Elections and Governance Review

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Dear Readers:

On the day the United States went to the polls and the whole world was holding its breath to see if an African American could become the next President, a group of Chinese officials gathered together in a small meeting room in the cavernous Great Hall of the People. Their purpose was to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the promulgation of the Organic Law of Vil- lager Committees of the People’s of China. It is this law that made direct village committee elections mandatory in China. The same law also raised hope that China’s long-overdue de- mocratization through grassroots elections would eventually move from the village level up- wards to higher echelons of government. The media report of the event was entitled “Ten Years of Villager Self-government: 900 Million Chinese Farmers’ Real Democratic Exer- cise”.

According to this report, as of December 2007, there were 610,000 villager committees in a nation where 2.41 million members were directly elected by the voters. Mr. Xueju, Minis- ter of Civil Affairs, who guides and supervises this largest election in the world, declared that in the past 10 years there were three great accomplishments. First of all, provincial govern- ments have supplemented the national law with provincial ordinances guaranteeing farmers’ democratic rights. Secondly, under the strong leadership of village party branches, three rounds of elections were held and 85% of the villager committees have set up villager repre- sentative assemblies. Thirdly, village democracy has established a solid foundation for the political development of Chinese characteristics delineated by the 17th National Congress of the . This report also made public that the revision of the Organic Law is now being listed into the five-year legislative agenda of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.

No prominent leader from the Chinese Communist Party or the government appeared at this occasion and the rhetoric from both Minister Li Xueju and the media seemed to be drastically subdued from what was said about this so-called silent revolution back in 1998 when the provisional Organic Law became official. It was more hushed even than the atten- tion it received in 1987 when Peng Zhen, the then chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, tried to convince a suspicious Standing Committee to adopt the Organic Law on a provisional basis. What is the current status of village elections in Chi- na? Are they still meaningful? Are they still a seminar through which a new culture of dem- ocratic procedures can be introduced into a system that does not posess anything remotely similar to “one man, one vote”? Do Chinese leaders and the Chinese elite still believe in elec- tions as a way to launch political reform, reinvent the CCP’s legitimacy, curtail corruption and introduce a new governance of choice and accountability?

These are the questions this first issue of the China Elections and Governance Review is designed to answer. We welcome contributions from our readers for the next issue of this online re- port, which will be on China’s recent experiments concerning elections at higher levels. Please send submissions no later than March 2009 to [email protected].

Yawei Liu Director, China Program. The Carter Center

China Elections and Governance Review Issue 1 | February 2009

Are Village Elections Leading to Democracy?

By Yawei Liu

n 1988, China began allowing villagers is so young, this paper will focus more on to elect their leaders in an experiment the years from November 1998 when the I that democracy advocates hoped Organic Law was amended to September would eventually lead to more pluralism 2005 when Premier Wen Jiabao repeated throughout the political system. Today, Peng Zhen’s famous remarks to visiting the Communist Party still is in firm com- foreign dignitaries: when villagers learned mand of the high ground and villages are how to manage the village affairs they still holding elections. So, what has the would then try to manage the township experiment accomplished? affairs.

This paper will offer an assessment, first Villager self-government: Empower- looking at the various discourses on vil- ment or Emasculation? lager self-government and trying to de- termine if there is a consensus on the sig- When the NPC was debating the Organic nificance of this undertaking. It will then Law, Peng Zhen, chairman of its Standing examine how this political act is trans- Committee, remarked that introducing forming the political language, culture and villager self-government was in line with landscape in China and aim to decide if the Chinese Communist Party’s goal of villager self-government indeed consti- making common people the masters of tutes an opening crucial for China’s long their own affairs. It was a very effective overdue political reform. Thirdly, it will way to conduct a democracy seminar for dwell on the questions of 1) what is de- the peasants. When they learned how to mocracy, 2) what is democracy of Chinese govern their own affairs, they would then characteristics, and 3) will the current vil- try to learn how to manage the township lage democracy lead to a fundamental and county affairs. In 1989, there was a transformation from one of choice and coordinated effort to discredit the Organic accountability at the lowest rung and to Law and to label it as a sinister plot de- one of choice and accountability at each rived from the Western ideas of democra- and every level secured by institutions, not tization. Peng Zhen and his supporters by moral coercion and ideological purifi- withstood the assault and stuck firm to cation. the need of rule of law and said that a way must be found to allow peasants to hold While it is hard to separate the past, local officials accountable. With almost a present and future of a development that decade-long of persistent effort by the

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officials of the civil affairs apparatus, the tions for peasants’ access to education, Organic Law was finally amended signifi- healthcare and wealth. cantly and adopted officially. Another eight years have passed and what is the This shift of emphasis on the top is indic- current discourse on villager self- ative of which arguments among the government? watchers of villager self-government have found more responsive ears among the There seems to be little change among the national leaders. As the current divergent top leadership of the Chinese Communist assessments of reform and opening up, Party (CCP) in their view of the nature of the views of villager self-government are villager self-government although there is also sharply divisive. There are those who a detectable shift of emphasis and priori- perceive villager self-government as a mi- ty. Jiang Zeming called villager self- racle prescription to the chronic diseases government one of the three crucial re- of the Chinese countryside and the step- forms in China’s coun- ping-stone to the eventual modernization tryside, as important as and democratization of China. For those We see a pattern of the beginning of the who are less friendly to villager self- devaluating rural household responsibility government, they see the alarming ree- system and the launch of mergence of the clans, the susceptibility democracy and ac- village and town enter- by the broad masses of peasants to small celerating prag- prises. In the political materialistic incentives and indirect anti- matic measures reports of both the 15th government appeals, and the interruption and 16th CCP National of the development of village enterprises. Congresses, Jiang identi- fied villager self- Those who are opposed to the expansion government as the point of breakthrough of villager self-government have been for China’s political reform. Since the aided by two factors: 1) the lack of linkage ushering of the Hu-Wen New Deal in late between the growth of village wealth and 2002, growing attention was given to the the institutionalization of village democra- solution of economic woes of the pea- cy, the increasing misery among tens of sants and social instability in the country- millions of Chinese peasants and the side. From the campaign to promote growing sense that they are actually vic- open administration of village affairs to tims of the economic reform that has the elimination of taxes and fees, from the made China such an integral part of the emphasis on increasing the income of the world economy, and 2) the CCP’s concern peasants to the call to build a new socialist that popular choice and strict accountabil- countryside, we see a pattern of devaluat- ity could undermine the Party’s legitimacy ing rural democracy and accelerating and its insistence on being the paramount pragmatic measures to create better condi- decision-maker on all aspects of rural life.

Dr. Yawei Liu is the Director of the China Program at The Carter Center. Dr. Liu has written numerous articles on China's political developments and grassroots democracy and is the editor of the China Elections and Governance Web site.

