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ROCZNIKI FILOZOFICZNE Tom LXIII, numer 2 – 2015 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf.2015.63.2-7 TOMASZ STĘPIEŃ * THE UNDERSTANDING OF SYMBOLS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE ASCENT OF THE SOUL TO GOD IN PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE AND NICHOLAS OF CUSA INTRODUCTION Human nature is dual—corporeal and spiritual—so on every stage of the ascension to God the human body assists the efforts of the soul. The body may be perceived as a burden and an obstacle, though man cannot get rid of the body; he remains a corporeal being even at the highest ecstatic stage of deifica- tion. That remark shows the importance of symbols in following the mystical path, which in the history of mysticism was perceived as the point of connection between the corporeal and the spiritual world. Symbols are always material; they could be written or spoken, could be an image, sound, or even the entire rite, but the sensual side always points to a certain aspect of spiritual reality. It seems that late Neoplatonic philosophers were the first who clearly realized the importance of symbols to spiritual life. However, it happened due to the influence of the mystical Chaldean and Egyptian thought trans- ferred to philosophical investigation by the Chaldean oracles and Corpus hermeticum. The late Neoplatonic thought of Iamblichus and Eastern Neo- platonic schools used symbols and rituals as integral parts of philosophical investigation understood as having a mystical goal. The first part of this article attempts to show the main issues of this first encounter of symbolism with philosophical tradition, which is important because of the revival of the Neoplatonic tradition in the fifteenth century. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areo- Ks. dr hab. TOMASZ STĘPIEŃ, prof. UKSW – Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie; adres do korespondencji: ul. Dewajtis 5, 01-815 Warszawa; e-mail: t.stepien@ uksw.edu.pl 86 TOMASZ STĘPIEŃ pagite, who creatively transformed the teaching of his pagan predecessors, incorporated the ancient Neoplatonic tradition into Christian theology. An analysis of his idea of symbols and their role in Christian life also seems to be indispensable for a proper understanding of Cusanus’ teaching. The se- cond part of this article considers which of those aspects of the under- standing of symbols were preserved by Pseudo-Dionysius, and which were transformed or completely rejected. The third part will analyze the meaning of symbolism in the thought of Nicolas of Cusa. He was deeply influenced by Pseudo-Dionysius and he also places great stress on the role of symbols for the mystical path. The key pro- blem is once again to show what was changed and what parts of ancient tradition remained in his thought. Such an approach should also allow for deriving more general conclusions on the character of philosophical thought at the dawn of the modern era. SYMBOLS WORKING THROUGH THEMSELVES The recognition of symbols as an important part of philosophical life did not come with the first Neoplatonic philosopher — Plotinus. He knew well the Chaldean oracles, and probably Corpus Hermeticum, but he did not admit that the content of those writings played any role in philosophical investigation.1 The interesting case was that of Porphyry — Plotinus’ disciple who acknowledged the importance of Chaldean symbolism in the Philosophy of Oracles, but later radically changed his view in the well-known Letter to Anebo. One of the most important issues in criticizing Chaldean and Egyp- tian influences was the irrationality of symbols and rites.2 This letter, ad- dressed probably to a fictitious person, did not survive till the present, but we can reconstruct its main topics thanks to a reply written by Iamblichus — On the Mysteries. Porphyry pointed out that through symbols and rites called “theurgical,” a philosopher can have control over the powers of Gods and even command them. For him it was irrational to claim that man, who is a lesser being, has control over a higher one. Gods and demons are more perfect and thus men cannot control them. 1 See John DILLON, “Plotinus and the Chaldean Oracles,” in Platonism in the Late Antiquity, ed. Stephen Gersh and Charles Kannengiesser (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 140. 