Nuclear Russia. International and Domestic Agendas

Nuclear Russia: International and domestic agendas

Tomsk University Press 2020 UDC: 327.37 LBC: 31.4; 60.527; 66.4(2Ɋɨɫ)

Nuclear Russia: International and domestic agendas / Edi- ted by Andrey Pavlov and Larisa Deriglazova. – Tomsk: Tomsk University Press, 2020. – 210 ɪ.

ISBN 978-5-7511-2606-3 DOI 10.17223/978-5-7511-2606-3

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, not know or thereafter invented, including photocopying and re- cording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permis- sion in writing from the corresponding contributor.

1. Nuclear nonproliferation. 2. National security. 3. Nuclear energy – Social aspects. 4. Security, International.

The fragment of Wassily Kandinsky’ drawing «Untitled» (1922) is used for the book cover

Elena Bychkova, the book cover design

UDC: 327.37 LBC: 31.4; 60.527; 66.4(2Ɋɨɫ)

Foreword by Ambassador Sergey Batsanov...... 3

I. Strategy and Politics...... 11 1. Andrey Pavlov. Nuclear Weapons in the Russian Military Strategy ...... 13 2. Andrey Bodrov. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yester- day, Today, Tomorrow...... 37

II. Nonproliferation and Disarmament...... 65 1. Anastasia Malygina. Russia in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime...... 67 2. Ekaterina Mikhaylenko. Why Does Russia Not Support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons? ...... 111

III. Societal Dimension...... 129 1. Larisa Deriglazova, Nina Rozhanovskaya. Building Nuclear Consensus in Contemporary Russia: Factors and Perceptions...... 131 2. Nikolai Dronishinets, Grigory Zinovyev. Nuclear Education as an Atomic Era Phenomenon...... 163 3. Dmitry Pobedash. The Russian Nonproliferation Research: State of the Field .....191

Authors ...... 207 Foreword It gives me a great pleasure to recommend to English-speaking readers a new book about almost everything nuclear in Russia. It is a fascinating book – at least for three reasons. To start with, it is probably the first attempt by the Russian academic community to look comprehensively at a wide range of nuclear issues, including the evolution of nuclear industrial complex during the period after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992, nuclear weapons, respective political decisions and military doctrines regarding their use, nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, societal attitudes to nuclear weapons and to peaceful nuclear activities (including environmental issues), system of “nuclear education”, state of play with non-proliferation research in Russia. Finally, in a separate chapter, it deals with Russian attitudes towards the Treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It is not that all these aspects have not been addressed in other publications. But here, to the authors’ credit, they have attempted to collectively address these different, but not really separate issues in a holistic manner. The second reason is that the book was written by researchers working not in Moscow, but in several other Russian cities – St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Tomsk, Novo-Uralsk – and under the leadership of Prof. Andrey Pavlov from St Petersburg State University. This is important, because until recently Russian arms control, non-proliferation and “nuclear-at-large” community was mainly concentrated in the capital, Mos- cow. This applies, of course, to political side of the research. The technical side – nuclear engineers, designers, scientists – has been well represented, since long time ago, in a number of other places across the country, including, in particular, such scientific and engineering centers as Tomsk, Novo-Uralsk and Ekaterinburg. But they could not really contribute to political science for several reasons. This “horizontal proliferation” of non-proliferation expertise, research and teaching is a most wel- Foreword 5 come development, and I strongly hope this trend will continue and “pro- liferate” to more research centers and think tanks across Russia. The third reason is that majority of the authors are relatively young professionals with the gender ratio of 5 to 4 ( males still have a tendency to dominate, but things are changing, and Russia is not immune). It is also a sign that a new generation of Russian arms control, non-proliferation and nuclear affairs policy scholars is coming out from the shadow. Now, I am not sure I like the title so much – NUCLEAR RUSSIA – which may look a bit ominous. It seems a bit excessive and, maybe, a conces- sion to certain domestic political trends, and, after all, Russia is much more than nuclear. But that said, nuclear energy, with its military and peaceful applications, occupies a special place in Russian history and present, and, no doubt, will occupy in future. That was the case in the second half of 1940s, when the then Soviet Un- ion, after having won the bloodiest and most destructive war the world had seen, with its many cities in ruins and countless villages burnt, facing uni- maginable reconstruction challenges, rushed towards acquiring its own nuclear arsenal (and nuclear scientific-industrial complex to support it), which was believed, and not without a reason, to be a guarantee for national survival in the face of U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons during 1945-1949. That was also the case when, in 1954 the world’s first nuclear power plant, connected to the grid was opened in the city of Obninsk not far from Moscow. Approximately one decade later, in mid-1960s, due to the advent of nuclear –tipped ICBMs and SLBMs in sufficient quantities the U.S. and the Soviet Union arrived at the shared conclusion of mutual vulnerability and of the need to cooperatively regulate and limit their strategic nuclear arms race, both in its offensive and defensive segments (certainly, the lessons of Cuban missile crisis played a big role). That opened the door for a whole series of bilateral, but also multilateral, agreements on arms control, disarmament, prevention of nuclear war and confidence building. Not everything was smooth; in the first half of the 1980s the crisis over Euromissiles pushed the world much closer to a nuclear conflagration. At that time both Moscow and Washington found the way to defuse the crisis by concluding the INF treaty. 6 Foreword

But of equally high importance was a widely shared perception in the world that nuclear negotiations between the two superpowers were absolutely necessary not just in themselves, but as a stabilizing instrument in the context of improving their relations in general and, thus contributing to global stability. Then there have been several nuclear accidents, some with devastating consequences and many lives lost. Chernobyl disaster on 26 April 1986 was in all probability, the worst of them. It resulted in severe radioactive contami- nation of significant areas not only in the vicinity of that explosion itself – in the northern part of present-day Ukraine, but also in vast adjacent areas of Belarus and Russia, with radioactive cloud then traveling up to northern Europe and then south, to central Europe. The Chernobyl disaster has been correctly portrayed in many research papers and books (including this one) as a symbol of decay of the Soviet system of governance and of the then prevail- ing “culture” of secrecy in the USSR. But I feel obliged to add two more ob- servations, based on personal experience: Chernobyl opened the eyes of the Soviet leadership and of M. Gorbachev in particular, to the horrors of nuclear war and to the pressing need to prevent it, and it also became a starting point of a very serious, systemic change in the mindset of the Soviet leadership towards genuine transparency, openness and accountability in the military and nuclear spheres. And in the end, it changed a lot in the complex relationship among various power centers in the country. During the initial post-Soviet period Russian nuclear complex – both on the military and civilian sides – had to go through very difficult times, but it had survived and eventually after many trials and tribulations (and reorgani- zations) became again a show-case of modern Russia. On the military side nuclear weapons almost immediately started to play a more prominent role in the country’s defense – due to a number of systemic weaknesses affecting conventional forces. For example, Russia quickly abandoned a long-standing Soviet position in favor of the Non-First-Use of nuclear weapons. Both in the elites’ and popular mindsets nuclear weapons have again re-emerged as the ultimate protectors of the country’s independence. But, in reality, the increased reliance on nuclear weapons did not go as far as it could seem from the statements and articles of nuclear weapons enthusiasts in Russia and of a Foreword 7 number of analysts and officials in the West. Nuclear saber-rattling by ama- teurish politicians and officials speaking above their pay grades is being dis- couraged; there is no such thing as “Russian escalate to de-escalate doctrine”, and, with the gradual but solid improvement of non-nuclear capabilities of the Russian armed forces, there is growing attention being paid to strategic non- nuclear deterrence. And some of the latest additions to the Russian nuclear strategic forces have reduced further their vulnerability to any missile defense systems that may be deployed in foreseeable future by other nations. Does that mean that we can hope to return to an ordinary process of nuclear reductions? Unfortunately, not. The book “Nuclear Russia” is coming out at the crucial and difficult period for nuclear (and, in fact not just nuclear) arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament. To put it squarely, towards the end of the second decade of the 21st century this process ended up in deep systemic crisis (like many other areas of international life). Today we observe seemingly relentless disintegration of the whole system of arms control and disarmament agreements, many of which have direct bearing on nuclear weapons and nuclear risks. The only remaining nuclear weapons reduction treaty, the New START, binding on the two major nuclear powers – Russia and the US is expiring in February 2021, and the prospects for its extension are becoming weaker almost day by day (although, at the time of writing, in April 2020, they still do exist). A key nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaty – CTBT, the one prohibiting nuclear testing – was negotiated in 1996, but is still very far from entering into force, and there is a risk of the US withdrawing its signature. There are no bilateral negotiations between Russia and the US on nuclear weapons – and no multilateral negotiations, for example, on the non-production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. And while it seemed that by early 1990s the biggest nuclear weapon states have more or less achieved one key objective of Article VI of the NPT – cessation of the nuclear arms race – today there is a real risk of its renewal. On top of all that there are renewed attempts to re- introduce concepts of limited nuclear war, that can be winnable, and to challenge the historic dictum by Presidents Gorbachev and Reagan that nuclear 8 Foreword war can never be won and must never be fought. The military conflicts around the globe are multiplying, and some of them might lead to situations where use of nuclear weapons might be thinkable. Atmosphere of deep distrust has become a dominant feature of relations among nuclear-weapon states and between them and non-nuclear-weapon states. It is, of course, deeply depressing to see that nothing (or almost nothing) works today. Too many factors and parameters, which used to define, govern and sustain nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, are now in flux. It would take much more than this short foreword to develop a good account of all relevant reasons for that, but the main one is worth mentioning. We are living through major global redistribution of power – economic, political and military – both among regions and individual nations, and the emergence of a multi-polar world. This process is anything but linear or even, and certainly not synchronized; it is driven, for each country and region, by unique combination of factors. In fact, the first phase, which started in early 1990s with the demise of the Soviet Union and continued for 20 or so years, looked more as transition from duopoly to monopoly, with the U.S. and U.S.- led system of alliances and temporary coalitions taking dominant positions in most aspects of international relations. But when the pendulum started swing- ing back, when Russia re-emerged (rather unexpectedly to some) as the most formidable military power and China already overtaking the US economi- cally, it was not surprising a good part of U.S. and other Western elites reacted with nervousness, shock, confrontational instincts and more investment in military solutions to the issues which cannot be resolved militarily. This probably explains to a large degree the U.S. reluctance to accept constraints on its military options. “Nuclear Russia” is not a textbook for students – it reflects the research done by respective authors, their appreciation of hard facts and, to some extent, personal attitudes and ways of looking at things. A critical eye would probably notice some room for improvement. In my view, some chapters are too heavy on the narrative side at the expense of the authors` own conclusions, and conclusions are often supported by references to the views of the “grands” of Russian non-proliferation and arms control community. Many Foreword 9 quotes of Russian official statements (which is inevitable while discussing Russian political positions) sometimes appear static and overlook the fact that some of them could have been issued in a certain historical, political or diplomatic context and have been overtaken by events. One could find some popular clichés that migrate from one study to another without being properly verified. That said, the book contains a lot of well-researched material and will be of use to a wide range of readers and scholars.

Sergey Batsanov, Ambassador (ret.), Member of PUGWASH Council, Member of the Advisory Board of Master Program “Strategic and Arms Control Studies’’ at Saint-Petersburg State University

Part I

Strategy and Politics

1 Nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy

Andrey Pavlov

Nuclear military strategy of any state possessing nuclear weapons always combines openness with secrecy and their ratio varies depending on variety of circumstances. Openness and secrecy are the inherent elements of any nuclear doctrine, so there can be no complete clarity regarding its contents. All this fully applies to the Russian nuclear strategy. The document entitled “Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence until 2020” was adopted in 2010, but its contents were not disclosed. In June 2020, a new version of this document was developed and this time the Government decided to make it public. On the one hand, for the sake of deterrence and strategic stability it is necessary to make sure that potential adversaries have a certain degree of clarity regarding the Russian nuclear arsenal, its composition and the main prerequisites for its use. On the other hand, nuclear arms belong in an area of government secrecy and one should hardly expect a high degree of openness. In order to ensure credible deterrence, any nuclear doctrine intentionally preserves a certain degree of ambiguity and in modern doctrines of nuclear states the level of ambiguity often tends to be quite high. In the context of increasing tensions in the Russian-U.S. relations, the demand for an adequate assessment of the role that nuclear weapons play in the Russian nuclear strategy is also growing. At the same time, growing mutual suspicion and mistrust create an array of problems even in the expert communities. As a result, a multitude of different assessments emerges with varying combinations of reality, wrong interpretations and myths. In this chapter we undertake to outline the openly stated conceptual foundations of the Russian nuclear doctrine, the interconnection between them and their place in the overall military strategy of the state. In order to provide the correct interpretation of concepts, one will need to trace their development – from ideas to officially codified doctrinal provisions. Although the details of the Russian nuclear doctrine are not disclosed, its fundamental principles are recorded in published official documents. Approved in 2010, then expanded and edited in 2014, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation thus represents the viewpoint of the Russian leadership on the role of nuclear weapons: “Nuclear weapons will remain an important factor of preventing an outbreak of nuclear military conflicts and conflicts involving the use of conventional arms (large-scale war or regional war).”1 Already this

1 In certain translations of the Military Doctrine, this paragraph looks somewhat different: “Nuclear weapons will remain an important factor of preventing an outbreak of nuclear military conflicts involving the use of conventional arms (large-scale war or regional war).” (Website of the Russian Embassy in the UK: https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029), however, in the official Rus- sian version, the Doctrine talks precisely about the prevention of both types of conflicts – nuclear and non-nuclear, https://rg.ru/ 2014/12/30 / doktrina-dok.html. 14 A. Pavlov provision, as well as the absence of a no-first-use provision in the Doctrine, indicates that Russia suggests the possibility of using nuclear weapons not only in response to a nuclear strike, but also in response to aggression involving conventional weapons only. This position is most clearly formulated in the following provision of the Military Doctrine: “The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” This formula is repeated in the “Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence” of June 2020.

Development of Russian strategic nuclear forces One of the most respected Russian experts on nuclear strategy issues, Alexei Arbatov, wrote: «The monstrous destructive power and technical complexity of existing nuclear forces practically made the most important political decisions hostage to the strategic concepts and operational plans developed in military departments and headquarters long before the armed conflict. Furthermore, these plans were dictated by the technical characteristics of weapons and their information-control systems».2 Thus, before proceeding with an analysis of the role of nuclear weapons in Russian military strategy, it is necessary to understand the resources available to the Russian Armed Forces and the capacity to which they can be used. In early 1990-s Russia inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal. After the dissolution of the USSR four new states found themselves with nuclear arms in their territory – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Significant number of nuclear missiles and bombers, as well as storage facilities with nuclear weapons components, including ready-for-use warheads, were outside Rus- sian borders. Moreover, there were tactical nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine. Russia became the only successor state of the Soviet Union as a nuclear weapon state (NWS) under the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the other three joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). By the end of 1996 withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine to Russia was completed. Ensuring guaranteed nuclear deterrence was always one of the key priorities for the Soviet military strategy, and Russia inherited this priority together with the Soviet nuclear arsenal. After the dissolution of the USSR it seemed for a while that the situation could change. As far as strategic stability was concerned, United States was still considered the main opponent. However, in the new state of affairs that developed in the 1990s, some Russian experts believed that Russia’s nuclear forces no longer need to maintain parity with the US nuclear forces in order to maintain strategic

2 Ⱥ. Ⱥɪɛɚɬɨɜ. Ɋɨɥɶɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɹɜɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɣɫɬɚɛɢɥɶɧɨɫɬɢ. Ƚɚɪɚɧ- ɬɢɹɢɥɢɭɝɪɨɡɚ? (Aleksei Arbatov, The Role of Nuclear Deterrence in Strategic Stability. Guar- antee or Threat?), (Moscow Carnegie Centrer, January 28 2019), https:// carnegie.ru/2019/01/28/ru-pub-78209. Nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy 15 stability.3 But soon everything went back to business as usual. In the 1990s Russian political and military leadership accepted the main nuclear strategy concepts of the Cold War era without making any fundamental changes. Various factors had an impact on further post-Soviet development of the Russian nuclear forces. Traditionally, decisions in the field of government contracts for development and production of military equipment and armaments rely on complex analysis of material and non- material factors. Complex military equipment requires an exceptionally high level of training from research and development, engineering and military personnel, and – which is less obvious, but no less important – specialized knowledge from persons making decisions regarding weapons development, use or disposal. The processes around high-tech military equipment involve different economic sectors and a large number of people. Decisions in this field have long-term and complex implications and envisage multi-stage implementation. Depending on specific features of this or that weapons complex, it takes from 15 to 25 years to develop the new equipment and put it into service. In order to completely replace the earlier adopted military equipment and armaments with new systems, one needs additional time that, depending on different factors, can be measured in years and even dozens of years. In the nuclear missile era, the cycle of decision making and implementation lasts decades. In 2012 Vladimir Putin, then Chairman of the Russian Government, mentioned the period of 30-50 years as a planning and forecasting cycle in development of the national military industrial complex.4 All programs associated with development of state-of-the-art military systems are long-term, especially in the nuclear weapons field. However, at today’s stage of science and technology development new systems are created based on existing ones. That is why R&D and production capacity and accumulated technological experience are of primary importance not only from the standpoint of feasibility of armed forces modernization, but also from the standpoint of rational spending of funds allocated for defense and preservation of the state’s ability to flexibly and timely respond to changes in the international political and military arena. Nuclear weapons systems that Russia has at its disposal now are the result of decisions made soon after the end of the Cold War. It was then that the foundations of Russian-U.S. relations were reexamined. As a result, the un- derlying principles of defense policy were subjected to serious revision, which predetermined the fundamentally new logic of bilateral strategic arms control system. At the time of the Cold War the Soviet Union considered the

3 More about that: Andrey Pavlov, Anastasia Malygina, The Russian Approach to Strategic Stability in The End of Strategic Stability? Nuclear Weapons and the Challenge of Regional Rivalries, ed. Lawrence Rubin and Adam N. Stulberg (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018). 4 Transcript of the meeting in Sarov (February 21, 2012) between Vladimir Putin and experts on global threats to national security, strengthening of defense capability and enhancement of combat readiness of the Russian Armed Forces, Archive of the Website of the Chairman of the Russian Government Vladimir Putin, http://archive. premier.gov.ru/events/news/18248/. 16 A. Pavlov

Unites States exclusively as an adversary, but following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in Russia there was a brief period during which existed an illusion of the United States as a potential strategic partner. In the context of strategic partnership that seemed to be forming Russia made multiple rather important concessions in bilateral arms control. The gradual deterioration of relations between Russia and the West turned into a serious crisis shortly after the start of the events taking place in and around Ukraine. All that may have triggered the beginning of serious shifts throughout the international relations system that one can only compare in scale to the collapse of bipolar system. In terms of magnitude, the changes that national security concepts are undergoing against the backdrop of Ukrainian crisis might also be compared only to the changes in the Russian- U.S. relations immediately after the end of the Cold War. Decisions made now will obviously predetermine the prospects of nuclear forces development up until the middle of the 21st century. Another important factor that influenced the development of nuclear forces were the restrictions imposed by bilateral Russian-American arms control agreements. In order to evaluate the present state of the Russian strategic forces and technological potential for their modernization, one should recall some historical aspects of Russian-U.S. strategic arms control talks.5 It was still the Soviet Union that entered into the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) talks with the United States. In July 1991 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the treaty on behalf of the USSR, but it entered into force in 1994, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. So it was Russia that was to implement the treaty provisions, along with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine that also joined START-I and were to possess no nuclear weapons under the treaty. Therefore, START-I was drafted in one geopolitical and economic context and was to be implemented in a different one. At the same time, the treaty imposed rather serious limitations on development of Russian nuclear forces, which influenced their today’s configuration. START-I imposed a ban on production, testing and deployment of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of a new type, as well as heavy submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy mobile ICBMs and their launchers.6 Heavy ICBMs constituted a foundation of the Soviet strategic forces. Russia, therefore, inherited the architecture of the Soviet strategic forces that relied on ICBMs and at the same time it stemmed from START-I in its strategic planning. This treaty did not impose any restrictions on R&D and experimental design. However, despite the absence of legal obstacles, in the course of ten years after the treaty entered

5 For a more detailed examination of the bilateral arms control regime see Andrey Bodrov’s chapter in this book. 6 START-I, Article V, http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/start-12.htm; https://www. state.gov/documents/organization/27360.pdf) According to the Definitions Annex, “The term "heavy ICBM" means an ICBM of a type, any one of which has a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight greater than 4350 kilograms”, http://www. armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/start1/definitions.txt; https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-tion/ 27362.pdf. Nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy 17 into force Russia did not invest in development of new weapons systems or complexes. A combination of domestic economic and political constraints accounts for this policy of the country’s leadership. In the field of arms control, it was important for Russia as a successor state of the Soviet Union to continue the previous foreign policy course towards further reduction of strategic offensive arms. In July 1992 parameters of the new Russian-U.S. treaty on further limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms were agreed upon. The treaty known as START-II was signed on January 3, 1993 and envisaged not only the ban on creation of new heavy ICBMs, but also the elimination of existing heavy ICBMs and ban on equipping the remaining ones with more than one warhead.7 The entry into force process took years. START-II attracted a good deal of criticism from the Russian political and expert circles; many military experts saw it as disadvantageous and burdensome in many respects. Public debates around it lasted up until 2000. At the same time, at the official level Russia maintained its commitment to the Soviet policy line in the field of strategic arms reduction and continued the talks, aiming to preserve the possibility of implementation should the new agreements enter into force. In 1997 Russia and the United States reached an agreement on extending the deadline of strategic delivery vehicles elimination under START-II. START-II specified the date of implementation: January 1, 2003. The New York Protocol to START-II signed in 1997 stipulated a new deadline for the implementation of treaty provisions: December 31, 2007. A set of documents aimed at preservation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty have also been signed. Russia ratified START-II together with the New York Protocol and ABM agreements in 2000, but the U.S. Congress never ratified the package of documents agreed upon in New York in 1997.8 This story was brought to a close in 2002, when in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty of 1972 Russia declared that it did not consider itself bound by START-II anymore. During the ten years when debates around START-II and the possibility of its entry into force were unfolding, the Russian leadership drafted development plans for the national strategic nuclear forces keeping in mind that it might have to implement the agreements reached with the United States in 1993 and 1997. Furthermore, the need to save budgetary funds allocated for defense forced Russian decision- makers to prioritize the reduction of the number of systems and further unification of strategic missile complexes. It was presumed that gradually, as operational lifetimes expired, all heavy ICBMs would be removed from service. Those missiles that were not covered by START-I and START-II provisions, i.e. non-heavy ICBMs, were to be

7 START-II, Article II, http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/dogovor.htm; https://www. state.gov/t/avc/trty/102887.htm. 8 Ⱥ. Ⱥɧɬɨɧɨɜ, Ʉɨɧɬɪɨɥɶ ɧɚɞ ɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹɦɢ: ɢɫɬɨɪɢɹ, ɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɟ, ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɵ (A.I. Antonov, Arms control: history, state, prospects), (Moscow: 2012), 36–37. 18 A. Pavlov partially eliminated and partially transformed into single-warhead missiles. The 1990s were the time of severe economic hardship for Russia. The government had not enough resources for research and development and experimental design work for future use, just for the sake of preserving the accumulated technological experience. So it prioritized only those systems that did not fall under bans stipulated in START-II that was awaiting ratification. Es- sentially, only single-warhead and non-heavy ICBMs met this requirement among the land-based components of strategic nuclear forces. It was then that a decision was made to develop the main advanced system for the land-based component of strategic nuclear forces on the basis of the single-warhead solid-propellant Topol missile (RS-12M) that was developed and introduced into service in the 1980s. But the problems of Russian strategic nuclear forces did not end there. Two types of missiles were the core of the land-based component of the Rus- sian nuclear triad: heavy RS-18 missiles capable of carrying up to 6 warheads and heavy RS-20 missiles. The latter, known as the Satan in the West, could carry up to 10 warheads and were the heaviest in the Soviet arsenal inherited by Russia. RS-20 complex was developed and manufactured by Yuzhnoe design bureau in the city of Dnepropetrovsk and after the dissolution of the So- viet Union it found itself in independent Ukraine. Engaging a foreign design office in maintenance and service life extension of Russian missiles was a forced choice, but developing new systems in collaboration with a Ukrainian design office was not an option for the Russian leadership. Furthermore, in the 1990s Russia actively reduced the number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Russia could not afford to maintain the large submarine fleet it inherited from the USSR, which in addition to the difficulties caused by its size was also quickly becoming obsolete. At the same time, construction of the new, fourth, generation of SSBNs proceeded at a very slow pace. Construction of the first submarine of the Pro- ject 955 Borei started in 1996 and it was put into the water only twelve years later. Complex problems that Russia was experiencing at the time also had an effect on the speed of missile development for Borei project submarines. Bu- lava missile was under development since 1998, but seven failed test launches significantly delayed introducing it into service. Thus, by the end of the 2000s Russian strategic nuclear forces largely consisted of missiles produced in the 1970–80s, the operational life of which was extended multiple times. As far as START-II never entered into force, Russia was de jure free from obligation to eliminate heavy missiles and missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). However, up until December 2009, when START-I expired, Russia could not manufacture and test new heavy missiles. In the 2000s Russia actively removed single-warhead Topol missiles, heavy RS- 20 systems and heavy RS-18 ICBMs from its strategic nuclear forces. Single-warhead Topol M (RS-12M) came to supersede them. In the early 2010s Russian arsenal of strategic nuclear forces also acquired Yars complexes (RS-24) created on the basis of Topol M and capable of carrying three MIRVs. After the expiration of START-I, restrictions on testing and production of heavy missiles were removed. The new START signed in 2010 did A. Pavlov Nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy 19 not include bans such as the ones specified in the previous treaties. START-I was to expire in December 2009. A year before, in December 2008, Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces Colonel-General Niko- lai Solovtsov announced that Russian specialists were developing a new heavy missile that in terms of characteristics would be on a par with RS- 20 complex.9 In December 2009 Strategic Missile Forces Commander Lieutenant General Andrei Shvaichenko announced the Russian leadership’s plan to create a new heavy missile by the end of 201610. Later on, this missile came to be known as Sarmat (RS-28). In June 2014 Colonel Vladimir Evseev, director of the Center for Socio-Political Studies, voiced his supposition that Sarmat complex developed by Academician V.P. Makeev Design Bureau was to go on combat duty by 2018–2020.11 According to updated data, mass production of this system will begin in 2021. Over the recent years, intensive modernization of the Russian strategic nuclear forces went on. RS-24 ICBMs with MIRVs (Yars) entered into service. The testing of a new light RS-26 missile (Rubezh) began in 2011. In 2013 experimental design work was launched to create a new military railroad missile complex.12 Missile systems for submarines were also undergoing modernization. In 2007 new RSM-54 submarine- launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) Sineva entered into service; they are capable of carrying from 4 to 10 warheads and are a modernized version of missiles produced from mid-1980s to mid-1990s. In 2014 the modernized version of Sineva – Lainer missile entered into service.13 In 2012 serial production of Bulava SLBMs was started. One should note that, as Alexei Arbatov believes, in the future existence of such a large number of projects might lead to considerable increase in spending, which in turn can significantly slow down the introduction of new complexes into service.14 Indeed, economic downturn since 2014 somewhat impeded the creation and production of new weapons. What is not entirely clear is the fate of the new military railroad missile complex project, as design work was suspended for financial reasons. The first test launches of Sarmat complex missile started in late 2017 after several delays.