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This dichotomy of different perceptions dates were the most cost-efficient way of of villager self-government has been in providing “guidance” have led the resi- existence when the debate on what to do dents there to overcome the initial suspi- with the peasants in the wake of the aboli- cion if their votes would make a differ- tion of the communes in the early ence and begin to play the political game 1980s. The discussion on whether villager more and more seriously. self-government is empowering the rural residents or emasculating the Party’s lea- Political scientists who study this new ru- dership and on whether it will make pea- ral political development began to paint a sants feel happier or create obstacles for very rosy picture of this undertaking and economic development will continue in have even hatched a new field of the foreseeable future and have a signifi- study. They call villager self-government cant impact on the sustainability of villag- a “silent revolution” that will lead to the er self-government. destruction of old feudalistic heritage and the birth of new civic virtues and political activism; they feel villager self-government is the beginning of a new wave of the en- circlement of the urban centers by the vast countryside; and they wonder if the least informed and educated group of the Chinese were given the right to directly elect those who make decisions for them- selves, the better prepared residents in the cities should be offered more.

The echoes of the Chinese scholars have not only reverberated in the capitals and classrooms of European countries and the United States but also been heard by the top leaders inside the Forbidden City. This new language has not only crept into the speeches of the China watchers in the West but also been melded into the political jargon of the Chinese leaders. While the image-makers of China have achieved the goal of using The renewal of the direct election of local villager self-government to prove the nas- people’s congress deputies in 1978 and cent rise of a political reform in China, the particularly the introduction of the direct praise of it by the top Chinese leaders in election of village committees in 1988 1998 at the 15th CCP National Congress have introduced a new sense of political led to the unprecedented experiment of a ownership and a new awareness of what direct election of a township magistrate in constitutes political legitimacy. Real com- Buyun, . petition at the village level in places where local officials felt direct nomination of If we use Robert Dahl’s two attributes of candidates and direct election of village democracy, 1) contestation or compilation committee members with multiple candi- and 2) participation or inclusion, to meas-

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ure up villager self-government, it seems Thirdly, direct village elections, its compe- we may call it a curtailed democracy in a titiveness and its real impact on political restricted geographical area that is always legitimacy, governance and the initiatives subject to outside forces with no capacity of those who run and get elected by the to resist. Villager self-government also ordinary voters is a reminder to those who seems to possess the feature of both in- are contemplating political reform in Chi- ternal and external efficacy. But, if we use na that real reform does not have to be other criteria to determine if villager self- wholesale adoption of the Western system government is democracy with other un- of multiple political parties and parliamen- iversally recognized and accepted compo- tary supremacy. The Chinese system on nents, the answer becomes more uncer- the paper is sufficient if the Party super- tain and even doubtful. structure does not interfere with direct elections of township and county people’s But, in the context of Chinese political congress deputies and indirect elections of system, both ancient and present, villager local officials such as township and coun- self-government can be described as mea- ty magistrates by the directly elected ningful democracy with Chinese characte- people’s deputies. ristics, or at least, it is an embryonic form of a unique democratic practice that is Lastly, it appears villager self-government different from other forms of democra- is conducive to the firming of the Party’s cy. First, it calls citizens’ attention to the legitimacy and likeability in the country- serious problem of the Chinese political side. This may reduce the fear that is con- system, i.e. the justice of the systemic de- stantly on the lips of Chinese officials: al- sign and the injustice of procedures. This lowing the lowly common Chinese people injustice is caused by the woeful lack of to engage in democratic elections and de- executable procedures in choice and ac- cision-making at higher levels will lead to countability matters and the gross mani- chaos and eventually break the back of the pulation of those procedures that are on Party. the paper.

Second, villager self-government is oper- ating in the context of a Chinese system Also by Dr. Yawei Liu whose center of gravity is located with the Party. The fact that a significant number Political reform in China: a Q&A with of Party officials feel the cost of gover- Yawei Liu nance is so much lower when the right to choose their immediate leaders and make http://www.cartercenter.org/news/current_qa/c decisions on things of significant impact hina.html on their life is given to the peasants may lead to a reorientation of the belief that the Party always knows better and makes wiser decisions. In fact, practice of villag- er self-government has already trickled upwards and led to many trials of choice and accountability at higher levels.

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Democracy Outmaneuvered: Village Self-Governance in Yunnan Province A Case Study by Jens Kolhammar

n an area of China where the village • A number of indications from differ- self-governance reform has been the ent sources suggested that the election least implemented, Yunnan province of the chair had not been conducted I in a fair manner. Reports on the re- is a region where many villagers seem un- quirements for candidates up for aware of the responsibilities of their vil- nominations, electing officials, and lage committee (VC). This study examines official duties were skewed to party a VC in Yunnan province that, at the time members’ advantages. when the fieldwork was conducted, had held only one election. The quality of the The local party branch and the ruling VC is a reflection of the degree of village members of the VC used feigned compliance, self governance as well as a study of a manner of enforcing laws in name only whether VC election laws are sufficiently to circumvent new legislation to remain in established. power. Issues concerning the VC and its election seemed superficial – the confus- The study found several indications that ing nomination procedure, the scant the village election and village committee number of VC meetings, and the power- elections were far from fair and democrat- less lower VC members – all enforce that ic. The quality of village elections was as- the power holders were skilled in the ma- sessed as "inconsistent" and a greater ef- nipulating of within the institution for the fort should be done to improve the self- benefit of their own interests. Those in governance of the Chinese countryside. power in the VCs preside over not only The below exemplifies the aforemen- their formal duties; in addition, they take tioned "inconsistencies": on informal duties not specifically given to them by law without scrutiny from the • In an interview with the chair of the levels of higher Chinese government. Al- VC, it became apparent that the chair though many villagers were interested in and the vice chair were the only in- fluential members out of the five the process of electing officials, no one, members sitting on the committee. including the already elected officials • None of the members of the VC, with knew of the precise rights that organic law the exception of the chair and vice guaranteed. This lack of transparency al- chair, knew the express duties of their lowed for local officials to remain in con- positions. trol. Consequently, the equalization of • Lack of a clear nomination process had the government at the township power that the village self-governance level giving one explanation of proce- reform could have brought forth did not dures while the chair of the VC gave materialize in any substantial degree in the another. villages that they were supposed to reform.

