Still Louis Hartz after All These Years: A Defense of the Liberal Society Thesis Author(s): Philip Abbott Reviewed work(s): Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Mar., 2005), pp. 93-109 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688113 . Accessed: 25/07/2012 11:42

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Perspectives on Politics.

http://www.jstor.org Articles

StillLouis Hartzafter All These Years: A Defenseof the LiberalSociety Thesis PhilipAbbott

LouisHartz's The Liberal Tradition inAmerica was the dominant interpretative text in American political thought for a generation. In thelate 1960s the Hartzian hegemony came under severe attack, and by the 1990s his interpretive framework had been declared obsolete.Critiques allege two basic, related flaws: (1) Hartz'sinterpretation ignored the diversity inAmerican political thought, particularly,though not exclusively, onquestions ofrace, and (2) hisanalysis exaggerated theextent of the consensus inAmerican politicalculture. These critiques are based almost exclusively onHartz's analysis ofselected periods ofearlyAmerican political devel- opment.I argue that Hartz's basic concepts are powerful analytical tools that continue toprovide the most compelling analysis of recentAmerican political development. I test the Hartz thesis by constructing a plausible interpretation ofthe 1960s based on the conceptsemployed in TheLiberal Tradition.

ouis TheLiberal Tradition inAmerica (hence- chunksof American and saw oth- Hartz's huge politicalthought forthLT) was the dominantinterpretative text in ersthat simply were not there. This view was based almost Americanpolitical thought for a generation.Hartz's exclusivelyon Hartz'sanalysis of selected periods ofAmer- analysisinfluenced nearly every aspect of the study ofAmer- ican history,especially the Revolution, the founding, and icanpolitics and informedapproaches to comparativeand theCivil War. Critics suggested that LT owingto itsana- internationalpolitics as well.' Not onlywere classics of lyticalfailings in theseareas, could not adequatelyinter- Americanpolitical science informed by butalso more pretsubsequent changes and events.LTwas thusviewed recentapproaches to thecultural bases LT,2of national identi- as a theoreticallyunusable guide to eventsin the 1960s tiesborrow from Hartz's framework.3 His novelclassifica- and beyond. tionof politicalsystems that arrayed "fragment cultures" I arguethat, however contested Hartz's readings of any producedby European imperialism anticipated the themes particularperiod, his basic concepts are powerful analyti- of postcolonialstudies.4 Nevertheless, the hegemonyof cal tools,which continue to providethe most compelling LTcame undersevere attack in thelate 1960s,and bythe analysisof recentAmerican political development. 1990s it was "prettymuch dead."5 Hartz has becomean "untrustworthynarrator," whose conclusionscould not be reliedon.6 Missingand ImaginedParts These whichI reviewin moredetail critiques, below, Accordingto manycritics, Hartz failedto considerthe two basic,related flaws: Hartz's allege (1) interpretation followingaspects of Americanpolitical culture: republi- the in American ignored diversity politicalthought, par- canism,racism, African American political discourse, fem- ticularly,though not exclusively, on questionsof race, and inism,Calvinism, socialism, and feudalism.The lasttwo (2) his theextent of theconsensus in analysisexaggerated elements,of course, were explicitly rejected by Hartz, and American culture.In other Hartzmissed political words, even earlyreaders have voiced skepticismabout their exclusion. Earlycritics were particularly suspicious of Hartz's meth- PhilipAbbott is DistinguishedGraduate Professor at Wayne odology.J. H. Powellcomplained that Hartz's account StateUniversity ([email protected]). His recentbooks seemedto be basedupon an a prioritheory. If forHartz, includeExceptional America: Newness and National "historicalfacts have little to do witha theoreticanalysis, Identity(1999) and PoliticalThought in America: worseluck," since "the facts of American history get brisk, Conversationsand Debates (2004). Theauthor is grateful casual treatment."Powell claimed that the bestway to toJennifer Hochschild for her encouragement and to the evaluateLTwas to compareit to anyother set of beliefs, anonymousreviewers for Perspectives on Politics.Christo- sinceHartz had not presented historical evidence, but rather Duncanand pher Max Skidmorealso provided very help- an "academicfable." 7 ForAdrienne Koch, Hartz employed ful advice. a "perversehistorical method":

March2005 1 Vol.3/No. 1 93 Articles I StillLouis Hartzafter All These Years

It is a methodthat produces no substantialdocumentation or analysis,but proceeds rather to pickup one nameafter another and freezeits arbitrarily selected essence to supportthe author's historicalintuition. Individuality, chance, and the complex spe- cificcoloration of a thinker'sthought is "explained"by the absence ofthe feudal experience; ifthe name is European, the thought is bythe presence of a feudalsituation. The endresult i~iii~i "explained" ...... ::::::?:i!! ofthis "comparative method" which the author recommends as .::i!:::i:...... ::."111= ,"3 meansto make is to andreaffirm ? a history"scientific," repeat - .: ...... :...... whathe is obligatedto establishin thefirst place.8 .i:::i.!iiiliiiiiiiii~iiN . i;::':.: :ii'~!ii'iii -'iii~iiii~ii~s i...-:..:....!H 61M Likewise,Stuart Gerry Brown complained about Hartz's "passionatefondness for isms, both foreignand domes- : a tic, as well as occasionalfresh of his own." ;:i " : : :. ::: mintings .. :. :::. ii:.:":. Terms"such as 'feudalism,''feudal socialism,' 'socialist , "".:''': :" . :: iii.:iiiii:i;;!;!:iiii~liiii'i~iiii . .. . feudalism,''conservatism,' 'social conservatism,''liberal ._ " .,g.N,,o conservatism,''conservative liberalism,' etc. etc. gush throughhis pagesin an unceasingtorrent until the read- ing becomesa nightmare."'This absenceof specificdef- initions(both liberalismand feudalismwere seen as standingprimarily alone as signifiers)and crypticallu- sionsled criticsto concludethat that there were really no causalrelationships at all once the readerdeciphered the text.For Eric McKitrickasked the Feder- example, why tl'!?#,'.NltSiI~i' "'''"''''ii alistParty should be comparedto theWhigs when they are separatedby a generation("which in Americanpoli- OR ticsmeans virtually everything; it mayas well be a cen- tury"),and thereis "onlyone thingthat gave themthe leastresemblance to each other-each was on thelosing side of a politicalcontest in whichthe otherparty was gettingmore votes."10 It was, accordingto McKitrick, While Hartz acknowledgedthe putativeexistence of simplythese second-placefinishes that give the air of socialismand feudalismin the mindsof both political failure,not the misapplicationof EnglishWhig political actorsand historians,he, accordingto critics,failed to tacticsand strategy. graspideologies that both leaned upon and competedwith Nearlytwenty years later, Kenneth McNaught reiter- liberalism.Hartz explained the proclivity toward moder- ated thiscriticism in his analysisof Hartz'streatment of ationof opinionsin Americanpolitics as a resultof John Americansocialism. McNaught questioned the themes of Locke'sinfluence. In thisview, Locke's devotion to private inevitability.For him,the parts of the narrative"did not property,combined with the prevalence of land in Amer- add up to thewhole and evenmany of theparts are not ica, gavean historicalreality to thestate of naturefiction historicallyvalid at all."11McNaught was "verytempted" thatmade a Reignof Terrorimpossible and moderated to concludethat Hartz decidedfirst to proveAmerican revolution'sinevitable Thermidor. Thus theapparent pre- liberaluniqueness and had "thengone abroadin search and post-Revolutionarypolitical conflicts were fictional only of differencesand has blindedhimself to similari- ones, in whichparticipants incorrectly transposed their ties." It could even be argued,he said, thatHartz was conceptionsof radicalchange in Europeupon America. actuallyseeking the lawmaking results of thequantitative Daniel Shayswas no Robespierre(nor was Jefferson a late methodwithout actually using that method.12 bloomingone), and the ConstitutionalConvention was More recently,Karen Orren, too, suggested that feudal no Thermidor.But critics argued that this narrative missed structuresdid exist,despite Hartz's claim, and thatthey an entire,indeed dominant, strand of politicalthought. persistedin employmentrelationships well into the nine- Republicanism,with its desire for instituting a respublica teenthcentury. She blamedthe influence of LTforhistor- and itsobsession with corruption, competed with the lib- ians'general lack of acknowledgment of feudalstructures. eral idea. The fearsof participantsin eighteenth-century Hartzhad adopteda "bigbang" theory of American polit- politicswere real.'4 Though republicancritics acknowl- ical developmentthat assumed that "interests and institu- edgedthat this ideology was defeatedin 1787 (or 1800 or tionspresent at thecreation" were "propelled into a world 1825), Hartz"exaggerates his case by reading the phenom- theywould govern thenceforth."'13 Even theorists who saw enon [ofliberalism] backward through the whole of Amer- themselvesas radicalsand declaredthe "end of liberalism" ican history"and thus bringshis whole narrativeinto werestill under the sway of thebig bangtheory. question.15