9 Press release at NEWSru.com, http://www.newsru.com/russia/19dec2008/raketa.html. 10 “Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ ɫɨɡɞɚɫɬ ɡɚɦɟɧɭ «ɋɚɬɚɧɟ» Russia will create a replacement for Satan”. 16 December 2009, Lenta.ru, lenta.ru/news/2009/12/16/antisatan/. 11ȼɆɭɯɢɧ, “«ɋɚɬɚɧɚ» ɩɨɫɥɭɠɢɬɊɨɫɫɢɢɟɳɟɩɹɬɶɥɟɬ” (V. Mukhin, “Satan will serve Russia for another five years”), Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 June 2014, http://www. ng.ru/armies/2014-06-23/1_satan.html. 12 “Ɋɨɫɫɢɹɜɨɫɫɨɡɞɚɟɬɛɨɟɜɵɟɠɟɥɟɡɧɨɞɨɪɨɠɧɵɟɪɚɤɟɬɧɵɟɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɵ” (Russia is rec- reating railroad combat missiles complexes), RIA Novosti, 23 April 2013, http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130423/934029183.html#13667004582993&message=resize&relto =register&action=addClass&value=registration. 13 " «Ʌɚɣɧɟɪ» ɩɨɣɞɟɬ ɜ ɬɢɪɚɠ" (“Lainer will be mass-produced”), Interfax, 6 October 2011, http://www.interfax.ru/politics/txt.asp?id=210987&sw=%EB%E0%E9%ED%E5%F0&bd =6&bm=9&by=2011&ed=6&em=10&ey=2011&secid=0&mp=2&p=1. 14 ȺȺɪɛɚɬɨɜ. “əɞɟɪɧɵɣ ɩɨɬɨɥɨɤ” (A. Arbatov. “Nuclear ceiling”), Voenno- promyshlennyi kurier, no. 26, 23 July 2014, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/21133. 20 A. Pavlov

The basic development priorities for the Russian nuclear forces are outlined in the Russian State Armament Program to 2020, while Vladimir Putin specified the details of the complex modernization plan in several public statements. For instance, in February 2012 he, then head of the Russian government, noted that in the course of the next ten years over 400 new land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles would enter into service, along with eight new missile-carrying submarines, while the existing fleet of strategic bombers will be preserved and modernized.15 A few days later in Sarov during the meeting with national security experts Putin stated that from 2008 to 2011 Russian strategic nuclear forces had already received 39 new intercontinental ballistic missiles.16 Some experts voiced their doubts regarding the feasibility of the announced plans.17 At the same time, in early 2019, Putin was already talking about the introduction of 80 new ICBMs and 102 new SLBMs.18 In general the reduction of delivery vehicle and warhead numbers went on. This was due to the commitments under the New START of 2010 and operational life expiration of old complexes. A short time before the expiration of START-I (as of January 1, 2009) official sources estimated that, under the START-I counting rules, Russia had 814 deployed strategic delivery vehicles and 3,909 warheads.19 Five years later, as of September 1, 2014, the information exchange data revealed that, under the New START counting rules, Russian nuclear arsenal consisted of 528 deployed delivery vehicles and 1,643 warheads attributed to them, as well as 383 non-deployed delivery vehicles (START-I did not take non- deployed delivery systems into account).20 Considerable reduction was evident. The number of deployed delivery systems was already much smaller than what the New START allowed, and the warheads ceiling was exceeded by less than 100 warheads. In February 2018 Russia presented official data on implementation of its obligations under the START treaty of 2010. According to these data, under the New START counting rules, there were: 1444 warheads on deployed ICBMs, SSBNs and heavy bombers; 527 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers; 779 deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed and

15 ȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪ ɉɭɬɢɧ: "Ȼɵɬɶ ɫɢɥɶɧɵɦɢ: ɝɚɪɚɧɬɢɢ ɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɣ ɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ ɞɥɹ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ" (Vladimir Putin: “To be strong: national security guarantees for Russia”), Rossiiskaia gazeta. February 17 2012. 16 Transcript of the meeting in Sarov of Vladimir Putin and experts on global threats to national security, strengthening of defense capability and enhancement of combat readiness of the Russian Armed Forces. Archive of the Website of the Chairman of the Russian Government Vladimir Putin, archive.premier.gov.ru/visits/ru/18238/events/18248/. 17 See, for instance, ɘɪɢɣɎɟɞɨɪɨɜ. “Ƚɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɚɹɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɚɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɣ” – 2020: ɜɥɚɫɬɶ ɢ ɩɪɨɦɵɲɥɟɧɧɨɫɬɶ (Yu. Fedorov. “State Armament Program 2020: Authorities and Industry”), Indeks bezopastnosti 19, no. 4 (107). 18 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly. March 1, 2018 // http://en. kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 19ȼ. ȿɫɢɧ. “əɞɟɪɧɵɟɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹɢɩɨɞɯɨɞɵȼɚɲɢɧɝɬɨɧɚ” (V. Yesin. “Nuclear weapons: Washington’s approaches”), Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 13 March 2009. 20 New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. Fact Sheet. January 1, 2015. Nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy 21 non-deployed heavy bombers. Thus, Russia, like the United States, fulfilled the obligation to reduce strategic nuclear weapons below the levels established by New START by the beginning of 2018. One should note that according to some expert estimates, at that time 532 of those warheads were on old R-36M (SS-18) and Topol (SS-25) ICBNs that are scheduled to be removed from operational service in 2021–2022.21 Opera- tional life of these missiles was extended multiple times. In the case of some systems, it reached an impressive figure of 30 years. Extension of operational life of missile systems is associated with a number of difficulties. In 2014 operational life of SS-18 missile system was extended to 27 years, and for the first time it was done without a test launch.22 It is quite probable that operational life of some of the most recent among old-generation missiles would be extended, but only for a period required to produce enough new missiles to completely replace the outdated complexes. Increase in the number of SSBNs is not planned either. By the early 2020s only 8 new SSBNs ought to be in commission, which means that as new SSBNs are joining the fleet, old ones are going to be decommissioned. Russia’s strategic triad is actively revamped and the country spares neither trouble nor expense on development of its strategic nuclear forces. No doubt, modernization of the Russian nuclear arsenal is one of the key priorities. At the same time, strategic nuclear forces development plans fully conform with the limits outlined in the New START treaty. In his March 1st, 2018 annual message to the Russian Federal Assem- bly, President Putin announced the development and testing of perspective strategic weapons systems in Russia, including nuclear ones. More specifically, the speech covered the already mentioned ICBM Sarmat, new warheads for ballistic missiles – missile’s gliding cruise blocs, as well as sophisticated air-launched nuclear-powered cruise missile, and unmanned nuclear-powered underwater vehicles – all of them capable of carrying nuclear warheads. If deployed, the first two systems will be subject to the limitations of the New START. The remaining systems, which can also be characterized as strategic and nuclear, will not be limited by the treaty since it only targets ICBM, SLBM, heavy bombers and warheads that can be deployed on them. Putin emphasized that this is the way Russia intends to respond to the deployment of the US global missile defense system. Separately, it is worth mentioning the non-strategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons. Official data regarding their exact numbers and types have never been published, so at this point in time, we can rely solely on experts opinions. According to one of the world's leading independent think-tank Stock- holm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2018, Russia had approximately 1830 warheads for non-strategic launchers. A special feature of this type of weapon is that most launchers can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads.23

21 Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces portal, http://russianforces.org/rus/missiles/. 22 ȼ. Ɇɭɯɢɧ, “«ɋɚɬɚɧɚ» ɩɨɫɥɭɠɢɬ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ ɟɳɟ ɩɹɬɶ ɥɟɬ” (V. Mukhin. “«Satan» will serve Russia for another five years”), Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 June 2014. 23 Shannon N. Kile, Hans M. Kristensen, World nuclear force in SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (2019). 22 A. Pavlov

Amongst Russia’s forces, the Navy is the one with the largest number and variety of systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Its arsenal consists of about 810 nuclear charges including warheads for land-attack cruise missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-submarine rockets, torpedoes, depth charges, and weapons carried by naval aviation. Additional non-strategic nuclear weapons are also in the arsenal of the Russian Aerospace Forces (Air Defense and Air Force) and Land Forces. The concept of operations of these weapons is not disclosed, but in discussions regarding the prospects for the development of Russia's nuclear strategy, a special place is usually reserved for this particular subject.

From nuclear to ‘strategic’ deterrence Nuclear weapons were considered the primary means of deterrence during the Cold War. In the 1990s due to drastic decrease in over-all combat capability of the armed forces, an idea was rather popular that nuclear weapons remain the main national security guarantee, as well as a key factor in Russia’s influence on global affairs. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted in 2000 mentions deterrence only in connection with nuclear weapons. At the time one should not have expected a decrease in the role of nuclear weapons in the overall military strategy of the state. On the contrary, one could expect an expanded scope of tasks pursued with their help. Numerical strength of the Russian armed forces was still quite high, but their combat capability was steadily declining. Weapons were becoming outdated, equipment was wearing off, and practically no new systems were introduced. A declining share of weapons and equipment could be considered modern. All this was happening against the backdrop of steady increase in technical and technological level of U.S. armed forces and those of other NATO countries. At the same time, these problems were not as acute in the field of nuclear arms. Reduction of Russian nuclear weapons was taking place within the framework of the Russian-U.S. agreements, which enabled Russia to maintain the parity of capabilities vis-à-vis the United States. Nuclear arsenals of all other nuclear-weapon states were still incomparable with those of Russia or the United States. Besides, France and United Kingdom were unilaterally reducing their arsenals. There was no clear technological inferiority either. The level of technological development reached by the Soviet Union allowed maintaining the leadership position in the nuclear field for a long time, while other nuclear powers, with the exception of China, did not deem it necessary to invest large funds into development of military nuclear programs and associated technologies. In parallel with this, the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring national security was being reconsidered. The idea of expanding the scope of tasks for the nuclear forces looked very attractive, and preservation of a powerful nuclear arsenal at the time when conventional weapons were in decline seemed to make that option logical. However, it was not easy to figure out what tasks, apart from traditional ones, nuclear forces were capable of pursuing. The probability of a large-scale war seemed low, and the possibility of using nuclear arms to deter other threats was not evident. One should note that other nuclear powers, particularly the United States, France and United Kingdom, Nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy 23 faced a similar challenge. It was not easy to determine the role of nuclear arms at the time when global confrontation was over. The notion of “deterrence strategy” was also under review. During the Cold War an understanding that deterrence strategy relies primarily on the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons was not questioned. At the time when the threat of a large-scale military conflict went down and the range of threats expanded significantly, one needed to review the deterrence concept itself. The Russian Military Doctrine of 2000 mentions deterrence only in connection with nuclear weapons. Later on, the situation started to change. In 2003 the Russian Ministry of Defense published a document entitled “The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” where the term “strategic deterrence” was used, but its meaning was not yet defined.24 This term was used in combination with the term “strategic deterrent forces” that comprised land-based, air-based and sea-based strategic nuclear arms. So at the time one only meant deterrence using nuclear force. Further on, the notion of “strategic deterrence” underwent gradual transformation. In 2005 Voennaya Mysl journal published an article written by researchers from the Centre for Military-Strategic Studies (CMSS) of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (presently – Centre for Military- Strategic Studies of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces) and entitled “Conceptual Foundations of Strategic Deter- rence.” As far as one of the main lines of work for CMSS is drafting recommendations for the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces, one can assume that this article outlined some CMSS suggestions regarding the official state concept of strategic deterrence. The authors defined strategic deterrence as follows: “Strategic deterrence is a complex of measures in political, economic, military and other areas undertaken by the state unilaterally or as part of a coalition and aimed at instilling on the adversary an understanding that it would fail to achieve its military-political goals by violent methods, because it would face unacceptable consequences as a result of retaliatory actions.”25 It is important to note that in this case it was assumed that deterrence strategy would be pursued by both military and non-military means. How- ever, the general idea was based on the principle typical for nuclear deterrence: inflicting unacceptable damage in response to violent actions of a military-political nature. As for the use of armed forces to implement the deterrence strategy, the authors emphasized the role of both strategic nuclear forces and general operation forces, including non-nuclear ones. Development of strategic deterrence concept went on in subsequent years. Soon after the conflict with Georgia, on September 22, 2008, President of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences General of the Army Makhmut

24 Krasnaya zvesda, 11 October 2003. 25 ȺɅ. ɏɪɹɩɢɧ, ȼȺ. Ⱥɮɚɧɚɫɶɟɜ, “Ʉɨɧɰɟɩɬɭɚɥɶɧɵɟ ɨɫɧɨɜɵ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɞɟɪ- ɠɢɜɚɧɢɹ” (A.L. Khriapin, V.A. Afanasiev. “Conceptual foundations of strategic deterrence”), Voennaya Mysl, no. 1 (2005): 8-9. 24 A. Pavlov

Gareev made his remarks at the roundtable involving military commanders and politicians at Peter the Great Military Academy of Strategic Missile Forces. He suggested introducing a uniform understanding of the term “strategic deterrence” at the official level. His presentation defined the notion as follows: “Complex of interconnected political, diplomatic, informational, economic, military and others measures aimed to deter, reduce and prevent threats and aggressive actions by any state (coalition of states) by means of countermeasures alleviating the concern of the opposite party or by an adequate threat of unacceptable consequences to be inflicted upon it as a result of retaliatory actions. Strategic deterrence is ensured by efforts and defense power of the entire state.”26 It is interesting to note that Gareev’s proposal suggests supplementing the threat of retaliation with positive measures to alleviate the opponent’s security concerns. Soon the term “strategic deterrence” came up in the Na- tional Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 adopted in May 2009 and then in the Military Doctrine of 2010. These documents do not offer precise definitions of the term, but in them and their subsequent versions strategic deterrence implies uniting military and non-military efforts to prevent the use of military force against Russia. Although strategic deterrence concept implies the use of not only military force, but all of the tools at the state’s disposal, the military were the first ones to try and clarify the practical meaning of the new concept. However, there was no clarity in that matter for a rather long time. Lead- ing CMSS experts on nuclear strategy Colonels Viacheslav Matvichuk and Aleksandr Khriapin published an article in January 2010, where they offered only the most general outline of the future path for conceptual foundations and the system of combined (nuclear and non-nuclear) strategic deterrence.27 While the tasks and functions of nuclear weapons were generally clear, because they remained fundamentally unchanged, one had yet to understand how non-nuclear weapons would fit in the system of strategic deterrence. Therefore, strategic role of non-nuclear (conventional) weapons was studied in parallel with development of strategic deterrence concept, and the next section will examine how this line of strategic thought evolved.

Strategic function of non-nuclear weapons: Russian threat perception As it often happens, practical interest in strategic role of conventional weapons emerged among the Russian military as a result of a new turn in U.S. strategy. Russia closely monitored the evolution of the non-nuclear

26 ɆȺȽɚɪɟɟɜ, “ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɟ ɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɟ: ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ ɢ ɪɟɲɟɧɢɹ” (M.A. Gareev. “Strategic deterrence: problems and solution”s), Krasnaya zvezda, 8 October, 2008, http:// old.redstar.ru/2008/10/08_10/2_04.html. 27ȼȼ. Ɇɚɬɜɢɱɭɤ, ȺɅ. ɏɪɹɩɢɧ, “ɋɢɫɬɟɦɚɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɹɜɧɨɜɵɯɭɫ- ɥɨɜɢɹɯ” (V.V. Matvichuk, A.L. Khriapin, “The system of strategic deterrence under new conditions”), Voennaya Mysl, no. 1 (2010): 11–16. Nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy 25 weapons use concept in the U.S. deterrence strategy. For the first time intention to combine nuclear and non-nuclear means within the single strategic concept was officially announced in the new U.S. nuclear doctrine that was made public in January 2002.28 The New Triad envisaged the combination of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear), means of active and passive defense and revitalized defense infrastructure that allows responding to emerging threats in a timely fashion. Already in February 2002 Za- rubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie journal (Foreign Military Review) featured an article analyzing the new U.S. nuclear strategy, where its author specifically noted the U.S. intention to combine nuclear and non-nuclear arms within the single complex.29 Further development of various American concepts of combining nuclear and non-nuclear forces continued to attract close attention of Rus- sian military experts. It was clear that combat capabilities of some modern high-tech systems can be of strategic significance. This was primarily about air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles that have sufficient firing range and accuracy to hit strategic launchers, as well as about intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles equipped with non-nuclear warheads. Special attention was paid to studying the role of strategic defensive arms, primarily ballistic missile defense system, which the United States has been working on since its withdrawal from the 1972 ABM treaty in 2002. Gradually, an understanding solidified that one can use the state-of-the- art long-range precision-guided systems, on their own or in combination with strategic nuclear forces, both to strengthen the deterrent potential of one’s own nuclear forces and to undermine the opponent’s potential. For instance, one of renowned experts on this matter Evgeniy Miasnikov as early as in 2000 paid attention to counterforce potential of precision-guided non-nuclear weapons. He thought that, should the size of the Russian nuclear arsenal decline, growing potential of modern precision-guided munition (PGM) of the United States would become one of the factors reducing the deterrent potential of Russian nuclear weapons.30 In case of “disarming” or “counterforce” first strike against Russian strategic nuclear weapons, the United States would significantly decrease Russia’s ability to launch a retaliatory strike. The Russian side considered American concept of Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) the most evident expression of U.S. intent to increase the significance of nonnuclear weapons. Evgeny Miasnikov believed that one should not overestimate the value of precision-guided weapons, but at the same time “in the medium-term, PGM is a bigger threat for the survival of Russian strategic offensive weapons than missile defense (BMD) because a breakthrough in the development of missile defense, which would increase their effectiveness against ICBM, is not likely, and because the United States

28 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 8 January, 2002, https://fas.org/wp- content/uploads/media/Excerpts-of-Classified-Nuclear-Posture-Review.pdf. 29ɂɂɜɚɧɨɜ. “ɇɨɜɚɹɹɞɟɪɧɚɹɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɹɋɒȺ” (I. Ivanov, “New U.S. nuclear strategy”), Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie, no. 2 (2002): 9–10. 30ȿȼɆɹɫɧɢɤɨɜ, “ȼɵɫɨɤɨɬɨɱɧɨɟ ɨɪɭɠɢɟɢ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣɛɚɥɚɧɫ” (E.V. Miasnikov, “Precision-guided weapons and strategic equilibrium”), (Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Dolgoprudny, 2000), 5–6. 26 A. Pavlov already has a large number of high-precision weapons that are continuously improved and multiplied.”31 These assessments corresponded to perceptions that were spreading in political and military circles. Referring to multiple statements of the Rus- sian military officials, the authors of “Non-Nuclear Factors of Nuclear Disarmament” published in 2010 made a well-justified conclusion that “in the top echelons of the Russian military establishment, the military- industrial complex, as well as among the vast majority of the country’s expert community there is an explicit perception of a new and increasing threat from the US and their allies”.32 In July 2013 Russian Vice-Premier Dmitry Rogozin mentioned that according to existing American estimates high-precision weapons at U.S. disposal can destroy 80-90% of the Rus- sian nuclear potential.33 It is difficult to say which estimates Rogozin was referring to, who made those estimates and how trustworthy they were, but this statement characterizes the perceptions that existed in the Russian government. Reduction of strategic nuclear weapons under bilateral agreements was seen as accompanied by unconstrained increase in the number and combat capabilities of strategic non-nuclear weapons, as well as missile defense systems. All these trends taken together were thought to be capable of undermining strategic stability. Russian officials and experts took special note of the plans to equip strategic ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads developed within the CPGS program. In 2009–2010 during the New START talks Russian delegation insisted that this type of weapons be included into the system of limitations. This question could be raised, because treaties dealt with strategic offensive weapons and the START formula did not include the word “nuclear”. As Anatoly Antonov, who led the Russian delegation in the START talks in 2009–2010, emphasized, this wording was the “result of a difficult compromise” with the United States, because Americans always strived to take any non-nuclear systems outside the limitation framework.34 As a result, the Rus- sian delegation succeeded in making sure that the New START of 2010 stipulated the restriction on non-deployed strategic delivery systems, the definition of which covered ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads. Still, Antonov voiced an opinion that Russia would also have to develop its own conventional strategic weapons.

31 E. Miasnikov, “Counterforce potential of precision guided munitions”, in Nuclear Prolif- eration: New Technologies, Weapons and Treaties, ed. A. Arbatov, V. Dvorkin, (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009), 122–123; Precision guided conventional weapons in Nuclear Reset: Arms Reduction and Nonproliferation, ed. By A. Arbatov, V. Dvorkin, (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2011), 421. 32 A. Arbatov, V. Dvorkin, S. Oznobishchev. “Non-nuclear Factors of Nuclear Disarma- ment (Ballistic Missile Defense, High-Precision Conventional Weapons, Space Arms)”, (Mos- cow: IMEMO, 2010), 27–28, https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/en/publ/2010/10045_e.pdf. 33 Remarks by Dmitry Rogozin at Rossiiskaia gazeta press conference, June 26, 2013. https://rg.ru/2013/06/28/doklad.html. 34Ⱥ. Ⱥɧɬɨɧɨɜ, “Ɋɨɫɫɢɹɜɵɧɭɠɞɟɧɚɡɚɧɹɬɶɫɹɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɟɦɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨɨɪɭɠɢɹɜɧɟ- ɹɞɟɪɧɨɦɨɫɧɚɳɟɧɢɢ” (A.Antonov, “Russia is forced to create conventional strategic weapons”), Indeks bezopasnosti 105, no. 2 (2013). Nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy 27 Russian response For a long time the plan was to maintain strategic stability by counterbal- ancing the growing strategic potential of U.S. non-nuclear weapons by high combat capability of nuclear forces and further improvement of strategic nuclear systems. The poor state of Russian armed forces in the 1990s and early 2000s did not leave much reason to hope that Russia would create strategic non-nuclear potential, analogous to what Americans were trying to do. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russian government allocated practically no funds to purchase new equipment, as a result conventional weapons were largely outdated by late 2000s. The situation was not as dire in the nuclear field though. This branch of armed forces was always considered a priority, and military expenditure programs paid the required attention to its preservation and maintenance at an adequate technical level. Besides, the United States were not revamping their nuclear weapons and were not planning to create new ones, thinking that existing systems performed their tasks sufficiently well and preferring to spend money on improvement of conventional weapons. Thus, Russian nuclear weapons remained sufficiently effective despite the overall decrease in military spending. In that context Russian doctrinal thought followed the logic that the United States and NATO used during the Cold War, when they considered nuclear forces as a means to compensate for conventional superiority of the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries in Europe. There was an opposite situation now: Russian nuclear weapons were to compensate for Russia’s conventional inferiority. By the end of 2000s the situation started to change. In 2008 a decision was made to launch a new military reform that envisaged fundamental re- structuring of armed forces. Then in 2010 an ambitious rearmament program was adopted, and for the first time since the end of the Cold War it was planned to allocate considerable funds on dramatic increase in the quality of conventional arms. The government decided to allocate nearly 20 trillion rubles for the program’s implementation. According to the reform plan, by 2020 the share of state-of-the-art weapons in general operation forces was to reach 70%.35 All this allowed counting on recovery and buildup of combat properties of non-nuclear forces. Taken together, all these factors created conditions for the practical stage of debate about the role of nuclear and non- nuclear weapons in strategic deterrence.

Nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence Practical adoption of strategic deterrence doctrine and acknowledgement of the fact that non-nuclear weapons could play strategic roles launched the discussion about what should the ratio of tasks pursued by nuclear and non- nuclear arms be within the deterrence strategy. Debate about non-nuclear deterrence has been unfolding in Russia for quite a long time.

35Ɇ. Ȼɚɪɚɛɚɧɨɜ, Ʉ. Ɇɚɤɢɟɧɤɨ, Ɋ. ɉɭɯɨɜ, ȼɨɟɧɧɚɹɪɟɮɨɪɦɚ: ɧɚɩɭɬɢɤɧɨɜɨɦɭɨɛɥɢɤɭ ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɚɪɦɢɢ (M. Barabanov, K. Makienko, R. Pukhov. Military reform: on the path towards the new look of the Russian army), Analytical report of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Moscow, 2012, 31. 28 A. Pavlov

One of the most consistent proponents of developing strategic non- nuclear systems for deterrence has been Andrei Kokoshin who in the 1990s occupied positions of Deputy Defense Minister and Security Council Chair- man. Not only did he support the creation and development of corresponding systems during his public office tenure, but developed conceptual foundations for their use as an expert and scholar. Kokoshin advocated including a provision on combination of nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence into the new military doctrine of 2010.36 From his point of view, efficient deterrence strategy ought to rely upon the combination of strategic nuclear weapons, non- strategic nuclear weapons and strategic non-nuclear weapons.37 This combination would ensure flexibility in responding to any paths of military conflict development, which would strengthen the deterrent potential of armed forces. The idea was not to substitute nuclear arms with non-nuclear ones, but rather to combine both. According to Kokoshin, weapons development ought to be accompanied by corresponding additions to the military doctrine: “The threat of using high-precision long-range weapons ought to be well “kitted out” politically, as a final warning in the course of warfare before the selective use of relatively low-yield nuclear ammunition.”38 This version of deterrence strengthening is similar to the concept of non- strategic (“pre-strategic”) weapons use that existed in France during the Cold War. The French concept envisaged that in case of an armed conflict single “pre-strategic” nuclear weapons strikes were to demonstrate that decision to use nuclear weapons was already made, but at the same time that there was still an opportunity to avoid a large-scale nuclear war, if the opposing side ceased its aggressive actions. The concept suggested by Kokoshin offered one more stage of preventive measures, namely the use of non-nuclear strategic arms as a warning that one was ready to cross the threshold, behind which the nuclear conflict phase was to begin. The idea of supplementing nuclear deterrence with non-nuclear gave rise to mixed response in the military circles. There were proponents and opponents of this approach to the future deterrence strategy. Vice-President of the Academy of Military Sciences, professor of the Academy of Strategic Missile Forces, General Varfolomei Korobushin back in 2005 already acknowledged the need to develop a non-nuclear deterrence strategy in addition to the nuclear one. He justified this need by emergence of the New Triad in the United States and related increase in counterforce potential of conventional weapons. Korobushin suggested basing the non-nuclear deterrence strategy on the traditional deterrence principle: “ability of the country’s strategic forces to ensure

36 ȺȺ. Ʉɨɤɨɲɢɧ, ȼə. ɉɨɩɨɜ, ȺȽ. ɋɚɜɟɥɶɟɜ, “Ʉ ɜɨɩɪɨɫɭ ɨ ɜɨɡɦɨɠɧɨɣ ɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɟ ɢ ɫɨɞɟɪɠɚɧɢɢɧɨɜɨɣɪɟɞɚɤɰɢɢȼɨɟɧɧɨɣɞɨɤɬɪɢɧɵ” (A.A. Kokoshin, V.Ya. Potapov, A.G. Save- liev, “On possible structure and content of the new Military Doctrine edition”), Ʉɧɨɜɨɣɪɟɞɚɤ- ɰɢɢȼɨɟɧɧɨɣɞɨɤɬɪɢɧɵɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ (On the new edition of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), (Moscow, 2009), 182. 37ȺȺɄɨɤɨɲɢɧ, “Ɉ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɟɧɟɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ (ɩɪɟɞɴɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ) ɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɹ ɜɨɛɨɪɨɧɧɨɣ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɟɊɨɫɫɢɢ” (A.A. Kokoshin, “On the system of non-nuclear (pre-nuclear) deterrence in Russia’s defense policy”), (Moscow: MSU publishing house, 2012), 28–29. 38ȺȺ. Ʉɨɤɨɲɢɧ. “ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɟɹɞɟɪɧɨɟɢɧɟɹɞɟɪɧɨɟɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɟ: ɩɪɢɨɪɢɬɟɬɵɫɨ- ɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɨɣɷɩɨɯɢ” (A.A. Kokoshin, “Strategic nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence: contemporary priorities”), Vestnik Rossijskoy Akademii Nauk 84, no. 3 (2014): 202. A. Pavlov Nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy 29 guaranteed punishment of an aggressor for unleashing the war.” He considered non-nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles as one of the possible future means of non-nuclear deterrence. It is interesting to see how Korobushin formulated possible military-political goals of non-nuclear deterrence: “deter an opponent from deploying BMD system with combat capabilities threatening Russia’s nuclear deterrent potential and at the first stage use the diplomatic methods to create conditions for talks on balanced limitation of strategic offensive and defensive potentials; deter the leading nuclear powers from transforming armed conflicts (local wars) into regional (large-scale) conventional warfare. deter other nuclear powers from nuclear aggression.” 39 One of the Voennaya Mysl journal issues in 2007 featured an article by General Vasilii Burenok and Colonel Achasov that explored the concept and discussed the provision of armed forces with the necessary means for non- nuclear deterrence. This article deserves special attention, because at the time General Burenok headed a research institute of the Russian Defense Ministry that worked on substantiating and developing future weapons development programs. The authors do not offer unambiguous answers to questions about what the concept of combined nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence ought to look like and which conventional arms would ensure its implementation. They suggest and briefly analyze various options and frame this article’s task as follows: “outline the area, subject matter and directions of further research on this difficult problem.” One should note a crucial element of analysis offered in the article. The authors emphasize that Russia at that time and in the “foreseeable future” did not have the economic capacity to fulfill deterrence tasks relying on conventional arms only and hence non-nuclear deterrence could only be a “subsystem” inscribed into existing concepts.40 In other words, the idea was to preserve the dominant role of nuclear deterrence, while using non-nuclear forces to strengthen it. Apparently, military agencies were only beginning to contemplate a complex deterrence system at the time. This is confirmed by the previously mentioned article by CMSS researchers Mat- vichuk and Khriapin who acknowledged in 2010 that Russia had yet to create a system and implementation mechanism for combined strategic deterrence.41 The Military Doctrine of 2010 does not mention non-nuclear deterrence, which indicates that at the time the concept of combined deterrence was not yet developed and adopted. Later on, parallel development of this concept and increase in the number and combat capabilities of Russia’s conventional arms gradually increased the concept’s attractiveness. The new Military Doc- trine version of 2014 offered a clarification “nuclear and non-nuclear” in

