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Commentary to Feature Review: The Future of Moral : Truth, , and the Pluralist Way Author(s): Richard A. Shweder and Source: Psychological Science, Vol. 4, No. 6 (Nov., 1993), pp. 360-365 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the Association for Psychological Science Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40062563 Accessed: 10-08-2019 20:30 UTC

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Truth, Intuitionism, Pluralism

ethical mission. Lagerkvist (1971) Hampshire, had S. (1983). and conflict. Moore, Cam- G.E. (1959). Philosophical papers. London: bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Allen & Unwin. (Original work published God reply to a question regarding his in- Hartshorne, H., & May, M. (1928). Studies in the 1922) tention in creating human beings with, nature "I of character: Vol. 1 . Studies in deceit.Peirce, C.S. (1992). Reasoning and the logic of only intended that you need never Newbe York: Macmillan. things (K.L. Ketner, Ed.). Cambridge, MA: content with nothing" (p. 65). James, W. (1981). of psychology (Vol. 2). Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Quine, W.V. (1981). Theories and things. Cam- (Original work published 1890) bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kochanska, G. (1991). Socialization and tempera- Shweder, R.A. (1985). Menstrual pollution, soul loss REFERENCES ment in the development of and con- and the comparative study of . In A. science. Child Development, 62, 1379-1392. Kleinman & B. Goode (Eds.), Culture and de- Donagan, A. (1977). The theory of morality. Lagerqvist, Chi- P. (1971). The eternal smile. New York: pression (pp. 182-215). Berkeley: University cago: University of Chicago Press. Hill & Wang. of California Press.

Commentary to Feature Review

THE FUTURE OF : Truth, Intuition, and the Pluralist Way

Richard A. Shweder and Jonathan Haidt Committee on Human Development, University of Chicago

What are the recent theoretical developments in ment"the confirms this picture: Sixty percent of the entries study of moral psychology? The publication of the Hand- for 1991 either employ or criticize Kohlberg's theory and book of Moral Behavior and Development (Kurtines methods. & Gewirtz, 1991) provides us with an excuse to assess the Kohlberg's preeminence derives from the fact that in state of the art. It also provides us with a chance the to wake of the "cognitive revolution" of the 1960s, he engage in some augury (and perhaps influence the future) temporarily gained the upper hand over psychoanalysts, by making an educated guess about where the discipline radical relativists, and social learning theorists in the bat- is heading. We assess the current state of moral psychol- tle between and . Moral cognitiv- ogy in the light of a history of conflicts along three theo- ism is the position that qualities such as goodness, right- retical fronts: cognitivism versus emotivism, pluralism ness, , or beneficence are real and knowable and versus monism, and intuitionism versus rationalism. that We moral statements can therefore be either true or false foresee the consolidation of a cognitive-pluralist- (see Gewirth, 1984). A cognitivist approach to moral de- intuitionist theory of moral psychology whose main tenet velopment tries to identify the particular mix of intellec- is that moral appraisals (this is , that is right) tualare skills (e.g., perspective taking) and interpersonal ex- grounded in -evident truths (), saturated periences (e.g., caretaking) that makes it possible to with local cultural meanings, and activated by means apprehend of or figure out moral truth. The basic point of the emotions. cognitivist theories of moral psychology is that everyday moral appraisals (e.g., that the police officers in the Rod- ney King video behaved in a morally repulsive way) can SOME PRINCIPALS OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE be right or wrong; they are not subjective or inculcated CURRENT STATE OF THE ART tastes, opinions, or attitudes, as emotivism would have it. Kohlberg succeeded at driving home the cognitivist' s The 40 chapters contained in the Handbook make it point about the objective reality of justice, which he clear that the voice of still dominates viewed as the supreme moral truth. the current scene. The reference lists contain 143 refer- The most influential and widely cited critic of Kohl- ences to Kohlberg's work, more than twice the number berg's theory is . Gilligan's importance de- for any other author. A survey of all entries rives in fromthe the fact that in the wake of the feminist revo- PsycLit data base under the descriptor "moral develop- lution of the 1970s, she temporarily gained the upper hand over Kohlberg in the battle between pluralism and Address correspondence to Richard A. Shweder, University of Chi- monism. She can be credited with the claim that the cago, Committee on Human Development, 5730 South Woodlawn realm of moral truth is diverse, not homogeneous, and Ave., Chicago, IL 60637. consists of an of care as well as an ethics of justice.