94 Perspectiveson Politics The samepattern of discovery of alternate discourses in politicalvisions that intertwined liberal themes with ascrip- LThas appearedwith regard to race.The mostextensive tivenotions of identity and status,"then Hartz's narrative treatmentof race in LTis coterminouswith what is prob- is not simplyincomplete but also a textof undeserved ablyHartz's most theoretically innovative argument. For nationalcelebration.21 LT "powerfullyreinforced beliefs Hartz,Southern defenses of slaverywere ignored by the thatthe United States' core values" were "pervasively lib- Northbecause they required arguments well beyondthe eraldemocratic" at a timewhen the nation was stilldeny- liberaltradition. Hartz concluded that "if a racialtheory ingfull access on racial,ethnic, and gendergrounds. triedto savewhites from the attack on Locke,an inescap- Shklarrejects the indictmentthat American political able realitykept pulling them into its orbit,since their thoughtis characterizedby an "obsessiveand unconscious commonhumanity with the Negro could not easilybe commitmentto a liberalfaith . . . prevent[ing]it from denied."16If the Negro was nota man,why attack Locke, askingprofound and criticalquestions." She contendsthat and ifthe Negro was chattel,why bother to attackJeffer- thehistory of American political theory is notone of"bland son? Hartz concludesthat the "politicalthought of the uniformity,"with sparksof "pettyintellectual squab- Civil War symbolizesnot theweakness of theAmerican bles."22In itsplace she presents a historicalnarrative that liberalidea butits strength, its vitality, and itsutter dom- seesAmerican political theory as a seriesof complex debates inationover the American mind."17 Why, though, asks overtwo experimentsconducted simultaneously: one in RogersSmith, if the Southerndefense was so weakas to democracy,the otherin tyranny.Others have detected restonly in therealm of "fantasy" in themind of the white additionalideological forms obscured by Hartz's Lockean Southerner,was a bloodyand costlyCivil War necessary discourse.In Habitsof the Heart, Robert Bellah and his to defeatthe South? And why, asks Smith, was Reconstruc- associatesacknowledge the dominanceof "Lockeanism" tionsuch a failure,as Hartzhimself admitted? i" in Hartz'snarrative; however, extrapolating backward from JudithShklar raised similar questions when she offered whatcontemporary Americans say, they contend that par- her own definitionof Americanexceptionalism. Why, if tially"lost languages" of politicaldiscourse survive. Had racialarguments are so fantasticalin a Lockeanenviron- Hartz listenedmore carefullyto the modernechoes of ment,was America the only example of a democracywith thesediscourses, he would not have describedAmerican an indigenousslave-owning class? And why,for that mat- politicalthought as "exclusivelyliberal."23 John P. Dig- ter,did the realistsensibilities of the allegedlymarginal gins,too, criticizes Hartz for a failureto acknowledgethe GeorgeFitzhugh on theinevitability of thestrong ruling influenceof Calvinism on theLockean idea inAmerica.24 overthe weak become so predominantin post-CivilWar Americain theform of socialDarwinism?'9 Smith'sand Shklar'squeries (although they reached dif- ExaggeratedLiberalism ferentassessments on theinfluence of Fitzhugh) led them, The obverseof the missing-partscritique of LT focuses as wellas others,to discoverdiscourses of political thought upon Hartz'scontention that liberalism itself is an iden- unacknowledgedin Hartz'sanalysis. Like Orren, Smith is tifiablyexclusive force in Americanpolitical culture. The suspiciousof critics whose focus tends to replicateHartz's mosthaunting theme of LT is Hartz'srepeated reference narrativeeven as theyattack it. Since Marxist critics accept to the"tyranny of Locke."Critics argue that LTdoes not Hartz'sown fundamentaldistinction between liberalism merelyunderestimate contingent factors-it spectacu- and socialism,their complaints center upon the relative larlyexaggerates them. One versionof this judgment marginalityof the leftin Americaor the reasonsfor its maintainsthat Hartz was excessively influenced by McCar- absence.20For Smith, however, ascriptive political thought, thyism;hence his narrativeemphasizes far too heavily of which racismis the most prominentand important Tocqueville's"tyranny of themajority," which appears in type,has always competed with the liberal narrative Hartz LT as a "tyrannyof unanimity."25For example,Joshua outlined.Hartz almost completely ignored ascriptive argu- Dienstag,focusing on the "Lockean"figure in Hartz's mentsby focusing upon Fitzhugh:"Thus bycentering his narrative,contends that his storytellingembodied two discussionof blacksand race on a writeroften seen as elementsof a consensus,one openlystated and one hid- exceptionalin histreatment of those issues (as Hartzadmit- den. The formerinvolves the assertionthat Locke was ted),Hartz, illegitimately deprecated the place of overtly the animatingideological force of theAmerican Revolu- racialistand nativistideologies in America."If American tion.When thatwas challenged,the latter was exposed. politicalculture consists of powerfulascriptive ideologies That is, the consensuson Locke'smeaning was, accord- thatcompete and interactwith liberalism, then, accord- ing to Dienstag,strong enough that Hartz "felt so com- ing to Smith,Hartz's narrative is aboutwhite men only. fortablethat he alreadyshared an accountof Lockewith As such,and as his about only such, argument American his readersthat he saw no need to repeatit.'26 Unfortu- politicaldevelopment might work "quite well" as a theory. natelyfor Hartz, Locke's meaning was contestedby writ- Once, however,one recognizesthat "virtually every polit- erssuch as Leo Straussand C. B. Macpherson.Without ical actorfrom the founding to theProgressive era offered a consensuson Locke himself,"the storybookLocke

March2005 I Vol.3/No. 1 95 Articles I StillLouis Hartz after All These Years disappearedin a cloud of controversy,dragging Hartz's had misreadLocke and Fitzhugh,the Revolution,the 'storybookhistory' along with it."27 The importof Dien- founding,and eventhe liberal tradition in general.There stag'sanalysis is thatonce readersconcluded that Hartz are,however, some crucial missing parts among the con- had misreadLocke, theyalso concludedthat he must tra Hartz critiques.First, Hartz's misapplication of his have misreadhis entiresubject of Americanhistory. In theoryto particularperiods of Americanpolitical devel- otherwords, the persuasiveness ofLocke in LTwas depen- opmentdoes not by itselfinvalidate the generaltheory. dent upon a culturalconsensus of which Hartz was Nearlyevery argument of the Hartz criticsis made by unaware. additiveimplication. Smith's "test case" against Hartz ends Anotherversion of thesame critiqueaccuses Hartz of at 1920; Orren'sin 1937; Greenstone'sin 1865;Wood's in overemphasizingthe general liberal agreement on princi- 1787. Second,recent studies suggest that Hartz's interpre- ples in Americaeven in the 1950s and henceneglecting tationsof pastperiods may not have been so faroff the conflictthroughout the past and present.28Thus Smith mark.31Third, the so-called "multiple traditions" thesis is questionswhether any reasonable interpretation ofAmer- itselfopen to criticismnot onlyin termsof thestandard icanhistory should be basedupon the designation "liberal of parsimonybut, as I hope to illustrate,on thegrounds tradition,"since the term"liberalism" did not appearin thatit makesthe same kind of errors that Hartz allegedly Americandiscourse until at leastthe 1920s: "The degree committed.Where Hartz presumablysaw onlyconsen- to which eighteenthand nineteenthcentury American sus,the multiple traditions theorist can see onlydiversity. politicalactors and thinkerswould have recognized them- Thus,if LTsuffers from confirmation bias, so too does its selvesas fellowparticipants in a traditionproperly desig- competitor.More important,however, it is also possible nated 'liberalism'is, at best,a matterof dispute."29In thatthe focuson the missingparts in Hartz'sanalysis bothcases then, a textthat is designedto challengecon- overlooksor underemphasizes the capacity of a liberalsoci- ventionalnarrative actually replicates it. Hartz simply cod- etyto contain,undermine, and redirectchallenges with- ifieda recentconsensus on both Locke and liberalism out resortto supportfrom other ideologies. Fourth, the generally. mostsubstantial feature of Hartz'sanalysis is theseries of David Greenstone'scritique moves in theopposite direc- analyticconcepts he employs.Hartz's readers, both those tionas he retrievesearly methodological attacks on Hartz. who focusupon themissing-parts critique and thosewho He notesHartz's vagueness in defining"Lockeanism" and focusupon the consensus critique, almost universally ignore his underestimationof social conflictand government thisaspect of his treatment of American political develop- interventionin the economy.He tracesthese faults to ment.This is an astonishingomission since the concepts the distendednature of Hartz'snarrative and asks why of liberalreform, the American democrat, liberal enlight- thisbreadth is defective.He concludesthat Hartz's nar- enment,and Thermidorconstitute the actual framework rativehas only the appearanceof causalitybecause it is of LT difficultto distinguishit fromalternatives that might While it is uselessto guesshow Hartz himselfmight refutethe thesis. This "boundary"problem occurs because have interpretedchanges in Americanpolitical culture Hartzdoes not listento thepolitical actors in theAmer- after1955, we can constructa testcase forhis theoryif ican politicaltradition he is narrating.Rules of behavior, hisaccount can providea plausibleinterpretation ofrecent even well circumscribedones, are capable of multiple Americanpolitical development. Any critic of Hartz must interpretations.Hartz can not detectimportant varia- acknowledgethat the turmoil of the 1960s,with its focus tionsin Americanhistory because he failsto recognize on raceand thechallenges to liberalism,do notappear to thelikelihood that his subjectsare interpretingconcepts be fertileground for a defense.The 1960s appear to differentlywithin accepted boundaries and thatthese dis- violateall of the parametersset down by Hartz about agreementscan lead to significantactions. Greenstone's Americanpolitical culture. The "tyrannyof Locke"was own narrativepurports to pay special attentionto the overthrown,and politicaldiscourses unacknowledged in hidden aspectsof his subjects'behavior. If Hartz had LT such as feminismand AfricanAmerican thought, listenedto hissubjects, according to Greenstone,he would becamethe centralfocus of American culture. Ironically have discovereda distinctpolarity in the meaningsthey froma contra-Hartzstandpoint, Cold War culturewas derivedfrom the Lockean consensus (a "humanist"and a the "spawningground"32 for these changes. Smith, for "reform"liberalism) that compete with each other through- example,regards the 1960s as proofthat Hartz's views on out theAmerican political tradition.30 race in a liberalsociety are mistakenand suggeststhat theretreat from reforms in theperiod is furtherevidence for the multiple-positionsapproach.33 Systematic con- Testing Hartz in the 1960s frontationswith liberalismhave of courseappeared in With critiquessuch as these,along withsome theoreti- other periods as well, particularlyas Americanscon- callyintriguing alternatives, it is no wonderthat Hartz's frontedindustrialization and theGreat Depression. Focus- analysisshould be regardedas "prettymuch dead." Hartz ing on the 1960s thuspermits us to not onlyevaluate

