UNCLASSIFIED AD NUMBER AD392381 CLASSIFICATION CHANGES
TO: unclassified
FROM: confidential
LIMITATION CHANGES TO: Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM: No foreign distribution.
AUTHORITY 1980 Group-4 per document markings; OAG, O/A ltr., 29 Apr 1980
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airnlobile), Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U) 00 CYJ SEE DISTRIBUTION
\ '. C\i 'C» . 1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should ~ be reported to ACSFOR. OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days Q. of receipt of covering letter. j' cr: 2. Information contained in this rf~portis provided to insure that the Army reallaes current benefits from l~ssons learned during recent'opera tiona.
3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily avail~ble on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons l ~.. Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the I' :., .• t- . reports is compiled and distributed periodically. ReCipients of the ~ !'I a -.attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it t·, i.nclusion i;J to- oS !in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressea .~·rm provided .. '8 CD at the end of this report • • o.~A' fj JIg BY ORDEIl OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ~1Y: J I ; ! ~ h". ---j. -, j-- I I ~ : ~ .'. . J ~ .JldUaAMA-· ~.:~O ~ ~ . 11 5 II .. allncl KENNETH G. WICKHAM •• • 0 til aa Major General, USA 0 ...... ~ ~ .. ~ u 0 The Adjutant General -I:: .;: g. DISTlUBUTION: o o • CIJ ~ ~ Commanding Generals " : :i : 8. US Continental Army Command ~ ~ .. :: ~ US J.\rmy Combat Developments Command • ~~ CD! Commandants . !f , .• '!l' ~ US Army War College i ~ ... ~ ~ .8 US Army Command and General Staff College I I B;:: 0 i US Army Adjutant General School : • .. i ii US Arf4y Air Defense School o !I! J. Ii I ~: .:: =~l:~~o:~d' Miuile SCh001~-R---eg-"r-~~e' d~-~~l~s;ified w~-~ri--~epa~~t~ , , . ~ us Army Aviation Scbool . U . . . ': ~ f !': US Army Chaplain School from classified Inclosure.' . . .,1 ~ .. e - ,,------".--.--... .~ &j 2 I CONFIDENTIAL.
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.L:.m.~.!.'dI._-__ . -c-___~.=~~ ",···.. ·.,~.o<.·,<:l"':'1r."=::"~·_._~rj_:w~,.~~~~~~~"~,,.::':', ... ,. .,.,.._ ..:_.::,_::::':::::::::::. :;:. c' ==::::==:::::;, ... ::;;::z:c:·:,::,:;;;;"':;:::rr;::-.~;-': US Army Missile and Munitions School . US Army Ordnance School US Army Quartermaster School US Army Security Agency School. US Army Signal School US, Army Southeastern Signal Scheol US Army Special Warfare Schcol US Army Transportation School Copies furnished: Offic~, Chief of Staff, US Army D6puty Chiefs of Staff Chief of Engineers Chief of Research and Development Assistant Chiefs of Staff The Surgeon General The Provost Marshal General Research Analysis Corporation (Library) OSD(SA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces National Aeronautics and Space Administration Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group Commanding Generals US Army Materiel Command US Army Weapons Comnand US STRIKE Command US Army Flight Training Center US Army STRATCOM US Army Southern Connlumd 1st Ca~alry Division (AM) Commanding Officers US Army Limited War Laboratory US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency US Army Aviation Test Activity Hudson Institute . Defense DocUmentation Center USAF Air Ground Operations School Commandant of the Marine Corps (A03HIO) Senior Army Representative, Marine Corps Dev & Educ Gommand Bell Aero Systems Company
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'"' ''''I:, U.l..~UUQ"'''''V'' Q,w l'U~g .... ~ VA •.""".J".J. '""1"""" ~..,-- •• - ...... _. -- \ Lessons Learned •• " •••••• 4 ~ ; ; •• ~ ; ; •••••••••• ~ ; .. ; •• ; p. 14 I * 'l118 Bett;Ue of e.u8:llg 'iI i ••••.•••.•- .•...••.....•.- •.• lTPJ3 A 1 ** SSM OpeNit»ioB8 Aftep l,e't·:L?P.. Ropol"S O:pQPat1m~ -PmSHlNG n ••• .,. fJ rnt •••• , •••••• rrrrrr-ty-r-r. ~ ~. !t';',B 'R "".. 'D• .&..&.3. 4> U • . . . . • • !'C! n ~G ~1I:..Q Q.. aU,6 •••••••••••••• »" ••••••••••••••• J • ' c Ii *** i Task Organizat:.ion •••••••••••••••••• II ••••••• 4 ~ •• ; .; TJ\B D I Weather and Terrain ...... ~ ~ • ; ..... ~ • ~ •••••••••••• ; 'rt.B E I' Enenu Act'ivity ••••••••• ~.~ •••••••••••• ~ ••• ~; ••••• ~ 'T.':"B F. Aarial Surveillance ••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••••••• w.,. ·'Tf.R G· . ,.' Int elligence Support Units. ~ •••• ; •• ~ •••••• ' •••• <> •• TJiB H S\1JIIlV.Ll"1 of G-l Activit.l.es ••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••• '['I,B I Strength Report ••••••••••••••••••••• e~ ••••• ;~ •••• ~ TtB J Casualty Report.•••••••••• ~; •••••••• " ••••••• ; • • • •• 'r /, 'R K Replacement ReVOrt •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Tl'.B L Units in t he 1st l.ir Cay Oiv •••••••••••••••••••••••T tJ3 J·t , **** Key PCl"S.OMel. RCiiit ep •••••••••••••••••• " •.•••••• ~~ Extensions/floonlistJl\ents,/ 'Promotions •••••• ~ ••••••• T/.:a 0 j\\t,'a.rds and Dec:>rat. ions •••••• ; •••• ; •••••••• ~ ••••••• '['f.R P , . Speoial Services Act! vities ••••••• ~ ••' ••••••••• " ••• T ; ..13 Cl Postal Oporati0ns ••••••••••• ~ 00 •• 0 •••• " ••••••••• ~ TI.P. a . J~ ~ •••••••• ., •••••••• ~ .... ~ •• ~ •••••••• ~ ~ • ; ••• ~ ••• ~; T "R ~ Finance Stlrvice ~." ...... ~ ••••••••••••••••• ;.; ~.; '1'.''11 T Medical I.ct~.vities .. 0 •• ~ ~ •• o. ~o. ~ ~ ~.,~"".~;, 0 ••••• TI.B U ReligiO'll.'!I Activities •••. ~., .... '" ~ .00. '" ; 0 ; ~ •• ~.; Tl'l~ V **** ill' 1liait.a.1;.,...... r",..· ...... ~ .... ~~.,,-r.-~· r..-.-r...... , , ~ ••• Tf,B \.<,r_. i '. ln1'omat~,on Activit.i6s ..... ~. ~.;. ~ ~ ...... ~ ~~ ~:. TAB X Courts-Martial/J\rticle 15 • ~ •••• ; • ~ •• ~ • ~ ~; ; • ; •• ; • ~ • T:',n y. Ktlitar.r Police Activities~ ••••• ;;;;;;~~;;~~;;;; •• ·1AB Z G-4 CpeIiltions ••••••• ; ~ ~; ;. ; ~ ~; • ~; ; ; 0 ...... ~ ••• ; ; •• TAB AA Logl.stiCft •• II ••• ' ••••••••• ,.. ; ~ ~ ~ •••••••••• ~ '. ~ • ~ ; ; ;:. Tl'.. B BB. psvcholOtJica.l Op.j~at.. ions •• ; ~ ...... ~ •••••• ; .; TAB· CO Ci vil Af1'a1:t:'s ...... 0 •• 0 •••• I ••••••••• 0 •• ~ ••• '...... TAB .on
* Withdrawn, Hq, DAj pUblished sepa~ately as cAJ~68X050 ',' ~ ~ Withdra.wn, Hq, DA; published sep;~rately ns CAAI{· 63X()Sl *** Withdrawn, Hq, DA; pUblished ~epara~ely as ~AAR'6eX052 **** Withdrawn, Hq, 'DA ., , .
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I ", '-'-""'-'.' .... -...•. -... " ..- .... -.--~-- I DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTER'IAL5; I DECLASSIFIED AFiER 12 YEARS. l CONFIDENTIAL DOD DIR 5200.10
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I r TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Developnent Department of the J'tt-rrry' Wa~h.ingt.onl D.C. ?0310
Section I~ 1. Operations A. General: FolloWing the completion of a ma.,;or deplovment of the 1 ACD from BINH DINH Province ~d $outher:n I Corps Tact:i.ca1 Zone in lf1t.e Jam1a.r,'"T, this reporting period covers the initiation of l1igr;'intensitv combat oper ations in QUANG TRI and TfIUA T"mJ' Provinces. It 'encompasses three highly su.ccessful a~ tacticallv' siro1ificant operatj.ons: (1) The 'r~ ('\ffensjve, which saw th~ 1 ACD preventing the seizure of Qt1J'.NI"! T'flJ and assist.ipp, in t,1~e exPulsion of tho NVA from their' foothold in Hue City (Operation Jeb St,"h:-t :n! (2) Operation PErY":o.;3/LAM SON 207A which. relievecl tlte NV:\ prec5s1lre ori the 26th ~~ar:i ne Re&iment. at, KHE S/J'lH; and (3) the entirelv air-supportp.ct Op<::i~:. ation DEL,\W.I\RE/LAM SON 216, Wllich disrupt,eel NVA act.ivit.ies bv means of a reconnaissance in force in t.he A SHAU Va11ev. In each of t,"ese op~ratj\ons, the applied concepts, tactics, and doctrine of t~e 1 .t,eD were again prO"-,r.;O successful. Corol'm am' search in con.iunction "z;th "Swooppr" operations. initiated and refined or the 'BONG ~ON Plain, were a~aj.n success:f'1u in diS·· rupting the ez:,t"l1l'\V. infra.structure. in' NICTZ:, a.nd· asslst.ed :i n denv:l.!:l~ thA el'le.fIV:1 refuge among the populace. In Opor,~tion PegMus, entire bn.ttolions wor~ ~ii"~ ift,ed over enemr strong .points and assaulted on to crj.tica.1 terrain as-1tri::1e th~ enemy' 5 route of withdr~.wA.l. This bold mOV0 with its corr0spollding use of. firepower had a. profound effect on the enemv's will to starrl and fiBht. 1:1. maI'G" cases he left his fortified dclayinp,; pos).tion, abandoning ll\r~e amounts , of· supplies ani equipment, and fled in small groups to the sni'ety of LAos or to rugged uncontested terraJ.n. At the opposite end of the spectrum of mobility was the ground attack ' . to relieve Hue. Using tact ies more aldn to breaching the SIEGFRIED L:lliE . than to bold, dashing CBval:.'Y' chr£l.ges, elements of the division atta.cked a strong, heavil.y bunkered enenv in weather that oft. times precluded effective air and artillery support.. The l'. SHAtT Valley Operat.ion "Jas e.j.r-mobilitv in its finest hour. A dashing assault into an en~ bastion lon2.denied'to U3 Forces ani a~ainst modern anti-a.ircraft:. defenses enabled tJ.,e 1 ACD, entirel$ suprorted by air, to rorun the vallev at will for oS. period of nlmost .30 days. During these oper~tions,'the 1 Acn demonstrated a considerable ~ib . ility of a. pe.rticulnr mission, tho task orlZaniza,+·ion of the 1 ACT) oxpand.~ Fc~ o-r ~~...... 062331 . CONf.IDENTIAL . l.
r ' .. _ • _____ .." .,- _____ • -Z"''' ...... '''u (l1JO ... .LUJ"U wa5 Oll-l.Cl.UlY DLinated 'tier- .';. at 2400H .31 March 196a.· The finnl results were:· . . (1) Friendly: 291 KIA, 1735' vaA, 24 MIA, 26 !l.C·lost •. (2) EneiT~r: 3268 KIA, 119 Pt-l, 585 D'Ie, lAS CSv.rc, 1.314· MineIHG.~ 76,tr37 SA ammo, 2906 19 cal rds, f!f1 tons rice. .::.. Operation PE'}ASUS/Lfo.M SON' 20711. beQ:an at OOOlH 1 April 1969 am t,~rr.u.l':' ated at OeooH 15 April lQ6~. The final'results were: (1) Friendly: U9 Army:' 41 KIA, 208 WIA, :; MiA;:~: lil KIA, 459 WIA, 0 MIA; ARVN TF: . 33 KIA, 187' WIA. (2) 'Filemv: '1044 KIA, 9
,I.. _---. __ ~~ _____ ~ .• __ ... __ ... - __ ' •• _ ...... , _ 'l_' '"""' ...... , ..... ,,_.... , ... ___ v_ organic units since July 1966. ThroulSh')ut the remainder of n'l'6ra.til'm ,Teb Stuart I, the Brigade conducted operations :in s,.... se i,rea 101, on the coa~tal plain vicinitv r,f "The "tzoeet. ""ithout Joy", and f\.l;'n~ ~l{-tr Ki.r..,~ ,\ven,.\?, le:3.ding from RAI LANr, to the '1-ulf of Tonkin. (!f nr-incipn,l concet'n .,-1:'-\;' t~o security of Wunder Beach (an Iwer-tha-beach logistical f'ac:U1.br), Sl<:v KinO' AVenue and QL-l in sector. Operations I')n the plains wl3ra ch·".rectcrized h~r cordon and search and s,·roo~~r onern.ti('1n:;. in or~or t" Rt+ AMt"'t. t,o tiP.rIV the . enenry rei\l~e in popul<>ted area.s. ~everal comh:inad oporatir,nr:: ,··~th lr.'lco?l~·RiJr-..T forces assisted in init.iating the destru.ctl.on r,f the locnl va i1"'rraRtructure,' Search and clear operat.icms penetrated Bc'1.se Aren 101) p-.nd 15qht. rosistD.r'ce 'Was met.. On:3 April the 'Rrir7S.de conducted two batt111;,~·n nir assaults a.nd . one battalion airlift into an area Southeast of Khl;! S~.nh. On. lk f.l"ril t.he BdEl with two be.ttalions assumed the r&s'POnsibilitv for tho securit.v of Khe Sanh and bn l50SQOH April196~ was released oreON 1 ten and placed OPCON . 3d Marine Division. On.;:: battalion had airlifted to Camp lWllns ·~n 12 April. For the remainder of the reporting period, the Bde remained OPCON to the 3d Marine DivisJon. D. 3r.l Brigade: During the first month ()f t.he report;n~ period" the Brigade participated in the battle of Hue City. 1{nny significant problems were encountered during the battle: pc10r weather, which h:.urrpe:re,d o.irm··)1:d1e operatir,ns and close air support, a sh')rtage of supplies, all c"lupled "'lith the app~rance of n detnmi.noo profesrd0M.l anent'!. Although plagued bv low cellings, poor visibilitv, an::!. fierce l'nelT('! resistance" the Bde drove the determined NVA forces from their well prepared/;fortj fied defensive posit.ions and battled its way to the wa.lls of the former imp(~rial capitol (gee T/J3 C: The B"t.tle of Hue). With the conclusion I)f t>,,~ Bnttle r,f Hue, t,e I311pht..sis of combat· opernti0ns shiftl'ld to the coastal plains N~)rthea , i •. J.S'tiJ.oaJ. ana COI'nDa'ti support., cOUlpJ.exes. wea'tner nurl ng t'rlT.li.Oll" pI"eCl.un.ea high int:.ensity airmobile operations prior to 1200 hours whereas in D'ELAlIT.\R.E, operations were norJ'03.11,y precluded after J.200 hours. . E. 1st Brigade, 101 Abn: During the period 1 tljru IS ~farch, the Brigade conducted combat operations to the Soutljwest of T-Iue along +rj.~).lwal' 547 •. As the 'Rri~cie established fire bases from Fast to l:lest in the vicin itv ot. Hi~way' 547: a~"l"essive operations were coroucterl t'1 nest.ro-Y' enew . forces in sector. Against mC!derate enemv resistance, the Bri FJ'an.e hf:~~an to success'fullv neutralize ~nelll1' forces. Satura+it:m patrollin" and nic9'ht am bushes. were extrEltlelv successful. On 18 March the Briga.rle "'as ret,urned OPCON to thelOlst ADn Divisjon. . F. 2d Bri~a.de, 101 Abn: DurinlS the per~ori 1 FebruaroT .to ]'0 March. the Brigade conducted operations on the coastal ",lain vieiro.t,,. of "T',o ~treet I I Without JOV" and along Sk.v Ko( n~ AveJ"'le. Of princil'le crlncerr' "ras t '-If! seo I i urity of th~ develop'i~ over-the--beach lo~.stical base at Nllndr~r Bef.l.ch, and I the Sky' King Avenuei'o.L-l land LOC. Cordon and search opera.t.ions in oon.iunc tion with the National Police Field Forces ~gain proved sucees-,ful as this' ·1, brigade amployed this 1 !lCD technioue. Continuous' daYlight ~.trols and night ambushes were required along; QL-l to reduce rnininl! incidents. On 2 March the Bri~ade assumed tho respona:i.bilfty for the southern portion o.r the Jeb Stuart I AO and moved fran the vicinity of LZ Jane ll.n~. J{s.i L!l.n~ to the area between Hue and the lm lno. bridge to facilitato return to its pa~'(It division. In the now Brignde AO, operations were directed toward th(~ GS+,- . abllshmerlt ot fire.ba.ses l~nd the cqnduct. ot search and clear operations :in the populated a.reas north of Hue. On 10 March the Bri~lln.e ret'.lrned qrcoN to the 101st Abn Divis ion 0 . G. 1st Ma.rine Regiment: . During t.he period 29 Mi-'.rch to 15 !'~pril, the;.. Regllnent conducted operations in the Pegasus/Lam Son 207A area of oper~ti~~~ under the operational control of the 1· ACD. On 1 April thf! 'l\egiTrl<'!nt ",il:.h two battalions launched an a.ttack along the hi~hp,rollnd to tho 1.rest· from Oa Lu a.long Highway 9. One batta.lion operated j.n an J~O vicinity of LZ ~U~. The·Regimenta.l 'Uission \'$lS to attack in zone dcstrovinlr, or capt,urin~ enG''tlV forces and securing and assisting engineers in the reopening of Hill:hwav.9 in sector. To accomplish the mission t~e Re~iment . conducted ·a ntmber of limited ob.1ective attacks ap'pinst li~ht enemv resis.tance. Operations "lere initially concent.rated alo~ Highway 9; hO\,I ever" as the sit,uation developed the Regimont, cnriducted operations severa.l thousand metorr. to the ~Tort,h and ", . South ot Highway 9 usiIlP.; modifiod. airmobile tec.h.niC{ues •. Onl", minimum sec urity torces were reouired to protect. the roed lind enp,:tneel' \oTori( PPo.rlies· on QL-9. Ch 15 April the Regiment returned OPC0N to the 3d. Haril1e '05vision. H. 26th Marine Regiment: nurin~ the period 31 ~ar~h to 15 I.pril,"~he Reg1m.ent, freed from its static positions in and near Y.he ~anh bv the 1. J~CD, began operations under the o-peratiol'lo:"l.l control of the 1 ACD. As the 1 ACn. advanced toward Khe Sanh by leaps 'and bounds, qnelT!V' activitv around t.he beaeiged combat base ceased. Indirect fire attacks dirnin~.shed am "irtueJ.~· disappef1red and enEllt1 ground troo"s ned from ·the bAttle field. Tnus" the Marines were able to leave their fortified posit:i.ons a.nd attack the hills to ----...... 't...... _J CONFIDENTIAL .) "" --. , .. ~ . ," .. t . r - ~ .. ~: :::;. '::'~=.--- - .-.-. ~:~.'_ .. t==,,~:::.,::li:."::::: ::::.:::::::::===:-::=::::.;;:,.;.;;::.:=. ~. ,::::,,~ .•!!:: •. ::, ..:::, . • ,.\1' • '.hE'-.... -e' . 1'''1-".]" cunuuc-veu a oa-v~u.J..1.on 5.J.~U uU" atH:I&1u.-V anu vWU ;.1<:'1.0 tJl;I.J,.J,.UU IU.;r.t:: CoI..!.,,-"" ...... O OJ.., LZ Snako (XDA0837S). Durin~ the r3port poriod, the 'l'F coMuct.ed a. aerlas of 'limited objective attacks against modernte x'esist.,q,nce West to t.he Le..f.')o border. On 15 April the TF terminated operations ~.n the PegEisns/~1Y\ 30ft ')!j7f! area of operations. J. 3d ARVN Regiment: On 29 a.nd 30 April two bI.l.ttelions of the Regiment a.irlifted to i.: Lucy vic Ta 'Sat in the centrl'l /. Shllu Vallev. Th~?'d 'Sn lst ARVU Regjment, attached, was to follow' on 1 May. Here thov init:bl.ted So joint reco!lOaissance in force operation in cooperation and coord:l.n."1.ti.on with the 1 I.CD. 'rho operation continues into t,l-je next report.in~ period. K. 196th Light Infa.ntry Briga.do: On 20 April thp. Bri.~rle arrived at Cnmp Evans and was placed OPCON to the 1 ACD. Given the' mission to secure Camp Evans am corduct eombat operations in the v:icinitv, t.he Rri~L\de util ized 1 ACD aviation assets to accomplish the reouireri tn.eks ~ .~.reas of tlrin cipal concern were the security of Q.1-1 in sector" and tl-te roc'kr1t. helt vieinity of L2 Jack. Extensive operations wl1re conducted a~jnst s?oI'A.dic light resist.