Al-Qa`Ida Versus the Islamic State

v Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Objective • Relevant • Rigorous | July 2016 • Volume 9, Issue 7 FEATURE ARTICLE A VIEW FROM THE CT FOXHOLE Al-Qaìda Versus the Hazim Fouad and Islamic State Behnam Said Analysts, Bremen & Hamburg How the nature of their competition will impact global security Branches of the Office for the Clint Watts Protection of the Constitution FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Deciphering Competition Between al-Qaìda and the Islamic State Editor in Chief Clint Watts Paul Cruickshank INTERVIEW Managing Editor Kristina Hummel 7 A View from the CT Foxhole: Hazim Fouad and Behnam Said, Analysts at the Bremen and Hamburg branches of Germany’s Verfassungsschutz Paul Cruickshank EDITORIAL BOARD Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. ANALYSIS Department Head 11 The Islamic State Threat to Germany: Evidence from the Investigations Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point) Florian Flade Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Price, Ph.D. 15 The Enduring Influence of Anwar al-Awlaki in the Age of the Islamic State Director, CTC Scott Shane 20 The Polarizing Efect of Islamic State Aggression on the Global Jihadist Brian Dodwell Movement Deputy Director, CTC William McCants 24 The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons: A Profile of the Arm’s-Length Proxy of the CONTACT Kurdistan Workers’ Party Combating Terrorism Center Metin Gurcan U.S. Military Academy On July 21 al-Qaìda issued arguably its strongest rebuke ever to the 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Islamic State, warning that a pledge to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi meant West Point, NY 10996 being a “partner in every curse upon the Muslims” including “killing thousands of mujahideen.” Our cover story by Clint Watts outlines how Phone: (845) 938-8495 despite such rhetoric, competition between the two global jihadist powerhouses and their satellite Email: [email protected] groups has moved from a “destructive” phase in which they clashed with each other in Syria in the first half of 2014 to an “escalating” phase resulting in a surge in attacks worldwide. He argues that Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ with the Islamic State weakening at its center, escalating competition will be a strong feature of an increasingly fractured and “multi-polar” jihadist landscape in the future and assesses strategies SUBMISSIONS available to get jihadist groups to turn their guns on each other. William McCants explores how the Islamic State’s aggressive campaign to obliterate all jihadist rivals has seen some jihadist The CTC Sentinel welcomes submissions. groups around the world bandwagon to its cause but has also antagonized powerful local rivals. Please contact us at [email protected]. He argues the Islamic State’s lack of jihadist diplomacy will leave it with few allies if and when the caliphate collapses, potentially accelerating its demise. This issue also focuses on Germany, which this month has endured two attacks by extremists The views expressed in this report are claiming to act on behalf of the Islamic State. Our interview is with Hazim Fouad and Behnam those of the authors and not of the U.S. Said, analysts at the Bremen and Hamburg branches of the Verfassungsschutz, the Federal Ofce for the Protection of the Constitution. Florian Flade outlines how recent investigations have re- Military Academy, the Department of the vealed that Germany is increasingly in the crosshairs of the Islamic State. As we approach the fifth Army, or any other agency of the U.S. anniversary of the death of American terrorist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, Scott Shane examines his Government. enduring appeal in the Islamic State era. Finally, Metin Gurcan profiles the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), a semi-autonomous terrorist “proxy” for the PKK responsible for a string of recent attacks in Turkey’s major cities. Cover: Al-Qaìda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al- Editor in Chief Paul Cruickshank, Baghdadi JULY 2016 CTC SENTINEL 1 Deciphering Competition Between al-Qaìda and the Islamic State By Clint Wats global terror network fractured and transformed into a more viru- Fractures between jihadist groups like al-Qaìda and the lent form. Afliates across the globe splintered from al-Qaìda or Islamic State have ushered in periods of both destructive arose anew, inspired by the Islamic State. Disgruntled al-Qaìda competition and escalating competition. Destructive factions in Algeria, Pakistan, and Yemen formed new Islamic State competition, when terror groups attack each other, wilayat as previously al-Qaìda-pledged afliates Boko Haram and arises predominately from internal splits when terror- Ansar Beit al Maqdisi switched alliances. The appeal of Islamic ist factions occupy the same terrain. It can be amplified State branding has mobilized allegiance or support from more than three dozen afliates and emerging terrorist organizations stretch- by younger extremists seeking a more violent direction ing from Morocco to Indonesia.2 Today, the jihadist landscape is than older members, the presence of foreign fighter con- both larger and more diverse than at any time in world