode of treatment, it wasn't considered to be entirely wrong, unjust for the patient and immoral altogether. This was because in ancient times, it was held that the expertise in the field lies with the doctor alone and it is the doctor who understands the complexities of the situation and the doctor is the best judge for taking any decision related to the course of treatment. It was assumed that any such decision would be in the best interest of the patient and should not be questioned. This was the system which was essentially Paternalistic as far as the role of the doctor was concerned.
Changes took place in this system gradually, and these changes were pertaining to the social attitude in general against the supremacy and domination of the doctors in the whole process of treating the patient. There was a rising demand for a doctor-patient relationship based on the patients' own rights and wishes which were hardly regarded significant until then. Doctor-patient relationship based on this new perspective required the doctor to be truthful about the patient's condition, to disclose a full range of alternatives available to the patient in the form of investigations or in the form of other alternative therapies, giving the patient a complete understanding of the pros and cons of the treatment he has chosen and thus attaining his informed consent. With these changes, other parties having interests in the field of medicine also started having influence on doctor patient relationship. These included hospitals, nursing staff, hospital management, trustees, etc. These institutions also laid down certain rules and regulations for doctors, in order to ensure their professional and ethical conduct. However, it has been seen even today that there are quite a few unprofessional practices that are being followed, e.g., fee-splitting, self referral, kickbacks, etc.
113 In spite of the fact that the primary goal of both the physician and the patient should be the restoration of the patient's optimal heaUh status, any differences between the interests, other goals, values and expectations of the patient as compared to those of the physician, set the stage for paternalistic practices on the part of the physician, at the expense of the patients' autonomy. In such situations, there appears conflict of values, of expectations and interests between the physician and the patient. Problems concerning doctor-patient relationship require a deep understanding of the particular situation on one hand, as well as recognition of and respecting the rights and duties of both, the doctor and the patient. (b) Informed Consent Informed consent can be defined as an ethical and legal doctrine based on the assumption that all interventions (diagnostic, therapeutic, preventive or related to scientific studies) in the medical field should only be performed after a patient or a research participant has been informed about the purpose, nature, consequences, and risks of the intervention and has freely consented to it. The right to withdraw consent is also an important component of the doctrine. The doctrine of Informed Consent is based on the principle of autonomy and self-determination. It gives importance to individual choices and preferences and grants freedom to an individual who is also a rational moral agent to act on his own decisions. From the legal point of view, it can be said to be based on protection of privacy and bodily integrity. In case the doctor informs the patient about an intervention but fails to inform the patient about important risks related to the intervention, the doctor would not be held liable for the violation of the patient's right to Informed Consent. In such cases it would be termed rather as medical negligence, as the physician has not displayed reasonable care by not disclosing the possible risks associated with medical intervention. There seem to be two trends with regards to the real meaning and import of informed consent. The basic minimal purpose of the doctrine is to protect the person from external interferences with his or her choices and decision making. However, there is an alternative ideal of respecting the self-determination and autonomy of the individual that goes way beyond this minimalistic standard, and
114 seems to be predominant in contemporary bioethics. It also facilitates the process of decision making by promoting patients' interests and values. The most important challenge lies in maintaining the balance between the legal and ethical aspects of the doctrine of Informed Consent. Integrating these two discourses within the conceptual framework of Informed Consent will prove to be a useful tool in bringing about this balance.
(c)Principles of Bio-Medical Etiiics The four Principles of biomedical ethics- respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice have been propounded by Dr. James Childress and Thomas Beauchamp in their book Principles if Biomedical Ethics. There are several principle based approaches to ethics particularly with reference to bioethics. A principal based approach holds that some general moral norms are central in moral reasoning. These norms include principles as well as rules which provide general guidelines with regards to actions that are prohibited, required or permitted in specific circumstances. Beauchamp and Childress "believe that principles provide the most general and comprehensive norms...that guide actions. The difference (between rules and principles) is that rules are more specific in content and more restricted in scope than principles." Their approach is known as principlism or the four-principle approach to biomedical ethics. (i) Respect for Autonomy; Though this principle is mentioned as the foremost in the list, it should not be understood to have priority over the other principles. The principle of respect for autonomy does not override all other moral considerations in the context of biomedical ethics. The respect for autonomy in this context is neither excessively individualistic, nor excessively focused on reason, and also not unduly legaHstic.'" The word 'Autonomy' though first used in the framework of self- governance, has over a period of time been extended to individuals too and is
Beauchamp Tom L. and Childress James F., Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, Newyork, 1994
'" Childress & Beauchamp, 1994, p.57
115 used in different senses including liberty, rights, choice, individual privacy, freedom of will, etc. The concept of autonomy involves a kind of immunity from exercise of authority on one hand and on the other hand also implies personal independence and acknowledgement of the capacity of an individual to make his/her own decisions. An autonomous individual acts freely in accordance with a plan chosen by him. This is similar to the functioning of a government which makes policies, plans to implement them and executes the plan, all by its own choice. A person who is not autonomous, on the contrary, is controlled by others in some respect, or is sometimes incompetent to take his own decisions and execute them and thus is dependent on someone else for decisions related to his life. A prisoner, for example is controlled by other people in the sense of having limited freedom and being imposed upon certain restrictions by persons of authority. On the other hand, a mentally challenged person is incapable of taking certain decisions and thus is of diminished autonomy and dependent on the people around him for several choices and decisions. In the medical context, there is a need for medical decisions to be made. It is important to comprehend whether the patient's decision or choice is an autonomous one. In order for the decision to be autonomous, it is necessary that the patient's choice of a particular course of treatment has not been forced upon him, i.e. the action of taking the decision on the part of the patient is voluntary. Neither the patient nor the decision should be either controlled or imposed upon him by another individual or a group of individuals. Secondly, it is important that the patient's decision is informed. However, for a patient to exercise his autonomy, he should be capable of taking a decision. This decision making capacity or competence is extremely crucial, because in the absence of this capacity the freedom to make the choice as well as being well informed is all in vain. An infant, for example, lacks this competence and thus the question of autonomy in the context of medical decisions in case of infants does not arise. Similarly, a patient in a vegetative state or in coma is incapable of taking medical decisions. In such situations, however, the complexity of the process of decision making increases by a large extent because the moral responsibility of taking the