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Research has revealed that when VC elec- tions slowly, for there are still many op- tions are undemocratic and do not bring ponents to the VC election law. Reaching any real effects, villagers become uninte- for too much, too soon could jeopardize rested in these elections. Moreover, the the whole undertaking of villager self- analysis of the VC in the villages within governance. Contrastingly, a watered- the study illuminates that there are a down organic law might only, as in the number of obstacles in the way for ge- case of the first election in the villages un- nuine village self-governance which need der study, create elections that are only for to be considered. The organic law itself the sake of appearance. These cases will creates by outlining that the VC is under continue to enforce to villagers that elec- the rule of the party, and leaving out elec- tions have no practical use, thus under- tion procedures to be specified and car- mining the original idea of self- ried through at the discretion of the local governance. provinces or, as discovered in this study, by the local elite on the Village dwellers are seen as village level. Some of these Reaching for too the important factors that issues could be resolved, as much, too soon could strengthen the reform of self governance in the Chi- discussed above, by clearly jeopardize the whole formulating the procedure nese countryside. As long on how the candidates undertaking of villag- as no concrete values can should be nominated, how er self-governance be demonstrated to the vil- and by whom the votes lagers, they will not be in- should be counted, how fluential in bringing forth the VC meetings should be conducted, organic law. This essay argues that in- and by removing the article that states that creased knowledge of organic law and a the VC is under the rule of the party. presentation of the differences in opinion However, a shift in power away from the with the Chinese state would give villagers corrupt party leaders towards villagers a vested interest in the elections as they may still be able to materialize. Since its will become more familiar with its practic- inception, the reform law has led elections al use. Research is lacking in how know- in numerous locations in the Chinese ledge can be spread in places where countryside where old corrupt cadres have rightful resistance has materialized and in been voted out of office as well provoking places where the old disliked regime has instances where unfair elections have been managed to stay in power. Researchers revoked. Time itself could perhaps work must focus on how the upper-echelons of in favour of more democratic VC elec- the Chinese state, grant makers and non- tions. governmental organizations could work to give villagers insight into their new rights These changes may be far in the future yet, given by organic law. as the Ministry of Civil Affairs has pur- posely taken the reform of village elec-

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Democracy with Chinese Characteristics: A New Look at Village Elections in China

By Xinsong Wang

hile China has continually im- Understanding Village Elections pressed the world with its flourishing economy, it has yet China has approximately 610,000 Villager W Committees (VCs). Each VC is composed to show any sign of political liberalization. Although political experiments were of three to seven members. VCs are not tested on the local level, none of them an independent level of state administra- were sustained or applied to a large geo- tion, instead assisting township govern- graphic area. Perhaps the only prominent ments to implement state and political reform in post-Mao China that local policies while also han- has been formally institutionalized is the dling village level affairs such as the allocation of land, econom- *The Carter Center village elections. In the 1980s, confronted and the Ministry of by the political vacuum after the collapse ic policy, provision of public Civil of Affairs of of the people’s commune system and wor- goods, and resolution of family China sponsored a conflicts. nationwide survey on ried by the increased tension between pea- villager self- sants and local cadres, the Chinese Com- government in 2005. Villager Representatives (VRs) The survey was im- munist Party established the autonomous are selected by local voters at plemented by the Villager Committees (VCs) in rural areas the villager small group (cunmin Sociology Institute of and permitted peasants to elect VC mem- the China Academy xiaozu) meetings or by house- of Social Sciences and bers every three years. Now, after 20 years hold representatives. The num- the Center for of practice, village elections are en- ber of VRs selected depends on Policy Research. The trenched in rural political dynamics and survey sample cov- the size of a village. Typically ered 3,498 peasants in significantly influence the daily lives of every 5 to 15 households have 27 provinces. Chinese peasants. Based on the data from one VR. a nationwide survey* and this author’s field research, this article will assess the How are elected officials to be current state of village elections and dis- held accountable and respon- cuss the emerging issues of democratic sive? This question became relevant in the governance in today’s rural China. mid-1990s when corruption and other

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illicit acts were seen among some elected tice, these principles are not consistently village leaders, exacerbating the already followed. According to our survey, in 18% tense relations between cadres and pea- of the sampled villages, electoral commis- sants. In the late 1990s, the Chinese gov- sions were selected by voters themselves ernment called for additional oversight as opposed to being appointed by incum- institutions in rural China to constrain the bent village cadres or upper authorities. elected VC cadres. The Village Represen- In 35% of the villages, voters were al- tation Assembly (VRA) and Democratic lowed to freely nominate candidates. 69% Financial Management Team (DFMT) are of the villages followed the requirement in two such self-governing agencies. the Organic Law to allow for multiple candidates for VC chairs. The secret ballot Research Results and Analysis booth, another requirement in the Organ- Villager Committee Elections ic Law, was only used in 40% of villages. Finally, in 70% of the villages, ballots were According to the statistics of the Ministry counted publicly as opposed to being of Civil Affairs (MCA) of China, which closed-door to voters. supervises the village-level self- government, the first province to hold Village elections have become increasingly province-wide village elections was Fujian standardized compared with earlier statis- in 1982. By 2006, nine rounds of elections tics and our own observations of previous had been held in the province. The last elections. Our results indicate that core province to start elections was Yunnan in features of a free and fair election such as 2001, and to date has held three rounds of multiple candidates and open ballot elections. Our survey indicates that, by the counting have been widely practiced. year 2005, 98% of villages in China had However, the low percentage rate of conducted at least one election. complete adherence to policy suggests that there is still room for improvement in Since there is no national electoral law on many of these criteria. VC elections, every province produced its own electoral rules based on the basic Our survey showed a turnout rate of 63%. principles defined by the Organic Law. This number is lower than that in earlier This measure requires open nomination, surveys due to an increase in the number multiple candidates, anonymous voting, of migrant workers who remain registered use of secret ballot booths, public tallying, in their villages despite working in cities. public announcement of results, and pro- Among the migrant workers in our sample, hibition of election bribery and forceful 81% said they did not vote in the latest voting. Our survey results suggest in prac- village election, whereas only 24% of rural

Dr. Xinsong Wang is a lecturer of Political Science at Oglethorpe University, and is the primary investigator of the Carter Center-Ministry of Civil Affairs nationwide survey.

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respondents reported not voting. education levels are less likely to vote than less educated peasants. This result mirrors The survey indicates that turnout was trends in other studies of Chinese voter higher among males than among females: turnout (Figure 2). The result holds true 67% of male villagers voted in the last when other conditions such as individual election compared to 60% of females. wealth and level of election’s competitive- Moreover, between the age of 18 and 55, ness are held constant. older male and female peasants were more likely to vote than younger peasants. Fe- According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs male turnout rate in the two oldest age (MCA), the education level of village ca- groups was lower than their younger Figure 2 Education and Voter Turnout counterparts because older females be-

came less interested in politics or because 0.7 of their poor physical conditions. Male 0.65 turnout rate was slightly higher in older 0.6 age groups (Figure 1). As many young 0.55 0.5 people are looking outside for economic 0.45 opportunities or have left the countryside, Voter Turnout 0.4 0.35 Figure 1 Age and Voter Turnout 0.3 l l te o o l n a o o oo io er h h h at it sc c c c ll s s u I y le h d 0.9 ar d g e t d i h en i H ig m M H le 0.8 E Education Level

t 0.7

Male 0.6 dres has gradually increased, with a Female marked improvement in the number of Voter Turnou Voter 0.5 VC chairs with associate degrees or higher. 0.4 Our survey shows that the majority (85%) of VC chairs have completed middle or 0.3 18-25 26-35 35-45 46-55 56-65 66-89 high school, with 10% having completed Age Group an associate degree or more. The percen- older peasants became the center pillar of tages of VC chairs with associates or more village politics. Since they have higher are the highest in Beijing, and Jiangsu stakes in village elections, they are more - 50%, 50% and 32% respectively. In likely to vote than younger peasants. This comparison, about 13% of VPB secreta- is further proved by the fact that 88% of ries had associate degrees or higher and the elected VC chairs are between 36 and 84% had completed either middle or high 56 years old. school education.

