The Doctrine of Hypostatic Union As a Viable Inspiration

Journal of Moral Theology, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2016): 81-98

Catholic Theology of Post-Conflict Restorative Justice: The Doctrine of Hypostatic Union as a Viable Inspiration

Rev. Raymond Aina, MSP

HE HYPOSTATIC UNION IS HARDLY INVOKED in Catholic social ethics, unlike the apparently more arcane doctrine of Trinity, which appears more popular for both the Church and T public theologians. Yet, from the doctrine of the hypostatic union, humans can recognize that God encounters humans and beck- ons them on towards full reconciliation without destroying what de- fines them as humans. Rather, God unites them with himself. That “mode of being” should be Christians’ critical contribution to the public as inspired from their distinctive ethics. This theology of restorative justice must be relational, full of dependence, kenosis and “paradox.” The presence of “paradox” in this theology is not necessarily a moral failure, because tension arising from competing wills will always be with us. It is not regrettable, so long as they do not wander off the telos (God’s reign in the world). Accordingly, Catholic Social Teach- ing/Thought needs to acknowledge the promise of the “hypostatic union” as a more viable theological analogue in the Church’s theology of reconciliation. Before proceeding with this thesis, it is imperative to offer the basis for this doctrine as a primary theological analogue.

THE DOCTRINE OF HYPOSTATIC UNION AND RECONCILIATION In the search and desire for reconciliation with humanity, God paid attention to the other, even if different. By opting for relationality in the concrete sense (hypostatic union), for the sake of reconciliation, God accepted limitation. It offers a message that timeless and tangible, even if hypostatic, union is possible. In other words, radical otherness in a reconciled union of qualitative differences is possible.1 Brian Da- ley, a church historian from the Western tradition, argues with Leon- tius of Byzantium’s explication. According to Leontius, the union of the two spheres of realities “is more unitive than one of completely

1 Stephen Davis, Daniel Kendal and Gerald O’Collins, “Preface,” in The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God, ed. Stephen Davis, Daniel Kendal and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), ix-x. 82 Raymond Aina divided things, yet richer than one of completely confused things; it does not make the elements united completely the same as other, nor completely different.”2 However, this mode of union, being a paradox, was difficult to state clearly without ambiguities. For instance, Cyril of Alexandria spoke of the hypostatic union as the Word clothed in human flesh, i.e., a cosmetic change, without anything substantially happening to it. This may be seen as a peripheral attachment. Thus the core remains— powerful and divine—while the other at the periphery was simply an unavoidable element needed for an end. Irenaeus and Tertullian had their own ambiguous explanations of the hypostatic union.

Chalcedonian Confession and Renewal of Mode of Being Human The ambiguities noticed in the Christological controversies during the patristic period eventually led to the Chalcedonian confession that the belief in the unity of the two natures was based on communicatio idiomatum.3 The unity of human and divine natures in the person of the incarnate Son is similar to the unity of three persons in one God. Thus, it was appropriate that the same terminology used to explain the unity of the Trinitarian persons (communicatio idiomatum) was used to explain the unity of the two natures in one person of the incarnate Son. Communicatio idiomatum implied proportional interchange of properties, i.e., the divine took up human property; the human took up divine property in mutual exchange in proportion to its human nature. This interchange of properties did not dissolve the distinction of the two natures.4 The caution with which communicatio idiomatum was used showed that interchanged properties for the sake of reconciliation did not dissolve, and should not dissolve, differences.5 Perhaps, it was

2 Brian Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’: Late Patristic Models for the Per- sonal Unity of Christ,” in The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God, ed. Stephen Davis, Daniel Kendal and Gerald O’Col- lins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 167. 3 The Chalcedonian confession on the unity of the human and divine properties in the incarnate Son of God is enunciated thus in the Council’s Definition of Faith: “One and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten, acknowledged in two natures which undergo no confusion, no change, no division, no separation; at no point was the difference between the natures taken away through the union, but rather the property of both natures is preserved and comes together into a single person and a single subsist- ent being; he is parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the same only - begotten Son, God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ” (Council of Chalcedon, “Definition of Faith” in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils—Vol. I: Nicaea I to Lateran V, ed. Norman Tanner [Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990], 86). 4 Gerald O’Collins, Christology: A Biblical, Historical, and Systematic Study of Jesus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 185. 5 O’Collins, Christology, 161-8, 191. Hypostatic Union as a Viable Inspiration 83 meant to highlight the unique paradox of the hypostatic union: something incommunicable, deeply rooted in divine sphere of reality, at the moment of kenosis, joined with human sphere of reality and the outcome was Jesus Christ, the God-man.6 The hypostatic union as “[t]he most unlikely truth”7 appeals to the human heart and conscience.8 This unlikely truth is the work of grace, and the human heart perceives that grace is needed for human co-belonging. This holistic co-belonging is a pilgrimage; we may never reach it, but it is achievable. On the whole, it is safe to state with Sarah Coakley that the Chal- cedonian confession has proved very successful in “regulating language about Christ.”9 Chalcedon made it possible to envision an anal- ogy of one actor whose actions reveal two natures, like one nation act- ing in such a way that distinct entities that make up the union are revealed. For instance, in communication and language our distinctness is revealed without any identity suppressed.10 It is necessary to bear in mind that the issue about the hypostatic union during the patristic period was not really on the two natures (di- vinity and humanity). No one was denying these realities. The issue was the “mode of union,” i.e., the manner by which separate spheres of realities joined in the person confessed as the Son of God. This is the great mystery of the Christian faith. Hence, the task for the fathers was to investigate the mode and the outcome. The leading question could be framed thus: “how can we conceive the mode of union which produced the complex reality called Christ as a person?”11 Daley, in my opinion, brings home to non-systematic theologians the whole debate on the meaning of ousia (nature; substance) and hypostasis (person) and the “how.” Ousia (nature; generic) means “what exists,” while hypostasis (person) means “a particular living being.” Accordingly, the hypostatic union changes the manner of the Logos’ being human “in a way that sets before us the new ‘manner of being’ that is the pattern of our redemption.”12 Although the overriding argu- ments favor some form of substantial relational union (e.g. Cyril of Alexandria; Maximus the Confessor; John of Damascus) over and

