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DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY & THE DRAFT: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSCRIPTION METHODS, DEMOCRACY, & INTERSTATE CONFLICT A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Policy in Public Policy By Lauren Justine Vine, B.A. Washington, DC April 14, 2016 Copyright 2016 by Lauren Justine Vine All Rights Reserved ii DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY & THE DRAFT: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSCRIPTION METHODS, DEMOCRACY, & INTERSTATE CONFLICT Lauren Justine Vine, B.A. Thesis Advisor: Andrew S. Wise, Ph.D. ABSTRACT As a theory of international relations, Democratic Peace Theory posits that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other, thereby reducing the overall incidence of interstate conflict. Immanuel Kant suggested that this principle was true in part because citizens in democracies do not want to bear the costs, physical, emotional, or fiscal, of war and vote to remove bellicose leaders from power. I test the hypothesis that conscription methods may affect the incidence and length of interstate conflicts, specifically that citizens forced to fight in draft armies, as opposed to citizens who choose to fight in all-volunteer armies, will be less likely to vote for or in other ways approve of their leaders and will thus reduce the likelihood that a country will choose to go to war or choose to stay at war for an extended period of time. Using data from the Correlates of War Project, the Polity IV Project, the Military Recruitment Data Set, and the World Bank, I find that my hypothesis is not supported, and that in fact all-volunteer military recruitment methods lead to a statistically significant reduction in the incidence and length of interstate conflicts. I conclude that interstate conflict is an incredibly complex concept to explain using a single variable, regardless of statistical significance, and that further research needs to be done on the issue particularly with regards to modern shifts in the nature of war. iii The research and writing of this thesis is dedicated to those who supported me along the way. Many thanks, Lauren Justine Vine iv TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 II. Background & Literature Review ................................................................................ 3 III. Theoretical Model .................................................................................................... 13 IV. Empirical Model ...................................................................................................... 15 V. Data ........................................................................................................................... 18 VI. Results...................................................................................................................... 25 VII. Conclusions & Recommendations ......................................................................... 43 VIII. Bibliography.......................................................................................................... 47 v LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Description of Variables in Empirical Model 1.A……………………………………..15 Table 2: Description of Variables in Empirical Model 1.B……………………………………..16 Table 3: Description of Variables in Empirical Model 2………………………………………..17 Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Data in Model 1.A…………………………………………...23 Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Data in Model 1.B…………………………………………...23 Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Data in Model 2……………………………………………...24 Table 7: Linear Probability Models of the Relationship Between Likelihood of Going to War, Method of Military Recruitment, and Type of Governance Structure, with Controls for Geographic Characteristics, 1816-2005………………………………………………………….27 Table 8: Logistical (Logit) Models of the Relationship Between Likelihood of Going to War, Method of Military Recruitment, and Type of Governance Structure, with Controls for Geographic Characteristics, 1816-2005………………………………………………………….30 Table 9: Linear Probability Models of the Relationship Between Likelihood of Going to War, Method of Military Recruitment, and Type of Governance Structure, with Controls for Geographic, Economic, and Population Characteristics, 1960-2005……………………………33 Table 10: Logistical (Logit) Models of the Relationship Between Likelihood of Going to War, Method of Military Recruitment, and Type of Governance Structure, with Controls for Geographic, Economic, and Population Characteristics, 1960-2005……………………………37 Table 11: Multiple Regression Models of the Relationship Between Length of War, Method of Military Recruitment, and Type of Governance Structure, with Controls for Geographic and Other Characteristics, 1816-2005………………………………………………………………..39 vi I. INTRODUCTION In 1795, the philosopher Immanuel Kant proposed a then-novel idea regarding what he would term “perpetual peace” - the security of nations against the natural state of war through republican forms of government (Kant). This theory evolved as the international system of states grew and took form, morphing into today’s widely-accepted Democratic Peace Theory. This theory posits that democratic states are less likely to engage in armed conflict with each other because their citizens are leery of paying the costs of war. Yet even as republican forms of government have spread, the vision of a lasting and independent peace has been elusive. I test one facet of the theory of democratic peace, with regards to conscription as a cost of war. The draft of individuals into the military is one of the primary burdens of war faced by the average citizen. Using data on inter-state conflicts and military recruitment practices across the world, I explore the relationship between instituting military drafts and the likelihood of engaging in armed conflict, as well as the duration of such conflicts once engaged. A large body of literature and data are associated with Democratic Peace Theory and the study of conflict in international relations. Kant and other Western philosophers first began to explore how forms of government could affect international relations in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Their work was brought to new light at the end of the First World War when Woodrow Wilson advocated for a League of Nations and expansion of self-determination for the peoples of Europe, in the hopes of mitigating future conflicts (Wilson). Since Wilson’s time, the promotion of democracy has become a staple of American foreign policy, in part implicitly (if not explicitly) founded on the belief that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other (Smith 85). Research into this concept by political scientists progressed in the latter half of the 1 20th century, moving from the data-driven five volume set on Understanding Conflict and War compiled by Rudolph Rummel in the 1970s (Rummel) through to Francis Fukuyama’s post- Soviet musings on “the end of history” (Fukuyama) and Samuel Huntington’s “third wave of democracy” (Huntington). Today’s discussion of conflict, particularly in the form of violence driven by non-state actors, inevitably draws the theory of democratic peace to the forefront of international relations. The subject is vast, and deserves more attention than could possibly be given in a paper of this length. For this reason, I have narrowed my focus to the study of conscription as a cost of war which serves to dissuade the democratic public from seeking such engagements. I have combined data on inter-state conflicts from the Correlates of War Project at Penn State, on democratic and autocratic characteristics of states from the Polity IV Project at the Center for Systemic Peace, and on conscription methods compiled by the Foreign Military Studies Office of the U.S. Army, for the period between 1816 and 2005. I have supplemented these datasets with control variables from the World Bank for a subset of the original time frame, from 1960 to 2005. I will first review the relevant literature and background information on Democratic Peace Theory and conscription, individually and as they are related to each other. I will then cover my theoretical and empirical models, with a discussion of data sources, as well as the outcomes of my regression analysis of the questions posed here. Finally, I will explore the policy implications of this question, and avenues for further research. 2 II. BACKGROUND & LITERATURE REVIEW Those who study international relations are generally familiar with the concept of the “Democratic Peace,” the hypothesis that countries with democratic forms of government are less likely to engage in war-like activities with each other. This paper seeks greater understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of this hypothesis through a review of the linkages between war- like behavior and forms of military recruitment. In this section, I will provide necessary background information and historical context on the subjects of Democratic Peace Theory and military recruitment. I will then review relevant literature on both subjects as they relate to incidence and duration of armed conflict between states. A. Background In 1795, Immanuel Kant wrote the essay “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” as an assessment of how governments of the day might establish a lasting world peace. This was during a period of tremendous change for traditional structures of power and political authority.