2 Emma C. CLARKE, John M. DILLON, and Jackson P. HERSHBELL, “Introduction,” in IAMBLI- CHUS, De mysteriis (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), xxvi–xxxvii. THE UNDERSTANDING OF SYMBOLS AND THEIR ROLE... 87 The polemic between Porphyry and Iamblichus is well known, but in our case it reveals very important aspects of the understanding of symbols. In his answer Iamblichus formulated a point of view, which was hardly changed until the end of pagan Neoplatonic philosophy. He claimed that using the rites and symbols in a philosophical way of perfection was indeed irrational, but it was not due to being less rational. On the contrary, these rites should be conceived as exceeding the human capability of understanding. If they were under- standable they would only match the activity of man, but being beyond it, they are actions of the gods themselves. The mode and efficacy of rites was revealed in sacred writings, and thus they are only given to man who cannot understand them, but can perform them using the powers of gods. Thus sacred rites that help the initiate are true theurgy—the work of gods. For Iamblichus symbols are indispensable on the path of man to per- fection and unity with the One. His position on the matter means that the way of a philosopher is no longer merely an intellectual activity. Plotinus and his disciple Porphyry claimed that intellectual activity — philosophical investigation - leads man all the way to the point where he reaches the edge of the second hypostasis, that is Intellect (nous). The One itself is above Intellect, and thus the last part of the way must follow beyond the concepts of reason. Iamblichus disagrees with that, saying that philosophical life must be partially irrational from very beginning. Norman Russell expressed it well, writing about Iamblichus that: “Doing philosophy could no longer in itself raise the soul to the level of the divine because the divine essence transcends the essence of the human soul to such a degree. It is therefore necessary for the divine to descend by a ‘providential love’ before the lower reality can be perfected through participation in the characteristics of the higher. Iamblichus speaks of theurgy as taking place through wordless sym- bols beyond the act of thinking.”3 This disproportion between the soul and the divine reality is also stressed by Iamblichus. He also underlines that symbols are entities independent of the activity of a philosopher. They produce specific effects according to their kind by themselves, not thanks to the activity of man. Iamblichus explains this in the fragment De mysteriis: “Granting then that ignorance and decep- tion are faulty and impious, it does not follow on this that the offerings made to the gods and divine works (ta theia erga) are invalid, for it is not pure thought (ennoia) that unites theurgists to the gods. Indeed what, then, would 3 Norman RUSSELL, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Ox- ford University Press, 2004), 43. 88 TOMASZ STĘPIEŃ hinder those who are theoretical philosophers (theoretikos philosophountas) from enjoying a theurgic union with the gods? But the situation is not so: it is the accomplishment of acts not to be divulged and beyond all conception (hyper pasan noesin) and the power of unutterable symbols, understood solely by the gods, which establishes theurgic union. Hence, we do not bring about these things by intellection alone; for thus their efficacy would be intellectual, and dependent upon us. But neither assumption is true. For even then we are not engaged in intellection, the symbols themselves, by themselves, perform their appropriate work, and ineffable power of the gods, to whom these symbols relate, itself recognizes the proper images of itself, not through being aroused by our thought.”4 Symbols and the effects they cause are completely incomprehensible for the human intellect. Thanks to such a notion, Iamblichus can refute the claim that lesser beings direct and command the higher ones. The intellectual comprehension of man is not the cause of the operation of symbols. The theurgist can only prepare himself to accept the divine operation of symbols by having his soul in the best condition and maintaining ritual purity.5 So the role of man is rather limited to the technique of using them in the proper way. He has no control over what a symbol does to his soul, but thanks to the knowledge revealed in sacred writings he can discover the sympathy of a symbol with the specific deity. Sympathy of this kind shows what the effect of the symbol’s work on the soul could be. The sympathy of a symbol with divinity points to the cosmological perspective. The usage of symbols in the process of a return to the divine reality must also be proper and has to take place in the sequence, which mirrors how they were created by Demiurge. Those symbols are present in the universe because the gods seeded them during the process of the creation of the material universe. A god who plays the most important role in the creation of symbols is often Demiurge.6 He is not understood as the Platonic 4 IAMBLICHUS, De mysteriis, 96, 9-97, 7. 5 Iamblichus clarifies it in the next lines of this fragment, De mysteriis, 97,7-15: “For it is not in the nature of the things containing (synthemata) to be aroused by those contained in them, nor of things perfect by things imperfect, nor even of wholes by parts.

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