6 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 167. 7 Marguerite Shuster, “The Incarnation in Selected Christmas Sermons,” in The In- carnation: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God, ed. Stephen Davis, Daniel Kendal and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 380. 8 Shuster, “The Incarnation in Selected Christmas Sermons,” 378. 9 Sarah Coakley, “What Does Chalcedon Solve and What Does it Not? Some Reflec- tions on the Status and Meaning of the Chalcedonian ‘Definition’,” in The Incarna- tion: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God, ed. Ste- phen Davis, Daniel Kendal and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 161. 10 O’Collins, Christology, 193-4. 11 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 167. 12 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 187. 84 Raymond Aina above a mere moral/spiritual union (Nestorian position), the mode of union is clearly relational, and one that happened “due solely to divine grace and favour.”13 This, therefore, is the core of the hypostatic union. It is about the relationship between God and humans. The relationship is so unique because it is so unequal: humans are totally dependent on God for their personal and generic being. Nevertheless, at the same time, through the hypostatic union, Christians recognize that God, as expression of graciousness and gratuitousness, has set a particular human person (Christ) “freer than any human before him to be what all of us are created to be—sons and daughters of God, created in God’s image and likeness.” 14 In this sense, therefore, the union “renews” how to be with individualities. Hence, life, love, and grace revealed in the hypostatic union transform previous manifestations of evil in the human community, like death, lies, hatred, and wickedness.15 Consequently, through God’s graciousness and gratuitousness, humanity is revealed in its fullest possible perfection because the hypostatic union clearly reveals that sinlessness is not equivalent with being non-human.16 At the same time this union concretely reveals the unknowable nature of God. This union is not merely a moral one (like husband and wife). Rather, as Daley affirms, “it is God who encounters us personally in Jesus,” and the hypostasis (personhood) with its “mode” and actions originated from the Logos (the second person of the Trinity), yet humanity is fully recognized and respected by God.17 So, the intricate union of separate realities (ousia—nature) without an- nihilation, sublimation, and totalitarianism reveals how God patterns our redemption: no imposition, no violation; and the kenosis was chosen to repair the damaged original telos—God’s reign in creation, in- cluding comprehensive wellbeing. This implies repairing the defects in our complex human need structure damaged by sin.

The Doctrine of Hypostatic Union as an Inspiration for Post-Conflict Contexts If recovery from violence is a form of “redemption,” then the hypostatic union, as a new manner of being, challenges stakeholders, especially Christians, to let this manner of being be the pattern of “redemption” after violence. This is more compelling for persons/peoples in civil and internal conflicts with competing origination. From the foregoing, therefore, hypostatic union is not a destruction of what exists. Rather, it is about renewal. It is about repairing “the ‘mode’ of our being,” i.e., renewing who we are and how we are in relation with our relationships and those we share common actions .18

13 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 181. 14 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 195. 15 Shuster, “Incarnation in Selected Sermons,” 389. 16 Shuster, “Incarnation in Selected Sermons,” 384, 389. 17 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 196. 18 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 187. Hypostatic Union as a Viable Inspiration 85

The theological point of “renewal,” according to Daley, is clearly emphasized in Maximus the Confessor, who insists that what needs renewal is not human nature, but the “mode” of being human: “The structure of human nature is the fact that it is soul and body, and that its nature is constituted by soul and body; but its mode is the order found in this natural give-and-take of activity, something often varied and altered, yet not altering the nature at all along itself”.19 Daley offers what “renewal” of “mode” of being human means. It refers to a crucial transformation “of the way we exist, which leaves intact the inner character of what we have been made to be.”20 This definition implies that “renewal” does not mean humans have to become what they are not e.g. angels; renewal is not beyond humans; it is simply a change in how we live in the world. This implies a change in some particular ways of how we exercise especially human freedom with regards to choice (“γνώμη”), which according to Maximus the Con- fessor is “a mode of living according to virtue or vice.”21 Therefore, the hypostatic union reorients humanity (as opposed to previous state of “disorientation”), i.e., how we use our habitual faculty—of choice vis-à-vis how we relate with God and with one another.22 From the foregoing, we can appreciate the enduring doctrinal sig- nificance, theological point, and ethical importance of the hypostatic union. The union ultimately has a soteriological telos: the mediation between two extremes via a concrete living paradox of both extremes, hence “closing in himself the distance between extremities, making peace and reconciling through the Spirit human nature with God the Father….” 23 In concluding chapter six of his work, Melchisedec Törönen sums up Maximus’ position thus: the hypostatic union implies retaining the differences as per the natures, though paradoxically united “in the one Christ” in whom exists “a simultaneous union and distinction.” 24 This position is similar to Daley’s conclusion that Christ as a human hypostasis is “a living paradox” because his union is not derived from human knowledge. It defies our knowledge of human nature and our speculation about divine realities. On the contrary, the hypostatic union of Christ is imposed on our consciousness. All we know are from historical witnesses. Yet, the patristic fathers all agree from historical witnesses about Christ’s conception, birth, pas- sion and resurrection that: “[H]ow he exists, how each ‘part’ of him

