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French Cultural Studies http://frc.sagepub.com Charlemagne's Crusaders: French Collaboration in Arms, 1941-1945 J. G. Shields French Cultural Studies 2007; 18; 83 DOI: 10.1177/0957155807073317 The online version of this article can be found at: http://frc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/18/1/83 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com Additional services and information for French Cultural Studies can be found at: Email Alerts: http://frc.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://frc.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Downloaded from http://frc.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on May 15, 2007 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 083-106 FRC-073317.qxd 10/1/07 4:16 PM Page 83 French Cultural Studies Charlemagne’s Crusaders French Collaboration in Arms, 1941–1945 J. G. SHIELDS University of Warwick Military collaboration is one of the least acknowledged aspects of France under the Occupation. Yet from summer 1941 France raised a number of fighting units for Hitler’s armies, each with its distinctive mission and each drawing the Vichy regime deeper into collaboration with Nazi Germany. This article discusses that process and its diverse implications. It shows how the Paris collaborationists used military engagement to pressure the Vichy government into more activist collaboration and explores the divergent perspectives in which this was viewed from Berlin, Paris and Vichy; it considers the mobilising myths, motivations and misapprehensions behind military collabora- tion; and it identifies some of the anomalies of that collaboration, with its reconceptualising of France and Other, friend and foe, belonging and alienation. Those French ‘patriots’ who fought in German uniform would become effective exiles from a homeland they departed to ‘defend’ only to see it ‘liberated’ by their ‘enemies’. Exposing the divisions and the delusions underlying military collaboration, the article sheds light on conflicting political calculations and shifting allegiances in occupied France. Keywords: Bolshevism, collaboration/collaborationism, France, Germany, military, Occupation, Vichy government, Waffen-SS, Wehrmacht At 3.15 a.m. on Sunday 22 June 1941, the first artillery barrages announced the invasion by German armed forces of the Soviet Union. The ‘European crusade against Bolshevism’ code-named Operation Barbarossa was underway. A week later, having cleared its intentions with Berlin, the French government at Vichy severed diplomatic relations with Moscow. French Cultural Studies, 18(1): 83–105 Copyright © SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) http://frc.sagepub.com [200702] 10.1177/0957155807073317 Downloaded from http://frc.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on May 15, 2007 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 083-106 FRC-073317.qxd 10/1/07 4:16 PM Page 84 84 FRENCH CULTURAL STUDIES 18(1) At the same time, approval was sought from the German authorities by leading collaborationists in occupied Paris to form a French volunteer legion to participate in the military effort on the new Eastern Front. With approval secured, the creation in July 1941 of the Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchevisme (LVF) marked the start of a Franco- German military collaboration that would evolve over the next four years and culminate by stages – Légion Tricolore, Phalange Africaine, Sturmbrigade Frankreich – in the formation and deployment of the French Waffen-SS Charlemagne Division. Though they enlisted relatively few recruits, the LVF and subsequent formations drew France deeper into the spiral of collaboration initiated in October 1940 by the agreement between Hitler and Marshal Philippe Pétain as French head of state. In their propaganda, their statutes and the personal testimony of some who fought in them, these units yielded telling insights into the motivations of those in France most committed to collaboration with Nazi Germany. They also brought into focus the tensions between the ‘collaboration’ born of political expedience at Vichy and the ‘collaborationism’ promoted from ideological conviction by more radical elements mainly in Paris. Taking France well beyond the terms of the armistice agreement of June 1940, military collaboration exacerbated the fundamental problem with which the Vichy government grappled throughout the Occupation: that of retaining sovereign authority over a France which it controlled only insofar as the Germans permitted. Though it warrants barely a mention in most studies of the Vichy regime, the French provision of fighting units for