Final Reports
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EU Election Expert Mission (EEM) to Colombia 2018 - Legislative Elections EUROPEAN UNION FINAL REPORTS Election Experts Mission (EEM) to COLOMBIA Legislative Elections - 11 March 2018 Election Experts Mission (EEM) to COLOMBIA Presidential elections - 27 May (first round) and 17 June 2018 (second round) Final Report 1 EU Election Expert Mission (EEM) to Colombia 2018 - Legislative Elections EUROPEAN UNION Election Experts Mission (EEM) to COLOMBIA Legislative Elections 11 March 2018 FINAL REPORT February/March 2018 Final Report 1 EU Election Expert Mission (EEM) to Colombia 2018 - Legislative Elections LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS COLOMBIA 11 MARCH 2018 FINAL REPORT EU Election Experts Mission (EU EEM) 7 February - 17 March 2018 The information and views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Final Report EU Election Expert Mission (EEM) to Colombia 2018 - Legislative Elections TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................ 1 2. BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................................................... 4 3. CONTEXT OF THE ELECTIONS ............................................................................................................... 4 3.1 The Peace Agreement and Congressional Elections ....................................................................... 4 3.2 Nominations .................................................................................................................................... 5 4. ELECTORAL SYSTEM .............................................................................................................................. 5 5. CAMPAIGN ........................................................................................................................................... 6 5.1 Electoral Violence ............................................................................................................................ 7 6. CAMPAIGN FUNDING ........................................................................................................................... 8 7. MEDIA ................................................................................................................................................. 11 7.1 Access to Media in Election Period…………………………………………………………………………………………. 11 7.2 The Role of Social Media…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..12 8. ELECTORAL CENSUS ............................................................................................................................ 13 9. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION ................................................................................................................ 15 10. ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION ........................................................................................................... 16 11. PARTICIPATION OF VULNERABLE GROUPS......................................................................................... 19 11.1 Women’s Participation .................................................................................................................. 19 11.2 Participation of the Indigenous and Afro-descendant Population ............................................... 19 11.3 Participation of People with Disabilities ....................................................................................... 20 12 ELECTORAL REFORM .......................................................................................................................... 21 12.1 Electoral Reform Process .............................................................................................................. 21 13 ELECTION OBSERVATION .................................................................................................................... 22 14 ELECTION DAY .................................................................................................................................... 23 15 TRANSMISSION OF RESULTS and OFFICIAL COUNT............................................................................ 24 16 INTERPARTY CONSULTATIONS ........................................................................................................... 24 17 ELECTORAL APPEALS .......................................................................................................................... 26 17.1 Revocation of the registration of candidates ................................................................................ 26 17.2 Challenges to the Results of the Elections .................................................................................... 27 17.3 Electoral Crimes ............................................................................................................................ 27 18 RESULTS .............................................................................................................................................. 28 ANNEX 1 - RESULTS ......................................................................................................................................... 30 Final Report EU Election Expert Mission (EEM) to Colombia 2018 - Legislative Elections 1. SUMMARY • The congressional elections held on the 11th of March were of historical importance as they were the first elections held since the signing of the Peace Agreement in November 2016. The impact of the Agreement was felt in that elections could be held for the first time across the entire territory, without the obstacles that guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) created in the past. Participation was close to 49% in both houses, among the highest over the past three decades. • The Agreement involved the conversion of the FARC into a party, its participation in the elections, and implied a guarantee of five seats in each of the houses of Congress, regardless of the result obtained. Other commitments of the Agreement, such as the adoption of an electoral reform and the creation of 16 electoral constituencies in conflict-affected areas, did not pass the legislative procedure. The tone of the campaign was marked by the controversy around the participation of the FARC and the generalised opposition to the corruption of the political system. • In general, candidates were able to carry out their campaign throughout the territory without major restrictions on their rights to assemble and move, despite serious incidents, especially the harassment of the FARC candidates and, to a lesser extent, of the other parties. The campaign showed that the structural violence suffered by the country did not definitively end with the signing of the Agreement. The ELN attacks and the increase in the number of murders of social leaders were worrisome. The tone of the campaign was considered to be very harsh by most parties. The Procuracy revealed widespread non- compliance with campaign rules. • The media covered the electoral campaign in a legal framework that offered extensive guarantees, despite significant vulnerabilities that affect the sector, such as threats to the physical integrity of journalists (which were significantly reduced after the signing of the Peace Agreement), sexual harassment to women journalists, alleged pressures from different instances of the State, aggressions of the public force and a non-transparent allocation of state advertising. It was especially worrying the role of social media was especially worrying, considering the lack of effective tools against the fake news it spreads. • The management of campaign funding is considered to be a potential source of corruption in the political system, given the abundance of resources linked to illegal activities and corporate interests. The law provides reasonable legal instruments to face these problems. The resolutions of the National Electoral Council (CNE) represented an advance, due to the mandatory use of public telematic means, for parties and candidates to report their accounting movements and update them throughout the campaign. However, the lack of transparency in the accounts deprived Colombians of the opportunity to monitor the campaign funds. The control and supervision mechanisms applied proved to be insufficient to fight against illegal funding and non-compliance with campaign ceilings. • The reliability of the census, estimated at over 36 million voters, was not a primary concern for the parties, despite the fact that it contains an undetermined number of people who have died or emigrated, and that it does not include almost 800,000 unregistered people. Although the Peace Agreement calls for the promotion of registration campaigns that prioritise the most marginalised areas, especially areas affected Final Report 1 EU Election Expert Mission (EEM) to Colombia 2018 - Legislative Elections by conflict, these campaigns have not been carried out. Another problem of the census is the existence of almost two million citizens who have not been assigned a polling station based on their residence, which could have affected their participation. • The Congress is made up of 108 senators and 175 members of the House of Representatives, elected through a proportional system in which parties can contest with closed or open lists. In Colombia, open lists are questioned because they are understood