Being and Becoming-Ontology and the Conception of Evolution In
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Part I: Foundationof Activify Theory Chapter2: Beingand Becoming-Ontologyand the Conceptionof Evolution in Activity Theory Pp.79-172 IN: Karpatsclrol.B. (1000).Human actit,ity. Contributions to the A nI hr op oI og i c'u I Sc' i en c e s .fr om a P er.s p ec t it,e of A ct iv i ty Theory. Copenlragen:Dansk Psykologisk Forlag. ISBN: 87 7706311 2. (Front.cover + xii + 513pages). Re-publishedriith acceptancefrom the authorand copyright- holder. PART I FOUNDATIONOF ACTIVITY THEORY 2. Beingand Becoming Ontology and the Conceptionof Evolution in Activity Theory As mentionedin thetirst chapter.this treatiseis abouta specificanthropo- loeicaltheor-v. Activitl'Theory'. In the flrst chapter.the historicaltradition of Activitv Theor.vu'as discussed. Before presenting the core of thetheory. how- eier. I uill intloduceand discuss its philclsophicalbasis. This philosophical tootingis ccrnrprisedof theba.irt' (onLept o.f reulitt andour knorletlg,eof tli.s realitt. The currentchapter presents the former.the onlo/ri,qr'.and chapter 3 presentsthe latter. the epistetrtologr. 2.1 Ontology Ontologr is thc'philosophicaldiscipline that erplores the question of beurg. Thus.the ontolog),'of Activin' Theori'mLlst ans\\'er such questions as. "What thingsexist iiroundhere'1" "Are thereditterent nrodes of eristence'1"Mclre- over.although episteurological in nature."How areue. thesub.ject.s discussing ontolog)-.relatecl to theerrlrtrr,r 'ul e arediscnssin-g'1" In principle.I u ill distinguishbenr,een Ihe object ntutlel'of ontologv (i.e.. the categorvof tlteotttit. and the content of ontolo-ufitself) and the ontolosi(ul (i.e..the description of theontic). This is in principal.because u'hen there is no dangerof confusion. I rnal bea little lar in theterminolo-t1'. The retrsonfor going into ontologr'.a sonte'uvhatfo.l-ey field within rneta- Pltvsies.is tltnttherc lrrc. letuullr. \{)nle r'rlheI irrrp,rl-1;1111 er)nll'o\er\ie\ in \ei- cncerclated to ontolo-licaiproblems. This is true e speciallv in a scientificfield suchas anthropolog)' that is in itselfsomeu hat fogg1,. This is evenmore appro- I Jlriatefor a theorvlike Activin'Theon:. u,hich most of mv colleagueswithin anthropologvfind at leastmistr'. There is indeeda lot of ambiguityorcontro- r crsvabout the existence of u hatn e arediscussing. Whena clinicalpsl,cholo-list talks about a personulittconfli<-t. or a de.fertce trteLltLuti.rrrt. not to mentiona patient'snurc'is.si.stic per.sonality.s/nrclure. is this psy'chologistpostulatin-e that the ternt ref'ers to somethingthat exists'l When the 82 Ch. 2: Being and Becoming sociologistdiscusses class tensiort and etJuic conflicts. how or wheredo these phenomenatake piace'l When the culturai anthropologist describes a culturehe or shehas studied. u'hat is thisentitl'called "culture" l Scientificcontroversies are largely about pt'rsitir e or nesativea\\ertions of existence.'Forinstance. the radical behaviourists otten state that nteiltul plte- tlonlen(l.not to mentionmetttal ug,ettcies. do notexist. q'hereas behuriLttrr cToe: exist.The maingoal of thedeconstructivist school of socialscience is to negate assertionsof existence.implying that there are no objectiveentities correspon- dingto conceptslike culture.as these concepts are merely social constructlons. 2.1.1 To be or not to be Parmenidesis generallypresented in thehistorr of philosophra\ thcantago- nistof Heraclite.the tbrmer being the founder of theEleatic ckrctrinc ol'inr an- ance.asserting the illusory' character of perceiVedchangc. the latter heing the fatherof dialectics.teaching the illLrsorl' character of perceivedidentitl andthe permanentl1ux of change.I havealreadl' announced nt1 afTiliation to theHera- clitic line,but I admitthat Parmenides had a validpoint w'hen he refused to talk aboutnon-existence.'\l'e are involved in anembanassing conundrum when we statethat sonrcthin,q does not e.rlst.The verl,linguistic form of the staterrent suggestsan obiect-predicatelogic. the something not existin-sbeing the o[.r1c.ct andthe predicatebeing eristence. Modern logic to a certainextent has s()l\cd someof theparadoxes that .,1'ere obstacles to Parmenides. SinceRussell, however. the set correspondin-e to the description ol theobjce r is ernpty.The exact neaning of thesentence that. "the celebrated Se orti.h ntLrn- stercalled Nessie does not exist." should thus be that. "the e\ten\i()n oi rhc.ct of hugeaquatic animals living. at the time being. in Loch\err is nrl.'flou- ever.if we attelnptto anah'sethe content of theternt "\r-ssrr-.". \\c \\()uld\()()n be in trouble. It wouldbe unsatisfactor)'tosimply suggest that the ternt is nt!