19 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 187, italics in the original. 20 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 188, italics in the original. 21 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 188, citing Maximus the Confessor. 22 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 189. 23 Melchisedec Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor, ed. Gillian Clark and Andrew Lotuh, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Ox- ford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 103. 24 Törönen, Union and Distinction, 104. 86 Raymond Aina shapes and expresses the other, makes him who he is.”25 However, this union, as a divine initiative, leaves a message: God personally invites us to accept a new origin because of the hypostatic union, and to accept “a new set of relationships, a new personal identity and ‘mode of being’ that does not destroy what is proper to ourselves, but unites it to him.”26 One can infer from the foregoing that this classical doctrinal formulation should be brought into public discourse without fear that no one will understand it. The content of Christian doctrine and subse- quent theological discourse should be set forth in practical terms for Christians, without necessarily making these unintelligible for the non-Christian.27 Consequently, the next section offers a reflection on the place of the hypostatic union in Christian ethics. By doing this, one seeks to emphasize that Christian ethics should attempt to be more Christological. This Christological option especially in transitional contexts can sharpen reconciliation projects.

HARMONY OF THE TWO EXTREMES AS A REVEALED CLAIM The harmony of the two extremes in the Incarnate Son is anchored on the doctrine of hypostatic union for the sake of reconciliation between God and humanity. Hence, agreeing with Gregory of Nazianzus’ classic formulation, “that which He (sic) has not assumed He has not healed”.28 As such, without entering the world of the perpetrators (humanity), reconciliation could not have come to it, and humans, according to Gregory the Great, would have considered any conflict resolution as ineffective if “the battle had been fought outside our nature.”29 There is another doctrinal affirmation that inspires the harmony of two extremes. At the third Council of Constantinople (681 AD), the Church confessed: Christ has two natural operations and wills, divine and human. They are unopposed; they cooperate such that the Incar- nate Word willed humanly in obedience to the Father all that had been divinely willed for our salvation.30 We are assured of salvation because of the subordination of the human will to the divine, and the harmonious cooperation of the two. Hence, peace and reconciliation (triumph over estrangement) came from within humanity, though grace made this possible.

25 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 195. 26 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 196. 27 Shuster, “Incarnation in Selected Sermons,” 394. 28 Gregory of Nazianzen, “To Cledonius the Priest against Apollinarius,” in A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church—Cyril of Jeru- salem and Gregory Nazianzen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978; reprint, 1978), 440. 29 O’Collins, Christology, 156. 30 Catechism of the Catholic Church: With Modifications from the Editio Typica (New York: Doubleday, 1997), no. 475. Hypostatic Union as a Viable Inspiration 87

Indeed, only those who had immediate experiences of Jesus Christ directly witnessed the harmony of the two extremes at work in Christ as he worked out human redemption. They saw these clearly several times. The miracles of Jesus in the synoptic Gospels, and the signs of Jesus in the Gospel of John are the Apostles’ testimonies to the grace and reality of “harmony of two extremes” in Christ. These testimonies, therefore, offer Christians, from the post-apostolic age, the belief that triumph over estrangement within humanity is always possible regardless of contrary movements in the body-polity. Despite our distinctiveness, “co-existence, co-operation, and co-participation”31 is possible. This is part of the Christian affirmation of graced “ordo caritatis” that is necessary for realizing an ethics of love and responsibility in the world. Divine grace, on the one hand, and belief in the fundamental goodness of humanity, assumed and healed by Christ, on the other are integral to any theology and praxis of restorative justice from the Christian perspective based on the memory of Christ mediated by apostolic witnessing.32

THE DOCTRINE OF HYPOSTATIC UNION IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY OF RECONCILIATION Linda Zagzebski demonstrates how the doctrine of incarnation can inspire a Christian formal ethical theory.33 Regardless of a somewhat evangelical posturing, with some tendencies even towards the “WWJD” movement,34 I agree with her on the centrality of the hypostatic union in Christian ethics: “If the incarnation had a moral purpose other than atonement, one would expect it to be given a central place in Christian ethics, and indeed, in Christian ethical theory.” 35 This Christological distinctiveness of Christian ethics should take a more central place in any Christian theology of reconciliation, as “renewal” of humans’ mode of living with themselves without sacrificing uniqueness.