116 decision in the best interest of the patient lies with those kin who take the decision on the incompetent patients' behalf. Childress and Beauchamp state the principle of autonomy as a combination of both, a negative obligation and a positive obligation as follows; (i) As a negative obligation: Autonomous actions should not be subjected to controlling constraints by others. (ii) As a positive obligation, this principle requires a respectful treatment in disclosing information and fostering autonomous decision making. Several issues arise with reference to the principle of respect of autonomy especially given our diverse cultural beliefs and values that affect the beliefs of both, communities and individuals. It is important that this principle gives specific guidelines to conduct in particular situations as well as gives room for valid exceptions, hi this context, Childress and Beauchamp claim that the respect for autonomy supports a number of more specific rules including the following;" 1. Tell the truth 2. Respect the privacy of others 3. Protect confidential information 4. Obtain consent for interventions with patients 5. When asked, help others make important decisions. To summarize the discussion, for a patient's choice to be autonomous, the decision taken by the patient ought to be a voluntary one, the choice made by the patient must be adequately informed and the patient must have the capacity to take the decision. (ii) Nonmaleficence The principle of nonmaleficence expresses the rule "do not harm". It states the obligation of not inflicting harm on others. In the western tradition of medical ethics, it is the Hippocratic Oath that states the obligation to this principle together with the principle of beneficence. It involves helping and treating the sick to the
"- Childress & Beauchamp, 1996, p. 64
^''ibid
117 best of the knowledge of the physician, but never using the knowledge in a way that would cause any injury or harm to anyone. According to Childress and Beauchamp the principle of nonmaleficence supports a number of specific moral rules including the following; 1. Do not kill. 2. Do not cause pain or suffering. 3. Do not incapacitate. 4. Do not cause offense. 5. Do not deprive others of the good life. There are however many occasions when the physician has to cause some harm to the patient, which results in some good of the patient himself Such an act won't be termed as the violation of the principle of nonmaleficence. E.g. a physician who performs a surgery on a patient, it is inevitable that the physician has to use sharp instruments on the patient, and though it may not be painful for the patient during the surgery under the effect of anesthesia, it may be painful for a few days after the surgery. This harm is lesser in magnitude than the good that is being brought about in performing the surgery for removal of a fatal tumor. Saying that the physician won't perform the surgery because he does not want to harm or hurt the patient would be ridiculous. There are other situations when the harm being caused is justifiable. It is when the harm caused is outweighed by the good brought about. A harmful act will appear to be wrong, however it may not be considered wrong if the harm is justifiable. A harmful act will be considered justifiable when there is a just and lawfiil excuse for the apparent harmful act. This action may either be that of commission or of omission, i.e. of positively giving a drug to treat a patient which may have harmfiil side-effects or the act of omission of not giving to the patient a high dose of a pain-killer to stop its side- effects from worsening the health of the patient. Though in the former case harmfiil side effects of the drug are known, it can yet be given to minimize the extreme pain, at the expense of causing a medical condition like hyper-acidity which can be dealt with easily. In the latter case however, if giving the pain-killer
"'ft/^p. 117
118 will cause complications that will be responsible for deterioration of the patient's health which cannot be restored, it would be advisable to not administer the drug, even though it means that the patient has to go through excruciating pain. Thus, causing harm, either through an act of commission or omission, is justifiable and reasonable in such situations. Thus, whether of commission or omission, the act should be a good act and at least morally neutral in the given context. The only intention of the physician or another agent performing the act should be bringing about a good effect. Though the bad effect can be foreseen, anticipated and dealt with, it should not be intended. It is the proportion between the good effect and the bad effect that determines the justifiability of the act. The function of the principle of nonmaleficence is thus to protect the patient from any intended harm. It also safeguards the interests of the patient as an individual especially because of the vulnerability of the patient in the medical situation. It is in order to ensure that no deliberate harm is caused to the patient and also makes certain that if any harm or injury is inevitable it is only in order to bring about a greater good to secure the patients health. (iii) Beneficence; The principle of beneficence is closely related to that of maleficence. It entails performing the duty towards helping others and protecting their interests. Under the principle of beneficence, one ought to prevent harm and promote good. According to Childress and Beauchamp, the principle of beneficence supports a number of specific rules, including the following; ^'^ 1. Protect and defend the rights of others. 2. Prevent harm from occurring to others. 3. Remove conditions that will cause harm to others. 4. Help persons with disabilities. 5. Rescue persons in danger. The principle of nonmaleficence places prohibitions of the "do not..." kind, whereas the principle of beneficence directs to act affirmatively. Some
^^^ Ibid p. 115
119 philosophers combine nonmaleficence and beneficence into a single principle. If we combine these principles together, the task before us is to disseminate the different obligations embedded in the general principle obtained from combining the two principles. There is an inbuilt difference of approach between the two principles; the obligations not to harm others (nonmaleficence) are fundamentally different and have different implications from the obligation to help others (beneficence). In different situations where both the principles need to be applied, one of the two takes precedence over the other, depending on the circumstances. Childress and Beauchamp distinguish between two kinds of beneficence, specific and general. Specific beneficence is that which refers to our obligations to others with who we are in a special relationship, e.g, our children; for health care professionals, their patients. A physician and every other healthcare professional have the obligation to not merely refrain from harming the patient in accordance with the principle of nonmaleficence, but also to act in their best medical interests. General beneficence, on the other hand extends beyond the scope of the former in the sense that it considers the interests of not merely those with who we are in a special relationship with, but even the rest of the community. This general beneficence is in a way of an ideal kind because it involves acts done out of the possession of a general good will towards others with whom we may not share a special relationship. In such circumstances we are under no direct moral or legal obligation to act affirmatively so as to help others. Childress and Beauchamp argue that even apart from special relationships, a person X owes an obligation of beneficence to person Y if each of the following conditions is true "^
1. Y is at a risk of significant loss of or damage to life or health or some major interest. 2. X's action is needed (singly or in concert with others) to prevent this loss or damage. 3. X's action (singly or in concert with others) has a high probability of preventing it. 4. X's action would not present significant risks, costs or burdens to X.