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Richard A. Shweder and Jonathan Haidt

Finally, research on the importance of determinations of truth and falsehood, and cannot be flourished during the 1980s, as the cognitive revolution judged against rational standards. They are simply dec- branched out into multiple skirmishes, including the bat- larations of preferences and values. tle of intuitionism versus rationalism. Cognitive intuition- Given those two choices, Hume opted for emotivism. ists (e.g., Kagan,1984; Lazarus, 1991) assume that moral Having ceded to reason nothing more than the instrumen- appraisals are generated rapidly and automatically, with- tal capacity to calculate the most efficient means for out deliberate reflection or deductive or inductive rea- achieving a given end, he argued that appraisals about soning. They assume that verbal judgments about actions which ends in life are bad and which ones are good must and goals (this is right, that is good) and morally relevant be rooted entirely in people's passions, interests, and emotional appraisals (pride, , , , will. This led Hume to a series of breathtaking emotivist guilt, , dread) are grounded in a base set of nonde- conclusions, from which he had the ducible and noninducible self-evident truths, for exam- not to shrink: "Reason is and ought to only be the slave ple, that it is wrong to inflict pain arbitrarily, that itof is the passions, and can never pretend to any other office right to treat like cases alike, that it is right that wrongs than to serve and obey." "Reason alone can never be a should be repaired. motive to any action of the will." "Tis not contrary to Ironically, if the cognitive intuitionists win the day, thereason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the emotions (reinterpreted as a rapid system of cognitive scratching of my finger." (See Hume, 1739-1740/1969, appraisal) may well be restored to their rightful place pp. in 460-463.) In Hume's emotivism, ends may provide the study of . It is not just emotivists the rational justification of means, but nothing can pro- who believe that 4 'emotions may be the gatekeeper to the vide a rational justification of ends. moral world." Cognitive intuitionists believe it as well One can develop a cognitivist theory or an emotivist (see Lucas, 1971; Moore, 1903/1966; Ross, 1930; Seung, theory about any kind of mental state. The distinction 1993; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993; also Strawson, 1949, betweenp. cognitivism and emotivism is not peculiar to the 24, from whom the "gatekeeper" quote is drawn). study of moral appraisals. There are cognitivist theories of the emotions and emotivist theories of inductive rea- SOME PRINCIPLES OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE soning. The mark of a cognitivist theory is the assump- EMOTIVIST LEGACY OF tion that mental states serve primarily a representational Hume described the state of the art in moral function.philoso- The mark of an emotivist theory is the assump- phy in 1777 (1777/1960). His description is astonishingly tion that mental states serve primarily nonrepresenta- accurate for moral psychology in 1993: "There has tional been functions. Cognitivist theories explain a mental a controversy started of late . . . concerning the state general by reference to facts or truths about the objects and foundation of Morals; whether they be derived from events Rea- which that mental state "re-presents" (sometimes son, or from Sentiment; whether we attain the knowledge inaccurately), on the assumption that such objects and of them by a chain of argument and induction, eventsor by existan and can be invoked as external standards for immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether explaining like and judging (as rational or irrational) mental all sound judgments of truth and falsehood, they states. should Emotivist theories explain the occurrence and be the same to every rational intelligent being; or whethercharacter of a mental state without assessing the veracity like the of beauty and deformity, theyof the be mental state vis-^-vis the objects or events it rep- found entirely on the particular fabric and constitution resents, of on the assumption that no such objects and the human species" (p. 2). Hume believed there events were exist aside from the mental representation of only two possible resolutions to this controversy them. con- cerning the foundation of morals. Prior to the cognitive revolution of the 1960s, emotiv- The first possible resolution is the cognitivist ist resolu- theories of moral psychology flourished and were used tion, that moral qualities are objective and universal to explain qual- the apparent diversity of moral appraisals ities of events in the world and can be apprehended across historyby and culture (e.g., why eating beef is judged means of reason through a "chain of argument a andsin inin- Delhi but not in Dallas). It was widely recognized duction," and that moral appraisals can reasonably that moral be disagreements are interminable. Emotivist judged to be true or false. theories offered a simple explanation for why moral dis- The second possible resolution is the emotivist putes reso- go on forever: There are no moral facts. Morality is lution, that the moral qualities of events in the worldnothing do more than a system of inculcated, reinforced, or not exist aside from people's sentimental reactions introjected to values, evolved to serve some pragmatic those events, including their feelings of approval and (nonrepresentational) dis- function such as influencing people approval. For emotivists, morality (like beauty) tois doin whatthe you want, coordinating social activities, or of the arbiter. Moral appraisals are not subject balancing to intrapsychic conflict anxiety.