~nce to the Southwest of Camp Ev:.ms while nl.lrnerl')US .'O.;trnls, ni~h1.. ambushes, and reinforced brid~e securitY' pOsiti "ns discollra.f'ed enan,r attomm.s to interdict OL-1 in sector.. . L. 1-9 Cava.lry: Dur~ng the report period, the SC'u".dron cont.i.nuon to con1uct reconnaissance of the Divisi~n area of operntlons an~ to nrovld3 support to the Brigndes on a mission' 'Oo.s1.6. Initi2.11vp C Troop was ;.lssi~ed the Norl:.hern portion of the AO and B Trp was assigned tl-J e Southern portion. As a 'rule, C Trp supported the 1st Bde .".nd 2d Bde 101 Jilin, while B Troop supported tho 3d Bde.. D Troop provIded c'-"nvoy S E:ctlritv on 01-1 bet'w~en Quang Tri and Cnmp Eva.ns. On 17 Feb J. Troop depart.ed the Pershinl!. n AO and joined the Squadron in the Jeb Stt1c;'\rt I AO. This rn..'\rked the first, tim~ ·the Squadron had opero.ted with a.ll orgcmic resources s.inca , f'.~il 1967. During the remainder of the repnrt period, t.he concept. of operll.tions nsr-:u,nelt the familiar role of one troop in Genoral Support:. of.' uach bri~a.de. The 0 Squtldron continued to cooouct intensive first snd If.l.st liE!;ht reconnniasanct) ·around Camp Evans~ LZ Sharon, LZ Jrult} and the ,\,llmn.flr Bench Ccrnpll;lx. ~cep'i~ for special operations, emphasis of reconnaissance was di-roctod in base ar\:.a~ 101 and llA, Ba Lon~ Valley, and on the COo!l.3t,al Pla.ins. In the month of . April, the first he').l! of the rnrmth saw the Squadron conductin~ extensive operll.tions around the Khe Sanh Combnt Base in Opcrntion Pep,seus/lAm Son 20711. Due to a totE.l lack of tactical intelligcnceconcmoning the ".rca in and aro~d Khe Sanh, the 1-9 Cll.V cOImnenced reconnro.ssr.nce opernticns ')n 26 }"arch vic of LZ STUD and ultimatel." extending west of Khe Sanh to ncnuire hard intelligence and to destroy enemv forces, f1.nti-a~ rcrnf't l'osiMt:'ns, a.nd resources with artil.:l.ery, tactical air, [tnd B··52 EI.rc lil2:ht strikes. The com bination of 1-9 Ca.v recon res':mrcee working with mEl6sivc fire support assets provided I.\. classic examplo of fire D.nd n!p..net..vE'.r "nee t.he 01 ACT) "'.... neuver battalions were integrat.ed into the operr.tion on 1 Apr:n. l.Jhen tl,e operation came to a closr- on 15 April, the: Sauadron initiated extensive reconna.issAnce in the A Shau Valley in Operat.:i./">n Delaware/Lam Son 2l~ in the Sfltrle mo.nnct' a.s in Operation Pegasus. '.5.. :_ . CONFIDENTIAL ~ , 1. .;I:d.'11 .!..! "''-1,.. Evans \Ultil 30 March 1968, e.l'ld then alSp.l:t:1Cen .. 0 L'• from camp LZ Stud to of Operation Pegasus. On 3.5 April the CP returned from port Group part- Camp Evans. Significant operations in which the 11th t..v:i.ation icipated were: . (A) JEB STUliRT I (1 Februal'.5'-31 M:u-oh): went t,t" . (1) Dudng February, priority of nyiatinn support were ~.n Moe'· 3d Brigade dur~ng the Batt.le of Hue. 3d Brign,rle oleml)nts the "tl.'l.S sevei"ely to hefl,V1 cont;;l.ct throughout t.he month •. ·Aviation supp:)rt erate 'cy hos hampered by extremel,v adverse weather. This was further a~rti'.vD;t.er.l morlar/rocket attacks and a lml availa.hilitv of 'missi0n ready' tile fireJ gt.way Cn.... l • Lightning Bug miss ions were conduct ed nightly al.ong Hj. aircra.ft, . .. to reduce mining incidents and NVA movement alont' the road. Battle of Hue ended in . I: '. . .' (2) As the weather :improve(i' and the incr~sed throl:tRhout the first ~rt of l-i'arch, tht;j number of combat a~snults 1'.0, four RE-F's were the AO. When the 2d Brigade displaced from the Pershing basis (one to each of tho di"is:tI)~l bri~.de5 2.nd one required on a' dail,v il'l Bele, lOlst Airborne Division). Av:i.ation assnts \,l1're deployed to the 2d respon throught:lut the 1.0 to dispel"se resources and to ~nsure maximum depth. missions siveness for the supporteti. units.' Numerous emerRency re~'J.pplY resupply oonducted for the 1st fJtVN Division in the were required. One u,unships • vicinity of Quang·Tri (YD344629) resulted in 2~ NVk KIA bv n/22qt~ ship was reoucs+.cl'l . _..On several occa.sions dur1ng the month, the stand-bY' flare cor:Gect'.le!'tl~r, by units in contact. ttleather coriliti"'ns preclooed vm. f.li~~t.~ aircraft 'was given a GCA vector to the site of the enp,~~cment. Al~0r. the \,lerp. relel'..soo. and con.tact was established "tlith the l1,I'01.U'ld corrrno.nder, flares A. CA bv the ground nnit. On 2~ i'ft.'rch t,he ?29th !.HR executed then adjusted of Quanf1 Tri with simultaneous touch do:wns of three 6 +. 2 flight.s snuthet\st. WD.S in prol'?;!'es'> f"r around an encnw compleX. Throl'ghout March, plnnning (¥-1') nlJ.M~3) on Operation Pegasus. The qUtl.rter.ing party closed nt L~ Stud 24 Mf.1.rch and the tactical OP closed on 30 Hnrch. . (B) PEGASUS (1-15 April):.. (1) Pre-Assault: On 24 N='..reh the ouz:..rterinn; party movoo Recon to LZ Stud and began wOl:k on ct)Illmand and corranunic'tii'ns bunkers. by cOTlUMnd ors M.d naissance of the area. a.."1d proposed LZ sites were cr)nd.uct~ leaders. The assa.ult elements of the 3d 13rigac\ci were pre-poslti(")ned night LZ Stud a.nd at LZ Pedro. On 30 It'\rch the 11th Aviation Group moved to oporati'm control was transferred from Camp Evans on 31 March. (2) Initial Assault: D Dc:W' ccnunenced on 1 J\prU with the Pega.sus AO, while the .1st 3d Brig~e air assaulting and nirlifting into the Lu alf.'Tlg hi~hwa..v 9. Marine Reg:iment. attaclted with 2 battalin.ns west from ell. a &ec...,nri battalion air I batta.lion of the 3d Briga.do air ~.ssaulted anrl One assaulted into '. I lift,ed to LZ MIKE. The ·third. bC'.t.talion of the Brj.~ado air I 932432).. On 2 ·April (0+1) the battalion which was previouslv" LZ CATES .(XD LZ THffi. I' airlifted to LZ MJKE air nssa,ulted to .(Xl) S9~40J) and establishElt;i I on 3 April, (D+2), a.ir assault'ed one br..ttali·:m and Il.irlif'tod I The 2d Brigade, of the. battalion into LZ WHA'RTON (xn S37aJ63). wh5.le t.he thirrl bntta1ion I one (n+4), tho 1st 1 Sir assaulted into .~ TCM.(XD S9fl34a) •. en ; April ! Brip;a.de i~~to. .. I one battalion and airlif'ted a second battalinn Brigade air assaulted . I LZ SNAPPER (XO' 844347). The MVN Airborne'Task Force assaulted/airlifted' I into LZ SNAKE (XD 810378) on 7 April (D+6). j .CONFIDENTIAL-- G .l .. ! ' .. I (4) Communic~.tions: DurinC! rrel:inin8.l"',r 'Plann:in:; for t this operatir:m it was !'eadil.v apparent thatserio1l8 comrnuni.cnt.i('lns 'Oroblem.s ' r would be enc:ountered. L2 Stud was sit(::ld in a bcwl shapl.Yl mOl1nte.1nnus ~l"ea '. lOCuterl 54 kilometers from Camp Evans. A relay site was cstt'l.hlisr.e(l o~, t, Hill 440, just west of Stud; however reliabi1itv problEllTls persisted. ·Equi~· I i I ment shortCOmings reduced th~ effectiveness of the Arvl vOico/RTT net. In all probability this svstem would have provided effective /.I.m relico.ble com I municatirms it the AM equipment had been :)perating. I (C) JEB STUART II (16-18 April): Rout ine support \'lI:lS provided I to the Division dur~ng this period. In act.(iition" support Wl.S provided to r, the 196tn Light Infantry Brigade" OPCON to tiw 1st MD. 'l'his period '.;al> utilized to improve aircl'ni't availability am plan for- Opel"a.ticln Delaware. I (:3) 13th' Signal Batt,,1icn: Durlng the rcpc·rt.il1g per-iod" the 13th Signal Battalion provided communications to th~ Division Task Organiznt,ion r I for: . f (a) Opcrnti"m Pershing II: 1-29 Feb (BD,TH nnm Prov.1.nco) f' (b) Operation Job Stu.1.rt I: 1 Feb-30 Hal" f i (c) Oper-:-'ti0n Pegnsus/L.~m Son 207 A: 31 }{.~r-15 Apr f (d) OpeI7o.tion Job StunrtII: l6-1S Apr [ (e) Opert.ti0n Delm,zare/lam Son 216 . [ D'lU'ing tho nll"')nth of F0brm~r" the Battal:i on continued ·i:,o pr.,vi.4 {-' cOmffi1.111.1.cations r support fo~ t.he I ACD i'!1 oper;,:,tions P(~rshing II and Jeb StU"~l"i 1. Direct comnl.U'lications weremail.ltainedwiththe2r1BrigadeatIZUplift~n(lth.)J.st. ! ProvisioD.al Battali~·n at Camp Ranc1:i.ff u~in,"!, f~ raoio. Mot,..,r- nlessen~er 8(''1;'" l vice was also provided to the T)i v AG at Camp Rlldcliff. i\n I.ir o'3j cm,~.l Courier m~de daily runs botwcen An K~e and Phu Bai vic C-'7A Ail'craft. At t.he Div- . ision CP (Camp Evans), the folley"inl'{ services "'ere pl:'(,vioed: (1) FM Radio (Secure and 110n-securp.) (2) AM Radin (Voice aJ,'ld socu~e telety1c) (3) Telephone swit~hirlg system (4) ConmuniC<.1.ti m Center (Sec'lU'e teletv'pe) (5) Hotor messenger service Although conununicat1nns cOll'D'lli'c.ments cont.inued throughout tl1e m· ... nth, the~'e were no serious difficult:ies encounte','ed. -, During the month of lw.rch, plan:-' wero finalizod f0r Operat.i('n '2egasu.s I Lam Son 207A. A Sub-urea signal cencer was dp.ployed t/O Camp &rans to pro vide telephone servic& at that location. The depl·'yn.ent of Signal eq~ipment ·for Operation Pegasus presented major difficultiee. 'Ibe 10cat:j.-:;:n of the Division OP at LZ Stud, and surrounding terrain required the use'::>f a relay· Site, Hill 440, to tho west. The relAy site was S9Cl.1red by ground fC'rces 0", 26 March, but eneIl\Y' contact prccl\i.d"3d nilSht ')pcr,'l,tinn until 29 }~f.11·ch. Additiona.lly .the aito requiren. mensive earth work prior to emplacement of signal eqw.pment. Provisional Corps si.~al equipnent. was moved to the hill by Division aviation assets. After 1nstallin.~ C':>rps Tropn and V~1f system.'3 . on the hill, ext,rena difficulty "-us experienced ~n establishing the Corps circuitsc Ma.,;or iter.8 of equipnent failed (TRC-97 t~,nsr:d.ttcranci r'J._ _ _.. --- . CONFIDENTIAL r., vrl.gaae~/n.e~nen\l~ Pr;Lur- ~u ~I1C " ... w ...... ' ..... A , ..... -1".----.. - -_ -_ .. -'~-r Even atter displacement, Corps teletype circuits and TOe hot liTles l)ad not been $stablisted. lrlork continued on t'1ese cirC\lits p.nd sntj.sfact.,X"T sei'v:tce. wae received fl)ur; da.ys after the Division OP had (\isT'lo.ct;;Cl. Operaticn De.l.aware beg8Jl with tho osta.blishment of an Ft.of rarii:" l'..nri a . " .i VHF relny site on, ;'Sigrl<'\l }1ount.."lin" (Hill 1487). Long Range P.'ltrolj erll!in eers ~nd signal p.:~x'!'Jonl1el were inserted on the hill top to s acure a cornrnun~ icat1.ons radio re.lDJI" site for the opa~~tion. Non-flyable wlat.her de1A"ed operations for two da,vs. Once the site WEI.S secured and clo.'lred; relay communications for the Division TAO OF were· installed. Difficulties were '; .. encountered in airlifting conmninicatit:lns equipnent. to the rolll.Y site . throughout the pel:-ioo. due to n!>n-fl1ll.bla weather. /. qualified pathfinder ~ :" was assigned. to control air traffic on the third da.y of operptiQns. The .' relE'.Y site was also used ll.S a weather station and arliUler,y fire bnse. ' Com-, municationa persomcl 'Were e:nplOY~ thr':)Ughout tho period in assisting 111- " fantr,y units in defense of the (\rca~ SiX automatic FM radio-retransmissi')ns sets a.nd two VHF rfl!tio reln:r . .', set ware installed on the site to mEl.:i.ntn:tn FM rl!.dio and telephone. 'c''lmnup icatirms between units operating in the f. Sh.O.u V3.11c·r and LZ Evans ~ , . '. On 29 April 1965, 3. Division T,,~,C CP we.S estt'l.hlishcd at L7. Stallion. ' No serious difficulties were encr)unteroo during this TIl~ve. 'l'he: follo,dn-,,: communicatiOns WeI"C. :insto.l.led: . (i) F?·1 radio (secure and non-secure) to all rna-.ior suh- . '. 'ordinate . conmands • (2) I~ radio (voice f.l..no. secure teletvpe) to all lI\k..1'=\r etibordinata commands. (3) VHF radio teler-hone cOl1ml\mic~.tions to the t".ro com- ' mitt(:)d Brigades, 3d ARVN Regt ll.nd LZ Evans. . (4) Switchboard and telephone serviqe nt L~ Sto.lli('\n. , (4) Sth Enr(ineer 'Battalion: During the reoort'inC! reri ort the t.ac~: ~ tical operations in the Jeb Stu.."!\.rt AO.· In the In.ttcr stl'J~es nt t~is cmnrter, Operatir::n13 Pegasus (1-15 A}:'ril 19611 anc\ Delaware (19 April to V1e T'rt3n011t) . inCl'.eased'the tactical scope, causing Cl similar increase in eminr:Gr· support •. lnitia~~ all availDble resources wore committen in sur~~r+. ~f n~l, dev ! . eloping .new landing zones am fira bases, nnl ~re~":I.ring instn.llntions in I the new AO. Elements thut h...... d remained in the "'.rerahing f~O to sllprort the I Febru~rv. ! . 2d Brigade ret.urnerl to the ba.t.tnlion in lo.te Bxt.ensivC3 work I. was done on lnajor LZ's to develop helioopter langer, refuel, .J:l.rld rearm fac i I I ilities without. dct.r~ctj,ng from the direct support provided to, t,ne mane\lwr batta.ll.o:lS engaged in tactical opAra.ti~.ns. Constructi')n WD.S initi~.ted on .' i; ! threo airstrips dur1.ng the reporting period. At Camp }lNans, a ·150'x3100'. . ... I' . I strip "WCi.S completed by mid April ft:.r 0-130 aircraft, with work still:in .. , . i progr<:ls8 on a parking apron. At 1,Z Stud, a 150 'x2500. strip ·was built to ! supporl Opere.ticn Pegasu,s (1-15 April) Il.l'lr.\ at LZ Ste'l.llion, n strip presen.f;ly i boi~lg cor~truc':.ed in BUp!'ort of Operntion Dela"lare (19 April-present)., . ;" i Elements' of Mobile ConstruCtion Battalions 4,5 a.nd 10 provided ~ine,e:a:'tng I" j support' to the 1st Ail" Cavalry Division throughl.'>ut;, the r'eporting peri Ot'." ~ Ii I l.. r ' .. I·· Opera.tion DELt.Wi\RE/L~ SON 216 U9 April.-continu:tng) ~ I"or t.aSK organuuLI,J.VUQ I see T/~ D). . A. JEB STUART I. I . (1) General: TOE, attached, and supporting units of the 1 :,CD co)')·· I ducted ccmbat operati",ns :in Quang Tri and Thua. Thien Prov~ nccs du:t'ins ~eI.'" ation JEB STUllRT I. The eneIl'!Y' TEl' offensive was conducted during ~eration JEB STUJ~T I and consequently the Division was engagen in he~vy contact on numerous occasions. The Bc"1.ttle of Hue, which lasted the entire ;t!.onth of Febru:try (See TAB C), \'AS one of the two very significant contacts in'tho JEB STUMT 11.0. Results of the b.:'l.tt.lc wc)"e 404 enemy KJI., 15 captured, and 187 weapons captwed or destroyed. The other sigrrl.ficant c"ntncrt was the . J3attle of Quang Tri (See TAB A). In contrllot to the Battle of Hue" the' Battle of' Quang Tri. Ifl.sten.only Seven (l.a.ys. Res'llts of the battle ''lcre 900 enemv KIA, 300 weapons captured 0)." ,;estrovart with the City of Quant:!: Tri never being occupied by' the enemy'. The month of Februa.rv wa.s a. cr:i.tica1 period of the war in the First Co:>rps Tacl:.ical Zone. The onemy launched ',yht.t .he believed to be an Offensive ca.r~ble of an easY' victory, whereas in re<.'.11ty he lUet defeat. One major item which .attrj.buted to the enEmY's rtefer.t''!.·1''''s his lack of understa.ndin~ a.nd arprecir..tion of the 1 ACrus fiexi.hi1.i.tv" . mobility and fire~ower--a unit whose presence in IC~ he ha~ certainly not ~ticipated. . With the conolusion of the enemr TE~ offensive, .there wns ~ si~jficant decline in enell'tY' c0ntllCtS. During the rel'lort5.np, 1'\(3ri .... ~, t.hp. enewr ,,~s pt tempting to re~roup his fight.ing post:ure-while lwoi(~5nlZ detecti"'n or. {' ct.llel cot'l.to.ct with tho forces of the First Tew.. In ord,,)r tn r\e~... res",ite to the enemY" the 1 ACD quickly initillte:i l"'Ursuit oner:::.ti'1ns r"·llo"d.ng the en.. . on the coastal plain nm n..eop into I,') known enCl'llV bas e ~.reli.l.S. During the l1\.::-.n~h of M:'.rch" the 1 ACD penetrat(-)d BD.se l~rea 101 '!.'lith q9 rec"nnmSSEJ.nce mission.s and 77 offensive operL'l.ti:')ns. Base l~ea 114 w~.s :renetrat~d bv 4S recontlaj.s·· sance missions and 14 offensive operations. (2) Other significant· llcti::ms occuring. in the JEB ·~'l'U.:.HT· I AO wore: . (l'.) Ch 2 February, an aircraft from B Tro"p, 1-9 Cav" in' su..:·pr;:., .. ·l:, of the 3d Brigo.de in the vicinity of Hue, became the to.rget of intense ground... ·to-air fire. The aircraft \'las hit and crash-la.nded in enany contrljlled tar- . ritory. The crew escaped serious injury, but was immediately enga.ged b~ small arms firo. '-lhile the crew was beil1;~ extracted bv a Me.rine helicopter (CH-46)" scoa!:. aircraft. engaged the enany resultir..g in 15 KIA's. In scn.t~ tered contacts through0ut the ~m.a:inde':, or th(·) day, the tro('p9 killed an a.ddition~~ 20 enernr resulting in ~ total of 35 (mcIJ\V KIf. f·~r· t.he 'la.,v •. . (b) On 7 February, aircraft of C Troop, 1-9 C['l,V, while p'3ri'orming first light reconnaissa.nce aro\mc:l D.:>ng fh, observed.n. wr::;ll fort.iried area at coordinate YD 194610. The area was engaged. resulting in 12 NVA KIA. Ex ploiM.ng tbe area or contact, C Troop 1-9 Cay continued tt:' .-levelop thl3. sit uation and in scattered contact in the vicinity of YD 200621" the troop engaged a.nd ld11ed another 41 NvA. '. (c) On 16-17 Feb, A!1-9'Cav anri BIl-a CtJ.v engagen in heaV"r c.m tact w.t"th elements of the 003rt Re~, 324B 'f)iv~sion vicinit', YD 433(...0$. -...... ~ • .:.-., "*'f".' ./ •••• : • .:. ••, •• ~••. , ... '...... ;..:...... c..~;.: •• _ •• ~_~-.~". " ~.~:;.~--r:- .. WU.Ll\..L,"5 W"''''''' WI .. -- _ __ w • ____ .. __ _ • ______tions. ARA received extensive ground fire from this same location- result- . ing in 2 US KIA. Arty and air otrikes were ~ployed agains~ the enemy and these were followed by a ground attack. Both companies continued to meet heavy resistance and at 1900H withdrew into a mutually supporting night FOB. Artillery was f:f.red into the contact area all night long and the following morning an artillery TOT was fired followed by employment of CSt followed by a ground attack. TAe air could not be employed on 17 February due to marginal weather conditio11s. (d) On 18 l!'ebruary 1968, at 0107H, vicinity YO 39254l >, CIl-8 Cav while in a night perimeter was attacked by the 5th Company, 803d Regt, 324B Div. An OP observed 40 individuals moving toward the perimeter. The OF was withdrawn and the enwQY was engaged with. artillery. At the same time the perime~er came under 60mm mortar, B-40 rocket, ar.d small arms fire. At 0145H .. 