Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Kyrgyzstan under New Leadership Path to a Better Future?

Beate Eschment* SWP Comments

By mid-September 2005 disquieting reports were coming one after another out of : the dismissal of the federal prosecutor who had vigorously gone after the widespread corruption; the murder of an MP; an emergency session of the parliament. These events contradict earlier expectations that calm would return to the country after Kurmanbek Bakiyev had been elected for president on 10 July with a surprisingly high 89 percent of the popular vote and had been inaugurated on 14 August 2005 with much fanfare. Germany and Western Europe badly need allies in the strife-ridden region around Kyrgyzstan. And Kyrgyzstan is the only state in the region in which relative political liberty exists and where Islamic fundamentalism, at least up to the moment, does not have significant influence.

The new president Bakiyev has years-long post-Soviet territory, namely the peaceful experience in political leadership and his regime changes in Georgia (“Rose Revolu- election was internationally recognized. tion” in 2003) and in the Ukraine (“Orange Together with his new prime minister, Revolution” in 2004). However, in the Feliks Kulov, he appeared to possess the meantime, it is becoming more and more best qualifications to push through sorely evident that these comparisons do not fit needed political and economic reforms. But and that the regime change in the a closer analysis of the initial situation and can neither be interpreted as a revolution of Bakiyev’s first steps shows that the coun- nor as a victory for democracy—rather, it try’s problems are difficult to solve and that is a symptom of fragile statehood. the new president’s parameters for political action are as limited as his actual commit- ment to make those reforms. Symptoms of Fragile Statehood The change in the leadership in Kyrgyz- In the first half of the 1990s Bakiyev’s pre- stan is often designated the “Tulip Revolu- decessor Akayev still was still considered tion” by the Kyrgyz public and internation- a democrat, but then he methodically al observers. Despite glaring anomalies, the expanded his powers and governed in an toppling of was considered increasingly authoritarian style. Among one in a series of “color revolutions” in the his central Asian colleagues he nevertheless

∗ The author has been working in the Special Research Area 586 “Difference and Integration” at the Institute for Oriental Studies, SWP Comments 46 University Halle-Wittenberg, which examines the relationship between nomads and resident populations, since 2004 October 2005

1 appeared to be the most moderate of the rodes popular trust in the state’s authority presidential autocrats. However, evidence and seriously damages the economy. In suggests that his moderation was due less Transparency International’s “corruption to his political opinions than to the lack index” Kyrgyzstan is ranked 122 out of 145 of political instruments to back a more countries. Within the country, different autocratic course. De jure, the president figures about the dimensions of the prob- had concentrated more and more political lem circulate. In early 2005 Bakiyev claimed power in his own hands through constitu- that two-thirds of the state’s tax revenues tional changes, but in doing so he had had ended up in the Akayev family’s coffers. ultimately weakened the state as a whole According to other sources, one fifth of the by marginalizing other state institutions. annual state budget is sapped through cor- Also, his actual power did not reach as far ruption. Thus, the state was additionally as he would have liked. In consequence, weakened by its limited solvency and individual bureaucrats and, above all, the was even less able to provide basic social governors of the provinces withdrew services. The infrastructure deteriorated further and further from the orbit of markedly, the education and health the central government’s control. These systems stood on the brink of collapse. bureaucrats and governors carved out Crime spread. Yet, private paramilitary their own spheres which were marked actors have not been able to gain a per- by the abuse of power, patronage, and manent foothold. corruption. Criminal structures, exploited Since it became a Soviet republic, Kyr- the weakness of the state and, in particular, gyzstan has been divided into two parts: of the security forces in order to accumu- a more strongly russified and industrial late ever greater influence on politics and north (Issyk-Kul, Naryn, Chui) with the to practically buy themselves into the state. capital Bishkek and the poorer, agrarian, Parallel to the constitutional power, traditional south (Och, Jalalabad, Batken) the economic power and the wealth of the with a large Uzbek population. During the presidential family and other close 13 years of Akayev’s rule, this division associates in leadership grew. In contrast, was exacerbated to the extent that many over the course of the 1990s, the country, inhabitants now perceive it as the major which had already in the Soviet period been danger to Kyrgyzstan’s statehood. One the second poorest republic in the union, underlying reason for this division is that fell into a serious economic crisis. Post- still today clan and family membership are Soviet Kyrgyzstan suffered from high the foundation for personal, political and foreign debt, impoverishment of the popu- economic decisions. The dividing line runs lation and further socio-economic prob- chiefly between different segments of the lems. The Kyrgyz economy demonstrated Kyrgyz “titular nation.” Tensions between such massive structural shortcomings that nationalities do not play an essential role, a rapid improvement could not be expected nor do fundamentalist strains of Islam, even after a regime change. Although the which in Kyrgyzstan (still!) do not pose the macroeconomic situation has improved in main problem. recent years, this was not palpable for most In contrast to other countries of Central of the population. While the population Asia, Kyrgyzstan’s population appears, at was faced with declining pensions, unpaid first glance, to be politically active. For wages and unemployment, an elite made years now there has been a steady flow of up of politicians, nouveau rich entrepre- reports about demonstrations and hunger neurs and criminals cavalierly displayed strikes. But these usually revolve around their wealth. individual persons—like those candidates Corruption is considered the most denied participation in elections or potent impediment development. It cor- defeated candidates—not political programs