history. Ini- tingents with divergent interests, and the existence of tially, al-Qaìda and Islamic State groups destructively competed. terrorist ‘Pretorian Guards’ lacking a stake in a post-con- Since the declaration of a caliphate, however, competition between flict settlement. On the other hand, escalating competi- al-Qaìda and the Islamic State has shifted from destructive to es- tion, when terror groups attempt to outpace each other calating with both groups’ franchises aggressively pursuing attacks through expansive competition, occurs when competing in an attempt to one up each other. Counterterrorists now sufer terror organizations separate geographically and the the detriments rather than the benefits of al-Qaìda and Islamic perpetration of successful attacks leads to gains in noto- State competition, straining to keep up with the scale and pace of riety and subsequent increases in resources. In the near terrorist attacks globally. term, international counterterrorism coalitions facing The international coalition that is confronting the Islamic State and other terrorist groups must learn how to tamp down this esca- escalating competition from an assortment of al-Qaìda lating competition and return jihadis to pitched battles against one and Islamic State afliates might look to broker an end to another. Those terrorists surviving Syria and Iraq’s battlefields will the Syrian conflict and target shared sources of strength empower the more than three dozen al-Qaìda and Islamic State between competing groups as methods for returning afliates and associated terror groups, each of which seeks ‘glory’ to competition to a destructive context. inspire their ranks and refill their cofers.3 he first month of 2014 brought what initially ap- Destructive Terrorist Competition peared to be a positive development. Al-Qaìda’s Throughout history, terrorist groups and their movements have leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and its local Syrian afliate sufered many periods of destructive competition, predominately Jabhat al-Nusra—rebufed the previous summer by a in the form of internal splits. Splits over strategic direction result- belligerent subordinate then called the Islamic State ing in destructive competition between factions often mask more in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)—hatched eforts along with other Syr- important currents fomenting dissent. Generational divergence is T a ian Islamist groups to attack the defiant and ascendant Abu Bakr a consistent feature during fracturing. al-Baghdadi.1 Throughout the spring of 2014, terrorists lament- In Egypt during the 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood faced of ed and counterterrorists rejoiced as open fighting between once- against younger, more violent jihadist groups. Similarly, Algeria aligned jihadis brought destructive competition to the landscape, in the 1990s witnessed the emergence of the FIS (Islamic Salva- a blessing for Western countries who had no viable or palatable tion Front) in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood. FIS leaders method to counter the rising jihadist tide in Syria. were then assassinated in mid-1993 by the more junior and vio- Tides shifted again by the summer of 2014, however, when ISIS lent Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which ultimately declared war proved victorious over al-Qaìda, making a run across the Iraqi on the FIS and Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) and killed hundreds desert and capturing town after town. In June 2014, ISIS took Mo- of Islamists.4 Internal fractures and splintering among Palestinian sul, declared a caliphate, and rebranded itself as the Islamic State. extremists, whether the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Within months, significant parts of the once-vaunted al-Qaìda Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, or Fatah, show a persistent trend Clint Watts is a Robert A. Fox Fellow at the Foreign Policy Re- search Institute and a senior fellow at the Center for Cyber and a Martin Marty and Scott Appleby noted this as a persistent trend in extremist breakups where Islamist movements stall and then become Homeland Security at George Washington University. He previ- challenged by younger upstarts. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, ously served as the Executive Ofcer at the Combating Terrorism Accounting For Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements, Center. Follow @selectedwisdom (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2004), pp. 364-366. 2 CTC SENTINEL JULY 2016 WATTS of the young breaking away from their older forefathers. In all of “When defeats outnumber victories these cases, younger extremists—detecting a pause, moderation, or shortcomings of the older generation—believe a new strategic di- and objectives appear unatainable, rection incorporating greater violence will bring about the ultimate fractures routinely form between victory.5 Al-Qaìda and the Islamic State’s modern global jihad fol- lows a similar pattern, where each generation of foreign fighters has local and foreign fighters. Locals with splintered from their forefathers and become increasingly violent a post-conflict stake in the region and aggressive.

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