MOBILITY IN THE CHAD-LIBYA-NIGER TRIANGLE August 2019 - September 2020 MOBILITY IN THE Photo (cover page): Migrants leaving from Agadez (Niger) to Libya © Monica Chiriac / IOM 2018 CHAD-LIBYA-NIGER © 2021 International Organization for Migration (IOM) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted TRIANGLE in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the International Organization for August 2019 - September 2020 Migration (IOM). IOM OIM THE UN MIGRATION AGENCY Funded by the Government of Canada Project funded by the European Union Mobility in the Chad-Libya-Niger Triangle CONTENTS LIST OF ACRONYMS 07 INTRODUCTION 4Mi Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative 11 PART 1: ROUTES & FLOWS ASM Artisanal and small-scale mining 18 PART 2: MIGRANT PROFILES DTM Displacement Tracking Matrix 20 PART 3: COVID-19 ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 30 PART 4: CONCLUSIONS ENACT Enhancing Africa’s Response to Transnational Organised Crime FMP Flow Monitoring Point FMR Flow Monitoring Registry FMS Flow Monitoring Survey IOM International Organization for Migration MSNA Multi-Sector Needs Assessment NFIs Non-Food Items OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development UN United Nations UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya WHO United Nations World Health Organisation iv Displacement Tracking Matrix | IOM v August 2019 - September 2020 Mobility in the Chad-Libya-Niger Triangle KEY FACTS & FIGURES INTRODUCTION August 2019 - September 2020 For centuries, human mobility and migration across the Being at the crossroads between West, Central, East LIBYA Sahel and Sahara regions have been central1 to trade, and North Africa, historically Niger and Chad have been cultural and social exchanges. Cross-border movement2 important hubs10 for trade, cultural exchanges and social Regardless of nationality, and deep-rooted circular migration patterns3 have mobility. In the 1990s and 2000s, in a context of political migrants interviewed in Libya 202,773 also been a means to seek economic opportunities or instability and economic crises in the West African cited economic factors as the migrants from Chad and Niger were temporary labour to cope with uncertainty, shocks and region, Niger, a country of emigration and immigration, NIGER 4 main reason for migrating to 11 identified in Libya as of December environmental challenges, such as food shortages due to became a country of transit for migrants from Western Libya. The majority of them 2020. Most of them were employed extreme weather events, such as droughts or flooding. Africa. Agadez, being the last city in the north of the Drivers of migration from, intended to stay in Libya in different sectors of the Libyan country before crossing the Sahara, became an important to or through Niger were and a minority reported economy, including the construction To varying degrees, Chad, Libya and Niger have all been regional hub12 for migrants travelling north towards Libya multiple and included their intentions to continue sector, agriculture, domestic and care countries of origin, transit and destination for migration employment opportunities onwards to another country (and Algeria). work and manufacturing. in gold mines in Murzuq or to travel to Niger or Chad. along the trans-Sahelian and trans-Saharan routes. and seasonal or short-term Migration patterns and routes between the three countries While Chad has long stood at the historical crossroads income-generating activities have been heavily influenced5 by cultural and geographical of Sahelian migration, especially for migrants from Sudan, in the fields during harvest in proximity, trade, tension and conflict as well as border Somalia and Eritrea, the intensification of gold mining in Libya. Other factors included management policies. Following the discovery of oil in the northern part of the country in 2012 became an insecurity in neighbouring Libya in the 1960s, the Northern African nation became important driver for national and international migration. countries. an appealing destination6 for migrants, particularly from In 2015-16, boosted by anti-smuggling operations13 Tripoli CHAD neighbouring countries, seeking livelihood opportunities in Niger (and Sudan), Chad became an important Chad is a country of on a temporary, regular or long-term basis. Starting in the destination and transit node for migrants from Western departure, transit and 1990s, as a result of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s African countries, such as Senegal, Mali and Liberia. Some 24,687 Sebha destination where migration open-door and visa-free policy7 for most Sub-Saharan migrants started travelling through Chad to reach Libya flows are driven by multiple migrants on the move