Whereas more educated voters are more The Organic Law requires that women likely to vote in Western societies, in Chi- should be given a “proper” number of nese countryside, peasants with higher seats in VC, but the political arena re-

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mains male-dominated, with only 2% of cadres and demanding an explanation. the sample villages having a female chair Should they decide that the dinner was and 44% having no women on the com- unnecessary, they may decline to impress mittee. Similarly, only about 4% of VPB the DFMT’s seal. Since the township gov- secretaries are females and only 38% of ernment can check village accounts regu- VPBs have one or more female members. larly and villagers also can inspect public accounts at any time, an unsigned monthly Examining Oversight Agencies ledger book would not only reflect poorly Both the Organic Law and the CCP’s na- on the cadres, but also may cost them tional circular require that VC and VPB their jobs. With DFMT checking and consult with and obtain approval from the monitoring public expenditures regularly, VRA before any decisions on substantial cadres are less likely to engage in abusive issues are made. In many villages, any spending or appropriating public money. public expense over 5,000 yuan ($694.44) However, DFMTs are flawed due to the needs to be approved in advance by the fact that peasants have little control over VRA. In 15% of the surveyed villages, the them. For example, although 70% of the VRA had ever vetoed VC proposals. Due villages in the survey had DFMTs, 74% of to the fact that VRs are unpaid, the moti- the interviewed peasants said that they did vation for fulfilling their jobs is not always not know anything about the village fi- high. In fact, in order to encourage VRs to nancial conditions. The power of DFMT 1 attend meetings , some VCs pay each VR is further foiled by its internal conflicts. 5-20 yuan ($0.70-$2.78) per meeting. Also, There is not a set procedure to resolve since there is little supervision by fellow member disagreement on financial inspec- villagers, VRs have the potential to be co- tion results. Voting is a seemingly legiti- opted by village cadres to approve budget mate solution but not always effective and or bills that are against the peasants’ inter- fair, especially since members of the ests. DFMT could be bought out by village The major task of the DFMT is to make cadres. An extremely indigenous resolu- sure that public money is not misused or tion was seen in a mountainous village in embezzled by VC and VPB cadres. A Guizhou, in which the DFMT seal was DFMT consists of five members who are cut into five pieces. Each DFMT mem- selected among VRs. The DFMT mem- bers held one piece and, when they agree bers meet once a month to go through the on financial inspection results, they would public expenditure and make judgment on piece together the seal and authorize their 2 whether any line items are reasonable and approval . Since each DFMT member permissible. They can be as meticulous as held effective veto power, the “Five Piece pinpointing a dinner bill paid by village Seal” method could prevent the circums-

1 Any resolution to be passed at VRA meetings has to be 2 Wang Yuanbai, Wang Yongquan and Wang Bin, “yimei approved by at least half of VRs. qite de yinzhang – jinping xian guiye cun minzhu licai xiaoji” Guizhou Daily, November 3, 2007.

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tance in which some DFMT members’ During my field research, I found two opinions might be hijacked by others’ main patterns of VC-VPB relationship through voting or persuasion. But it also leading to opposite village governance may risk setting a village in paralysis if the conditions. The first pattern was a DFMT members never reach an agree- “Strong-Strong” combination. When both ment. A more legitimate solution is to ex- the VC chair and VPB secretary had pand the voting body to the VRA and strong personalities, family background, give all VRs the power to vote on contro- kinship support, economic resources and versial issues. external relations, chances are that certain degree of disorderliness was underway or Exploring Villager Committee/Village Party a crisis of such was looming. The stable Branch Interactions and peaceful villages I saw were all go- The relationship between VC and VPB verned by a “Strong-Weak” combination has long determined the quality of village model. The strong person could be either governance. The Organic Law is ambiva- the VPB secretary or the VC chair. As lent by stating that “the grassroots organi- long as one of the position holders was zation of the CCP”, referring to the VPB, “weak”, in the sense that he had a mild should take “the leadership and center personality, had less or no kinship support, role” in village management, but at the and had no massive personal economic same time needs to “support and guaran- resources or external (personal tee villagers to adopt self-government and connections) resources, the “stronger” exercise democratic rights”. In reality, it is person would take advantage of the hard for a democratically elected commit- “weaker” person by having more deci- tee to get along with a branch nominated sion-making power and expecting fewer by the upper-level party committee and obstacles from the “weaker”. In this sce- approved only by party members in the nario, the “weaker” person basically acted village. As a result of fighting between VC as an assistant to the “stronger” one under and VPB over power, many villages are an intended or unintended agreement of plunged in paralyzed governance condi- division of labor. Often the “stronger” tions. Overall, the survey data show that person took care of “foreign relations”, VPB secretaries still held a more impor- dealing with upper-level governments, tant position than VC chairs. When asked bargaining for more funds, and develop- “who do you think are the most powerful ing relations with other money-givers. On and trustworthy people in your village”, “domestic” issues, the “stronger” person 59% of the respondents chose “VPB Sec- made decisions only but let the “weaker” retary”, but only 12% of them made “VC implement them. In some villages, the Chair” their first choice3. “stronger” person took control of every- thing with the “weaker” being a figure- head. Such a model of compromise and cooperation proved to be beneficial to 3 These respondents were from the villages in which the positions of VC Chair and VPB Secretary were held by villagers because it reduced the likelihood different persons.