39ȼȼ. Ʉɨɪɨɛɭɲɢɧ, “ɉɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɵɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɹ ɯɚɪɚɤɬɟɪɚ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɹ ɢɟɝɨɪɨɥɶɜɨɛɟɫɩɟɱɟɧɢɢɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢɊɨɫɫɢɢ” (V.V. Korobushin, “The prospects of strategic deterrence development and its role in ensuring Russian security”), Voennaya Mysl, no. 6 (2005): 14. 40ȼɆ. Ȼɭɪɟɧɨɤ, ɈȻ. Ⱥɱɚɫɨɜ, “ɇɟɹɞɟɪɧɨɟɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɟ” (V.M. Burenok, O.B. Acha- sov, “Non-nuclear deterrence”), Voennaya Mysl, no. 12 (2007): 14–15. 41ȼȼ. Ɇɚɬɜɢɱɭɤ, ȺɅ. ɏɪɹɩɢɧ, “ɋɢɫɬɟɦɚɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɹɜɧɨɜɵɯɭɫ- ɥɨɜɢɹɯ” (V.V. Matvichuk, A.L. Khriapin, “The system of strategic deterrence under new condition”s), 16. 30 A. Pavlov brackets after the words “strategic deterrence”. Thus, the concept envisaging the combination of nuclear and conventional weapons was finally acknowledged and officially codified, and in 2015 it was already sufficiently clear and better defined. An article published in January 2015 by CMSS offers some rather precisely formulated provisions and provides the following definition of the structure of strategic deterrence forces:42 “a) strategic offensive forces consisting of: strategic nuclear forces – land-based (SMF), sea-based and air-based strategic nuclear forces; non-strategic nuclear forces – military units and formations of general operation forces armed with land-based, sea-based and air-based non- strategic nuclear weapons; strategic non-nuclear forces – military units and formations of general operation forces armed with strategic non-nuclear weapons; b) strategic defensive forces – forces and means of missile attack warning systems, space control, missile, space and air defense, supporting the combat use of strategic offensive forces”. One should specifically note the division of Russian strategic deterrence forces into offensive and defensive. This division as such is not new, Russian military have often underlined the interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, especially after the U.S. started playing with the idea of ballistic missile defense and withdrawal from the ABM treaty. Provision regarding this interrelationship was included into the preamble of the 2010 START upon Russia’s insistence. Earlier, this issue had been discussed mainly in connection with American ballistic missile defense system, but in 2015 Russia completed the merger of its space control, air defense and air forces and creation of Aerospace Forces on their basis. This was the birth of a new military branch that became an element of Russia’s strategic deterrence system. Development of combined deterrence concept can also be traced in another official source – a document adopted in July 2017 and entitled “Basic Principles of State Naval Policy until 2030.”43 It devotes a lot of space to substantiating the significance of the Navy in ensuring strategic stability, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. Possession of the entire range of strategic deterrence tools determines the special role of the Navy: strategic nuclear, non-strategic nuclear and conventional arms, including high-precision long-range systems. The Navy was not bound by the INF treaty obligations and thus has what is considered the most promising type of strategic non-nuclear weapons – cruise missiles with a range of around 1,500 km. The new task of the fleet formulated as “destruction of adversary’s military-economic potential by hitting its vital objects from the sea” is seen as a crucial strategic deterrence component. Admiral Vladimir Korolev, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, said

42ȺɅ. ɏɪɹɩɢɧ, ȾȺ. Ʉɚɥɢɧɤɢɧ, ȼȼ. Ɇɚɬɜɢɱɭɤ, “ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɟ ɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɟɜɭɫ- ɥɨɜɢɹɯ ɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɹ ɋɒȺ ɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɨɣ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɵ ɉɊɈ ɢ ɫɪɟɞɫɬɜ ɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɭɞɚɪɚ” (A.L. Khriapin, D.A. Kalinkin, V.V. Matvichuk, “Strategic deterrence in the context of global BMD system and global strike means creation by the USA”), Voennaya Mysl, no.1 (2015): 18–22. 43 Ɉɫɧɨɜɵ ɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɣ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɢ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɜ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɢ ɜɨɟɧɧɨ- ɦɨɪɫɤɨɣɞɟɹɬɟɥɶɧɨɫɬɢɧɚɩɟɪɢɨɞɞɨ 2030 ɝɨɞɚ (Basic Principles of State Naval Policy until 2030) (2017), http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/42117; http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/55127. A. Pavlov Nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy 31 in his interview in January 2018 that “the most important long-term work segment of the Chief Command of the Navy will be to form strategic non- nuclear deterrence alignments composed of vessels carrying high-precision long-range weapons.”44 One should note that not all military experts agreed to acknowledge the strategic value of non-nuclear weapons in deterrence strategy. Views of the military experts representing individual military branches were often quite skeptical. Let us offer a few examples. In 2010, soon after the new military doctrine was adopted, professor of the Military Academy of Aerospace De- fense General (ret.) Evgenii Sirotin published an article, where he argued that only strategic nuclear, missile strike warning and air defense forces could constitute the foundation for deterrence of aggression by “the most powerful” nuclear-weapon states, while general operation forces could only be used for deterrence of non-nuclear-weapon states.45 Even after official emergence of the term “nuclear and non-nuclear strategic deterrence” in the Military Doctrine, some experts criticized the new approach. For instance, Colonels Vladimir Polegaev and Vladislav Alferov wrote in 2015: “Speculations about “strategic non-nuclear deterrence” of wars are at the very least inappropriate. Moreover, they are dangerous, because they lead to the transformation of nuclear deterrence into non-nuclear, which is detrimental for Russia.” In their view, the danger consists in “unfounded overestimation of combat capabilities of forces and characteristics of non-nuclear deterrence means (by the way, not yet confirmed even experimentally) and non-systemic approach to resolving the non-nuclear deterrence problems.”46 On the other hand, such an assessment is quite natural for these authors who work at the Defense Min- istry research institute that is in charge of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces development. Development and revamping of non-nuclear strategic tools, their increased supply to the army, as well as, it seems, the experience of using some types of high-precision long-range weaponry during the conflict in Syria – all this allowed Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces General Valery Gerasimov to voice a rather radical position on the future of non- nuclear deterrence in November 2017: “Looking forward, the gained dynamic of high-precision weaponry development and ongoing hypersonic missile research and development will allow transferring the main share of strategic deterrence tasks from the nuclear to non-nuclear area.”47

44 TASS news report (1 January 2018), http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4854676. 45 ȿɋɋɢɪɨɬɢɧ, “ɋɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɟ ɚɝɪɟɫɫɢɢ ɜ ɤɨɧɬɟɤɫɬɟ ɧɨɜɨɣ ȼɨɟɧɧɨɣ ɞɨɤɬɪɢɧɵ Ɋɨɫ- ɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ” (E.S. Sirotin, “Deterrence of aggression in the context of the new Russian Military Doctrine”), Voennaya Mysl, no. 5 (2010): 9. 46ȼɂ. ɉɨɥɟɝɚɟɜ, ȼȼ. Ⱥɥɮɟɪɨɜ, “Ɉɧɟɹɞɟɪɧɨɦɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɢɢɟɝɨɪɨɥɢɢɦɟɫɬɟɜ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɟɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɹ” (V.I. Polegaev, V.V. Alferov, “On non-nuclear deterrence, its role and place in the strategic deterrence system”), Voennaya Mysl, no. 7 (2015): 4–5. 47 Gerasimov’s remarks at the open session of the Russian Defense Ministry Board (No-vember 7, 2017), https://function.mil.ru/newspage/person/more.htm?id=12149743@ egNews. 32 A. Pavlov

Details of the new state weapons program for the period until 2027 that was adopted in early 2018 are not disclosed, but one knows that the plan is to allocate the funds comparable with expenses under the previous program, which also gives the Defense Ministry an opportunity to count on considerable strengthening of non-nuclear weapons that are part of the strategic deterrence system.

“Escalation” and “de-escalation” in deterrence strategy A natural continuation of the combined and multilevel deterrence concept formation was the debate about what goals to pursue with those weapons types that had become part of strategic deterrence forces. The tasks of strategic offensive arms were mostly the same and generally clear. Therefore, one needed to conceptualize the application of non-strategic nuclear and strategic non-nuclear weapons. In this connection, the most heated discussion in the expert circles revolved around the idea of “escalation for de-escalation” that gave rise to numerous myths. This element of Russian strategic thought can be considered rather new and thus not yet sufficiently clear, so let us try to get to the core of this idea. Usually, the emergence in Russia of an idea to use nuclear weapons for de-escalation of an armed conflict is linked to an article published in 1999 in Voennaya Mysl journal by three military expert community representatives: V. Levshin, A. Nedelin and M. Sosnovskiy.48 This rather short text outlined a number of suggestions to develop the nuclear deterrence concept. One should specifically note that the authors explored the possible evolution of the concept in the future rather than officially adopted provisions. Suggestions voiced by the three authors were radical. First of all, they recommended abandoning the customary division of all nuclear weapons into strategic and tactical depending on their range. They suggested stemming instead from the tasks pursued by individual nuclear weapons types and identify three groups: strategic, operational-strategic and operational-tactical weapons. The authors did not question the main message of the then military doctrine that nuclear weapons were the means to deter aggression against Russia and focused on what needed to be done, if an aggression started after all. The authors believed that in the case of such a conflict operational- tactical nuclear weapons could be used to compel an opponent to cease aggressive actions as soon as possible. In accordance with the new classification of nuclear forces, they offered their own classification of nuclear strikes consisting of six options. It was suggested to consequently move from one option to another, as a conflict unfolded, in pursuit of a single goal – to convince the aggressor to cease the warfare sooner rather than later. The idea of introducing such large-scale changes in the military doctrine was unlikely to gain traction at the official level at the time, and even later one cannot trace any special interest on the part of Russian military in sugges-

48 ȼɂ. Ʌɢɜɲɢɧ, Ⱥȼ. ɇɟɞɟɥɢɧ, Ɇȿ. ɋɨɫɧɨɜɫɤɢɣ, “Ɉɩɪɢɦɟɧɟɧɢɢ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ ɨɪɭɠɢɹ ɞɥɹɞɟɷɫɤɚɥɚɰɢɢɜɨɟɧɧɵɯɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɣ” (V.I. Levshin, A.V. Nedelin and M.E. Sosnovskiy, “On nuclear weapons use for de-escalation of warfare”), Voennaya Mysl, no. 3 (1999): 34–37. A. Pavlov Nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy 33 tions voiced by Levshin, Nedelin and Sosnovskiy. It is interesting that if one compares these recommendations with the NATO nuclear doctrine outlined in the strategic concept of 1967, then one can find a lot in common.49 It seems that this similarity is not coincidental. In essence, conceptual exposition by Levshin, Nedelin and Sosnovskiy represents a version of NATO’s flexible response concept also characterized as “flexible escalation” that was re- worked and adjusted to new realities.50 This concept also envisaged gradually increasing the power and scale of strikes as an armed conflict unfolded, in order to convince an opponent to cease the aggression as soon as possible. In late 1990s relations between Russia and NATO were already sour and continued on a downward trend. At the same time, the crisis of Russian armed forces was so evident that one could compare Russian and NATO power in the nuclear weapons field only. As a result, an idea was rather popular that nuclear forces could help compensate for Russia’s weakness in conventional arms. Levshin, Nedelin and Sosnovskiy voiced this idea in their article and essentially suggested following the example of NATO that during the Cold War was striving to compensate for the Warsaw Pact conventional superiority using the nuclear strategy of flexible response. The fact that the nuclear deterrence reform suggested by Levshin, Nede- lin and Sosnovskiy was not adopted does not meant that the idea of conflict de-escalation failed to find its place in the Russian strategic discourse. Many experts paid close attention to the possibility of using different components of strategic deterrence forces in a situation when armed conflict could not be prevented. The only official document where the concept of aggression de- escalation was loosely discussed was a document published by the Defense Ministry in 2003 and entitled “The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” It stated that the tasks of strategic deterrence forces consisted in deterring conflict escalation in case of aggrava- tion of the situation and ensuring de-escalation if an armed phase of the conflict started. The document specifically dealt with de-escalation of aggression against Russia and its allies. Despite the fact that this topic is covered in the section on strategic nuclear forces, de-escalation of aggression is defined as “compelling an adversary to cease military actions by threatening to inflict or inflicting strikes of different scale using conventional and/or nuclear weaponry.” Therefore, according to this theory, de-escalation of aggression is a task for the entire armed forces, both nuclear and conventional. There is an assumption that actions within strategic deterrence ought to be undertaken not only before the armed conflict, but also at its initial stages, up until the massive use of nuclear weapons.51 Many of the already mentioned experts examined the possibility of using different weapons types in

49 A report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on overall strategic concept for the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization area. NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969, ed. Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow, 357–359. 50 Heuser B. NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000. (Palgrave Macmillan. 1999), 52–56. 51ȺɅ. ɏɪɹɩɢɧ, ȾȺ. Ʉɚɥɢɧɤɢɧ, ȼȼ. Ɇɚɬɜɢɱɭɤ, “ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɟ ɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɟɜɭɫ- ɥɨɜɢɹɯ ɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɹ ɋɒȺ ɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɨɣ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɵ ɉɊɈ ɢ ɫɪɟɞɫɬɜ ɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɭɞɚɪɚ” (A.L. Khriapin, D.A. Kalinkin, V.V. Matvichuk, “Strategic deterrence in the context of global BMD system and global strike means creation by the USA”), Voennaya Mysl, no. 1 (2015): 20. 34 A. Pavlov case of an armed conflict to stop it at an early stage. In a 2005 article Khri- apin and Afanasiev suggested the strategic deterrence concept assumed all deterrent actions, military and non-military, to pursue the following objectives: “in the time of peace – prevention of power pressure and aggression against Russia and its allies; in the time of war – de-escalation of aggression and cessation of warfare on conditions acceptable to Russia.”52 Examination of the possibility of armed conflict de-escalation mainly went on within the debate on the role of non-nuclear forces. Korobushin wrote about the use of non-nuclear strategic arms to “deter the leading nuclear powers from transforming armed conflicts (local wars) to regional (large-scale) conventional warfare.”53 In this case one is rather dealing with deterrence of escalation. Polegaev and Alferov, as well as Burenok and Pechatnov, wrote specifically about de-escalation of aggression with the help of non-nuclear strategic weapons.54 Negative attitude to de-escalation as a component of deterrence also stemmed from Russia’s conventional inferiority. For instance, Sirotin wrote: “With the existing discrepancies in military potentials of conflicting parties (coalitions), the United States will also have an opportunity to undertake de-escalation measures, and Russia will not”.55 In all these cases the authors voiced only their own vision of the problem. Doctrinal documents do not reflect the ideas of deterrence of escalation and conflict de-escalation. Only relatively recently, an idea came up in the Russian official navy doctrine published in July 2017 that in case of an armed conflict containment of its escalation can be implemented by demonstration of readiness to use non-strategic nuclear weapons. The word “de-escalation” is not used though. The document only states that in the event of an armed conflict the Navy ought to have “the ca-pability to inflict unacceptable damage upon an adversary, in order to compel it to cease military actions upon the condition of guaranteed assurance of national interests of the Russian Federation.”56 Similar provision is included in the “Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence” of June 2020: in case of an armed conflict, Russia’s aim will be preventing further escalation of warfare and eventually terminating it under conditions deemed acceptable by Russia and (or) its Allies57.

52ȺɅ. ɏɪɹɩɢɧ, ȼȺ. Ⱥɮɚɧɚɫɶɟɜ, “Ʉɨɧɰɟɩɬɭɚɥɶɧɵɟ ɨɫɧɨɜɵɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɞɟɪɠɢ- ɜɚɧɢɹ” (A.L. Khriapin, V.A. Afanasiev, “Conceptual foundations of strategic deterrence”), Voennaya Mysl, no. 1 (2005): 8. 53ȼȼ. Ʉɨɪɨɛɭɲɢɧ, “ɉɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɵɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɹ ɯɚɪɚɤɬɟɪɚ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɹ ɢɟɝɨɪɨɥɶɜɨɛɟɫɩɟɱɟɧɢɢɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢɊɨɫɫɢɢ” (V.V. Korobushin, “The prospects of strategic deterrence development and its role in ensuring Russian security”), 15. 54ȼɂ. ɉɨɥɟɝɚɟɜ, ȼȼ. Ⱥɥɮɟɪɨɜ, “Ɉɧɟɹɞɟɪɧɨɦɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɢɢɟɝɨɪɨɥɢɢɦɟɫɬɟɜɫɢɫ- ɬɟɦɟ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɹ” (V.I. Polegaev, V.V. Alferov, “On non-nuclear deterrence, its role and place in the strategic deterrence system”), Voennaya Mysl, no. 7 (2015): 7; ȼɆȻɭɪɟɧɨɤ, ɘȺ. ɉɟɱɚɬɧɨɜ, “ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɟ ɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɟ” (V.M. Burenok, Yu.A. Pe- chatnov, “Strategic deterrence”), 13, 15. 55ȿɋ. ɋɢɪɨɬɢɧ. “ɋɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɟɚɝɪɟɫɫɢɢɜɤɨɧɬɟɤɫɬɟɧɨɜɨɣȼɨɟɧɧɨɣɞɨɤɬɪɢɧɵ ɪɨɫ- ɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ” (E.S. Sirotin, “Deterrence of aggression in the context of the new Russian Military Doctrine”), 6. 56 Ɉɫɧɨɜɵ ɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɣ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɢ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɜ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɢ ɜɨɟɧɧɨ- ɦɨɪɫɤɨɣɞɟɹɬɟɥɶɧɨɫɬɢɧɚɩɟɪɢɨɞɞɨ 2030 ɝɨɞɚ (Basic Principles of State Naval Policy until 2030), 2017, Sections 37, 40. 57 http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202006020040 A. Pavlov Nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy 35 Conclusion Present-day perceptions about the role of nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy are the result of the long evolution of armaments, ideas and concepts. After the end of the Cold War Russian nuclear strategy evolved through several stages. In the 1990s overall social and economic crisis in the country dealt a heavy blow upon combat capability of armed forces. Person- nel and armaments declined in numbers, equipment was quickly getting outdated, and troops were getting practically no new weapons. At the same time, in the context of strategic nuclear arms reductions within the Russian-U.S. bilateral regime as well as unilateral nuclear arms reductions by nuclear member states of NATO, the nuclear part of the Russian armed forces was modern enough and comparable in numbers to the U.S. nuclear forces. Wors- ening of relations with the United States and NATO in late 1990s prompted Russian military and political leadership to review the deterrence concept. Strategic deterrence concept was gradually developed; it was the concept of uniting different military and non-military measures to achieve the single goal, i.e. prevent an aggression. Initially, nuclear forces were the foundation of the military component of strategic deterrence. Technological backward- ness of Russian conventional armed forces did not leave hope for significant non-nuclear supplement to nuclear deterrence, but studies of this possibility went on. Growing interest in it became especially noticeable after the United States made a decision to form the New Triad combining nuclear and non- nuclear systems, creating non-nuclear strategic defense system (ballistic missile defense), and then – the system of Conventional Prompt Global Strike. Relatively successful implementation of the program of conventional arms revamping since 2010 allowed the military leadership to supplement nuclear deterrence with non-nuclear in practice, transferring some of the tasks of nuclear forces to that area, which one can interpret as considerable elevation of the “nuclear threshold” and decrease in the role of nuclear weapons within strategic deterrence. The concept of strategic deterrence organically incorporated the tasks of different types of armed forces associated with preventing the escalation of armed conflict in the case when such conflict could not be prevented. This is meant to be primarily achieved using non-nuclear strategic weapons, the use of which is seen as a signal of readiness to move onto nuclear weapons use. Non-strategic nuclear weapons, in their turn, are considered as a means to signal the readiness to move onto strategic weapons use. It is important to remember that in all conceptual documents that reflect this concept the authors are talking about deterrence and prevention of aggression. Essentially, this version of strategy is a strategy adopted by NATO in 1967, where the main task was to give political leadership an opportunity of flexible response to aggressive actions of any scale undertaken by an opponent with conventional superiority. One should also not forget that both formation of a concept and creation of means for its implementation are the means to strengthen the deterrent effect. The main task is still to convince any adversary that aggression is futile and thus prevent an armed conflict. One should also note another crucial moment: the concept of using all nuclear arms, as well as uniting nuclear and non-nuclear arms within strategic deterrence, cannot be considered 36 A. Pavlov outside the scope of the main formula defining Russia’s nuclear strategy: “The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” This principle was formulated in the Mili- tary Doctrine of 2010, preserved in its edition of 2014 and emphasized on multiple occasions at the highest level. Only in the case of a situation described in the Military Doctrine one can imagine implementation of any concepts of nuclear weapons use – whether on their own or in combination with non-nuclear weapons. 2 Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow

Andrey Bodrov

For half a century talks and agreements on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms have invariably been a crucial area of U.S.-Soviet and then U.S.-Russian relations. Every American president, from Richard Nixon to George H.W. Bush, regarded reciprocal limitations as an important mean to reduce the Soviet nuclear arsenal. In the early 1990s Washington found a kind of “ally” in Russian economic difficulties, which pushed Mos- cow further to reductions for the sake of budgetary savings. Nevertheless, Moscow unfailingly emphasized that Russia was a responsible nuclear power. Reductions of the nuclear arsenal were additionally presented as fulfillment of the Soviet/Russian obligations under Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In the 1990s and 2000s, Russia and the United States achieved considerable progress in the reduction of their nuclear arsenals. However, starting from the early 2010s, a progressively long pause interrupted the negotiation process. Stra- tegic arms control talks served to engage the two largest nuclear weapons powers in a strategic relationship, increased the value of maintaining bilateral relations on an acceptable level, and created stimuli for efforts to reconcile differences in other areas. They also served as a kind of acknowledgment of the two parties’ equality, which Moscow especially valued. Today, the Russian-U.S. relations in a political sense (though fortunately not yet militarily) might have hit the lowest point since the Euro-missile Crisis of the early 1980s, and any diplomatic or legal vacuum is fraught with risks of a new arms race. In the present circumstances, both parties should undoubtedly meet each other halfway. To what extent is Russia interested in overcoming this “pause” in the strategic dialogue? In order to answer that question, one needs to describe the Russian leadership’s thinking that finds its reflection in the present- day official position. This permits us to identify the changes in its approach to nuclear arms reductions since the early 2000s.The other goal is to represent the specter of opinions in the Russian expert community not excluding those military experts whose estimates can be described as “hardline” and “conservative.” While Russian-U.S. relations deteriorate, it seems that their train of thought gains in popularity and influence.

The history of nuclear arms reduction agreements, their signing and ratification The negotiation process between the USA and USSR on the limitation of strategic arms was initiated in 1969 and led to an interim Strategic Arms 38 A. Bodrov

Limitation Talks Agreement (SALT I) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) signed on May 26, 1972. It was succeeded in 1979 by even more detailed SALT II treaty, which was observed by both sides notwithstanding non-ratification by the U.S. Congress in response to the invasion of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Both these agreements set levels on nuclear delivery vehicles but have not yet envisaged the reduction of nuclear warheads. The long pause in the negotiation process was interrupted by the Inter- mediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). It was signed in 1987 by Mik- hail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan and remained up to this date one of the cornerstones of the Russian-American regime of mutual restrictions on strategic offensive arms. This document became the first bilateral agreement stipulating not the limitation, but complete renunciation of two classes of nuclear weapons. Following its provisions, the treaty parties destroyed over 2.6 thousand short- and intermediate missiles by May 31, 1991, along with their launchers. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) that was signed in July 1991 and entered into force in 1994 became the next step in the process. It envisaged lowering the ceilings on deployed strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) to 1,600 and warheads attributed to them – to six thousand. Both parties took as the starting point the following levels concerning their strategic nuclear arsenals as for September 1, 1989: 2500 delivery vehicles and 10271 warheads in the USSR, 2246 and 10563 correspondingly in the USA. The treaty stipulated a seven-year deadline for reductions, but the collapse of the Soviet Union had an impact upon the process. Under the Lisbon Protocol of May 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine became START-I parties, along with Russia and the United States, but they pledged to have no nuclear weapons at all. By 1996, the three newly independent republics gained their non-nuclear-weapon state status, having transferred to Russia the nuclear weapons that had remained on their territory from Soviet times.1 Over the time of START-I implementation, the parties accumulated vast experience in verification and mutual control over nuclear arms reductions. In 1993, they signed the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II) that envisaged the reduction of strategic offensive arms to 3–3.5 thousand warheads and a ban on heavy ICBMs2 and ICBMs with multiple independently targe- table reentry vehicles (MIRVs). This decision stemmed from the American vision of such ICBMs as the most destabilizing weapons systems due to their ability to hit highly protected targets, which made

1 “The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions is a new stage in development of the legal framework in the area of nuclear arms reduction (reference information)”, Official website of the Russian MFA, May 22, 2002, http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/us/-/asset_publisher/un VXBbj4Z6e8/content/id/556462. 2 Heavy ICBM is a term used to describe a class of Soviet and Russian ICBMs that were characterized by a heavy throw-weight of 5 to 9 tons and capability to deliver a large number of warheads in a single MIRV missile. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 39 the an attractive target for the adversary’s first strike and what, in turn, prompted their use at the slightest danger.3 The obligation to eliminate heavy ICBMs was the most burdensome for Russia. In the 1980s, ICBMs constituted more than half of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces and carried around 60% of nuclear warheads. The Soviet Un- ion preferred a land-based option due to the country’s geostrategic location and the fact that land-based forces were the cheapest and most reliable type of strategic nuclear forces in terms of production and operation.4 Heavy ICBMs carrying a dozen powerful warheads each were seen as a guaranteed way to penetrate the opponent’s ballistic missile defense. From the very beginning, START-II was heavily criticized in Russia, as it disrupted the traditional structure of Russian strategic nuclear forces. The U.S. Congress ratified START-II in 1996, but ratification in the Russian parliament dragged on. Russia ratified START-II only in April 2000, together with the Protocol of 1997 and on the condition of U.S. compliance with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. After the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, Russia announced the end of its obligations under START-II. Thus, the only agreement still binding both nuclear superpowers was START-I, implementation of which the parties announced in December 2001. At the time, Russia had 1,136 delivery vehicles and 5,518 warheads and the United States had 1,237 delivery vehicles and 5,948 warheads.5 In May 2002, in order to give a new impetus to the arms control process, the Russian and U.S. presidents signed the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Re- ductions (SORT, or Moscow Treaty) that envisaged reductions to the level of 1,700-2,200 warheads. The Moscow Treaty was criticized for being largely declarative. Unlike START-I, it did not detail the terms of elimination and verification procedures. The very this fact pointed toward the declining interest of Washington in new constrains. The provisions of the treaty left too much to different interpretation by both sides. That is why some experts regarded the SORT implementation mechanism as rather a “parallel track ”than an extension of the START regime, which was what the Russian side had expected.6 Nevertheless, both countries ratified the treaty, and it entered into force on June 1, 2003. It was superseded by the New START that was signed in Prague by Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama in 2010 and entered into force in February 2011 (the Prague Treaty, often somewhat inaccurately called START-III).