96 Perspectiveson Politics Hartz'sanalyses of theseprevious crises, but also to assess theyfocused upon the trusts,and New Dealersdeluded how theymight be appliedto thiscase. themselvesinto portraying themselves as radicals.Those To retainviability, the liberal society approach must be fartherbeyond the consensusseemed to even have less able to answerplausibly three related questions about the awareness:"The AmericanMarxist learns nothing and 1960s: Whydid thepatterns of protestand politicaland forgetsnothing."39 culturalexperimentation emerge, especially so suddenly? In thefinal chapter Hartznoted that while "Amer- Why did thesepatterns escalate so rapidly?Why did the icanism"appeared regularly ofLT,throughout American history, 1960s endin sucha contested"stalemate"?34 The missing- repeatedlyfrustrating both reformist and reactionary move- partsand consensuscritiques, of course, must also answer ments,it reachedits "purest form" during the Cold War. thesequestions, but since LThas beenjudged as singularly WhileHartz seemed to despairthat a people"born equal" lackingin accountingfor new ideological forms, any exten- couldever understand those attempting to becomeso, he sion ofthe Hartzian narrative seems a wasteof theoretical hopedfor a "comingof age" in America. "What is at stake," energy.Smith, for example, argues that Hartz com- heconcluded, "is nothing less than a newlevel of conscious- poundedhis error in a laterwork by insisting that the civil ness.... in whichan understandingof selfand an under- rightsmovement confirmed rather than challengedhis standingof othersgo hand in hand." Such a battlefor thesis.35For Smith,"in of the harms nationalself-awareness would be "wellworth light enduring they fightingfor."'40 wroughton millions,Hartz's minimization [of racial doc- Was the 1960s an exampleof the battleHartz hoped trines]was grotesque."36The ideologicalimplications of for?His normativeargument does include intriguing per- Hartz'slong-range optimism on thisquestion, however, spectiveson thethree questions we posedabout the 1960s. shouldnot be thedetermining factor in theassessment of Hartzseemed to pose theproposition that the Cold War, the liberalsociety analyst.37 Rather, the issue of utility withits demand for permanent global commitments and shouldrest on thecapacity of his conceptsto addressthe attention,would break the historical cycle of isolationism above questions.For if the liberalsociety approach can and intermittent"messianistic" intervention. There were offera plausibleaccount of thisperiod, in whichideolog- thus"larger forces working toward a shatteringof Amer- ical challengeswere so prominentand intense,then per- ican provincialism"that held out "thehope of an inward hapstheorists should reevaluate Hartz's position for other enrichmentof culture and perspective."41 Hartz was moved periodsas well. almostto the pointof hopelessnessby the ironythat a societygiven totally to Enlightenmentprinciples should producesuch a monumentalinability for self-reflection. LiberalEnlightenment But whatif a majorpattern of Europeanpolitical devel- While Hartz'sconcept of a reactionaryenlightenment opmentwas repeatedin America? has receivedmuch attention from critics, his (unnamed) Hartz providedthe frameworkfor this sort of analy- conceptof liberalenlightenment, a normative principle sis in his discussionof theantebellum defense of slavery. of hisanalysis, has gonelargely unnoticed. Without ideo- Afterreading George Fitzhugh'sproclamation in 1863 logicalcompetition, Americans were unable to compre- ("We begina greatconservative reaction") and studying hend the economic and political bases of theirown scoresof Southernthinkers who "duplicatedin everyes- thoughtsand hencecompulsively relied upon Locke as a sentialrespect the argument of Europe'sreactionary feu- symbolof national identity. Free of thefeudal constraints dalism,"Hartz asked how a liberalsociety could have thatEuropeans struggled for centuries to eliminate,Amer- "explode[d]with all theold historictensions of Europe"? ica producedits own kind of tyranny-thetyranny of He concluded,however, that this putative "Reactionary Locke. Unable to see theeconomic, cultural, and politi- Enlightenment"with its "massive revival of Burke, Comte, cal formulationsthat formed their own nationalidentity, Disraeli,and Hegel belowthe Mason-Dixonline was in Americanssuffered from a different,and perhapsmore largemeasure a simplefraud."42 Society was not experi- severe,sense of irrationalitythan Europeans.Even its encingthe advent of what Fitzhugh believed to be some- owncritics, like the federalists and theSouthern reactionar- thingnew in Americanlife, the emergence of theFrench ies, could only glimpsethe contoursof Americancul- Revolutionin reverse;rather, it was experiencingthe ture. Adherentsof political movementswere simply "impendingdisappearance of somethingvery old." For incapableeither of perceivingtheir opponents with any wheneverthe Southernerstalked about feudalism,they kindof objectivity,or posingtheir own goalsclearly. The weretalking about slavery.They werenot feudalland- greatbattles between Whigs and Democratsin thenine- lords,but, like everyoneelse in America,capitalists. Yet teenthcentury produced "a set of victoriesand defeats theyendured the "philosophicalpain" of thesedelusions which the Americanswho experiencedthem scarcely becausethere was no way to accommodatetheir way of understood."They reminded Hartz of"two boxers, swing- lifein thecontext of a Lockeannation. Final proof of their ing wildly,knocking each otherdown with accidental self-deceptionswas the nonchalance with which the North punches."38Progressives had not the slightestidea why ignoredtheir arguments.

March2005 Vol.3/No. 1 97 Articles I StillLouis Hartz after All These Years

Hartz'scritics do notcontest the illiberalism of antebel- are two of manyexamples of stridentdisagreement on lum Southerners.In fact,their collective and open rejec- thispoint. For Mansfield,the decadewas a "comprehen- tionof liberalism appears to supportthe multiple-tradition sivedisaster for America."45 To Ehrenreich,on theother approach.Critics' objections instead focus upon themar- hand,the vision of human liberation begun in the 1960s ginalityHartz attributed to Southerners.For, according to "represents... thebest (and perhapsthe lastbest) hope thecritics, Hartz grasped another part of American polit- formankind."46 ical culture,but he threwit away.Thus theconcept of the This typeof Paine/Burkedivision continues to haunt reactionaryenlightenment is a commontheme of both thosewho speakof the 1960s in the1970s and beyond.47 Hartz and his critics,albeit with differentassessments. One can easilyidentify Hartz's critics in termsof this Giventhis rare agreement, is itpossible for both parties to divide.Smith, for example, while he openlydenies the acknowledgeother "enlightenment" moments in Amer- applicabilityof a linearmodel of progressin American ica? What if,as a resultof the Cold War,America pro- politicalculture, nevertheless regards the 1960s as repre- duced,not a reactionaryenlightenment, as slavery did in sentinga major(although incomplete) victory "in build- thenineteenth century, but a liberalone? inga moreinclusive democracy"; Bellah regards the 1960s The questionraised by Hartz'sanalysis, then, is what as a period in whichTocquevillian individualism pro- wouldan enlightenmentmovement within a pureEnlight- gressedin shockingproportions. enmentsociety look like,and howwould it develop?Was One advantageof the liberal society approach is itsskep- the 1960s an attemptto both cleanseAmerica of the ticismof analyses that see clear winners and losers.Hartz's "irrationalLocke," in termsof itscurrent Cold Warfixa- majorcritique of theProgressive historians was thatthey tion,andto removethe remnants of reaction in theSouth? couldnot view America from the "outside." "Blinded" by "The Port Huron Statement"-theurtext of the early theunity of a liberalsociety, they constructed narratives of 1960s-repeatedlypaired liberal theory with liberal prac- heroeschallenged regularly by a "nationalvillain" who tice.As the Statementput it, thecomfort of thecurrent would eventuallybe slain.48Such accountshad a critical generationrested upon practicestoo "disturbingto dis- veneer,but ended up confirmingthe beliefin a "happy miss."The signatoriescited the impact of confronting the nationalfamily" that was theschema of existingpolitical "humandegradation" in the Southas wellas the aware- discourse.Multiple-tradition critics seem to replicatethis nessof theirown deathsand thatof "millionsof abstract historicalpattern. If inequalitiesin Americacontinue to " 'others'"created by the "enclosing fact of the Cold War. 43 persist,the reason must be thatother ideologies are secretly In his famous1965 antiwarspeech, Carl Oglesbyalso at workthat prevent a fullflowering of liberalpotential. seemedpoised to engagein thisproject of enlightenment. Thus Smithconcludes that "if we acceptthat ideologies Differentiatingtwo liberalisms,one "corporate"and one and institutionsof ascriptive hierarchy have shaped Amer- "humanist,"Oglesby asserted that the former performed ica in interactionwith its liberal and democraticfeatures, thesame function for the corporate state that the Church we can makemore sense of a wide rangeof ineqalitarian once performedfor the feudalstate and urgedhis audi- policies .. ."49 Ironicallyit is the multiple-traditions enceto builda movementwhose "aim is nothingless than approachthat harbors a celebratoryapproach to Ameri- a humanistreformation."44 can politicalculture. This approachto the 1960s can lead to differentpos- It is unlikelythat liberal society analysis of thepolitics sible conclusions.For a societythat is alreadyliberal, of thedecade, despite Hartz's own normativeambitions, whatare the consequencesof the systematicapplication would endorsea modelof eitherascent or descent.One of theVoltairian injunction ecrasez l'infame? One might mighteven concludethat a liberalenlightenment was concludethat complete liberation from the irrational Locke "delusional,"much like the nineteenth-century reaction- is as difficultas the transitionfrom feudalism was for ary experience.As the Southernreactionaries were not Europeannations and thatpost-sixties America is thus reallyconservative, despite their apparent agenda, so too stillcareening from the shock of an enlightenmentwithin were the 1960s criticsnot reallyradicals, despite their an Enlightenmentsociety-much as France struggled apparentefforts to purifyliberalism. But this unusual throughoutthe nineteenth century to reachan a nation- occurrence,a liberalenlightenment in a liberalsociety, allyacceptable postfeudal identity. Alternatively, one might neverthelessprovides a usefulcategorization of the par- concludethat the attempt to cleanseAmerica of the irratio- ticipantsthemselves, much as thephenomenon of a reac- nal Locke leads to a processof self-destructionthat in tionaryenlightenment did forantebellum Southerners.5so turnproduces a critiquenot onlyof Locke, but of the Enlightenmentitself. The firstconclusion claims a model of ascent,albeit uneven, fraught with wrong turns and LiberalReform periodsof temporaryquiescence. The secondis a model If theconcept of a liberalenlightenment can accountfor of descent,characterized by the same unevenness.Har- thedebates of the 1960s as well as a generalinterpretive veyC. Mansfield'sand BarbaraEhrenreich's assessments framework,what Hartz described as "liberalreform" can