31 Louis Janssens, “Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics,” Louvain Studies 6, no. 3 (Spring 1977): 207-38, at 221. 32 I acknowledge and appreciate the critique of an anonymous reviewer that under- scored the importance of apostolic witnessing in the theology of restorative justice inspired by the hypostatic union. 33 Linda Zagzebski, “The Incarnation and Virtue Ethics,” in The Incarnation: An In- terdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God, ed. Stephen Davis, Daniel Kendal and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 313- 31. 34 Zagzebski, “The Incarnation and Virtue Ethics,” 314, 326-7. 35 Zagzebski, “The Incarnation and Virtue Ethics,” 314. 88 Raymond Aina

The Marginal Status of Hypostatic Union in Catholic Theology of Justice and Reconciliation CST has paid insufficient attention, if any at all, to the doctrine of the hypostatic union as an inspiration. Yet, the hypostatic union and the discussions after the Chalcedonian Definition can enrich CST, especially with regards to theological basis for justice and reconciliation in pluralist settings. CST can be challenged by these discussions to shift its focus from a rather disproportionate emphasis on some patristic teachings and monastic tradition as sources of Roman Catholic pen- itentiary and criminal justice. According to the research findings of Daniel Bell Jr.,36 Andrew Skotnicki,37 and Willard Oliver,38 the preservation of order in the society is the principal emphasis in these traditions. Hence, as long as these roots are grounds for a Christian (Roman Catholic) theology on post-conflict justice and reconciliation, there cannot be radical change, and there will not be a thoroughgoing critique from CST on this justice. Accordingly, restorative justice, for instance, will remain marginal, functioning, as it were, within that patristic/monastic-inspir e d post-conflict justice and its correctional facilities. One can notice this trend in recent publications from some sectors of the CST.39

The Absence of Hypostatic Union in Magisterial Teachings on Post-Violence Reconciliation Let us begin with the Compendium. Although it has some sections on social justice, this social justice is not connected with criminal justice, especially where the Compendium deals with criminal justice (nos. 402-5). The Compendium affirms restoration of strained inter- personal relationships. However, it limits its concern for this restoration to the prisons with the work of prison chaplains (no. 403). There

36 Daniel Bell Jr., “Deliberating: Justice and Liberation,” in The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, Blackwell Companions to Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006)., 37 Andrew Skotnicki, Criminal Justice and the Catholic Church (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). 38 Willard Oliver, Catholic Perspectives on Crime and Criminal Justice (Lanham: Lexington, 2008). 39 Three are from those within the official teaching magisterium. These are Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines—Episcopal Commission on Prison Pastoral Care, ed. Restorative Justice: A Source Book (Manila: CBCP-ECPPC, 2004); Pontif- ical Council for Justice and Peace, ed. Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (London: Burns & Oates, 2004); United States Conference of Catholic Bish- ops, Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration: A Catholic Perspective on Crime and Criminal Justice—A Statement of the Catholic Bishops of the United States, www.nccbuscc.org/sdwp/criminal.htm (accessed 03.05. 2015). The other two are from theologians who have written in detail on the Roman Catholic theology of criminal justice. Oliver, Catholic Perspectives on Crime and Criminal Justice; Skotnicki, Criminal Justice. Hypostatic Union as a Viable Inspiration 89 is silence on how the victim or the marginalized coming out of violence and conflicts will be restored and reintegrated into the community again. In other words, where it deals with criminal justice, the Compendium is concerned with how the state can perform well its role to grant “freedom from the fear of crime, or simply ‘freedom from fear’.”40 It seems therefore that social justice matters for the Compen- dium in times of relative peace, but in times of violence and its after- math what matters is ameliorated retributive justice, but not transform- ative [social] justice that pays attention to the victims of violence. The inattentiveness pointed out here, I suggest, is rooted in a deeper hermeneutics. According to the Compendium, in the throes of war, justice includes the following: punishment in proportionality to the gravity of offence—as deterrence; reparation of disrupted harmony through custodial punishment, i.e., imprisonment. Consequently, prison restores harmony of order—not necessarily the offender or victims (no. 402). Yet, in no. 403, the Compendium states that justice is correctional—an “expiation” if the guilty party voluntarily submits to punishment. The other parts of justice are meticulous search for the truth of what happened, and the full recognition of the human dignity of all parties, even the guilty (no. 404). This kind of justice promotes reconciliation, i.e., “social harmony disrupted by the criminal act …” (no. 403). Victims of war and violence, except those of “judicial errors” who should be duly compensated (no. 404) are not mentioned. By way of deduction, the official Church’s justice outlook, at least in the Com- pendium, follows the retributivist-deterrent trajectory. Consequently, restorative justice in post-conflict peacebuilding is absent in CST. Perhaps, the notable exception is the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), with a remarkable statement (2000),41 and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philip- pines that published a resource book on restorative justice (2004).42

40 Markus Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims’ Right, ed. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical America (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 18-19. 41 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration: A Catholic Perspective on Crime and Criminal Justice—A Statement of the Catholic Bishops of the United States,” United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, www.nccbuscc.org/sdwp/criminal.htm (accessed 03.05. 2007). 42 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines—Episcopal Commission on Prison Pastoral Care, ed. Restorative Jus- tice: A Source Book (Manila: CBCP-ECPPC, 2004). 90 Raymond Aina