4 UH-1H flareship came on station. At 0215H the fire ceased and an emergency resupply ship was brought in which drew enemy fire. A medevac ship took out 4 WIA at 0235H. At 0245H the perimete.r again came under spor adic mortar and small anns fi.re. Artillery engaged a suspected target at YO 391550. At 0220H Moonshine (USAF C-47 flareship) replaced the UH-1H flareship. All firing ceased at 0350H. At 0415H, a 2d Moonshine came on stati.)n. . At first light a check of the area revealed 6 NVA KIA, 6 AK-47, numerous drag marks (body), and 3" of documents. Frieudly casualties were 4 US KIA and 4 US WIA. During the day the unit found 2 more NVA KIA and 5 B-40 rockets, 150 rounds of S/A ammo, 19 Chiconl grenades, 26 AK-47 maga zineG.1 carbine magazine, and assorted NVA eqUipment. (e) On 19 February at 1530H, in a combined search and clear operation vicinity YD 363610, All-12 and C/1-12 Cav carne into heavy contact with an 6stimated NVA Company. After initial contact was established the units pulled back and artillery was fired into the contact area. TAe air could not be employed due to marginal weather conditions in the target area. Both companies cont~nued the attack through the area killing 8 NVA. ARA ships engaged several groups of enemy in hedgerows who were trying to evade ~he contact area and accounted for 38 NVA KIA and destroyed 3 light machine guns. (f) On 22 February at 1.500H vicinity 'lD 315505 A & C/1-3 Ma"~ rines, acting in response to a report from the Senior Sector Advisor of Quang Tri, concucted a cordon and search operation with a PRU team, result ing in the capture of 5 hamlet cadre and 17 hamlet guerrillas. (g) At 1303H on 24 February Vicinity YO 362594 first brigade scouts in support of Bl-12 Cav killed 11 NVA and captured 2 ~ pistols, 1 PPS-43 SMG, assorted web gear, and Chicom grenades. (h) On 1 March, lw501 Abn made contact with an unknownsi2e enemy force north of the An Lac Bridge on the Song Bo River. Sixteen NVA were .killed by the airborne troopers who were supported by ARA, tube artil~ lerYt 1-9 Cav gunships and tactical air strikes. . (1) On 2 March, 1-7 Cav made contact ',ith an unknown size enemy force vic YO 6211. killing 12 NVA and capturing two pistols and two rifles. .. 10 ...... '_ .. " .. CONFIDENTIAL I I.. _ - -J ~ ------1'------__ a ---_•• --J r-----·. of 1-9 Cav to exploit the action. ~ihile on the ground, the infantry captured 3 weapons and one pack. Movement was detected around them, and to keep fran being decisively engaged, they were extracted without incident. The recon team covering the extraction killed 7 more NVA. (k) On 13 March, C/2-7 Cav in a village at YO 558473 killed 5 NVA. The company received 60mm m.ortar fire with neg casualties. In the __~ same area the company captured several tons of rice hidden in false graves. (1) At 250900H Mar 68, A/l-8 Cav assaulted two separate LZ's: one on the south and one on the north of the hamlet of Thon Xuan Duong. Upon landing, both LZs were Green. At 0918H units on both LZs were receiving heavy fire from all directions. ARA and Brigade Scouts were on station and engaged the areas. The third platoon of D/1-8 Cav which had conducted a "Swooper" operation vic of YO 387558 earlier moved by foot to a pOSition ·vic YO 399553. D (-)/1-8 Cav further south, attempted to move to the west to rejoin ·its sister units; however, intense SA, AW & B-40 rocket fire pre vented this. Following the unsuccessful maneuver of D/l-8, A/l-8 and C/l-S conducted coordinated attacks supported by A/1-9 Cav, artillery, ARA and CS to link up with the two platoons. The attempt failed because of intense enemy fire. Artillery, ARA, and gunships continued to engage the area. A/l-8 (-) and ell-a were resupplied by logships and established defensive positions in the center of a village. Contact remained sporadic until 1930H when it was broken. During the hours of darkness, illumination was provided· by "SpookY" and by "Moonshine." The target area was engaged by artillery "I throughout the night. POW's captured earlier'in the day indicated that the . i companies were in contact with the K-l4 Main Force Bn minus its heavy weapons company. A search of the battle area the following morning revealed that the enemy had exfiltrated in small groups. to the northeast. Results of the battle were': 276 NVA KIA, 6 small arms weapons and 1 LMG captured. B. PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A (1) General: Operation PEGASUS/LAM SON 207A will become a classic; example of fire and maneuver combining artillery, tactical ·air and B-52 arc light strikes with a massive employment of troops using airmobile tactics • ! and techniques. In the operation, the mission of the l ACD and its non divisional units, was to relieve Khe Sanh Combat Base; re-open QL-9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh; and destroy enemy forces in the PEGASUS AD. To accomplish. the miSSion, the 1 ACD was augmented by the following non-diVisional units: 1st Marine Regiment, 26th Marine Regiment, III ARVN Airborne Task Force, and the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion. Although the enemy may have initiated a withdrawal of troops prior to Operation PEGASUS, it soon became evident he had no intention of allowing the combined force to march to Khe Sanh unopposed. He had established successive blocking positions, oriented toward the East, on critical terrain astride QL-9. Based on the organization of these delaying positions a conventional attack westward along QL·9 would not only have been costly in casualties, but would have taken a much longer ~riod than 1 week to reach the desired objective, Khe Sanh. On 14 March engineer construction began on a 150' x 2500' airstrip and a logistical complex at LZ STUD. By 29 March the strip was opened for C-7A l1'-CO'N~IDENTIAL-- enany' and the terrain in oztder for' the tactical plan to be completed. In arcs of ever Increasin~ distance west ,from Ca Lu and LZ STUn, 1-9 Cav pin pointed enell\Y concentrations aM a.nti~iurcraft ~itos and immerliatel:r brou!7ht to bear on those varied ordnance. BV 1 April, sufficieht intelJi~enoa con- cerning the enemv had been obtained, his anti-n i rcrf.1, it \,,()p.l~.,ns' neut rali~E:" .. and the 1 ACD prepared to launch i~s ~ssivc hcl:tborne asat:,ult~ , en 1 li.pril, tbe 1 ACD conmenced the attnck toward' Kho Sanh wit,~ theIst }r.... .,.ine 'Rc~iment, conducting II ~ound attack west from Ca Lu alon~ (")L-9 and ,t. Jo)e '~d Brignde, ' lACD, air assaulting tw(') battali'ons and ,o,j,rlittirtg one 'battt'lj,f'l)1 ()nt~ orit-, ieal terra.~ behind the initIal. ene~ delaying positions, a.h"l':rt, hnlf way: .. between Ca, Lu an1 Kbe Sanh Canbat Base. On 3 I.pril, tha 2d Bri~ade, '-1 ],(1), air assaulted two battalions and' airlifted.' one bllttalionto tho S~utheast 'i of Khe Sanh and on 4 April one battalIon of the 26th } f ' .. L, , ______~_~ ______~---r" --- . l.mo ~ne area. Tne next. fla..." Wllll.e COnr1UC1i1ng a /:iVA or ~ne nrea, eJ.emeIlli~ of A Troop observed armored vehicle tracks which lerl to the 11.scoverv of two well cmn~uflaged tanlcs. The tanks wer~ nestroved by' airstr1kes alon~ with 15 l-4VA KIA. . (h) On 11 April, the 1-12 Cav attackinrz: t",'lflrn the Lanrt Vei Special Forces camp m~de c')nta.ct with an enerrr force ~f unlmnwn sioze at Xi.) 7S5357 resulting in 27 NVA KIA. The nf'..xt, , '. -_ 1\; (b) EVALUATION: The use .01- IN agCl.Uull. tUllt2l\y lo'V ..... u ... ' •• - _ ••• __ t.o or~anic ann. r I the enany to leave .1dn~ them a more vulnerable tarf!et j artillerr tires. . r, That units onpllW" OS I\t eve'N, '''P!='orl~.it.,:,:", \ j (c) RECO~ND.i~TION: ~ masks reanilv available. ann have rrotective , 2) P.n~ Morlar aM Rocket Firing I to rnl')rtar t, (a) OBSliltVATION: The enEllTl'1' possess the eapahUitv . . and r(')ck~ ~ienc\~ installati,.,ns anvwhore in the ".0. ' one of' 1IIa1W methods t"r o\)ieklv locatin'! th'\s$ '.' (b) JWALUATION: __. ' is to utilize the int:.ersect1on metht')(\. .... ' , . locations be f'I,4.rt.- " , (e) RF~CHlE~mATlOO: That evr~ry ,8t;)lrlierbe troinan, t~ " flashes, I for eneM1 m~rtar ~ rocket tlashes. ~n s1~htin~ iculnrlyalert ! take an azimuth reAdinr, t" t~e flash anf\ ,render, a soldier should hnmedintel.v ' his comma~ channel. a report through :' I (3) Armor Seats in LOR. There is a need for b~ter armor seP,ts in tl'te . " (a) OBSERVATICW:' . , I OH-6A helicl')pter.· . . . so ! (b) EVALUATION: The armor scats in the LOH are t1ed.rmed th"t ! frClnt seat . , , . i there is aprroximatelv a 2 inch ~ap where the 'ba.ck sent an~, , gar is remotet junction. The chances of ht'.ving a. round come t.hr"u~h this I to the ri1ot; The I however, it has happened, reslllting ~n serious in,jUlY i landed the a.ircraft. rreventin/\ a loss of crew o.nd· I, observer successfully' ' I air cra.ft; • I (c) REtOMMEtJDt,TION: That armor sea.ts be rodedm,lEld, olosin.q; I the gap in the seat. , . (4) Recovery Aircrnft.. ' ! it has been 's"comm"n pra,ctioo ,I , (a) OIBE1V/.TlON: In the past, lead er responsible for all downed o.irc,rart.. ~6rma.ll,y \'lhen, j to have a night ,', 12 or morc l3.irar~tt., the batt.o.li')n maintenanoe a.i~ 0. flight consistod of ' , ", ! craft accompanied ,t:he night. ' . '. I ina:rl'equate:,..mere , , (b) EVALUATInN: Thes(~ r.roce r '. -- ~ ...... ~, ;.» e: "d.' . ~ ..bia,,;...,s J~=~--'-~~'~='-='='~H=~=~====~==~",;" - .. ,-,' ...... , Mrlt"rtc.w.· i. (·c) RECOMME~lJ)ATION: That dual lo~ sl,ips be used when dictntecl bY' the tactical situation and as aircra oft availabil::!.tv permits. . (8) Medevac at Night in Poor Wenther (8.) OBSERVATION: Medevac by helieoptcr can be accomplished d.~ing periods of darkness and poor weather in cases of extreme erneraenar. . (b) EVALUATION: Techniques were d~veloped dur"'n~ the rerortin~ period to conduCt. medevac at ni~ht during periods of poor w~ther in cases of ext.rame.life or death emergencies. Search lip,hts E):re ut,ilized and a hn~ . of constant artillery illumination is fu-ed t.CJ the vicinit~r of t.he PZ. At . the PZ ground illumination is utilized to guide the medevac helicopter on its last leg. Artillery Ulumillr'ltion continues in a line to guide the helioopter baok to its own pad where rotat.ing bea.cons are us(~d t.o l;YUirle the returning helicopter. . (c) REnmtJiENnATION: That this technique be utilized when appl;ieable .. . . (9) Mine Sweep Procedures (a) oromvATION: Mc1.ny units establish fl. procedure for mine. sweeps and then never deviate from it. (b) EVALUATION: This acti.")n has the advantl'l.go of assurin~ the commander a thorough, well oontrolled sweep. ijo~ever, it also P,ives the enenw the advantage of beimt able t.o predict movF)ment,s. l1e is then able to plao(') his mines and boobv'. traps 1:..0' infiict rna,xlrn\Jrl da.rna~e. (c) RECOMMENDATION: Thnt units en&!£I.lf.ed in dailv mine s'rle'eps alter their methods of sweerd_li~ from different direct;ons and. on a non scheduled buie. (10) Canmand 'Detonated Mines' . . (a) OBS1'RVATION: In Northern I Corps 'lone, the eneJ'lt'I is . employing n1.unerO\l8 command detonated mines in con;iunction with convel"t.'iural mine Wlrft,re. 15 ~ .. CO'NFIDENTIAL.: , I· ..:I_I!:.=' :::;:: .... ,;:::: .•.. ;:: ... :!:. .. ~. :'::::":;:"~-- - . ---~.~--'--"'-·""r.·-~·.·::z·.:::;:>...... ::::: ... :=!!j'==~.:::""::;.:::,~.;;:;:.:- --- _u. ~::-:::::::::==._ !.=.:::::::::;;:::::::::::::;:;:;':::::-=-::';:'}'+' _s"",', b·'·'··· ..:::;;;;;. - ;;:-:;;;;,,;;;;;;;:;;"";,.-;;;-;,;- rt XI;;;;'= Y"si <'1.t.en \<'l.~n a , 'orous sea.rch fC'r the enentY while nn" man is placed in ci~t'\er drag~ed behim him on the jltround. grapp~ hook ' (U) Spot Mine SweepS' , in the lcP,d veh;, ~le , (a) OmJiRVATINI: 'The use of en~ineer tl"OOpS' to provide a spot mine sweep hE'S proved ouita '-l*'fective. , of a convoy lwa (b} ,EVALUATIOlT: This method of mine sw~e'P can he useO. but ~c conrnander over routes normally tk"8.veled bv friehdlv troops tactical if t.he speed of cessible to the enemr during periods ot'darkness. However, convoy is in excess of lOmph, the spot mine sweep los~s tte effect~veness the , ",' ' : : " and cannot provide the de$,-red safetv t.c~ tlie con\l'O't. RECOMMENDATION: The tact.ieal eonmander he informed of the , ' (c) ' ' , spot. mine sweep concept. :" " Repair of RunWay Soft Spots , , , ' , (12) Hasty ail' (a.) OEGERVATION': Quiok repair of slIQll port.i.ons or fO,rlo'1D.rd supporting a limited tactical operation is a necossit~. fields 1lS00. " " (b) E.VALUA'rION: The backhoElJ model 3414 can be eff.ect.~vely out centralized soft spots that do not meet the botlt:imt 'reouirements to sooop "lith river established under MACV criteria.. Bv re~la.cing the poor material substiture, the danger nreo. can be ouickly ;erased. run or ~ sui:tnble the (c) RECOMMENDATION: That the 3414 bnokhoe'be included' in for rehnbilitl.l.iion of exist ing airfields _ ' , ' initi.. l lift of equipn:tont ' C~ f':ra1ning' ", " ',' SlinE} Out for Engineer Uequipnent - -, ,,' (a) ODSERVA'rION: During Operation PEGl'SUS and'DELAWARE, it ann rip:ging , pecame evident tb3.t personnel were not profic:tent ,in breakdown for sling out ot all tvpes of ai,rn.obile equipment. (b) EVALUATION: 'These oporations empl1asii~'ed t.ne need for c~r· , - -,",,',:': trainin,s, of personnel in a.ll aspects of s ling out,. stant all pe~ -- - (c) RF..cOl-MENDRJ'ION::' That units conduct traininv.of' 15th ,C;&"3 '/'" '":' in proper sling out t.eehniqu~ and that ri..~E'rs from t,ne sonn,el Air Cavnlrv, Bn present tra.ining as necessary' t.o ea.oh unit within the 1st Division. ' n; Intelli~ence (1) Overt Liaison C~ntact (OI) , _ intel... '. " " (a) OBSn:RVATION:, An e~fcctivo liai,son llt"oqrs!TI bflt'WP.crt is reoui't'ed. " " _ ' _ ligon~o agencies cities in , - (b) ~ALUATION:' Bv positionin~ personnel in large the Division AO, and in those citics i~ t~e D~vision TAOI where areas Withi~ liaison, are a nunber of allioo: intelligence. agencies, an effective - there and ' :" has been establi8h~d" wh:!,c,", has resulted in t,ho offectivA program sources not timely transmission of 1ntelli~ence information from numorous ' This is pa;rticull"..rly noticeable' in the ar~as of previoU8~ available. , Quang Tri, and Hue. ,'," (c) REOOMMENDATlml:··, The practice of estnblish~ permanent inc':'rpora.tad in the intelligence Pl"Olf.ram •. liaison teams should be ' , . (2) Translations by AAVN Interpreters', ' ."" : A Requiremont exist-sto 'insure a.ocurato' •.. i·~,n,;'· , (a)' OB3:rffiVATION= :', " ' lation of intelligence d~~ents. ,,_, 1& " . " , ' " ,CONFIDENTIAL-~ , I. --.------_.... _-- .... _------r-- .. -----y ------~--- -. lations, a better assessment of the completeness of the t~anslat:l()n . can be . made. (c) RECOMMEl\o'T)ATION: That this douhle cl-teck svstem b~ SGP ir. translation of inte1l1~ence data. where SVN personnel ser-ve as intertll'et..e;."S •. (3) Processing \4}'oundedPrisoners '. (a)' OBSERVATION: Many PWs havinlT. information of 5.nte1.li"'ence . value are evacuated throll/Sh medical channels.. . (b) EVALUATION: During the reportin~ period, there were at least 8 N's of interest to the division who ""ere P.va cuet·ed throu"l, medicE'l .. channels. (c) RECOMMENDATION: In order to insure that no intelligence of value is lost, the following should be accomplished;.' (1) Tag WIA PW's in same manner: as other PW's. (~) Units should submit spot reports on WIA PItI's t.hrougb I normal channels. I (2) Hedical £acUities should notifY nea.rest IP1 AT elem.ent \ . immediately' upon receipt of a WIA PW • I . (4) Limitation of AN/PPS-4 Radar i (a) OBSERVATION: The AN/PFS-4- Radar cannot pxoovide f'qll oov.:.·· i I erage in rai~ weather. I (b) . EVALUATION: The AN/PPS-4 Radar dOGS not give satisfactor,r . results when empl~ed in the rain. .' (c') RECO~·mNDATICN: That efforts be mtv3.e to obtain AN/rfS-5 Ra.dar to repla( . the AN/FPS-4. . · (5) It ;omplete Capture Data on IPt~IS. . . (a) OB.C)'F,RVATION: Prisoners of war a.rc freauently improperly documented. (b) EVALUA'rION: In order to insure timel...... and accurate illtl:A'''' rogation of detainees, it is neeessary' to provide the it"lterrop:ator with &.s much information about the r:l(~ainee and circumstances of capt:,ure as possible. (c) RECOI-1MEf-IDATION: Detail'leOS should be evacuatod to niv ~1 with complete capture data and any documents ano weapons in. their posseosio~ at time of' capture. Captul:'.in~ unit shOl.~ln ta.~ cacl-t deta.inee us;nQ; W\CV · form 365 (Detainee Card) or tI. facsimile thereof. Infor~tion sl-tould include:. .DTG ot capture, location of ea¢uring unit, c1rc~'ItI\stE'nce of' cl1.ntu'l'.a; name and ~ weapons or documents found on detaineo. If at ~ll possible, docu ments and weapons should be eve..eu.''l.ted "'ith the detainee. Division Pl-,f Co.ge · has received. rn.'l.rJy' deta.inees during this reportinR' period \'lith incom-pleteor no oo.pture data. . .' (6) Falsified Docmmentntion bv the ~NA/VC , (a) OremVATION: The NVA ond VC ho.ve been falsifyi.ng GVN official docunents, such as identity eards. . . (b) EVALUATION: Infortl1D.tion developed durin~ t.he recent Tt.'1' . offensive reveals tha.t the NVA/VC haYe been most .successful in duplicli'.ting officialGVN documentation suoh ns identity ca.rds. To dat.e, there has . been no report of US documentntion being falsified. However, .the INA/ve have the apparent ca.pabil?:t~r..•...... l~ ;CONF·IDENtlAL.·~( •• '1 :~, •• " 1t "'-, _.. --_ .. _- --_ ... ------.,;, - --- ~ ------1ma.ted two NVA squads. The supported unit Wel.S unable t,O reo.et to the con- ,'.: . tact and conseauently the 1/9. Ca.v 1mmediatelv e:>:tractedthe t ea.m and two NVA. , (0) REC01-!MENDATION: As future situations sind18.r to this '[lI;.::r be expected to ariee, it is recorrmende.d tha.t the supported unit ren..6t b·! t.:ir lift.ing a platoon and one empty slick to orbit near area., of contact. Thus airborne, the comnc'mders can make an immediate eval~tion of the situe.tion and if \'tE.rranted drop the platoon in to. reinforce the team in contact ~ develop the situation. . " .. . . (8) Rc1.pid Evacua.tion of PW's to D1.vision Collection Poirrt.. . '. (a.) OBSJilWATION:, Prisoners must be evacuo.tEti to intelligence .