'"ftWp. 171
120 5. The benefit that Y can be expected to gain outweighs any harms, costs or burdens to X that is Hkely to occur. The principle of beneficence, understood in its specific and general sense as above, is instrumental in bringing about proactive action responsible for preserving and upholding the interest of the patient in the medical context by health care professionals. In conjunction with the principle of nonmaleficence, it only strengthens the grounds for preventing harm as well as protecting interests of not only the patient but also those whose interests are directly dependant on the patients' interests. The principle of beneficence encourages decision makers to ensure that their medical decisions aim to do good to the patient and contributes to his welfare. (iv) Justice The fourth principle, the principle of justice concerns itself with distribution of social benefits and burdens in a just manner. For example, if there are two patients in a hospital, both in a similar situation with reference to the state of health, they ought to be treated in exactly the same manner regardless of their financial or social status. If one of them who is a celebrity and thus gets more care and attention than the other who is a commoner, this would be non-adherence to the principle of justice. Going beyond this instance, in medical ethics, justice involves engaging in resource distribution and entitlement to treatment. According to Childress and Beauchamp, philosophers have proposed each of the following principles as a valid material principle of distributive justice; "' 1. to each person an equal share 2. to each person according to need 3. to each person according to effort 4. to each person according to contribution 5. to each person according to merit 6. to each person according to free market exchanges There are different theories of justice, all of which have one common formal principle of justice that can be ascribed to Aristotle, viz. equals be treated
"^/i/^p. 228
121 equally and the unequal be treated unequally, but in proportion to their relevant inequalities. The material principles mentioned above determine the basis for the relevance of these inequalities. The choice of the material principles however depends on the theory of justice one subscribes to. E.g, if one subscribes to the utilitarian principle of justice, one will choose that material principle which will produce as much overall happiness as possible. The application of the principle of justice, however, is not a matter of straightforward and upfront decision making. Situations in institutions providing medical facilities to people can get extremely complex and requires a meticulous understanding and translation of the principle of justice in practice. In hospitals with limited life saving apparatus, allocation of those resources to patients depending on their health conditions is a difficult and overtly pressurizing task. The pressure originates in applying the principles of beneficence as well as nonmaleficence in the given context while applying the principle of justice. If the situation involves a risk to the patients' lives, then there is dual pressure from both, the relatives of the patient as well as the management of the institutions. In most of the situations, since the circumstances are very uniquely contextual as well as due to absence of policies of the institution, taking a decision which will be at the same time in the best interest of all the parties involved as well as in accordance with the principle of justice becomes quite a strenuous task. This situation however does not arise due to the inefficacy of the principle of justice as such, but is a part of the difficulties one comes across when translating formal principles into practice which is the prominent characteristic of the domain of applied ethics in general.
3.6. Choice of Ethical theories for the current study The present thesis focuses on the ethical considerations in Ayurveda and intends to formulate a possible ethical theory of Ayurveda, with a special reference to Caraka Samhitd. The concept of ethical theory is peculiar to western philosophy and has not appeared in a similar form in the Indian context at all. It is difficult in the Indian context to formulate a moral theory because the concepts
122 used by Indian Philosophical systems are largely not used uniformly. Also, in the traditional Indian milieu one cannot make a clear distinction between the social and the moral. There seems to be an overlap between moral behavior and social behavior, thus making it difficult for ethics to split the two for the purpose of understanding them individually."** Indian Philosophy, though extremely rich in giving directives on morality and each Philosophical system having had an ethical perspective of their own, has not performed the exercise of building ethical theories as such. It is only based on the ethical theories of the west that we have been able to vaguely draw the ethical standpoint of a few of the Indian Philosophical systems. In the western context, however, we can see a long tradition of ethical theories which provide with a decision procedure for moral reasoning. In one of the previous sections of this chapter we have already enumerated different ways of classification of ethical theories. Some of the prominent ethical theories will be taken up in this section, particularly those propounded and elaborated by five Philosophers in the western tradition viz; Aristotle, Epicurus, Spinoza, Kant and Mill. One of the primary reasons for having chosen these five philosophers and their ethical theories in particular is their eminence and significance in the discourse of ethical theory. Each of these theories has contributed significantly to the development of ethics and ethical theory, by giving it a new dimension at every attempt. The moral philosophies of these five philosophers represent major trends as well as major stages of development in ethical theory. Also, during this research I have been able to identify these ethical theories as having certain fundamental similarifies with the ethical considerations in Ayurveda. Thus, these five ethical theories of the above menfioned five philosophers are those which are the most relevant in the context of the current enquiry and hence have been particularly chosen over the other theories. The current chapter includes an exposition of these five theories, whereas a critical evaluation of these theories as
"** For a detailed analysis, see A Modern Introduction to Indian Ethics by Prof. S.S.Barlingay, Penman Publishers, Delhi, 1998, p. 113
123 t :> well as a detailed analysis of the ethical considerations of Ayurveda in the light of these five ethical theories will be carried out in chapter five.
3.6.1 Aristotle Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics is a philosophical enquiry into the nature of good life for human beings. His virtue ethics can be categorized as a teleological ethical theory in the fact that it regards good as fundamental and defines right actions in terms of it. However, different teleological theories have varied positions with reference to the very understanding of 'good'. Some views involve an emphasis on conduct and character and its relation with the 'good' and the 'right'. Aristotelians, e.g., hold that character traits are fundamental and that right actions are those that result from a good character. "^ It is important to begin with certain fundamental concepts that Aristotle uses in order to introduce his theory of virtue ethics. Aristotle begins his work by stating that every activity of human beings, whether it is relating to art and craft or any other action, seems to aim at some good. He also defines 'good' as that at which everything aims. What then does the term 'good' actually mean? There are numerous ways in which we use the word good. To call something good is to say that it is under certain conditions sought or aimed at. There are numerous activities, numerous aims and hence numerous goods. When any activity of an individual aims at something and the individual calls it good, it means that it is something which is generally sought by people doing a similar activity. The concept of good is essentially related to the object of desire in that people would usually desire that which is generally accepted as good. However, if something is desired because it is good, a question which logically follows, is that is it good for the sake of something, or is it good in itself? E.g, a fresh graduate who desires to get a good job, desires the job not merely because it is 'good' or because generally people of his age and qualifications too would aim for such a job; but because the goodness of the job
"' Luper Steven & Brown Curtis (Eds), The Moral Life, Second Edition, Wadsworth Group/Thomson Learning, Belmont, USA, 1999,p.6