USCCB’s Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration The USCCB’s statement on November 15, 2000 was issued against the backdrop of increasing criminality, on the one hand, and punitiveness, on the other in the United States.43 Accordingly, the “merciless” country appears to be in need of a renewed moral imagination that neither de-culpabilizes nor demonizes. Though inspired by biblical imagination of justice and CST, the statement echoes contemporary shift in critical criminology. There is a shift from an “antiseptic construal” of justice to a passionate construal. This passionate construal, which Jonathan Burnside refers to as relational justice,44 pays signifi- cant attention to the connectedness of those affected by or implicated in a crime. By “antiseptic construal” I mean justice that is characterized by objectivity, impartiality, and a fair assessment of the issues involved. It aims at sanitizing the crime and justice landscape. Yet, sanitization does not imply a passionate construal of justice that would be characterized by love, compassion and the vindication of those at the receiving end of victimization.45 Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration has an inductive approach and makes a constructive use of empirical studies in criminology and other social sciences. This in my estimation added to its moral force and critical reception by experts working within the criminal justice system. Instructively, the statement notes that the Catholic tradition’s influence on the penal system is paradoxical. While origi- nally the penal system had a noble and reformatory aim, the system over time accommodated conducts that endangered and denigrated the rights of those put in its care (under).46 Despite the paradox and flaws in the tradition, the Church enriched and challenged by its “Scriptural, Theological, and Sacramental Heritage” still has plausible alternatives to offer in dealing with the crime and its social pathos. Under a section titled “Policy Foundations and Directions,” the Bishops advocate for more opportunities given to victims to partici- pate in criminal justice processes dealing with their traumas (no. 5). Furthermore, the Bishops add that without apprehending offenders, victims still have a right to closure institutionally as much as possible

43 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, Episcopal Commission on Prison Pastoral Care, under “Crime and the Catholic Community.” 44 Jonathan Burnside, “Tension and Tradition in the Pursuit of Justice,” in Relational Justice: Repairing the Breach, ed. Jonathan Burnside and Nicola Baker (Winchester: Waterside, 1994), 42-52. 45 Burnside argues that we need both “antiseptic” and “passionate” construal in criminal justice system. The antiseptic view (symbolized by the blindfolded Lady Iusticia) alone is “an inadequate idol for criminal justice system.” Like the creation of coun- terpoint in music, the passionate construal is needed for harmony with the antiseptic construal if justice will create “bond of friendship of union” in the human society (Burnside, “Tension and Tradition in the Pursuit of Justice,” 43-5). 46 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration, under “Scriptural, Theological, and Sacramental Heritage.” Hypostatic Union as a Viable Inspiration 91

(no. 5). By this proposal they hint at a limitation in classical restorative justice: what happens when the offender is unavailable? By the Bish- ops’ proposal, they emphasize that restorative justice is not just about (humane) punishment and face-to-face encounter. There must be attention to other elements of justice that can bring closure, and possibly peace. Under the section “The Church’s Mission,” the Bishops state that the Church must focus on teaching justice and love-as-mercy, if the vision their statement outlines will flourish (no. 1). Furthermore, the Church is enjoined to stand by victims through pastoral ministry of presence (no. 2). It should be pointed out, all the same, that this statement, like traditional CST, focused more on prisons, prisoners, and their reintegration after their prison sentences. It is not as victim-focused as one would have expected. Yet, to its credit it included in its references contributions from criminologists involved with restorative justice in its original context.47

Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines Restorative Justice: A Source Book The source book from the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines is no less different from the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ statement.48 The source book is a product of the Episcopal Commission on Prison Pastoral Care. It aims at offering an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) approach for those working within the criminal justice system. The book is designed to be used by stakeholders at the various levels of conflict resolution in the throes of criminal violations of relationships and integrity of persons. The source book presupposes that the basic information and understanding of restorative justice in its original context ought to be made accessible to practitioners working with perpetrators of crime, victims and their respective communities of support. The source demonstrates that even if restorative justice approach is new in critical criminology, the fundamental principles and aims are not alien to Catholic tradition, and indigenous cultures around the world. The remarkable difference is that being a source book, it is far more useful and practical for prison chaplains and those interested in re- forming prisoners and some of their victims than their United States counterpart’s statement. ***

47 This is perhaps the reason that this Statement is the primary interlocutor of Oliver, Catholic Perspectives on Crime. This is a former police officer before changing career to become a university professor. Oliver’s work is unmistakably prison, prisoners, and crime-focused. 48 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines—Episcopal Commission on Prison Pastoral Care, ed. Restorative Jus- tice. 92 Raymond Aina

Unfortunately, these “magisterial” documents did not find their way into the Compendium because the compilers of the Compendium left out teachings of Bishops’ Conferences independent of the pope. It is regrettable, though not too surprising for some, that “justice that renews and promises to heal” is absent in the “Catholic Social Doc- trine.” The reason for the omission of the Bishops’ statement is not farfetched, if one bears in mind Johan Verstraeten’s observation: “… the Compendium, moving away from the spirit of the post-Vatican II era, appears to have learned nothing from bishops, particularly with regard to justice and the experience of the poor for whom they are an important voice ….”49 One wonders if the theologians fared any better with regard to a realistic theology of (post-conflict) reconciliation through justice, amidst other elements. In the following pages, I criti- cally examine two relevant works mentioned earlier: Skotnicki (2008) and Oliver (2008).