98 Perspectiveson Politics accountfor its pace. The New Frontierand the Great ferences.To Mailer,this edginess suggested a "conquista- Societyboth had all the characteristicsof thisphenom- dorial" stylethat ignoredthe boundariesof American enon. As a movementthat first appeared in theWest at politics:"We as a nationwould finallybe loose againin theend of thenineteenth century, liberal reform, accord- the historicseas of a nationalpsyche which was willy- to Hartz, to extendthe of the state and at last, MacGre- ing "sought sphere nilly again,adventurous."'55 James and at the same timeretain the principlesof Locke and gorBurns recommended the New Frontieras "liberalism Bentham."5'Though the agendas of the Progressives and withouttears," free of the moralismof theNew Deal.56 eventhe New Dealersin America were fundamentally like ArthurSchlesinger Jr. was convincedthat the New Fron- thoseof the English liberals and Frenchradicals, in Amer- tierwas quitedifferent from past periods of liberal reform. ica the embourgeoismentof the peasantryand working He spokeof Kennedyas an ironistand skeptic,praised class,for Hartz, inoculated the American version against hisability to engagein self-criticism,and admiredhis wit socialistcriticism. This gavethe American version of lib- and intelligence.Of theNew Frontierapparat, he spoke eralreform a less defensive, even a cheerier,cast. No detailed of theirversatility and willingnessto experiment("They expressionof faith in privateproperty need be offered.For would tryanything"), their vitality, and theirtoughness. Hartz,liberal reform in Americahas all the "youthand But mostof all, Schlesingerfocused upon the "coolness" energythat Marxism has acrossthe Atlantic."'52 of bothKennedy and his agenda: But thoughunfettered from the Left, American liberal His"coolness" was itself new frontier. Itmeant freedom from reformersalso were enslaved by the very Lockeanism they the totranscend. For the the ofthis stereotypedresponses ofthe past. It promised the deliverance of sought Progressives, symbol Americanidealism, buried in thenational character but enslavementwas thenew concentrationof in the deep capital imprisonedbythe knowingness and calculations ofAmerican formof the trust. If trusts could be smashed,opportunity societyin the fifties. Itheld out to the young the possibility that wouldagain reign as an operationalrule, and Lockewould theycould become more than satisfied stockholders ina satisfied nation.It offeredthe for in remainintact. For the New Dealers,"experimentation" hope spontaneitya countrydrown- ingin passivity-passive because ithad come to the servedthe same hiddencompulsion, since accept theory experimenta- ofits own impotence.57 tionwas perceived as radicalism,in thatit hid the "true lib- eralself... faithin property, a belief in class unity, a suspicion Was thiskind of Nietzschean-likebravado what Hartz oftoo muchstate power, a hostilityto theutopian mood." meantby an Americancoming of age, or was it,as later To Hartz,this tension between reform and return was "like criticsconcluded, a kindof adolescence that Hartz thought themind of a childin adolescence, torn between old taboos so characterizedAmerican politics in thepast? Both Nor- and newreality, forever on theverge of exploding into fan- man Mailerand ArthurSchlesinger Jr. explored the for- tasy."Liberal reformers were "like pitchers forever winding mer hypothesis.The image that Mailer invoked of up butnever throwing the ball.",53 JFK'sproject of liberation, "Superman comes to theSuper- Assessmentsof the New Frontierveered dramatically in market,"was givena more programmaticemphasis by the 1970s and later.For those who treasuredthe "happy" Schlesinger,who spokeof the Kennedy administration in 1960s,the frontier was Camelot;for those who did not,it termsof itsvictories won in thebattles for "the emanci- representedCold War liberalismindistinguishable from pationof the American Negro" and "concernfor poverty." thatof the 1950s.54In 1961, however,the New Frontier But Schlesingeralso spokeof thesense of "impotence" in exhibitedall thefeatures of a returnto theliberal reform regardto the 1950s and the "energies released" by Kennedy's as Progressivismthat Hartz felt had beenso entrappedby leadership.58While therewould alwaysbe a tensionin theirrational Locke. It representeda reformist impulse in Americabetween a pragmaticand utopian liberalism, Ken- thecontext of a viableeconomy; it spokeof revivingand nedyto some extenttransformed these antagonisms by repairingthe deficiencies of capitalism; it "discovered" pov- offeringa "politics of modernity." ertybut was ambivalentabout organized labor; it offered DuringKennedy's presidency, Mailer ceased to believe the same evocationsof public service;it attractedsocial in his own supermananalogy. The modestachievements scientistswho offeredto "professionalize"reform; and it of theadministration and itsCold Warorthodoxy placed featuredthe same fascination with political process. JFK squarelywithin the parametersof liberalreform. There was one difference,however, between Progres- Schlesingercountered this assessment with the assertion sivism and theNew Frontier.Now absentwas thesenti- that to evaluateJFK's legacywould be like evaluating mentallonging for the American past that characterized Jackson'spresidency before the nullification crisis and the previousliberal reform movements. New Frontiersmen waron thebank, Lincoln's six months after Gettysburg, or rarelyspoke of returningto anygolden age. On thebasis FDR's after1935. Kennedy'sassassination thus sealed his of thisapparent indifference to thepast, early commen- possibleproject of transcendingthe irrationalLocke as tatorssaw theNew Frontieras a liberationfrom previous one foreverencased in determinationof hispotential. liberalreform. Norman Mailer was fascinated by Kennedy's Reactionsto theassassination can be regardedas repli- "aloofness,""detachment," and "elusiveness"at presscon- catingcertain previous interpretations of liberalreform

March2005 I Vol.3/No. 1 99 Articles I StillLouis Hartz after All These Years

that Hartz had criticized.Villains were identifiedand son promiseda waron povertyitself. The collapseof this momentarilyvanquished, and theidea of a "happynational movementof liberalreform was itselfimminent within family"was preserved. Nostalgia-noticeably absent from the 1960s,but fora momentit appearedthat the Great New Frontierliberal reform-returned after the assassina- Societyhad marshaledevery possible segment of Ameri- tioneven more powerfully than in previousperiods. For can societyto producea grandpledge of nationaltran- example,Irving Bernstein has arguedthat, based upon a scendenceof Locke. As EricGoldman observed, "Working hypotheticaltrajectory of acquiredskill, vision, and pop- in theWhite House duringthis period produced on occa- ularity,Kennedy "was emergingas a Presidentof great sionan almosteerie feeling. The legislationrolled through stature"who could haverecast the liberal agenda save for theHouse and Senatein suchprofusion and so method- a "mindlessassassin." 59 Oliver Stone's JFKoffered a mythic icallythat you seemed part of a vast,overpowering machin- accountof lost opportunities.60 His portrayalof the assas- ery,oiled to purr."63 sinationas a coup d'etatwas a heroiceffort to use the While manycommentators would soon concludethat 1960s as a foundationfor a post-Reaganliberalism. This Johnson'sproject of liberal reform was as limitedby Lock- nostalgiacontinues despite numerous attempts to portray eanismas all the othersin America,Johnson's rhetoric JFKand the New Frontier as adolescentfantasy. Alan Brink- conveyedthe senseof a door unbolted.Suddenly there ley writes,for example, that "Kennedy reminds Ameri- wereintimations of a worldin whichcommunion with cansof a timewhen the nation's capacities seemed limitless, naturereplaced its subjugation, a world in whichindivid- whenits future seemed unbounded, when it was possible ualsvalued beauty and community above commerce: "The to believethat the United States could solvesocial prob- GreatSociety is a placewhere every child can findknowl- lems and accomplishgreat deeds withoutgreat conflict edge to enrichhis mindand to enlargehis talents.It is a and withoutgreat cost."61 placewhere leisure is a welcomechance to build and reflect, To Hartz,Progressives made a fetishof the trust in ways nota fearedcause of boredom and restlessness.It is a place no Europeanliberal could imaginebecause "if the trust wherethe cityof man servesnot onlythe needsof the wereat the heartof all evil,then Locke could be kept body and the demandsof commercebut the desirefor intactsimply by smashing it."62 Similarly, as longas if-JFK- beautyand thehunger for community."64 Johnson rejected had-livedis theanalytical focus of theearly 1960s, all the otherslogans, such as "BetterDeal," forhis programin subsequenttrauma of the decade-Vietnam,racial con- orderto suggest"new objectives for an age of abundance flict,distrust in government-canbe enclosed.As trusts ... when... governmentmust begin ministering to the in partdisplaced rational action for Progressives (a "com- social,spiritual, and aestheticneeds of thenation, as well pulsive'Americanism' was projectedupon the real eco- as to itsdiplomatic and economicneeds."65 In thearea of nomicworld," according to Hartz),so too doesJFK divert civil rights,LBJ spoke of liberationin new terms.No attentionfrom the failureof New Frontierliberalism to president,not evenLincoln, identified with the cause of cope withthe challenges facing America. Those multiple- racialequality more comprehensively and forthrightly than traditionwriters who highlightrepublicanism neatly fit Johnson.His March 1965 speechto Congressnot only intothis pattern, outlined by Hartz. For Bellah, Kennedy appropriatedthe movement'santhem, "We Shall Over- retrievedthe republican res publica for a new generation; come,"as a nationalone, but elevated the struggle to one forShklar, those social scientists who reenteredthe polit- thattied American national identity to itssuccess. To John- ical arenaafter the Eisenhower interregnum attempted to son,crises of earlier decades-the Depression,World War retrieveJeffersonian political science. Thus to her the II, and theCold War-did not "laybare the secret heart reemergenceof republicanismwas temporarilythwarted ofAmerica itself" in theway that the issue of equal rights by Kennedy'ssuccessors rather than by the paradoxof forAfrican Americans did. Quoting Isaiah ("What is a American-styleliberal reform as predictedby Hartz'slib- manprofited, ifhe shallgain the whole world, and losehis eralsociety analysis. soul?"),Johnson contended that all thewealth and power As liberalreform the GreatSociety does not benefit of this"great, rich and restlesscountry" were worthless fromthe same prophylactic,even though Lyndon John- withouta resolutionto thisproblem.66 son announcedthe theme of a GreatSociety as an homage If the "We Shall Overcome"address declared war on to thedead president.There was, in fact,even more emo- thelegal toleration of racismin a liberalsociety through tivecontent to theGreat Society than this powerful con- historicalpatterns of "systematicand ingeniousdiscrimi- nectionsuggests, for Johnson broke the unholyalliance nation,"two months later, at HowardUniversity, Johnson withthe party's Southern wing-something that neither seemedto confrontand smashLockeianism even more FDR norJFK dared to do. This was,of course, the initia- directly.Declaring that a guaranteeof votingrights and tivethat suggested a monumentalproject of liberation. It theend to segregationwere not enough because "you can- was Johnson'scommitment to eradicatingsegregation in not take a personwho, foryears, has been hobbledby particular,and racismin general,that seemed to divestthe chainsand liberatehim, bring him up to thestarting line nationof itslast semifeudal remnant. To top it off,John- of a raceand thensay, 'you are freeto competewith all