Africans, the proliferation of conflicts and a number while others, attracted by gold mining opportunities in Libya factors. Gold mining from Libya to Niger were Murzuq of severe droughts in Western Africa and the Horn of Alkufra in northern Chad and northern Chad, begun to stay in these areas. recorded at the Madama Africa, Sub-Saharan nationals began to migrate to Libya FMP. employment opportunities Madama in Libya are among the main in greater numbers. As a result, Libya has been hosting Zouarké drivers for national and large groups of migrants from neighbouring Niger, Egypt, Séguedine Ounianga international migrants in Sudan and Chad. 40,886 Faya Chad. Agadez Niger Since the mid-1990s, migration across the Sahara “ outgoing migrants were Chad Kalaït between the Sahel and the Maghreb has increased and recorded at the Séguedine 8 9 To varying degrees, Chad, Abéché diversified . Individuals from more diverse nationalities FMP going mainly to LibyaNiamey 9,756 have started migrating and migrants’ motivations have (98%) and, to a lesser extent, Libya and Niger have all been broadened to not only include trade and work, but also to Chad (2%). N’Djaména migrants going to Libya from Chad were recorded at the religion, education, entrepreneurship and transit. countries of origin, transit and Faya, Zouarké and Ounianga destination for migration along Kébir FMPs. the trans-Sahelian and trans- This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official 1 OECD (2014). An Atlas of the Saharan-Sahel: Geography, Economics and Security, available Saharan routes. “ endorsement or acceptance by IOM. at https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/an-atlas-of-the-sahara-sahel_9789264222359-en#page1 (accessed December 2020). 11,711 2 Global Initiative (2019). After the Storm: Organized Crime Across the Sahel-Sahara Following Upheaval in Libya and Mal, available at https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/After_the_storm_ GI-TOC.pdf (accessed December 2020). migrants on the move from 3 Clingendael (2018). Multilateral Damage: The Impact of EU Migration Policies on Central Saharan Routes, available at https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2018/multilateral-damage/ (accessed November Libya to Chad were recorded 2020). at the Faya, Zouarké and 4 Altai Consulting (2015). Irregular Migration Between West Africa, North Africa and the Mediterranean, available at http://www.altaiconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Altai_Consulting_Free_ Ounianga Kébir FMPs. Movement_and_Migration_in_West_Africa.pdf (accessed November 2020). 5 Bredeloup, S. and Pliez, O. (2011). The Libyan Migration Corridor, available at https://halshs. archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00585315/document (accessed December 2020). 10 IOM Niger (2020). Migration Trends from, to and within the Niger, available at https://migration. 6 Migration Policy Centre (2013). Libya, available at https://migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/ iom.int/reports/niger-—-migration-trends-and-within-niger-2016—2019 (accessed December 2020). migration_profiles/Libya.pdf (accessed October 2020). 11 FEPS and IAI (2019). Governance and Security in the Sahel: Tackling Mobility, 7 Ibid. Demography and Climate Change, available at https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/ 8 OECD (2014). An Atlas of the Saharan-Sahel: Geography, Economics and Security, available governance%2520and%2520security%2520in%2520the%2520sahel.pdf (accessed November 2020). at https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/an-atlas-of-the-sahara-sahel_9789264222359-en#page57 12 IOM Niger (2020). Migration Trends from, to and within the Niger, available at https://migration. (accessed December 2020). iom.int/reports/niger-—-migration-trends-and-within-niger-2016—2019 (accessed December 2020). 9 Global Initiative (2019). After the Storm: Organized Crime Across the Sahel-Sahara Following 13 Global Initiative (2019). After the Storm: Organized Crime Across the Sahel-Sahara Following Upheaval in Libya and Mal, available at https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/After_the_storm_ Upheaval in Libya and Mal, available at https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/After_the_storm_ GI-TOC.pdf (accessed December 2020). GI-TOC.pdf (accessed December 2020). 6 Displacement Tracking Matrix | IOM 7 August 2019 - September 2020 Mobility in the Chad-Libya-Niger Triangle Securitisation of migration COVID-19 and mobility Beyond human mobility, the pandemic and the loss of Purpose income-generating activities have also affected31 remittance Stricter border restrictions in Niger, starting with the More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly flows. Between Libya