Catholic Theologians on Post-Violence Justice and Reconciliation: Skotnicki’s Criminal Justice and the Catholic Church Skotnicki sets out to offer a Roman Catholic theory of criminal justice. According to the author, this theory seeks to answer four questions: “Who are the offenders? What is the justification for detain- ing/punishing them? What is the end at which forcible intervention aims? By what means will the end be accomplished?“50 A critical observation about these questions, and indeed the content of the book, can be formulated thus: for Skotnicki, criminal justice is about punishing, processing for penality, not processing for truth (as some restorative justice advocates insist). Hence, Skotnicki’s work is offender-focused. It does not include attentiveness to victims’ needs, thus giving the impression that the complex justice needs of victims are not part of criminal justice’s brief. From Skotnicki’s four questions, one can surmise that criminal justice is not interested in reconciliation, but perhaps with the “reformation” of offenders. Consequently, Skotnicki seems to continue the traditional Roman Catholic approach to criminal justice, which is the hard core approach, i.e., “deterrence” though with a “human face.” Indeed, the largest chapter, chapter four, of Skotnicki’s Criminal takes the theological and ethical discussion into the prison cells to be confronted with reality. However, one wonders if prisoners’ experience is the only reality that theology and ethics should be confronted with. What about the

49 Johan Verstraeten, “Justice Subordinated to Love?: The Changing Agenda of Cath- olic Social Teaching since Populorum Progressio,” in Responsibility, God and Soci- ety: Theological Ethics in Dialogue (Fs Roger Burggraeve), ed. Johan De Tavernier et al., Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium (Leuven; Paris; Dud- ley: Peeters, 2008), 402. 50 Skotnicki, Criminal Justice, 3. Hypostatic Union as a Viable Inspiration 93 experiences and data thrown up by victims? In fact, due to these observations, one wonders if a more appropriate title for Skotnicki’s work should not have been Justice for Criminals according to a Ro- man Catholic Approach. Skotnicki published an article two years before his book in which he tackled the concept of restorative justice in its original context and its compatibility with the Christian tradition.51 His observations and conclusion on the subject matter leave a critical observer with a position: Skotnicki, as a Western Christian scholar of the Roman Catholic tradition, has a theological ethics of justice and its ends which follows the traditional Roman Catholic rectificatory and deontological retribu- tionist school. According to Skotnicki, “restorative justice and Chris- tian tradition both concur that the end is restoration of offender”52 after punishment, which must fit the crime committed, and will serve to restore the moral order the offender disrupted.53 To reach this conclusion, Skotnicki invoked St Anselm, St Thomas Aquinas, and Pius XII.54 It is striking that a Christian ethicist like Skotnicki, dealing with “restoring justice,” begins his theology of “restoring justice” with insights from medieval theologians, and a pope during late modernity period. It seems for him, like traditional CST, the patristic discussions on Christian classics offer no insights to broaden our horizons.

Catholic Theologians on Post-Violence Justice and Reconciliation: Oliver’s Catholic Perspectives on Crime and Criminal Justice Oliver does better than Skotnicki’s work—at least on the point of departure. He begins his discussion on his subject matter by tracing

51 Andrew Skotnicki, “How is Justice Restored?,” Studies in Christian Ethics 19, no. 2 (2006): 187-204. 52 Skotnicki, “How is Justice Restored?,” 199. 53 A similar, though refreshingly different, article on the same issue was published a year after Skotnicki’s article. Zenon Szablowinski is a Roman Catholic theologian from Papua New Guinea, a context that is struggling with issues of past violations, unlike Skotnicki’s Western liberal society. Szablowinski offers that the relationships between punitiveness and restorative justice are mutual. Punishment is not fundamen- tally to restore the disordered moral order or to restore offenders. Rather, it is a helpful contribution towards the healing of victim-survivors. Nevertheless, punishment is not the end, because punishment alone cannot reconcile estranged parties. Hence, concrete justice that improves the quality of life of survivors, yet with space for love-as- mercy consequently yielding an environment of peace, is crucial, according to restorative justice. Zenon Szablowinski, “Punitive Justice and Restorative Justice as Social Reconciliation,”The Heythrop Journal 49, no. 3 (May 2008): 405-22. 54 Skotnicki, “Justice Restored?,” 192-7. It can be suggested that Skotnicki’s reading of Anselm, as mostly done by Christian theologians dealing with the issue of atonement and punishment, is partial by focusing on atonement for the moral disorder caused by sin (offences), with little focus on Anselm’s principal thesis, i.e., reconciliation between estranged parties. This marginal, though more appropriate, interpretation has been offered by Lisa Cahill, “The Atonement Paradigm: Does It Still Have Explanatory Value?,” Theological Studies 68, no. 2 (2007): 418-32. 94 Raymond Aina the ethical theories that have come to be influential in Roman Catholic penal and criminal justice teaching. For Oliver, the roots of Roman Catholic ethics in general and criminal justice in particular are “the Word of God, the teaching of Jesus Christ, and the Traditions of the Roman Catholic Church.” 55 Augustinian (patristic) and Thomistic (mediaeval) schools of thought are the ethical traditions that get prom- inent place in Oliver’s work. While Augustine tilted more towards the Stoics and Aquinas towards Aristotle, both share a similarity. Both, Oliver claims, are deontological in approach: “In either case, Augus- tine or Aquinas, because their ethical theories are focused on right and good behaviors, what is right and good in the eyes of God, it is a deontological theory.”56 On the basis of these roots, Catholic ethical system, according to Oliver, “must always adhere to the deontological school of thought and reject all teleological theories.”57 Since deontological theory focuses on an action in itself,58 it is unsurprising that traditional Roman Catholic perspective, promoted in Oliver’s work, focuses on regulation of right behaviors. Oliver’s work, with its telling title “Catholic Perspectives on Crime and Criminal Justice,” gives the impression that the work presents different schools of thought within the Roman Catholic tradition, or is an extensive critical engagement with these Roman Catholic traditions on criminal justice and their ethics leading to constructive pro- posals for today. Conversely, this work is largely based on the US Bishops’ Statement referred to above. It is written largely from a cor-