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Truth, Intuitionism, Pluralism

THE COGNITIVIST LEGACY OF them as stages, from primitive to advanced. Both of these LAWRENCE KOHLBERG strategies are forms of moral monism, asserting that there is only one correct or mature morality. In contrast, the It is a striking fact of intellectual history that emotivist third strategy, moderate relativism, is a form of moral theories have nearly disappeared from the intellectual pluralism, accepting that there can be more than one cor- landscape of moral psychology. This disappearance is rect and mature morality. Gilligan (1982) argued against due largely to the bold formulations and fortunate timing the prevailing monism of morality research in the 1970s, of Kohlberg (1969). Kohlberg argued that judgments which seemed to rank women as deficient in the one true about the moral world could be true or false, better or morality of justice. worse, just like judgments about the physical world. Kohlberg and others have pointed out that the mere When children learn to conserve mass in Piagetian tasks, existence of difference between groups is not evidence we do not hesitate to say they are developing a more that a measuring instrument is biased. We do not throw correct, adequate, and true understanding of the physical out our measuring tapes when they tell us that women world. Kohlberg' s cognitivism employed the same logic are, on average, shorter than men. But Gilligan's (1982) for moral judgments. Kohlberg drew on Rawls (1971) to now-famous critique of her ex-advisor said more than make philosophical claims about the superiority of justice this. Gilligan asserted that people have two . He backed up these claims with longitudinal "voices," or ways of talking and thinking about moral and cross-cultural evidence that justice reasoning was in issues. Kohlberg measured only the development of the fact the endpoint of moral development. Kohlberg made justice voice, ignoring (or missing the sophistication of) the world safe for cognitivism. the care voice. Gilligan found in narrative analyses that Hume (and Kohlberg) saw only two possible resolu- American women use the care voice more than the justice tions to the "controversy started of late . . . concerning voice, while American men do the reverse, yet she noted the general foundation of Morals." The cognitivist reso- that both genders use both voices. However, studies of lution implied that morals "should be the same to every moral reasoning in hypothetical dilemmas have generally rational intelligent being," at least upon sufficient reflec- failed to find gender differences (Walker, 1991). Some tion, and "we attain the knowledge of [morals] by a chain . scholars think Gilligan misread the difference between of argument and induction." Kohlberg endorsed both of justice and care as a gender issue. these propositions. But cognitivist theories come in many Whether the two moral voices are associated with the varieties. Much of the recent work in moral psychology two sexes or not, Gilligan has, by common consensus, can be seen as a challenge to one or the other of the two won the argument for pluralism. Kohlberg, Levine, and propositions, from within the framework of a cognitivist Hewer (1983) acknowledged that there is more to the theory. Pluralists like Gilligan disagree with monists like moral domain than justice reasoning, and they specifi- Kohlberg about the first proposition, and intuitionists like Kagan disagree with rationalists like Kohlberg cally about cited the an additional cluster of including second. "charity, love, caring, brotherhood, or community" (p. 19). This cluster is not homogeneous, however, and there is ambiguity about how the is to be con- PLURALISM VERSUS MONISM ceptualized: as a sensitivity to other people's needs? as Moral appraisals seem to differ widely across the people, particularistic side of justice in its guise as mercy? as cultures, and historical periods. They differ at the the level role of obligation of guardianship? actions deemed morally obnoxious; in India, for More exam- recently, cultural have been ex- ple, among Brahmans, it is highly immoral for a ploringson to eat forms of limited pluralism. The moral of meat or cut his hair during the 10 days that followjustice maythe be recognized in some form in all cultures, death of his father (see Shweder, Mahapatra, yet& Miller, there are additional moral that are often used in 1987/1990). Moral appraisals also differ in terms sophisticated of the (or "postconventional") ways to resolve moral qualities (e.g., , duty, care, sanctity) moral that dilemmas. are Japanese see a moral value in preserv- salient in judging the lightness or goodness of an ingaction group or harmony, even in some cases when justice goal. might be compromised (see Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Shweder (1984) described three strategies for dealing Indians see a moral value in meeting one's social role with this apparent diversity across time and space. The obligations, even when these may conflict with the de- universalist strategy (exemplified by Elliot Turiel) is to mands of justice (Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Shweder & interpret apparent difference as superficial, and to seek Much, 1991 ; Snarey & Keljo, 1991 ; for a powerful theory commonality in a more universal deep structure. The de- of limited pluralism, see Fiske, 1991, 1992). velopmentalist strategy (exemplified by Kohlberg) is to Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park (in press; see acknowledge the existence of differences and to rank also Shweder, 1990) find that moral discourse tends,