-i.uullgless. becausenothing with thattenll asits narneerists. Nonethelc-s.. \\ !' nll\ lreable to go on living u"ithoutany clear solution to thesemantics of Nes.ic. However.n'hen some psychologists assert that the nurnberoi narcissistsis increasingand other psychologists deny that such a categor\of indir,iduals exists.rt revealsan ontolo-eicaiproblem in psychologlas a discipline.Like- wise. some)'ears ago the PLO declareditself to be the exile governmentof Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv 83 Palestine.Israel. on the otherhand. denied that thereu'as such a thing as a Palestinianpeopie. This wasa disputeof not only ontology.but alsoof an tm- portantpolitical matter. To clarify our ideasof existence.we first haveto specit,vthe coordinotes of existence.The existence of somethingmeans that this sornething has existed in a certaininterval oftinte andspace. Talking about such an entityas the Sume- rians.we cannotjust bluntlvdeny their existence. Instead. \.\'e say that between about21.000 and 2.000 BC. thesepeople populated the area of theMiddle East calledMesopotamia. Of course.u'e do not haveto specrf,vthis when vr'eref'er to somethingpre- sent.the here-and-nowspecification has a privile_tedstatus: it is normally unmarkedas a deicticdef-ault. Nonetheless.ntv primaryconcern is notproblems of spatial-temporalspecr- lication.but deeperproblen.rs of existence.In the Israeli-Palestinianconflict. theIsraelis did notdeny' the existence of somepeople callin-u themselves pale- stinians.nor did thevdeny' the existence of suchpeople going to theextrerne of announcingtheir ou,n .sovernment. what they'did denl'rvas that these indivi- dualsconstitnted apeople. The Israeligovernment perceived their antagonists n01 as a peopleentitled to a state.but asa criminaltenorist organisation. ln a way.this conceptual aspect of the Middle Eastconflict ma1'be morecorrectly understood as a semantrc. not an ontologicalantagonism. Hor'"'ever. it is not alway'seasv to distinguish betrveenontological and semantic questions. Not manl'people u'ould be wil- ling to sacrificetheir lives to fight tbr a semanticposition. but for rnillionsit is a mattelof lit'eand cleath r.r hether a certaincategorv of peopleis to be recognised asa nationor not. Thefbllou ing examplesshould help to clarit'vthe relation between ontology and semantics.Are therean-r enriries corresponding to phl,sicalconcepts like blackholes or clnrks. or evena conceptu'ith a firmerstanding such as theelec- tron'lrn thepsy'cholo-uical arena. hou' do we makeup our mindsabout the dis- putedontolo-ev of thesuperego. not to mentionthemind (that we aremaking up so ofien.ilithout everrealh knorvin-sq'hat is). And what aboutthe aura ol a pL'rson.the postulated niental surroundin-e that is a popularobject of diagnosis and evenmassage in somevalieties of rnoderntherapl. of course.an ardent materiirlistcould bluntlv deny that stalementsref'erring to "aura" har.eany meaningat all. Hou'ever.I can sug-sestan alternativeway to dealwith such 84 Ch.2: Beingand Becoming problematicentities. Partlv concurrin-e u ith Parmenides.I arn rather reluctant to makea total verdictof non-existence.This is true aswell for the supposed ref-erentsof "Unicorn"and "God" or "The holv spirit". Generally.I amheading in thedirection ofredefining rather than denying the existenceof ret-erentsof elusiveconcepts like the onesjust mentioned.These conceptsmay be misunderstoodand rnisrepresented. verv oftenbecar"rse they arethought of in a contertto u,hichthey actuallydo not beltlng.In particular. the misrepresentationcan be a mis-cate-qorisation.Theretore. the re-definition rl,'illotien be a re-contertualisationand a re-catesori:ation. An1,kind of ontologicalcritique. even as nroderate as the one proposecl. at bestwill bea criterionfor theu'eakness of thepositions criticised. btlt ltot a crl- terionfor its validity.To arguetbr ther aliditvof a certainontological positit'tt. we needan explicit criterion to acknowledgesomething s exl\tence. Incrden- talll'.it shouldbe noted that u,hat I am su-egestingis rl o'rterrott tor ttckttowletlq- inge.ristente.notadelinitiortof'e.ristence.whichisericlentlrsolnethingentire- ly difl-erent. 2.1.2 PracticalNecessity as a Criterion for the Acknowledgementof Existence I will nou'proposethe following criterion: We acknowledgesomething as existing when ue are/rrt r'rlto rcrtliseits existence.thus being unable to denvits eri.stertt'e. And conversely: We can deny that something is in existenceonl,v rvhen \\'e Are//()r lrtrt t'tl ttt realiseits existence.thus being uutble to ossert rt.lr',rrln'1t. Part I: Foundation of Activitl.Theory 85 In fact.this criterion tbr theacknowledgment of existenceis a key to devel- oping an ontology.but is not an ontologyin itself. Therefbre.the criterion shouldnot be understoodas a detlnitionof existence.In thisform. the criterion would be a positionof extremelvontoiogical idealism: our refusalto acknow- led_uethat sontething exists