124 lies probably in the fact that it will help him earn a living, which in turn will help him lead a better life or satisfy certain other needs. "If then," says Aristotle, "there is some one goal among those which we pursue in our actions, which we desire for its own sake, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else- in that case, we should proceed to choose ad infinitum, so that all desire would be empty and fiitile- it is plain that this would be the good and the best of goods." '^'^ Thus for Aristotle, there is a possibility that there exists a supreme good, because if there isn't any, we would pursue one good for the sake of other, ad infinitum. This supreme good, for Aristotle is eudaemonia, translated has happiness or flourishing. There exist several types of 'good' to which human actions aim, which in their turn aim at some other good. That is, something that is sought for is so because it is good for something else, as seen in the example above. But eudaemonia is that good which is not sought for anything else, but is good in itself In this sense it is the supreme good. Aristotle's search for good is a search for the highest kind of good, and he assumes that this good, whatever it turns out to be, has three characteristics: it is desirable for itself, it is not desirable for the sake of some other good, and all other goods are desirable for its sake. '"' In general people aim for happiness in life and Aristotle, too, accepts this. However, everyone's understanding of happiness might be different. For one individual wealth might constitute happiness, whereas for another it might be health. Moreover, the same individual may have a different estimation of what happiness is, at different times. When he does not have enough wealth to fulfill his basic needs, he might identify happiness with wealth. When he is ill, he might relate happiness with health, and so on. So can being morally virtuous be the end of human life? No, says Aristotle, for moral virtue can go with inactivity and
'"° Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, 1094a '"' Kraut, Richard, "Aristotle's Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
125 misery; and happiness, which is the end of life, that at which all aim, must be an activity and excludes misery. For Aristotle, every object and being in the world has a particular function to perform, and if the function is performed well, then the object or being can be said to be good. E.g. a good knife is the one which carries out the function of cutting well. Similarly, a good painter is one who carries his activity of painting well. What then, is the ergon or the function of human beings in general? Human beings share several activities with the other living beings in the world, like growth, reproduction, sensation, etc. hence none of these can be identified as the unique ftinction of human beings. One peculiar faculty and activity that differentiates human beings from all other living beings, according to Aristotle is that of reason or activity in accordance with reason. Thus, as human beings, if we reason well, we live well. If all our activities are in accordance with reason, it would naturally result in leading a happy life and towards happiness as the ultimate good. It is necessary to have virtue or excellence in order to perform any activity well. Therefore, living well consists in activities caused by the rational soul in accordance with virtue or excellence. Ordinarily, when men hold that happiness consists in being virtuous, they indicate the moral virtues like temperance, justice, etc. However, happiness consists in the activity of both moral as well as intellectual virtues. It must be noted that living well is not a state or condition, but a continuous or lifelong activity as a whole. For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one sunny day, similarly, one day or a short time does not make a man blessed and happy. '^'^
It is important to understand the concept of virtue in order to comprehend its significance in Aristotle's ethics. Virtue, for Aristotle does not mean the excellence of the body, but that of the soul. The soul consists of two elements, one irrational and one rational. One part of the irrational element which is responsible for nurture and growth is common to all living beings and vegetation and hence is not exclusively human and is known as the vegetative part of the soul.
'^' Copleston Frederick, A History of Philosophy, Vol. I Greece and Rome, Doubleday, e-edition, '"^ Luper and Brown(Eds) p.21
126 Aristotle defines virtue as a habit of choice, the characteristic of which Ues in the observation of the mean or of moderation (relative to the circumstances of the individual concerned), as it is determined by reason or as the practically prudent man would determine it. '^'^ He further defined choice as the deliberate desire of things in our power after consideration of them by the intellect. Thus, virtue, for Aristotle, is not a mere habit, but a habit of choice. There is an inherent element of freedom at the core of choice that makes it a deliberate act. It is only a voluntary action for which an individual can be held responsible and not an action imposed upon him externally or one which springs out of ignorance. It is important that an action, in order to be called a virtuous one, springs out of a habituation to perform good actions and not by mere chance or as a one off instance. Single good actions, though ensuing from the operation of choice, can be a matter of accident or impulse and do not fall under the category of virtuous acts; it is only habitual choice that can be considered as virtue. Virtue, says Aristotle, is of two kinds, intellectual and moral; philosophical wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom being intellectual and liberality and temperance being moral. Intellectual virtue can be cultivated and developed in human beings through teaching, while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit.
The point in Aristotle's definition above that is discussed the most is that of mean or moderation. Every ethical virtue is regarded as an intermediate position between two extremes, both regarded as vices. E.g. modesty is the mean between bashfulness and shamelessness, courage between cowardice and rashness, etc. One must bear in mind, that this mean depends on the circumstances and the individual placed in those circumstances. The courage that is required to be displayed by a soldier is closer to rashness than that required for a statesman. The soldier has to take major risks, whereas taking such risks frequently won't be recommended for a statesman. The mean then, cannot always be an exact and particular amount of any emotion, feeling or characteristic quality because such
'^'' Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics II, vi, 15 ^-^ Ibid m, mi, 19
127 quantification is practically impossible. The right amount is not some quantity, but that amount which is in accordance and proportion with the gravity of the situation. In his definition of virtue, Aristotle provides us with two ways in which one can identify and arrive at the mean. One of these is 'reason' which can be identified with knowledge and the second one as given by Aristotle is the wisdom of a practically prudent man. On one hand there is the way of learning what is right by enquiring into the philosophical understanding of ethics whereas on the other hand there is the easier way of following the example of those who have learned and demonstrated their goodness in the practical experience of life. This ability of the prudent man is different from the ability of a philosopher in that the prudent man has acquired it through practice. It has already been mentioned that for Aristotle, happiness is an activity that is not desired for the sake of something else, but for its own sake. Similarly, virtuous actions too are those desirable in themselves; to do noble and good deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake. Aristotle discusses the pursuit of happiness in comparison with that of relaxation and amusement. He maintains that relaxation cannot be an end because it is for the sake of the impending activity that relaxation is taken. Amusement is usually pursued at the cost of our bodies and property and Aristotle thinks we are injured rather than being benefited by pleasant amusements. Therefore, neither do relaxation and amusement qualify as ends, nor do they constitute happiness. The happy life is thought to be virtuous; now a virtuous life requires exertion and does not consist in amusement. Happiness is thus something which is always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to something else and is thus final, in an unqualified sense. In order to achieve happiness, people must act moderately; they must act so as to be striving for the mean between two extremes. But Aristotle acknowledges the fact that the mean will vary from person to person, e.g. some can be more courageous and some less, yet each will be proper for the individual. Thus one important consequence of Aristotle's theory can be that there can be devised various correct ways of living for different people and one cannot by the means of
''-'Ibid
128 reason alone, decipher the correct way of living for someone. Aristotle also does not agree with Plato that the knowledge of the good will necessarily lead to virtuous behavior. He maintains a more realistic view and acknowledges the susceptibility of human nature to moral weakness and lack of self-control. Knowledge of what we ought to do is not sufficient without the exercise of self- discipline to ensure that we do what we ought to do. Aristotle thus maintains a more commonsensical and realistic approach towards good life in general.