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of leadership conflicts and the mess they Challenges of Village Democracy would cause to the villages. Widespread Bribery In order to curtail the negative effects of the VC-VPB duel, a “two-ballot system” Although village elections are being prac- (liangpiao zhi) has been tried in some places. ticed in a more standardized way than be- The system requires that the VPB candi- fore, they face some chronic and widely dates pass the majority “votes of trust” existing problems such as election bribery. (xinren piao) cast by all voters before they Vote buying has been so common that it are eligible to be voted by CCP members. has become the norm in some village elec- The “two-ballot system” seemed to in- tions. During my interviews, I could tell crease the legitimacy of the VPB members; from the peasants’ matter-of-fact tone however, it did not resolve the conflicts that it was not unusual that candidate sent between the VPB and VC. A more effec- gifts, gave money, and provided free tive solution is called “yijian tiao”, meaning meals to voters before elections. that the positions of VPB secretary and In general, two types of election bribery VC chair are undertaken by one person. were commonly seen. The first was de facto In some villages, the VPB secretary was bribery before elections. In some cases, nominated as a candidate and then elected the candidates’ acolytes stopped by each as the VC chair. In others, an elected VC household, dropped the bribe (such as chair was nominated by the upper party cigarettes, liquors, or hard cash), and committee to be VPB secretary and then asked a verbal guarantee from the voters approved by party members. By any of to vote for the candidates. these means, the VPB and VC were unit- In others, the candidates ed to avoid their conflicts. The survey da- designated a restaurant in Related reading: Chinese ta show that 24% of the sampled villages the nearby town and in- official admits bribery increasing at grassroots had yijian tiao and 15% of the sampled vil- vited all voters to go for a lages had the same people on both the VC elections free meal. In this type of http://www.chinaelectio and the VPB. Yijian tiao has been sus- bribery, the candidates ns.net/newsinfo.asp?new pected of causing more corruption and could not guarantee that sid=18767 authoritarian rule in the villages because the bribe-takers cast the power is monopolized and dominated by right votes. In fact, some the single leader. This was seen in some voters still voted for their rare cases but there has not been studies favored choice despite taking bribe from based on a large number of cases to con- the other candidate. In a rare case in sub- firm this speculation. Our survey data do urban Beijing covered by the mainstream not show a significant association between Chinese news media, the candidates asked yijian tiao and the quality of governance. In their assistants to buy voter ID cards from any case, a more explicit and detailed voters so that, on the election day, they regulation needs to be installed by the could use these ID cards to get ballots and Chinese government to fix the relation- ship between VCs and VPBs.

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cast proxy votes (weituo toupiao) 4 . The God of Guan that they must not use bri- competition for voter ID cards became so bery as a means to compete for votes. Lo- intense that some voters raised the price cal news reporters were attracted by the of their voter cards. One voter put up a fact that local religious belief was tangled note on his door, “600 yuan ($83.33) for with the election and went for a news sto- my voter ID card. Firm Price!”5 ry. They were surprised to find that the villagers were very unhappy about the The candidates who were engaged in the candidates’ oath because they would lose first type of election bribery risked violat- several hundred RMB in bribery money. ing the Organic Law and being sued. Thus “That’s a loss of more than a thousand many have changed their strategy by giv- yuan for my family!”6 ing money or gifts to the loyal voters after the election. They make promises to the The rampant act of bribery in village elec- voters in their campaigns but there is no tions prompts the consideration of moti- real act of bribery before the election. The vations behind such acts. Why would a Organic Law does not de- candidate spend two mil- fine what election bribery is lion yuan to be a VC chair A detailed legal code and whether the second (an infamous vote buying type of irregular electoral on election bribery case in Laojiaotou village in behavior is classified as bri- and the correspond- covered by Fazhi bery. In sum, a detailed legal ing punishment is Xinwen or Legal News, Is- code on election bribery missing in China. sue 3, 2003)? An imme- and the corresponding pu- diate answer from the nishment is missing in Chi- peasants I interviewed was, na. “They will earn it back!” However, being a VC chair is not a high paying job. The A more serious concern is that vote buy- survey indicates that the average monthly ing has become so rampant that many salary of a VC chair was 357 yuan ($50), peasants started to take it for granted. In far below the national average. Therefore, fact, some peasants use village elections as the value of being a VC extends beyond an opportunity to earn extra cash, and the salary. For a peasant who has family they are even annoyed if bribes are not business, being VC chair means that he available. During an election in a Fujian could possibly make regulations that are village, both VC chair candidates went to favorable to his business by imposing the village temple and vowed before the fewer fees if his business takes up the vil- lage’s public land. Moreover, he would 4 The local electoral rule regulates that each voter can cast proxy votes for three other voters who cannot make have more opportunities to interact with it to the election. The voter needs to bring the voter ID town and even county government offi- cards of those who cannot attend the election to receive ballots from the election workers. cials, which is beneficial for developing

5 Li Liqiang, “cunli huanjie xuanju qian youren laishou xuan- minzheng” (Some Came to Buy Vote ID Cards before the 6 Li Mo, “zhi huixuan, fa budi baishen” (Fighting Vote Village Election), Xin Jing Bao or The Beijing News, June Buying, Law is Less Effective than God), Xiaokang or 23, 2007. The Well-off, March 16, 2007.

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business ties, obtaining external funding, tract to himself, the VC chair of Laojiaotou or asking for beneficial government poli- village, who spent two million yuan to win, cies. If a village is near an expanding ur- said, “It’s a matter of whether the VRA ban center, being VC chair means han- will approve it.” It is not difficult to im- dling a huge amount of compensation for agine that a person who was successful in the sold farmland and working on new buying out hundreds of voters could also development projects in the village, which co-opt a dozen villager representa- creates opportunities to receive kickbacks tives. from the contractors. In a coal-rich village, being VC chair means taking control of the village-owned coal mine and pocket- ing millions of income every year. For or- dinary villagers who have no control of the village cadres, taking cash for their ballots seems to be a rational choice.

Knowing that there are so many means for village cadres to seek personal gains with public power, one may wonder what the VRA and DMFT are doing. Are they Legal Moderation not supposed to restrain the predatory The issue of rampant vote buying illu- and corrupt behavior of elected officials? strates the lack of adequate legal protec- On the one hand, one should note that tion in the village election process. Al- not all the means through which village though the electoral and oversight institu- cadres aggrandize personal interests nec- tions have been established in rural China essarily involve acts that compromise vil- for a long time, a law that enforces the lagers’ interests. For example, if a VC running of these institutions has yet to be chair takes advantage of the public posi- put into place. Particularly, there is not tion to develop a personal business rela- detailed regulation with regard to punish- tionship with the local governments, it is ment of illicit electoral acts such as bribery, not necessarily bad for villagers. In fact, violation of electoral rules, and other elec- villagers like this kind of cadre. If a cadre toral disputes, or effective legal proce- has the capacity of developing external dures to resolve electoral disputes. The relations, he might be able to obtain more Organic Law holds that villagers could funding from the local governments for resort to local people’s congresses or civil village public projects. On the other hand, affair offices for resolution of illegal or the oversight institutions could completely controversial election issues. However, fail and could even be utilized by cadres to these offices do not have judiciary power legitimize their selfish behavior. For ex- and are very limited with enforceable reso- ample, when asked whether he would re- lutions. Part of the criminal law in China move the current mining contractor of the regulates illicit acts in elections of people’s village-owned coal mine and give the con-