55 Oliver, Catholic Perspectives on Crime, 4. 56 Surely some Christian ethicists equally inspired by Aquinas might contest Oliver’s classification of the Angelic Doctor as deontological. Joseph Selling offers some discussions on the non-deontological ethics of Aquinas. Cf. Joseph Selling, “Object, End and Moral Species in S.T., I-II, 1-21,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 84, no. 4 (December 2008): 363-407; Joseph Selling, “Looking toward the End: Revisiting Aquinas’ Teleological Ethics,” Heythrop Journal 51, no. 3 (May 2010): 388-400. 57 Oliver’s stated understanding of “teleological theories” can be misleading. For instance, he mistakenly states that “teleological” comes from “teleios” meaning “consequences.” So, teleological theories are “concerned with the consequences of one’s actions. The consequences of the act, not the act itself, are what determine whether or not the behavior was right.” Oliver, Catholic Perspectives on Crime, 7 [italics in the original]. According to New Testament Greek lexicons, “teleios” is an adjective (of “telos”) used to qualify an action that has reached its intended goal. “Telos” means an end (intended goal) chosen prior to an action, which subsequently directs the choices made towards the end. It can also mean the result of an action. Oliver’s rendition of “teleios” as “consequences” is questionable, more so without any references to back this up. Oliver’s interpretation appears to follow a neo-scholastic interpretation, as in Veritatis Splendor (cf. nos. 74, 75, 79, 90) which muddles various ethical theories “teleological, consequentialist, and proportionalist” without clearly defining and giving fair representation of what these mean, their Roman catholic traditional roots, and how they differ. 58 Oliver, Catholic Perspectives on Crime, 6. Hypostatic Union as a Viable Inspiration 95 rectional point of view. It has a clear structure that a critical and ex- pectant reader might find quite unsatisfactory. Each chapter normally begins with an invocation of the Bishops’ Statement. Then it launches into a long discussion to show how what he has brought out from the Bishops’ Statement connects with discussions in criminology and pe- nology today. Then towards the end of each chapter, the author offers a page or two on the Roman Catholic position. It appears very much like a proof-texting apologetic work on a Roman Catholic teaching on crime and criminal justice. Let’s take the important second chapter as an example. This chapter, titled “Criminal Justice,” promises to present the Ro- man Catholic perspective on criminal justice in the strict sense. The chapter begins with the Bishops’ Statement. However, Oliver states that in order to understand the Catholic position offered by the Bishops, the reader needs to understand the nature and goal of criminal justice in general. So, the author launches into these.59 Towards the end of the chapter, he presents a section titled “Criminal Justice from a Catholic Perspective.” It is the perspective of the Bishops’ Statement. It is a perspective inspired by the principle of subsidiarity (thus favoring community engagement in problem-solving) and “solidarity” (in the sense that responsibility should be broadened). The Bishops, inspired by these principles, outlined the Catholic perspective on criminal justice—along the four traditional movements in the Sacrament of Rec- onciliation: contrition—remorse; confession—acknowledgement and acceptance of responsibility; satisfaction—amendment of life, as a form of compensation; absolution—forgiveness and reintegration.60 The Bishops’ reference to the “Sacramental and Historical Herit- age” of Catholic perspective on criminal justice, according to Oliver, connects with restorative justice’s position. Consequently, he offers the following as the practical implications of what the Bishops’ emphasis means for a Catholic-inspired restorative justice: “mediation programs, along with crime prevention, rehabilitation, education, substance abuse treatment, probation, parole, and reintegration programs should be the primary use of government resources.”61 However, this Catholic perspective is presented in barely one and half pages. In the third chapter, Oliver follows the same structure: a position from the Bishops’ Statement (on restorative justice and community justice). 62 The second half of the chapter discusses restorative and community justice. 63 The chapter ends with Oliver’s conclusion in pinpointing Catholic perspective as “restorative community justice,”