Germany tells us much about the intensification of collaboration, the dynamics of power in occupied France, and the gulf of perception underlying relations between Berlin, Paris and Vichy. At another, more global level, military collaboration offers an intrigu- ing subject of analysis. It rested on particular conceptions of national, racial and cultural identity, mediated through the historically resonant notion of an East/West clash of ‘civilisation’; it radicalised the reshaping under Vichy of transnational alliances and enmities; and it raised press- ing questions about the place of a defeated, yet potentially rehabilitated, France within the context of a totalising war. Those Frenchmen departing in Wehrmacht uniform for the Russian front, however, were déracinés in time and in space. Likened to the knights of the First Crusade, they were embarked on a historic anomaly, fighting for an occupying enemy of France against an objective ally. They had the geographically incongruous conviction of mounting a last-ditch defence of a homeland over 2000 kilometres away; yet, in so doing, they were to become effective exiles from that homeland, both physically and ideologically displaced as Occupation gave way to Liberation in France and as the ‘New Europe’ in Downloaded from http://frc.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on May 15, 2007 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 083-106 FRC-073317.qxd 10/1/07 4:16 PM Page 85 SHIELDS: CHARLEMAGNE’S CRUSADERS 85 which they had sublimated their national identity fell to ruins. This arti- cle draws in part on the memoirs by which a number of these ‘exiles’ would later seek to justify their collaborationist engagement or simply to defy a post-war Republican consensus from which they continued to be alienated. Military collaboration: from LVF to Charlemagne Division A ‘Foreign Legion in German uniform’ Launched a year to the day after the signing of the Franco-German armistice, the invasion of the Soviet Union redefined not only the military but also the political contours of the war. In rupturing the Nazi–Soviet pact, it provided a powerful new rationale at Vichy for collaboration with Hitler’s Reich and galvanised the Paris collabora- tionists for a war on communism. It pushed the French Communist Party (PCF) into resistance and designated its members ‘agents of Moscow’ against whom ‘a fight to the death’ now had to be waged. Collaborationist publications like Je suis partout deemed the threat of communism a sufficient argument for embracing National Socialism. They colluded in the Nazi propagandist claim that the war in the East was not a war of aggression but a defensive measure to prevent ‘a savage horde from sweeping towards Lisbon and perhaps all the way to London’ (Mermet and Danan, 1966: 41, 53–5, 58).1 A motley group of political activists, journalists and intellectuals, the Paris collaborationists saw themselves – and were seen from Berlin – as a lever with which pressure could be brought to bear on the government at Vichy. They led or were associated with a range of radical movements which attracted a combined membership of perhaps a quarter of a million over the period of the Occupation. Critical of Pétain’s cautious traditionalism, they called for France to assume its place in a new European order, conceiving of Hitler as a modern Charlemagne mobilis- ing Europe against Bolshevism and its ‘allies’, international Jewry and Anglo-Saxon capitalist imperialism. Thus on 23 June, the day after the launch of Operation Barbarossa, the German ambassador in Paris, Otto Abetz, was prevailed upon to seek permission from the German Foreign Ministry for the creation of a French legion. Two weeks later, a number of collaborationist leaders – among them Jacques Doriot of the Parti Populaire Français (PPF) and Marcel Déat of the Rassemblement National Populaire (RNP) – signed a proclamation committing France, with ‘the consent of Marshal Pétain and the acquiescence of the Führer’, to ‘the cru- sade against Bolshevism’ and ‘the struggle to defend European civiliza- tion’. Published in the PPF’s organ Le Cri du Peuple on 8 July 1941, this Downloaded from http://frc.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on May 15, 2007 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 083-106 FRC-073317.qxd 10/1/07 4:16 PM Page 86 86 FRENCH CULTURAL STUDIES 18(1) was accompanied by an editorial from Doriot which identified in the ‘crusade against communism’ ‘the real meaning of the present war’: In helping to crush Bolshevism, the Legion of French Volunteers gives France the opportunity to resume her place as a major European power. The soldiers who are about to depart are on the threshold of a struggle for