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congresses but not in village elections. We quences. In order to address this problem, have seen many cases in which local local governments have adopted some courts refused to accept cases involving innovative policies. For example, in Ruian, irregular electoral behavior. As a result, a city in Zhejiang, the VC candidates are village conflicts were exacerbated and required to sign a responsibility agreement chaos deepened. before elections. The agreement dictates that, if an elected cadre causes massive Legal regulation on cadres’ governing be- damage to the village’s interests during his havior also needs to be complemented. term, he is required to undertake the civil Although the oversight agencies can partly responsibility and compensate the loss out check and balance the power of the of his own pocket. This local rule is par- elected cadres, there is very little means ticularly relevant to Ruian’s situation be- for the agencies and villagers to punish cause the city’s countryside has shrunk the cadres if villagers’ interests are sub- due to urbanization and every nearby vil- stantially lost due to their abusive acts. lage has been working on selling village Impeaching the elected cadres is men- farmland, distributing compensation, re- tioned in the Organic Law but, in reality, novating the old village buildings and de- is very hard to carry out due to the defi- veloping new housing projects. These ciency of collective action and the stum- projects can be so lucrative that village bling blocks erected by the power holders. cadres dive for personal profits at the ex- An outstanding issue lies in the fact that pense of the villagers’ interests. there is a legal and administrative vacuum Conclusion in regulating the non-party cadres. Party members have to observe the CCP rules Seen from both government reports and or are subjective to punishment by the scholarly studies, it is safe to say that vil- CCP Discipline Inspection Committee. lage election has taken root in rural China Non-party members, however, are not after 20 years of development. Whereas a covered by such rules. Furthermore, since few years ago we read news reports about village committees are self-governments village election being denied by township and not a level of state administration, governments, today village elections are non-party village cadres do not fall into held in China’s countryside regularly. the regulation of the Supervision Depart- From the institutional perspective, the ment (jiancha bumen), which checks the ill Chinese government has spared no efforts behavior of government officials. There- to protect peasants’ rights, better off pea- fore, unless the non-party cadres commit sants’ lives and maintain rural stability by crimes (then they may be prosecuted and launching various institutional reforms. In trialed through legal procedures), they can addition to the fact that village elections avoid punishment. Unfortunately, they are practiced in a more standardized way, may damage a village’s interests by other other institutional requirements such as actions, like an erroneous public project VRA’s approval on substantial village af- decision, that hold no punitive conse- fairs, DFMT’s regular check of village fi-

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nancial transactions, regular VC work re- Background reading: ports to villagers, and frequent use of History and Analysis of the Chi- public board to disclose village manage- ment information, were all pushed for- nese Organic Law of the Villagers ward by the government to hold elected Committees cadres accountable. By Jens Kolhammar At the same time, due to insufficient legal protection, these institutions have suf- fered from some degrees of dysfunction.

For example, election bribery has seriously Historical background affected the fairness of village elections.

Rampant vote buying behavior in many he development of the 1987 Or- places of rural China has caused voters to ganic Law governing village elec- be indifferent to village elections. Some tions in China was motivated by peasants have even accepted election bri- T fear among Chinese officials that the bery as a normal act. The incubation of countryside was spinning out of control. the vote buying culture can discount the This lack of control began when the value of village election as a means to commune system was dismantled in 1983, generate trustworthy village leaders and villagers became more independent from create new wave of conflicts between ca- the state and village cadres lost some of dres and peasants. A more comprehensive their previous power. Villagers were given and detailed national law on villager self- greater opportunities to disobey party of- government is in order as soon as possi- ficials who enforced unpopular policies ble 7 to provide more detailed guidance such as birth control and tax collection. and regulation on village election methods, Further infuriating the peasants was the provide a punishment mechanism towards fact that the cadres were becoming in- irregular behavior in village elections such creasingly corrupt as economic reforms as vote buying and make it possible for provided them with abundant opportuni- villagers or election commissions to sub- ties for illegal activities. Due to these divi- mit cases to local courts and, if necessary, sions, local institutions were poorly ma- higher courts, for judicial arbitration, and naged and chaotic. delineate a clearer relationship between VCs and VPBs. With the rural areas increasingly disorga- nized, Chinese leaders thought that it was

imperative to construct new political insti- tutions in the countryside. However, the nature of these necessary changes was 7 A legislative proposal of establishing a national law on widely debated. In 1984, Peng Zhen, the village elections was denied by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 2006. Instead, NPC has been work- chairman of the Chinese Communist Par- ing with the relevant government agencies, particularly ty, decided that elections would make the the MCA, to revise the Organic Law. The revision process started in 2006 and has yet to finish. cadres more accountable to the villagers,

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therefore making it easier to govern in the also outlines the responsibilities of the countryside. Peng Zhen, together with the VC. These duties include dealing with Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), started to public affairs and services in the village, work on a law that permitted village supporting and organizing villagers to de- committee (VC) elections. The law was velop cooperative economical enterprises, seen as controversial, and it was not until taking care of the public resources, set- four years of political debate that the pre- tling disputes among villagers, and main- liminary Organic Law was finally passed. taining public order.

The most noteworthy parts of the law are Implementing the Organic Law articles 11 and 12, which mandate that China’s almost one million villages con- After the approval of the provisional VC duct elections in order to election law, there was still a choose village committee lot of work to be done be- members: fore the law could be put into practice. China’s politi- “Article 11: the chair, vice cal system is rather frag- chair(s) and members of the mented; a decision made at village committee are to be di- the top of the hierarchy is rectly elected by the villagers. not necessarily enforced at No organization or individual the grassroots level. Conse- is allowed to appoint, desig- quently, “a whole string of nate, remove or replace mem- mutually-reinforcing deci- bers of the village committee. sions are required in order to keep any one initiative on Each term for a village com- track.” So the MCA, the or- mittee is three years. At the Cover of the Organic Law ganization which promoted end of the term, new elections the village elections, was should be held promptly. All members of forced to skillfully maneuver within the the village committee can be elected for Chinese governing structure to implement multiple terms. the law.