- agencies as rapidly as possible. '" ' . . . , (b) EVALUATIONt PW's must be evacup..ted as soon as feasible to the Division Collection Point to allow for detailed interrolSDt1on. Cap. turing units andsubordinnte headquarters shou.ld exploit the PW's for hl- . mediate information ot tactical value ·a.nd e;xpedite evacuation of the 'PWls to Division IPW. (c) RECOMMENDATION: Failure to rapid~y evacuat'a PW'sc<:1.uses I unnecessary inquiries from higher HQs and denies the Uiv HP v~uable time~, i intelligence information. ·Therefore,s. procedure that provid~s f"~. ~pid I evacuation must be established. ' .., . . ' '. .'i~' E. Lo~istics . : " '1 , (1). Pre-stock of supplies prior to opere.tions. . " . I (n) OBSERVATION: Combat QPorati ons can be fa.c~.litated by. pre- stockage of supplies for ma.1or operations. . . . . I . (b) EVALUATION: Prior to the initiat:ion of. O-perati(m P~.GA·<)t1S a :3 daY' stoci'.age <*>,1ective of all classes. of supplies W~.S. 'Oro-pos:i.i:.:i oned ~t LZ Stud. This pre-stocka~e enabled t.he oper~tion to ct"lJ"1Inonce' withoutlo~-· "1D.S or~nn:tc .' ~ , . istic difficulties. However,' the ·Divis:i.on reouired to \'6e re sources to establish a sirmifioant amount ot this pre-poR·itj.~n:tn~ becau.~e of the lack of FSA support. This resulted in utUhati on of orl(~nic re sO\1l'ces;'and nanpower which would hAve otherwi.se be(:3n used for int.ernal Ul.'r-, ,: . paration ot Units and eouipnent for enttwlr intotheopE'.rnt1.on. .' . , ' I (c) RECOMMENDATION: Whenever possible supplies should be pre- . stocked !o.t 0. forwo.rd supply baBe prior to the initio.tion of oporp..tlons in a . , new areD-" The FSA support a.genCY' shQuld perform the prc::-stoekngo mission . with organic resources. thus pennittil'lv. the division to pr~Pf're its re.,. entI"'1 .' ., ·sources. for into the operation• ~ . (2) FSA support. . . .: . ... . ' (a) omERVATION: FSA support must. be provided in each forward . operf.'t1c.)na1 areBB...... '. . . . (b) E'lALUATIC'N: On Operntiop DELANARE an FSA was requested . to support the two hrigade:a and the ARVN Regi:nont operating in ·the. A S~a.u " Valley" This request was not granted by .1st Log Cmd; th.e onl,v. support. . .. provided _8 augmenta.tion for the FSE.· Thil'J arrang~en~ was, ~sati$ factorY., . (c) RECOMMENDATION: Whene1fer a brigade. or lArg~ sizeelemenli , I of the division operates in a" new area., ti...'" ~A .must be .providoo. :to s uppl;V- .. wholesa.le :deliver,y of Class I, III, and V.. " 'J '". " :-. ',. I : " \ .. L I-CON{,riEN-TiAl'~:I~' I " •. I . ~ ... ' <>- ~" "',.,. :,:. I,.. ,. ,l~~~---~-~~'~~-~h~'2.~~=.~~~i~~.~.=.~,,=,_~'~~~~~~_'=_='='=~~'.='==='=-M='=.'=_~_='==(.====~~:~_~I~~~~'='~~*rl~q~~ (c) RECOMMENDATION: Prior to using such an area for a drop zone it should be cleared by burning if possible • . (4) Limiting stockage. (a) OBSERVKrION: Supply stockage must be rnonitorp.d and controlled according to plan. (b) EVALUATION: On Operation DELAWARE a large stock£..8~ of sup plies, particularly Class V, was built up. When the order came to begin extraction, e. massive effort was 1;~qqired to back-hal.!l this stockage. (c) RECOMHENDATION: In-B.,tl operations, but particularly one which are of limited duration in remote areas, thE:' s1\pply stocks must be closely .monitored and controlled so that excessive stockages do not ,occur which could c:ause prob.lems in tactical redeployment. F.. Organization (1) Crew Member's Individual Weapon I . (a) OBSERVKrION: The .38 caliber pistol is considered uriaatis factory for aircraft crew members. . i (b) EVALUATION: Recent operations in the ICTZ have shown that i when confronted by a well equip~ed and supplied enemy, a downed crew ~ay have : I to'defend themselves for an extended period prior to extraction. Most crew· , I . I members have requested and ~arr.y shot guns, M-16 rifles, and assorted surplus ~ i . weapons. The unit TO&E's do net allow for the issuance of more than one weapon i! to an iudividual. If an aircraft is forced down, the requirement for greater range and firepower exists. : i ~ I (c) RECOMMENDATION: That the CAR 15 or M-16 be the TOE individual weapon. (2) Authority for Fourth Line Company (a) OBSERV Kr ION: The recognition by Canbat Development Ccmmand of an urgent need for a fourth line company in the 8th Engineer Battalion empha i, sizes the ~equirement for an ~ediate op~ration change. : I , I (b) EVALUATION: In the early stases of operations in the JEB ., ,\ STUART I AC, there were no additional engineer units available on a general . I ;.\ support basis for the division. Co~sequently, general support was obtained . by removing sane of the direct support available to each committed·brigade. A ~ ! similar sf.tuation occurreJ in Operation PEGASUS and is being experienced now I ~ I in Operation D3LAWARE. The battalion cannot deliver the effective direct : ! support needed on a continUing basis by the brigades without a general support , 1 ( , capnbility. The fourth line company would solve this problam. , I (c) RECOMMENDATION: That TOE 5-215T be immediately revised to : I reflect the necessary chang~s. (3) Firebase Sets I I (a) OBSERV ATI0N: Operat ions PEGASUS and DELAWARE establ ished : I \1 re4uir~ents'for the airmobile engineer eq\\ipment necessary to open new land ,: . ing zones and fire bases. (b) 'SV ALUATION: A fire base set: of engineer eqUipment is com ~ I prised of an airmobile dozer (12,000·16000 lbs) ~nd a backhoe, m~el 3414. : I !.I These two pieces of eqUipment have proven to be essential in the level oping of fire bases in the tactical areac of operations. Since the committed brigade ~"._ ...... 19__ ._ ... _._ ..... __ _ CONFIDENTIAL ~: ,; f '_. G. Miscellaneous (1) 02B Tape Missions (Psyops) . ,. (a) OBSERVATION: Many 9th ACS 02B tape missions were cancelled due to artillery fire. (b) EVALUATION: On many uccasions, after the 02B aircraft arrived .- : at the Brigade AO, the pilot was denied entry into the AD to broadcast get area. Many ove= t~M of the missions were cancelled after clearance into the continually denied. AD was (c) RECOMMENDATION: The tactical sit~ation permitting, every effort must be mad.e by fire support coordinators to clear psyops aircraft into /t{)., (2) Use ox the Military Police Personnel . (a) OBSERVATION: When a division deploys, there 1s an increased need for military police personnel. (b) ~lALUATION: When the 1st Air Cavalry Division assumed mission'in the JEB its STUART I AD, it undertook the security of Highway 1 and SkY King Avenue. Since these were the major supply routes within the JEB STUART I AD and were ~lso important links in the supply system of I Corps, a major effort had to iJe mounted by the divi,sion to insure the safe and orderly flow ~f traffic al,ong these roadways. In order to move traffic 1n an orderly M ner on these restricted man roads, a disproportionate amount of the division'~ military police resources had to be committed to the task. In order to alleM viate th1.s drain on men and equipment, augmentation of additi~nal military police was requested fI'om the 18th Military Police Brigade through the USARV Provost Marshal. Although initially approved, the augmentation diverted was later to support the forming of the Provisional Corps Vietnam. (c) RECOMMENDATION: When divisions are deployed require to areas that military police to assume roles beyond those for which they M Signed, attachment are de of the required additional military police should be furM nished upon deploJlllent. If this is accomplished, the additional are personnel capable of receiving full.logistical support from the division outset. from the Likewise, the division is'capable of f:1uccessfully periorming mission reqUired. the (3) Location for Polygraph Examinations (a) OBSERVATION: A requirement exists for convenient polygraph facilities. access to (b) EVALUATION: During the condu~t of certain Rbports of lnves· tigation, the polygraph. is utilized. It is a valuable tool ,l"h~.l utUized properly.,__ _ by investigator personnel. Tr.'.I.ined operatprs of this are located instrument' at the Long Binh Headquarters of the Cr~inallnvfstigation (Provisional), nroup 18th Military Police Brigade. These qualified examiners conduct the polygraph examination upon appr~val of the Provost Marshal, , USARV,. These polygrcph examiners will not conduct the exsm1nat1on in th~ field or in an area that i~ mutually convenient to both parties. In the case of the 1st Caval~y Division, it would be advantageous conduct to be able to such examinations in Da Nang; instead of having both. the 20 , CONFIDENTIAL Det&t'lunClts. . ,I .~~ (4) Maintenance ot Control by Milital"Y' Police " . " 1')Ul'i!l8 Base Deve1opm.ont ". (a) Oml!RVATI0N~ Military- Pollee assistance is often requi.r«f , '. . ee.r~·,'i.tn ~fi!e detelopnent. . '" ~, :. (b) EVALUATION: The development of a base fs,ci1itv· thelt will encompass a c()JlU11.9.7)Ci post, airhead and· suppl.v elemEnt reouires the e~rly employnunt of milita.r;r pol~ ce in order to establish and then m.a.intflin contr<,l ". throught)ut the t:: • I I •• " ' .. ," ~: i . i, .; ','. ... ~". ·,'i·,'. t,. I ...... , ,I . '. ' n' : : ...'. ..' . .~. ", t . , .' '. ~''-~ . : I !--··.CO'NFID"ENT1Al . : r . ,' . • I ', •• '. ,'. ,111'.• , ". , ...... ,., ..... \ , . I ~/"':' I,,,". ,I. i ( '. ..-.--...... -,"'"" ':' :::8 ; ! I' ';I tit····· ~.; "';')'."'" If.' ,;; . ·;·;;~--:-:-C·' ··tt 't~·i ••· .... . 'J '(0" ."' ·"A) "",tt)",d lM'wtisrOCtY'rri .. , .... ". A.\o~~.&.UUO 11.,"",&,Y,&,".&.~ , . .. , .~ ,,' ..'. 'l'f.J3 If: \P:B? Vis its t N"" .... **** TJ.B X: Information Activities ,. I', ...,', Tlffi Y: Co\1rt,s-l.brliial/lrlicle 1.5 ...... ,. . . , . , ' . e;. I TJJ3 Z: Mi11tllr~t Pol:tce Activities Ti'Jj M,: Q.4 Opcrati""ns p. • " .. 'l'f~B BB: Logistics '. ,,',o' TAR CO: Psychological. (')porntions T"'J3 DD: Civil Aft'airs , . ,I.~; " , •• . .' " • ~.';' Ii: I " " • .,., J :, .• ~: ',',: .• '* Withdrawn,. Hq", 'DA; published sepa~a.tely a8~ CA.AR. 6SXOSO . '... , .' '" W1~hd.rawn. Hq,"DA~ pubiished ~'~J>.ar.~t(!,ly as.. : eAAR, ~~J:CQ~l' .::. i.." :·····l·:~·'i .. ,,.., ,** f " • *** Withdrawn, Hq, 'DA; published ieparatel'y as '.CAA.R. 68XOS2 . ,f, ,:' f : •. ~" .. ,. '~,Withdr~wn, Hq, DA, oJ '. ',,: '.:'.. . . ,'... .i I.' • ' .o ••• !' , \ .~ - . ,j, " "It· ,.- .' , . , ' 1,1, "~ I" :': "~ • ,i , '" ;',: i '\':',,':"" , .. :. ';1' ,,' .. ;. l '\ . . ... : ~I •• .'f • .L , '.~~ '. •• 0-", el' ., • q ~ ,," '.. \. ": '.: .. t.! ~" . ~ ", " .' ~.' fIi'! ' • t ~ ,: . ", . ,..,j~' • ,. ": ", .', .'., . ~ . . .:. ," , I, I, ", . ,. . .:. . '. . . ," • • ", ' •• ~ '. I . ' " 't., ~ . l " • ,I , ," '. ," , " , '!,~. ',.0. • '" I '," ",' ,,"" '. I " ... ,tt ;: .. , ., ... ~: ,', ,. II!: ::'.. .. ~I:i'~~: .. ' ." ',' ", . ' ~,. : ' ! I, , " I' • i . ! I I,::::,~" , '. ... \ '''" ,,:.. :',. ", ,:' , . , : , '," ',' , , I.; .' ~ t' ':, I .~ ~ ...... " ' , ,. , " , I : ", I j.- ,~t ", '1", ,,' , " ~:'., \ •• i. ',,' t,\" , , " " , ,~'r.. ~ .:, ' " I .•,.0 ", .;, .' r ",' '. ; ,: ,'0. " . ',' ':','. " .,:. I. ,:t' , ~I. .• ' \, ,',' ." ,', ':!.'1, . 'j "':,: " t' , •.•• f" I ~ , ',.":", • 'I .;0 .••. ':" :' I" " f' '. 22 .. i '. " ,: ;f. I, L! ...... :..--.-... ~ ,f. .. ;:.. ,.. .. _·.~·~_~_M .... X.•• • "'.' "scIi I.. ,I I, ~_. Iir" ~" t):, Reg 525-15. 2. (C) Canments 01'\ Section 1, Operations: 5ignificant Activities, are listed. b~l(J~!. I a. Item: Page:3, para 1D. Due to the general nature ot t.he stat'-'lment, it (.;arl not be determined what specific supply shortages existed. or the reasons there,t'Qre. ,I However, tanporary shortages ot Class II and Class IV supplies existed dur1n~' the , i Battle ot Hue Cit7. . . b. Item: Pago 7, psra 1M(2)CB~)(4). The ma:in difficulty encountered was one of interface ot· teletype circuits on US ArrlJ:¥ Tactical VHF-Oamer Systanswith U:iKC PJI/TOO-97 tropospheric scatter s;ysteaus. The problem was resolved when more ~periencel personnel were canmi tted. to assist in establishing the circuits. The expEirier4Ce ' gained will be valuable in precluding similiar difticulties during futUl~o joint can munications operations. 3. (c) Carunents on Section II, Lessons Leamed: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recanmendations, are listed. below. a. Item: Use ot CS chemical agent, page 14, para B(1). Concur .. b., Item: Jihe1l\}" IOOrtar and rocket firing, page 14, para. ,B(2). Concur. c. Items: Armor seats in LOH, pa.ge 14, para B(3). Concur with recommenda.tion. The reporting unit should eul:mit an equipment improvement recanmendation (EIR) IArt para 3-7.4, 'l'M "S-750. d. ItEm: Recov6r'J airoraft, page 14, para B(4). Concur when feasible. Crew reoovery must be mB.de as the mission permits. lUs~.iion requirEments ha.ve priority over either aircraft or crew recovery. Many C&f>es may arise "There assets will not permit use 6t two or JDO.('e ·aircra1't tor recovery. Thus, a hard and fast rule Call1'lot be ap- I plied to the number of aircraft resigned to this t;ype mission. . e. Item: Supporting fires for log ,qircraf't, ,page 14, para B(;). Concur. 'l'hie procedurE: is disoussed in Chapter 3, Section IV 01' 1st Aw Bde ()p«n;t:.ions Manual. .. I \ . f.lten:' CH-54 operations, page 15, para B(6). Concur. Single point SUI::lp«lsion . loads are not recommended tor IFR operations. , 8. 'Items ,Dual. aircraft, for log ndesi0115, page 1;" para B(7).· Coneur wh,ell fea sible. ' A1.rcratt availa.b1l1ty permitt~:, the use ot dual. aircratt greatlJr improves' the tl1ght tollowing. and is cOll8idered a crew morale factor ot geat.. :1mportance. . ~-.- - .,-~~--, \ CONFIDENTIAL I I . " ' L' .' .' ... ,':,. . . ., .. .:.~.~.-~-.. .,' . "-' L .J::::~:---...----:- -'-~~~_"",--.~-t-~...J.:2I:II::~~ . ":iwc:;::·,cz<:::.t..:i::,:,,3--II:::::::·::::' .Z:;;.! c'::::::,:::""!,!:::::;::.· -.::.::;;+.,,:: ..:;:, ..:;:: .. :.::: .. :::::=::::;. *:::::::"k";;:··'·:;·;;';;;;.;::'·::"::· ·::;;,·<,,;:;;:;:'Sd:=·;::;;,;::;:;· ;;;i !;;,:=;},(:lj,l;;';:;';~;;;;;;;;;;~'~~ '&ureat. a.Long the route of flight and the proficiency of rllp.ht Crel'lS. Thf~· cloes not appear to be a night techn:bue lt~plica.ble to a variety of circumstances. Because of the hazards of disorienta.tion and inadvertent instrument flight, such missions should be perfor.med only b,y instrument rated crews with proficiency in nieht flyine. i. Item: Hine sweep procedures, page 15, para nt9). ConcUr. DEl.ily mine Sl'reeps should alter their met~ods by s\'leeping from alternate directions and' at varyintl; times, .Also, mine sl-reep personnel should sweep the same area dally; this allows detection of minute chnnges in terrain • . j. Item: COnID1Bl1d detonated mines, page 15, para B( 10). Concur. k.Item: Spot mine sweeps, page 16, para B( 11 ) • Concur. spot mine sl-teeping operations will be performed. by engineer personnel only after dismountinr. from their vehicle. . 1. Item: Hasty repair of runway softspots, page 15, para B( 12) •. Concw. m. Item: Sling out for engineer equiPJ,llen'li, page 16, pp.ra. C. Concur. n. Item: Overt liaison contact, page 16, para D( 1). Concur. o. Item: Translntions by A).\.VN interpreters, page 16, pe.ra D(2). Concur in principle. The practico of translating each doc'Ulnent t\'d.ce is a waste of t:ime and assets. A spot check could be performed occasionally and serve the same pttrpose. p. Item: Pl'Ocessing wounded prisoners, page 17, nl1.ra D(3). Concur. . q. Item: L:Lnitation of AH/PPS-4 rL'.dar, page 17, plIra n(4). Concur. 'rhe Al'.;jPPS-5 rndar is coming into the inventory. Responsibility f.or rec,.u.sition is in cumbent upon the unit authorized this equipment by 'roE. r. Item: Incompiete captwe data on IP\'l's, pace 17, para D(S) •. Corlcur. s. Item: 'l"alsified documentntion by the VO/IrvA, pape'17, para D(6). Concur. OoIm1B.nders 8hould be advised by their intelligence officer a.s to the import.ant 3 ot .this information being reported. .. t. Item: Reaction to LRP team contacts, pnp.e H~, !lara DC?). Concur. Rapid reaction to significant LRP team contacts will increase the value of the information rec~ivod. . 2&1 -, )' '1-·' "CO-NFIDE~nAl L. w. Item: FSA support, page 18, para E(2). tronconcllr. The support :fUrnished for Operation DELAUf..n.E included b:,-th FSA (wholesale) support by Task Force La~ley ani auE1tlel!ltntioh for the For\'wrd Support J!a.enent (FSE). \:holesole supply support forward is dependent upon establishment D.l1d sao'lrity of lines of communications. These conditions 1:ere not sufficiently established to permit another forward FSA to contribute to the mission or Operation DT.z..Ai;ARE. x. Item: Clearance of drop zones, page 19, para E(3). Concur. 7. Item: 'Lwting stocl<:age, page 19, para E(4). Concur. Such controls are most effectively exercised by FSE's and provide sllvin~s in sUPPl.v expeditures and ll1D.npower, and provide for timely movement of priority sllplilies with reduced expendi··. tures of transportation assets. " z. Item: Crel" member's individual weapons, plI.p.;e 19, para F( 1). Concur. This change can be requested by WIDE submission. . sa. Item: Aut.hority for fourth line company, page 19, para F(2). Concur. This change can be request-ed by l:'lOE subnisr.ion. ab. Item: . Fire base sa'lis, pate 19, para F(3). Concur. This change ca,n be re . quested by HIDE submission. ac. Item: 02B tape missions" para 20, p~ra (i.