100 Perspectiveson Politics others,'and stilljustly believe that you have been com- One ofthe recurrent patterns of liberal reform in Amer- pletelyfair," he outlineda newand "moreprofound stage ican history,according to Hartz,was the inabilityof a of the battlefor civil rights." Johnson openly dismissed leftto challengeits inherent conservative impulses. Thus equalityof opportunityas a goal and announceda policy liberalreformers always looked, and believedthemselves thatwould promote"equality as a factand equalityas a to be, more radicalthan theywere. During the New result."67 Deal, forexample, FDR was neverrequired to respond This rapidshift from the demandfor the equalityof seriouslyto NormanThomas and Earl Browder,though opportunityfor all to one thatdecreed equality of result Englishliberals and Frenchradicals did contendwith appearedto be momentous.It seemedto suggestthe basic theircounterparts on the Left.Without being forced featuresof revolutionarytransformation: dramatic alter- to spellout Lockeanpremises about private property and ationsin politicalperspectives cascading to moreradical a limitedstate, American liberal reformavoided the goalsin a new concentratedtime span. Indeed,between "atmosphereof indecisionthis necessarilyinvolved."72 the two addresses,James Farmer declared a new phase Not so, however,in the1960s. The GreatSociety received of thecivil rights movement that would be independent its firstattack from the New Left,which asserted that ofthe federal government and white America. Two months its radicalpremises were more apparentthan real. Be- afterthe Howard Universityaddress, Watts erupted in neaththe rhetorical splendor and evenits administrative riotsthat many commentators called "rebellion."'68 apparatuslay an ideologyof cooptation and containment Again,liberal society analysis provides some important of the poor not fundamentallydifferent from Locke's perspectiveson boththe accelerated pace ofreform as well own perspectiveson poverty.To a certainextent, opposi- as thestrident critiques that followed. Just as DanielMoyni- tion to the war in Vietnamprovided the impetusand han was praisingthe Great Society for finally profession- courageto questionliberal reform, but the critiquealso alizingreform and thuscreating a permanentskilled class seemedto emanatefrom a wholevariety of sources. LBJ, devotedto humanbetterment that made petitionsand unlikeFDR, was repeatedlyforced to defendthe Lock- massrallies obsolete, Paul Goodman reached exactly oppo- ean principlesof liberal reform, including (especially after siteconclusions. 69 Borrowingimaginatively from the theory the urbanriots) the rightsof privateproperty and law ofAmericanexceptionalism, he contended that since Amer- and order. ica was withouta traditionalaristocracy or "totalitarian Was America,in fact,undergoing a liberalenlighten- dogma,"political elites maintained and extendedtheir mentin whichthe "irrational Locke" was confrontedand powerthough moral injunction.An ideologythat was the veryfoundations of Lockean rationalityitself chal- composedof "campaignslogans ... halfpublic relations lenged?The liberalsociety analyst would arguethat the and halfcorny dreams" promised liberation. But these emergenceof a forcefulLeft critique was in factthis sort were only "happyformulas" to "multiplyprofessional- of novelty.Yet, at leastin its originalform, the radical client"and "patron-client"relationships. By "the clubbing projectwas extremely short-lived. Conservative forces rose together"of thesecular and moralleaders of society-in withthe same rapidity as theNew Left,and liberalreform industry,the military,labor unions,the cities,sciences fellonce again into the familiar pattern in which the defeat and arts,the universities,the church, and thestate-the ofWhiggery was onlyapparent. In thiscase, the timidity Establishmentdetermines "not only the economy and pol- ofthe Great Society in termsof income redistribution and icy but the standardsand idealsof the nation."Thus a challengesto corporatepower were hiddennot by the practicaldefinition of the GreatSociety is: a set of pro- hagiographyof a president,but byanalyses that centered gramsto provideprofessional employment and otherbusi- on mistakenpresidential strategic calculations. The if-JFK- nessfor card-carrying members of theEstablishment.70 had-livedexplanation is replacedby a focuson guns-and- Goodmanrelied heavily upon his critique of the 1950s, butterstrategy of LBJ. If Johnson ended the war, the Great equatingEisenhower's policies with those of JFK and John- Societywould have flourished and perhapsovercome the son. Tom Hayden,however, added anotherelement to irrationalLocke in thespectacular glow of a trulyliberal thiscritique that became a powerfulmodel of the later, enlightenment. "angry"1960s. The GreatSociety was a bureaucraticchoke But this displacement,too, refusesto confrontthe on truechange in whichliberal moralism was a disguise: perennialparadoxes of American liberal reform that cause "The povertyprogram, in short,assumes the poor are itsfailure in each manifestation.For theliberal reformer groupsof damagedindividuals who need charity,relief, seeksto use thestate for her projects while remaining as technicalaid, or retraining."In fact,however, its promot- skittishas herWhig rivalabout the capacityof thestate ers could not accept the possibilitythat the poor are to destroyliberty.73 Alternatively, the multiple-tradition "'natives'pitted against colonial structures at home that theoristmust account not onlyfor the seeming popular- excludeand exploitthem." This "colonialism"was "as real ityof theGreat Society, but also forits demise. He must as themore traditional colonialism of Britain and France, findresurgent Jeffersonian impulses in GreatSociety pro- despiteour officialnational ideology of equality.""71 grams (Bellah), the germinationof democraticseeds

March2005 Vol.3/No. 1 101 Articles I StillLouis Hartz after All These Years plantedin the past (Shklar),impulses for a moreinclu- quicklya newkind of class analysis (remarkably similar to sivedemocracy (Smith)-and he mustalso uncoverillib- Jacksonianrhetoric) began to appearin which"limousine eralcounterforces that overcome them. liberals"and "richpeople in the suburbs"with so-called moralagendas exploited the "plain people of the city."78 In his ethnographicstudy of Carnesiein themid-1970s, The AmericanDemocrat/(Liberal) JonathanReider found liberalism described by residents Thermidor as associatedwith "profligacy, spinelessness, malevolence, Two moreHartz concepts provide valuable insights into masochism,elitism, fantasy, anarchy, idealism, softness, the mid-1960s.Johnson's populism conflated all classes, irresponsibility,and sanctimoniousness."79Thus protest butthe focus of his programs on thepoor and on minor- against 1960s protestwas framedmore in termsof itiessoon revealedthe natureof what Hartz called the American-styleclass conflict(with the American demo- "Americandemocrat." In Europe,the small-property owner cratascendant) than ascriptiveappeals. Ironically, from andshopkeeper were severely hemmed in byother classes.74 theliberal society approach even Greenstone's "reform lib- Bothwere forever described in diminishedterms by other eralism,"with its agenda of moral development, is seenby groups.The petitbourgeois was a mean-spiritedyet sub- theAmerican democrat as an elitistagenda. missivefigure with a smallnessof politicalvision. Thus It was difficultfor the Republican Party, as Hartznoted thepetit bourgeois is, as Hartznotes, a "familiarWestern itwas for the Whigs, to capitalizeupon this resentment.80 type,"who has "never been glamorous in Western thought." Butas Hartzalso observed, in thenineteenth century there Yethe becomesmagnified almost beyond recognition in werelimits to how manytimes politicians like Thurlow Americasince "the peasant is transformedinto thecapi- Weed and Daniel Websterwere willing to commitpoliti- talistfarmer, the proletarian into the incipiententrepre- cal suicide.So too, therewere limits to how manytimes neur."This hybrid can certainly be intimidatedby an upper followersof RobertTaft and BarryGoldwater would do middleclass, but when it collectively asserts itself, its num- thesame. Various formulas ofWhig victory are possible in bersgive it theappearance and forceof a nationalwill.75 Americanculture (as the Reagan revolutionlater illus- On the basis of theseobservations, Hartz describedthe trates).But in thisdecade, what better representative of Americandemocrat as alternatelya Hamlet and a Hercu- theAmerican democrat was therethan Richard Nixon? les. Foreversuspicious of stateauthority, the American Nixon'sbackground-his father was a trolleyoperator and democratseemed most powerful when he turnedto reform much-failedentrepreneur-and career were exemplars of and soughtto capturethe state in orderto destroyit. theAmerican democrat in termsof its frustrations, hatreds, This desireto bothdestroy and emulatethose who sur- and emulativesuccesses. The Herblockcartoons of Nixon roundhim can, as Hartz noted,be manipulatedto pro- in particulartrade upon class stereotypes of the street law- duceindecision, loss of confidence, and submission though yerand car salesman.Adlai Stevenson'sobservations on the tacticsof "charmand terror."'76This stratagem- "Nixonland"as a place characterizedby "hustling,push- discoveredfirst, according to Hartz, by the Whigs in ing,shoving-the land of smash and graband anythingto 1840-encouragedthe American democrat either to accept win"also spoke by innuendo of the upper-class disdain for Lockeanpremises and risein theworld, or to rejectthem theambition of thearriviste.81 and facerejection as an American. One ofHartz's insights about the American democrat is The Americandemocrat, and the petitbourgeois in thatthe petit bourgeois perspective is closeto thenational general,was not at all adverseto the1960s' liberal enlight- one.Nixon confirms this observation in his own multiclass enmentand theliberal reform that attempted to encapsu- analysis.In his acceptanceaddress for his party's nomina- lateit. Buttwin feelings of resentment and admirationfor tion,Nixon focused upon thetwo nightmares of 1968- classesboth above and belowthat of theAmerican dem- civildisorder and Vietnam:"[W] e see citiesenveloped in ocratexploded in the late 1960s. The classesfrom both smokeand flame. We hearsirens in thenight. We seeAmer- aboveand belowwere receiving enormous benefits in the icansdying on distantbattlefields abroad." Though prom- formof draftdeferments and affirmativeaction. More isingnational reconciliation and evena continuationof generally,the counterculturesystematically attacked the reform,Nixon nevertheless raised the question of the costs corevalues of the American democrat: family, hard work, ofchange: "As we see and hear these things, millions ofAmer- delayedgratification. Michael Novak spoke for a portion icanscry out in anguish:Did we comeall thisway for this? of this group resentmentwhen he reversedthe object Did Americanboys die in Normandy and Korea and in Val- of the New Leftsignifier, PIGS, to read Poles,Italians, leyForge for this?" Then camethe elucidation of the voice Greeks,and Slovaks.77Christopher Lasch, one of thefew thatbecame identified as the"silent majority": writerswho providesa sympatheticaccount of Hartz's It is anothervoice, it is a voice in the tumultof the shout- American this sentimentsof quiet democrat,analyzed group's ing. It is the voice of the greatmajority of Americans,the for- betrayal.Liberals, who were supposedto protectthem gotten Americans,the non-shouters,the non-demonstrators. againstmarket forces, had abandonedtheir cause. Very They'regood people. They'redecent people. They workand they