3ȺɧɚɬɨɥɢɣȺɧɬɨɧɨɜ, Ʉɨɧɬɪɨɥɶɧɚɞɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹɦɢ: ɢɫɬɨɪɢɹ, ɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɟ, ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢ- ɜɵ (Arms Control: History, State, Prospects) (Moscow, 2012), 34–35. 4 ȼɢɤɬɨɪ ɋɬɚɪɨɞɭɛɨɜ, ɋɭɩɟɪɞɟɪɠɚɜɵ ɞɜɚɞɰɚɬɨɝɨ ɜɟɤɚ. ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɟ ɩɪɨɬɢɜɨ- ɛɨɪɫɬɜɨ (Superpowers of the 21st Century: Strategic Confrontation), (Moscow, 2001), 493–494. 5 See: Section on Strategic Nuclear Forces of the USSR and Russia, Center for Arms Con- trol, Energy and Environmental Studies, http://www.armscontrol.ru/course/rsf/p11.htm; Section on Strategic Offensive Arms of the United States, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Envi- ronmental Studies, http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/basics/us-snf2.htm#MOU_010731; Ɋɨɫ- ɫɢɣɫɤɨɚɦɟɪɢɤɚɧɫɤɢɟɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɹ ɜ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɢɫɨɤɪɚɳɟɧɢɹ ɹɞɟɪɧɵɯɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɣ: ɫɨɜɪɟɦɟɧ- ɧɨɟɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɟɢ ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɵ (Russian-U.S. Relations in the Area of Nuclear Arms Reduc- tions: Contemporary State and Prospects), (Dolgoprudnii, 2001), 20–23, 32–38. 6 “Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions”, https://armscontrol.ru/start/sort.htm. 40 A. Bodrov

The signing of the Prague Treaty became a crucial step in the controlled nuclear arms reduction process after an almost twenty-year pause. Unlike START-I, its key limitations are only the admissible levels of deployed delivery vehicles (700), total number of deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles (800), and warheads (1,550).7 One of the new treaty’s distinctions was the absence of restrictions on the modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms that both Russia and eventually the United States were planning to carry out. It removed practically all restrictions on space and time parameters and conditions of stationing and deployment for land-based mobile ICBMs, which Russia disputed during the talks.8 Due to their mobility, these complexes are considered to possess enhanced survivability in the case of an adversary’s first strike and gain additional value as a means of retaliation. The United States also agreed to include ballistic missiles with conventional warheads into the total number of permitted strategic weapons. Another provision that Moscow considered an important achievement was the creation of the new verification system: advantageous parameters of a telemetric information exchange during missile launches, putting an end to continuous monitoring at the entrance to the Votkinsk machine-building factory, American consent to renounce the mandatory presence during weapons elimination, and not extending control procedures to the nuclear warhead storage facilities. Nevertheless, the simplified and less expensive verification mechanism left Russia with sufficient opportunities for control over the state and development of American strategic forces. The “lightened” restriction and verification regime is largely explained by the vast monitoring and assessment experience accumulated within the START-I framework that now allowed for significantly reducing the number of bans and restrictions, cur- tailing inspection activities and simplifying the counting rules. A unique feature of the new treaty is that during the talks the United States did not work hard to eliminate, reduce or limit any specific Russian systems or programs (e.g., heavy ICBMs or mobile missile complexes, as it was under START-II). That is why Anatoly Antonov, the head of the Russian delegation at the START talks, placed such an emphasis on the point that the new treaty was based on a mutually acceptable balance of interests and did not contain any unilateral advantages for the USA.9 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also gave full support to the vision of the New START as an “absolutely equitable document both in spirit and in letter,”10 and in the context these assessments were far less trivial as it might look at the first glance. De facto, Moscow and Washington kept their strategic nuclear weapons approximately at the same level as under the Moscow Treaty of 2002 (1,700–

7 “New START: Treaty Text”, U.S. Department of State, https://www.state. gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm. 8 Alexey Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, The New Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms: One Step in the Right Direction. Briefing 12, Issue 2 (June 2010), 3-4, Carnegie Moscow Center, http://carnegie.ru/2010/08/11/new-treaty-on-strategic-offensive-arms-one-step-in-right-direction- pub-41369. 9 A. Antonov, Arms Control, 51–52. 10ɋɟɪɝɟɣɅɚɜɪɨɜ, “ɇɨɜɵɣɞɨɝɨɜɨɪɨɋɇȼɜɦɚɬɪɢɰɟɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɨɣɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ. ɉɨɥɢ- ɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɟɢɡɦɟɪɟɧɢɟ (Sergey Lavrov, The New Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty in the Global Security Matrix. Political Dimensions)”, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, no. 7 (July 2010), https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/246. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 41

2,200 warheads). The reduced level of warheads under the Prague Treaty was achieved largely via new counting rules for warheads attributed to bombers. One should bear in mind that 56 deployed American B-52 bombers can in fact carry 1,120 cruise missiles (warheads). Under the START-I counting rules, 672 warheads used to be attributed to these American bombers and now – only 56. In the same manner, the number of warheads (over 850) attributed to 77 deployed Russian heavy bombers of TU-160 and TU-95ms types became 77.11 Antonov explained the parties’ consent to “reduce the weight of strategic aviation” in strategic arms counting onto day’s “perceptions about its contribution to the total combat potential of Russian and U.S. deterrence forces.”12 When the Russian State Duma discussed the Prague Treaty, criticisms came primarily from the Communist Party members. Leonid Kalashnikov, first deputy chair of the International Affairs Committee, summarized the main arguments against it. First, the treaty did not limit the development of the U.S. ballistic missile defense as “the main threat to strategic stability in the world.” Second, the treaty did not limit the nuclear arsenals of U.S. allies, which, according to estimates by Russian MPs, gave NATO a 30% superiority in strategic nuclear forces. Third, critics attacked the practice of counting only one nuclear warhead per heavy bomber. At the same time, the treaty did not limit the number of sea-based long-range cruise missiles, which in the context of U.S. naval domination created additional risks for the Russian strategic forces, and did not cover the weapons developed by the United States within the Prompt Global Strike concept, namely supersonic long-range cruise missiles. Fourth, the treaty did not limit the upload potential– the ability to rapidly redeploy nuclear warheads held in storage onto missiles and bombers.13 It should be noted that all this criticism had a rationale. For example, the USA actually holds a significant advantage over Russia in upload potential because it complied with the START and SORT limits on deployed nuclear warheads first and foremost by reducing the number of warheads carried on delivery vehicles, rather than by eliminating the delivery vehicles.14 Yet realization of all previously mentioned demands on practice would be tantamount to a drastic turn in the very course of U.S. policy (e.g. global ballistic missile defense, the Prompt Global Strike concept), which was highly improbable. Besides it would be extremely difficult (if even possible) to come to terms by interlinking so many different aspects. In general, the path of nuclear weapons reductions by Russia and the United States over the past fifteen years allows us to speak about optimi-

11 Arbatov and Dvorkin, The New Treaty, 5. 12 Ⱥɧɚɬɨɥɢɣ Ⱥɧɬɨɧɨɜ, “ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ ɢ ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɵ ɧɨɜɨɝɨ ɞɨɝɨɜɨɪɚ ɨ ɋɇȼ (Anatoliy Antonov, Problems and Prospects of the New Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms)”, USA – Canada. Economy, Politics, Culture, no. 9 (2012), 25. 13 “ɋɇȼ-3: ɉɪɨɞɚɠɚɊɨɞɢɧɵɜɩɟɪɜɨɦɱɬɟɧɢɢ (START-3: Selling the Homeland in the First Reading)”, Army News, http://army-news.ru/2010/12/snv-3-prodazha-rodiny-v-pervom- chtenii/. 14 Shannon N. Kile, “Making a new START in Russian–US nuclear arms control”, Stock- holm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), June 25,2009, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/thu-06-25-2009-14-00/making-a-new-start-russian-us- nuclear-arms-control. 42 A. Bodrov zation of nuclear arsenals prompted by a number of objective factors. The state of Russian strategic nuclear forces prompted Russian negotiators to insist on lower ceilings for strategic delivery vehicles and warheads than the American delegation had initially had in mind.15 Still, it is difficult to overestimate the meaning of the fact that the nuclear warhead and delivery vehicle ceilings for both countries were set by a comprehensive treaty rather than unilateral declarations. Vladimir Leontiev, Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Department for Security Affairs and Disar- mament, states that should the figures even be the same, one would not be able to consider unilateral declarations “a sufficient substitute for all un- derstandings and agreements codified on more than 300 pages of the treaty itself, the protocol to the treaty and its annexes.”16 The Russian Foreign Ministry considers the Prague Treaty a “gold standard” of international military and political agreements.17 By March 2018, both parties announced the completion of reductions under the Prague Treaty. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s official announcement, as of February 5, 2018, Russian strategic nuclear forces had 527 deployed ICBMs, deployed SSBNs and deployed heavy bombers; 1,444 nuclear warheads on deployed strategic delivery vehicles; 779 deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.18 Since then, Russia has made further reductions, down to 1,420 warheads attributed to 517 launchers as of September 1, 201819. Thus, the total potential of Rus- sia’s strategic weapons turned out to be below the stipulated threshold levels. Thus a crucial stage in the fate of the New START, implementation of which the current U.S. Administration named as a precondition for any discussion of further nuclear arms reductions, has been completed. However, the future of strategic arms control is becoming more and more gloomy. Part of the problem is connected with the implementation of the Treaty itself. In February 2018, Moscow voiced a number of complaints to the United States about “removal of strategic arms from accountability.”20 The Russian delegation outlined its concerns at length in a presentation on April 26, 2018 at the second Preparatory Committee session of the 2020 NPT Review Con- ference. Russia complained about U.S. “manipulations that are incorrect from the point of view of the Treaty.” Allegedly, “Washington has unilaterally re-

15 A. Antonov, Arms control, 43. 16 Vladimir Leontiev’s Remarks, Nuclear Weapons and International Security in the XXI Century: International Conference Proceedings [in Russian], Moscow, 2013, 73–74. 17 “Remarks by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the Conference on Disarmament session in Geneva, March 1, 2011 [in Russian]”, Official website of the Russian MFA, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/obsie-voprosy-mezdunarodnoj-bezopasnosti-i-kontrola-nad- vooruzeniami/-/asset_publisher/6sN03cZTYZOC/content/id/216966.) 18 “Russian MFA statement of 5.02.2018 [in Russian]”, Official website of the Russian MFA, http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/ 3054864; “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, February 22, 2018”, U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/278775.htm. 19 Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2019”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 2 (2019), 73. 20 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement at the Conference on Disarmament, Ge- neva, February 28, 2018 [in English]”, Official website of the Russian MFA, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3102270. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 43 moved from accountability under the Treaty 56 Trident II SLBM launchers and 41 B-52H heavy bombers by declaring them as converted” without following the required verification procedures, and it arbitrarily reclassified several silo launchers as “training silos,” a category that does not exist in the Treaty. The Russian delegation characterized the situation as a “serious anomaly,” without whose re- pairing “a threat to the viability of the Treaty will persist.”21 However, it should be noted that the tone of these complaints from the Rus- sian side constantly varied. Thus, further discussion on these issues continued in 2018 as part of the Bilateral Consultative Commission under the New START Treaty against a more positive background. For the moment these talks have not allayed Russian concerns. Sergei Lavrov stressed that Russia counted on the final success of the discussion and has not yet planned any step in response if it would bring no positive results. “Now we assume that we will be able to come to an understanding within the above mentioned Bilateral Commission,” emphasized Lavrov in May 2019.22 As Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov recently added, from Mos- cow’s perspective “all these problems can be solved and it is clear how to do it.” In Ryabkov’s opinion, the next step is to extend the New START Treaty for another 5 years, “in order to have time, some time span for discussion what to do thereafter.”23 But Moscow wants to take the issue of accountability off the table first. At the annual International Nuclear Policy Conference in March 2019, Rus- sian ambassador Antonov excluded the prolongation of the New START without a prior dialog and settlement of the alleged irregularities just in case the new U.S. Administration would be ready to do the same but would have no time to negotiate after its hypothetical coming to power in January 2021.24

The main obstacles for resumption of the Russian-U.S. dialogue on strategic arms reductions:

The Russian National Security Strategy of 2015 states that buildup and modernization of offensive weapons, as well as the creation and deployment of new offensive weapons types undermine the global security system and the system of arms control treaties and agreements. It lists the following main

21 “Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation on nuclear disarmament at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, April 26, 2018 [in English]”, Official website of the Russian MFA, April 27, 2018, http://www.mid.ru/ web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3195373. 22 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at a joint news conference following talks with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Sochi, May 14, 2019”, Official website of the Russian MFA, May 14, 2019, http://www. mid.ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/- /asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/3646994. 23 “ȼɆɂȾɩɪɨɤɨɦɦɟɧɬɢɪɨɜɚɥɢɢɞɟɸɹɞɟɪɧɨɣɫɞɟɥɤɢɦɟɠɞɭɊɨɫɫɢɟɣ, ɋɒȺɢɄɢɬɚɟɦ (Russian MFA commented on the idea of a nuclear deal between Russia, USA and China)”, Russian Information Agency RIA Novosti, May 5, 2019, https://ria.ru/ 20190505/1553267896.html. 24 “Ⱥɧɬɨɧɨɜ: ɊɨɫɫɢɹɧɟɝɨɬɨɜɚɤɩɪɨɞɥɟɧɢɸȾɋɇȼɛɟɡɧɨɪɦɚɥɶɧɨɝɨɩɪɟɞɜɚɪɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɞɢɚɥɨɝɚɫɋɒȺ (Antonov: Russia is not ready to extend the New Start Treaty without a normal preliminary dialogue with the United States)”, Russian News Agency TASS, March 12, 2019, https://tass.ru/politika/6207616. 44 A. Bodrov challenges: “deployment of U.S. missile defense components in Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East,” practical implementation of the Global Strike concept, deployment of strategic non-nuclear high-precision weapons systems, and hypothetical deployment of weapons in outer space. It also emphasizes that Russia is ready to discuss further reduction of nuclear arsenals “on the basis of bilateral agreements and in multilateral formats.”25 Starting out from the above cited challenges to the system of arms control treaties and agreements which create additional obstacles for resumption of the Russian-U.S. dialogue one should take a look at the Russian position, considering every point of the list more closely.

(1) The problem of the INF Treaty preservation

Starting from late 2018, the fate of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty came to the fore and it has a considerable effect on the prospects of further nuclear arms reductions. In the summer of 2014, Russia and the United States accused each other of violating the INF Treaty provisions, and in September 2014 Moscow hosted Russian-U.S. consultations regarding those allegations. The differences were not resolved, but the fact that consultations took place indicated that both parties were interested in preserving the treaty. The United States accused Russia of developing and testing in 2014 a land-based 9M729 cruise missile with a flight range of 2000–2500 km as part of the Iskander missile system. According to U.S officials, two missile battalions equipped in 9M729 were deployed as of 14 February 2017 with the prospect of increasing the number of missile battalions up to four. This brings to 64 alleged intermediate-range missiles in Russia’s possession, which can be armed with conventional or nuclear warheads. In turn, Russia voiced concern about the deployment of the American missile defense complex in Romania and then in Poland. This missile defense complex has launch units analogous to those on U.S. Navy vessels that are capable of launching not only counter-missiles, but also Tomahawk cruise missiles with a flight range of up to 2,500 km. Moscow also sees as a direct violation of the INF Treaty the fact that during missile defense tests the United States uses and accumulates ballistic target missiles that are analogous to medium-range ballistic missiles.26 Another unresolved issue emerged when Predator and Reaper drones were created, as they fall under definitions stipulated by the INF Treaty for land-based long-range cruise missiles.27 Donald Trump declared his intention to withdraw from the INF treaty on the basis of alleged Russian violations as early as on October 20, 2018. At the

25 “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015, no. 683 On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation [in Russian]”, Rossiiskaia gazeta, https://rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html. 26Ƚɟɧɧɚɞɢɣɏɪɨɦɨɜ, “ɂɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɟɪɚɤɟɬɵ «Ƚɟɪɚ» – ɧɚɪɭɲɟɧɢɟɞɨɝɨɜɨɪɚɊɋɆȾ (G. Khromov, The Use of Hera Missile Is a Violation of the INF Treaty)”, Website of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/ exclusive/gkk1120.htm. 27 ȿɜɝɟɧɢɣ Ɇɹɫɧɢɤɨɜ, “Ʉɨɧɬɪɨɥɶɧɚɞɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹɦɢ: ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɚɧɚɫɬɨɹɳɟɝɨ (Evgenii Miasnikov, Arms Control: Problem of the Present)”, Indeks besopastnosti 21, no. 1 (112), 2015, 132, http://pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14301361250.pdf. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 45 same time John R. Bolton, U.S. National Security Advisor, pointed out that the United States’ need to counter a Chinese arms buildup in the Pacific was another reason for their move to withdraw. A week later John R. Bolton said in an interview with Reuters that the INF Treaty was a Cold War relic and he wanted to hold strategic talks with Russia about Chinese missile capabilities.28 Up until the end of the year, Russian diplomacy tried to put diplomatic pressure on the USA, including efforts to get a favorable vote of the U.N. General Assembly but without success. On February 1, 2019, Washington suspended its obligations under the Treaty with the prospect of a complete withdrawal in a six-month period if Russia did not satisfy their claims. On the next day, Russia, pointing out the U.S. violations of the Treaty as justification, took reciprocal action. At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin made it clear that Russia would not deploy intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles either in Europe or anywhere until United States weapons of this kind were deployed there.29 Andrei Kortunov, the head of the Russian International Affairs Council, finds the only reason for optimism in this entire story in the fact that withdrawal of the USA and Russia from the INF does not mean a necessity in immediate steps beyond its restrictions. The USA, Kortunov believes, has no technical possibility to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Europe in the nearest future and Russia should manifest moderation and not take advantage of its possible best preparedness.30 Previously, in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty of 1972 the Russian side actually deemed the INF as “outdated” due to some other countries in close proximity to the Russian borders progressing with the development of intermediate- and short-range missiles. But Moscow has no obvious reason to violate the INF treaty clandestinely and on purpose (i.e. what the American position implies) because precisely such a scenario would make it more likely that American intermediate and short-range nuclear- armed missiles would return to Europe as a response. In fact, Russia has good reasons to avoid such prospects: missiles of this class put Russian territory under the danger of a flash-like nuclear strike whereas Russia can threaten only U.S. allies in Europe. Moreover, as member of the Russian Academy Alexei Arbatov surmises, in current realities these American missiles may be stationed not in Italy, Germany, the UK, Netherlands and Belgium as they were during the Cold war but in Poland, Romania or even in the Baltic states, covering Russian territory up to and including Western Siberia.31 That is why dissolution of the INF treaty is fraught with the danger of bringing Russia and the West to a much harsher Cold War style confrontation than in the 1980s. Arbatov, along with many other Russian experts (Eugene Miasnikov, Alexander Savelyev,

28 “Trump adviser says wants U.S.-Russia strategic talks on Chinese threat”, Reuters. Octo- ber 26, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-bolton-china/trump-adviser-says- wants-u-s-russia-strategic-talks-on-chinese-threat-idUSKCN1N01TI. 29 Ambassador A. Antonov at 2019 Arms Control Association Annual Meeting, April 15, 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/armscontrol2019#panel1. 30 Andrei Kortunov’s interview to “Snob”magazine, February 1, 2019, https://snob.ru/entry/171818/. 31 Alexei Arbatov’s interview to Kommersant FM, February 1, 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3872895. 46 A. Bodrov

Vladimir Dvorkin et al.), believes U.S.–Russian disagreements over the INF to be resolvable and mostly technical. However, in the current context the parties failed to reach a practical resolution of contested issues.32 To make things worse, as Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov pointed out recently, not only “anti-Russian forces in the U.S. Congress” but also the executive power of that country bind together the fate of INF Treaty and the future of the New START. He considered this approach “counterproductive,” “detrimental” and “dangerous.” Ryabkov assumed that at least an influential part of the American political elite needs no arms control treaties at all, which “entangle the USA with a kind of web of obligations and embar- rass the realization of the conception of the total military dominance in all spheres.”33

(2) Missile defense

The ballistic missile defense problem was aggravated by the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and further steps to create missile defense coverage for the entire territory of the U.S., including by creating missile defense sites in Europe. In 2015 Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, named the creation of the global ballistic missile defense system by the United States as the most significant one among all factors having a negative impact on strategic stability. Russia is striving to obtain reliable guarantees from the USA that these systems are not directed against Russian nuclear deterrence forces and is not satisfied with the verbal assurances offered by Washington.34 As the then Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov emphasized in 2012, “we consider not only words, potential, and capabilities, we summarize everything and determine who is heading where.”35 Former director of the Research Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies Sergei Rogov also noted that the meaning of any legally binding agreements is to “produce predictable situations for the next ten, twenty years,” which cannot be ensured by confidence-building measures only. He thinks that this is the reproduction of an old pattern: “in the areas where Russia is ahead of the USA, Americans want legally binding agreements. And where the United States have gained the lead, missile defense let’s say, Americans are not at all enthusiastic [about agreements].”36

32Ⱥɥɟɤɫɚɧɞɪɋɚɜɟɥɶɟɜ, “ɉɟɪɟɠɢɜɟɬɥɢɞɨɝɨɜɨɪɨɊɋɆȾɬɟɤɭɳɢɣɤɪɢɡɢɫ? ɇɟɫɤɨɥɶɤɨ ɞɨɜɨɞɨɜɜɟɝɨɩɨɥɶɡɭ (Will the INF Treaty Survive the Current Crisis? Several Arguments in Its Favor)”, Russia in Global Affairs, June 28 2018, https://www.globalaffairs.ru/global- processes/Perezhivet-li-Dogovor-o-RSMD-tekuschii-krizis--19639; ȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪȾɜɨɪɤɢɧ, “Ⱦɨɝɨ- ɜɨɪɨɊɋɆȾ: ɛɵɬɶɢɥɢɧɟɛɵɬɶ (V. Dvorkin, INF Treaty: To Be Or Not To Be)”, Nezavisimoie voiennoie obozrenie, July 14 2017, http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2017-07-14/1_956_dogovor.html; E. Miasnikov, Arms Control: Problem of the Present, 130. 33 ɋɟɪɝɟɣ Ɋɹɛɤɨɜ, “Ɉɬɤɪɨɜɟɧɧɵɣ ɪɚɡɝɨɜɨɪ ɨ ɜɨɣɧɟ ɢ ɦɢɪɟ (Sergey Ryabkov, Straight Talk about War and Peace)”, Mezdunrodnaya zhizn, no. 2, 2019, 16. 34 Interview with M.I. Ulyanov, June 1, 2015, RIA Novosti, https://ria. ru/interview/20150601/1067514136.html. 35 A.I. Antonov’s Remarks, November 8, 2012, Nuclear Weapons and International Secu- rity in the XX Century, 69. 36 S.V. Rogov’s Remarks, November 8, 2012, Nuclear Weapons and International Security in the XX Century, 71. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 47

Assuming that creation of an absolutely impermeable missile defense system is impossible from the military and technical viewpoints, researchers from the Center for Military and Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and from the Military Academy of the General Staff voiced an idea that the main objective of the European BMD may be to create an attack component of forward-based strategic offensive forces for preventive strikes against Russian territory. This is because GBI and Standard-3 are “in essence, medium-range ballistic missiles.”37 Thus, the authors prefer to evaluate the situation from a purely technical possibility, claiming that the United States may be in direct violation of INF Treaty provisions. It is interesting to note that lately Theodore A. Postol from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology came to the same conclusion: the Aegis ashore system has little or no true missile defense capabilities and may therefore – again from a purely technical point of view – be located in Europe for other purposes (for an attack).38 Vladimir Kozin, a leading expert at the Center for Military-Political Studies, also supported this argument. According to him, sea-based systems planned within the European BMD are designed for protection against a retaliatory strike by Russia in response to a first nuclear strike by NATO member states. Kozin also points to high rates of interceptor missile production and mobility of sea- based delivery systems, which may considerably weaken Russia’s second-strike capability, even though the probability of modern ICBMs and SLBNs being in- tercepted is relatively low. According to his estimate, by the mid-2020s the United States will have 2,400 interceptor missiles of all base types and functional uses against (stemming from the New START) 700 deployed delivery vehicles of Russian strategic forces.39 These estimates, however, confuse the three components of the U.S. missile defense system: sea-based, European and national (U.S. NMD) that, as PIR Center expert Vitalii Kabernik notes, are characterized by fundamentally different parameters and the degree of threat they may pose to Russia’s strategic deterrence forces. He believes that the European land-based ballistic missile defense in its present-day state does not pose a threat to Russian ICBMs. The NMD system with GBI interceptors located in Alaska and Cali- fornia is efficient in theory for shielding the West Coast from ICBMs, but is insufficient for the reliable prevention of a counterstrike, especially against the East Coast. As a result, NMD is more of a threat for the Chinese, rather

37Ⱥ. ɏɪɹɩɨɜɢɞɪ., “ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɟɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɟɜɭɫɥɨɜɢɹɯɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɹɋɒȺɝɥɨɛɚɥɶ- ɧɨɣɫɢɫɬɟɦɵɉɊɈɢɫɪɟɞɫɬɜɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɨɝɨɭɞɚɪɚ (Strategic Deterrence in the Context of Crea- tion by the USA of the Global Missile Defense System and Global Strike Means)”, Voiennaya mysl, no. 1 (2015), 20–21. 38 Theodore A. Postol, “Russia may have violated the INF Treaty. Here’s how the United States appears to have done the same”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 14, 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/02/russia-may-have-violated-the-inf-treaty-heres-how-the-united- states-appears-to-have-done-the-same/. 39 ȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪ Ʉɨɡɢɧ, “ȿɜɪɨɉɊɈ – ɷɬɨ ɭɫɬɚɧɨɜɤɚ ɧɚ ɩɟɪɜɵɣ ɹɞɟɪɧɵɣ ɭɞɚɪ (Vladimir Kozin, European Missile Defense Is a Setting for the First Nuclear Strike)”, Nezavisimoie voiennoie obozrenie, January 27, 2012, http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2012-01-27/1_europro.html; ȼɥɚɞɢ- ɦɢɪɄɨɡɢɧ, “ɉɊɈɫɩɪɟɬɟɧɡɢɟɣɧɚɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɨɫɬɶ. Ɉɫɧɨɜɧɵɟɢɬɨɝɢɢɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɵɪɚɡɜɟɪɬɵ- ɜɚɧɢɹɫɢɫɬɟɦɵ (Vladimir Kozin, BMD with a Global Claim. The Main Results and Deployment Prospects of the System)”, Nezavisimoie voiennoie obozrenie, July 03, 2015, http://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2015-07-03/1_pro.html. 48 A. Bodrov than Russian strategic arsenal. Nevertheless, in the medium term, the impact of U.S. missile defense on deterrence will grow, and one should consider this factor when drafting new nuclear arms reduction agreements.40 Researchers from the IMEMO Center for International Security support this view.41 Va- silii Burenok and Lev Lysenko from the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences prefer to talk about a ballistic missile defense system and the high potential of U.S. precision-guided weapons as “a significant military and strategic problem” for Russia and believe that “one should not overestimate it as a direct military threat and should not overestimate the capabilities of newly deployed U.S. missile defense systems because of exaggerated estimates of the likelihood of retaliatory nuclear strike interception.”42 Skeptical experts point to the unproven efficiency of interceptors against modern ballistic missiles equipped with penetration aids, as well as to the insufficient depth of defense that will be incapable of efficiently countering the retaliatory strike. This is, for instance, the conclusion made by Vladimir Dvorkin.43 As IMEMO scholar Alexander Savelyev notes, the United States has not yet exceeded the quantitative ceilings of the old ABM Treaty regarding strategic AMD in strict sense, while the missile defense system designed for Europe is not strategic from the standpoint of its deployment area and tactical and technical characteristics. Several modifications of the Standard interceptor missiles and THAAD were never tested against strategic missiles, and it is impossible to rely on them as a means of ICBM interception. Be- sides, due to their deployment geography these systems cannot threaten Rus- sia’s strategic potential.44 One should mention that the Russian leadership proposed that Russia and the U.S. cooperate in creating a joint missile defense system. The idea is not new and dates back to initiatives that were put forward in the early 1990s. In early 2000, it was “reinvented” as an alternative to USA with-

40ȼɢɬɚɥɢɣɄɚɛɟɪɧɢɤ, “ɉɨɞɯɨɞɵɤɩɨɫɬɪɨɟɧɢɸɫɢɫɬɟɦɵɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɹ ɩɨɫɥɟ 2021 ɝɨɞɚ (Approaches to Construction of the Strategic Deterrence System after 2021)”, Vestnik of MGIMO University 49, , no. 4 (2016), 226–227. 41 ɇ. Ɋɨɦɚɲɤɢɧɚ, ɂ. Ɇɚɫɥɨɜ, “ȼɨɡɦɨɠɧɨɫɬɢ ɊɎ ɜ ɨɬɜɟɬ ɧɚ ɪɚɡɜɟɪɬɵɜɚɧɢɟ ɲɢɪɨɤɨ- ɦɚɫɲɬɚɛɧɨɣɷɲɟɥɨɧɢɪɨɜɚɧɧɨɣɫɢɫɬɟɦɵɉɊɈɋɒȺɢɧɨɜɵɣɞɨɝɨɜɨɪɦɟɠɞɭɊɎɢɋɒȺɨ ɦɟɪɚɯɩɨɞɚɥɶɧɟɣɲɟɦɭɫɨɤɪɚɳɟɧɢɸɢɨɝɪɚɧɢɱɟɧɢɸɋɇȼ (N. Romashkina, I. Maslov, Capa- bilities of the Russian Federation in Response to Deployment of the Large-Scale Layered Missile Defense System of the United States and the New Treaty between Russia and the USA on Fur- ther Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms)”, Vestnik of the Academy of Military Sciences 37, no. 4 (2011), 14–21; ɇ. Ɋɨɦɚɲɤɢɧɚɢɂ. Ɇɚɫɥɨɜ, “ɉɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɚɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɹɲɢɪɨ- ɤɨɦɚɫɲɬɚɛɧɨɣɷɲɟɥɨɧɢɪɨɜɚɧɧɨɣɫɢɫɬɟɦɵɉɊɈɋɒȺ: ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɚ , ɜɨɡɦɨɠɧɨɫɬɢɢɩɨɫɥɟɞ- ɫɬɜɢɹ (N. Romashkina, I. Maslov, Development Program of the U.S. Large-Scale Layered Mis- sile Defense System: Problems, Capabilities and Consequences)”, Strategicheskaia stabilnost (Strategic Stability), no. 2 (2010), 56–66. 42ȼɚɫɢɥɢɣȻɭɪɟɧɨɤɢɅɟɜɅɵɫɟɧɤɨ, “Ɇɢɮɵɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɪɚɡɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹ (Myths of Nuclear Disarmament)”, Voienno-promyshlenniy kurier, no. 3 (2014), https://www.vpk- news.ru/articles/18910. 43ȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪȾɜɨɪɤɢɧ, “əɞɟɪɧɵɣɩɫɢɯɨɡ: ɤɨɦɭɨɧɧɭɠɟɧ? ɋɰɟɧɚɪɢɢɧɚɩɚɞɟɧɢɹɇȺɌɈ ɧɚɊɨɫɫɢɸɢɧɚɨɛɨɪɨɬ – ɩɨɥɧɵɣɚɛɫɭɪɞ (Vladimir Dvorkin, Nuclear Psychosis: Who Benefits? Scenarios of NATO Attack Against Russia and Vice Versa Are Completely Absurd)”, Voienno- promyshlenniy kurier, July 29, 2015, no. 28, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/26289. 44 Alexandr Savelyev, “Nuclear Weapons out of Control. Is There a Chance for Further Russian-U.S. Negotiations?” Russia in Global Affairs, October 5, 2017, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Yadernoe-vooruzhenie-bez-kontrolya-18928. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 49 drawal from the ABM Treaty.45 In June 2000, President Clinton and President Putin even signed in Moscow the Memorandum of Agreement regarding the exchange of information on missile launches and early warning, and the potential establishment of a multilateral notification system for the launch of ballistic missiles. In 2007, President Putin suggested including Russian radars in Armavir (Krasnodar Krai) and Gabala (Azer- baijan) in the joint missile defense system and creating joint early warning centers in Moscow and Brussels. Then Russia started to insist on creating joint (“sectoral”) missile defense in Europe and obtaining legally binding guarantees from the USA that U.S. missile defense was not directed against Russian missile forces. Washington rejected all these proposals. In his latest interviews, the Russian President continues to refer to the fact of these proposals as evidence of the seriousness of the Russian efforts to avoid the “current situation.” The latest version of the Russian Military Doctrine reflects the Rus- sian leadership’s readiness to “create mechanisms of mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral cooperation in countering potential missile threats, including if necessary, the creation of joint missile defense systems with Russian participation on a nuclear equal basis.”46 In practically the same form this message also became part of the Russian Foreign Pol- icy Concept adopted in late 2016. The Russian leadership still “stands for establishing, on an equal basis, a collective response system to possible missile-related challenges and threats, while opposing unilateral, unre- stricted actions by States or groups of States to build-up missile defense systems.”47 According to Vladimir Putin, Russia has no plans to create its own full- scale national missile defense system. Due to the country’s vast territory and geographic position, this measure would require enormous financial investments without a guarantee of success. As the Russian President noted in his March interview to NBC, no one, including the Americans, could be sure of the missile defense efficacy.48 Russia chose the path of developing strike systems capable of penetrating any system based on the interception of missiles launched over ballistic trajectory. Russian negotiators succeeded in including a statement about the interrelationship of strategic offensive and defensive arms and its growing importance in the process of strategic arms reductions into the Prague Treaty preamble. At Moscow’s suggestion, the Treaty also included restrictions on modifying ICBM and SLBM launchers for interceptors and back. Thus, Rus-

45 See: Alla Kassyanova, “Russian-European Cooperation on TMD: Russian Hopes and European Transatlantic Experience”, The Nonproliferation Review (Fall-Winter 2003): 2-3, https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/103kass.pdf. 46 “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved on December 25, 2014”, The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the UK, https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029. 47 “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016)”, Official website of the Russian MFA, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/- /asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248. 48 “Kremlin Publishes Full Megan Kelly Putin Interview - NBC Cut the Best Parts (Video + Transcript)”, Russian Insider, March 10, 2018, https://russia-insider.com/en/kremlin-publishes- full-megan-kelly-putin-interview-nbc-cut-best-parts-video-transcript/ri22747. 50 A. Bodrov sia reiterated that it would only reduce strategic offensive arms if it were sure that U.S. missile defense development would not undermine the Russian nuclear deterrence potential.49 Meanwhile, Russian officials are rather pessimistic. For instance, De- fense Ministry representative Alexander Emelyanov spoke at a joint Russian- Chinese briefing on missile defense issues held on the sidelines of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on October 12, 2017 and predicted rapid quantitative and qualitative development of American missile defense. The United States will accomplish the former, as the Russian military leadership expects, via buildup of a low-orbit system for ballistic missile detection by data transfer from a space vehicle directly to the counter missile. “Russian experts have concluded that 'Standard-3' missile systems of the 2A modifica- tion, which are expected to be deployed in 2018, will be able to intercept strategic ballistic missiles not only at the medium and final, but also at the early stage of trajectory, which will make it possible to destroy ballistic missiles prior to the dispensing of combat blocs,” he said.50 Emelyanov also emphasized: “According to our estimates, by 2022 the number of [U.S.] missile defense systems will come to over 1,000, and will in time surpass the number of warheads deployed on Russian intercontinental missiles.”51 Obviously this forecast also puts together different types of interceptors as shown earlier. By and large, the situation around American global ballistic missile defense significantly undermined Moscow’s trust in Washington’s official statements and impedes progress in the Russian-U.S. nuclear arms reduction dialogue. One can also name some other factors, e.g. U.S. non-strategic weapons in Europe, as well as U.S. precision-guided weapons systems that Moscow sees as threats to strategic stability. Each of these problems requires detailed examination.