( 1). Concur. ad. Item: Use of military police ncrson. el, pnr.:e ~O, pfl.ra G(2). Concur. In the initial deployment of a division to an area tlw,t (1.oe6 not have area military policEl, additiont'.l military policemen should be attached to the tli vision to aid in handling missions beyond the division's capability. Once aroa supnort has been established these military police should be roturned to their parent 'lmits. TIus -procedure was" fo11o\'/ed i'lith the 1st CI.',V niv (Al!) J but only after they had beon in the ne,,, loca.tion several "leeks. ae. Item: l.ocation for polygraph oxaminll.t~ons) TH).ge 20; para G(3). ronconcur. The frequency of use by the divisions of the polyp:raph and the requirements of. a suitallle location for administering the exroninntions (~dr conditioninfT" sound . proofing, steady current and good lighting) do not \-Tarrant the establishment ,of tempo- r8ry testing locations. The centralization of polygraph equipment and· personnel at . L.Jng Dinh allows for its most efficient use. 'af. Item: l'faintenance of control by .military pollce during base devoloPn,tent, page 21, para G(4). Concur. . . ~'5 I. . I CONFIDENT'A~ : , \ .. ' L. ""i ". i ...... 5. (U) Correction to G4 opcr~l.t.ion, Tab M~J para :3, line 13. Change' 25th General Support to 26th General Support Group. FOIL 'llill COlvJlWlDJ.iR: /;/ :I ?c,'<'-~~>?- '= Ii.":" L. NURDIN :tvl.A;, AGe Aast AG Cyfurn: DA, ACSFOR OG, 1st Cay Div , 1 CONFIDENTIAL· (.- !. APO 9655S I 1. This hea.dquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-LessonB Learned tor the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 ~rom Headquarters,' 1st Air I Cavalry Division. ./; 2. Concur with report as submitted. .' ' .. FOR THE COMMANDm: "N4c~~C. S. NAKATSUKASA Captain. AGe Assistant Adjutant Genera)· . Cy furn: .HQ PC" ! HQ 1st Cav TJi v ; . I " . ! '. ! ,I. I 1 " .. d .1 I. . ' ". ! " :j ", .i ! 27 I I I I L._ ...... : 'r'" ••: •• ,;. .. -----_n~=' I··· R'4, "'~ A~my. 4".~l.n,c. Al"U ~an Yranc1.,-co ~6558 . : 1 AUG 1~6a TO: Assiatant Chief of Staff for Force Development. Department GL the Army. Wa.hington. D. C. 20310 . ", This hesdquarter~ haa evaluBte4 subject report and forwarding indorse , ',menta, and concur. in the report' as indorsed. \ Foa TUB CCllfANDu IN CHIEF: ~.~ , ·C::.l. SH~· ~ '., . ('PT, A(,,,c I",:,' A_tAG ..... ," " .... " , .' 'i' '," , ,. ,I' ,., .,'. "',' 'I,', .... :';':' j. !'., 28 ". , .' ,-U lJaY 1-5 Cay ". 1-502 Abn . B. 2d Me 101 Abn ',-50, Abn 2-;01 Abn a.3d B£~ 2-12 Cay 1-7 Cay 5-7 Cav , '. 2. On 17 February, the 1st Bn, 3d Marine Re~ placed OPOO?>T to the 1st :3.' . On 22 Februal7, &ie. 2-7 Cav' which had heen OPCON to the 2d Fde in the '. Pershing II AO, tJ.. to Quang Tri, A/F and became OPCON to the 1st ACD in the Jeb stuart AO. ~ J+, On 29 February, the 1 at Bn" 3d Marine Regt, was released OProN 1st planed OPCON 3d Marine Bde Regt. . , '> , ,M.u'ch: A. 'l<.:lad, I ~arters, 2d Bde arrived Camp Evans; placed OPCON 1 ACD. fJ. . -';f,', r,r, tlnd 2-5 Cay released OPCON 2d 10,; pla.ced 'OPCON Bde 1 AClJ. 2d C. 1..... ):·'-1\0" Abn released OPCON 1st Ede and 2d Bde 101 Abn respectively; plac\1ct UH. IN >i Bde,. ... D. 2-12 Cav i;.I.~KI.. ' .,,( Gav released OPCON 3d Ede; placed 6. 2 Maroh: OrCON Division. . . A. 2-a CaY (.) arrived JEB STUART AO; placed OPCON 1st Bde. B. 1-5 Cav released 0PCON 10t nde; placed OPCON 2d Bde. C. 2-501 Abn and 1-502 Abn releal3ed OPCON 3d B:ie; placed 101 Am .. O~CON 2d Me D. 1-501 Abn released OPODN 2d Dde 1 ACD; .placed OPCON 2d Rdp. 101 E. 2-7 Cav'and Abn. 2-12 Cav released OPCON Div~sionj placed O~CQN 3d Bde. I 7. On Harch, 7 thA 1st Bde 101 Abn (,-327 Am, 2-327 Abn, 2 ... 502 Am)' I pJ aced OrOON 1 I\CD a : . e. 10 Mn:C'ch~ I A. ACD ! 1 relGssed OPCON III NAF; placed OPCON Provisional Corps Vietnam. B. 2d i Bde~' 101 Abn released OPCON 1 ACD; placedOPCON 101st Abn Div. 1 . 9. On 14 March~ 1 2-12 Cav released opcmr 3d Pde; placed OPOON 2d P.de. I 10. O~l 18 March. 1st Bde 10, Abn released OPCON 1 ACO; plaoed j Abn Division. ('PCO~ 101 1 . j' . 11. On 20 March, 3d Plt A Trp 3-5 Armored Cav released. OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 101 Abn Div. . I 12. On 26 f.farch, 2-1 Marined placed OreON 1 ACO. I . 13. 29 Hnrch: . A. 1st I' }/&'ine nep,t with 2-3 Marine battalion 'placed opa:m 1 ACD. I B. 2"'1 lfa~ines released I OPCON 1 AOD; placed OPCON 1st Narine ~ep't. 14. On,30 March, 1-1 Marine En pltl0ed OPCON , Mar Regt. . 15. On 31 Harchl/ 26 l-farine Rep,t placed OPCON 1 ACD. . 16. On 31 Harch tho Task Or~anization (maneu~r ba~taliol'ls' of'the 1 ACD were as rollows~ ,'-' .' ...... - ".' "-"-. , . . . I}.~· :CON.F~DENTIAL .;, ' . ,. 0' B. 2d Me '. • •.• 0'" ...... :. ,',' . " I 1-5 Cay .' ' ...... I . ',' . . .' 2-5 Cay' o· \ , '." ~.' 2-12 cav .',' ,', :' c. 3d Me ....',' 1-'1 CaY ·2-7 Ca,v 'I '. ,,' : 5-7 Cay " - D. 1st Marine· Rest 1-1 Mar ' 2-1 Mar r',, 2-3 Mar E. 26th Marine Rest 1-26 Mar 2-26 Ml\r 3-26 Mar 1-9 Mar , 17. Ch 7 ApoU, the 3d MVN ABN TF entered the PJ£GN3US/L~ Sr.N 2C17 A area ot operations and ,initiated joint operati.ons in coordination ~,rri coo-peration 'with 1 ACD. ' . 18. II April: , A. 1-32 Cay released OPCON lat' Bde, 1 fLCD; placerl OPCON. 2d l3de 1 }.CD. ,B. 2-12 Cav released OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACO; Placed OPCON 2d Bde 101 Abn. 19. on lA April, 2', -12 cay released OPCQr-T 2d Bde 101 AbnJ placed OPeON 3d Bde 1 ACD. .. , .. , 20. 15 April: ' , . .. , • , A. ~he 26th Mar Reg\'., 1st Mar Regt and 2d l3de (-)( l-S Cp.v, 2.• ; Cav) , 1 ACD released OPCON 1 ACD; plac£d OPCOH 3d }.fa.r l)iv. , B. 3d ARVN ABN TF terminated operations ~n mt"J,c)TlCI/LllM QON ')..07A area' ot operations. ' .. \'\ l. . ,21 .1SApril:' . If', . . A. 2-12 Cav releasert OPCON 3d Bde; }llaced ~P.¢9~T 1 Acn. B. 4-31 lnt "aoed OPCON 1 ACO. ' 22. 2) April, , A. 196th Light In!' Me with ?-? Inf and 3-~1 Tni' Bn' 8 1:'laced CT'CI"N 1 ACn. , B. 4-31 In! released OPCON 1 ACD; placed OPCON 196th Lt Inf Bd.e. 23. On 29 AprU, 3d !JiVN Re~ with 1-3 '8n, '-3 an md 2.. 1 .fm .1oinec1. the 1 ACD to conduct joint operations in the l. ShaU ValleV'. ·24. On,30 /'.l)rU the ass1"11Jlent ot ~euver. 'An's of tlo,e 1 Ann we a!ll foll,.".~: A. 1st Bde . . \ ',. '.. :.' 1:8 Cav· . ,., 2 ..8 Cay .. " . 1-12 Co.v . B. 'd Bde .. 1"7 cay 2 ..7 Cay 5-7 cay r I,:," I· - [Z_ • , J ,WARVN I I 2 ... 3 ARVN I I 2-1 ARVN I E~ ~. lieD Control I 2=12 Cav I *CoDiuctiinl't jOint ope~'ations in . 'O':>cpel'atjon and coortiintltinn with lACD I, I " -' i I " •• a.: ... ' ,': .. . . .' , I I I I I I j ... . _. _," ..J .• .. __ ...... 'CONFIDENTIAL, •••• __ ••• _ .... _ •••••••••• -.--•••••~- - ---'" .P '._.~._.-:"_._ ••• ,,_••••• _.,,. __ 'n _.~ __ • _ •• _~~._. ___ • ___-----. I gre$lt.;;--thm-50:{~f -th~ time--(mu~h-~t -this -~a; -le;s~th~n- 500 tt)-; visibilitv I less than or equal to :3 miles about. 60% of the tt'''e, and less than,S milel!t i 85% of the t't"te; measurable precipiiiat.ion fell on 25 dava with 'a ,tracerecorc:lr''''' I I on one other; temperatures were 10 degreQs below expect~d maximums but we~"~ within one or two degrees of expe~t,ed minimums; relative l'lurrddi,ty remained at Us annual hilJh (90-100%). ' ' - , ' The previous re,corti, to our lmowledge, for 'r'ersistence o~ crachin wee..ther was 22 consecutive days. This occured alon!?: 'the Red 'Rh'er 1)elt,a, which is the area of maximum crachin activity, statistical~". Althou2h on1:., 2.f,q 'i,nch~8 of precipitation accumulated durin~ the month a.lmost no evapnration tool,;' place due to h~aV1 cloun cover and hip,h relative humidity. Ad~itionallv, the daU', range, of temperatw'es was only 5-7 de~eas when'lo-lS d.~o:ree ranP.'e "as expected. ,Relatin~ t~is abnormal crachin went'her to the d-obal weather pic ture it appears, fran'data available, tha:t:.t'l1e month ,of Februarv was ",ore severe than ave'l"age in mM,V' p..,~s of the nOl't.hern hemisphere. 'r.l,isseems , especia~ true on the east COi:l.sts of t.he oont,inent. C3:inee crac"t~n wea.ther and its initiator, the northeast monsoo.'l, have tl,oir oridns in the comi,ncn tal air mass of ea.stAs18" art'( del)8.rt.ureb fro"! :",'1thin this' air ma:ss retle~M in the local dav-to-day 'Weather in areas 'down stream frQ'l\ the' sourt:;e redon.':. This Seems to be a case muc;, in evicience Ulro"~hnut. the ,TAA q't'TW~.'II: A.O. in the, month of Y;'ebruar:y. . ' ' During the first, +,'WO 'Weeks of M8rch, modp.rate oli... s~nre now hrouQ;ht ,low str.atus and fo~ conditions throul1,hout the .T1l:B ,~TUA'R.'I' A('.. Ceilil"'~ \IIere SOOf at ni~ht but tl.'enerallv raised to 1500' to 2000' liurin'q da~15,Ill1.t/' hours. Vis-, ibilities were' poor at ni.v.ht ann in t. he mornin 0' ,( *-2 mil.p.s), #1M ; ncr.~ sFld to 4-5 miles in haze during the da". The latt.er pat't of the lTIonth was characterized by southerlv' flow durint( whic,", overall conditions :1.rnN-oved. Ocoasional occurences of stratus still 'brou~ht ceil:i.nO'S of "00'-1,000', am ground fog WIlS common but dll.v11~ht c~illtlg5 ~vel'cp:ed 3000'.' Haze continuP.Ci 'IiO limit visibility to 5-6 miles. 'l!he extreme and mflan tem'OflrptUl"es ',"ere: V'~x 94/«7; }.fin 62/70. Rain fell on 12 dayS with accumulation of 2.21 inches. Average relative humidity wasPf'!'/,. . , :',' ' 2. PEGASts, JEB STUART II, T.>ELANARE (April). Operativn P1J;~AStTc) a.ni Oper ation JEB STUART II were relatively unaffected bv weco.ther. ,Fo~ and low stratus limited operational hours to the Mrioci 0000-2000 hou~' on manv da:rs. 'How ever, during these hours ceilings ot2000' 'or better' and'visibilitv of 5 miles or greater w.. e predominam. Showers fell on 6 days hi;t: the ll.ccumulation did not significantly affect operations. Oparation Delaware was adversely a.ffected by a late-senson frnntal pa.s8e,~e , on D+2. Accanpanying the passage Wore veY"'{' low ceilit'l~s, foa;, a.m intel'1llit-, tent drizzle ~ showers. These coYrlit1ons persisted for foul' davs. As the, , frontal system dissil"ated conditions improved SOm!'-1hat with davt.1"'e ceilings 2()()") i to 3000'. EVeri 'these cellings tehcled to parti,allv obscur'e s01l\e of the . higher peaks. Night t"me fo~ and l~ stratus perSisted throultl month's end., Precipitation accunul.ation was not 0. si~i1'icant, factor.' " Maxi.m\Jll temperatJures for April: Extreme 98, mean ~; miniJlNlU teltlt'erl'l.tures tor the month: extreme 62, mean 73. Rainfnll: COaCJt 2.67 inches: 'mountdns 3.53 inches. Mean Relative tfumidity ~~. • • " . ""~ ...... - .. ---~ TA8 E. I ~., .... -.' ~ . -r. t.' " cu.-~. J.U~ ..I.4:; ... n •.Japper on ana vne nut:! V~vY .")apper nn O'Pera1:.ea 1:.0 1:.r:\6 weS1J 0] Hue City under the control of 'l:'ri-Thien-Hue }~i1itar'lr Rem."n ij('I. "'he ~lOth LF Bn was operatinR South and T~Tost of Hue. . The unsuccessfu.l attack of (,luang Tri City was launch~rl lit 030(') l,rs' 31 January. The principle reasons for its failure were poor coorrl:i.ne>.t:ion" 'lack . of reconnaissance" and underestinntion of the 1st ACO's cap;:bD.it,tes. Anprox- 1ma.tely 700 were killed. After the attack part of the ~12th Ree;im.ent moved to the Thac M~, River area South and &'\st of Hai Lang. other elements returned to Base Area. 101. . .. The enemr attack on Hue City. achieved surprise and wassuc~essful in seizing a major portion of the city. As pressure from all:i.ed elEfllents in creased the enemy was forced ba.ck along the western ',ol8.11. 'T'he h16t.h Rn" 5t.h Regt" Which had moved from the Hal 1nng Forest" arrived in J.fue to reinforoe on 17 Februarv. It pas':1ed south of Khe Sanh" throu .... h the Bll Long Vallov" through Base Area 101 an:\ 114" through the La Chu area and arriverl .?t Hue on 22 .'lr'~~, ?3 February. The 7th En e..~tered the oitY' on 22. Feb. Elements of the 8th L: ~L:,·.;t'ed on the following day. The 29th 'Regt" 325C NV.~. Oiv, had also moved from the Khe ~anh area tq reinforce enemy- elements of Hue. 'The Tlressuro exerted .fruu ~rlU west of fJue initiated on 21 Feb by tlote 1st Ml),dispel1ed a.nT enenw hope of perm~lrip,ntlv holdinp; Hue. On 25 Feb eneJm~ element.s vacated the city with the 6th Reg''', ,)Gt:.h Regt (-) and 29th P..e~t. (-) movina: to the W€;st and southwest of Hue and the 4th 'Rege movinlT, south to the Nam HOEl, area ",flS oontrolled bv the Trl-'T.'~ien-Huo t!R, HQ which was loca.ted. sout,hwcst of the cit,'r .. EnelI\Y' losses in the battle are present.ly carrj.ed at ovp.r 500n ene1l!'T l~il1.er1. Since the battle of Hue City elements of An3d Re~, 3,?l.th ~nlfl l1iv· have moved east alonp.: the coast fl'orn. t"e Cua VirJt area to a t'IOslt-lon 't"orth. .?nc1 northwest of Hue. The 4Sth am 52d Regt's of the 3?oth T'TVA niv he.ve TTll'lved ,from the Cam to area toward C~. Viet. 'ttfithin the .in:Fi S'T'TTf.11T Af'l, t"lf) eneT'(!lr has been concerned w:i,th the evacuation' of tl,e 'Hue Q.ren arrl 'nrotect.in&r supnl-v routes along the Thach Mt!. and ~on~ Bo Rivers for sll'O}.")lv of 'Ra.'3e /\rf>.1. lrll fl.!"'rt, . 114 (southeast) res·pectivolv. Enemv oonstruction on route 547 from A "h~.\.i Valley to Hue Oi ty and indications of ll!.rge movements of fresh units end ro p1acement.s show the determination oft.he enemy to aMempl'. new large scale r,t- ta.oks in the Quang Tri-Hue Area. . I KIA-NVA/ve 1,%3/150; CAPrUREl)- NVP.!CS 32/9; Y"TFi;AF'CiNS- ~A/C9' 351/106 j Dur:ing the first 2 weeks of r·t\rch the enemv continued to reorganize, re .1 inforce, and resuppJ,v in prep..1.rlltion for' a renewed offensive. Oper£l,t i ons against allied units initia,1.4" appeared to be hil.rrassment· in nature, cM.rnc terized b.1 stand otf attacks by rooket and/or mortar fi~e, interdiction of . camnunications routes, and extensive use Qf mines and booby traps in arQa,s oritical to fr.l.endly supply activities. The enEllllV increased his aotivity in the A Shau VaJ.ley am along Rout~ 547 to establish a large logistical base and I I a secure oonrnuniortions route west of Hue_ 'The numerous rocket. positions oriented toward te ani allied installp.tions" and a decrea.se in normal activitv i indicate the imninence of a renewed offensive. I CONFIDENTIAL· . I , . ~~ ,',. I.. . . , ' .. Regiment in the vicinitv of Hue. This move was' .accomplished in less· than" ... 36 hours. .' .. . : . '. During the last two w:eeks of Harch the J".1lies launcheci a~~es~dve t.I.ttp..c"·} . ap,ainst known and suspected enany concentrations, with the lst'ACO att.acking . into Base Area 101 and Base Area li4, the l()lst Ab~ 'Div at.tackinp.:. northwest ...... of Hue am southwest of t h G citv alon.~ Hwy 547, and 1st /rJW~T Di visi OTl at tacking west, north, and south of Hue a.nd "lest into tho st.t'.~ng area north. of, Hwy 547. ARC Lights, llir 'Strikes alld. Naval Gunfire weJre emplovecf against lmown on~ concentrQ,tions. Tl-te Allies quickly .qa~ned the il1:tti.a.tive, dis- "/", organized the ener/1Y', and forced the enemv to abandon his plans fdr' an offon- siva, at lea.st temporar:i.ly. . KIA-NVA/VC 852/207; CA'PTIJR'8D- ~WA/VC 36/k2; WEAPON3- SA ICS 2"5137 2. PEG/SUS, JEB STUART II, lJELN·IT/IRE (April). DurinI\'( the reporting period, the First Team completed two operations and oontinues in a third. The first fift.een days of AprU, durin.~ Operation Pegasus~:Lm Son 207 A, the enemy con tinued wlthdrawinq' from the Khe Sanh area, with large se~ents of his estim- . ated 16 battalion force moving to the 'W'est into Laos. Ope'\"at.ions allainst allied foroeB consisted primarily of delayin,?; tactics for tl,e first week, de~enerating into full-scale retreat from the vast firepO''1er of the a.irmobile forces. The enemy was forced to aband.on large smountsof eqni'l"'lment, we.?nons and ~1tiorl in ol'der to salva~e his \,lo.nin~ troop stren~,h, seri.ouslv rle pleted by incessant B-52 strikes immediatelv pri or to" f.lnd dur:i.1"'~ t,1,e earlv phases of the operat,ion. 'fhe enemy offered lit.tle or no res~ stance. to ellie~ efforts to open Hi[~hwa.v 9; those contacts that mrteriaiized '·'.F.;re nert'et.l"pt.ed om of desperD.tion Ut~on beinr; trapped bV the hip,"'lv mohJ.le allies. In the later phases of the operation the enemv reacted prw.rilv with st.andoff rocket and art.illerv· atta.cks, manY from the sanctu8.l""{ of Le.os. "['he np.l'l snec:isl T'orcea camp to the west of Lang Vei wa.s stubbornlv defencied hv ~.n estimf.lteo batt/alion~ as \\'QS the prominent terra:tn features of Hills gal North And 47 1. Tl1.e I!lnan" ~ took fl1ll advantage of holding r,i~h P,round to c1.elav allied anvances to the Laotian bOl"der. Operation JEB STUIIRT II brought the First Team back to the coastal nlains to bolster security for t.he lst, ilir Cavalry Division base areas. The enemy con:lucted reconnaissance and resupply missions in pre pa.rE'.t iOl'I for' a second offensive against Quang Tri and Hue City. H;gh level coordination meetin~s were disclosed throu~h numerous ngent reports and ma:n:r Pr·ep..'\rert rocket launch ing sites appeared oanpleteJy encircling CllJl1P Twans. Simultaneously, the enenw continued their efforts nt. opening 0. mo.:i.n supply route from the A <3hau Valley to the mountainous area. west of Hue City. The lAst eleven days of the month of April" the enemv increased his repositioning activity considerab1:y-, movlnp.; large forces into Base Areas 101 and 1l4j {;loS well as sa.thering supplies to support a planned offensive. The A Shau Valley became an area of deep concern to the eneay as· the allied forces air assaulted into the long-time logistical oom.plex nnd base area. 't'he el1em:'r had provided an excellent air defense capability for the vall~r \-lith at least two battalions of anti-aircraft gtmS, ranP,ing in size from 12. "'mm thro\l.~h --'~'-- ._ .. _-- .~~-..:.------CONFIDENTIAL .' 3't r 1•• - .. L" __ ._ -----. ~--~------Guv~nllage 01' Dell1g able to maneuver large ~ fight:i.n~ !.o-:'ceslnto 'A8.seAreas and ostens1bl¥ 101 .m, for the pur.pose '0£ 1n1tiatinO' another. offen~ive. OPERATION PEGASUS/I.J~ SON 207 A: . .' . KIA-NVA/VO lD42/2' OAPTURED- ~rvAlvo 1.3/0 ltImAPNlS- SA/Ct) 473/190 , OPERATION JEB' STU/.RT II: I . I " . KIA-WA/VO 224/1 OAPTUREO- 0/0 t'lEfJ'rr-:f3... 