102 Perspectiveson Politics saveand they pay taxes and they care. They work in factories, Thermidorianopponent destroy his counterpart when he theyrun businesses, they serve in government.They provide too was a democrat?How, too, could evena new"impe- mostof the soldiers who die to keep it free. They give the spirit rialist removeall restrictionsattached to America.82 president"fully Whig to theoffice in a societythat so fearedthe state?86 Nixon managedto includeworkers, capitalists, and Many of Nixon'spolicies did in factcontinue liberal bureaucratsin his descriptionwithout pausing to note reform.But therewas neverthelessthe kind of severe anydifferences, thus conveying a categorythat is broader retrenchment,particularly in regardto culturalissues, thana class,even a swollenclass, and suggestingthe exis- that is characteristicof Thermidors.He remindedhis tenceand reassertionof a nation.In fact,the trope "silent audiencethat "the first prerequisite of progressis order." majority"has all the earmarksof the discourseof an While promisingadherence to Lockeanlegalism, he still aggrievednation. There is thesense of commonidentity, spokeharshly of thecourts' role in "weakeningthe peace thepervasive feelings of resentment and anger at pastinjus- forcesas againstthe criminal forces in thiscountry." One tices,the determination to takepower and be ridof "oth- of his fewspecific campaign pledges was a promiseto ers."This classresentment, transformed into nationalism, appointa newattorney general to "launcha war"against formedthe core meaning of what Nixon calledthe "new criminalelements throughout the land. Shortlyafter his Americanrevolution" and constitutedin Hartzianterms election,the Nixon administrationin responseto a vio- the"Herculean" moment for the American democrat. lentprotest against the president in San Jose,unleashed a It was one ofthe ironies of the 1960s'version of liberal barrageof epithetsagainst the peace movement.They reformthat it seemedto producenew "nations"with a were"thugs and hoodlums,""anarchistic nihilistic extrem- dizzyingrapidity. First, there was the notion of racial iden- ists,""terrorists of thefar left," and "violentthugs." Mix- tity,given expression in the KernerCommission report ing the 1930s with the 1960s, Nixon promised"no and in variousblack nationalist groups. Then therewas appeasementof rock throwers." He declaredCharles Man- theconcept of a separatecultural identity, epitomized by son guiltyand drewdirect parallels between the Tate-La the WoodstockNation. ActivistsMichael Ferberand Biancamurders and "permissiveness."87Nixon expressed StaughtonLynd asserted in 1971 thatthere was no longer his attachmentto the Americandemocrat in his usual a singlemovement in America, but many "nations ... still visceralmanner to H. R. Haldeman.The current"ultra- in growingnumbers" with "plans and theories,organiza- liberal"leadership class in "thisperiod of our history" tionsand lifestyles, dreams and 'trips'that will take us out was "decadent"and without"character" and "guts."The of themurderous wasteland of America." 83 "ordinaryworking guy" was "all thatwas leftof the char- The overridingproject of these formulations was to be acterof thisnation.""8 liberatedfrom the Lockean nation.Nixon's project, in Hartz'sconcepts of American democrat and liberal Ther- response,had a clearThermidorian cast. Hartz said about midorprovide an explanationfor the stalemated "end" of the Constitutionalconvention and the riseof Federalist the 1960s. While liberalreform in this case may have thoughtin generalthat "a liberalsociety could produce, as produceda forcefulcritique from the left unlike previous anomalousas the seems,a liberal italso awakenedother cultural language reaction."'84 cases, historicallypowerful Again,for Hartz, a liberalThermidor rested primarily upon forces.There are,of course,recourses for the multiple- imaginaryassessments of social forces. Federalists did not traditionapproach to deal withthis account. Smith, for facea threatfrom "Levelers" nor were anti-Federalist char- example,contends that liberal reform itself awakens illib- acterizationsof theiropponents as monarchistsaccurate. eralimpulses in whatHartz calls the American democrat. But Hartz does note a purposefulrhetorical shift in the Threatenedby change,he becomes receptiveto sub- worldof the Federalists.Although he acceptedthe pre- mergedascriptive appeals and thus actively supports Ther- dominanceof pessimisticviews of humannature in the midorianprojects. In fact,for Smith, American history is FederalistPapers, he remindedreaders that all negative views strewnwith many Thermidors fired by racists, misogynists, arenot alike: "There is a feudalbleakness about man which and ethnicideologues. Smith admits that the "civil rights sees him fitonly for external domination, and thereis a reformsof the 1960s and 1970sare not as seriouslythreat- liberalbleakness about man which sees him working auton- ened todayas werethe civil rights measures of the 1860s omouslyon the basis of his own self-interest.""'85Thus in the 1890s."89Nevertheless, he citesas evidenceof per- liberalThermidors were like Thermidors in generalin the sistentascriptive ideologies: "[T]he Buchananand Duke sensethat they are characterizedby a loss of optimism,a campaigns,the Christian coalition, the Los Angelesriots, determinationto restraindemocratic "excess," and therise the Englishonly agitation,and the popularityof anti- of new "Bonapartist"executive structures. But theywere Japanesenovels."'9 As troublingas theseexamples might unlikethem in thatboth "democrats" and "reactionaries" be,the pertinent question is whether the post-1960s Ther- held commoncommitments. How could the American midoris moreeconomically and persuasivelyaccounted democrathave the will to destroyhis "rich"Whig cousin, forby theunique American demos that Hartz called the whom he reallyhoped to emulate,and how could his Americandemocrat, who respondedto Whig arguments

March2005 Vol.3/No. 1 103 Articles I StillLouis Hartz after All These Years

about returningto thecharm of Locke and theterror of actualcontours of Lockeandominance are brieflyappre- abandoninghim long before these movements appeared- ciated. Like the theoristsof the reactionaryenlighten- thenby an appealto alternativetraditions. ment, many 1960s activistsglimpsed the cultural configurationsthat animated Lockean "tyranny" as they wereat thesame timemisjudging its strength and ratio- Conclusion nality.In thisrespect, although the 1960s wereexcep- I havetried to suggest that however contested Hartz's analy- tionalin thata leftcritique of liberalreform did emerge, sis mightbe on particularperiods of Americanpolitical the resurgenceof the Americandemocrat in Thermi- development,the concepts he employsare capable of pro- dorianform replicated past cultural patterns. vidingan accountof recent political change. It is possible, Was it possiblethat the 1960s project,the liberation ofcourse, that these concepts could be appliedin different fromthe irrationalLocke, was so traumaticthat it pro- waysthan the narrativeI have offered.However, in its duceda theoreticalimpasse? The ascentand descentmod- basic format,Hartz's theory provides plausible explana- els thatfollowed the decade were attempts to makesense tionsfor three significant questions about thepolitics of of the 1960s,but neither was quiteable to establishitself the 1960s. as the authoritativereading. In fact,many critiques of The liberalenlightenment is certainly the most under- Hartzare themselves examples of thisphenomenon. As I developedand normativeconcept of Hartz'sanalysis, but noted,Hartz was extremelysuspicious of thetendency of itis suggestivein severalrespects. Hartz predicted that the thestudent of American politics to makeher observations constantfocus abroad demanded by the Cold Warmight from"within the nation." Hartz's critics, of course,make wellbreak down the "tyranny of Locke" in Americancul- thisvery point about LTitself. Thus Hartzis chargedwith ture.Hartz was unclearabout what formsthis national ignoringmajor parts of American political culture or assign- liberationmight assume, but it is certainlypossible to ing an imaginaryconsensus to the outcomeof conflicts. thinkof the politicsof the 1960s in theseterms. If the Yet,which account-Hartz's or his critics-is morethan attemptto discoverand apply alternative theories of Amer- an "eruditereflection of the limitedperspectives of the ican identityis one aspectof this"coming of age," then averageAmerican himself"? Is it Greenstone's,which con- Hartz'sscenario is relevantto thedecade. If any character- structsa contestbetween two liberalisms,one good and izationcan be made aboutthe decade in thisregard, it is one bad?Is it Dienstag's,which asserts in 1996 theend of thatthe 1960swere overtheorized by its participants. The the dominanceof Locke at the momentwhen theorists conceptof liberationfrom Locke veered wildly from one wouldsoon write about the "end of history" and theglob- interpretationtoanother. Although the early 1960s quickly alizationof Lockeanism? Is it Shklar,who seesAmerica as came to be regardedas overlycautious in its breakwith a uniqueexperiment brought to Hegelian-likefulfillment the 1950s,this instance of liberal reform fervently sought fromthe "intellectual germs" of the founders and redeemed to defineitself in termsof itsnewness and reassertionof historicallythrough constant struggle? And what could be sacrificeand risk.The later1960s was an arenafor an moreAmerican exceptionalist than the belief that the tri- arrayof theories that attempted to explainwhat was going umphof democracy is reallynot an Americanidea, but a on,ranging from a myriadof cultural experiments in drugs, universalidea, workingits way throughhumanity with personalstyle, and sexualarrangements to new political Americaas itsworld carrier? Is it Smith,who urgesus to theoriesabout race,political tactics, and globalchange. do "greaterjustice" to thosedenied access to the liberal Evenits Thermidor produced new formulations ofnational traditionand who contends that there are people commit- identityfor the American ted to add upon the democrat. "achievementsof Ameri- The liberalsociety ana- cans in buildinga more lystmust be preparedto Theliberal society analyst must be preparedto inclusivedemocracy" so entertainfantastic politi- that "illiberalforces will cal formulationsas well entertainfantastic political formulations as well as not prevail"? as predictableones. The The promise of the emergenceof a liberal predictableones. multiple traditionsap- enlightenmentwithin a proach rests upon its societyalready liberal is capacityto identifypat- certainly as bizarre a ternsof American politi- developmentas its nineteenth-centuryreactionary coun- cal developmentunaccounted for in the liberalsociety terparthas been,at leastin termsof Europeanpolitical model.Smith, for example, contends that the reassertion development.However, in termsof both its unexpected of nonliberalvalues is explainedby the inability of Lock- featuresand itsanticipated ones, the new liberal enlight- ean conceptsto reassurethose threatened by their broader enmentwas part of a recurringpattern in which the application.Insecure citizens thus search for ever new forms