59 Oliver, Catholic Perspectives on Crime, 32-54. 60 Oliver, Catholic Perspectives on Crime, 55. 61 Oliver, Catholic Perspectives on Crime, 62 Oliver, Catholic Perspectives on Crime, 63-72. 63 Oliver, Catholic Perspectives on Crime, 73-84. 96 Raymond Aina meaning neighborhood partnership, community policing, “community prosecution… various forms of victim-offender mediation;” and community correction services.64 What the rest of the book does is to show the symbiotic relationship between his Catholic perspective approach and restorative justice, without any question regarding the tensions, ambiguities and limita- tions of this approach. For instance, one can rightly wonder if the Catholic perspective presented by Oliver is ipso facto synonymous with restorative justice. In fact, Oliver’s perspective differs signifi- cantly from that of the Bishops’ Statement. Oliver’s work, like Skot- nicki’s Criminal Justice, published incidentally the same year, by sub- sidiaries of the same publishing house, has no space for victims on their own merit. His attention is on how to “do system repair” of the criminal justice system. On the contrary, as noted above, the Bishops’ Statement has some thoughts, policy directions and even pastoral pro- posals considering victims. A final remark on Oliver’s work and similar works is that it stands to be proven that Catholic perspective with sacramental movements (of Contrition–Confession–Satisfaction–Absolution) imposed on restorative justice discourse does sufficient justice to the issue of responsibility without personal guilt, or to structural crimes. The eighth chapter of Oliver’s work, titled “Criminal Justice Issues,” raises and treats the following: death penalty, abortion and euthanasia. In the ninth chapter, titled “Victimless Crimes,” attention is on drugs, prostitution and pornography. In all these issues, personal responsibility and guilt can be ascertained. But what of issues raised in critical criminology today like disproportionate incarceration along racial and gender lines, or faceless crimes/criminals like state crime? How does the Catholic perspective, presented by Oliver, Skotnicki, and even the US Bishops’ Statement, deal with these? We do not have much clue. Perhaps, this is due to the emphasis on the traditional sources of Catholic perspective on crime and criminal justice.

BROADENING THE HORIZON OF CATHOLIC THEOLOGY OF POST-CONFLICT RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROCES S Some space has been devoted to Oliver’s Catholic Perspectives on Crime since it is a prime example of a Roman Catholic work devoted exclusively to criminal justice issues with some attentions paid to restorative justice in its original context. Additionally, being a work that relentlessly pursues the traditional Roman Catholic ethics, more so in criminal justice, it can serve as a benchmark or mirror through which one can evaluate Roman Catholic scholarship on restorative justice.

64 Oliver, Catholic Perspectives on Crime, 84-5. Hypostatic Union as a Viable Inspiration 97

If the CST pays more attention to the kind of hermeneutics dis- played in the previous sections on the classical hypostatic union, perhaps the horizon can broaden to offer more sustainable theological framework for justice that resembles the telos confessed in the doctrine of hypostatic union. CST, inspired by the hypostatic union, especially when making intervention on post-violence justice and peace projects, will have to work toward a mode of union among humans that imitates the union of “timelessness with concreteness” (i.e., hypostatic union). This is human co-belonging. This holistic co-belonging is a pilgrimage—we may never reach it, but it is humanly possible, though negotiated through what is humanly desirable and meaningful. Now for the purpose of this contribution, this means that what is crucially and realistically needed is a post-conflict justice and theology favoring—or opting for—an imitated union between neighbors- turned-enemies that does not destroy differences. Rather, this justice and its theology harness differences. This is what is meant by “ana- logical imagination,” i.e., understanding through patristic witnesses what the hypostatic union is, and going to do likewise, not exactly (cf. Lk 10:37).65 To “go and do likewise” concerns renewing our being together and our common actions.66 Crucial to “going to do likewise” is biblical/doctrinal interpretations. However, we must first, agreeing with Bretzke, imagine “what the going and the doing of the “likewise” means for us…”67 For instance, the tensions between the divine and human natures of the Christ without bloodshed and oppression of either may inspire feuding communities to recognize that tensions do not necessarily have to lead to injustice, violence, and bloodshed.

CONCLUSION This contribution has a principal argument: the great mystery of Christian faith—hypostatic union—should inspire, challenge, and broaden CST’s horizons, confront its inattentiveness, and help it think through human need for reconciliation within complex spheres of human reality. It argued that this classical doctrine, its tensions, and the struggle to understand them, have a more familiar ring for peoples caught in violent conflicts due to identity politics and totalitarian projects than, for instance, the Trinity or the Imago Dei classics. Jesus’ hypostasis teaches what reconciliation is and should always be: union of complex spheres of realities which does not destroy “what” they are. Yet, it brings them to fuller perfection. But as human beings, we know this project will have to follow the path of historicity and contextuality such that the union on the way towards fuller perfection

65 James Bretzke, A Morally Complex World: Engaging Contemporary Moral Theol- ogy (Collegeville: Liturgical, 2004), 95. 66 Daley, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’,” 187. 67 Bretzke, Morally Complex World, 95. 98 Raymond Aina will move through the path of what is humanly possible and meaningful for the parties in the union. This theology of reconciliation must be relational, full of dependence, kenosis and “paradox” for the reason stated in the introduction. This contribution further argued that the term “renewal” of mode of being together between different spheres of reality is central to the discussion on the hypostatic union. Reconciliation between God and humans took into consideration an overall goal—God’s reign among “sons and daughters of God.” So, God’s choice to bring about reconciliation was comprehensive, without alienating any constituent part. Hence, this is a task of realistic justice. Justice seeking reconciliation must serve Life—comprehensively. Reconciliation must be for the sake of wellbeing of concrete human persons and their world. This may be termed the New Creation. CST is challenged to look more to the hypostatic union doctrine as a much needed inspiration for a realistic theology of post-conflict reconciliation. This doctrine’s inspiration might assist CST in filling the conceptual and practical void noted in this contribution.