2/0 OPERATION DELAWARE/LA!8 SO~J 216: (CoJtinuin~) , ' KrA-NVK/VO·l'J'J/S7 CAPt'URr.:D- 1/0 lW}'ONS- 54S/2~ . , ..... • I'," • " • '\ ~. .' I." \',,~ • i':" "'. " ., I • , . . \. : "'f .' , . " \ . ", .... " , '. ~, . ,', " ',: . ',. ',,' I i , . ' ~', ,\., , " , I, .;, I • ' I. ', . o • '.' " •.••. 'I . " , . . . i " '. -': ; . ,I' ':',' .. ,' ::.. .' ~:,.,.~., !"'" ~ ',. • • 'f .. , ,.' ••• ':...... '. " ',' ~" : ',,' " " ,'. f~ ,I " ••:: 1 •• , .\ . i r" " .... :1 i I . '., ....• '" " ,", . .1 ...... '-', .1. \ ," ,'...... _•••• r .' . .. ,.. ' ~." '. r" ~ I',", ". ", I •." , , ,', .t '," .. ,'j' ' .. ' . " ';'" i ' I . , I . . . . , \ 35 ' . ,"; .. ' ., . ,COI1ftDfrtTtAL . ' i ," . L . .-, - ~. I " , •• :.' 0/; .. ': . " .. : '.~. '. "" •• .. ... UV.LV \'.uu~JJ flr....uLIJ '-11'1· ·0/0 .' 2. General Canments; Aerial surveillance continued to be severelV' C1.ll" tailed by unfavorable weather conditions' and the .shorta.ge. of pilots, A. m. During the reporting period the: Iv.~TA Platoon was Doble to complete o~ 10% of the scheduled missions. - A total 'of 507 missions \'{~::,,"e' . cance1led···due to weather conditj.ona and 36. cancelled due toaircraf't, or sensQr malfunction. The J\STj~ Plntoon' lost· one OV-IC· aircraft. to ground fire on 6 . Apr 1968·. The a.ircraft was completely lost. No repla.cement aircraft has been rece:ived to') date leavingthe.ASTA Plat.oon With 2 rernainin~ OV-lC·aircraft. ; . B."'&4•. t"1.The ASTA Pla.toon continued t.o support the }'ar1.(E't Time operCl:tj.ons in conjunction with the US Navy. A totnl of 211 missions were scheduled and 95 were ·oompleted •. SLAR Operations were curto.Ued severe1vbv the loss ,of one OV-lB aircraft. during a rockot attack a.t Hue-Phu Bai on 2t. Mar 6$. A ... replacement, OV-lB aircraft. was received 21' J~pt "6~, hut was not nU.$sion-rea.Qy' until 1iH. 'Apr 68. . . '. :. '.' ...... : .. " C. PHOTO. A total of 237 missions WAre scheduled during the period ., of which 52 are· still outstanding. 'A majority of' 'the missions 'not completed... are :in the A Shau Vall£w. A tota.l of 9 hand held missions were oonducted bv .. the 3d· -Brigade in planning theJ.r assault :into the A ~ho.ll •. Cllmoufiage ·detect·~. .()n film was .used on' 8 missions during the mon+.h of. Apr and in ea.ch cs.se excel- . lent. results were obtained. Units desiring camounage detection missions .... !:lould submit approx1matel.v 4 ta.rget areaS, assignin~ -aa.en· a Tlrioritv:. ,This' will allow the use Q£ 1..1. full roll of film. 3b . ..,... ~ ... i CONFIDENT.IAL ,.-~ _ ... - --____**' __ -,. ,!i>7, ...... ; : ,. : .. - " ...... " - go """\III ,lSW&O'U.pl:t Gnu ~lU.Wl1;,ry p.La,1;,oonl5, a:s reau;z,reQ. ' ~. 191st Military Intell1gence Detachment. The 191st l'In continued to provide Order of' Battle, Counterintelligence, Imagerv Interpretation and Int erro~ation of' Prisoners of' vk1r support. to the 01 vision duriJ"1~ thc' r~POrt.: " I i I' I, " '. : , I I i . !' i I I I I J, I I 3? ... _.". .~~. -r1t6 U CONFIDENllAL ,',: .' .. ' .... ,,~\ -s. ...... ", ...... ~.' ...... ,~_ ..... t ...... I.. ,I"'.t::.'.":::~.:;::::.:-:--...-:~ ____ --:-' \I~""-' . ~---~'~=~~n~",=,=,,'=,.=7~""I,,'~rl~ .'0...... ,;.L,.... ""'. .""'" ~~_._""'"'-.~.. ,,~,~,,=~~=~~.=,=,,=,=;,==,=~=.~_='=-=i~;~=,1~6~·~I~I"="~.'~_ ,~. = _ -·-t'· 'I'" - - ... "._ •• _ : .... . 2. The operatin.~ sti-enpt,n of t"le divJ.s·! on l:'eTl'laine 3. ;!)taff. "".s~ts ,,/ere l'n3l~.e +'0 1st C'~VS.lr"7 solrliers ~.n hosp:i.t.a.ls t.h.rourr~o"t.. Vj ..tns.:n. . l'etho(l.s were worked. out to provi0.e a MOre expedit~ ous s""SteTl\ fo' rf)f'irectin~ mail. ., 4. Persoi',;,-el ')ervioes for t''\e cliv:i.sion continuer' to axpn,~. ann.. improvf'l. 8.• A Fost :~ci.~.n;'!.e was open&.1 !=I,t Ca.'l'\p ~w.ns" b. J\ laundrY opera.ted by Vietno?mesr:: ~·'8:··,iona.l.s we,a es+,ahl-t.s'l1~ rt. CaTllp '[wana. c •. Ii. centra.l 'Jarber sht)p "d.th Loe8,). Na.t:l.0ne.~ bf.',rhers also opened for i businoss. I . d. A becr ft~. fJonit bulk BaleR outlet, Nf1.S estr:-b1" s'l1e~. hv t,"te T)ivis:i.on I Club 3ys~·,ern., i e. A Piaster exc'1::1,n"'e poi:''!:' w~s es·l·,G,bl..lshert.• I 5. ')."'e diviR50n filltr.. :,'I.P, J'n rn1 Cut-of-Countr'lr '1'1~~ allocai'.i""nl; nurln17 t.l.le per:l.od. As of ? J·arch all I~-Coun·l·.~ B.c~.'1ls swit/ch.e~. from. Vunl'" 'J'au to I China. :'eA.ch in 1)a ran,'!'. ~e weeklv allooat5orls ~,t, C'~~ TI ..::" 'Cleac~ :i.ncre8,s~. ~ n April from ~ t,O 110 per week. 6. ',"he Cust~.ie.n, C~ntra.l fost. j"UM, t.ravelArl t.o .Tapa1'1 an'" 1113"'Ot.:i;.li:,~ contacts for CPF ht'..sinesa to :i.r..cl".~~ TI1.oment,oes t,o h~ p"'e")ent,en t.o all l'lv:m ! . bnra of ~rT1Ji: FJR'1T m.!~" rl.eTJrl.rtin17 Vietnam. 7. A pro@:ram to reduce t~e 'nU"'ber of offioer, rcc anrl ~list,~. cluhs a.t I . C~ Radcliff was initiated.. ".,. +.'-'e end of A:wU all. ;"ut. 1. rrN.cer· 8,n~. /." •. ' r;cco/llM club.s ha~ bean phaseq Ot~ or operrt,ioX'. 8. . In lr.arch ll.8 ottenses :vertJ rrocnsse~. b"f the Provost. l'a.rs~A.11 s office indic,=:tinl". a hi~h degree ot'~i~cipl"!'e, ld,'., M("~ orr1 er throw:r"ou4:', the ~:~v , ision. The division cOl-rt1nued. to strict,l"lf enforoe the off limits policv .'.: for all popuhtr. areas eXcey:rt, for t,~, 'SEI personnel cow,"ct·ir..tr of'ficJ,al " bus:Lness' anr~, ·t.a,ct.icP.l. .operat. ions • . ~.. : t .' ..." . '. . '':'9. »ue tocont,&t!:dMtert w&ter, thi":'.-e W;',.S ai', out''''rea.k of ~aatroent-.erit~,8 in . ·volvin,1approx:1matel.~r 50;; o.t'tho ,li.v'sion c:1.urh,'" th.t3 la.st t."10 weeks r")'f' April. Awropriate steps Were tlo.k~.n t,? p!'ec1w'e' 0. rMccurance. ,.', \ ", , 'I ' .. .. 10. Uorale in the ..1j.visirm rAr.'I8.ined...~h~.: CONFIDENTIAL . :t. ': ;}~.: : (.. . .... i . t' ,$ r b " I 1 • 5 . 0109 e of Period Aunt . 13?0. 710 1?392 ~Q4?2. ASao· ).!2~606 . 17?R~ 19191 '" " , . . .' . . ,." " .. , .. . . ',. I I t ' ..,: I ," .,. "1 " I' '" . . I I . ! I I I . I I ,. I . . . ___ -: ...... , i ...... _.__ ...... r'" _v, - - ;.. ~I .... ,. ,TOTAL " ~~"" 196.2 " 'f' .... ' ... ' ReprueDt;1J !)8raomelWtto ",er$' reported'K!A' :durlnlt this 'O"riod andwh<;> "," ,', .~ ~ 1f.t'.I\ 'statu. ,as ottt,e end ot'th*" report,' J)e1"1od. . t, \ . ~~. , ; .' '.' -': ,.... ; t· ", .:' :- •.! "" " 1"':,-' ;" .; .- . ',( " ...... , .... . "" "', , ' .', .: ',#' ,'- .... '. ','" . ",,"': ,', " .... I .. , "~.. , ','" ~,};.; ',: " I 1 ••~ ~)I I. t :, ~ \ • : I . ~ .', I ',_ ". " .... I . I' ;, , .. "~." ::~ :~\. ~:" " :' I.·... ::',' ".~, . ,. "".,0" ••.• '\' ,: ". ,'! ,", " : _.' • '... ~ • • • I . I • : .\ I ••.. ,I .. ,.... , ' . .. *0 .. r~¢-ONFIDtNT'A(: . I .. '. 11 •• _', • •• _.~ • . _. ~ __ ...... _.:..:...... :. .. •.•,r._~ .. ',: f. tL ,.. l ,'- ____ ~ ____ ,__ _ ,,--~------~----..------~..._~._t'...,...,.., .. ,...... ,...... ,...."'"'!':"-., .. _r...... -.,...... "':""',.,~,.,, urncera 359 176 i I,', ~. !, warrant Officers i 212 12, .i' Enlisted ~ 2m Total. 1.675 36l.2 ,,': ' . .' . , . ", .. , , . ' •••• r Lf' C'ONFI'DENTIAL " . ....I -- -- '---1 1--· --. .L.}l>fi O~~ .en 2d Bn" 7th Cav' 15th lidmin Co 5th Bn, 7th Cav " " ::, 545th MP Co \' :' .,'. ',: .:' :' c . 1st Sqdn, 9th Cay . , . 504th MP Co ',:', '. HHB D1 v Art., 5B3d I.(I net ',' . 2d Bn, 20th Art;y 41st PI l)P.t .. ': '. : .:' ... ~ '.' ' : 2n Bn, 19th trtv 42d PI Det .... .: . ,. . .' 1st En, 21stArt~ 25th Int Plt (~.,,) . . . ,'. . . .,' ;', ... .',' ':'.'; 1st Bn" 77th 'Arty 34th In!' P1t '(131) ...... :., ..... ; .... Btry E, 82d Arty 26th Chem Det .. . '.,:...... ,; ..... 5th Marine Gun Platoon l&th Chem T.let .: .. ' ". t '. :'., , ; :'. ", I. • '/ t \ .. ', .. ~ '" .. 1st Bn, 30th /a:t7 191st. ~I Det . . .. liliO, 11th Am Gp 14th )1'11 lfiqt 1)et" .'. . . : .•'" > \' 11th r;<)Avn Co .... '. . 47Bt.h Avn Co . . .~. . .' ., .': " · 227th Avn.Bn·...... ';' ":":.'." ... ~. 342d ''1'rana ..' .. ,'. :,"" '.... :" . . .·.22sth Avil 1m.. :::: . :. ...,;:'...... ':: .;;:;."'.: ' .. .~9t,: .. ,~~ ..' .(~ :~-:·:·/'::·.:~\i.;;.;{;,/,!· ... . .:.;~~~ :!J '=:"'Co . ':. ::: ":.' :';,:, .:.. , ...:.,-., ...... : ... -:.. :.: ..:.... ,:.';: .. ::.: .. ";~.:.':.. ';.:.:::::.:.'.'.. ,;:... ;.l::... .' : 62dlnr?lt .: ..... : .. ;~ '::' " · ~...s.. 1\.... :. ',...... '...... ' ' .. . .'Wea. ~cm·· 1"" ~ :.·Y .. I" '.' . . 5th .' ...:' .". . .. , .I, 15th Med an . . . . 1st Bn, 'SOtih IT-I. .f'tloc~~). . , .. , '. 15th S&S Bn · 15th TC an .. ' ~ , 27th )faint Bn . " ,. , .. /' ... .' I .... '. )',' . ' . 'I' " . '.:. 0 0. ' " . . • '.,." .1.· .. ·,'.' .•: .• ,.' '. '. ". .';:' ~,~ ,." ~' : .. ' " ,,' . ".' . .. " " '!: ' ' ":i .1 '. '0 I' '. ' ~ , ,' . . " 1\ ' ... ' ,t.' ' • " '"'I" '. . '. ..' .. ~l. . . t, I \ " .CONFIDENTI'AL :'. I •. ,', ',' .,' " (.. T I f"" ...•.. ,-, ••. -. ,-.-_. - --'--'--'-':-"-- ',II '~.". . ;~. ~ONFIDENT'AL . '. '. . . , .. SUl3JECT: Ope~ationa1 Report 'for Q.uartor~ Pericd Ending 31') April 1968" \. TAB D~ Task Organization (Cc,nt) C. 196th Lt In! Bde . 2 ..1 I.l'lf 3..,'21 !nf 4-31 Inf . D. 3d N.m Regt* t I 1-3 Jl.RVN . '2-:; ARVN 2-1 ARVN E~ ~- ACD Control 2=12 Cav *CoDiuet;in~ joint ope~'ations in .oocpelutjon and coorciil'lf.l.tinn with' 1 ACD " .': .. . .' ' ... . . . _...... _ _ _ ..J .• _._ ._ ...... 'CONfIDENTIAL . I So~e clearing was evidenced on the last two d~vs ot the month. altho~h mod I ~:rate earl.y mornin~ ro~ was preSent on those two davs also. I I. !3ignif'icant effects of the crachin were: ceilings were less 'tha.n 1500 ,feet I gre~ter th811 ;0% of the time (much of this was less 'than 500 it); visibilitv . less than or equal to 3 miles about. 60% of t·he ti1"'le, and less than.; mile~ . 1 i 85% of' the t"t"'te; mea.surab1epreeipiLat.ion fell on 25 daV9 with 'a tracerecorc!f''''' I I on one other; tEmperatures we!"elO degreQs below expect~d, maximums but we''':) within one or two degrees of expect-ed minimums; relative hu1'llid1,ty rema5nod at Us annual hiS?;h (90-100%). The previous recorci, to our lalowledge, for' T'ersistence or crachin weather was 22 consecutive day-s. This occured alonlt 'the Red 'Riv'er l)elt.a, whioh is. the are'1 of maximum crachin activity, statistioall.V. Althou~h onl.v 2.(,C) ",no}o,~8 of preaipitation a.coumulated durin~ the month almost no evapnratifJn tool~'. plaoe due to h~avv clou~ cover and hip,h relat~ve humidity. Adoitionallv, the daU', range, of tempera.tures was only 5-7 de~ees when'lG-15 d,~o:ree range '\\tS.8 expected. ,Relatinp, t~1s abnormal crachin weat'her to the ~obalweather pic ture it appears, fran'data avallible, tha:t ·tl1e month ,of Februarv was ,",ore severe than ave'l"age in man.v p."rt,s of the nOl't.hern hemisphere. '{'l,is seems . especially trua on the east coasts ot t,he cont,inent. ~ince crac~~n weathp,r and its initiator, the northeast monsoou, have t~oi~ orip,ins in the contincn-· ta.l air ma.ss of east ·As:hl., any depart-ure:' fro'" :'\\'ithin this' air ma:ss ref'leetErl in the local dav-to-day weather in areas 'down str&"\Dl !ran the' sour~e redon.':, This seems to be a case muc;, in evitience t.hro'u~hl"lut the .Tm ~"('tTA~."': ~O in t.he ' month of Io'ebruary •. ' During the first +,wo weeks of M~roh, modp.rate ort ... shl"lre noW' hrou£ht ,low str,atus and fo~ conditions t~rou~hout the .T'Ii;'R STUA'R'r A('\. Ceilil'l~ ~ere 1)00' at ni~ht but ~eneral1v raised to 1500' to 2000' durinq da""l~,llht,' hours, Vis ... ibilities were' poor 'at nip;ht and in t,he mornin~ ,(~-2 milAs), Rro increl!sACi to 4-5 miles in ha.ze during the da"'. The latt.er }:larl, ot' t,he month ~as characterlzed bv southcrlV' flow durin.a: whict, overall condit'i ons :imTlroved. Occ.o.sionaJ. ocourences ot' stratus still broup.;ht ceil.i.nas of '700'-1,000', am ' ground fog WIlS comnon but dnv11~ht oeilltlgs' ~veI'C~ed 3000 t .. 'Haze oontinuP.(i 'IiO limit visibility to 5-6 miles. 'the extreme and Tl\flan temnHr p tu't"6s .,"ere : 'flex 9lJm; Min 62/70. Rain fell on 12 da.yS with accumulation of 2,21 inches. Average relative humidity was «11.. ' , ,:'. ' . " 2. PEGASU3, JEB STUART II, 'OELANARE (April). Operatic...n PE~AStTS am Oper- . ation JEB STUART II were relatively ~f:fected bv W9l'.ther. ,Fo~ and low stra.tus . lllnited operational hours to the PQriod 0000-2000 hou~' on manv days. How- ever, during these hours ceilings ot 2000' 'or better,.and'visi'bi~tv of 5 miles or greater w... i3. predominant. S~owers fell on 6 days hiit: the ll.c;:eumulationd.id n · .. 1 :3 December to Base .l\rea 101 to participate in t~e attacK on f'll1ant.t Tri Oi tv. other pg.rti oi J:f't e Q.lrl,:,.~dv ill t ~e ('h,li:' n~ Tri a rea ",er~ t. lot e ~11,j,t h nn, lit, h ~Ti] t\ Regt, and the loth Sapper Bn. T~e 6th Regt was opernting fr~ Ra1e Area 114 I in the vicinitv of Hue •. T~e newlv formed 4th Re/lt op~r~teti in the Phu Loc I area. The 12th SaJ'rler Bn and the Hue. Citv Sapper fin ol'erated to the west of Hue City under the control of 'l.'ri-Thien-Bue }'~ilitar'lr ReP.i,.,n W'. 'l"he ~lOth LF Bn was operatinR South and T/Jost of Hue. . The \Dlsuccessf,\l attack of (.)uang Tri Ci tv was launch~rl nt 0301) l,rs' 31 I' Januar;r. The principle reasons for its failure were poor cooro:i.nEl.tion" 'lack of reconnaissance" and underestinntion of the 1st AC'O's cal:'\f:b5J.it,ies. Anprox imately 700 were killed. After the attack part of the ~l2th Ree;iment moved . to the Thac Ma. River area South and East of Hai Lang. Other elemf?.nts returned to Base AreA. 101.. ' .. The enemr attack on Hue City achieved surprise and was.suc~essful in seizing a . major portion of the city. As pressure from allted elEfl\ents' in creased the enemy was forced baok along the Nestern 'Jlall. ""he h16t,h Btl" 5t.h Regt, which had moved from the Hai 1ang Forest, arrived in Hue to reinforce on 17 FebrUArv. It paso;ed south of Khe Sanh, throu.,.h the Btl Long Vallov" through Base Area 101 ant 114, through the La Chu area a.nd arriverl ~t Hue on 22 or'. ?3 February. The 7th En entered the city on 22. Feb. Elements of the Bth E.: ~L :.':;red on the follOWing day. The 29th 'Regt, 3250 NVA 'Oi v, had also moved from the Khe ~anh area tQ reinforce enemv elements of Hue. 'l'he -pressure exerted .i'I' ". '. . ... '. "·.f " , ':" "'. \, : . I' '. l' .' .!, .... ~ . . ", :.~ ,.,,::. -, ., .. : :... ;' .,. ,. 'f '. " .. . , ' t • .. , , .\ '. ',. . ' ... ~ " . '.1, • ' I...... " \ ...... '/ .',,: ";', , ' , ; , •. " ~ t' ; ;. •• .. :.; •. 0, ...... ,~' ~...... '..', I ,! .,: '.' 'I... I '. ,:: •• ,' •.~ " '. .' .1 " ,'. •• • ',.. ! •.. • : ~ : '. " . oj ~ • • ,'. .', i:.:,1 ,.: ,: : .' ,..,.'.. .. i '. ," , ~, 4 :. " , 'i • ·.r ...... " .' '.' I . , • ,.'. ' •. . . . '. , .1. \ ', .1 ...... I.,.' , '. :: •.". 1'" I,. ~ 1 ':"" '.. ',.' .'. :i .. ,~:' ~:., :1' I , . .:.', . i' I , , . . . . " \ 35 . .• 'DfftTtAl . , ...... ,. . . C'ONFIDENTIAL .~ • I I I 'Tt; . SUBJECr: Operational Report for 0.utlrterlv Period Endh~~ 30 Ap~ll 19"ft . ' . '0" TAB Q: 'Ael'ial Surveillance .: i 1. Mission Statistics for the Period 1 Feb-30 Apr 6~ •. MISSION TYPE ASTA SOH!) ICOO HI Mj,F Smm/COl~ RE'ULTS IR , 606/63 IS/UN!{ , ll~ HmFOT~ .. .. . SLAft 211/95' % 2209 MOVPY; TARn.m ., .. ' PHOTO . 237/185 41/23 ' , . PHOTO (HAND HELD) 9/9 % .' ; '2. General Canments; Aerial surveillance continued to be severelv cur tailed by unfa.vorable w~ther conditions' and the .shortage of pilots. A. IR. During the reporting period the: tv.f3TA Platoon was Doble to complete onl.y"lO% Qf the scheduled missions. ,A tote.l'of 507 missions l'\e:.... e· , cancelled'l due to weather conditions and 36. cancelled due toaircra:f't. or sensor malf'Unotion. The ~\STj~ Plntoon' lost, one OV-IC· airoraft to ground fire on 6 . Apr 1968. The a.ircraft was completely lost. No replacement aircrcd't has been rece:ived tl') date leavingthe.ASTA Plat.oon with 2 remainin~ OV.. 1C·aircrai't. ; . J3."'SLI.R.The ASTA Platoon continued to support the }~arl.<:E>t. Time oper~.tj.ons in conjunct-ron with the US Navy. A totl'.l of 2J:l missions were scheduled~.nd , 95 were ·completed •. SLAR Operations were curtailed scverelvb'r thelo5s .of one OV-lB aircz-art. during a rockot atta.ck at Hue-Phu Bai on 2t. Mar. 68. A .': . replacement OV-lB aircraft:, was received 21' Npr "6~1 hut was not mission-reaQy' , until 'JI. 'Apr 68. . . " :' '.' .. . '. ;...., C. PHOTO. A total of 237 missions W0re scheduled durin~ the l'eriod •. of which 52 are, still outstanding. 'A majority of 'the missions 'nOt completed... are in the' A Shau Va:llew. A tota.l of 9 hand held missions ,were oonducted bv .. the 3d· -Brigade in planning the:i.r assault :into the A ~ho.'l •. Camouflagedetect·~. .on film was .used on' 8 missions, during the mont.h of. Apr and in ee.ch C8.se excel- ' lent. results were obtained. Units des1rin~ camouflage detection missions . ", e::lould submit approxlma.tel.v 4 target areas, ass1gnin~ "ea.ch· a., ",rioritv:. .This· will allow the use of a. full roll of film. , i I 3b \~-·CONFIDENT.IA.L ,I ',." .. ,, , I 'H i " CONFIDENTIAL . J. : .. t [: . SUBJECT: Operational Report far 0uarterlv Pel1.od Ending' 30 April' 196~ : ' J. • ~ TAB K: Intelligence SupPOrt Units, . E. r'. i 1 •. Co E, 52d Infantry (lRP). LRP suwort was provided throughout. the . reporting period in Operations JEB ,C)TUi.RT I & II, P'!l;'1ASUCl am DELA'ITARE. A . " total ot 66 missions were conducted during the reporting period with a total of 177 sightings of 1 or more WAlvc. LRP teaMS continued to provide timely' .. and accurate hard intelligence to the G2. The 1/9 Cay continued to support the LRP's with gunslU.ps and intant1"1 platoons .. as reauired •. 2. 191stHilita1"1 Inte1.l1gence Detachment. The 191st }'!n continued to provide Order of Battle, Counterintelligence, Image~ Interpretation and Int errogation ot Prisoners of \'~r support to the Oivision durinp: the' rI';lPOrt.:J!~ period. ,Liaison was made with existing 1ntelli~enee ~tharinP.' a. : , ' ' . . , , ,I i .', I I I I i 3? .-r1t6 H CONFI-DENTIAL~: "u~nut." III". .