(3) Long-range precision-guided conventional weapons

There are weapons systems affecting the strategic power balance that are not de jure strategic (from the standpoint of definitions established in Rus- sian-U.S. relations), but are strategic in essence, as they can hit the relevant military targets: missile launchers, government control sites etc. These weapons include air-based and sea-based cruise missiles, ICBMs with conventional warheads, and some weapons systems that may be introduced into service in the future, such as hypersonic systems. As the nuclear arms numbers go down, the effect of these weapons on the balance of power is going to increase.52 Lately, the Russian political and military leadership has been paying more and more attention to the problem of precision-guided non-nuclear weapons and their impact on strategic balance. Researchers at the 4th Central Research Institute of the Russian Defense Ministry Sergei Yagol’nikov,

49 A. Antonov, Arms Control, 50. 50 “US Global Missile Defenses Provoke New Spiral of Arms Race - Russian MoD”, Sput- nik News, October 13, 2017, https://sputniknews.com/world/201710131058186800-usa-global- missile-defences-arms-race/. 51 Ibid. 52 A. Antonov, Arms Control, 64–65. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 51

Aleksandr Khramichev, and Viktor Panin noted in this connection that “wars of the future are wars of high-precision technologies,” and precision-guided weapons “will become the main means of fire against practically all objects, regardless of their protection and mobility.”53 In the early 2000s, Moscow acknowledged that Russia was falling considerably behind Western countries, primarily the USA, in the development of precision-guided weapons. Even then the progress in such systems already raised concerns regarding the survivability of the shrinking strategic nuclear forces. Experts predicted then that by 2010 U.S. precision-guided weapons could acquire the necessary characteristics to destroy the land-based mobile missile complexes and launch silos of Russian ICBMs.54 That forecast was overly pessimistic, but an understanding that U.S. sea-based cruise missiles could in the future be no less dangerous to the Russian nuclear arsenal than U.S. missile defense was reflected in a failed attempt by Russian negotiators to get these systems covered by Prague Treaty restrictions. At the same time, Moscow justified the need to achieve parity of capabilities with the United States in that area as soon as possible. Vladimir Putin, the then head of government, argued that potential capabilities of the new weapons rendered this task a strategic one: “Given the power of contemporary warheads combined with accuracy and time of delivery to the potential aggressor’s territory, such complexes are becoming comparable with weapons of mass destruction. In terms of their results they already barely differ from those, and in the future, possibly, will not differ at all.”55 Over the past two decades, there have been multiple publications in the Russian press that examined scenarios where sea-based non-nuclear cruise missiles could be used for a preemptive disarming strike against Russian strategic nuclear forces. Nevertheless, military experts, while acknowledging the importance of these systems for the strengthening of offensive potential, also note that precision-guided systems are not yet suitable for a disarming strike for a variety of reasons. For instance, there have been several publications since 2009, where researchers from the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Russian Defense Min- istry offered a detailed analysis of the factors restricting the possibility of using non-nuclear cruise missiles against strategic nuclear forces. They drew the readers’ attention to the fact that it was difficult to organize a strike with non-nuclear cruise missiles against objects of strategic nuclear forces and difficult to exercise control over its results. In the meantime, they categori- cally rejected the theoretical possibility that precision-guided weapons would disarm strategic nuclear forces without an aggressor using nuclear weapons at the same time.56

53 ɋɟɪɝɟɣ əɝɨɥɶɧɢɤɨɜ et al., “ȼɨɣɧɵ ɜɵɫɨɤɢɯ ɬɟɯɧɨɥɨɝɢɣ (Wars of High-Precision Technologies)”, Vozdushno-kosmicheskaya oborona, no. 4 (2011), http://militaryarticle.ru/voenno-kosmicheskaya-oborona/2011/12637-vojny-vysokotochnyh- tehnologij. 54ȿɜɝɟɧɢɣɆɹɫɧɢɤɨɜ, ȼɵɫɨɤɨɬɨɱɧɨɟɨɪɭɠɢɟɢɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣɛɚɥɚɧɫ (Evgeniy Mi- asnikov, High-Precision Weapons and Strategic Balance) (Dolgoprundiy: 2000), 23–24. 55 Cit.: RIA Novosti, February 24, 2012, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/ 20120224/574048217.html. 56 ȿɜɝɟɧɢɣ Ⱥɯɦɟɬɨɜ et al., “ɇɟɨɛɯɨɞɢɦɨɫɬɢ ɜ ɡɟɧɢɬɧɨɪɚɤɟɬɧɨɦ ɩɪɢɤɪɵɬɢɢ Ɋȼɋɇ ɧɟɬ” (Evgeniy Akhmetov et al., There Is No Need for Air Defense Missile Cover of the Strategic 52 A. Bodrov

Military technical experts publicized rather detailed calculations to prove that it was impossible to accomplish a simultaneous strike with precision-guided cruise missiles even against one specific deployment site of the Strategic Missile Forces.57 Dmitrii Akhmerov, Evgenii Akhmerov and Marat Valeev from the Research Center of the Central Research Institute of Aerospace Defense Forces (Tver) conclude that “nuclear weapons were and will be the main threats to strategic nuclear forces. Non-nuclear cruise missiles can supplement them, striking, for instance, parts of strategic aviation airfields and submarine bases, facilities at permanent bases of mobile missile complexes, some mobile missile complexes at field positions, bridges, etc.”58 Another argument against the possibility of precision-guided weapons being used to destroy a considerable share of an opponent’s nuclear arsenal is that such an attack can only be a massive strike. Preparation for such a strike cannot go unnoticed, and one can guarantee that a retaliatory strike would be nuclear. As for ICBMs with conventional warheads, they are less destructive, so their accuracy ought to exceed that of nuclear ICBMs at least by an order of magnitude.59 If Russia or the United States make a decision to deploy a significant number of non-nuclear ICBMs, they will need to do so at the expense of their own strategic nuclear forces. If the parties choose to preserve and extend the New START, any ICBMs will be counted as part of the overall number of strategic delivery vehicles.60 Director of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Eugene Mias- nikov draws attention to the fact that the biggest threat to the survivability of Russian strategic nuclear forces in the near future comes not from weapons types developed by the United States within the Global Prompt Strike program, but from long-range air-based and sea-based cruise missiles. The latter are being continually modernized and gain qualitatively new capabilities. He also voices an opinion that one will hardly succeed in placing strategic non- nuclear weapons under the START limitations, and the “path towards resolv-

Missile Forces)”, Vozdushno-kosmicheskaia oborona, no. 3, 2009, http://militaryarticle. ru/voenno-kosmicheskaya-oborona/2009/12567-neobhodimosti-v-zenitnom-raketnom-prikrytii- rvsn. 57 Ⱦɦɢɬɪɢɣ Ⱥɯɦɟɬɨɜ et al., “ɉɨɛɵɫɬɪɨɦɭ ɧɟ ɩɨɥɭɱɢɬɫɹ” (Dmitriy Akhmetov et al., “Quickly Won’t Work”), Voienno-promyshlenniy kurier, no. 40, 2015, https://vpk- news.ru/articles/27617; Ⱦɦɢɬɪɢɣ Ⱥɯɦɟɬɨɜ et al., “Ɇɢɦɨ ɲɚɯɬɵ” (Dmitriy Akhmetov et al., “Past the Silo”), Voienno-promyshlenniy kurier, no. 21 2017, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/37124; Ɇɚɪɚɬȼɚɥɟɟɜ, ȺɥɟɤɫɚɧɞɪȻɟɥɨɦɵɬɰɟɜ, “ɋɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɟɧɟɨɩɪɟɞɟɥɟɧɧɨɫɬɶɸ (Marat Valeev, Aleksandr Belomytsev, Deterrence with Uncertainty)”, Voienno-promyshlenniy kurier, 2017, no. 26, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/37755. 58ȾɦɢɬɪɢɣȺɯɦɟɬɨɜ et al., “ɍɹɡɜɢɦɨɫɬɶɤɨɧɰɟɩɰɢɢɧɟɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɪɚɡɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹɋɬɪɚɬɟ- ɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɯɹɞɟɪɧɵɯɫɢɥɊɨɫɫɢɢ” (Dmitriy Akhmetov et al., Vulnerability of the Concept of Non- Nuclear Disarmament of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces”), Vestnik of the Academy of Mili- tary Sciences 54, no. 1 (2016): 37–40. 59 Alexandr Savelyev, “Nuclear Weapons out of Control. Is There a Chance for Further Russian-U.S. Negotiations? October 5, 2017”, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 3 (2017), http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Yadernoe-vooruzhenie-bez-kontrolya-18928. 60ȿɜɝɟɧɢɣɆɹɫɧɢɤɨɜ, “ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɟɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹɜɧɟɹɞɟɪɧɨɦɨɫɧɚɳɟɧɢɢ: ɩɪɨɛɥɟ- ɦɵɢɪɟɲɟɧɢɹ (Evgeniy Miasnikov, Non-Nuclear Strategic Weapons: Problems and Solutions)”, Indeks bezopastnosti 96, no. 1 (2011): 126. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 53 ing the problem consists in enhancing transparency and parties undertaking unilateral obligations.”61

(4) The problem of transition to multilateral talks

Over the past few years, the need to make talks on the reduction and limitation of strategic nuclear weapons (the former would obviously apply to the largest arsenal owners and the latter – to everyone else) a multilateral process became one of the key demands that Russian diplomacy voices to potential partners. Back in 2012, the then presidential candidate Vladimir Putin stated: “As for further steps in the area of nuclear arms, further steps ought to already have a complex character and the process ought to already involve all nuclear powers. We cannot endlessly disarm, while some other nuclear powers are arming themselves.”62 At first glance, this position resembles that of the Soviet Union in the late 1960s when it advocated the principle of “equal security” and demanded “compensation” for imbalances in other weapons categories when concluding agreements with the United States in the area of strategic nuclear weapons. These imbalances were created by the nuclear forces of the USA’s NATO allies, American nuclear forward-based weapons in Europe and also by American progress on MIRVing and advantages in SLBMs and strategic bombers. Washington was ready to interpret the Russian position in exactly that manner. In June 2013, President Barack Obama stated in Berlin that the United States was ready to negotiate reducing one third of the deployed strategic weapons allowed by the Prague Treaty. He also stated that the United States would “work with our NATO allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian tactical weapons in Europe.”63 However, Moscow reacted to this hint without enthusiasm. Talking about a military-strategic balance, Russia now formulates the agenda more widely, concentrating more on non-nuclear weapons. Anti-missile systems, conventional Prompt Global Strike potential, possible deployment of weapons in outer space, and increasing qualitative and quantitative imbalances in conventional arms are gaining more and more importance.64 In November 2012 Vladimir Leontiev, Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, offered an expanded interpretation to the idea of multilateral arms control talks indicating the need to engage India, Pakistan and Israel, non-members of the NPT

61 ȿɜɝɟɧɢɣ Ɇɹɫɧɢɤɨɜ, “ɋɦɟɧɳɢɤɢ «ɋɚɬɚɧɵ» ɢ «Ɇɢɧɢɬɦɟɧɚ» ɡɚɫɬɭɩɚɸɬ ɧɚ ɛɨɟɜɨɣ ɩɨɫɬ (Evgeniy Miasnikov, Satan and Minuteman Relief Shifts Take Up Duty)”, Nezavisimoie voiennoie obozrenie, September 28, 2012, http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2012-09-28/11_satan.html. 62 Cit.: RIA Novosti, February 24, 2012, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/ 20120224/574042339.html. 63 “Barack Obama's Berlin speech – full text”, The Guardian, June 19, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/19/barack-obama-berlin-speech-full-text. 64 “Vladimir Leontiev, Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, interview to Rossiya Segodnya, August 3, 2016”, Official website of the Russian MFA, http://www.mid.ru/nota-bene/-/asset_publisher/dx7DsH1WAM6w/ content/id/2378191 (Access date: 10.11.2017) 54 A. Bodrov that possess nuclear weapons, in possible multilateral talks of P-5.65 Later, this idea was given a fuzzier wording: “all states possessing military nuclear potential.”66 In February 2018, Sergei Lavrov repeated this formula in Ge- neva: “we have reached the point when all the States that possess nuclear military potential should join in further efforts towards nuclear disarmament.”67 At the same time, General Valentin Korabelnikov, then Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian General Staff, acknowledged in 2012 that the nuclear weapon stockpiles of India, Israel, Pakistan, and DPRK – “meant on top of that for the pursuit of purely regional tasks” – “are not a factor affecting the sustainability of bilateral Russian-American deterrence due to their incomparability.” For him the essence of a multilateral approach to nuclear arms control in the short term was to count China’s potential and add French and British strategic nuclear forces to American numbers when calculating the new reduction ceilings.68 The problem of engaging non-members of the NPT that possess nuclear weapons in possible multilateral talks on strategic arms control is complicated by the fact that their nuclear forces evolve due to a logic of their own and are not perceived by their possessors as dependent on the U.S.–Russian strategic balance. India is looking at China; Pakistan at India;69 and China’s nuclear deterrent came into being as largely intended for the USSR, and now is more influenced by Washington’s plans to create its global ballistic missile defense system. As for India and Pakistan, Russia obviously does not view their nuclear forces as a direct threat, but in case they are used against each other, there will be consequences for Russia. That is why Moscow is interested in keeping the nuclear arsenals of the two within limits and even to influence their structure to make them more crisis resistant. It should be also noted that from the Russian strategic perspective the relative role of French and British nuclear forces has grown over the last years, and that of the Chinese has decreased due to the substantial political rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing. The Russian expert community put forward a number of ideas about how to achieve the goal of “multilateralization.” According to Vladimir Dvorkin and Viktor Yesin, the most realistic option would be for Russia and the U.S. to renounce the concept of a retaliatory counter-strike, where missiles are launched in response to an attack warning. Their idea is to lower the combat

65 V.L. Leontiev’s Remarks, November 8, 2012, Nuclear Weapons and International Secu- rity in the XX Century: International Conference Proceedings, Moscow, 2013, 73–74. 66 Vladimir Leontiev’s interview to Rossiya Segodnya, August 3, 2016, http://www.mid.ru/nota-bene/-/asset_publisher/dx7DsH1WAM6w/content/id/2378191. 67 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement at the Conference on Disarmament, Ge- neva, February 28, 2018 [in English]”, Official website of the Russian MFA, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/ id/3102270. 68 V.V. Korabel’nikov’s Remarks, November 8, 2012, Nuclear Weapons and International Security in the XX Century, 85. 69 Vladimir Sotnikov from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sci- ence describes the Pakistan nuclear program as the most fast-growing. See: ȺɥɟɤɫɟɣɁɚɛɪɨɞɢɧ, ³ɉɚɤɢɫɬɚɧɭɫɬɪɟɦɢɥɫɹɜɩɨɝɨɧɸɡɚɹɞɟɪɧɵɦɢɩɨɬɟɧɰɢɚɥɚɦɢɋɒȺɢɊɎ (Pakistan in Pursuit of Nuclear Potentials of USA and Russia)”, Nezavisimaia gazeta, August 28, 2015, http://www.ng.ru/world/2015-08-28/1_pakistan.html. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 55 readiness level of some (20, 30, 50%) of the Russian and U.S. strategic forces, ICBMs and SLBMs, with their subsequent reduction. This measure would eventually bring the two largest nuclear powers to the levels of the United Kingdom, France and China.70 Dvorkin believes that it would be reasonable to invite France and the UK to join the periodic notifications on composition, number and types of nuclear weapons, locations of nuclear weapons production facilities, start and completion of nuclear weapons production, introduction of nuclear weapons into service and their removal from service, as well as other practices undertaken within the Russian-U.S. contractual framework.71 According to Alexei Arbatov, the most realistic way is a complex of bilateral agreements between countries that are engaged in relations of mutual nuclear deterrence. Such agreements could, taken altogether, lead to an overall nuclear reduction. Even with a 1,000 warhead ceiling on Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals, their nuclear potential would still be too large compared to third party arsenals to make the idea of multilateral disarmament attractive for the latter. DPRK joining the nuclear weapons consultations of P-5 is also the last thing one would expect. Arbatov believes that for Beijing a key prerequisite would be an obligation by the two leading nuclear powers not to try to undermine China’s nuclear potential by means of offensive (nuclear and conventional) and defensive (U.S. ballistic missile defense in the Pacific and Russia’s aerospace defense in the Asian part of the country) systems. He supports the idea of engaging Paris and London in transparency and trust- building mechanisms.72 Meanwhile, a group of researchers from the Russian Defense Ministry’s Central Research Institute deemed “unviable” the concept of nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the USA only, without taking into account other countries “that possess nuclear weapons or powerful conventional weapons potential.” They thought that the ideas of direct French and British engagement in a strategic nuclear reductions treaty and reduction of the number of deployed warheads by them were “unrealistic.” For them the only way to construct a deter-

70ȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪȾɜɨɪɤɢɧ, “Ɉɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɣɫɬɚɛɢɥɶɧɨɫɬɢɢɦɧɨɝɨɫɬɨɪɨɧɧɢɯɩɟɪɟɝɨɜɨ- ɪɚɯ ɩɨ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɦɭ ɪɚɡɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɸ” (interview) (Vladimir Dvorkin, “On Strategic Stability and Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Disarmament”), On Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Dis- armament: Working Papers of the Russian International Affairs Council, no. IX (2013): 19–20; ȼɢɤɬɨɪȿɫɢɧ, “Ɉɪɨɥɢɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɨɪɭɠɢɹɢɦɧɨɝɨɫɬɨɪɨɧɧɢɯɩɟɪɟɝɨɜɨɪɨɜɩɨɪɚɡɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɸ” (interview) (Viktor Esin, “On the Role of Nuclear Weapons and Multilateral Disarmament Talks”), On Multilateral Approach, 31. 71ȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪȾɜɨɪɤɢɧ, “ɋɨɤɪɚɳɟɧɢɟɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɯɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɣ” (Vladimir Dvorkin, Strategic Arms Reduction)”, Ȼɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɶɢɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɶɧɚɞɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹɦɢ 2015-2016. Ɇɟɠ- ɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɟɜɡɚɢɦɨɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɟɜɛɨɪɶɛɟ ɫɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɵɦɢɭɝɪɨɡɚɦɢ (Security and Arms Control 2015–2016. International Cooperation in Combatting Global Threats), ed. A.G. Arbatov, N.I. Bubnova (Moscow, 2016), 41. 72ȺɥɟɤɫɟɣȺɪɛɚɬɨɜ, “ȼɨɡɦɨɠɟɧɥɢɩɟɪɟɯɨɞɤɦɧɨɝɨɫɬɨɪɨɧɧɟɦɭɹɞɟɪɧɨɦɭɪɚɡɨɪɭɠɟ- ɧɢɸ? (Is Transition to Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Possible?)”, Mirovaya ekonomika I mezdunarodnie otnosheniya, no. 3, (2013), 13–18; ȺɥɟɤɫɟɣȺɪɛɚɬɨɜ, ȼɢɤɬɨɪȿɫɢɧ, “ɉɟɪɫɩɟɤ- ɬɢɜɵɩɨɞɤɥɸɱɟɧɢɹ Ʉɢɬɚɹ ɤ ɨɝɪɚɧɢɱɟɧɢɸ ɹɞɟɪɧɵɯ ɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɣ” (Aleksey Arbatov, Viktor Esin, “The Prospects of Engaging China in Nuclear Arms Limitation”), Carnegie Moscow Cen- ter, August 25, 2014, http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=56690. 56 A. Bodrov rence system without taking British and French nuclear forces into account was to start talks on the “liquidation of NATO.”73 Thus, the preference of a multilateral format seems to be a broad consensus between all Russian policy makers and experts. Yet up until now, none of the ideas about the practical implementation of Russia’s prerequisite has gained traction.

(5) Non-strategic nuclear weapons

Non-strategic nuclear weapons, otherwise known as tactical nuclear weapons, are generally low-yield short-range nuclear weapons designed for use on the battlefield. Within the U.S.-Soviet (Russian) context, this means land-based missiles with a range of less than 500 km (about 300 miles) and air- and sea-launched weapons with a range of less than 600 km (about 400 miles). It should be noted that these definitions are not universally accepted: France classifies all its currently deployed nuclear weapons as strategic; China also classifies many weapons as strategic that in the U.S.-Russian context would be considered tactical.74 They can also be defined as weapons not covered by strategic arms control treaties, including the New START and INF treaties. Due to Russia’s geostrategic location, non-strategic nuclear weapons mean much more to it than to the United States. First, Russia considers its non-strategic nuclear forces as a counterbalance for NATO’s considerable conventional superiority in Europe although this factor might lose some part of its gravity along with progress in the modernization of the Russian Army. Second, Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces also constitute a deterrent factor for third countries whose missile forces can reach Russian territory. In the U.S. case, the real threat still comes from Russian and Chinese strategic weapons only. Third, Russian non-strategic nuclear warheads are based on Russian territory, removed from active service and kept at special storage facilities, while the United States have such weapons stationed in Europe in close proximity to the Russian border.75 Russia believes American nuclear bombs in Europe to be directed only against Russia, because it is difficult to imagine a different scenario for their use in Europe.76 These weapons are seen as de facto strategic, as far as they can hit a target practically anywhere in the European part of Russia.77 For that

73 A. Ⱥɤɢɦɨɜ et al., “Ɉɜɨɡɦɨɠɧɨɫɬɢɢɧɟɨɛɯɨɞɢɦɵɯɭɫɥɨɜɢɹɯɞɚɥɶɧɟɣɲɟɝɨɫɨɤɪɚɳɟ- ɧɢɹɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨɧɚɫɬɭɩɚɬɟɥɶɧɨɝɨɩɨɬɟɧɰɢɚɥɚɊɨɫɫɢɢ (A. Akimov et al., On Possibility and Necessary Conditions of Further Reduction of Russia’s Strategic Offensive Potential), Strategicheskaya stabilnost (Strategic Stability), no. 2, (2009), 26. 74 Nicolai Sokov, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons”, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/tactical-nuclear-weapons. 75 A. Antonov, Arms Control, 75. 76 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement at the Conference on Disarmament, Ge- neva, February 28, 2018 [in English]”, Official website of the Russian MFA, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-sset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3102270. 77Ƚɪɢɝɨɪɢɣəɤɨɜɥɟɜ, “əɞɟɪɧɨɟɭɫɬɪɚɲɟɧɢɟɫɧɨɜɚɜɦɨɞɟ. ɋɒȺɢɇȺɌɈɧɟɫɨɛɢɪɚ- ɸɬɫɹɨɬɤɚɡɵɜɚɬɶɫɹɨɬɟɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɯɚɪɫɟɧɚɥɨɜɫɚɦɨɝɨɝɪɨɡɧɨɝɨɨɪɭɠɢɹ” (Grigoriy Yakovlev, “Nuclear Intimidation is in Fashion Again. The USA and NATO Are Not Going to Abandon European Arsenals of the Most Menacing Weapons”), Nezavisimoie voiennoie obozrenie, August 26, 2016, http://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2016-08-26/1_nuclear.html. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 57 reason, the Russian position is that any bilateral talks on the reduction of both parties’ non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) ought to be preceded by consolidation of all such weapons within the parties’ national borders, i.e. by withdrawal of American tactical weapons from Europe. Vladimir Dvorkin argues that with the exception of the 1987 INF Treaty “Russia and the USA have never before embarked upon talks on NSNW limitation due to the extremely complex problem of ensuring control over its implementation.”78 This is explained by the fact that delivery vehicles of non- strategic nuclear weapons often have a dual use (i.e. they can deliver conventional weapons too), different typology, and a large number of stationing areas. Thus any NSNW limitation as Anatoly Antonov notes is essentially reduced to controlled elimination of nuclear warheads.79 Moscow and Washing- ton carried out large-scale reductions of these weapons in the early 1990s as part of unspoken agreements and political good will gestures based on the principle of “reasonable sufficiency.”80 Russia, just like the United States, refrains from publicizing the numbers and composition of its tactical nuclear weapons. The position of the Russian Defense Ministry on that matter was outlined in detail by Major General Evgenii Ilyin, Deputy Head of the Main Directorate for Interna- tional Military Cooperation, who indicated that the weapons reduction process ought to pursue three objectives: “reduce the likelihood of conflict, make maintenance of the Armed Forces cheaper, and increase the common security space.” In his opinion, “from the standpoint of common security space, it is quite possible that declarations and figures somehow contribute to this process. But the first two points, that are in my view the main and priority ones, do not in any way depend on declarations of quantitative indicators.”81 At the same time, officials stated on multiple occasions that Russia transferred these weapons into the non-deployed category and keeps them at central storage facilities with the highest security level that prevents theft and accidental or unauthorized use.82 Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, pointed out that “over the past twenty years strategic nuclear arms were reduced five times and tactical – four times.”83 According to SIPRI experts, Russia has

78 V. Dvorkin, Strategic arms reduction, 40. 79 A. Antonov, Arms Control, 77. 80ȺɧɚɬɨɥɢɣȾɶɹɤɨɜ et al., ɇɟɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɟɹɞɟɪɧɨɟɨɪɭɠɢɟ. ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɵɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɹɢ ɫɨɤɪɚɳɟɧɢɹ (Anatoliy Diakov et al., Non-StrategicNuclearWeapons. The Problems of Control and Reduction) (Dolgoprudniy: 2004), 27–28. 81 “Ȼɭɞɭɳɟɟ ɧɟɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ ɨɪɭɠɢɹ ɜ ȿɜɪɨɩɟ: ɜɨɡɦɨɠɧɵ ɜɚɪɢɚɧɬɵ” (“The Future of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Different Options Are Possible”), Indeks bezopasnosti 18, no. 3–4 (2012), 179. 82 Practical Steps of the Russian Federation towards Nuclear Disarmament. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, April 27 – May 22, 2015, http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14319751051.pdf. 83 “Ɇɨɫɤɜɚ ɫɨɜɟɬɭɟɬ ȼɚɲɢɧɝɬɨɧɭ ɧɟ ɩɨɞɧɢɦɚɬɶ ɜɨɩɪɨɫ ɨ ɪɚɤɟɬɚɯ (Moscow recom- mends Washington not to raise the issue of missiles)”, ȼɟɫɬɢ, April 17, 2015, https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2511207. 58 A. Bodrov around 1,850 tactical nuclear warheads that are ready for use. Several thousand such warheads are awaiting dismantlement and elimination.84 Nevertheless, in November 2018 a bill was introduced in both houses of the U.S. Congress which was aimed to prevent funding to extend the New START Treaty until Russia agreed to verifiably reduce its stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and include its new systems under the limits of the New START Treaty. Realization of any verifiable reduction of NSNW, as mentioned earlier, demands from both the USA and Russia a very high level of transparency and trust that now seems unreachable. That is why Russian Am- bassador Antonov treated this initiative as a mere attempt to prevent the New START from extension. “It seems that they make this linking with a view to make it unacceptable for Russia and to induce us to reject it from the beginning,” observed a diplomat. He denied any direct link between NSNW and the New START treaty.85 The above-mentioned initiative by American congressmen found no support and was not realized but this episode demonstrated once more that from the Russian point of view the problem of NSNW was not an unsurmountable obstacle for new nuclear arms reduction agreements. One can agree with Yu- rii Nadtochei, a researcher from the Moscow University for the Humanities, that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are ɚ habitual “evil” for Moscow that holds less and less military, but invariably high political value for NATO.86 Russian doctrinal documents do not list it among the key challenges in the arms control area and Russian political discourse pays less attention to it than to U.S. ballistic missile defense or Global Prompt Strike.