3.6.2. Epicurus Epicureanism and Stoicism, though divergent schools of the post-Aristotelian period, share many concepts which were central to the Platonic and Aristotelian Ethics. Epicurus suffered all his life from bad health but endured it with great fortitude. Of his writings (which was said to be as much as 300 books), nothing remains except a few letters, some fragments and a statement of principal doctrine. The general thesis of Epicureanism is the principle of egoistic but long term pleasure seeking. There is however a difference between the general thesis and the specific application of it. In the matter of the specific application of the Epicurean principle, there is involved a grave misinterpretation which has resulted in regarding the Epicureans as pursuing relentlessly and indulging in only sensual pleasures. In fact the term 'epicure' now has acquired the meaning of a person who is devoted to refined sensuous enjoyment, especially food and drink. However, the Epicureans believed exactly the opposite. The life of sensual indulgence was condemned by them. Epicurus was convinced that the pleasures that are most easily attained and most intense at a given moment are the very ones that produce the most misery in the end. The philosophy of Epicurus was primarily designed to secure tranquility. Pleasure, he said is the beginning and the end of blessed life. The beginning and the root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach, even wisdom and culture must be referred to this. The pleasures of the mind is the contemplation of the pleasures of the body; its only advantage over bodily pleasures is that we can learn to
129 contemplate pleasure, rather than pain and thus have more control over mental than over physical pleasures. Virtue, unless it means Prudence in the pursuit of pleasure, is an empty name. Epicurus distinguishes between active and passive pleasures, or dynamic and static pleasures. Dynamic pleasures consist in the attainment of the desired end, the previous desire having been accompanied by pain. Static pleasures consist in a state of equilibrium which results from the existence of the kind of state of affairs that would be desired if it were absent. E.g. satisfying hunger, while it is in progress, is a dynamic pleasure, but the state of quiescence which supervenes when hunger is completely satisfied is a static pleasure, Epicurus holds it more prudent to pursue the second, since it is unalloyed and does not depend on the existence of pain as a stimulus to desire. When the body is in a state of equilibrium, there is no pain; we should therefore aim at equilibrium and the quiet pleasures, rather than at more violent joys. Epicurus maintains that a wise man would prefer absence of pain to presence of pleasure. For him, absence of pain is in itself pleasure, indeed in his ultimate analysis, the truest of pleasures. Epicurus advised abstinence from public life. It leads to either misfortune or impossibility of peace of mind. Sexual pleasure, the most dynamic of all pleasures, and hence should not be pursued. People very easily and naturally come to want sexual satisfaction, but ironically, such intense but momentary pleasures seldom give any long-term pleasures. Such pleasures are in a way traps set for us by nature, in which once we are caught, we fail to understand that in giving in to these pleasures we cheat ourselves, hidulgence in these pleasures makes man miserable because the more we experience them the more is our desire to experience them over and over again. In this process our tastes become so over-refined that nothing really satisfies us. For Epicurus sexual intercourse has never done a man good, and he is lucky if it has never harmed him. Marriage and children was considered by him as a distraction from more serious pursuits. The solution is simply to decrease gradually our desires and never to start out on a fateful road which will never lead to a happy destination. What pleasures then, does Epicurus recommend? They are the intellectual and the aesthetic pleasures, precisely because the self-defeating character of most of
130 the pleasures does not apply to these. It takes a lot of effort initially to cultivate the love for knowledge; but once that is accomplished we have an enduring source of satisfaction which nothing, but only death can take away. Once one has trained oneself to enjoy these pleasures the pleasures last; and they are not followed as the others are, by pain and misery. If one reads the philosophy of, e.g. a German philosopher for the first time, it requires mastery over the language and thus might be a tedious task initially. But once one gains mastery over it, it is to stay and will never desert the person as long as it is used. Same is the case with aesthetic pleasures. It requires some time and effort to appreciate and to be able to acquire mastery in the enjoyment of aesthetic pleasures. But once this is attained, these pleasures are there to stay, unaccompanied by any pain and misery. Thus these are what Epicurus terms as 'higher' pleasures as against the 'lower' ones that can be said to be long term miseries in the guise of intense momentary pleasure. Epicurus can be said to be a proponent of psychological hedonism. He believed that all people are motivated in their daily lives to attempt to acquire pleasure. All activities of human beings are directed towards the acquisition of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. An aspect of the hedonism of Epicurus is also Ethical hedonism which states that people not only in fact seek pleasure, but that they ought to do so since pleasure alone is good. Epicurus holds that pleasure is the beginning and the end of the blessed life. We recognize pleasure as the first and natural good starting from pleasure we accept or reject and we return to this as we judge every good thing, trusting this feeling of pleasure as our guide. This statement expresses both the ethical as well as the psychological aspects of Epicurus' approach. Epicurus was a materialist in the sense that he accepted the mechanistic, atomistic hypothesis of Democritus, but he was not a determinist. His rejection of determinism was rooted in his acceptance of free-will. According to him the soul is made up of atoms and soul atoms are distributed throughout the body. At the time of death, the soul is dispersed and its atoms, which survive, are no longer capable of sensation since they are no longer connected with the body. Thus for
131 him, there was no after-life. Death, for him is neither a passage that leads to fliture pleasures, nor to pain. Death is merely an end and so no cause for anguish. We have free will and are within limits, the masters of our fates. If we live prudently, we should probably be able to achieve freedom from pain. For Epicurus, the greatest overall pleasure constitutes a state called Ataraxia - tranquility, serenity and peace of mind. It is the state characterizing contentment, freedom from fears and pain; this contentment comes from the 'higher' pleasures. This contentment, it must be remembered is a passive state of absence of pain, rather than being that of positive joy. Contentment, for Epicurus is the minimal goal to seek. Desires for wealth and honor are futile because they make a man restless when he can be contended. The greatest good of all is Prudence and for Epicurus it is even more precious than philosophy. Philosophy according to him is a practical system designed to secure a happy life requires only common sense, not logic or mathematics or any of the elaborate training described by Plato.