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2 or goals. Protests signify the expression of Bakiyev’s political career (born 1949) began traditional personal, familial and local under the aegis of Akayev, when he became loyalties. governor of his home region, Jalalabad. A The unexpected success of the regime’s few years later he became prime minister overthrow, which took place on 24 March (2000–2002.) After the militia opened fire 2005 with the quick storming of the White and killed demonstrators in May 2002 House in Bishkek, set a dangerous new Bakiyev left the government and, in a precedent. Many now tend to take the law pattern typical for Central Asian opposi- into their own hands. This is the result of tionists, became the leader of the oppo- their experience that their votes do not sition alliance NDK in 2004. It is generally count in elections and that the civil service considered that the obvious rigging of the and institutions of justice are not effective. presidential elections in February 2005 to They have stormed courts, administration the disadvantage of Bakiyev was one of the buildings and factories in order to force factors that sparked the unrest which led decisions that are in their interests. Around to the overthrow of Akayev and Bakiyev’s Bishkek and there were wild land-grabs assumption of office. At this point Bakiyev by migrants who no longer wanted to wait himself—like the entire opposition—was for the legal allocation of building land. In hardly prepared for coming to power. the , fighting broke out over As a representative of the country’s appointments Bakiyev had made. In mid- south, Bakiyev had little personnel to back June a would-be presidential candidate, him up in the capital city. In Bishkek the Urmatbek Baryktabasov, who had been elite of the “northern clans” dominates. The excluded from the elections with due legal leadership team that Bakiyev put together process had his supporters storm the White for the transition period soon disappointed House. Today people tend to talk scornfully expectations for a new beginning. The team about a new “national sport” that is ob- featured so few young people that one com- viously highly dangerous for the internal mentator felt reminded of a session of the stability of the country and expresses Central Committee of the former Soviet popular distrust in the state as well as communist party. At first, the main con- increasing impatience. cern was to shut out Akayev supporters Thus, the starting position for the new and, in the next step, to win the upcoming Kyrgyz leadership is extraordinarily presidential election. For this purpose, precarious: its main goal, the political and Bakiyev had to unite the numerically small economic stabilization of a weak state, can and divided opposition. His smartest stra- only be accomplished in the long-term, and tegic move was to integrate Feliks Kulov the patience of the population is extremely into his campaign team as well as into the limited. The fact that Bakiyev is legitimized new government. by a democratic election may be of major Like Bakiyev, Feliks Kulov (born 1948) importance for his international profile, was a close associate of Akayev and a but for the majority of the Kyrgyz popu- member of the government until his falling lation his southern origin and a quick out with the president in 1999 and his improvement in their standard of living turning to the opposition. Kulov, who is carries more weight. from the north and a former KGB general, had as interior minister played an im- portant role in the Kyrgyz Soviet republic’s Bakiyev and Kulov: attaining of independence in 1991. Under Reform-oriented Actors? Akayev he continued his political career. Like Akayev, does Bakiyev, who is five years Multiple times Kulov resigned from younger, does not have a nomenclature political office in protest against griev- background dating from the Soviet period. ances: at the end of 1993 he resigned from

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3 Map Kyrgyzstan and the surrounding states