(6) Modernization of nuclear forces

Russia and the United States continually enhance their armed forces in general and strategic nuclear forces in particular. Over the past decade, Rus- sia has intensively modernized its strategic triad. The United States will start large-scale modernization of its strategic nuclear arsenal in the mid-2020s. The program will include the development of a new submarine, new strategic bomber and new ICBM. Expansion of the missile defense program is also quite likely. The eventual scale of this rearmament will largely depend on the current state of Russian-U.S. relations, including in the field of arms control. Fur- thermore, the phase of the modernization cycle in the case of each country will also have a serious effect on the prospects of mutual agreements. Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin forecast that due to the upcoming modernization of nuclear forces the United States will be interested in jointly lowering the ceilings on delivery vehicles and warheads for the sake of cost savings. On the contrary, Russia will almost completely revamp its Strategic Missile Forces over the 2020s, which

84 SIPRI Yearbook 2017. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford, 2017), 425–26. 85 “Ⱥɧɬɨɧɨɜ ɧɚɡɜɚɥ ɭɫɥɨɜɢɹ ɚɦɟɪɢɤɚɧɫɤɨɝɨ ɤɨɧɝɪɟɫɫɚ ɩɨ ɋɇȼ-3 ɧɟɩɪɢɟɦɥɟɦɵɦɢ” (“Antonov Qualified U.S. Congress’ Conditions on the New Start as Unacceptable”), RIA No- vosti, November 30, 2018, https://ria.ru/20181130/1533961179.html. 86ɘɪɢɣɇɚɞɬɨɱɟɣ, “ɌɚɤɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɟɹɞɟɪɧɨɟɨɪɭɠɢɟɋɒȺɜȿɜɪɨɩɟɢɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɚɇȺɌɈ” (Yuriy Nadtochey, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe and NATO Policies”), USA & Canada: Economics, Politics, Culture, no. 2 (2016), 113. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 59 pushes Moscow towards further reductions not via delivery vehicle elimination, but by means of partial “unloading” of MIRV’ed missiles or their re-equipment with non-nuclear warheads.87 Continuous modernization of old nuclear weapons systems and improvement of their combat characteristics also affect the strategic balance. In March 2017, American nuclear weapons experts indicated that the new super- fuse for W76-1/Mk4A Trident II SLBM warheads allows for adjusting the detonation point if falling short or long of a target.88 This publication gener- ated a lively discussion in Russia because the authors conclude that this warhead modernization will result in a qualitative increase in engagement effectiveness when targeting ICBM launcher silos.89 Increased vulnerability of strategic offensive forces to precision-guided nuclear and conventional weapons inevitably affects the question about whether further quantitative reductions of strategic nuclear forces are advisable. In this context, some Russian experts rush to argue that the claim that strategic offensive arms cuts reduce the temptation of launching a disarming nuclear strike is outdated.90 Vladimir Kozin, a leading expert at the Center for Military-Political Studies, does not believe the extension or non-extension of the Prague Treaty in 2018 to be “an urgent matter.” Extension of the existing or conclusion of a new nuclear reduction treaty is impeded by “sixteen unresolved arms control problems between Moscow and Washington at the latter’s fault and initiative,” including uncontrolled deployment of the global missile defense system by the United States and deployment in Europe of their tactical nuclear weapons capable of pursuing strategic tasks.91 Some authors, on the contrary, think that Russia ought to take the initiative in further strategic arms limitation and reduction talks. Fedor Lukyanov, editor of the “Russia in Global Affairs” journal and President of the Board of the NGO Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, notes that if Russia only reacts to Washington’s proposals, it may find itself in a situation where it will have to act within an imposed paradigm.92 Alexei Arbatov believes it important not to give “a free hand” to the United States in the case of a new nuclear arms race: “It is in Russia’s interests to set lower strategic ceilings on arse-

87Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, The New Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms: One Step in the Right Direction. Briefing 12, Issue 2 (June 2010), 3–4, Carnegie Moscow Center, http://carnegie.ru/2010/08/11/new-treaty-on-strategic-offensive-arms-one-step-in-right-direction- pub-41369. 88 Hans Kristensen et al., “How US nuclear force modernization is undermining strategic stability: The burst-height compensating super-fuze”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1, 2017, https://thebulletin.org/how-us-nuclear-force-modernization-undermining-strategic- stability-burst-height-compensating-super10578. 89 “U.S. Nuclear Warheads' Scary Modernization”, RIAC website, http://russiancouncil. ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/US-Nuclear-Warheads-Scary-Modernization/. 90 ȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪ Ɋɵɛɚɱɟɧɤɨɜ, “ɋɬɚɛɢɥɶɧɨɫɬɶ ɩɨɞ ɩɪɢɰɟɥɨɦ: Ɍɟɯɧɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɩɪɨɝɪɟɫɫ ɦɟɧɹɟɬ ɞɨɤɬɪɢɧɭ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ ɫɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɧɢɹ” (Vladimir Rybachenkov, “Stability at Gunpoint: Technological Progress Is Changing the Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine”), Voienno-promyshlenniy kurier, no. 38 (702), October 4, 2017, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/39212. 91ȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪɄɨɡɢɧ, “ɋɬɨɢɬ ɥɢɫɟɣɱɚɫɩɪɨɞɥɟɜɚɬɶɞɨɝɨɜɨɪɋɇȼ-3?” (Vladimir Kozin, “Should the START-3 Treaty Be Extended Now?”), Center for Military-Political Studies, http://eurasian-defence.ru/?q=ekspertnoe-mnenie/stoit-li-seychas-prodlevat. 92ɎɟɞɨɪɅɭɤɶɹɧɨɜ, “ȼɬɨɪɨɣɹɞɟɪɧɵɣɜɟɤ?” (Fedor Lukianov, “The Second Nuclear Cen- tury?”), Rossiiskaia gazeta, February 26, 2017, https://rg.ru/2017/02/26/lukianov-zaiavlenie- trampa-vozvrashchaiut-mir-v-hh-vek.html. 60 A. Bodrov nals, including hypersonic weapons, and resume negotiations on parameters and confidence-building measures with regard to missile defense systems.”93 Besides, Russia is in a more vulnerable geostrategic position than the United States, and new military rivalry would require colossal spending. Up until now, however, the Russian leadership has been avoiding taking the initiative, which begs for an explanation.

The prospects of new nuclear arms reduction agreements

Over the recent years, there has been a certain degree of self- contradiction in comments made by the Russian political leadership regarding the role of nuclear weapons and the prospects of their reduction. One can partially explain this by an intention to send this or that signal that can only be understood taking into account the context and the audience of a specific statement. Another factor is difficult adaptation to new external realities and to new technologies. These processes are not linear, and it led to a sort of a “learning curve” or a trial and error approach. However, one can also trace here an understanding of the crucial role that nuclear weapons still play in ensuring Russia’s security and great power status. Over the past few years, the Russian president has had the same message: strategic nuclear forces are a necessary component of international stability and strategic equilibrium, and maintaining them is not only “our common national task,” but also “our duty to the entire mankind.”94 Vladimir Putin reproduced this message in his much-talked-of address to the Federal Assembly in March 2018.95 However, at the Valdai Forum on October 24, 2014, Vladimir Putin also stated that “we are not only in favor of talks but insist on continuing talks to reduce nuclear arsenals. The fewer nuclear weapons we have in the world, the better.”96 More and more often, when talking about the elimination of nuclear arsenals, the Russian leadership links it to acquiring new capabilities in the form of strategic precision-guided conventional weapons. In 2012 Putin, the then Prime Minister, was rather straightforward about it: “We will renounce nuclear weapons only when we have such [precision-guided] complexes in service and not a day earlier.”97 Yet at the Valdai Forum of 2014 precision-guided weapons were already presented not only as a possible substitute for nuclear arms, but also as a potentially destabilizing factor. As Vladimir Putin stated, “in the event of full renunciation of nuclear weapons or radical reduction of nuclear potential, nations that are leaders in creating and producing high-precision systems will

93Alexei Arbatov, “Razing the Old to Build the New? Is Arms Control Obsolete?” Russia in Global Affairs, October 5, 2017, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Razing-the-Old-to-Build- the-New-190407. 94 Cit.: RIA Novosti, February 24, 2012, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20120224/ 574036609.html. 95 See: “Putin Told About the Newest Types of Russian Weaponry”, RIA Novosti, March 1, 2018, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20180301/1515566394.html. 96 “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club”, October 24, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860. 97 Cit.: RIA Novosti, February 24, 2012, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20120224/ 574048217.html. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 61 have a clear military advantage. Strategic parity will be disrupted, and this is likely to bring destabilization. The use of a so-called first global pre-emptive strike may become tempting.”98 As a matter of fact, the Russian leadership seems to somewhat exaggerate the capabilities of high-precision weapons. Alexei Arbatov, for example, challenges the claim that many types of these weapons have already become akin to weapons of mass destruction in terms of their destructive power.99 Recently, there was added the factor of economic sanctions imposed by Washington against Russia. As Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated in February 2016, there is “the complete absence of political logic or common sense in a disarmament proposal when the current U.S. administration has been working consistently and for a long time to undermine Russia’s defense and industrial potential through its policy of sanctions.”100 It sounded like a sort of new precondition for resuming the dialogue on further strategic arms reductions. But the thesis voiced by Ryabkov has not found thereafter a development in this sense and it has remained as one more sign of the strained relations of the two countries. Nevertheless, in his March 2018 interview to NBC, President Putin reiterated the importance of the New START and admitted that its extension or preparation of a new agreement on further reductions of delivery vehicles and warheads was possible. Before that, Russian officials on multiple occasions voiced doubt that further significant nuclear reductions were possible, indicating, among other things, that after Russia revamped its nuclear arsenal, elimination of new systems would be inadvisable.101 Recently, the Russian president presented a number of technical innovations to the public, such as the new heavy ICBM Sarmat, hypersonic weapons, the new nuclear-powered nuclear-armed cruise missile and nuclear “super torpedo.” They were meant as a message to the United States that it would be impossible to “zero out” Russian nuclear deterrence forces by developing missile defense systems, but this presentation was also an invitation to the negotiations table. As Putin clarified in the above-mentioned NBC interview, “We are ready to continue this dialogue <…> We agree to a reduction or to retaining current terms, to a reduction in delivery vehicles and warheads <…> today, when we are acquiring weapons that can easily breach all anti-ballistic missile systems, we no longer consider the reduction of ballistic missiles and warheads to be highly critical.”102

98 “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club”, http://en.kremlin. ru/events/president/news/46860 99Ⱥɥɟɤɫɟɣ Ⱥɪɛɚɬɨɜ, “ȼɚɥɞɚɣɫɤɢɟɩɪɟɞɥɨɠɟɧɢɹɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚɉɭɬɢɧɚ (Aleksei Arbatov, Valdai Proposals of President Putin)”, Official website of IMEMO, November 5, 2014, https://www.imemo.ru/index.php?page_id=502&id=1306&p=22. 100 “Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’ response to a Rossiya Segodnya question on the future of Russian-US nuclear reduction talks”, Official website of the Russian Foreign Minis- try, February 6, 2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/voenno-strategiceskie-problemy/- /asset_publisher/hpkjeev1aY0p/content/id/2064261. 101 See: Alexandr Savelyev, “Nuclear Weapons out of Control. Is There a Chance for Fur- ther Russian-U.S. Negotiations?”, Russia in Global Affairs, October 5, 2017, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Yadernoe-vooruzhenie-bez-kontrolya-18928. 102 “Kremlin Publishes Full Megan Kelly Putin Interview - NBC Cut the Best Parts (Video + Transcript)”, Russian Insider, March 10, 2018, https://russia-insider.com/en/kremlin-publishes- full-megan-kelly-putin-interview-nbc-cut-best-parts-video-transcript/ri22747. 62 A. Bodrov

This idea was further elaborated by Vladimir Ermakov, Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, at the Assembly of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy. He stated that by 2018 “the military-technological situation has changed radically in favor of Russia” and “sooner or later, our American colleagues will have to negotiate with us. And it would probably be more useful for them to do it sooner rather than later, since the military- technological weight of the United States in the global distribution of forces is constantly decreasing.”103 This perception of the situation stems from the fact that Russia managed to partly catch up with the United States in high-precision weapons and missile defense development and deployed the corresponding GLONASS orbital grouping.104 It also stems from successes of several countries (primarily China) in state-of-the-art combat systems programs. Therefore, the link between nuclear and non-nuclear strategic capabilities is the foundation of Russia’s current approach to strategic equilibrium and international stability, and one should not see it as a mere attempt to ensure the right to have a larger number of nuclear warheads or delivery vehicles in case of new limitations. If Russia acquires a full arsenal of state-of-the-art non-nuclear systems and capabilities on a par with the United States, this can eventually clear the way for further nuclear arms reductions. Besides, Russia and the United States are gradually coming closer to one another in terms of nuclear forces structure; in fact, they are already closer than ever before.105 For instance, Russia and the United States gradually become more alike in terms of the number of strategic submarines and characteristics of sea- based and air-based cruise missiles. One can consider all this as factors contributing to the possible success of future Russian-U.S. strategic arms control talks.

Conclusion

The New START remains a mutually beneficial treaty for the United States and Russia, and the latter sees it as a truly equitable agreement, a gold standard for all future agreements in this field. Moscow is committed to implementation of the Prague Treaty as it allows Russia to modernize its nuclear forces without the risk of sliding into an uncontrolled arms race. This is espe-

103 Cit.: “Moscow can respond “with dignity” to any pressure from the US”, Observatory, April 15, 2018, https://newsobservatory.com/moscow-can-respond-with-dignity-to-any-pressure- from-the-us/. 104 Russia plans to develop the Glonass navigation system in 2021-2030 on the basis of Glonass-K2 satellites which permit to improve navigation accuracy from 3-5 to less than 1 meter due to requirements of high-precision weapons. See: “New satellites to improve accuracy of Russia’s Glonass orbital grouping to one meter”, Russian news agency TASS, May 31, 2019, https://tass.com/science/1061174 (Access date 21.07.2019) 105 “Nuclear Policy of the New U.S. Administration: Challenges and Opportunities for Rus- sia and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Roundtable [in Russian]”, Yadernyi kontrol (Nu- clear Control), no. 2-3, (February-March 2018), 6, http://www.pircenter. org/media/content/files/14/15224267220.pdf. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 63 cially important in the context of worsening Russian-U.S. relations and the crisis of confidence. But it seems that the Russian political leadership and a large number of experts (especially military experts) still place an emphasis primarily on the strategic calculation of military balance between the USA/NATO and Russia and related requirements for effective deterrence. Often ignored are the consequences of nuclear proliferation should the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime begin to crumble due to lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. The New START expires very soon, in early 2021. The Russian leadership declares their readiness to negotiate either its extension or replacement with a new agreement. However, the two parties have not yet resumed their dialogue, not even at the expert level. This situation reflects the presence of considerable disagreements between the countries and demonstrates that Russia is serious about its preconditions for the resumption of strategic dialogue. Moscow’s position has been quite consistent over the past few years. First, the Russian leadership refers to Washington’s “destabilizing activities” aimed at creating a global missile defense system. Second, it highlights the increasing role of the newest precision-guided conventional systems capable of launching disarming strikes. Third, it links further disarmament to the need to transform strategic arms reduction talks into multilateral ones, where French and British nuclear arsenals would be taken into account, as they are U.S. allies and NATO member states, and where there would be more transparency (although this point is not spelled out) with regard to China’s strategic nuclear forces. There are also additional factors, such as the further steps of Russia and USA after the collapse of INF Treaty, the situation with non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the effect of the nuclear forces modernization carried out by both Russia and the United States on strategic equilibrium. The prospects of a new strategic arms control treaty also largely depend on the parties’ ability to reach a consensus on confidence-building measures. Here, one should recall the words of Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Vladimir Leontiev about the declining role of numbers as applied to ceilings of strategic nuclear forces: “specific figures become secondary, as they only indicate what nuclear arsenal this or that country considers sufficient for guaranteed resolution of its strategic tasks.”106 Official estimates of the future role of missile defense and precision- guided conventional weapons and their effect on strategic balance follow the most pessimistic forecasts, but in the current foreign policy context the tendency of the Russian military and political leadership to start from the worst- case scenarios is understandable. The current situation partly explains Rus- sia’s avoidance of initiative in strategic dialog with the USA. As Vladimir Putin repeated in February 2019, “We are ready to engage in disarmament talks, but we will not knock on a closed door anymore. We will wait until our

106 Nuclear Weapons and International Security in the XX Century, 73–74. 64 partners are ready and become aware of the need for dialogue on this matter.”107 Taking into consideration the manner of actions of the present-day American administration, conclusion of new serious agreements in the nearest future looks unlikely. On the other hand, one should also remember that only a year before the signing of the Prague Treaty the chances of a Russian-U.S. compromise also seemed rather bleak.108

107 “Presidential Address to Federal Assembly, February 20, 2019”, Official website of the President of Russia, February 20, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59863. 108 Ⱥɧɚɬɨɥɢɣ Ⱦɶɹɤɨɜ, ȿɜɝɟɧɢɣ Ɇɹɫɧɢɤɨɜ, “Ʉɨɧɬɪɨɥɶ ɧɚɞ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɦɢ ɧɚɫɬɭɩɚ- ɬɟɥɶɧɵɦɢ ɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹɦɢ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ ɢ ɋɒȺ ɩɨɫɥɟ 2009 ɝɨɞɚ: ɜɨɡɦɨɠɟɧ ɥɢ ɤɨɦɩɪɨɦɢɫɫ?” (Anatoliy Diakov, Evgeniy Miasnikov, “Control Over Russian and U.S. Strategic Offensive Arms after 2009: Is Compromise Possible?”), Indeks bezopasnosti 14, no. 4 (2008), 50. Part II

Nonproliferation and Disarmament

1 Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime

Anastasia Malygina

The three main pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The issues around the nexus of the NPT embrace such aspects as domestic compliance with IAEA nuclear safeguards and nuclear export control restrictions; national strategy in the realm of strategic stability and reduction of risk of nuclear war; foreign policies within the NPT Review Cycle and in other formats of NPT diplomacy. National nuclear nonproliferation policy is a multifaceted affair, which involves many national stakeholders ranging from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to national atomic industries. This chapter does not explore the causes behind the policy transformations but describes the stages of its evolution. Although the focus is kept on the role of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in setting and implementing the nuclear nonproliferation policy, this approach does not ne- glect the significant role of other national stakeholders. The corresponding parts of this chapter describe the milestones in the modern history of Russia, which are critical for understanding how Russia’s behavior within the NPT regime has been evolving. Historical periodization is a challenging task for any researcher. The study that follows does not claim to be a justification of the role of individuals in national history. Obviously, Russian federal ministers of atomic energy – Viktor Mikhaylov (1992–1998); Evgeniy Adamov (1998–2001); Aleksandr Rumyantsev (2001–2004), who became the first Head of the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (2004–2007) and was preceded by Sergey Kirienko (2004–2007) – played a significant role in framing Russian nuclear nonproliferation policies. So, the evolution of Russian policy in the NPT regime may be described as the result of a search for compromise in relations between different groups of interests within the Russian political elite. In this context, the establishment of the state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom, and the increase of political influence of its first director Sergey Kirienko (2007–2016) deserves an attentive survey. However, the following parts will describe the history of Russia’s behavior in the NPT regime in connection with the activities of the Russian Ministry of For- eign Affairs. The two decades of Russian policy in the NPT regime are divided into periods when different personalities occupied the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The changes in Russian foreign policy coincided with the appointment of a new minister. That does not mean that the changes in policy were the results of shifts in ministerial staff. More likely, those administrative shifts occurred as the results of changes in domestic policy. The following parts present a quick overview of the evolution of Russia’s nuclear nonproliferation policy, which is an integral part of Russian foreign and security policy. In the conclusion, the role of Russia in the NPT regime is 68 A. Malygina described and some trends in Russia’s nuclear nonproliferation policy are formulated.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the NPT regime

On June 12, 1990, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic declared state sovereignty. However, Russia, led by Boris Yeltsin, remained in the U.S.S.R. for almost one and a half years. At the time, Russia had its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Andrey Kozyrev1, but did not have a Ministry of Defense, a Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry, a General Staff, or any structured security agencies. Andrey Kozyrev is usually described in memoirs as an intelligent person with a calm voice and soft manners. His friends characterize him as a roman- tic reformist and a brave person who put his career at stake to defend his beliefs.2 Journalist and historian Leonid Mlechin called him “a teddy bear with an iron heart.”3 Kozyrev was an experienced bureaucrat who had had a very successful career in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and became as he called himself “a latent anti-Soviet dissident.”4 Being the youngest head of department among the leaders of the Soviet MFA, he was among those “latent reformists” who prepared the ideological foundation for Gorbachev’s policy of New Thinking aimed at transparency, disarmament, and international cooperation. Although Andrey Kozyrev agreed to leave his position of Head of the Office of International Organizations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and became the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia,5 the newly independent state did not sufficiently exercise foreign and security policy. The effectiveness of all institutions of the new Russian government suffered from the unprecedented high ambiguity in the division of responsibilities between the government of the U.S.S.R. and the government of the Russian Federation during the transition period of 1990–1991.6 On August 21, 1991, Yeltsin's supporters suppressed a coup attempt aimed at enforcing the centripetal forces within the Soviet Union and the removal of the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. That unsuccessful attempt

1 Andrey Kozyrev served as the Minister of foreign affairs of Russian Soviet Socialist Re- public from October 11, 1990 till May 16, 1992 and as the Minister of foreign affairs of Russian Federation from May 16, 1992 till January 5, 1996. 2Ⱥ. Ʉɨɯ, ɉ. Ⱥɜɟɧ, “ȺɧɞɪɟɣɄɨɡɵɪɟɜ: ɧɚɫɬɨɹɳɢɣɤɚɦɢɤɚɞɡɟ. ɂɧɬɟɪɜɶɸɫȺ. Ʉɨɡɵɪɟ- ɜɵɦ” (A. Koch, P. Aven, “Andrey Kozyrev: A real kamikaze. Interview with Andrey Kozyrev”), Forbes, September 28, 2011, https://www.forbes.ru/ekonomika/lyudi/74501-andrei-kozyrev- nastoyashchii-kamikadze. 3Ʌ. Ɇɥɟɱɢɧ, ɆɂȾ. Ɇɢɧɢɫɬɪɵɢɧɨɫɬɪɚɧɧɵɯɞɟɥ: ȼɧɟɲɧɹɹɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɚɊɨɫɫɢɢɨɬɅɟɧɢ- ɧɚɢɌɪɨɰɤɨɝɨɞɨɉɭɬɢɧɚɢɆɟɞɜɟɞɟɜɚ (L. Mlechin, MFA. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Russia’s foreign policy from Lenin and Trotsky to Putin and Medvedev) (Moscow: Tsentrpoli- graf, 2011), 35. 4 A. Koch, P. Aven, “Andrey Kozyrev: A real kamikaze. Interview with Andrey Kozyrev”, Forbes, September 28, 2011. 5 Andrey Kozyrev served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from October 1990 till January 1996. 6A. Koch, P. Aven, “Andrey Kozyrev: A real kamikaze. Interview with Andrey Kozyrev”, Forbes, September 28, 2011. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 69 at a coup catalyzed the process of further rapid and complete collapse of the Soviet Union. On December 8, 1991 at a Soviet governmental residence situated 8 kilometers from the border between Poland and Belarus the leaders of Rus- sia, Ukraine and Belarus, signed an agreement establishing the Common- wealth of Independent States (CIS).7 The preamble of the agreement stated that the U.S.S.R. “ceased to exist as a subject of international law and as a geopolitical reality.” On December 25, the President of the U.S.S.R. Mikhail Gorbachev resigned8 and on December 26, 1991 the Council of the Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., which by that time was the upper chamber of parliament of the Soviet Union confirmed that with the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics “ceased to exist as a state and as a subject of international law.”9 What did it mean for Russia and for the international multilateral nuclear nonproliferation regime? The collapse of the U.S.S.R. raised two equally important questions. The first question was about the succession of the status of nuclear weapon state. The second question related to guaranteeing effective control over nuclear forces, critical elements of nuclear energy infrastructure, and similar sites, facilities, and materials. The issue of compliance with the NPT and other arms control and disarmament agreements was defined in a series of documents signed by the newly independent states. Article 12 of the Agreement on the foundation of the CIS signed on December 8, 1991 stated that the agreeing parties guaranteed compliance with the treaties and agreements signed by the former U.S.S.R. Arti- cle 6 of the Agreement on the foundation of the CIS formulated the principles of arms control policies and determined the future of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. In order to ensure international peace and security, the Russian, Ukrain- ian and Belarusian leaders agreed to collaborate on undertaking effective measures aimed at arms reductions and cutting defense expenditures. The three co-founders of the CIS stated as their aim the pursuit of elimination of all nuclear weapons and of general and complete disarmament under strict international control. They also agreed to keep a common military-strategic space and sustain it under joint command and control including single control

7 ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɨ ɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɢ ɋɨɞɪɭɠɟɫɬɜɚ ɇɟɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɵɯ Ƚɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜ. 8 ɞɟɤɚɛɪɹ 1991 ɝ. Ƚɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɵɣ ɚɪɯɢɜ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ. Ɏ. 10026. Ɉɩ. 4. Ⱦ. 1303. Ʌ. 1-5. (The Agreement on the Foundation of the Commonwealth of Independent States of December 8, 1991. In Russian), The digital exhibition commemorating the 1150th anniversary of the Russian statehood, https://www.rusarchives.ru. 8ɍɤɚɡɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚɋɨɸɡɚɋɨɜɟɬɫɤɢɯɋɨɰɢɚɥɢɫɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɯɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤ “Ɉɫɥɨɠɟɧɢɢɉɪɟ- ɡɢɞɟɧɬɨɦ ɋɋɋɊ ɩɨɥɧɨɦɨɱɢɣ ȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨɝɨ Ƚɥɚɜɧɨɤɨɦɚɧɞɭɸɳɟɝɨ ȼɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɧɵɦɢ ɋɢɥɚɦɢ ɋɋɋɊ ɢ ɭɩɪɚɡɞɧɟɧɢɢ ɋɨɜɟɬɚ ɨɛɨɪɨɧɵ ɩɪɢ ɉɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɟ ɋɋɋɊ” ʋ ɍɉ-3162. 25.12.1991. (Decree of the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics “On the resignation by the President of the USSR of the powers of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the cancellation of the Defenɫe Council under the President of the USSR”), Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no 52, 1991, https://sssr.su. 9 Ⱦɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢɹ ɋɨɜɟɬɚ Ɋɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤȼɟɪɯɨɜɧɨɝɨ ɋɨɜɟɬɚ ɋɋɋɊ ɜ ɫɜɹɡɢ ɫ ɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɟɦɋɨ- ɞɪɭɠɟɫɬɜɚɇɟɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɵɯȽɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜ. ʋ 142 – ɇ. 26.12.1991 (Declaration of the Soviet of the Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the occasion of the creation of the Common- wealth of Independent States, December 26, 1991, no. 142-N), Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 52, 1991, https://sssr.su. 70 A. Malygina over nuclear weapons. According to the provisions of Article 6, the order of that single control over nuclear forces was to be defined by special agreement. The co-founders of the CIS also agreed in article 6 to respect each other’s endeavors “to attain the status of a zone free of nuclear weapons and a neutral state.”10 On December 21, 1991, the meeting of the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS took place in Kazakhstan. The leaders of the 11 newly independent states met in Alma-Ata where they signed a declaration to confirm their commitment to the goals and principles of the agreement on establishing the CIS, which was signed early on December 8 by the Belarus, Russian and Ukrainian leaders.11 Some provisions of the trilateral agreement of 8 December were specified in the Alma-Ata Declaration. The Alma-Ata Declaration stated that “allied command of the military-strategic forces and a single control over nuclear weapons” was preserved in order to ensure “international strategic stability and security.” Regarding the future nuclear arms control and disarmament policies the Alma-Ata declaration suggested more flexibility than did the Agreement of December 8. Instead of the rigid connection between the status of neutral and non-nuclear state suggested in the trilateral agreement of December 8, the declaration of December 21 stated that the sides would “respect each other's desire to attain the status of a non-nuclear and (or) neutral state.” Although the original text in Russian included the conjunction “and” and the conjunction “or” in brackets, the English language translation of the Alma-Ata Declaration published on December 23 in New York Times skipped the conjunction “or.” In the Alma-Ata Declaration, the idea of a zone free of nuclear weapons was no longer mentioned. So, the status of a state not possessing nuclear weapons was not any longer strictly connected with the status of member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. More- over, the concept of non-nuclear state was less directly connected with neu- trality. In general, the Alma-Ata declaration demonstrated that the newly independent states understood that it was vitally important to minimize the negative military and political consequences of the dissolution of the nuclear superpower. The differences in the texts of the trilateral agreement of 8 December and the Alma-Ata Declaration of December 21 and the changes in the text of the English language translation of the Alma-Ata Declaration demonstrated that the leaders of the three countries were occupied with general fundamental questions and ignored specific aspects in favor of setting up a basic framework of the new order. The delegations negotiating the arrangements obviously lacked expertise in the field of nuclear nonproliferation to identify all those slight differences that in crazy times of political turbu- lences seemed insignificant.

10ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟɨɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɢɋɨɞɪɭɠɟɫɬɜɚɇɟɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɵɯȽɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɨɬ 8 ɞɟɤɚɛɪɹ 1991 ɝ. (The Agreement on the Foundation of the Commonwealth of Independent States of December 8, 1991), http://cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=176. 11ȺɥɦɚȺɬɢɧɫɤɚɹɞɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢɹ 21 ɞɟɤɚɛɪɹ 1991 ɝ. (the Alma-Ata Declaration of Decem- ber 21, 1991), http://cis.minsk.by/reestr/ru/index.html#reestr/view/text?doc=4. The translation of the Alma-Ata Declaration appeared in New York Times newspaper on December 23, 1991 under the title The End of the Soviet Union. Text of Accords by Former Soviet Republics Setting Up a Commonwealth, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/23/world/end-soviet-union-text-accords- former-soviet-republics-setting-up-commonwealth.html. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 71

The member states of the CIS agreed to revise the U.S.S.R.’s commitments to international agreements against their accordance to national consti- tutional procedures of the newly independent states. In the field of nuclear nonproliferation, it meant that Russia and other former Soviet republics had to launch long and effort consuming process of building national statehood, which would secure legal and administrative continuity in all aspects of implementation of the NPT and nuclear arms control agreements signed by the U.S.S.R. There were other documents signed in Alma-Ata by the leaders of the eleven newly independent states on that day of December 21, 1991. One was the Decision of the Heads of the States of the Commonwealth of Independent States12 which supported Russia “in taking over the U.S.S.R.’s membership in the U.N., including permanent membership in the Security Council and other international organizations” and stated that Belarus, Russia and Ukraine would “help other member states of the Commonwealth settle problems connected with their full membership in the U.N. and other international organizations.” That decision confirmed Russia’s status as the successor but not the assignee of the U.S.S.R. The other document signed in Alma-Ata by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan on December 21, 1991, was the Agreement on Joint Measures Regarding Nuclear Weapons.13 That agreement confirmed the no-first-use pledge and the members’ commitment to the goal of elimination of all nuclear armaments. Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan agreed to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states, sign corresponding safeguard agreements with IAEA and ratify the Strategic Arms Re- duction Treaty. They also agreed to finalize by July 1, 1992, the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons “to the central factory premises for dismantling under joint supervision.” Article 5 of the Agreement on Joint Measures Re- garding Nuclear Weapons copied the text of Article 1 of the NPT, which stated the nonproliferation obligations of nuclear-weapon-state parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. To accomplish the transportation of nuclear weapons to Russia in compliance with the NPT, paragraph 5.3 of the Agreement on Joint Measures Regarding Nuclear Weapons included the res- ervation that the provisions of paragraph 5.2 of that agreement “do not stand in the way of transferring nuclear weapons from Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to R.S.F.S.R. (Russian – A.M.) territory with a view to destroying them.” The leaders of the four states who had nuclear weapons of the former U.S.S.R. on their territories agreed on December 21, 1991, that until nuclear weapons had been completely eliminated on the territory of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the Russian president would take decisions on the need to

12. Ɋɟɲɟɧɢɟ ɋɨɜɟɬɚ ɝɥɚɜ ɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜ ɋɨɞɪɭɠɟɫɬɜɚ ɇɟɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɵɯ Ƚɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜ ɨɬ 21 ɞɟɤɚɛɪɹ 1991 ɝ. (The Decision of the Council of the Heads of the Commonwealth of Inde- pendent States, 21 December, 1991), Rossiiskaia Gazeta, https://rg.ru/1991/12/19/sng-site- dok.html. The translation of the text of the Decision: New York Times, December 23, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/23/world/end-soviet-union-text-accords-former-soviet- republics-setting-up-commonwealth.html. 13 Agreement on Joint Measures in Regard to Nuclear Weapons Alma-Ata, 21 December 1991 ɝ. (In Russian) Rossiiskaia Gazeta, https://rg.ru/1991/12/19/sng-site-dok.html, The translation of the text of the Agreement: New York Times, December 23, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/23/world/end-soviet-union-text-accords-former-soviet- republics-setting-up-commonwealth.html. 72 A. Malygina use nuclear weapons by agreement with the heads of the other three states and on the basis of procedures drawn up jointly. The provisions of the Alma-Ata Agree- ment were clarified in the Agreement on strategic forces signed on December 30, 1991, and later in the Agreement on the states of the strategic forces signed on February 14, 1992. The basic principles of coordinated arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation policies were restated in the Charter of the Common- wealth of Independent States adopted in Minsk on January 22, 1993.14 Although the future of the nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Belarus was determined by the agreement signed in Alma-Ata, that agreement did not put an end to the discussion about the future of former Soviet nuclear arsenals deployed in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. In 1992, the leader of Kazakhstan considered the possibility of postponing the process of withdrawal of nuclear inventories15 and from 1992 until 1994, the leadership of Ukraine had been considering the possibility of keeping a part of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal integrated into national strategic forces.16 On July 20, 1992, Russia and Belarus signed an agreement that determined the status of Russian strategic nuclear forces temporally deployed on the territory of Bela- rus and the practical issues of the transition period before their final withdrawal from the territory of Belarus.17 Some provisions regarding the legal status of the deployed forces and the timeline of their withdrawal were specified in two bilateral agreements signed in 1993.18 Thus, Belarus was the first among the three former Soviet republics to join the NPT as non-nuclear- weapon state in 1993 and the process of withdrawing nuclear forces form the territory of Belarus was completed in 1996.19

14 Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States (with declaration and decisions). Adopted at Minsk on 22 January 1993, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ UNTS/Volume%201819/volume-1819-I-31139-English.pdf. 15 Gani M. Karasayev, Kanat A. Yensenov et al. N.A. Nazarbayev and the Problem of Nu- clear Weapons in the History of Independent Kazakhstan (1991-1995), http://oaji.net/articles/2017/6729-1543614246.pdf. 16ɘ. Ⱦɭɛɢɧɢɧ, əɞɟɪɧɵɣɞɪɟɣɮɍɤɪɚɢɧɵ (Y. Dubinin, The Ukraine’s nuclear drift), Ros- sia v Globalnoy Politike, April 7, 2004, https://globalaffairs.ru/number/n_2860. 17ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟɦɟɠɞɭɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɟɣɢɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɨɣȻɟɥɚɪɭɫɶɨɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟ- ɫɤɢɯɫɢɥɚɯ, ɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɨɪɚɡɦɟɳɟɧɧɵɯɧɚɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɢɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢȻɟɥɚɪɭɫɶɨɬ 20 ɢɸɥɹ 1992 ɝ. (The Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic on strategic forces tempo- rality deployed on the territory of Belarus, July 20, 1992), http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1900721. 18ȾɨɝɨɜɨɪɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɟɫɩɭɛ- ɥɢɤɢȻɟɥɚɪɭɫɶɨɫɬɚɬɭɫɟɜɨɢɧɫɤɢɯɮɨɪɦɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɣɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɡɫɨɫɬɚɜɚɋɬɪɚ- ɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɯ ɫɢɥ, ɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɨ ɪɚɡɦɟɳɟɧɧɵɯɧɚ ɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɢɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢȻɟɥɚɪɭɫɶ (Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Bela- rus on the status of military units of the Russian Federation from the Strategic Forces temporarily deployed on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. Signed on 24 September 1993, In force since 21 April 1995), http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1900980; ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɹɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬ- ɜɨɦ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɢ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ Ɋɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢ Ȼɟɥɚɪɭɫɶ ɨ ɩɨɪɹɞɤɟ ɜɵɜɨɞɚ ɜɨɢɧɫɤɢɯɮɨɪɦɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɣɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɡɫɨɫɬɚɜɚɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɯɫɢɥ, ɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɨ ɪɚɡɦɟɳɟɧɧɵɯɧɚɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɢɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢȻɟɥɚɪɭɫɶ, ɧɚɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɸɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɨɬ 24 ɫɟɧɬɹɛɪɹ 1993 ɝ. (Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on the procedure for the withdrawal of military units of the Russian Federation from the Strategic Forces temporarily deployed in the Republic of Bela- rus to the territory of the Russian Federation of September 24, 1993), http://pravo.kulichki. com/zak/megd/meg03446.htm. 19 Reference note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus “Belarus and nuclear disarmament”, http://mfa.gov.by/mulateral/global_issues/nuclear/. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 73

The principles and procedures of the withdrawal and elimination of the former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons and the nuclear explosive device stationed on the territory of Kazakhstan were determined in a series of bilateral Kazakhstan-Russia agreements in March and December 1994.20 The practical and commercial issues of the destruction of nuclear warheads of the ballistic and cruise missiles previously deployed on the territory of Kazakh- stan were determined in a bilateral agreement signed in Moscow on January 20, 1995.21 Kazakhstan joined the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in Feb- ruary 1994. By April 1995, Kazakhstan transferred the Russian nuclear warhead inventory deployed on its territory back to Russia.22 It took Moscow and Washington almost three years to persuade Kiev to adopt the status of non-nuclear-weapon state. The Lisbon Protocol to START I of May 23, 1992, and the U.S.-Russia-Ukraine Trilateral Statement of Janu-

20 ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɢ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ ɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟɜɩɪɨɰɟɫɫɟɫɨɤɪɚɳɟɧɢɹ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɯɧɚɫɬɭɩɚ- ɬɟɥɶɧɵɯɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɣ, ɪɚɫɩɨɥɨɠɟɧɧɵɯɧɚɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɢɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɨɬ 13 ɞɟɤɚɛɪɹ 1994 ɝ. ( Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on cooperation in the process of reducing strategic offensive weapons deployed on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan from 13 December, 1994), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/ bilateral/page-325/52453; ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢ- ɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ Ɋɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢ Ʉɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧ ɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟ ɜ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɢ ɩɟɪɟɜɨɡɤɢ ɫɩɟɰɢɚɥɶɧɵɯ ɝɪɭɡɨɜɆɢɧɢɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɚɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɩɨɚɬɨɦɧɨɣɷɧɟɪɝɢɢɢȺɝɟɧɬɫɬɜɚɩɨɚɬɨɦɧɨɣ ɷɧɟɪɝɢɢɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɨɬ 28 ɦɚɪɬɚ 1994 ɝ. (Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on cooperation in the transportation of special cargoes of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy and the Atomic Energy Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan from 28 March 1994), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storageviewer/bilateral/page- 25/53645?_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch=false&_storageviewer_ WAR_storageviewerportlet_keywords=%D0%9A%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%85%D1% 81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_fromPage=searc h&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_andOperator=1; ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭ ɉɪɚɜɢ- ɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɩɨɞɟɦɨɧɬɚɠɭ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɭɫɬɪɨɣɫɬɜɚ, ɡɚɥɨɠɟɧɧɨɝɨɧɚɋɟɦɢɩɚɥɚɬɢɧɫɤɨɦɢɫɩɵɬɚɬɟɥɶɧɨɦɹɞɟɪɧɨɦɩɨɥɢɝɨɧɟ ɞɨɟɝɨɡɚɤɪɵɬɢɹɨɬ 28 ɦɚɪɬɚ 1994 ɝ. (Agreement between the Government of the Russian Fed- eration and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the dismantling of a nuclear device laid down at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site before its closure from March 28, 1994), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storageviewer/bilateral/page-24/48161?_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch= false&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_keywords=%D0%9A%D0%B0%D0%B7%D 0%B0%D1%85%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerp ortlet_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_andOperator=1. 21 ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɢ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ ɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɄɚɡɚɯɫɬɚɧɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟ ɢ ɜɡɚɢɦɧɵɯ ɪɚɫɱɟɬɚɯ ɩɪɢ ɭɬɢɥɢɡɚɰɢɢɹɞɟɪɧɵɯɛɨɟɩɪɢɩɚɫɨɜ (Agree- ment between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on cooperation and reciprocal settlement payments in the nuclear weapons destruction from 20 January 1995), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_cont- racts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/page-16/47861?_storage- viewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch=false&_storageviewer_WAR_storageview erportlet_keywords=%D1%8F%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5+% D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B5&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewer portlet_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_andOperator=1. 22 Kazakhstan’s progress in WMD disarmament. Overview. Nuclear Threat Initiative, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/kazakhstan/. 74 A. Malygina ary 14, 1994, were the milestones that marked the way to the reductions of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. By the fall of 1994 the Ukrainian leadership realized that the price for further delay of the ratification of the NPT might be the political isolation of Kiev.23 Ukraine and Russia determined the principles and procedures of withdrawal and elimination of nuclear forces stationed on the territory of Ukraine in a series of bilateral agreements signed in April 1992, September 1993, November 1995 and April 1996. 24 On De- cember 5, 1994, Ukraine acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state. On that same date, the U.S., Russia and the

23əɞɟɪɧɨɟɧɟɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟɧɢɟ, ɍɱɟɛɧɨɟɩɨɫɨɛɢɟ, ɬ. 1, (Nuclear non-proliferation. Tuto- rial 1), ed. V.A. Orlov and N.N. Sokov (Moscow: PIR-Center, 2002), 224. 24 ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɟɣ ɢ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɨɣ ɨ ɩɨɪɹɞɤɟ ɩɟɪɟɦɟɳɟɧɢɹ ɛɨɟɩɪɢɩɚɫɨɜɫɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɢɍɤɪɚɢɧɵɧɚɰɟɧɬɪɚɥɶɧɵɟɩɪɟɞɡɚɜɨɞɫɤɢɟɛɚɡɵɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟ- ɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɫɰɟɥɶɸɢɯɪɚɡɭɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɬɨɜɚɧɢɹɢɭɧɢɱɬɨɠɟɧɢɹɨɬ 11 ɚɩɪɟɥɹ 1992 ɝ (Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the procedure for moving nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine to the central pre-factory bases of the Russian Federation with a view to dismantling and destroying them from 11 April 1992), http://www.mid. ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/page-20/53972?_ storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch=false&_storageviewer_WAR_ storageviewerportlet_keywords=%D1%8F%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%BE% D0%B5+%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B5&_storageviewer_WAR_st orageviewerportlet_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_and Opera- tor=1; ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɍɤ- ɪɚɢɧɵ ɨɛ ɭɬɢɥɢɡɚɰɢɢ ɹɞɟɪɧɵɯ ɛɨɟɡɚɪɹɞɨɜ ɨɬ 3 ɫɟɧɬɹɛɪɹ 1993 ɝ. (Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on the destruction of nuclear weapons from 3 September, 1993), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_ policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/page-2/48546?_storage- viewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch=false&_storageviewer_WAR_storageview erportlet_keywords=%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0+% D1%8F%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5+%D0%BE%D1%80%D1 %83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B5&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_fromPage=sear ch&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_andOperator=1; ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣ- ɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɟɣɢɍɤɪɚɢɧɨɣɨɩɨɪɹɞɤɟɨɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɥɟɧɢɹɝɚɪɚɧɬɢɣɧɨɝɨɢɚɜɬɨɪɫɤɨɝɨɧɚɞɡɨ- ɪɚ ɡɚɷɤɫɩɥɭɚɬɚɰɢɟɣ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɯ ɪɚɤɟɬɧɵɯ ɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɨɜ ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɯɫɢɥ, ɪɚɫɩɨɥɨ- ɠɟɧɧɵɯɧɚɢɯɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɹɯɨɬ 3 ɫɟɧɬɹɛɪɹ 1993 ɝ. (Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the procedure for warranty supervision of the safe maintenance of strategic missile systems of the Strategic Forces deployed on their territories from 3 September, 1993), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storageviewer/bilateral/page-2/48530?_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch= false&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_keywords=%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D 0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0+%D1%8F%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0% BE%D0%B5+%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B5&_storageviewer_WA R_storageviewerportlet_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_andOpe rator=1; ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɢ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ ɍɤɪɚɢɧɵɨɩɨɪɹɞɤɟɜɵɜɨɡɚ (ɭɧɢɱɬɨɠɟɧɢɹ) ɫɩɟɰɢɚɥɶɧɨɣɬɟɯɧɢɤɢ, ɧɚɯɨɞɹɳɟɣɫɹɜɍɤɪɚɢɧɟ ɨɬ 25 ɧɨɹɛɪɹ 1995 ɝ. (Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on the procedure for the transportation (destruction) of special equipment located in Ukraine from 25 November 1995), http://docs.cntd. ru/document/901112538; ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɍɤɪɚɢɧɵɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟ ɜ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɢ ɬɪɚɧɫɩɨɪɬɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɹɞɟɪɧɵɯ ɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɨɜ ɨɬ 12 ɚɩɪɟɥɹ 1996 ɝ.(Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on cooperation in the field of transportation of nuclear materials from 12 April 1996), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_ policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/ page-1/47723?_storage-viewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch=false&_storage- viewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_keywords=%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0% D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0+%D1%8F%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0 %B5+%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B5&_storageviewer_WAR_stora geviewerportlet_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_andOperator=1. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 75

United Kingdom signed at the OSCE conference in Budapest a memorandum that provided security assurances to Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakh- stan. Simultaneously, France and China provided similar security assurances individually. Ukraine signed a new agreement with the IAEA as a non-nuclear-weapon state in September 1995, joint Nuclear Suppliers Group in April 1996, and finished transferring nuclear warheads to Russia in June 1996.25 Russia and the three newly independent states had to solve commercial issues connected with the transfer of nuclear warheads, which included nuclear material. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan received compensation: Ukraine received nuclear fuel for its nuclear reactors and Belarus and Ka- zakhstan received corresponding shares of the profit from the “Megatons to Megawatts Program” based on the U.S.-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement signed in 1993. Three days after the adoption of the Alma-Ata Declaration, on December 24, 1991, Russian president Boris Yeltsin officially informed the UN Secre- tary General that Russia would take over the U.S.S.R. membership in the UN including the membership in the Security Council. The UN legal department concluded that there was no need for formal approval from the UN and that position was shared by all the members of the UN Security Council.26 Four days after the Alma-Ata Declaration, on December 25, 1991 Mikhail Gorba- chev – who happened to be the first and the only president of the Soviet Un- ion – signed a decree in which he stated that in connection with his resignation from the post of President of the U.S.S.R. he transferred the right of taking decisions on the need to use nuclear weapons to the President of the Russian Federation.27 On January 13, 1992, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation informed the heads of the foreign embassies in Moscow that “Russia continues to exercise the rights and responsibilities under international agreements concluded by the U.S.S.R.,” that it will replace the government of the Soviet Union “as the depository of the existing multilateral agreements” and requested that they “consider the Russian Federation to be the state party to all international agreements instead of the U.S.S.R.”28 Thus, the world community accepted Russia as the legal successor of the Soviet Union as regards the fulfilment of obligations under all arms control and disarmament agreements. For the Russian leadership the term “successor” meant that Russia continued the arms control policy of the U.S.S.R. and did not just inherit its legacy.

25 Nuclear non-proliferation. Tutorial 1, 224. 26 Ⱦ. ɘɪɶɟɜ, ɊɚɫɩɚɞɋɋɋɊ, “ɩɪɚɜɨɩɪɟɟɦɫɬɜɨ” ɢ ɞɨɛɪɚɹ ɜɨɥɹɊɨɫɫɢɢ (D. Juriev, The Dissolution of U.S.S.R., “succession” and the good will of Russia). Regnum Information Agency. March 8, 2006, https://regnum.ru/news/602262.html. 27ɍɤɚɡɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚɋɋɋɊɨɬ 25 ɞɟɤɚɛɪɹ 1991 ɝ. ɍɉ-3162 (The Order of the President of the U.S.S.R),Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 52, December 25, 1991, sssr.su. 28ɉɢɫɶɦɨɆɂȾɊɎɨɬ 13 ɹɧɜɚɪɹ 1992 ɝ. ʋ 11/ɍɝɩ “Ɉɛɨɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɥɟɧɢɢɩɪɚɜɢɜɵɩɨɥ- ɧɟɧɢɢɨɛɹɡɚɬɟɥɶɫɬɜ, ɜɵɬɟɤɚɸɳɢɯɢɡɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɵɯɞɨɝɨɜɨɪɨɜ, ɡɚɤɥɸɱɟɧɧɵɯɋɋɋɊ” (The Letter of the MFA of Russia “On the exercise of rights and fulfillment of obligations arising from international treaties concluded by the USSR” dated January 13, 1992), http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_12511/. 76 A. Malygina

On January 27, 1992, President Boris Yeltsin sent a nine-page letter to the UN Secretary General29 declaring Russia's goal “to make its weighty contribution to the creation of a single global space of cooperation and security.” That document stated Russia’s position concerning the outstanding issues of international security and outlined future measures aimed at arms control, establishing a moratorium on nuclear tests, strengthening WMD nonproliferation regimes, and joining the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Rus- sian Federation was characterized as not only the successor to the Soviet Un- ion but also as a state that continued the traditions of the Russian Empire, which initiated the Hague Peace Conferences at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. President Yeltsin stated in his letter that Russia saw disarmament “as one of the most important instruments for ensuring national security and strengthening international peace and stability.” The Russian Federation stated its intention to continue nuclear arms reductions within a bilateral Russo-American format but also reminded that China, the United Kingdom and France “must also participate in the process of genuine nuclear disarmament.”

The first five years of Russia’s nuclear nonproliferation policy

The process of the disintegration of the Soviet Union was unexpected and very rapid. Neither Russia and the newly independent states, nor the international community were ready for the sudden processes that created dangerous shocks for the NPT. In 1992, Russian president Boris Yeltsin pro- claimed the first concept of foreign policy in Russian modern history. As one of the leading Russian international relations theorists, Aleksey Bogaturov says that the concept was a derivative of the Soviet foreign policy doctrine developed in the 1980s. Guided by the principles stated in the foreign policy concept, Russian diplomacy faced a very challenging task. The international environment had changed tremendously. Russia had to work hard on mini- mizing unavoidable losses while integrating itself into the deconstructed international architecture. The source of the difficulties had, according to A. Bogaturov, a political and psychological nature. The Soviet Union performed the role of a power confronting the global capitalist order. Russia as a new sovereign state had to get used to its role as an ordinary member in the community of democratic nations.30 The first five years of Russia’s foreign policy was based on a rejection of “empire-style power politics” of confrontation, rejection of “messianism” and “ideological ambitions.” Moscow’s course in international affairs was oriented to economic cooperation aimed at the creation of an external environment for radical internal reforms.31 As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kozyrev

29 Message dated 27 January 1992 from the President of the Russian Federation, B.N. Yeltsin, to the UN Secretary-General (Ⱥ/47/77-S/23486). 30 Ⱥ. Ȼɨɝɚɬɭɪɨɜ, “Ɍɪɢ ɩɨɤɨɥɟɧɢɹ ɜɧɟɲɧɟɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɯ ɞɨɤɬɪɢɧ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ” (A. Bogaturov, “The three generations of foreign policy doctrines of Russia”), Mezhdunarodnye processy 5, no. 1 (13) (2007), http://intertrends.ru/old/thirteen/005.htm#note1. 31Ⱥ. Ʉɨɡɵɪɟɜ, ɉɪɟɨɛɪɚɠɟɧɢɟ (A. Kozyrev, Transformation) (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994), 48–50. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 77 strived to make Russia an attractive partner for business collaboration and trade and pursued integration into the political and economic structures of the West. At that time, global integration processes and globalization were viewed by the Russian political elite exclusively in a positive way. The function of arms control and nonproliferation, according to Kozyrev’s vision, was quite pragmatic and was geographically limited to the regions close to Russia’s borders. The aim of foreign and security policy for Russia was “to avert the threat of escalation of armed conflicts near the borders of Russia, and prevent the appearance of new threats, including missile and nuclear.”32 During that period Moscow did not pursue the goal of determining the global order in the nuclear nonproliferation regime by setting the international agenda or shaping the scope of activities of international institutions. The priorities of the nuclear nonproliferation policies of Russian MFA in those days were focused on practical short-term issues and did not address the fundamental problems of world order. The main goal of the Russian nuclear nonproliferation policy at that time was the prevention of the appearance of WMDs and their means of delivery to zones of political instabilities or regional conflicts. The efforts were focused on the perimeter of the Com- monwealth of Independent States, the Middle East and the South Asia. In order to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery it was crucial, according to Kozyrev’s vision, to act in three dimensions: 1) manage the conflicts which fuel the regional arms race and assist the normalization of relations in the Middle East, between India and Pakistan, and between North Korea and South Korea; 2) enforce international arms trade regulations and especially the missile technology control regime; 3) establish international legally binding norms banning the development and production of chemical and nuclear weapons.33 Therefore, Russia was one of the first to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and was one of the initiators of the launch of negotiations on the development of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Commenting on the process of nuclear-test-ban negotiations which started in January 1994, Kozyrev was very positive about the similarity in the positions of Russia, the U.S. and the non-nuclear-weapon states of Europe.34 Russia joined the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1995 which was a significant improvement in global WMD nonproliferation arrangements as during that period there were increasing concerns about the appetites of North Korea and Iran in regard to nuclear weapon programs. The reduction in Russian strategic nuclear weapons was seen by the Rus- sian leasership as a part of the radical process of deideologization of Russian foreign policy, the consequence of the refusal to continue the arms race with the West, and the abandonment of the policy of rigid ideological confrontation of the two world systems. Kozyrev saw no problem if the reduction in Russian nuclear arsenals would lead to a diminishing of Russia’s geopolitical status. At that time, a decisive majority of the Russian political elite, including Kozyrev, saw Russia as a rank-and-file member of the community of Western democratic states with geopolitical potential similar to that of France

32Ⱥ. Kozyrev, Transformation, 48. 33 A. Kozyrev, Transformation, 90. 34 A. Kozyrev, Transformation, 92. 78 A. Malygina or Canada. In all dimensions of foreign policy, including the nuclear nonproliferation domain, Kozyrev understood cooperation with the West in terms of homogeneousness.35 Later he admitted that such an easygoing policy and avoidance of any disagreements with the West were interpreted by their counterparts as a posture of humbleness.36 The Russian leadership actively supported any initiatives and proposals by the West in all spheres of international relations. Moreover, being busy with geopolitical problems close to Russia’s borders, Moscow did not communicate clear priorities and instructions regarding the disarmament and nonproliferation policy to its representatives to foreign countries and international organizations, which made Russian policy relatively passive and made the West believe that the Russian position might not be taken into consideration in the rare cases when Russia expressed its concerns or disagreements. In disarmament and nonproliferation diplomacy, that led to the situation when the Western nations started to see Russia as a follower and not a leader, which at that time was seen both by Russia and the West as a positive sign of Russia’s rapid integration into the community of democratic states. The year 1995 was a turning point in the history of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Twenty-five years after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force, in May 1995, the states who were parties to the NPT convened, according to the treaty provisions, in New York to make a decision about the extension of the treaty for an indefinite period of time. The NPT Review and extension conference was held five years after Russia’s declaration of state sovereignty. Russia’s unilateral and joint activities to mitigate the negative effects of the turbulent processes of those five years were critical for preserving the sustainability of global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The facilitation of the inclusion of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the START I and their accession to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states; the series of bilateral agreements with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine addressing nuclear disarmament issues; the reforms of the Russian national nuclear export control system;37 efforts aimed at securing nuclear weapons and nuclear materials;38 active involvement in nuclear-test-ban treaty negotiations and consultations in the ad hoc committee established by the Conference on Disarmament with a mandate to negotiate banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices proved to the