3.6.3. Benedict Spinoza Spinoza, who has usually been counted along with Descartes and Leibnitz, as one of the three major rationalists, is best known as a philosopher for his work, Ethics. The ultimate and explicit aim of his philosophical works was to discover what human perfection consists in, to explain the difficulties which prevent most men from reaching it and to show the way which they must follow if they would overcome these difficulties. '^^ For Spinoza, Man is a finite part of the general order of nature. The very system which 'runs' within man is of an extremely complex kind and has a peculiar unity and balance. The very nature and placement of man is such that he is in constant interaction with other men as well as the nature around him, and as a result of these interactions there are interruptions in the unity and balance within the internal system of man. The natural tendency of the system is to restore the unity and balance constantly. When these interruptions are of a minor impact, he
'^^ CD Broad, 1930, p. 15
132 is either physically ill or psychologically imbalanced, or both. And when there are major interruptions, it can lead to death. This inherent tendency of any finite natural unit to restore balance and unity, Spinoza calls the conatus, and for him the conatus is the essence of that unit. According to Spinoza, man is composed of two very different but extremely co-related aspects; the physical and the psychical. These are the attributes through which man understands the world around him- thought and extension. Considering only the physical aspect, he would be called an organism and considering only the psychical aspect, he would be called the soul. However, both these points of view are abstract and one sided; everything which is a soul, is 1 78 also a body and everything which is a body is also a soul. The two are not distinct entities causally interacting with each other but merely different aspects of the same events. During his interactions with nature and other human beings, whatever changes take place in man are both, physical and psychical, since these two aspects of man are co-related. Every event which is a modification of the physical aspect is also a modification of the psychical aspect. However, this account seems to be an extreme position and hence problematic. What we can minimally agree with Spinoza is that the psychical and physical aspects are, and constantly work in co-relation with each other. Spinoza classifies knowledge into two kinds: First and Second kind of knowledge. The first kind of knowledge consists of mere sense perceptions and imagery and of instincts of the level of animals. Animals have only the first kind of knowledge. Human beings have this first kind of knowledge as well as the capacity for the second kind of knowledge, and most men realize this capacity to some extent. This second kind of knowledge is the rational insight which facilitates drawing conclusions, mapping connections between sense perceptions, impressions of perceptions and ideas related as well as not related to sense perceptions. Human perfection and imperfection are closely related to these two kinds of knowledge for Spinoza and hence it was important to discuss them briefly here.
''*lbid.
133 Spinoza distinguishes between three kinds of primary emotions - pleasure, pain and desire. Pleasure is the consciousness of a transition to a heightened vitality, Pain being consciousness of a transition to a lowered vitality and Desire, the consciousness of the constancy of one's vitality throughout the change in the body. He further differentiates between two kinds of pleasures: 1. The vitality of the body as a whole may be increased, the consciousness of which he calls Hilaritas which we may translate as "Sense of Wellbeing" 2. The vitality of a part may increase, without any increase of the total vitality, or even at the expense of it. The consciousness of this he calls Titillatio which we may translate as "Localized Pleasure". Corresponding to these pleasures, there are two kinds of pain, viz. Melancholia and Dolor. Melancholia is a feeling of thoughtful sadness, whereas Dolor is extremely painftil grief The distinction that Spinoza made between passive and active emotions is particularly important to understand his ethical theory. Passive Emotions are the confused and inadequate ideas of the first kind of knowledge. Panic fears, overmastering loves and hates and jealousies are emotions of this kind. At this level, we may be called slaves of passion, instinct, impulse, popular opinion, convention and superstition. Spinoza calls this state Bondage. Active Emotions are the affective correlates of the rational insight/clear rational knowledge. Essence of the human mind lies in the striving towards understanding, towards clear thinking, and towards connecting its ideas rationally. Active emotions fall under two categories. He calls them Animositas (Rational self-love) and Generositas (Rational Benevolence). The state of predominantly clear knowledge and predominantly active emotion is called "human freedom" How can one pass from the state of bondage to the state of freedom? Every person is always predisposed to passive emotions, due to his finite nature, especially in unfavorable and difficult external circumstances. It is these emotions that in the form of passions are constantly directed towards external objects. We constantly seek those objects which give us pleasure and try to get rid of those which give us pain. But these objects of our passion are beyond our control, they being external to us. Thus the more we allow ourselves to be carried
134 away by our passions for them, the less free we are. Spinoza suggests four different ways in which we can attempt to replace obsessive passive emotions by calm active emotions. 1) Forming clear ideas of our own passive emotions by using the disinterested scientific standpoint of the introspective psychologist. 2) Understanding that emotions towards ideal and impersonal objects are more permanent than emotions towards particular things or persons. 3) Understanding that every event is a result of an infinite network of contemporary cause factors. And when we clearly understand that every event is the inevitable consequence of an endless chain of causes, each of which is of infinite complexity, our emotion ceases to be concentrated on any one event or thing or person, and is spread over all these infinitely numerous conditions. As a resuh, we view the world from the level of rational knowledge and no longer feel an intense and obsessive love or hate of any one thing or person. 4) Deliberately forming certain habits of thought (in moments of calm) and certain associations and dissociations which will persist and check passive emotions when they occur. In this manner we can counteract passions and control them to a certain extent. The path to restraining and moderating the affects is through virtue.'^^ Virtue, for him consists in pursuit of knowledge and understanding of the essence of things. This is the third kind of knowledge for him, beyond the perceptual and instinctual first kind of knowledge, and the rational insight which is of the second kind. With this third kind of knowledge we do not understand things in their spatiotemporal dimensions of this world, but our understanding of them is situated in their relationship to God and His attributes. Ideal life for Spinoza would be a life lived by the "free-man" under the guidance of reason rather than being driven by passions. Spinoza writes, "...since reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it demands that everyone love himself, seek his own advantage, what is really usefiil to him, want what will really lead a man to greater perfection, and
'^^ Nadler, Steven, "Baruch Spinoza", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
135 absolutely, that everyone should strive to preserve his own being as far as he can. This, indeed, is as necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its part." Thus for Spinoza, reason prescribes that we do whatever is good for us and act in accordance with our nature. This constitutes acting virtuously. This, for Spinoza has to be achieved within the framework of the society since we cannot isolate ourselves from the society. Our actions should be conducive to maintaining the stability and harmony of the society. Spinoza goes so far as to say that in a society in which everyone lives by the guidance of reason, there would be no need of political authority to restrict action. It is only insofar as individuals live under the sway of the passions that they come into conflict with one another and are in need of political authority. Spinoza takes his thesis of acting in accordance with reason further by stating that knowledge of God is the highest good for man. Mind continuously strives for the knowledge of the essence of things and God, as an infinite substance is the greatest thing that can be conceived. The greatest virtue of mind, the greatest good of mind is knowledge of God. In this state, the mind attains the highest state of perfection and experiences joy of the highest degree. Such a blessed being will always possess peace of mind. All this can be attained only if in the first place man is successful in escaping the influence of his passions. It is only after refraining from being swayed by passions that he can attain the third kind of knowledge, the knowledge of God, which is the highest good that the mind can attain. Spinoza acknowledges the difficulty in being able to achieve this by saying, "But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare."'^'
3.6.4. Immanuel Kant Kant holds that it is impossible to conceive anj^hing at all in the world or even out of it which can be taken as good without qualification except a good will. He illustrates this by enumerating different 'talents' of mind like intelligence, wit, judgment, and qualities of temperament such as courage and
"° Spinoza, Ethics, Book IV, 18 S '^' Ibid, Book V P 42S
136 resolution. For him, there is no doubt about the desirability of these qualities. However, it cannot be denied that in certain circumstances if these are not accompanied by a good will, the same talents can be extremely bad and can be hurtful. It is the will that makes use of these natural talents, and if this will is not good, they lose the character of desirability. This is also the case with what Kant calls 'the gifts of fortune' like wealth, health, etc which produce happiness and also boldness and sometimes produces too much of boldness unless accompanied by good will. This however does not mean that good will is a mere accompaniment or a component of a good action and hence good. Goodness here does not depend on the presence of the good will, but on the fact that happiness is deserved, i.e. happiness is deserved when it is a consequence of virtue. The intrinsic goodness of a good will can be established on the basis of the fact that even when good will exists quite alone, it is good. He wrote "if with its greatest efforts, (the good will) should achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not to be sure a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power) then, like a jewel, it should still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself"'^^ Kant thus meant that the goodness of the good will does not depend on any conditions, it is unconditionally good. The problem that arises here is, 'What is it that makes good will good?' The sense, in which Kant used the word will, cannot be a mere passing wish which is casual in nature. A mere idle wish is of no moral value. It has to be a definite purposive action, which has strength and is categorical in nature. The goodness of the good will does not depend on the consequences of the action done out of the good will. Consequences will vary with varying circumstances. Referring to the consequences of the actions in the context of good will, will bring in a contingent element which, for Kant would be unacceptable. A similar contingent element will be brought into the process of willing if we also evaluate the action on the basis of the circumstances in which an action is done. It follows from this that the moral law can never give commands about the concrete nature of our actions; for example, to command men to give alms in certain circumstances would bring in
''-Ibid.