104 Perspectiveson Politics ofascription to"reinvigorate thehierarchies they esteem." 8 Koch1955, 551-52. Shklarposits the continued struggle between democracy 9 Brown1955, 314. andtyranny. Thus once the multiple-tradition approach 10 McKitrick1955, 25. assumesthe existence of other forms, ittheoretically wills 11 McNaught1974, 410. theirappearance. As Daniel Rogers has argued in terms of 12 Hartz(1974) hurled the charge back at thecritic: thosewho search for historical manifestations ofrepubli- "ProfessorMcNaught maintains a logical position canism,the assertion of paradigmaticstrength hides its inhis criticism of my work: having asserted the empiricalfragility.91 But,as I havesuggested inthe case of presencein the United States of the elements the1960s, there is ample room within the liberal tradition yieldinga powerful socialist movement, he goes itselfto fashiona retreatfrom reform in responseto the on to implythat such a movementactually existed" demandsof the American democrat. Morever, the multiple- (p. 421). traditionsapproach acknowledges that the liberal tradi- 13 Orren1991, 1. tionhas, in Smith'swords, "great normative and political 14 Bailyn1967; Wood 1969. ",92 potency. 15 Berthoffand Murrin 1973, 286-87. See also see Bar- The liberalsociety approach outlined by Hartz that ber1986, 356-57. seeksto find"national weaknesses" with "no absolute assur- 16 Hartz1955, 170. anceon thebasis of the past that they will be remedied"is 17 Ibid.,177. a betterone both in termsof understandingthe 1960s 18 Smith1997, 287-88. andAmerican political culture in general.For that decade, 19 Shklar1991a; Shklar 1991b. thoughunique in some respects,seeing as it did, if only 20 Smith1997, 28. fora moment,the possibilities of a liberalenlightenment, 21 Ibid.,21. Hartz(1955) clearly intended his efforts as offeredan openingfor a Leftcritique of liberalreform. It a counterweighttocelebratory interpretations ofAmer- also triggeredthe same patternsas the past: a periodof icanpolitical culture; he reiteratedhis aim in the liberalreform that both attackedand soughtto preserve firstand last chapters (pp. 32, 309). Lockeanbeliefs, a resurgenceof the American democrat as 22 Shklar1991a, 3-4. a Hercules(only to be disarmedas Hamlet),and the appear- 23 Bellahet al. 1985,311. ance of a (liberal)Thermidor that excited conservatives 24 Diggins1984, 103-5. and terrifiedreformers and radicals. 25 Roelofs1998, 31; Fowler1999, 29; Young1996, Americanpolitical culture after the events of 9/11 may 11. provideyet another opportunity to reexaminethe liberal 26 Dienstag1996, 499. societythesis, for the sense of mission and threatto Amer- 27 Ibid. ica is at leastas intenseas it was in theearly days of the 28 Smith1997, 24-26. Cold War.The questionthat Hartz posed in 1955 is once 29 Smith1999, 16. again painfullyrelevant: "Must a liberalcommunity, in 30 Greenstone1993, 54-55. additionto all of themassive problems of diplomacy and 31 Ericson(2001) has studied the debate over Hartz's freedomany great nation faces in the modernworld, be analysisof the slavery "test case" and concluded that foreversaddled with the peculiarlimitations of its own whileHartz "erred in viewingthe proslavery perspective?"Is it not stilltrue "to saythat America must dilemmaprimarily as a psychologicaldilemma rather lookto itscontact with other nations to providethat grain thana rhetoricalone," by recasting his thesis the of insightthat its own historyhas deniedit"?93 After all liberalsociety position is actually"stronger ... theseyears, we are left,then, with Louis Hartz as the thanhe himselfcast it" (p. 10). DanielRodgers authorof the most potent interpretation ofAmerican polit- (1992)has employed much the same strategy in ical thought. termsof republicanism and the American Revolu- tion.T. H. Breen2004 presentsa bold challenge to thethesis that republicanism was theanimating Notes forceof the revolution. He contendsthat the 1 Woodward1968. imperialeconomy established by GreatBritain 2 Lipset1963; McConnell 1966; Potter 1954; McClos- inadvertentlyinvented choice of consumergoods key1958; Huntington 1981. as a basicfeature of life.The AmericanRevolution, 3 Anderson1983; Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983; Jen- in his reading,was basedupon guaranteeingthe kinsand Sofos 1996. rightof consumerchoice, a verymodern and 4 Garcia-Morenoand Pfeiffer 1996. decidedlyliberal perspective. Brinkley 1995 and 5 Fowler1999, 35. Brands2001 offerinterpretations of the New 6 Abbott2001. Deal and theCold Warthat parallel Hartz's 7 Powell1955, 12. accounts.

March2005 1Vol. 3/No. 1 105 Articles I StillLouis Hartz after All These Years

32 Anderson1996, 4. 60 Stoneand Sklar 1992. 33 Smith1993, 555, 563; Smith1999, 9. 61 Brinkley1998, 220. 34 Steigerwald1995 and Isserman and Kazin 2000 62 Hartz1955, 232. discussthe stalemate question from different 63 Goldman1969, 334. perspectives. 64 Johnson1965, 704. 35 Hartzargued in TheFounding ofNew Societies 65 Schulman1995, 84. thatemancipation was a "revolutionarymatter 66 Johnson1966, 281. in Enlightenmentfragments" and thus arguments 67 Ibid.,635. overrace are "more passionately doctrinaire" with 68 Thisview of the radical impetus of the Great Society theside favoring equal treatment possessing "an is stillsometimes advanced. See Davies1996, where enormoussource of strength." He didnot suggest theprograms are portrayed as an aborted"entitle- thatracism was not a monumentalproblem in mentrevolution." liberalsocieties. On thecontrary, a "feudal ethos, 69 Moynihan1965; Goodman 1967. beingmore absorptive in therealm of race, 70 Goodman1967, 516-17. purchasesimmunity from the storms of Little 71 Hayden1967, 481-82. Rockat theprice of a traditionalistsocial order" 72 Hartz1955, 261. (pp. 17,62, 114).The impactof a liberal 73 Foran evaluationof the Great Society that adopts societyfor the American Indian was, according thisapproach, see DeHaven-Smith 1988. to Hartz,catastrophic and he speculateson the 74 See Bechhoeferand Elliot 1983 for a discussionof possiblecourse of American political development Europeanpetit bourgeoisie values as a defensive hadthis group not been "eliminated" (1964, reaction. 94-99). 75 Hartz1955, 114-15. 36 Smith1997, 554. 76 Goodwyn1978 describes this kind of reaction in the 37 Hartz(1955) did note that the "theory ofracial suprem- Populistmovement after 1900. acyfound a twistedroot in American life" in the 77 Novak1972. Many subsequent analysts have incorpo- beliefsof a "thousanddrug store Gobineaus" (p. 291). ratedHartz's American democrat into their accounts 38 Hartz1955, 90. ofthe period. See Reider1985; Lesher 1994. 39 Ibid.,277. 78 Lasch1991, 478. 40 Ibid.,308-9. 79 Reider1985, 6. 41 Ibid.,308. Historicalnarratives ofthe decade gener- 80 Reider1989 discusses efforts to on thepart of allysupport Hartz's prediction. See Matusow1984; theright to shedits "remnant identity" in thelate Gitlin1993; Anderson 1996. sixties. 42 Hartz1955, 147. 81 Nixontried to appeal to theAmerican democrat as 43 Studentsfor Democratic Society 1995, 62. earlyas hiscampaign for class president atWhittier. 44 Oglesby1995, 224-25. SeeMatthews 1996, 24-25; Ambrose 1987, 59-64. 45 Mansfield1997, 21. See alsohis own account (1962) of Alger Hiss as an 46 Ehrenreich1992, 234. ungratefulfigure of privilege and the "class war" 47 Compare,for example, Gitlin 1993 (p. 438) andCol- thathe feltwas waged against him for his role in the lierand Horowitz 1989 (p. 265). case(pp. 1-71).Nixon's affinity to the American 48 Hartz1955, 27-32. democratis thereason Wicker (1991) concludes that 49 Smith1993, 562. he is "oneof us" (pp. 686-87). 50 The theoreticalprojects of Holland (2001) 82 NewYork Times 1968. andNorton (1993) are examples of the 83 Ferberand Lynd 1971, ix. innovativecapacities of Hartz'sconcept of liberal 84 Hartz 1955, 70. enlightenment. 85 Ibid., 80. 51 Hartz 1955, 259. 86 Thus ArthurSchlesinger Jr.'s comparison of Nixon 52 Ibid.,261. to Louis Bonaparte(1973, 254-55) capturedhalf of 53 Ibid.,270, 237-38. Hartz'sinsight. 54 Compare,for example, Miroff 1976 and Bernstein 87 Graham1970; Semple1970; New YorkTimes 1970. 1991. 88 Haldeman1994, 326. 55 Mailer1964, 46. 89 Smith1993, 563. 56 Burns1960. 90 Ibid. 57 Schlesinger1965, 115-16. 91 Rodgers1992, 38. 58 Ibid.,747. 92 Smith1993, 558. 59 Bernstein1991, 298. 93 Hartz 1955, 287.