Article 12: any villager over 18 years old Government officials had varying opi- has the right to vote and be elected, re- nions on the implementation of village gardless of ethnicity, race, gender, occupa- committee elections, which were depen- tion, family background, religious belief, dent upon their respective government educational level, financial situation or positions. Many cadres in higher levels of length of residence, except for those who government seemed indifferent to the are deprived of political rights by law reform since it was supposed to streng- […]” then the Party’s control of the country- side. The strongest opponents to village In addition to describing how the com- elections came instead from the bottom of mittee members should be elected, the law

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the state structure: from the county, town- Although many local cadres and peasants ship, and village officials. Since they could did not take the elections very seriously, in be voted out of office, village cadres had some elections corrupt officials were natural objections to elections. voted out and new leaders took power. Stories about these occurrences spread, The MCA used “a foot-in-the door ap- peaking peasants’ interest and changing proach of concealing aims, separating the local cadres’ opinions on elections. When reforms from each other, and pushing for they saw that it was easier to govern the only one change at the time.” They ap- previously unruly countryside, local cadres plied a two-step approach to change insti- began to see that this benefit outweighed tutions and cement village elections in the the new vulnerability of their elected posi- countryside. The first stage focused on tions. convincing local officials to agree to con- duct the elections. The importance of As the village elections were more widely whether the elections were democratic accepted, it became harder for opponents was deliberately understated by MCA offi- to protest the process. Strengthened by cials. Wang Zhenyao, an this fact, the MCA started the MCA official, described second stage of implementa- the reasoning behind this As village elections tion: to act for widespread approach: were more widely ac- functioning of village elec- cepted, it became tions and stress that they are “We knew there were held in a fair manner. They strong incentives for the harder for opponents began to underline that there local bureaucrats to ma- to protest the process should be more candidates nipulate the elections. than the number of positions But no matter what we and that the candidates did at that time, there was no way for us to should be nominated by villagers instead prevent such manipulation from occurring. of by the government. Tianjian Shi argues […] If the standard were set too high, there that the “approach pursued by the refor- would be open confrontation between of- mers has succeeded up to now, and the ficials in the civil affairs system and leaders power of their opponents has been dimi- in prefectural and county government who nished.” could always veto the proposed reforms. […] We were confident that ordinary pea- Analyzing the Organic Law sants would be mobilized by the electoral The 1987 experimental version of the Or- reform to defend their own interests. We ganic Law contained 21 articles. In 1998, therefore instructed our local bureaus to do the law became permanent and was ex- only two things. The first was to make sure tended to 30 articles. Although a number to organize elections and the second was to of improvements were made, the law is honor the results of those elections”. still lacking in several respects.

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First of all, the VC’s autonomy is limited role of the VC and village elections com- by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mittee, and gives greater details on how to who should, according to article 3 of the recall VC members. However, the law has VC election law, “play a core role in lea- been sent to the state council's legal affairs dership”. According to several research- office which has yet to submit the law to ers, this vaguely formulated segment is the the National People’s Congress standing law’s greatest weakness, as it undermines committee, the de facto legislative body in the democratically elected committee’s the Chinese governing apparatus. The independence. future of the Organic Law will depend on the willingness of the CCP to deepen vil- Secondly, the law has unclear formula- lage election reforms. tions on how the elections should be con- ducted, resulting in election procedures that vary greatly between and even within provinces and counties. The revised 1998 Suggested readings law improved the standardization of vil- Linda Jakobson. “Local governance: Vil- lage elections by giving more details on lage and Township Direct Elections”, in election rules. It specified that the candi- Governance in China, edited by Jude Howell dates should be nominated by voters, that (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, there must be a larger number of candi- 2004). dates than number of positions, and that the voting should be secret. However, Tianjian Shi. “Village Committee Elec- nomination procedures and the selection tions in China: Institutional Tactics for of the candidates are not clearly articu- Democracy”, in World Politics vol. 51, issue lated. As village self-governance is a new 3 (1999): 385-412 political institution, it is vital to have stan- Qingshan Tan. “Building Institutional dardized rules. A vaguely written law gives Rules and Procedures: Village Election in much power to local authorities to outline China”, Policy Science vol. 37, issue 1 (2004): the final election rules and procedures in 1-22 their area while providing few opportuni- ties for voters to question unfair elections. This ambiguity contributes to the varia- tion between provinces and makes it Also by Jens Kolhammar harder for local authorities as well as vil- Village self-governance in China: A lagers to know how the election should be case study conducted. http://www.chinaelections.net/newsinfo. The Ministry of Civil Affairs has drafted a asp?newsid=18374 newly revised Organic Law with 52 ar- ticles. This more developed law changes the terms for VC members from three years to five years, further outlines the

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The Status and a Few Problems of Village Committee Elections

By Mei Yongsheng, translated by Sean Ding

hen it comes to the problems ty, setting up of secret ballot booths, de- of village committee elections sign of the ballot, layout of polling centers, Win China, much emphasis has and certification processes. Hence, it is been given to the electoral procedures and reasonable to argue that if people failed to techniques. However, the main principles address the fundamental problems of the concerning the overall system have been elections, any technical design, no matter frequently understressed. As a conse- how perfectly executed, would be utterly quence, it is difficult to resolve the current meaningless. Based on the author’s long conundrum in which extensive efforts experience in working on villager self- dedicated to the electoral process produce governance, the following are the prevail- only unsatisfactory and undemocratic re- ing issues, often understressed or even sults. ignored.

The main form of China’s grassroots de- 1. The basis for conducting village com- mocracy, village committee elections have mittee elections is relatively weak because: received great attention in recent years. From a legal perspective, the Organic Law a) Many villagers lack the basic awareness has been implemented for less than a dec- of democracy and rule of law. Without ade, thus it is inevitable that village elec- active participation and the villagers’ tions will encounter various difficulties. strong sense of defending their rights, While efforts have been made to address elections would easily become a mere these problems, records show that instead formality. Unfortunately, we regret to see of seeking the fundamental and structural that a significant portion of villagers, es- causes, people have focused overwhel- pecially those living in poor areas, are lu- mingly on issues at the procedural and kewarm or indifferent toward village technical levels, for instance voter eligibili- committee elections.

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On the election day, they either excuse cant shortage of capable election organiz- themselves from polling centers, or ask ers. According to the Organic Law, village someone else to cast the ballot for them; cadres are the immediate organizers of their preference may be easily manipulated, elections, but they often lack the appro- sometimes by just a casual dinner or a priate education and experience; township pack of cheap cigarettes. When their own officials are responsible for supervising democratic rights are violated, they often the elections, but these officials are disin- choose to compromise instead of fighting terested in village committee elections back because they do not want to be seen (many even show a strong resistance). as troublemakers. In every village commit- Even if the officials do “supervise” the tee where the authorities received letters elections, the primary focus would be on from the villagers complaining about illeg- how to manipulate the election so that its al manipulation of the election results, result satisfies “the intention of the organ- when these complaints were ization”. In regard to mishandled, villagers chose county leadership and to leave the issue unsettled We have done too lit- those leaders above the rather than turn to legal tle in educating the county level, it is even channels. villagers, and have more difficult to designate not shown serious- personnel to the organiza- Certainly, the lack of ness and sincerity tion and supervision of awareness of democracy village committee elec- and rule of law has its cul- tions. tural and historical roots. Nevertheless, it In terms of funding, it has become clear is undeniable that as supervisors and or- that many villages simply can’t afford elec- ganizers of village committee elections, we tions. In most cases, a village committee have done too little in educating the vil- election requires approximately 3000 lagers, and have not shown seriousness RMB (750 US dollars). Although this is and sincerity. not a great deal of money, it remains a tremendous difficulty for many villages b) Human and financial resources dedicat- that are in debt or do not have any collec- ed to village committee elections are un- tive economy. As a result, elections in guaranteed. A national project involving a these villages are conducted in a poor large population, sufficient funding and manner with simplified procedures and human resources is crucial to the success- the minimum requirements. While the ful implementation of village committee Organic Law does ask local governments elections. However, the status quo is that to provide financial support to villages many villages are experiencing a signifi- that lack funding, the reality is that almost