Source: .

his position as deputy president to protest percent of the vote in the north. As pledged, government corruption. In April 1999 he the newly elected president named his accused Akayev, in an open letter, of un- partner as prime minister. But when the democratic behaviour and violation of the nomination in parliament took longer than law and resigned from the office of mayor the time-limit stipulated by the constitu- of Bishkek. He also served as governor of tion, rumours started to spread about the Chui province and as chief of the Bakiyev’s fraudulent intentions. But Kulov Kyrgyz security forces. was, on 1 September, finally elected into In the early 2000 parliamentary elections office by the parliament with 55 of a total he suffered a setback as an independent 66 votes. If his nomination had been turned candidate because the Akayev adminis- down, new demonstrations and unrest tration fixed the ballot against him. This would surely have followed. This parlia- sparked anti-Akayev protests. Kulov was mentary event constituted an important then removed from the playing field step toward the stabilization of the country. altogether by the Akayev administration A long-term cooperation between the when it had him sentenced to a long two politicians is considered to be a fun- prison term. Kulov was freed on the day damental precondition for the stable of Akayev’s overthrow, 24 March 2005. development of Kyrgyzstan. Only in this His rapid success as provisory vice-prime constellation, observers say, can both parts minister in stopping the rampant plunder- of the country feel themselves properly ing and unrest in Bishkek clearly indicates represented. Kulov’s popularity would give his considerable influence in the security the leadership a kind of “trust bonus.” The forces, which was obviously effective even very different competencies of the two after years behind bars. politicians could complement one another. In the middle of May, Bakiyev and Kulov Nevertheless, there is grave doubt about the forged an electoral alliance that was in tandem leadership functionning smoothly both their interests: through the alliance in the long-term. The personal relationship Bakiyev strove to win votes from the north, of the two politicians appears to be rather where Kulov was popular, and promised poor. More and more principle political Kulov in the event of victory the office of differences are coming to the surface. Also, prime minister. Pay day came: in the the pact forged before the regime change, election Bakiyev received between 66–88 which provided for Bakiyev being in charge

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4 of foreign and domestic politics as presi- taken during the transition period, were dent and Kulov being responsible for ad hoc measures in the spirit of the election economics as prime minister, contains campaign. However, since the president’s plenty of fodder for conflict. The prognosis inauguration further plans have been for the duo is therefore rather bleak. announced that reveal differences in accent What role can the parliament play in the between Bakiyev and Kulov: Bakiyev reform process? Its legitimacy is, as before, promises primarily state-provided social contested. The fraudulent results of its services while Kulov wants to support election were ultimately what prompted individual initiative. Akayev’s fall. Nevertheless, the new par- In the direct aftermath of Akayev’s over- liament has, upon the decision of the throw, a parliamentary committee was central election commission, been able formed, comprising 114 representatives to take up its work. Demands for new from political parties, NGOs, the parlia- elections still circulate today. But new ment and the government. This committee elections would endanger internal stability should formulate proposals for constitu- because angry members of parliament tional reform, but its work suffers from the would, in the now familiar pattern, send lack of engagement of its members and their supporters onto the streets again. from principal disagreements, for example, They invested a lot of money to be elected on the question of whether Kyrgyzstan and now they expect a lucrative return should have a parliamentary or a presiden- from their mandates. The parliament is, at tial system. Since neither the president nor any rate, strongly dominated by rich busi- the members of parliament in the commit- ness people, so much so that people speak tee have an interest in constitutional of the “parliament of the purses.” Some reform and since pressure from the popu- representatives, including the recently lation on this question is not to be ex- murdered Bayaman Erkinbaev, are said to pected, besides Kulov only few individual have contacts to the criminal milieu. opposition figures, journalists, and western Clearly, many are thus dependent on their legal advisers and organizations will lobby immunity as parliamentarians. From such a for these kinds of decisive reforms. parliament one can not expect a credible A rapprochement between north and reform course. This much the members of south would be important for the state. parliament have already proven with the Since the foundation of the Kyrgyz Soviet constitution-required ratification of the republic, Bakiyev is only the second repre- new government at the end of September, sentative of the south in a leadership when in a secret vote they accepted only position in Kyrgyzstan (the first was 10 out of 16 of the proposed ministers— Absamat Masaliev who 1985–1990 led efusing ratification to those who were the Kyrgyz communist party apparatus). western- and reform-oriented, among them Productive cooperation with Kulov as a Roza Otunbaeva. In consequence, there are representative of the north would be an no other reformers in the highest leader- important advantage. There is the wide- ship positions besides Kulov. spread perception in Kyrgyzstan that a politician of a region primarily supports his native region and, correspondingly, less so First Steps of Reform? the interests of the entire state. The north- More democracy, decentralization, the south division can ultimately only be overcoming of the north-south division, redressed by overcoming this perception the fight against corruption, economic and by levelling the standard of living in recovery, more social services—these were both parts of the country. However, moves Bakiyev’s promises in his presidential in this direction are not in sight at the election campaign. The first measures, moment.