137 just those contingent elements which Kant wished to avoid. '^^It is important that we genuinely carry out our intention and also important for our motive to be right. The consequences, then, do not matter for Kant. What does then constitute the rightness of a motive? According to Kant, the characteristic that makes willing right is that it must be done in accordance with a rational principle. Before this rational principle can be understood, it is necessary to understand the distinction between two kinds of voluntary actions. Professor CD. Broad'^'' makes this distinction as Actions on Impulse and Actions on Principle. An impulsive voluntary action is one in which something in the particular circumstance which creates the impulse of doing the action. For example, a teacher decides to help a student who is in distress just because the teacher is fond of the student or because the sight of the student's distress makes the teacher feel uncomfortable. In such a situation, the teacher may not be disposed towards helping another student equally in distress if the teacher does not happen to like the student. The act of reaching out to the first student is done out of an impulse and is not an outcome of rational deliberation on the circumstances. An impulsive voluntary action does have a cause, but it is not done for a reason or on any principle which is not limited to one particular context. On the other hand, if the teacher gives a donation to an institute which takes care of orphans and the teacher is not personally acquainted with any of the children there, then there is a chance that it is not an act done out of impulse. If the teacher has taken the decision of reaching out to help the orphans on the basis of some rational principle which she follows, then it is an action which is done for a reason. The teacher would do the same action regardless of the circumstances, i.e. whether she is acquainted with the children in the orphanage or not. This would then be a voluntary action on principle. An action done on impulse, for e.g, the impulse of pity cannot, in Kant's framework be a reasonable action.
The rational principle behind an action cannot consider tastes, inclinations and circumstances of different individuals, because these together constitute the contingent element of the process of willing. For willing to be right, it has to be
'"LillieWilliam,2013,p. 149 '^''CD. Broad, 1930, p. 117
138 based on a rational principle which is essentially rational in character. E.g, I refuse to lie in a particular circumstance because I believe lies ought not to be told. However, if I argue that 'lies ought not to be told because it is harmful for the general concept of trustworthiness amongst people', then it does not remain a categorical rational principle. I can, in a situation that I feel won't hamper this general trustworthiness, chose to tell a lie and rest assured that an insignificant lie will not do any harm to the concept of general trustworthiness. This rational principle, 'lies ought not to be told' would then be a Hypothetical Imperative because it is not accepted for its own merits, rather for gaining a desired end. What Kant calls a Categorical Imperative, on the other hand, is one that is not accepted for gaining certain desired ends, but for its own merit. If an action were done on a principle which is a categorical imperative, we might say that it was done/or a principle and not merely on a principle. '''^And for Kant, an action is right if, and only if it is done on a principle which is a categorical imperative. It is understandable that for Kant, an action done for a rational principle which is right in one situation be necessarily right in any situation whatsoever; and an action which is right for one individual be necessarily right for any individual in any situation whatsoever. This categorical nature of the rational principle makes it such that it is accepted by all rational beings regardless of their differences, dispositions, likes, dislikes and sensations. A hypothetical imperative cannot have such a character. All rational individual human beings may or may not follow the hypothetical imperative depending on the circumstances and their dispositions. However, if there are any principles of conduct that are accepted and followed by all rational beings, they should be accepted for their own merits and thus be categorical and not hypothetical. Kant formulates the Categorical Imperative in several different ways, the first of which is known as the Principle of Universality. Kant says, "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst, at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This implies that a person should always act as if every action of his were to become a universal law. Thus no person should steal because if he
'''Ibid.
139 were to steal and if everyone were to steal (if stealing should become a general rule), then moral relations based on the possession of private property would become impossible. Similarly with regard to telling lies. One should never lie, since if lying were to become a universal law, all human relations based on trust would be meaningless and impossible. Thus, according to this formulation of the categorical imperative of Kant, if an action which one does can pass the test of being thus universalized, it will qualify as a moral action. Another formulation of the categorical imperative is, "Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end and never as merely a means." This principle of humanity as an end in itself commands that rational beings or persons are ends-in-themselves and cannot rightly be used simply as means. It is an injunction which prohibits us from using any person as merely a means to achieve something. By doing this, we degrade the person to a 'thing' which can be used to serve our purposes. According to Kant, man is not governed from without, but from within. In obeying the sense of duty within himself, man is obeying a law imposed by his own reason and at the same time it is a universal law that binds all the rational beings.
3.6.5. John Stuart Mill Utilitarianism is a prominent teleological approach amongst ethical theories. For a utilitarian, an action would be morally right if and only if it leads to more happiness than any available alternative action. It was Jeremy Bentham who is believed to have conceived for the first time the concept of utilitarianism. From the utilitarian point of view, when we have to decide what needs to be done in a given situation, we first need to determine what our alternatives are, try to contemplate on what the consequences of each of the altemafives would possible be as far as happiness is concerned, and finally compare those consequences to determine which of those alternative actions would lead to most amount of happiness. It is morally right to perform that acfion which has the potentiality to give us maximum happiness, and we ought to do that action.