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Richard A. Shweder and Jonathan Haidt cross-culturally, to make use of three distinct butMost coher- philosophers, however, are uncomfortable with ent clusters of moral concerns. These three ways the ideaof talk- that goodness or lightness or even harm is a ing about morality are labeled the ethics of natural property (like redness) that anyone with a normal (concerns about freedom, rights, harm, andsensory justice), apparatus can see. Yet almost everyone allows community (concerns about duty and the collective that appraisals en- of Tightness and goodness are unavoidably terprise), and divinity (concerns about purity, made sanctity, about almost all of the actions that one does see. and the realization of one's spiritual nature). How Haidt, is this Kol- done? Cognitive intuitionists offer a third ler, and Dias (in press) found that people of high kind of and account. low social class in Brazil and North America made differen- Theories of cognitive intuitionism assume that moral tial use of these three ethics when judging acts that were properties (e.g., Tightness, goodness, gratitude, benefi- harmless yet offensive (such as eating one's dead pet dog cence, justice, sanctity, fraternity) are objective and or cleaning one's toilet with the national flag). And Balle- knowable but apprehended as self-evident truths. Such Jensen (1993) has confirmed that North American college theories assume that moral knowledge is distinct from students are unusual in their almost exclusive reliance on other forms of knowledge (knowledge of geometry, the ethics of autonomy. Older Americans of the same knowledge of minerals, knowledge of how to build a social class are more willing to talk about the moral issues house) in that it cannot be derived solely from deductive of community and divinity. reason (e.g., a of consistency or universalizabil- ity) or instrumental reason (e.g., knowledge of the most efficient use of means to accomplish a given end) or in- INTUITIONISM VERSUS RATIONALISM ductive reason (e.g., systematic of the natu- (AND ) ral properties of objects and events in the world). Theories of cognitive intuitionism assume that the How exactly does one discover or figure out moral project of grounding moral appraisals in deductive, in- truths? Hume described cognitivists as relying ductive, on a or instrumental reason has failed. Such theories "chain of argument and induction." But in fact oneassume can that what this failure implies is not that emotiv- be a cognitivist yet hold any of three views on how ismpeople is right and objective moral qualities do not exist, but acquire moral knowledge. One can be a cognitive rather ratio- that objective moral qualities are neither logical nalist, a cognitive naturalist, or a cognitive intuitionist. properties nor observable properties. Theories of cogni- Theories of cognitive rationalism argue that knowl- tive intuitionism assume that moral qualities are objective edge of moral truth comes from a process of argumenta- properties of a different kind, properties that are open to tion and deductive reasoning. Kant, for example, the was rational a intuitive capacities of the human mind or cognitive rationalist. So was Kohlberg, who was a nervous Kant- system. They can be activated without reflec- ian as well. Both Kant and Kohlberg tried to countertion. They are not dependent on deliberative reason or Hume's emotivism by grounding a cognitivist theory argumentation of to bring them on-line. morals not in the instrumental means-ends reasoning thatOne attractive feature of cognitive intuitionism is that Hume parodied so effectively, but rather in the principle it makes it possible to tell the following kind of story of consistency inherent in deductive reasoning. They about pro- moral pluralism. Following Ross (1930), imagine posed a method for deducing right conduct from the that logic the human mind has intuitive access to a plethora of of noncontradiction, as in Kant's . self-evident, abstract moral truths (e.g., fidelity, grati- (The critiques of this famous and failed attempt to derivetude, reciprocity, justice, beneficence, self-improve- substantive moral conclusions from a purely formal ment). log- These truths are so self-evident that if someone ical principle are voluminous; see Seung, 1993). were to deny that, for example, it is right to treat like Theories of cognitive naturalism, in contrast, cases argue alike and different cases differently, you would sus- that the methods for acquiring knowledge of the pect moral either that they did not understand the of world are similar to the methods for acquiring knowledge those words or that they were not sincere in their denial. about the natural world: observation and inductive Yet rea- there are too many such truths. They cannot all be soning. The idea is that actions that are right and activated out- at once. They cannot be institutionalized simul- comes that are good exhibit certain defining properties, taneously in social practices. Some cultures specialize in which can be observed directly with the senses, much the the truths of justice and fidelity, others in the truths of way one can observe the defining properties of aduty tiger. and care, others in the truths of purity and pollution, Turiel is an eminent contemporary cognitive naturalist. and so on. He argues that moral violations, such as murder, contain Moreover, the various objective moral qualities open intrinsic features, such as harm, which are directly to apprehension ob- by the intuitive mind are only the ab- servable (Turiel, 1983; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987).stract "frames" or the "gross architecture" within which