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5 As the north was egregiously overrepre- Generally, there have been no decisive sented in the government under Akayev, measures or successes in the campaign it was expected that Bakiyev would favour against the systematic corruption on all politicians from the south. Until his elec- levels. The 100-day program that was taken tion, southerners tended to be promoted up in April in order to re-establish stability without attracting much attention; since and the rule of law and that was directed then practically all important positions above all against corruption had to be have been staffed with southerners. It is extended because of its lack of results. In decisive that conspicuously often these the provinces the program is believed to southerners are members of Bakiyev’s have failed. Ministries and regional author- family. So, for example, one of the new ities are accused of blocking investigations president’s brothers is ambassador to into corruption cases. On 19 September the Germany. federal prosecutor Azimbek Beknazarov Bakiyev thus pursues less a course of and his deputy were fired dismissed, structural promotion of the south than presumably because of their overly zealous one of political patronage. He builds a basis activism in the anti-corruption campaign. for his power, reinforcing reservations of At the moment, however, it is unclear the north against himself and against the whether this case, and similarly in other “southerners” in general. dismissal cases, signifies a legitimate per- In some regions of the south provincial sonnel decision or patronage and political governors have become quasi-independent power struggles. actors. Bakiyev took a fundamental step In contrast to Bakiyev, who lacks credi- toward the reestablishment of control over bility in the campaign against corruption, these regions when he announced that Kulov counts as “clean”. He, too, announced by 2007 the provinces as such would be immediately after his election that an anti- abolished. Thus the affected governors corruption campaign would be the chief would not only lose their offices but also priority of his government. However, paltry their domains of power. results in the fight against corruption are not unique to this new leadership. An anti- corruption campaign started by Akayev in The Significance of 2003 was just as unsuccessful, as were Anti-corruption Measures similar measures in the Ukraine and The anti-corruption measures in particular Georgia after their “colour revolutions”. will be watched by the population with The only way to achieve results in this area great interest. The degree of trust in the in the long-term, apart from harshly new government hinges, next to the im- punishing offenders, is through change in provement of the economy, above all on the relevant legislation, increase of wages success in this sphere. Immediately after and changes in the public perception of the march uprising, a special commission the rule of law. This might include, for was established to investigate the financial example, training courses but also the circumstances of the Akayev family. The establishment of complaint offices, the “family” had apparently not only accumu- nomination of ombudsmen focusing on lated its wealth through corruption and the corruption with appellate powers who gray economy but also by blackmailing would also address the selling of offices, successful firms. The commission has come abuses of power, etc. Alongside their con- up with new information but it has not trol functions, they would also give the initiated effective legal proceedings because population a possibility to articulate com- those accused of tax evasion, embezzlement plaints and dissatisfaction in a regular and fraud either enjoy immunity or reside fashion. now abroad, for the most part in Russia.