Mei Yongsheng is a civil affairs official in China. The original article was published on Chinaelections.org. To read the original article in Chinese, please go to http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=122855

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no county or township government will Since village cadres are the immediate or- spend money on village elections. ganizers of committee elections, it is ex- tremely difficult for an election to be con- 2. Based on the author’s many years of ducted in a democratic manner without observation, the incumbent village cadres their support. are the strongest opponents to village committee elections (including village Par- 3. Township leadership, the immediate ty branch elections), therefore becoming supervisor of village committee elections, the biggest obstacle of successful implan- lacks enthusiasm due to the following rea- tation of village committee elections. The sons: primary reasons include: a) The absence of internal motivation. In a) They are afraid of losing the election. In the current political system, township the previous system, village cadres were leaders are in fact appointed by their supe- appointed by their superiors. Thus, their riors, despite that indirect elections are priority was to please the higher leader- held as a formality. Consequently, the po- ship instead of serving the villagers. Some litical career of a township official de- village cadres would even sacrifice the vil- pends only on his or her ability to coddle lagers’ interests in order to be “consistent the higher leadership instead of answering with the higher leadership”. Such cadres to public demand. These officials would resist strongly to committee elections be- never spend time and energy on supervis- cause they are well aware that they would ing village committee elections in accor- undoubtedly lose office once an election is dance with the law, because public opi- held. nion reflected in the elections means very little, if anything, to their own career. b) They fear the exposure of their misde- meanors. Prior to the introduction of vil- b) The township leadership is concerned lager self-governance, village cadres could that democratically elected village cadres do whatever they wanted as long as they may be hard to control. As we know, settled with their superiors. For instance, prior to the implementation of villager the author was informed by a village cadre self-governance, township leaders had ab- that he barely had any household expendi- solute authority over the selection and ture, because he charged public funds for removal of village cadres, who at the time all his purchases including even grocery. were the same as the leaders’ personal ser- Once a democratic election was held, vants. However, once introduced, demo- these misdeeds would be exposed and the cratic elections deprived the township officials involved might face charges leaders’ power of appointing village cadres, Because of the above concerns, many in- thus making them worry about their own cumbent village cadres are resistant to political future: Will democratically elected democratic elections, some even tried to cadres listen to my orders? If they don’t, obstruct the elections from being held. will it jeopardize my political career? A

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township leader once sullenly complained China’s democracy should take its first to the author: “Now you are holding these step? If not in villages, should we start elections which made it impossible for me with electing our parents?” to even manage a few village cadres. What power do I have left? Why the heck would Second, many township officials assume I still want to be a leader?” that villagers do not possess the quality of electing their own leaders. This is blatant c) Township leaders worry that the exist- discrimination against the peasants. It is ing interest ties between the village cadres true that Chinese peasants know little and them may be disrupted. As discussed about science and technology, but it is above, in villages where self-governance is senseless to argue that they can’t even not thoroughly implemented, the ap- choose a leader from pointment of village cadres is determined their fellow villagers. In- solely by “the intention of the organiza- deed, if we wholehearted- The villagers are tion”, namely the intention of township ly returned the right to hesitant to believe leaders, who themselves are also ap- vote to the villagers and pointed based on the preference of the provided adequate sup- in the legitimacy higher leadership. Such a system has port, they would be com- of the elections created shared interests between township pletely capable of electing and village officials. In order to secure their own leaders. their own position, village cadres give monetary contributions, in many cases out Third, they believe that villagers them- of the public budget, to their township selves are indifferent toward elections and superiors on a regular basis, while at the will not enthusiastically participate. This is same time township leaders return the again not the truth. While we do see many favor by passing incentives down to the lukewarm villagers who are disengaged villages. Such shared interests have over and do not go to polling stations, this by time reinforced the abnormal, yet stable no means suggests a lack of enthusiasm. relationship between township and village According to the author’s in-depth obser- cadres, who see democratic elections as a vation, the reason why many villagers are dangerous challenge to their interests. disengaged is that they are hesitant to be- lieve in the legitimacy of the elections, and In addition to the cadre system and inter- cannot trust that the right to vote will be est ties, township leadership often fails to so easily returned to their hands. Indeed, proactively support village committee many village committee elections are so elections because of several misconcep- loosely organized and poorly conducted tions. First, many of them think that de- that they can hardly demonstrate any legi- mocratization is moving too fast in China timacy. How can we ask villagers to be and is not suitable for the country’s cur- enthusiastic about these elections, when rent conditions. I often ask these arrogant they still sense strongly the existence of township leaders “where do you think the “intention of the organization”?

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The problems discussed above have little to do with the technical and procedural details of the elections; nonetheless, they INTERNSHIP OPPORTUNITIES are vital components of the fundamental problems facing village committee elec- The Carter Center is committed to waging peace, building hope, and fighting disease, tions. Any person involved in directly and interns have the opportunity to work working with village committee elections for Carter Center programs that contribute knows clearly that it is already a significant to this mission. Carter Center interns make accomplishment for a county to even have vital contributions to the Center's work. In a few decent window dressing village elec- turn, The Carter Center provides a subs- tantive learning experience that serves as a tions—we are, after all, still waiting for the basis for interns to explore their career breakthrough at the institutional level. options and to develop professional skills. While it is beyond the scope of this article Internships are offered during three ses- to discuss structural change, it is fruitful sions per year to undergraduate juniors for us to admit that only when the prin- and seniors, graduate students, and recent graduates (graduated in the past 24 ciple issues are addressed can village months). committee elections become truly mea- ningful. The China Program prefers individuals with a background or coursework in inter- national relations, political science, or oth- er related fields. Applicants should com- More translations by Sean Ding municate well in Mandarin Chinese and be current in Chinese affairs and U.S.-China

relations. Interns should be skilled con- Grieving parents: tools of the anti- versationalists and researchers, with basic Chinese forces? technological proficiency (such as Web http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid page creation, PowerPoint and Excel), =17932 capable of working independently. Dedi- cation to the program's objective is man- datory. Who will maintain peaceful cross- Strait relations? Interns will perform a variety of tasks, including administrative assistance, docu- http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid ment translation into Chinese and English, =18155 monitoring media for political develop- ments in China, and delving into Chinese ’s reform program: the 19 reports. points To learn more about the Carter Center http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid internship program, visit us online at =18083 http://www.cartercenter.org/involved/int ernship/index.html

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