• I ; . SlrRJro'1': .('-.:. rt,tiomu'R r.ort f.or·r·.u"'1.rter.l'''Fer5.~~ En~in~ 30 Apr-il 1960 I· TAR I: SumM4I"" of 0-r-1. Activitj.es !. 1. T~le pGnod 1. Ff.l!b 6(\ to 30 Apr:i~ 1.9.~~ 13hO~'le0. a.n i",.prove~. opp.rp.t,:b.~ cap.·;. abW,t,'I" tor t.;e ~."encies All!"l. sP.!ct.:;'''na 'WI!l"(" tl'.e '.1r;n·ernJ. staff sUl'ervision· of t.ho AC ot 8, m. ·Al~. sectit)ns/s.I7'encies cont,::i.nue~ to consoltn.at~·the1r:·. activities at Camp ·~Wa.n8 to provi(l.e hat/·.er service for the nivi~'on. l\ .. ' .... . small element con8ist.~.!'p': ot 1 ott5~cer' an~. 1 elp.rk, .8'3rvet~. S,C: "·1 }~orwP.rd dur'-z~.g Cpera.t.1on Pe"asus n.p.m 'Son 207A'~··. ". . . . . . 2. The operatin~ strenpt,h ot th.e divj)~'~ on reTll.ainM at, aTmroyima.tel~ one ~ .... '. ~I hunr'red. per cent of atythori'Ze~.· 'Ke~'losses n.'lr~ n'" t,l'i~ "'t:lr:l.~ i.nolw~.~, '? 'Rf:I;!·,tali'Jn Canrnanders 1d.ll~. al1.·' 2 me('U.c&11~r 'oevacuat. ed~ '';er:i ()Us sh.orta .... es· co~inued ~o exist in lnftl.ntr:" <'lnri ,i,mor CRpt.Edns, :1i"llEtl ..... {-"N c~rc;, ~·'ar·rai:!:t ('fficer anators (especiall"r OT'47 oual5. ..C'ied.),· Intant~ l1.r1 I S Flrr ..·~rtj.ll"'X"" 13A (t~ D's. A s1·.a.ff· visit t.o t~NW .'.~ wa.s mat1e t,o cooMiro.d,e rerlf.l.cemei\'tis du~.·in~ the pe~k s,nnmer· rot.a~··ion per5.or1. an-'. ,1isCl'1SS pl'!rsonnel ~"ort~ "'eR. 3. :~ta.tf v::l.s:i ts 'tIere rn3!~.e +.0 1st C·~vs.lr!1 solrliers ~.n hospjJ,f).ls t."rourrho"t.. Vl .tna:Z!.. . lrethoo.s were worked out to provi0.e a M.ore ex}:'adit~ o\\S s~tell'l fo' rer'ire ctin~ mail. 4.. P8l"'SOi:i.- el '>ervioes for t ''\e eli v:I.sion oontinu~r' to axplI.M. ann.. improvFl. . .' .. 8 .• A Fost :mx:c'1t~.n.?e was open&.'" ;:I.t Camp ~vanB. b. A laundrY opera.ted bv Vietno?mesr:: ~··~:··.ionals WB.S es·":ah1;.811~ ~t. Camp :wans. c,. A central ')arber sh"p \-d.th Loca.1 Nat:l.()ne~ be.rbers also opened f.or business, . d..A beC!lr E'.~. SOn.R bulk sB~eR outlet, N~S estr:-bl" sl1e~. hv t.lote T):tvis5.on Club :'3ys~·.ei':t.. e. A Piaster exc'1:.l.n"'e poL,t,. W::l.S es·:·.G.bJ.~ shan., 5. ~"e diviR5.on fill~. :,l~~.. In F'n~. Cut-of-Count.l"1r '1fl~ allocai·.i""nl; n,ur:i.ntr t,he per:l.od. As of ? J'a.rch all I~-Cou.n'l·.l'I" 'Rt,?,~ IS swit.chA~. :from. Vunro 'J'au to China :'er'l.ch in Da ran:'!'. 'r.he weeklv allocat:1ons a.t, C'~~ ):1,.::- 't1ea.c~ :i.ncre~.8At1. :i n April from ~ to 110 per week. 6, ""he Cust~.iM, Cr.!lntral fost. J"UM., t,ravelArl t,o .Tap.~n anr1 net.1ot.:i;.lt.efI cOl'ltacts foX' CPF ht".siness to ir..clu . .4 ~ "loment.oes t,o h Po p"'e'3 flnt.en t·o C'.1.1. Yl'v;m bt'lrs of ~rf1]; F:n.r~T ~/!,. rl.er,,8,rti n,'7 Vietnam. .. , '0 :. I' 7. A pro~rSl!l to reduce t~e 'htrber of otfieer, rc:: an('\ ~list,~. c1uhs at . . .. I...... "I', I . Cami' :aMeliff was initiated.· n.r +."'e end of AprU all hut. 1. !"f.t.tcer B.nn. ' .. I tifoo/lM club.s ~~ bean phaser\ Ot~ or o-perr+,ion. I 8. . In lr.arch ll.8 offenses :vere rrocnssE'~. b~ the Provost. lrars~A.l' s office .. .:i.nd.ic,=t1n~ a hi~h degree or'~ilSc1p1 ~;'e .. Itl.w Mr~ orr1er thro,'~hClt1+. t"'e r.1.~ v . iSion. The division cOl"t-lnued.. to striot,lv enforce the off limits poliav .. '.: for all populAt~. areas except. tor th·'st) personnel eC)n~."ct.ir..tr official ., bustM!'s' ami&ctical.operat,1t)ns. ~" ,: t '.' • \9. Due to· coat.iJ!:d.Mtert wat~r .. th~':-e W·'.. s sr.. out,"reak of ~astroent,eriM.8 in Yol.Vin,'J 8.pprox1mateJ.~r 50:~ of tho lay-Ision t:'.urh,,:r t~e last t."10 weeks I'lf . April. Appropriate steps were to.kp..n t.? pz-8clw'e· tl. rMCCUrance. '. --~-- .-.-- . - .-. .._-- -"---"-- ' ,...... \ ". • 'I .. 10. Uorale in the "'Jvisit:m rAT:lained_J:tl~h.~ CONFIDENTIAL. 'JJ~< : l. J:. .' • f · !:'tJ . j... C~N"D£NTlAL-·:'.' :' .:' : ;:.. ... J . ','; :.i~ , ','.. '. .'. . .,', '.: ' .. J'I. .' .'Jr! . j.. .. ~:~~:st=:=r:eport; tor Qua~er~Perlod End~. 3~'~~:~ l~~~; ~.~. ", .....' .: . •'! ' , ;" '. ! ': '., .' .'!'he authorized am aS$1gned strengths at the be't1nnin~ aD! c~o~e of 1;~e I reportinq pe~iocl wre as t ollows: , '. .' , .' ,', . .1 ...,' " i . '.' \ Beginning of. Period "OFF 'f«) ENt Am . .' ,.' •. .1"I· " AUTH.'· '1294, 69'7 i6'"i33 ~~234' . '" . " '. " · 1. . A~GD . 1303 560 16273 18136 •• 1 . Cloe e of Period Atrnl . 1370 710 17392 lCl4?2 ASGO ,12A7 .6(;)6 l'7?B~ 19181 , ": , i :'1 '.: ,'. I , .. ..'" ! ••• ;•. I . , . I . 1 .. ll'__ " . > . I I . ! I 1 I · I I , I .. . , • ' \' '~vv.'" ,~r '-:"7, ~ . ", I" " I , 'SUBJECT'" ~tJlO'nal Report. tor ~ ...17 Period Ending" 30' April 1968 ~ ',"'; ":<' ,..; ,! ': " , ' TAB Itl ~. Rt!porti' , , " ", .' ' ,,', :' , ' ",': ;', \, ~~::, ! . "." II. • ;.: Dur1ii8';~, 'Ma!'oh-:and APi'U tb$ 't\ivi8ion'~ustained ',tbe:foU~n~'!:"tr::;;:::-:r~;:~i:: :,!, ";,,:,.':, ,caS~lt1~~4,;', ,~ ~UA 'HM'" CROWN 'TOX'f.L ,:,: ",',."::,:/':." ':::':;lt~,:<,;,,;,<;,: "\"';:" . • .. " ';'... ~~";: ...,:.. '!. . ~tf1c6r, '3" : , '2rn~' 13 ,6',~'"'''' "1 260," , .' ",,:: . . " . '. . :, ~ .. " .. ~ .- . ..~;, -:~. ", 'r ,,~ .. -~.~:' , ,Eftliate4 aia,: ,1755 "12 'SO 122167 , . . : . . ,:' .:," ~, :'. . . , ': ," 'tOTAL "A"':'" ,1~6,2 85, S6 13'4Z7 , ".,,<:' " ,', :.. :aepres_II' t)8~onnel 'Who "er~' l"8'Ported'1(TA' :durlntt this;'riod andWhQ ' ..... ,', ,,' "~ ~ Ml',A; 'statUe ,as ott"e end ot:th~, report: ))el"iod..' :':\';' " ... . ', . , I' ""::";;;' ',' , ,,', . ;. .. , ~ " ,_:.,::;, . , ; ...... ': .. ;; t·', .,'., .... : .. ' . _.,l" • '." " '-, ~,' . ", . ,- ,.. ',: ' .. ', ':":':"<~:.! " ,'.... , '. ~. .' . .' ~ .. " ' ''', , ;.' .... I, ' ; ' .. , ' " . ,', , ' ' . . I.",I., .''j" . , .... ' .,;." .': ,;',;' ":::,': ,;'1 " " " , .~. .' "', ,',' ": : : " , ' , ..•.... ".' t. : , ' , . . ... ' , , " , . " ,*0 :';' ':'tC'ONFiotNT1Af: • '. ' ~ ~ .. ~ f~' " , ...._'.. ._.:_ _ • _ •• __ ...... _.~.: .....,:;,. ~'.... ~' :: .... 'A ~ ••••_. ~ ...... r-:-;-; .. ·· ,.. ··1 .. :- .. _.-,- ':.:;'"'-~~ ';. . .• . .. ~ I; •. :,.j' ..•.• ":'"\\'!' t '.· ·I.·~S ···r'".CONFIO£,N.TJ,AL.:'~"'·"· ..'. e I· '. ' " I", '} , " I. i . SUBJECT: ()J)eratj.onal Report for Ouart.erlT Pel1.od. Fnd1~ .30/\'"1":11 196A ." .'. ! 'VB L: Rtmlaconent Report; '.. ,. ,. . ~ .' .. :' i , . The tol1owin~ is a bre&kout ot fnccmdng and out@in'f' 1lOrsonne1 tf)lf:~'" ,~04 .. " February, lfarch and A):rU..,, ,,' : <,'. :' .,' . . ' Reelacements Regeived' Rotateea " .," .. ,1. ,. Ott1cers 3S9 176 ',', ,'. ,,'. '. ~rrant Ot.f1cers 212 123 Enlisted ~ 2m Total. t..61,) 36l.2 ',. ': i .' . " , " .. j', I I .' ,.:, ... ': . ';', " .,., • e • . , , ~'.;': ',. '. . ' . '. ,\ .' ". " , , I I. I I I .\ I I 1, . \, '+1 to ", ',\ ... , c -C'ONFI'DEN-jfAL~ .. I I ....1 . .. _-_._-...... ---_. . . .I - ...... : . 'w •• " .. BUBJEOr': 0pa~at1onalRepOrt. tOI' Quarterlr ':l~er1od Fl'id1n~ 30 Anrl1.·.lq0~ . , ..c". ll'AB 11.: List of Dn:i.t8 in the 1st Air ~v·· . '.....' ", ,":.. :" 1st Bn, 12th Cay HHC,' lst. Cay 1l1y ',' ..•. . ; . . , I lat 1m; 8th Cay Co 15, S2d 'Int . i 2d an, 8th Cav ,,! ',I- H'"fC .. 1st Bde i 1st :en, 5th cav 'I, . RHC,. 2d Bde " ,..... i . 2d Bn, 5th OaY . ., , HHC , 3d Bdoa '", .• '. ".', '" •.. 1 ~d Bn, l.2thCa.v ath Fn,,-r Bn '. . l~t Bn, 7th Cay 2d Bn, 7th Cav· 13th S1g an ' , . , 15th Jldm!n Co ,.';:':' .. ,! 5th Bn, 7th Cav c"5th \n:I Co ... ;:' . , ':' ! 1st Sqdn, 9th Cay • JI+ D.~ '. \::,,' -::: .'\.' mm Div Arty 2d Bn.. 20th Art,. 21'\ Dn.. 19th I.rtv ~:~~~! ...• .• .. .. "'::.1 1st En.. 21stArt~ 25th IntPlt (<;\j)" '" ., ':;,'.'. ,;,' •.. ~',".;,:: ','.', I 1st Bn, 77th 'Arty 34th In!' P1t .(C;n) , ""I" ' I Bt.ry E, 82d Arty 26th ahem Det .. ,".:"~ , ",'.. '., '.' , .. , 5th Marine Gun Platoon l&th Chem net , ..... '. , . ....!.. , ","",' , .: 1st Bn, 30th Art7 191st}(I Det , . ", ',";" <'7. '.;, 0',,' •. I lilIC, 11th Am Gp 14th J.fll lfi~t net" ,', . " ", " '.. .:;.'. '.,' ,I 11th ~Avn CC. .' '. ." . 4?Ath .AW Co .. ~' , ",': :: ". " . . 227tb AVIl.Bn .•..... ;," ...... ":' ":.. :'\;.,~. la2d ''''rans ! ,,'.' :." ".: •...... ":'0:, ! 22ath Avil1m :".;. 1 • ", ::. • • ,:';":",, , 229th It; 'Bat"'~' .,::; .. .' ':,:. ;.1 '.," '. .'459th S:l~, T)et'.':,: . ", .,', ,:': .. ':.-,. \;.','>, .. ~:;,:::;, :"'1 t 'n_;,I "b e Co' -' .... ,.' . )" .. " ' ,.. ' "~ '," '. , ,. ~ I\oGU. n.1 .. ' ,.'.:;' .,,"" ,', :" \, ,",':' ',>:':':'::",', =~s:s fi,); ;;; :l:' ... 62d Int?lot . " '. . ,.'. . .' "" .. .. .' ..... '.. . 5th :'Wea CScrdn··· . . c'.',"',' " .' . ", .;'~.. .. '. :" 15th Meel 'Bil . 1st Bn, 'SothO !,.,t .(Vf)C~i). '. " '\;,'::1 15th S&.fJ Bn , , '. " ' ' ..' ' .': 1 , 15th TO Bn . . 'I 27th lfa.1nt an " . " 'l ,I'" '\ , I J , ' .. ,'I , , . . . . "t" ". .,:,,''''', I . .". , I' • It " • .. • .,', .' I I ,,' " .' , : I . '.:. , ;, . I:., ,~:. I'.;. : .. ,' • i I . 4 ;.. :,. . • :', • ;~I: '. 'u.-, " . . • '." ,I , " , . , .. .;: . ~.. .". • • I .'.. ,I"" :." ... I • . ': ; ~ . " • " ~ , " " • , ~ ". ""1 I ~ '., .; '.. • .' : '. • • ", •. . , I " '" 1\ :0' . . .'.' .. '"'I" '. . ' ; . 4.\-)...... , • '. I \ ... .. CONFIDENTIAL: ~ , .- :' .., l •. . - " ,. '; ... ~. ----,-.------'~i.--.---' ______A; __~P~$-- __~------~--~------~----~ =...... ;;JiF~ ~,~~... ------. • COMflDEIlTIAL , " 1. ' nur~ the period 1, 'eb-30 AJa" 6R, t~ Oftice of tl\e PrOV05t M-rsMl. lit Air Cavalr,r Division p-ocessed a total of' l~ o"f'ensflls thj!lt vere. ccmmd.t-ted within the l.It Air Caval.!y ~vi8ion's area of'r,sl'JOnsi1)U1tv. a. Otfender Statistics:' gatego17 Crimes a~ainst persons aD:i property' Miscellaneous offenses Militar,r offenses ~rarfic violations , TO'I'IIL , b. Coament.s on Offemer Statistics: I . (1) Crimes against per,sons and PX'e)pert:y: Frauds (9) a¢ lJ'rcenios .. (19) 'accoUlltied for the w\1ority of offernC1'8 wit.hin this cate~orv. " . (2) MiscelJ.aneoua Offenses:, ~·rongful. possession and/or usc of [ , marijuana accounted for 'Z7 ortende~.!I.., '., , ' . ., (.3) Milit8.r7 Offen&es: This categorv incluied 30 off-limits; '9 t A1«lL, one careless discharge of a tirJ)B.l'm, one losin~ militerv property tJ,rough' , , neglect, and one mald.ng of a false official. document. . .. : :, i' Cl,,) Traffic Violation~ ~ There Wel"f3 54 individuals cited as . speeding otfendel'1J during this repor.,~ period. ,. 2. Detain~e llepc'A"t: . ClI.tegorr Ret\l4~eE)s 12 ''VO 49 NVA 65 Civil nefendants U6 Innocent Oi vilians . ill Total. 981 .. 5S -. CONFIDENTIAL , .. . ",\ \. I ... ~,.,:,. -. ,J ,- \\; h}:-ol ~ ~-=-- -~--"'''''-:,,"¥-,\';1,,, .. ,''~~~w.r.:_~liJi~lhh t~ CONfiD~HTIAt. . .. ~ 106ft ' SUB.JICI& Os-rat,ional. Repon. tor o.uart.et'lr PeriOd Indiq '0 11'rU !AB .U. cw. Opuationa· . eu]:lpOl't 1. General. During the period 1 Peb-3:) 1])1- 68 ccmbat 8ente. tor five major operations: pmq"fIN(;,.me S'I'UART, P1rt''''!t14, m V&I provided '.. .. .• II, &be! DPLAWARE. . , STUART 20 Feb aM 'tU . .. , . 2. The 2d Briga"e remained in Operation PJ!R~~fl untU wit.h the brid,~e at provided canbat serv1c~ ~upport by the 1st pcJE coUocated LZ UpUft.. '. . . . .~ l 31 )Karch. :3. Operation JEB qTUAaT which began on 24 Jan cont1nued until Cont1"01 Center at· Fhu The Division ~upport Canmand established the Lo~istieal sUP1'Ort cernA :V' ~ Bai. During the initial phase of the operation all su):)ply Pai. Shorl1:~ FLSG-A of t.he III MAF, Force Lo~stics Ccmmard. located at Phu fomeri the na. }TanR; (,lu'C1)Ort after the be~1nn1ng of the opera.tion 1st Loce CO'ITI'Ilann , of I'U TtC; Command which was to assume responsibility for lodst.ical sU'P'Port .1 Durinlot tl1e T'E't' Offensive the LOC fran 'Phu 'Pa1 to .the d~.v... Arm'9' units in IC'l'Z. th1.s, lop' ision was cut. because of the tJVA occul)S.tion of l1ue. 't'o cireumven"t HA. ~nd the operstion.:. istic support war shirt,e~ from FL<.lo- \ to FLC)C'-'R at l)on~ LOO fran 'Dong tla. Beca.us~ of the short~ ~P, of ~und . was supported by lard ' .. it was necessarv to supplement the resunplv '('eeeive~ .1w la.nd! transportation Ca.mp lilvans. In . ,\ LOO with emergenev air drop of ammunition and rRt1t)ns into SUPpOrt Group, the subordinate el~ment Of l1a Np..t\p U,earlv March, ?5th.General ·.r.C'r'7" Support CommaMlo=!responsible f~l' support of US Arrrt'{' U¢ts in!~Tort.hern a Logistical Over the Shore (LOT~) oper~tional site at ~ndnr ~eec~ established from this source. and besan providing resuppl1 to ~he elements of the division of the op"lration logist.io support from Wundfl!r 'f:Je8ch hid PoX By the conclusion from to a point where most sln'l'ly- reQuirements were filled· bV' m-9teris.l pa~ded bv Fl'.. e;n-h. and rL~n-B. this souroe although some supplv was still being furnished The 1st Brigade assumed responsibility for the Nortbern T\Or\:,ion A. supt'ort \-raa ot the AD am established its base at LZ Betty. Combat semoe wit.h FSA support pro~Jided by Task Foree Moroz. ResupplY' , provided bY' the 2d FSE 'j was accomplished by land LOC from FISG-B and \l1und~r Beach. 2d Brigade lOlst Abn was urxier t,he OPCON. of th£l 1st Air Cavalry B. The for for the first part of the operation and assumed responsibility Division base a.t 1Z Ja.ne the central portion of the AO. The brigade established its canbnt service support bY' the 2d !'SE with FSE supr0rt from ani was provided and Ta.sk Force Morez. Resupply was accanplished bV land LOe from Ji'U'~B Wun~.er Beaeh. or C. The 3d Brigade assumed responsibilitv for the southern portion ~u'P"'ort was and establl.shecl its base at Camp 'Evo.ns. Combat service the AO V'cDonald col provided by the 3d FSE with FSA SUpt'lort provided bv 'rasl<: Forcp. fran Ft.'3r-A, Fl,,<:)'"',...f located with the FSE. Resupt'l1 wns accomplished bv land LOC Beacho and WUnder M') until 1 M'trch D. The 2d Bri~ade did not arrive ~.n the .rEB c;'rtT~'R~ ,,1' res l'OnCJihi litV' fnr time ~hev relieved the 2d Brigade l"'lst. Abn. at which .lene. Combl't centre.l port.ion of the AO and established their base a.t L1. tha i'rom Task 'Force 'WQ.S l)roviried by the 1st F9'F; with Ft;A .CJuPl"lOrt service support. Beach. \t.EI.S accanplished b', land LOe :from FL~rT-~ and 1·1t.1nrier Moroz. Resup1'lv tlort.; on ?.d Brigade,lOlst after being relieved +'rom t."'e c~.ntral E. The estab the AO reJn!lined OroON, moved to an area soUth of the 3d ~;~ri.~ade, am or tlrie org~.nie a base at LZ Sallv. Combat service support was T'ro~:i.np:d bv lished. lind FV)f'_A. and resupply was accomplished by land LOO from Wunder 'Rea ch FS'F. to contl",ol of Soon after the move to the new aran. the 2d Bde lOlst reverted the lOlst Abn. __..... __ $io CONFIDENTIAL· L .. ~- -_...... _------_.. _-- : 1 ~. . • CONFIDENTIAL SUl.JEta OperatlOlllkJ. 'Report. tar -QuarterlY Periai IncU,nc 30 Arm 1968 t.m £A. Q..4 Operet1ons . 4. Operation ITJljts which ran tram 1 to lS AnrU 196R involved IAll three 1st Air Cav41rY' Division br1~ndes, the 1st ""nr-4no HaP.11nerit, am the 3d AltV-' Airborne Task Force. A. Each ot tfte 1,t Air QlVAlr1 Divi~ion ~riga(les (!sts.hl~ sl-ted its tr~·:bl3 at LZ Stud. PriOl' to t.he. operati.t)l'. the FOE's we're' 'reAd.1u~ted so the P.:ppr'Cll""- . 1 riately n1.mlberf!'d ME ~~an habitual. association with the cort"eepontlint!' 'brln.d6· I (the 1st with t~e 1st, et.c.) The tbrefl numbered 'f'!C)~'s colloc"tP.d .... it.h t,he brigades at LZ Stud. A.nrovisional PSE was or~nizf3d to l)rOvi~~ sUJmort to the divisIon tmits remain1'nv, Bt Ca.mn liNans. B. The 1st Marine Re~iment established ita tr.ains nt. Ca. Lu Comh'" • se and "9 provided combat service. support:. by a Mnrine Shore Pll.T1iv C~~nv frv~ the 3d Marine Division.··. . c. The 3d AFtVN Airborne Task Force este.blishad its trains 9.t L7, Rtun am was provided con'bat service sUllJ'Ort bv the 1st FSE.. . D. FSA support. for the operatil)n was provided bV FC3A/L,)A "('ask 'For~~i McDonald. This was a .1oint ArDty'-}'.a.rine task force T'lrovided bv 1st Log G0H, ..and USASUPCOM-DSC and augmented bv Force Lo~istics Conrn.,qnd. ResuPD1v to L'7. Stud was accomplished by land LOa over Highway 9 from '>lunder Bench and Dong ,Be • All. resuppl;y forward of LZ stud, E:"lCCept tor the Mal-inc regimpnt, wa.s accOJn\e" pllshed by organic helicoptnl's. During Operation P~(".J.sUS Task Force Ianglev continued to provide FSA supoort to the units of tlte division which remp.ined at Camp Evans. 5. Operation JEB STUART II was ~imarilY a stagin~ exercise durjn~ which the 1st and 3d Bri~ades with their respectivG It''SE's return~d to their rear bases in the JEB STUf~T AO and began preparation for future operations. The 2d BrigCtde with tho 2d FSE came under the OPCON of the 3d Mar T)iv at. the conclusion of Operntion Persasus am continues to operate in the 3d }.ar 1)i v AO a.t the close of t"e !'oportinR period. . 6. Operation DELAt-TARE be~an on 19 April ann cOl"'tinues at tlo)p, c10')e of . the report.i~ period~, It jnvolves 1st m)j 3d Bri..,ades 1st Air Cnvalrv Div ision, the 3d Rogiment 1st AnVN l1i vision and the 196th J.i~t Inff;·ntrv 'l3ri~a,de. A. The 1st Brigade base is locl1t,..d at L2 Sta.llion with the l'3t F8E collocated with the Brigade trains. . B. The 3d BriF(ll.de forwnrcl base is located at L'~ Penr"ler 'If.':i.t,lo) tl-te 3d Brigade Traj.ns and t.he 3d F'C)'I£ renaininQ: ~t Camp liivans providlnlT CO'!1'lhr>t. SAl'v).Ct:) support by helicopter from the r~~r base. . C. The 3d Re~iment 1st ARVN 'JiviSion estahlished its ha1'3e atL'l. L:i.l1il.ll"\" and is receivin~ comb~t service SUTlT'Iort from the 1st .FSH: B.t 1.'7. c)tflll1on. . D. The 196th Light Infantry BriJ4ade est.ab1i shen its hSl.S'" r>t C.;;~M:p::T~~Vllr'lS to operate in an AO southwest of. Camp Bvana. Comb:lt sArviee s'Opoort is nro- . vided by' the organic FSE. The Provisional FS'E continues to SUl'l"orl 1st Air Cavalry Division units at Camp }iNans. E. FSA support. provided by 1st Log C01T1l\o.nd U'3ASUPCO?l-OC;C in the A Shau Vallev' consists of rugmentation to the 1st FC)'E to run M A~P lit L,?; Stll1- lion am to provide en service. Task Force !anglev continues to Drovide f'qA support to aU units at Camp Evans. . 