Extending the Theoretical Lenses of Behavioral Economics Through the Sociological Prisms of Gary Becker
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Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1, 45-51, 2018 Extending the theoretical lenses of behavioral economics through the sociological prisms of Gary Becker Morris Altman1* Abstract Becker stands out as a Godfather of conventional economics because of his reliance on prices, income, and rationality as a means of analysing and predicting choice behaviour. He also accepts, for modelling purposes, the assumption that individuals make decisions after considering the consequences of these decisions. Hence, there can’t be any regret. But Becker also maintains that traditional economics is flawed, often generating highly misleading analytical predictions. However, he rejects the heuristic and biases approach to behavioral economics which he equates to a psychological approach to economic issues, focusing on irrationality in decision-making. Instead, Becker introduces key sociological variables as core determinants of choice, taking us well beyond the traditional economic focus on price and income In this approach to modelling, choice behaviour is rational or sensible and smart. One need not revert to referring to behaviour that can’t easily be explained by prices and income as biased or irrational. Becker also recognizes the importance of individuals’ preferences changing through their interactions with their socio-economic environment. I argue that Becker’s approach to decision- making contributes to enriching a behavioralist approach to modelling choice behaviour. It is particularly well situated in the approach to behavioral economics taken by Simon, which was heavily interdisciplinary, going well beyond psychology and economics, who also challenged a narrow economic understanding of the determinants of choice behaviour. I argue for a modelling framework that integrates aspects of Becker’s research through a critical assessment of his contributions. JEL Classification: A12; B41; D00; D91 Keywords Becker — personal and social capital — rationality — smart decision-making — identity economics 1University of Newcastle *Corresponding author: [email protected] Introduction by better embedding it in the reality of individuals’ decision- making environments, which should incorporate their social Why would anyone in their right mind consider an important environment. Becker berates traditional price theory for ig- aspect of Gary Becker’s research to represent a potential and noring the fact that individual decision making is significantly significant contribution to behavioral economics? Becker is, affected by its relationship to others in their community. I of course, one of the founding-fathers of the rational choice argue that Becker’s sociological intervention in economic approach to contemporary price theory and neoclassical eco- modeling, consistent with the big tent approach to behavioral nomics. In Becker, one finds an unbending focus on prices economics, is an important contribution to developing models and income as the default approach to explain and predict that are better grounded in the reality of the human condition. human behavior. Moreover, the realism of the modeling as- This can contribute to better predictive models and to models sumptions are not of any consequence. Prediction is what’s that can provide a more robust causal narrative as compared critical to judging the validity of the model, irrespective of to narrow price theory as well narrow behavioral economics, how unrealistic the modeling assumptions might be, based on where the latter places an undue emphasis on psychological the methodological approach advocated by Friedman (1953). variables underlying human decision-making. However, Becker significantly modified traditional theory, In this article, I will model Becker’s contributions into a taking it well beyond traditional price theory. ‘big tent’ behavioral economics framework. Examples will be Yet, surprisingly little attention is paid in the behavioral provided on how Becker’s sociological variables improve our economics literature to the contributions Gary Becker (Becker capacity to understand human decision making. Moreover, 1996; see also Coleman 1993) has made to expanding and I’ll discuss how this broader analytical framework sits with deepening the analytical modeling capability of price theory the notion of the rational decision maker. Finally, I’ll address Extending the theoretical lenses of behavioral economics through the sociological prisms of Gary Becker — 46/51 some limitations of this modeling framework when situated in to what became known as behavioral economics beginning the standard neoclassical model (with its embedded assump- in the 1950s. Simon (1959, 1978, 1987) introduced a much tion of perfect foresight) and how these shortcomings can be broader understanding of rationality and model building. First quite easily addressed by further modifying the neoclassical his understanding of rationality is more consistent with social or traditional economic model. science writ large, as opposed to the narrow definition artic- ulated in traditional economics. Simon, and others working What is behavioral economics on this approach to behavior economics, largely at Carnegie- Mellon University at this time, assume that people are rational To understand how one might situate Becker’s sociological although sometimes limited by their capacities. They make intervention within the framework of behavioral economics decisions based on their physiologically, socially, and insti- it is best to first get a handle on what actually is behavioral tutionally determined decision-making capabilities. These economics. This question is not as simple as it first appears variables set bounds to individuals’ decision-making capa- and is subject to debate (Altman 2017a, 2017b; Berg and bilities and, given these capabilities, they do well enough to Gigerenzer 2010; Tomer 2007). achieve their goals, yielding what Simon refers to as satis- Some economists argue that since economics is about ficing behavior. Overall, one can argue that individuals are behavior (decisions), all economics is behavioral economics. smart in their behavior, even though they might make errors But this is a very simplistic view. Behavioral economics was in decision-making. Moreover, given the reality of human developed in response to what many academics believed was decision-makers, behaving according to neoclassical behav- a serious gap in theory, which focused on human behavior ioral norms might generate decisions that are welfare reducing through the lenses of price theory wherein individuals were to the individual. Individuals would be better off engaging in expected to behave mechanically in a particular direction as satisficing behaviour (Berg and Hoffrage, 2008), and the soci- relative prices and real income change. eties comprised of satisficers may be able to achieve greater One very important perspective on behavioral economics, levels of social welfare (Berg and Gigerenzer, 2007). In this its most recent incarnation, is vested in Kahneman’s and Tver- sense, neoclassical behavior would be, in many if not most sky’s (1979; Kahneman 2003) (two psychologists’) heuris- instances, irrational and sub-optimal. tics and biases approach to human decision-making. This perspective maintains that the standard neoclassical model, Simon and others that work in the bounded rationality predicating one’s understanding of decision-making on price tradition, argue that one needs other benchmarks for optimal theory (narrow neoclassical theory), is wrong-headed. It fails behavior, rooted in the reality of human decision-making, to describe average human behaviour and might even fail to such as procedural rationality. Here, one aspect of deter- predict such behaviour. The neoclassical benchmarks might mining rationality is whether given the objective one sets be correct as a measure of optimal , rational, and unbiased for oneself, one is using the best procedure to achieve ones’ behaviour; but human decision-makers do not have the capa- stated objectives. But even here, a decision might be sub- bilities (which can’t be learnt) to behave optimally. We tend to ject to error, based on one’s knowledge and decision-making deviate, often quite significantly, from neoclassical behavioral capabilities. A smart agent might still make mistakes and norms. We are not neoclassical agents. The heuristics and choose incorrect procedures to achieve her stated objectives. biases approach is largely grounded in psychology with strong Moreover, the ‘rationality’ of a decision is also based on the leanings towards aspects of neuroscience. decision-making capabilities of the individual and this per- Upon this modeling framework is built the nudging ap- son’s decision-making environment. And these two factors proach to decision-making, with significant impact on policy would be quite different across individuals and over time. In (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Humans are regarded as being this modeling framework, the human decision-maker does not hardwired towards making sub-optimal decisions from an behave, for good rational reasons, in a neoclassical fashion. individual welfare maximizing perspective. In other words, In the bounded rationality approach to model building and individuals tend to make decisions that are not in their own analysis, the realism of ones’ simplifying assumptions are best interest. And even if such individuals believe they are critically important as well. In a word, to get our explanations making decisions that are in their own best