140 On its face, this view seems to be very commonsensical and appealing. It seems to be natural for us to feel that people ought to do whatever gives them the best kind of happiness. However, there are a few questions which this view logically leads to. The first fundamental question is what does the notion of happiness actually mean? Bentham's utilitarianism was hedonistic. He held that what the utilitarian should maximize is pleasure. However it is not possible to measure pleasure in the way in which a utilitarian would require, especially when we need compare the amounts of pleasure different people are feeling. Pleasure is a feeling that is difficult to measure and calculate. The second question for a utilitarian is whose happiness counts? The answer given by them would be "everyone's". It is very unclear who this 'everyone' is. Mill, who was Bentham's student has tried to re-formulate the theory of utilitarianism and made an effort to overcome some of its flaws. In his book Utilitarianism, Mill states that since the dawn of philosophy the question concerning summum bonum has been the main problem in speculative thought and today, after two thousand years, still remains so. He thinks it is the case with almost every science that what he calls its 'first principles' have always had some sort of confusion and uncertainty. He says that while in science particular truths precede the general theory, the contrary might be expected to be the case with pracUcal art, such as morals or reason. For Mill, questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to proof Whatever can be demonstrated to be good must be shown to be a means to something has to be accepted to be good without proof He gives a comprehensive formula that whatever is good not for the sake of something else, everything else is good as a means to it and the acceptance or rejection of this formula should not depend on blind impulse or arbitrary choice. It should be subject to rational faculty. Mill maintains that the creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. Prof William Lillie summarizes Mill's theory of
141 utilitarianism in five statements.'^^ Stated below are these five statements and a brief explanation of each of them. (i) Pleasure is the only thing that is desirable For Mill there are only two things desirable as ends - pleasure and freedom from pain. Saying that the highest end of life is pleasure might sound mean and totally submissive and a doctrine that should be despised. The pleasure seeking attitude can be criticized as being animal like and that was precisely why philosophers like Epicurus were criticized. For Mill the faculties of human beings are far more developed and higher than those of animals. Once a human being is made aware of such faculties, for him happiness is only a result of the gratification of these faculties. The utilitarian places mental pleasures at a higher level than their physical counterparts. Also, some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. [This will be elaborated upon in point number (v)] (ii) The only proof that a thing is desirable is the fact that people do actually desire it. Mill believes that questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof If anything can be proven to be good, it would only be a means to something else which is accepted to be good, without any proof It cannot be the subject of proof that pleasure is desirable. If we come up with a formula that includes on one hand, things which are good in themselves and on the other hand things that are good only as means to some end, Mill believes the formula may be either accepted or rejected, but cannot be subject to what is commonly understood by proof The same formula can be applied to happiness, thus, that happiness is desirable is not amenable to proof The only fact that can ascertain it is that people do actually desire happiness. Mill, to a certain extent is right in maintaining that people desire happiness and happiness is desired by people not for the sake of some other end. I desire to have a good job in order to earn my living, i.e. having a good job is a means to another end. In turn, I want to earn good money for myself so as to secure happiness for myself and my family. But securing
'^'' Lillie William, An Introduction to Ethics, University Paperbacks, London, 2013, p. 167
142 happiness cannot be a means to any further end, according to Mill and thus being an ultimate end, not acquiescent to any proof. (iii) Each person's own pleasure or happiness (to use Mill's more usual term) is a good to that person, so the general happiness is a good to everybody. One of the indispensible conditions for accepting the utilitarian standard, for Mill is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. The very principle of utilitarianism is the Greatest Happiness principle, which is the ultimate end for every utilitarian. This is attainable only if nobleness of character is cultivated in each individual. No one can deny that nobleness of character is good, not only for that person but for everyone in general. This way, every person would benefit from his own nobleness of character as well as that of the others. He not only believes that a person with a noble character is happy, rather happier than probably those with not a purely noble character; but also considers it beyond doubt that a noble character makes other people happier and the world in general is a gainer by its virtue. The happiness of an individual is good to him, and so is happiness of everyone good to everyone. (iv)Men do desire other objects but they desire them as a means to pleasure. Mill does admit that people, at different times have different desires, and rather they also desire several objects at the same time. One may desire to have a good job, a car, all for a comfortable way of life. For some doctor, his dream job would probably be to live in a faraway remote place among local people who are deprived of basic healthcare services and serve them. Out of the two kinds of people mentioned above, the latter may not desire for a 'comfortable' life, yet be happy and gain satisfaction out of his job. The former too, through the comforts of life, desires them only as a means to the pleasure or happiness that he derives out of them. Thus all the desires of an individual are directed towards one ultimate end, happiness and act as a means to attain the end, i.e. happiness. (v) If one of two pleasures is preferred by those who are completely acquainted with both, we are justified in saying that this preferred pleasure is superior in quality to the other.
143 It has been mentioned above that some pleasures are considered to be better or quahtatively superior than others. On several occasions in life we need to make choices between pleasures of different kinds. Mill has arrived at a way in which we can decide which one is qualitatively superior to the other. He mentions quality as well as quantity as two different aspects of pleasures, both equally crucial for the utilitarian. He explains what he means by difference in pleasures in terms of quality. Suppose that there are two pleasures and a choice has to be made between them. Different people who have had an experience both the pleasures prior to that prefer one particular pleasure over the other, the one preferred by all is the more desirable pleasure and superior in quality to the other. In such a situation it may so happen that people choose and give a higher position to one particular pleasure in spite of it being accompanied by some amount of discontent. In this context, it becomes evident that at times the quality of the pleasure outweighs the quantity and also that human beings tend to prefer pleasures of superior quality. This preference for pleasures of superior quality is an outcome of man's noble character. Mill maintains that it is due to infirmity of character that men often choose their nearer good though they know it is less valuable; they pursue sensual indulgence at the cost of injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good.
Conclusion The significance of ethics in human life is not alien to either the Indian Philosophical tradition, or to its Western counterpart. While the ethical theories, since ancient times have given directives about the good of man and the society and attempt to provide a theoretical basis for practical concerns, the branch of Applied Ethics takes a different approach and works on the ground level, dealing with several issues of the practical concern. Over a period of more than two thousand years, an array of several ethical theories has been presented by different philosophers, representing a variety of perspectives towards the ethical life of man.
144