5'7 CONFIDENTIAL. • , , CONFIDENTIAL . ~ , . .. . ., SUBJEC'ft OperAtional Report. tor C'WU"terlv Period End1nC 30 April 1~68 • '1 TAB. Logistics " I. Supp:Jt and Services A; ClAss I Activities: During the quarter, 4575 tons of Class I were .. 1aeued to divisiolUll and sUPPOl'"tinlJ units.. '. .' B. Class II and IV: . • .... 1 .. · Received, processed and shipped 176 lifelines to forward elemen~"! :: 2. 13,000 to~s of. clothing, equipment. nnd barrier M"tcrials were. .. '. issued during the period.. . . . : . .. . ": .: C. Class III: ...... 1 .. 24 linflines were shipped 'for a 'tdtnl of 61.1 ~ons •.. ' . 2. A total of 246 fuel sample~ .wore ~nalvze~; of thes.e 192 were on. ' .. I ~c!e. 30 met use of limits and 24 were off sf'ecifications. .. . . I I 3. Issues of 11,286,154 ceaUons of fuel. were made'durinfr the ouart.er. j ! D. Class. V! . .. ." . I 1. 13' lifellnes w~re proceesed and shipped 'to f'orward:·elem~nt·~. ~ I I'", 2. Class V personnel destroyed 121 tons of unserviceahle .ammunition. :3~ Received and processed 5 arrununition malfunctions·re't'Ot'ts. . . 4. Pre-USARV AflI inspections a.nd liaison visits made to unit C;4'.ss V. .J I storage facilities throu~hout the dividion. .. . I E.' . Food Service Activities.··· . . . I 1. Local facilities for ~rocurement or ice were ins~ecte~ i~ coordin- . 1 i &tion with the Di vision C)ur~eon' s office...... I 2. Pre-tSIIRV AGI.inspections and liaison la.dY; sorv visits "1f1;r~e conduCted I I at messhalla throu~hout t""e divis·1on. ElnphaRis was T.Uaced on Ylroper.·!';e.n1tation !, I axxi field messin,:r procedures. . !.... :.: • I F. AerialSu~plV Activities 1. AES personnel packed 38 Marlin 13ak~r }:I<'\raqhutos for rlivis;on .a.vil:l-· . tion units and 18 B-1.2 pa.ro.chutes were reracked. .... '.,.. . .' . !~ 2 .. Rig~e~ support wns provided to LZ's Jane, Bett,r, ~ll~.ron,. %ud, Stal~on, a.nd Camp Eva.ns...... 3. J!inergency rcsuppl.v a.irdrops conducted vic Camp 'Evans wi~h 7CJ. ~130: ,... sorties deliver:ing 1,133 tons 'of supplies. . ,.. -\:,. _. , ... 4. A combined 16 man ri~er detachment at LZ Stud was respon~i~~a for the rigging of 4,,329,137 lbs of assorted supplies in support of diyisionel opera.tions. . . .' . . . . 5. A five (5) man rigger detachment was inserted into Khe: Sanh to :.,' assist in sling loading 300,000 lbs of 'defective rurmunition to ~: 'destruct-ion site. . ..' .'.: .... ' . . .' I . .. 6 •. Serviceability inspections of air items wer.c In-3.de .aJ:1driecessarv replacWlent :i.terns were issued. .... G. The followin~ supplies were ,issued du~ng the q~rter: . _.. ;. ': ~ ... :' . i .. . 1. Class I (Short tons)· ,. .' ...... a. A-Ra.tions 640.64 ...... ""'" '. ," ... : ,' .. b. 13-Rations 1,03$.77 ... . :,,:. c. C RAtions It 822.09 '. 'I • ",: Total- 3,501.50 2. Class II-IV (~hort tons) a. Clothing and eouipment-3, 460 b. Fortificf.'I.tion materials 9,540 . Total- 13,000 3. Class II (Gallons) a. AVGAS- 267,265 SS b. JP-4- S,085,96g:-·--·· -.-._. --_._--_._-----, c. MOGAS- 1,ClIU,A94 d. DF2- 8ql 027 CONFIDENTIAL , I... TOTAL- 1~2~6,154 ~0~.;? -.- - - " ._._- ----~ ... ---...-.-- .. ---.------~ .~--. ~ ._... . _.6 I J , CONFIDENTIAL ... 1 SU&l'BC!: ()pere~1an&l and Muntemnee .. I ,AB., Lo81ltics ! II. '1ranaportatlon and Maintenance A. Air transportation signiticant movements during the period 1 }'eb- . I 30 April 68 were as tollows: " , TYPE ~m UNIT ill!!fr 12m TYPE Ale CMU"',o L~, !!:! S,['RTI'I!S ,01 . S Feb 586Sig AK Chu C-13O 8 .. sao ' 0 1. 01 7 :isb Div APO AK Phu-B, 0-130 18,,450 0 1 01 *ll. Feb 2/101 Eng Phu-B AT 0-130 376.440 &17 CE ~2 Feb Div El DNG Phu-B 0-130, 961~030 ,0 1.24 , ' " CE *24 Feb Det/15 TO DNIl Phu-B 0-130 70,6<'11 0 4 ,. i, CE 25 Feb n/1STO ~K aT 0-130 251~930 120 11 CE *26 Feb 27 Maint DNe; Phu-B C-130 335~1~4 48 -17 CE 26 Feb 228 Av Bn AK 0.'1' C-130 1Q6,978 2S S CE 4 Mar 2.2S Av Bn AI< OT C-130 , 27~, ~~3 6t.. 17 CE 12 Mar 1St h S&S ' AK PHU-B C-130 , 231 000 0 1. 01 13 Mar 27 Maint AX Phu-B, C-130 17,500 0 1 ' ,I .. " OE 15 Mar 37lst R&R AK ' QT 0-130 12.150 0 1 , 01 23 Mar 15th S8cS AK f'hu-B C-130 C),050 0 1 - CE 27 Mar 1/9 Cav AK OT . 0-130 144,200 7 0 OE 27 Mar 13 Sig TSN rtr 0-130 8,648 0 1 OE 31 Mar 15 S&S AI< Phu-B C-130 23 .. 000 0 1 CE )..1 Apr ARVN ~r KHF.-'3 DN."}, G-130 16,000 ??O .3 CE ) 2 Apr ARVN R~r KJ.IE ...S nNG C-130 5,000 SO 1 OE 12 Apr 2 Bde LZ Stud Evans C-123 3/300 14q lL OE 13 Apr 2 Bne " II C-l?3 45,100 117 7 OE 14 Apr<2 Bele II II C-1'3 102,500 99 13 CE 14 Apr ARVN '1'F KHE....s Phu-B 0-130 3Si 000 9l. 3 CE 15 Apr ARVN 'fr' KHE-S Phu-B 0-130 39,?00· 196 .3 OE 15 Apr 2 Bde LZ Stud Evans 0-123 70,500 90 10 CE 16 Apr ARVN TF" Phu-B C-123 304 6 OE 17 Apr ARVN TF" II 0-123 S14 1.2 CE 18 Apr ARVN TF" '1 C-123 364. S 01 21 Apr 15 S&S AK 1\ C-130 36,900 0 2 01 29 Apr EOD Tm Evans M. C-123 7,160 2 1 * Air movement required because of road interdiction by cnemr a.ction. . B. Aerial resupply. Because of road interdiction by en~v action, in sufficient availability of bround transportationJ and weather conditions the division received emergenqy supplies by air drop as follows: DATE SCRTIES WEIGHI' CLN3S SUFfLJJiS 4=8'Feb 34, 946, S15 lbs 01 r; II; III, "N 19 Feb 7 211,100 lbs C1 V 20 Feb 7 195;900 lbs C1 V 22 Feb 14 416,836 1bs C1 V 24 Feb 9 25S:;000 1bs C1 V 25 Feb S 240,719 1bs C1 V 26 Apr 15 440:,000 lbs C1 V 'Z1 Apr 17 478;000 1bs 01 V 28 Apr 17 486:;000 1bs C1 V ; 29 Apr 22 616,000 1bs C1 I &. V t 30 Apr 17 474,000 1bs 01 I,& V f C. Sea (USAF) Airlift and courier service (1) During the reporting period cargo/passenRer f1i~hts continued to I 8erve An Kbe tor the movement of PCS am R&R p~r~_o~e1. I 48 1"7 CONFIDENTIAL" I ,~ ~.-- .. -... ~--. It. : CONfiDENTIAL (2) Daily courier service was continued throughout the period ,nth t1lA between An lbe, Hue-Phu Bai. Quang 'i'ri, Camp Evans, and L~ stud as requ1recl. ' : I en At the request ot 1. I.CO, TJ.fA' MACV established ·t,'lO dt,11y o-l3O ' tllghts ~etween An ](he, Hue':"Phu Bai, Q'lilDg' Tri,' Hue-Phu Bai, An IOte, Caro.nanh . I 'Bay, for the movement of replacanents, R&R, PCS,; and administrative per90nnel:" "h:1ch were in excess or C7 A 1'DO,remem. capability. ' ' .: D. Ground transportation. 'Transportation resources for divis~on tJupport during report ed period were inad equate. DailV'line haul transTlOrt.~,tion I fOl' the ny;wement of sup-plies from suppartin,p: actj,vitied ha.d to he au~ented ",I l 1 with org8n1c transportation assets. Transportation support for &eripltl"rt ';, . I clearance, un.i.t movement ~ and local haul" was limit ed, " " : E. Grouni Maintenanoe:· ." . , (1) Operational readiness 'of vehicles arid ef1uinment cieadllned ' :) I, d.uring the reporting periOd \tIaS a result of the following: ~,' ',. ,;: a. tack ot transportation support, causin~ avsi'ahle V'ehicles too be overloaded and otherwise abused. ,'" '" " ' , , , b. Inclement weather, and lack of T\roper ~intene,noe fp,c511tl-.s , c. Inadequate ~tnir 'parts supply because 'of ipadec'JUIl.te :: repair parts resup~ chanl'lels " " , , , , d. lAck, ot emphasiS' on drivar-operator maintenance. :' '. ,-; (2) Road spot chocks 'Wore'reinstated in the JEB STUAllT A,O 'during, . the tirst week o~ the r eporliing p.enod" and has continued thr,ougnout, the period. III. Aircraft, Maintenance '. '" , , " o A. ' The following number of aircrai'l:., by tyPe, he,ve been dronped 'from :":' accountability during the reporting period. ' "0 .. ' ','. <- TYPE ACFT I~OUNT '''', OH-6A- 8 . \J OH-l:3S 23 ' " , '" UH-lB 17 " UH-1C " ' 22 ;:\ , UH-1D 4 t,,: UH-1H 34 CH-47 A 9 ., ...... , ACH-47A 1 CH-54 A , 1 OV-lB 1 ,OV-1C l' AH ...1G 1'" .' ...... ,~. B. The follOWing number of aircraft bv tVpe, have be"'n l"eceived from' " depvt stock at.' other commands during the re'Oort.in~ Tleriod: TYPE ACFl' ," AMOUNT ' 0 OH-6A- 42 .; .:; t' UH-1B,19, ' UH-10 ' , " 1 ' .. , UH-1H ' 45 AH-1G 33 ' CH-47A S CH-47B ' 4 CH-51~A .3 OV-lB ' , 1 I":,'" OV-10 ,1 0-1 -, - 2 U-6A 1 CONFIDENTiAL ": " '00- I J\ • ) • CONfiDENTiAL . 1 : f c:. PB8 At.~ 13:' by DSU Unit ,. Fill ~ Co B Co C Co D • Aircraft. 97 -,;r- sr-- ar- ~ as 74 «7 83 Avid CI 73 '77 91 as -lJ. Average Mission Reat\V % FEB /LCFl' ~ OH-61. 7;6 OH-l3S 52 UH-lB 58 UH-1C 56 UH-lD "'1 UH-1H 63 AH-1G S3 CH-47A 62- .. '" " -\- I '. " ",,' . ',', '.. CH-54 65 .. ~ OV-l 79 ,', "".,: V-:-6A 92 _E. Maroh Aircraft JISt bv DSU ~ Fill Co A Co B Co C Co D 'AIrcratt 75 !f9 -~ 77 Armament 89 7 S ~6 A1 Avionics ffi RJ. as 79· F. Aircr-a1't. Mission Read;y' %March AUt I,' % !.CF!' . ~ !leFT % ACFT ~ 'oi{":'6A 5-i ii1{:ic 5b iJt:rG 50 oV-B/c 45 OH-13S 55 UH-lD 86 CH~7 A &J 0-1 50 UH-lB 64 UH... 1H 65 CH-~ 77 V-6A 62 G.. Aircraft. Mission Ready %April - 1TYPE A(;Fr .... ~ OH-6A- 66 OH-l3S 66 . UH-lB 7';. UH-1C 57 · ' UH-lD -68 UH-lli 68 CH..q.7A 56 CH-,4A . 69 OV-lB 58 OV-1C 82 0-1 64 u-6A 80 ). AH-1G - 59 ASL fox- the month ot A}'ril was not available. - CONFIDENTIAL·1 ,J -..,. ~. ~l, SCJBJECr: ap.re.\.itlniL! A4JP.r:t ::«- Q\iaJ"t.rJ" \'e:"!od ~1~ )0 .\N'1l. l~~ t ,-AS CCI Pqchal~1.cal Op.:Jrat.1uua . \ 1 • 1. aenet-l\l: l'sycbf>lo,pCAl Oll4arat.i'WJ we-e C . ", .. , ; . I, , /' SUBJECT: 'OpI!X'ational Report. fO~rI Quarterly' l'edM Ending 30 April 19f,9 TAB 00: ?tSy<.lhologioal Orr.ration (Cont) ' ! -", t. 'Mlirt,y Kit Carson ~couts were assigned to t.he l)ivi!ion (lurin~ this , report.ing perl,'l . t, ,.,• .' ,'. ':. ; .... " .' .,', , " . ' • • p' ~ . . . .' ..', .~. ".'. .',' ;: ~.' '. . ,. ' ., .:.".'.. . • ~ , I, r. '" ~ .... :'. " f" ~~.;. ',';::'" .' . .... , .,',." , .. :. '. ,'. ,. . . ,:. " ", '''; • I , " ~ !. • " t.,.\,. " ." .' .' . ,:,. ',', ' "... ,',. ,. , " ' l?3 • .' 4',' :------CONFIDENTlAl J ..... - ~ ~ . CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT: TABDD: The T~ Oftensiva caused ri\a.nY' refugees' and, displaced' persons :'r'lurintt th ~ 'fI, .~onth ,of February. Man;y 'people were caUght awa'l,'.fran horne."hen~~lJt1n1T ': .'\ . erupt, ad and :eould not move on the : roads. : others ned from battle' areas •.. In ~ ",'I Thong Dien arid Ruong Tra 'Districts a l.?rge number of· civilians B.:ld refue:~.es .. ~'. were without food because transportat.ion could not move on the ·roa:ds •. 1;l1is. '!'. : , pro~lem was solved bY air lif't.inr,r; rice, corn meal and bul/2:ar wh'eat to tJle , ., . respective districts. Later,' foodstuffs were 'also air lifted to· "uan.~ TIiep, ' .: Huong T>ien and Hai Lang Districts. In ·March the refugee problem les"'e!:'e~ : throughout the AO as supply routes were reopened ann the· peoplo '.t~~·n.- -!X~.'! .... "1, . return to their homes. A major effort dllrin~ tl-)is pnriort was thi3 ralocat::··... n of approximatel3' 3,000 people from Utah Beach to an area apl'l'oxim~tel'1,':3 kilo:':; . ~., meters to the south-east. (~n5?54). Coor.dinati on wa,s effecten with Hai Lan~ . ;: District and Provinoe O,fficials., . Actual movement of people "o('l'an ')n ?2 '~aroh ' , and took approximately one webk,to complete. Assistance ~'as furrU.shed it'! the· wav of food" 'MJi:T)CAFS, lumber/am some transportation. 'rhe civic act; on t">roP;rsm began to expand. Launnrv fa'e'illties were '~l'encd bv )0 'P~p. a.nti T)j.vartv j.n .', Phong Dien. ~'he Div Hos Co. medics Pl"ovidect almost, cia'i lv ASslst,&lnce to the Phong Di~n Dis'r."ensary. Sanrlba't fill points cm1tinued to ne (IMrptp,'" near L7t !CI " Evans, Jane and 'Bett". Dur1hp.: Opp.retion FelZASUS t.ne "nlv si"nH!cp.nt ell. act,';' , ivity was movement of 316 rd\1gees from the AO to the ,.e1\l~p CI)'I'I\1' =t, c,c,T1\ 1.0. Population. within ,the Pe~asus AO was VertT s~arse. "('0 na.t.e, no nrtive "eol"le' have been found livin~ in the A Shau Vallev. In At'ril civic action T'l'1')1eets continued by rear elements at .L7.'s TiNans, ,Tane and 'Rettv-~l-)~'l'l'm. ,\t the p.m ...... of April the oi vic act inn pro~am was steadilv j.T1\provin~ A.nd .; norells:inlZ thro\1R:~ out the AO. Cooperation from the local populace is U\'I fro'l'l\ Febru.qM'. At ( the beginning of the quarter a civil affairs team was att.ached from the .2%h I CA Compa.n;y. This team was wit~drawn on 12 March 1965 due to a reor~;~2ti.rm 'of the company and .relooD.tion of teams. Loss of this team has ha:rrr08ren civil ( " affairs activities. Support ha.s not been received !rani ,CA teams ~ttached to I Province 'j, 1 1 . DLf ,j" \ CONFIDENTIAL' j -~~ ./-_.- .... ~---.- ...... ~ ...... ---.----~-.-...... -~.~ ...... _...... -...... '-" ------, -- .. _- --_ ------. ---.. --- .. --.-..... ~~:-' ~' •. \"'-" •• 'I.'."" . ~ ...... ___ - l.Ji~(,j./\bSlnED . ' . .fleeuritY'_ Ct •••lfie.lion DOCUWEMT COMTqOL OAT A • R&D ,....",,,, .,...",..,•• , ''''''.... III ...... , IIAII ;..Ieafltlf _ .." ...'_.t M .,.,.-1 .... ~ lite ...,." reptwt _I. el.'."'."~ t. Oll'.• 'M"nM. "~T'Vt1''t tc..-...... ) M. "IItPO"T •• CU"'T." CL .. h'FIL"T'ON Confidential ·QACSFOa. ... CUIOU_ HQ. DA. Washington, D.C. 20310 4 c I. "C,"O"" "1"1." Operational Report .. Lessons Learned, Hq, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) . (U) •• D".e .....,.."1t NO".' (J)o~ .,,..,, ...... , ...... ) .\ . Experiences of unit enaaaed in counterinsuraency operations. 1 Feb ~ 30 Apr 68 I •. ""',, .....,. ("'" - .•,- -,...... ,-> CG, 1st Cavalry Division (A billobil, e) . •• R&P_" D"T" ... , .. TOT"" NO. Oil' ....C • i3.June 1968 6S .r6. NO. 0 ..." .... . "\' .. .. _. CONT""CT O ...... "NT NO. .... O ....'M""O .... IItzllO"" ..uw" ...... ' 1 .. . I' ·1 ! ...... C"·MO. 682337' , . . .. N/A ... 0 THIE" "CPO"T NO". (AItV .... -"eN /!WI ...... ,,,..., •• title ,.,..Nf) ... tI. 'o. DI." ..I..,TIOM ,."TDIl&N" . .. I'. ·.U,..... II.. CNT""" NO"&. II. '''ON$OIU~O ...".11' ....., "CT,VI.,., N/A OACSrOR, DA. Washington, D.C •. 2Q310 , •••~'T"".CT .. ' . , .. I • 1 : . .' . . . . " . . . • 6S DO .''::•• 1473 UNCLASSIFIED L&rity ClauUic:aUOA " . The followlna ltema are reC:OII1IIlended for inclusion in the Lessons Learnedt. . . Index: .. I1:EM 1 / ! * SUBJECT TITLE __--+_--,. . I ______( ** FOlt OT' RD :/I '~PAGE :/I' ITEM 2 i I I SUBJECT TITLE;,..,------Ir. ~, ______I 0\ •• .' FOlt, ~T RD II '. .. I , PAGE' ii' :, .. I' ". " .' .; .. : . ", ~ :" I ITEM 3 I SUBJECT n'1'LB I . :.. ~ , . I FOR OT RD" j .<' :. '.. 1 ! ; PAGE # ". ITEM 4 SUBJECT .TITLE FOR OT RD ti fAG,E * ITEM 5 SUBJECT TITLE FOR OT aD # PAGE # * Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest. ** FOR OT RD I : Ap,peara in the Reply Reference lirte of the Letter of Trans mittal. ~his number,~ be accurately stated. ***Page # : Th.t page Qn which the ttem of interest is located. .- I I I " ;-.- I \ , , ; .. _ ...... I, ....MTMENT OF TH~ ARMY POSTAGe AND .... "A'O OACSFOR OIPARTMI:HT Of' THE ARMY I W•• hington, D.C. 20310 I, ~ , OfrII'I~IAL. au.tHQa I ...... ~·-·--·- •.• - I . . Ii ._-.- .~-.- ... -.-.------.---~ ;. ,- Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development I ATTN: Operational Reports Branch I Headquarters, Department of the Army Washington, D.C. 20310 I •• _ • ~ •••• I .. -. .. -POLD ..... - • .. , " ...... - ... -- .-.. _.- --.. ,- - ... ------'-_...... ------ ',3 The follovina it.... ar. r.c~nd.d for inclusion in the Lessons Learned II. Index: ~ IT,," 1 •. SVBJECT TITLE _____- __------_____ *'It FOR OT RD I .' #' **'*PAGE * ITEM 2 SUBJECT TITLE______...... ______.! . " FOR .OT RD I PAGE * • , 'p 'I .~ .. ITEM 3 SUBJECT TITLB~_c'""" _..-_....-_------:-~--- 'FOR OT lID /# I' i .' 'I' "'. ' •. ', .' ~.: . PAGE /# j I ITEM 4 SUBJECT Tl'J:LE...______ FOR OT RD I PAG~ I :., " ITEM 5 SUBJECT TITLE___ ---- ____-- ______ FOR or RD /# PAGE II * Subject T~tle; . A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of ~nt.reat. ** FOR OT RD I : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of:Trans .. mittal. This ~umbe:t',.must be accurately stated. I i 'I I ***Page I Tl.t page on which the ~tem of interest is located. I I i I ." " . . I II' 1,\ I ! I 1- • • • • • e .• ~ llla"MTMaNT Of' THe ARMV POsTAGI AI'ID ..... I"Alo OACSFOI DIf'ARTMEHT oer THE A.. MY W•• h 1ftstoft, D.C. 20310 OfI'IiPICIAloIlUSINESS ______.. _.--.----~ ,- 4_~_'_4_ •••• . ..• __ 4. ___•• _ •• _._ •••• __ ~ .. __ ••• ___ ._ •• _. , Office of. the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development ATTN: Operational R~ports B~anch Headquarters, Department of the Army Washington, D.C. 20310 -. . . ~ . -...... -FOLD •..• - _ .. ------" .. ~" ...... I· , .lecurity_ CI •••lReatlon i j DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA. R&D , I . ,....",,,, ....; ....,.,. ., til.. , ... ., ...... , IWIIII ...... , ...... " ••_., .....,wM w.t. ... lite ...,,,,, "1JM:f'.e'••• ItI.tI~ ! t, 0.. '...... ,. ....,T."tT" ~ ...., U. 'II£,"O"T •• CUIt, T", C LAb,l"c. TIO,., ., .... Confidential Po ."ou" HQ.OACSFOll. DA. Washington, D.C. 20310 4 I ...CPo"" TITLC .. Operat1onal Report -Lessons Learned, Hq, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) . (u) .. D.leM.. ,.,,, .... ,. •• (1»,.. .,.... .", ...... , .....) Feb . I E~·p_er ience s of unit enRaRed in counterlnsUrRenCY. QPerfttions 1 ~ 30.Apr 68 ...UTMOItt" ,,,.. , _ ••, ...... , ..,. ...,_, . ,I ,I !- CG, 1st Cavalry Divis10n (Airmoblle) . ·1 , ". ! I ....a ..... T D.~. ... 7 .. ,.4\· ... NO. 0" ".aci NO. 0' ...... 1 13. June 1968 65 r" i· .... CON,. ••CT D ...... ,. NO • ... O .....oli",.O ...... ~R,. NUN"."'" . :. I i ...... y ...... 682337 N/A •• ... tItI.,0,...... ••", £.-0 ..,...... 0.'. (Mtr .aII... -"era lite, .., .....,..- If. 10. DlI,..,.,,...,.. .,..,...... ,. . II. ·au ...... ,. ••" NO"'" I •• '''ON" '"". 0 N''''T.'''' ACT'VIT.,. N/A OAt;:SFOR, DA, Washington, D.C •. 20310 'II. "I!.,. ....C,. .. . • ' . I .. . I .. . " . . . ' . . . • , 65 .DD ::::•• 1473 U;~CLASSIFIED ...... • .... I ~. ," ~ •.••. ", '. .• ~ .... _. _ "... '. , ,'.. •