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6 The Economy and the Foreign Policy superpowers, have ultimately had positive Many of Bakiyev’s election promises can implications for Kyrgyzstan. The country only become reality when more money now receives attention and financial help flows into the state’s accounts. While from both sides: the American secretary of Bakiyev could proudly point to the fact that defence promised significant financial during his transitional government the aid during his visit in July, and in when flow of tax revenue actually increased, that Bakiyev made is first trip abroad as presi- will not be enough as long as thorough- dent he received promises in Moscow of going economic recovery remains elusive. Russian investment, military aid and debt The promises he made for more social relief. services require substantially higher social The development of the conflict-ridden expenditures on behalf of the state. For this relationship with Uzbekistan has an im- purpose, Bakiyev wants to further increase portant domestic component. As a result of the country’s foreign debt. Akayev’s over- the tensions, a reduced supply of natural throw did not spell a spontaneous eco- gas and the closing of borders in the nomic turnaround. Foreign direct invest- Fergana Valley are not unlikely. Both could ment appears to have increased in the first be socially and economically destabilizing: half of 2005 in comparison to 2004, even many people in this part of central Asia though economic growth, 7% in 2004, is make their livelihoods from cross-border expected to decrease in 2005. trade. Kyrgyzstan’s economy is highly With the exception of stated intentions, dependent on energy imports. It is thus little has happened in the way of reform especially noteworthy that the Kyrgyz and spurring the economy. Investment government has so far withstood Uzbeki- conditions and labour laws for private stan’s pressure and has not handed over entrepreneurs are supposed to be im- the Usbeks (with the exception of four proved, the state’s involvement in the econ- persons) who had fled from Andijan after omy reduced, taxation laws simplified and the brutal repression of the May uprising. tax collection improved. The new leader- ship has invited foreign firms to exploit Kyrgyzstan’s gold reserves. Akayev tried to Outlook rescue Kyrgyzstan’s state budget by the In the light of the enormous difficulties same means. In terms of the creation of inherent in stabilizing a politically and new jobs, the settling of land issues and the economically weak state, no rapid improve- fight against poverty, no really new steps ment in the situation in Kyrgyzstan can be have been undertaken. foreseen. In addition, there are already The Kyrgyz public pays little attention to doubts about whether the new president the country’s difficult geopolitical situation actually wants changes. One increasingly with American and Russian troops are gets the impression that his predecessor stationed on its territory and with, in Akayev is his role model. Also, even though addition, a very uncomfortable and much the regime change in Bishkek is not com- stronger neighbour, Uzbekistan. Bakiyev, parable to the political transitions in like Akayev before him, obviously tends to a Georgia and the Ukraine in terms of the more pro-Russian course while Kulov and politicization and democratic conscious- with him a number of the other transi- ness of the leading actors, there are striking tional ministers spoke out for renewing the similarities in all three cases. As until terms for the stationing of American recently in the Ukraine, there is a conflict- troops. At present, it is not yet possible to stricken ruling twosome in Kyrgyzstan tell which position will prevail. Neverthe- with differing domestic and foreign-policy less, the contradictory positions of Bakiyev orientations. As in both of the other CIS and Kulov, which have unnerved both republics, the population of Kyrgyzstan has

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7 had dashed hopes linked to the overthrow of the former president. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan offers German and European policymakers a starting point in the region. It is a region in which political instability is either a present reality (like in Afghanistan) or is a real possibility (like in Uzbekistan). Also, these are bizarre, authoritarian regimes (above all in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), whose human rights violations are even deplored by the American government and that follow increasingly unpredictable foreign- policy courses. In contrast, the political

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und climate in Kyrgyzstan can be considered Politik, 2005 relatively liberal, and there is still a certain All rights reserved openness toward the West. But this can

SWP change quickly. What can the West do in Stiftung Wissenschaft und order to prevent deterioration? Politik German Institute for For one, the political events in the coun- International and try should be watched very carefully—by Security Affairs the OSCE, the diplomatic missions in the Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 country but also the local media. Secondly, 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 the West should offer targeted financial Fax +49 30 880 07-100 aid. Economic support in the form of loans, www.swp-berlin.org debt relief, etc., must, however, be linked [email protected] to clearly formulated conditions and ISSN 1861-1761 benchmarks. In order to prevent aid being thrown away into a corrupt system or having it actually support endemic cor- ruption, the expenditure of developmental aid should be overseen through strict monitoring processes. Only when the disappointed elite and the wider public recognize that the inter- national community takes the situation in Kyrgyzstan seriously and criticizes rather than supports the corrupt state system can the widespread feeling of hopelessness be overcome. In turn, it is important to mobilize the representatives of the elite to become politically active again and to remain so. Also, it is important to dissuade the population from further non-legal extra-parliamentary activism or uprisings. Not only the , but also Western politicians must be patient: neither a flourishing economy nor a western-style democracy can be expected in Kyrgyzstan in this generation.

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