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Truth, Intuitionism, Pluralism

societies historically implement and develop facto their processes. local These processes depend on verbal, de- and quite divergent moral practices. Thus, for ductive, example, and inductive abilities, which improve through- although moral appraisals are grounded in an out originalchildhood, accounting for Kohlberg' s age trends. Yet multiplicity of self-evident moral truths, it is studiesnot, onof moral first intuition find few age trends. Turiel's glance, immediately obvious to an Anglo-American (1983) method ob- can be reinterpreted as a way to probe server precisely why it is morally obnoxious childrenfor a aboutBrah- their moral intuitions (using a series of man male in India to eat chicken or have a haircut in the yes/no questions), and studies that have used this method days immediately following the death of his father. The typically find that 5-year-old children have intuitions sim- case does become self-evident, however, once one rec- ilar to those of within their own communities. ognizes it for what it is: a powerful combination of reci- According to cognitive intuitionism, emotions are the procity, care, duty, nonmalfeasance, and other intu- "gatekeeper to the moral world." Emotions "tell us how itively available moral qualities. the world is in a very vivid way" (D'Andrade, 1981, p. To recognize the case for what it is, however, one 191; also see Shweder, 1993). Emotional responses, it is must know the kinds of things orthodox Hindus in India now generally thought, involve rapid, automatic, and un- know about death pollution. One must know about the conscious cognitive appraisals of the significance of difficulties faced by a reincarnating soul in its attempt to events for personal well-being. Lazarus (1991), for exam- escape from the bondage of the corpse. One must know ple, has proposed a cognitive theory of the emotions in about the ascetic techniques employed by living relatives which emotions serve a representational function. In (abstaining from sex; fasting from all "hot" foods, such Lazarus's view, the emotions are mental maps of certain as chicken) to facilitate the absorption of death pollution kinds of truths. The experience of anger is a representa- into their own bodies as a form of assistance to the spirit tion of a certain kind of interpersonal event (e.g., a de- of the dead. One must know about the migration of pol- meaning personal insult) that exists both inside and out- lutions to the extremities of the body. One must know side the anger, in the mental state and in the state of the how to remove the pollution by cutting off all head hair, world that is represented emotionally. which is done only after the soul is on its way, typically Crucially, many of the cognitive appraisals that have 12 days after the death. In other words, historical and been postulated as causal conditions for an emotional cultural understanding is essential for moral appraisal, experience are quite similar to the self-evident truths of yet there is always more to a moral appraisal (the intu- morality. Anger is about injustice and the perception of a ition of an abstract moral truth) than only historical and demeaning personal insult. is about harm and cultural understanding can provide. Taken together, . Shame and guilt are about the right and the however, moral intuitions and cultural-historical under- good. Disgust is about degradation and human dignity. standing work hand in hand to turn the reality of a cog- (For more on the emotional basis of morality, see Haidt, nitive moral pluralism into a credible theoretical possibil- Koller, & Dias, in press; Hoffman, 1991; Kagan, 1984; ity. Solomon, 1976). According to this cognitive-pluralist-intuitionist view, Kagan (1984) has long argued that moral psychology there is such a thing as moral truth, and it is a heteroge- should pay more attention to the emotions: "Beneath the neous collection of goods, known through culturally as- extraordinary variety of surface behavior and con- sisted intuition. The base set of abstract, self-evident sciously articulated ideals, there is a set of emotional moral truths is universal but accessed differentially and states that form the bases for a limited number of univer- with particularizing substance. sal moral categories that transcend time and locality" (p. A second attractive feature of cognitive intuitionism is 119). In other words, if cognitive intuitionism gains the that it makes it possible to acknowledge the difference upper hand over cognitive rationalism, we will soon rec- between fast and slow cognitive processes, without as- ognize what many peoples of the world have been telling similating this difference to the distinction between "af- anthropologists for a long time: The mind of the moralist fect" and "cognition." Moral reasoning, like any other is located in the heart, which is, paradoxically, a cogni- kind of explicit and conscious problem solving, is slow. tive organ, and it is through the heart that we come to Yet moral intuition, like all intuitive knowledge, is rapid know moral truth(s). That is our augury. and introspectively opaque. Margolis (1987) argued that most of cognition consists of rapid, intuitive pattern matching, followed (when people are called upon to ex- plain themselves) by slow, ex post facto propositional Acknowledgments - This essay was developed with support from the reasoning. Applying this view to the study of moral de- John D. and Catherine T. Mac Arthur Foundation Health Pro- gram Research Network for Successful Midlife Development velopment suggests that cognitive rationalists such as (MIDMAC). Kohlberg focused their attention on the slow, ex post

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This content downloaded from 205.208.116.24 on Sat, 10 Aug 2019 20:30:36 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Richard A. Shweder and Jonathan Haidt

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