106 Perspectiveson Politics References Diggins,John P. 1984, Thelost soul ofAmerican politics. Abbott,Philip. 2001. The humansciences and thecase New York:Basic Books. of theuntrustworthy narrator. Soundings 84 (3-4): Ehrenreich,Barbara. 1992. Legaciesof the 1960s:New 419-47. Rightsand New Lefts.In Sightson thesixties, ed. Bar- Ambrose,Stephen. 1987. Nixon:The education ofa poli- baraL. Tischler,227-34. New Brunswick,NJ: Rut- tician,1913-1962. New York:Simon and Schuster. gersUniversity Press. Anderson,Benedict. 1983. Imaginedcommunities: Reflec- Ericson,David. 2001. Thedebate over slavery. New York: tionson theorigin and spreadof nationalism. London: New YorkUniversity Press. Verso. Ferber,Michael, and StaughtonLynd. 1971. Theresis- Anderson,Terry H. 1996. Themovement and thesixties. tance.Boston: Beacon Press. New York:Oxford University Press. Fowler,Robert Booth. 1999. Enduringliberalism: Ameri- Bailyn,Bernard. 1967. Theideological origins of the Amer- canpolitical thought since the 1960s. Lawrence: Univer- icanRevolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. sityPress of Kansas. Barber,Benjamin. 1986. Louis Hartz.Political Theory Garcia-Moreno,Laura, and PeterC. Pfeiffer,eds. 14 (3): 355-58. 1996. Textand nation:Cross-disciplinary essays Bechhoefer,Eric, and BrianElliot. 1983. Pettyproperty: on culturaland nationalidentities. London: The survivalof a moraleconomy. In Thepetite bour- CamdenHouse. geoisie,ed. EricBechhoefer and BrianElliot, 182- Gitlin,Todd. 1993. Thesixties: Years of hope, days of rage. 200. London:Macmillan. New York:Bantam. Bellah,Robert N., RichardMadsen, William M. Sulli- Goldman,Eric. 1969. Thetragedy ofLyndon Johnson. van,Ann Swidler,and StevenTipton 1985. Habits New York:Alfred A. Knopf. ofthe heart. Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress. Goodman,Paul. 1967. The povertyof theGreat Society. Berthoff,Rowland and JohnMurrin. 1973. Feudalism, In The GreatSociety reader, ed. MarvinE. Gettleman communalism,and theyeoman freeholder: The Amer- and David Mermelstein,512-19. New York:Ran- ican Revolutionas a socialaccident. In Essayson dom House. theAmerican Revolution, ed. StephenG. Kurtzand Goodwyn,Lawrence. 1978. Thepopulist moment. New JamesH. Hudson,256-88. New York:W. W. Norton. York:Oxford University Press. Bernstein,Irving. 1991. Promiseskept: John E Kennedy's Graham,Fred P. 1970.President to get program to curb ter- newfrontier. New York:Oxford University Press. rorbombings. New YorkTimes, October 31. Brands,H. W. 2001. Thestrange death ofAmerican liber- Greenstone,J.David. 1993. TheLincoln persuasion: Remak- alism.New Haven:Yale UniversityPress. ingAmerican liberalism. Princeton: Princeton Univer- Breen,T. H. 2004. Themarketplace ofrevolution. New sityPress. York:Oxford University Press. Hartz,Louis. 1955. Theliberal tradition in America. Brinkley,Alan. 1995.The end ofreform: New Deal liber- New York:Harcourt, Brace and World. alismin recessionand war.New York:Alfred A. Knopf. -- . 1964. Thefounding ofnew societies. New York: Har- . 1998. Liberalismand itsdiscontents. Cambridge: court,Brace. HarvardUniversity Press. 1.1974. Reply.In Failureofa dream?Essays in thehis- Brown,Stuart G. 1955. Reviewof Theliberal tradition toryofAmerican socialism, ed. JohnH. M. Laslettand in America,by Louis Hartz.Ethics 65 (4): 313-14. SeymourMartin Lipset, 421-24. GardenCity, NY: Burns,James MacGregor. 1960. JohnE Kennedy:Can- Anchor. didateon theeve: Liberalism without tears. New Repub- Haldeman,H. R. 1994. TheHaldeman diaries. New lic,October 31, 14-16. York:Putnam's. Collier,Peter, and David Horowitz.1989. Destructivegen- Hayden,Tom. 1967. WelfareLiberalism and Social eration:Second thoughts about the sixties. New York: Sum- Change.In TheGreat Society reader, ed. MarvinE. Get- mitBooks. tlemanand David Mermelstein,476-501. New Davies,Gareth. 1996. Fromopportunity toentitlement: York:Random House. Thetransformation and declineof Great Society liber- Hobsbawn,Eric, and Terrence Ranger, eds. 1983. The alism.Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. inventionoftradition. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- DeHaven-Smith,Lance. 1988. Philosophicalcritiques ofpol- versityPress. icyanalysis: Lindbloom, Habermas, and theGreat Soci- Holland,Catherine A. 2001. Thebody politic: Found- ety.Gainesville, FL: Universityof FloridaPress. ings,citizenship, and differencein the American imag- Dienstag,Joshua Foa. 1996. ServingGod and Mam- ination.New York:Routledge. mon:The Lockeansympathy in earlyAmerican polit- Huntington,Samuel P. 1981.American politics: Theprom- ical thought.American Political Science Review 90 (3): iseof disharmony. Cambridge: Harvard University 497-511. Press.

March2005 i Vol.3/No. 1 107 Articles I StillLouis Hartz after All These Years

Isserman,Maurice, and MichaelKazin. 2000. America Nixon,Richard. 1962. Six crises.Garden City, NY: divided:The civil war ofthe 1960s. New York: Oxford Doubleday. UniversityPress. Norton,Anne. 1993. Therepublic ofsigns. Chicago: Uni- Jenkins,Brian, and SyporosA. Sofos,eds. 1996. Nation versityof ChicagoPress. and identityin contemporaryEurope. New York: Novak,Michael. 1972. Therise of the unmeltable ethnics. Routledge. New York:Macmillan. Johnson,Lyndon Baines. 1965. Publicpapers of the Oglesby,Carl. 1995. Trappedin a system.In "Takin'it presidents:Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1963-1964. to thestreets"- A sixties reader, ed. AlexanderBloom Washington,DC: GovernmentPrinting Office. and Wini Breines,172-82. New York:Oxford Univer- -. 1966. Publicpapers of the presidents: Lyndon sityPress. BainesJohnson, 1965. Washington,DC: Government Orren,Karen. 1991. Belatedfeudalism: Labor, the law PrintingOffice. and liberaldevelopment in theUnited States. New Koch,Adrienne. 1955. Reviewof Theliberal tradition in York:Cambridge University Press. America,by Louis Hartz.Mississippi Valley Historical Potter,David M. 1954. Peopleofplenty: Economic abun- Review42 (3): 550-52. danceand theAmerican character. Chicago: University Lasch,Christopher. 1991. Thetrue and onlyheaven: of ChicagoPress. Progressand itscritics. New York:W. W Norton. Powell,J. H. 1955. Reviewof Theliberal tradition in Amer- Lesher,Stephan. 1994. GeorgeWallace: American popu- ica,by Louis Hartz.Saturday Review, June 4. list.Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Reider,Jonathan. 1985. Canarsie:The Jews and Italiansof Lipset,Seymour Martin. 1963. Thefirst new nation: The Brooklynagainst liberalism. Cambridge: Harvard Uni- UnitedStates in historicaland comparativeperspective. versityPress. New York:Basic Books. - . 1989. The riseof the"silent majority." In The Mailer,Norman. 1964. Thepresidentialpapers. London: riseand fall ofthe New Deal order,1930-1980, ed. Deutsch. SteveFraser and Gary Gerstle,243-68. Princeton: Mansfield,Harvey. 1997. The legacyof thelate sixties. PrincetonUniversity Press. In Reassessingthe sixties, ed. StephenMacedo, 21-45. Rodgers,Daniel T. 1992. Republicanism:The career New York:W. W. Norton. of a concept.Journal ofAmerican History 79 (1): Matthews,Christopher. 1996. Kennedyand Nixon:The 11-38. rivalrythat shaped post-war America. New York: Roelofs,H. Mark. 1998. Thepoverty ofAmerican politics: Simonand Schuster. A theoreticalinterpretation. Philadelphia: Temple Uni- Matusow,Allen J. 1984. Theunraveling ofAmerica: A his- versityPress. toryof liberalism in the1960s. New York:Harper and Schlesinger,Arthur M., Jr.1965. A thousanddays: John Row. E Kennedyin theWhite House. Boston: Houghton Miroff,Bruce. 1976. Pragmatic illusions: Thepresidentialpol- Mifflin. iticsofJohn E Kennedy.New York:McKay. - . 1973. Theimperial presidency. Boston: Houghton McCloskey,Robert. 1958. Americanpolitical thought Miffin. and thestudy of politics.In Approachesto thestudy Semple,Robert B., Jr.1970. Nixonsharpens drive on ofpolitics,ed. RolandYoung, 155-71. Evanston,IL: "thugs."New YorkTimes, November 1. NorthwesternUniversity Press. Shklar,Judith. 199 la. Americancitizenship: The quest for McConnell,Grant. 1966. Privatepower and American inclusion.Cambridge: Harvard University Press. democracy.New York:Alfred A. Knopf. -. 1991b. RedeemingAmerican political theory. Amer- McKitrick,Eric L. 1955. Reviewof Theliberal tradition icanPolitical Science Review 85 (1): 3-15. in America,by Louis Hartz.New Republic,April 11, Schulman,Bruce J. 1995 LyndonJohnson andAmerican lib- 22-25. eralism:A briefbiography with documents. Boston: Bed- McNaught,Kenneth. 1974. Reply.In Failureofa dream? fordBooks. Essaysin thehistory ofAmerican socialism, ed. John Smith,Rogers M. 1997. Civicideals: Conflicting visions H. M. Laslettand SeymourMartin Lipset, 409-20. ofcitizenshipin U.S. History.New Haven:Yale Uni- GardenCity, NY: Anchor. versityPress. Moynihan,Daniel Patrick.1965. The professionaliza- - . 1999. Liberalismand racism:The problemof ana- tionof reform.Public Interest 1 (1): 6-16. lyzingtraditions. In Theliberal tradition in Americanpol- New YorkTimes. 1968. Transcriptsof acceptance speeches itics,ed. David Ericsonand Louisa BertchGreen, byNixon and Agnewto theG.O.P convention. 9-27. New York:Routledge. August9. - . 1993. BeyondTocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz: 1970. Nixon'sremarks on Mansonand statement . The multipletraditions in America.American Polit- in Washington.August 4. ical ScienceReview 87 (3): 549-66.

108 Perspectiveson Politics Steigerwald,David. 1995. Thesixties and theend of mod- Wood,Gordon S. 1969. Thecreation oftheAmerican repub- ernAmerica. New York:St. Martin's. lic, 1776-1787. New York:W. W. Norton. Stone,Oliver, and ZacharySklar, eds. 1992.JFKI The Woodward,C. Vann. 1968. The comparabilityof Amer- bookofthefilm. New York:Applause Books. ican History.In Thecomparative approach to American Studentsfor a DemocraticSociety. 1995. The Port history,ed. C. VannWoodward, 3-17. New York: Huronstatement. In "Takin'it tothe streets": A sixties Basic Books. reader,ed. AlexanderBloom and Wini Breines, Young,James P. 1996. ReconsideringAmerican liberalism: 61-74. New York:Oxford University Press. Thetroubled odyssey of the liberal idea. Boulder, CO: Wicker,Tom. 1991. Oneofus: RichardNixon and theAmer- WestviewPress. icandream. New York:Random House.

March2005 1Vol. 3/No. 1 109