35A. Koch, P. Aven, “Anrey Kozyrev: A real kamikaze. Interview with Andrey Kozyrev”, Forbes, September 28, 2011. 36 Ibid. 37 ɍɤɚɡ ɉɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ «Ɉ ɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɟ ɡɚ ɷɤɫɩɨɪɬɨɦ ɢɡ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɹɞɟɪɧɵɯɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɨɜ, ɨɛɨɪɭɞɨɜɚɧɢɹɢ ɬɟɯɧɨɥɨɝɢɣ» ɨɬ 27 ɦɚɪɬɚ 1992 ɝ. (The Order of the President of the Russian Federation “ On control of the export from the Russian Federation of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies” of March 27, 1992; Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɥɶɧɵɣɡɚɤɨɧʋ 183 ©Ɉɛɷɤɫɩɨɪɬɧɨɦɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɟ» ɨɬ 18 ɢɸɧɹ 1999 (Federal law no 183 “On export control” of June 18, 1999). About the evolution of Russian export control system see ɗɤɫɩɨɪɬɧɵɣɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɶɜ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ: ɉɨɥɢɬɢɤɚ ɢ ɩɪɚɤɬɢɤɚ. (Export control in Russia: Politics and practice), ed. D. Evstafiev and V. Orlov (Moscow: PIR-Center, 2000), pircenter.org/media/ content/files/9/13464057850.pdf; ȼɅ. Ɇɚɥɶɤɟɜɢɱ, ɗɤɫɩɨɪɬɧɵɣɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɶ: ɨɬɩɪɨɬɢɜɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɹɤ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɭ (V.L. Ɇalkevich, Export control: from confrontation to cooperation) (Moscow: The society for preserving literary heritage , 2012), http://osln.ru/knigi/eksp-kontr_mak.pdf. 38 See for details D. Kovchegin, “Developing a nuclear material control and accounting system in Russia” (U. Maryland: Center for International & Security Studies, 2013). Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 79 international community that Russia fully supported the principles of the NPT and was ready to do everything necessary to secure the sustainability of the NPT regime.39 During their meeting in Moscow in May 1995, the Russian and American presidents issued a joint statement on nonproliferation. The joint statement started with the following sentences: “The President of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, and the President of the Rus- sian Federation, B.N. Yeltsin, at their meeting in Moscow, 9-10 May 1995, expressed the strong view that the Nonproliferation Treaty Review and Ex- tension Conference underway in New York should decide to make the Treaty permanent. The two leaders pledged that the United States and Russia will continue to work to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty. In particular, they reaffirmed the commitments by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, under article VI of the NPT, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains their ultimate goal.”40 In the context of the deep economic crisis faced by Russia in the early 1990s, the issue of exporting nuclear technologies became of special importance for the Russian government. Russia needed to expand its niche in the global market of civil nuclear energy. Russia set two priorities in this regard. Firstly, the high standards of a national export control policy had to be established. Russia strived to secure its interests as a nuclear exporter through establishing the reputation of a responsible and predictable player in the global nuclear energy market. Secondly, the Russian MFA had to establish proper cooperation with the stakeholders in the government and in the industrial sector to promote Russia’s commercial interests. In August 1992, Russia signed an agreement with Iran under which Russia would build a nuclear power plant in Iran.41 Some practicalities of that agreement were later defined in the

39 “Declaration by France, Russia, The United Kingdom and The United States in Connec- tion with the NPT” (Geneva, April 6, 1995), CD/1308. Page 2 cited from: Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Conference on Disarmament, CD/SA/WP.15/Add 1, 5 June 1998, 44, https://www.unog.ch/ 80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/9EF136656BAB181 CC12580B400529C5B/$file/CD_SA_WP.15_ADD.1_ENG+(1).pdf. 40 “Joint Statement on Nonproliferation” (Moscow, 10 May, 1995) cited from: Letter dated 22 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America and the Rus- sian Federation to the Conference addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting text of the documents of the Russian-American Summit (Moscow, 10 May 1995), CD/1327, 23 June 1995. Page 2. United Nations Digital Library, Conference on Disarmament, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/190583/files/CD_1327-EN.pdf. 41ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɂɫ- ɥɚɦɫɤɨɣɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɂɪɚɧɨɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟɜɫɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɢɧɚɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɢɂɪɚɧɚɚɬɨɦɧɨɣ ɷɥɟɤɬɪɨɫɬɚɧɰɢɢ ɨɬ 25 ɚɜɝɭɫɬɚ 1992 ɝ. (Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on cooperation in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran of August 25, 1992), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/ page-1/48724?_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch=true&_storage- viewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_sdAttr_countries_key_field=%D0%98%D0%A0%D0%90% D0%9D&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR _storageviewerportlet_sdAttr_subjects_key_field=%D0%9C%D0%98%D0%A0%D0%9D%D0 %AB%D0%99+%D0%90%D0%A2%D0%9E%D0%9C&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerp ortlet_andOperator=1. 80 A. Malygina protocols signed in 200542 and 2014.43 That contract with Iran was vitally important for the Russian economy and later proved to have critical geopolitical importance. In 1995, some provisions of the Russian nuclear deal with Iran attracted much criticism from the U.S., which was concerned that Iran might use Russian nuclear technologies for illicit purposes not compliant with the NPT. As a result of a series of discussions with the U.S., Russia had to reframe the provisions of agreement with Iran to make the deal more secure in terms of nuclear nonproliferation. In the 2000s, the Russian state nuclear energy corporation, Rosatom, became an active and successful player in the global market of nuclear energy. In the 1990s, the sustainability of nuclear disarmament was a multidi- mensional issue for Russia. Firstly, Russia needed commercial sustainability for reprocessing nuclear materials extracted from the nuclear weapons. The provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty demanded that each state party reduce almost 5000 nuclear warheads. Therefore, in the 1990s Russia and the U.S. signed a series of agreements addressing the conversion of highly enriched uranium and weapon-grade plutonium. The HEU-LEU Agreement44 signed in 1993 also known as the “Megatons to Megawatts Pro- gram” proved that it was possible to integrate the technology of nuclear disarmament into a commercially sustainable political solution. Secondly, Rus- sia needed to secure the principles of fairness and reciprocity in relations with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. A series of bilateral agreements guaranteed that the three newly independent states would get compensation equal to the

42 ɉɪɨɬɨɤɨɥ ɦɟɠɞɭ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɢ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ ɂɫ- ɥɚɦɫɤɨɣ Ɋɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɂɪɚɧ ɨɜɧɟɫɟɧɢɢɞɨɩɨɥɧɟɧɢɹɜɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ ɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɂɫɥɚɦɫɤɨɣɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɂɪɚɧɨɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟ ɜ ɫɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɢ ɧɚ ɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɢ ɂɪɚɧɚ ɚɬɨɦɧɨɣ ɷɥɟɤɬɪɨɫɬɚɧɰɢɢ ɨɬ 25 ɚɜɝɭɫɬɚ 1992ɝ. ɨɬ 27 ɮɟɜɪɚɥɹ 2005 ɝ. (Protocol on the amendments to the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on cooperation in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran of August 25, 1992 dated February 27, 2005), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storageviewer/bilateral/page-1/46008?_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advanced Search=true&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_sdAttr_countries_key_field=%D0%9 8%D0%A0%D0%90%D0%9D&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_fromPage=search &_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_sdAttr_subjects_key_field=%D0%9C%D0%98% D0%A0%D0%9D%D0%AB%D0%99+%D0%90%D0%A2%D0%9E%D0%9C&_storageviewer _WAR_storageviewerportlet_andOperator=1. 43ɉɪɨɬɨɤɨɥɤɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɸɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢ- ɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ ɂɫɥɚɦɫɤɨɣ Ɋɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢ ɂɪɚɧ ɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟ ɜ ɫɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɢ ɧɚ ɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɢ ɂɪɚɧɚɚɬɨɦɧɨɣɷɥɟɤɬɪɨɫɬɚɧɰɢɢɨɬ 25 ɚɜɝɭɫɬɚ 1992 ɝ. ɨɬ 11 ɧɨɹɛɪɹ 2014 ɝ. ɜɫɬɭɩɢɥɜɫɢɥɭ 26 ɚɩɪɟɥɹ 2016 ɝ. (Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federa- tion and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on cooperation in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran of August 25, 1992 dated November 11, 2014, entered into force April 26, 2016), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/ international_contracts/2_contract/-/storageviewer/bilateral/page-1/44069?_storageviewer_ WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch=true&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_ sdAttr_countries_key_field=%D0%98%D0%A0%D0%90%D0%9D&_storageviewer_WAR_sto rageviewerport- let_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_sdAttr_subjects_key_field= %D0%9C%D0%98%D0%A0%D0%9D%D0%AB%D0%99+%D0%90%D0%A2%D0%9E%D0 %9C&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_andOperator=1. 44 Russia-U.S. agreement concerning the disposition of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons, February18, 1993, http://fissile- materials.org/library/heu93.pdf. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 81 commercial price of the nuclear materials extracted from the nuclear weapons transferred from their territories to Russia. Thirdly, because of the increasing economic crisis, Russia needed technical and financial assistance to secure the steady pace of nuclear weapons destruction. Without external assistance, Russia could not guarantee the safe and secure character of its nuclear disarmament efforts. Such technical and financial assistance was seen by the leaders of Russian atomic industries as a way toward a common goal and as an integral part of joint efforts to help democratic Russia accomplish its radical reforms.45 Kozyrev remembers that financial assistance was seen by the Rus- sian political elite as a hand of support extended by the international community.46 In 1992, the United States, 47 France48 and Germany49 launched pro-

45 V. Mikhaylov. I am a Hawk: Memoirs of Atomic Energy Minister Mikhaylov. 46 A. Koch, P. Aven, “Anrey Kozyrev: A real kamikaze. Interview with Andrey Kozyrev”, Forbes, September 28, 2011. 47 ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɟɣ ɢ ɋɨɟɞɢɧɟɧɧɵɦɢ ɒɬɚɬɚɦɢȺɦɟɪɢɤɢ ɨɬɧɨɫɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɵɯɢɧɚɞɟɠɧɵɯɩɟɪɟɜɨɡɤɢ, ɯɪɚɧɟɧɢɹɢɭɧɢɱɬɨɠɟɧɢɹɨɪɭɠɢɹɢɩɪɟ- ɞɨɬɜɪɚɳɟɧɢɹ ɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟɧɢɹ ɨɪɭɠɢɹ (The Agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation of 17 June 1992), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/ page-20/48730?_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch=false&_ storage- viewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_keywords=%D1%8F%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B D%D0%BE%D0%B5+%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B5&_storagevie wer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet _andOperator=1. The U.S.-Russia agreement that launched Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was amended and extended by the Protocol of June 15-16, 1999 and amended by the Agreement January 13 and February 3, 2005 ɝ. which was set in the form of the exchange of diplomatic notes The Protocol of June 16, 2006 extended the Agreement for the next seven years starting from June 17, 2006. The Agreement expired on 16 June 2013. 48 ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɢ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ ɎɪɚɧɰɭɡɫɤɨɣɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɨɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟɜɨɛɥɚɫɬɢɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɝɨɭɧɢɱɬɨɠɟɧɢɹɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ ɨɪɭɠɢɹɜɊɨɫɫɢɢɢɢɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɹɜɦɢɪɧɵɯɰɟɥɹɯɜɵɫɜɨɛɨɠɞɚɟɦɵɯɨɪɭɠɟɣɧɵɯɦɚɬɟɪɢɚ- ɥɨɜ ɨɬ 12 ɧɨɹɛɪɹ 1992 ɝ., ɜɫɬɭɩɢɥɨɜ ɫɢɥɭ 30 ɦɚɪɬɚ 1993 ɝ. (The Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the French Republic on cooperation in the field of the safe destruction of nuclear weapons in Russia and the peaceful use of the released weapons materials of November 12, 1992, entered into force on March 30, 1993.), Digi- tal library of the History of Rosatom, http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/yadernoe- nerasprostranenie_t2_2002/go,428/; ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟ- ɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɎɪɚɧɰɭɡɫɤɨɣɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɨɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟɜɨɛɥɚɫɬɢɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨ- ɫɬɢ ɢ ɦɨɧɢɬɨɪɢɧɝɚ ɪɚɞɢɚɰɢɨɧɧɨɣ ɨɛɫɬɚɧɨɜɤɢ ɩɪɢ ɬɪɚɧɫɩɨɪɬɢɪɨɜɤɟ, ɫɤɥɚɞɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɢ ɢ ɭɧɢɱɬɨɠɟɧɢɢɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ ɨɪɭɠɢɹɜɊɨɫɫɢɢɨɬ 12 ɧɨɹɛɪɹ 1993 ɝ., ɜɫɬɭɩɢɥɨɜɫɢɥɭ 30 ɦɚɪɬɚ 1993 ɝ. (The agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the French Republic on cooperation in the field of nuclear safety and security and monitoring of the radiation situation during the transportation, storage and destruction of nuclear weapons in Russia of November 12, 1993 entered into force on March 30, 1993), http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901734620; ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ ɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɎɪɚɧɰɭɡɫɤɨɣɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɨɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟɜɨɛɥɚɫɬɢɹɞɟɪ- ɧɨɣɷɧɟɪɝɢɢɨɬ 19 ɚɩɪɟɥɹ 1996 ɝ. ɜɫɬɭɩɢɥɨɜɫɢɥɭ 23 ɞɟɤɚɛɪɹ 1996 ɝ. (The Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the French Republic on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy of April 19, 1996 entered into force on December 23, 1996), http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901941429; ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɨɫɫɢɣ- ɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɎɪɚɧɰɭɡɫɤɨɣɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɨɝɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɤɨɣɨɬɜɟɬɫɬɜɟɧɧɨ- ɫɬɢɡɚɹɞɟɪɧɵɣɭɳɟɪɛɜɫɜɹɡɢɫɩɨɫɬɚɜɤɚɦɢɢɡɎɪɚɧɰɭɡɫɤɨɣɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɞɥɹɹɞɟɪɧɵɯɭɫ- ɬɚɧɨɜɨɤɜɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɨɬ 20 ɢɸɧɹ 2000 ɝ., ɜɫɬɭɩɢɥɨɜɫɢɥɭ 9 ɢɸɥɹ 2004 ɝ. (The Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the French Republic on civil liability for nuclear damage in connection with shipments from the 82 A. Malygina grams of technical and financial assistance to support Russia’s compliance with Article VI of the NPT. Japan started such collaboration with Russia in 1993.50 In the second half of the 1990s, the geography of international assistance expanded. Programs of assistance to Russia were launched by the United Kingdom (1996),51 Sweden (1997),52 and the Netherlands (2000). The

French Republic for nuclear installations in the Russian Federation of June 20, 2000 entered into force on July 9, 2004), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/ international_ contracts/2_contract/- /storage-viewer/bilateral/page-1/46816?_storageviewer_WAR_storagevie- werport- let_advancedSearch=true&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_sdAttr_countries_key_fi eld=%D0%A4%D0%A0%D0%90%D0%9D%D0%A6%D0%98%D0%AF&_storageviewer_W AR_storageviewerportlet_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_sdAttr _subjects_key_field=%D0%9C%D0%98%D0%A0%D0%9D%D0%AB%D0%99+%D0%90%D 0%A2%D0%9E%D0%9C&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_andOperator=1 49ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɎɟ- ɞɟɪɚɬɢɜɧɨɣɊɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢȽɟɪɦɚɧɢɢɨɛɨɤɚɡɚɧɢɢɩɨɦɨɳɢɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɜɥɢɤɜɢɞɚ- ɰɢɢɫɨɤɪɚɳɚɟɦɨɝɨɟɸɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɢɯɢɦɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ ɨɪɭɠɢɹ ɨɬ 16 ɞɟɤɚɛɪɹ 1992 ɝ. (The Agree- ment between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on assisting the Russian Federation in the destruction of its nuclear weapons being reduced and destruction of chemical weapons of December 16, 1992), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/ page-19/52785?_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch=false&_ stora- geviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_keywords=%D1%8F%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80% D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5+%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B5&_sto rageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR_storagevie- werportlet_andOperator=1. 50 ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɦɟɠɞɭ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɢ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦ əɩɨɧɢɢ ɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟ ɜ ɰɟɥɹɯ ɫɨɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɹ ɜ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɢ ɥɢɤɜɢɞɚɰɢɢ ɩɨɞɥɟɠɚɳɟɝɨ ɤ ɫɨ- ɤɪɚɳɟɧɢɸɜɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ ɨɪɭɠɢɹɢ ɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɢɄɨɦɢɬɟɬɚɩɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢ- ɱɟɫɬɜɭɜɷɬɢɯɰɟɥɹɯɨɬ 13 ɨɤɬɹɛɪɹ 1993 ɝ., (Agreement between the Government of the Rus- sian Federation and the Government of Japan on cooperation aimed at facilitating the destruction of nuclear weapons subject to reduction in the Russian Federation and the establishment of the Committee for Cooperation for these purposes of October 13, 1993), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/ page-17/48545?_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch=false&_ storage- viewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_keywords=%D1%8F%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B D%D0%BE%D0%B5+%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B5&_storagevie wer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet _andOperator=1. 51ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɋɨ- ɟɞɢɧɟɧɧɨɝɨ Ʉɨɪɨɥɟɜɫɬɜɚ ȼɟɥɢɤɨɛɪɢɬɚɧɢɢ ɢ ɋɟɜɟɪɧɨɣ ɂɪɥɚɧɞɢɢ ɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟ ɜ ɨɛ- ɥɚɫɬɢ ɦɢɪɧɨɝɨ ɢɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɹɚɬɨɦɧɨɣ ɷɧɟɪɝɢɢ ɨɬ 03 ɫɟɧɬɹɛɪɹ 1996 ɝ. ɜɫɬɭɩɢɥ ɜ ɫɢɥɭ 2 ɞɟɤɚɛɪɹ 1996 ɝ. (The agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of September 3, 1996 entered into force on December 2, 1996), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/ page-1/47573?_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch=false&_ storage- viewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_keywords=%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0% BA%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8+ %D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%88%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0 %B5&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR_st orageviewerportlet_andOperator=1. 52ɋɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɄɨ- ɪɨɥɟɜɫɬɜɚ ɒɜɟɰɢɹ ɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟ ɜ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɢ ɪɟɝɭɥɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɹ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɣ ɢ ɪɚɞɢɚɰɢɨɧɧɨɣ ɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ ɩɪɢ ɢɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɢ ɚɬɨɦɧɨɣ ɷɧɟɪɝɢɢ ɜ ɦɢɪɧɵɯɰɟɥɹɯɨɬ 2 ɞɟɤɚɛɪɹ 1997 ɝ. (Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on cooperation in the field of regulation of nuclear and radiation safety and security in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of December 2, 1997), http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/ Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 83 realization of those agreements demanded a qualitatively new level of cross- institutional cooperation between the MFA, Ministry of Defense, and special services.53 At the next level, bilateral programs of assistance were integrated within the G8 Global partnership program, and other states joined the collaboration. The Russian MFA in close collaboration with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy prepared the Moscow Nuclear Security Summit, hosted in April 1996 by Evgeniy Primakov who replaced Kozyrev in January 1996. Kozyrev’s team created the foundation for integrating Russia with the G7 and the first summit of G7+1 was conducted in 1997. In the 1990s, Russia and the West were seeking alternative mutually beneficial ways of securing the sustainability of WMD nonproliferation. Therefore, Russian secret services extended bilateral cooperation with the intelligence services of Germany, Poland, Romania, Hungary, France and Great Britain in order to exchange information and experience on nuclear export control issues, custom control capacities, protection of fissile materials and nuclear facilities, control and accounting of nuclear materials. The extended cooperation with the special services of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had the similar agenda.54 The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) was an innovative format with a solid commercial background. The ISTC was established in 1992 through an agreement signed in Moscow by the representatives of Rus- sia, European Union, Japan, and the United States.55 In the second half of the 1990s, the Center has become a big multilateral project which involved Geor- gia, Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan (1995); Armenia and Belarus (1996); Norway (1998), Republic of Korea (1998), and later Tajikistan (2003) and Canada (2004). The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, later transformed into the Federal Atomic Energy Agency “Rosatom,” coordinated the activities of the ISTC, which sponsored science and technology projects for peaceful pur- page-14/47310?_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_advancedSearch=false&_storage- viewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_keywords=%D1%8F%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B D%D0%BE%D0%B5+%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B5&_storagevie wer_WAR_storageviewerportlet_fromPage=search&_storageviewer_WAR_storageviewerportlet _andOperator=1. 53ɉɨɫɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɢɟɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɚɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢʋ 1164 “Ɉɩɨɞɩɢɫɚɧɢɢɋɨ- ɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɹɦɟɠɞɭɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨɦɎɪɚɧɰɭɡɫɤɨɣ Ɋɟɫɩɭɛɥɢɤɢɨɯɪɚɧɟɧɢɢɜɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɵɯɭɫɥɨɜɢɹɯɜɨɞɨɪɨɞɫɨɞɟɪɠɚɳɢɯɥɢɬɢɟɜɵɯɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɨɜ, ɩɨɥɭɱɟɧɧɵɯɩɪɢɞɟɦɨɧɬɚɠɟɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɨɪɭɠɢɹɜɊɨɫɫɢɢ” ɨɬ 14 ɨɤɬɹɛɪɹ 1994 ɝ. (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation noɸ 1164 “On Signing the Agreement between the Gov- ernment of the Russian Federation and the Government of the French Republic on the safe storage of hydrogen-containing lithium materials extracted during the destruction of nuclear weapons in Russia” of October 14, 1994), http:// www.pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?doc_itself=&nd= 102032639&page=1&rdk=0&intelsearch=%CE+%E3%EE%F1%F3%E4%E0%F0%F1%F2%E2 %E5%ED%ED%EE%E9+%E3%F0%E0%E6%E4%E0%ED%F1%EA%EE%E9+%F1%EB%F 3%E6%E1%E5++&link_id=19#I0 54ȼ. Ɉɪɥɨɜ, “əɞɟɪɧɚɹɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɶ: ɞɨɢɩɨɫɥɟɦɨɫɤɨɜɫɤɨɣɜɫɬɪɟɱɢɜɜɟɪɯɚɯ. Ȼɟɫɟɞɚɫ ɩɨɦɨɳɧɢɤɨɦ ɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɩɨ ɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɣ ɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ ɘɪɢɟɦ Ȼɚɬɭɪɢɧɵɦ” (V. Orlov, “Nuclear safety: before and after the Moscow Summit. Conversation with the Assistant for National Security to the President of the Russian Federation Yuri Ba- turin”), Yaderny kontrol, no. 18-19, (1996): 14. 55 The Agreement establishing the International Science and Technology Center formally entered into force on 2 March 1994 after it was ratified by Russian Parliament. 84 A. Malygina poses. These projects were to be carried out primarily at institutions and facilities located in the Russian Federation and in the other newly independent states of the post-Soviet area. At the beginning, Russia had a very positive attitude to how the ISTC integrated Russia’s former weapons scientists and engineers into the world scientific community. Although there was firm opposition against the ISTC among Russian parliamentarians who continuously refused to ratify the Agreement on the establishment of the ISTC in 1996, 2000 and 2004,56 the vast majority of the Russian scientific and engineering community had a firmly positive attitude towards the ISTC.57 Moscow’s position regarding the ISTC changed as the most urgent WMD nonproliferation problems were resolved and Russia became more proactive and aggressive in the global markets of advanced technologies. Russia no longer wanted to be humbled by the status of recipient within the ISTC and preferred to act unilaterally instead of being a part of a complicated system, which demanded a high degree of interdependence and transparency potentially challenging for national political, industrial and commercial interests.58 In 2010, Russian president Dmitri Medvedev issued an order to end Russian participation in ISTC projects by 2015. Belarus together with Russia withdrew from the ISTC in 2015, and in 2016 the Center moved to Kazakhstan. The U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on Scientific and Technological Co- operation was established in 1993 after Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin met in Vancouver on April 3–4, 1993. Initially, the Commission co-chaired by the Russian prime minister and American vice president had a mandate to coordinate bilateral cooperation in space technologies and nuclear energy. The agenda of the Commission was later expanded and included a broad spectrum of economic and social issues such as the development of entrepreneurship in Russia, conversion of defense industries, health care, environmental protection, agriculture, science and technology. That Joint Commission was often named after the co-chairs. So, the history of Russia’s governmental crisis of the end of the 1990s is reflected in the name of the Commission. The Gore- Chernomyrdin Commission, later know as Gore-Kirienko and Gore-Primakov worked until the spring of 1999. In the second half of the 1990s, that Joint Commission achieved substantive results in synchronizing Russia’s and the U.S.’s efforts in securing fissile materials and implementing high universal standards of nuclear safety and security. The establishment of transparent relations between Russia and the West after the end of the Cold War created diverse opportunities for scientific and technical cooperation. The profound technical experience, deep scientific knowledge and rich intellectual potential of Russian nuclear specialists, in-

56Ⱥ. ɑɟɛɚɧ. “ȼɵɯɨɞɊɨɫɫɢɢɢɡɆɇɌɐ: Ɋɚɡɜɨɞɢɥɢɩɭɬɶɤɪɚɜɧɨɩɪɚɜɢɸ?” (A. Cheban, “Russia’s withdrawal from ISTC: a divorce or a way to equality?”), Index bezopasnosti 20, no. 1 (108) (2014): 124, http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/12/13898781270.pdf. 57 Ⱥ. ȿɦɟɥɶɹɧɟɧɤɨɜ, “Ɇɢɫɫɢɹ ɢɫɱɟɪɩɚɧɚ, ɡɚɞɚɱɢ ɨɫɬɚɸɬɫɹ: Ɉɩɵɬ Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɝɨ ɧɚɭɱɧɨɬɟɯɧɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨɰɟɧɬɪɚɟɳɟɦɨɠɟɬɩɨɫɥɭɠɢɬɶɊɨɫɫɢɢ” (A. Emelianenkov, “Mission is over, tasks remain: The Experience of the International Science and Technology Centre may still be useful for Russia”), Rossiiskaja gazeta, August 24, 2010, https://rg.ru/ 2010/08/24/uchastie.html. 58 A. Emelianenkov, “Mission is over, tasks remain: The Experience of the International Science and Technology Centre may still be useful for Russia”; Ⱥ. A. Cheban, “Russia’s withdrawal from ISTC: a divorce or a way to equality?”: 128. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 85 cluding weapon engineers, contributed to the development of IAEA verification and monitoring capabilities. In the 1990s, Russian nuclear experts participated in consultations with the IAEA and facilitated inspections to ensure Iraq’s compliance with the UN policies concerning the Iraqi production and use of weapons of mass destruction (UNSCOM, 1991–1997) and inspections of South Africa's nuclear facilities to verify the scope and history of the program and its dismantlement (1991–1994) after South Africa joined the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1991.59 In the 1990s, Russian nuclear experts participated in working groups, which developed proposals for the improvement of the IAEA safeguard system. Those consultations contributed to the development of the Model Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA, which was introduced by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997 (INFCIRC/540). Together with the other P5 states, Russia adopted the modified Additional Protocol to the Comprehen- sive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which reflects Russia’s status of nuclear-weapon-state party to NPT.60 The scope, agenda, timeline and achievements of the cooperation between the U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists were brilliantly studied in the two-volume book edited by the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Professor Siegfried Hecker. The book demonstrates how many joint efforts were invested during the 1990s and 2000s to avert post-Cold War nuclear dangers. As Hecker says, “the extraordinary professionalism, dedica- tion, and patriotism of the Russian nuclear weapons workers and leaders, combined with an extraordinary and timely assistance from the United States through innovative government programs and scientific cooperation, saved the world from potential disaster.” Professor Hecker also points out that, “in the nearly 25 years since the Soviet dissolution, there has been no… disaster in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex, no serious nuclear accidents, very limited loss of nuclear material, limited leakage of nuclear weapons know-how or brain-drain, and no nuclear weapons stolen, sold or diverted.”61 Russia’s nuclear nonproliferation policy after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. had three dimensions: legislative, diplomatic, and administrative. Russia demonstrated that as a successor to the U.S.S.R. it was ready to carry out responsibility for the sustainability of international arms control and nonproliferation regimes. Russia defined its legal status within the NPT regime. Through dialogue with the newly independent states, Russia achieved a common vision regarding the legal status and the future of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Russia put efforts into finding a legislative and diplomatic solution to the problem of adapting the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The level of complexity of the problems faced by the newly independent states after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. was unprecedently high. Russia entered a deep systemic crisis of a transition period. The economic situation

59 V. Orlov, “Nuclear safety: before and after the Moscow Summit”: 17. 60Ɋ. Ɍɢɦɟɪɛɚɟɜ “Ⱦɨɩɨɥɧɢɬɟɥɶɧɵɣɩɪɨɬɨɤɨɥɤɫɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɸɨɜɫɟɨɛɴɟɦɥɸɳɢɯɝɚɪɚɧ- ɬɢɹɯ ɆȺȽȺɌɗ” (R. Timerbaev, “Additional protocol to the Comprehensive agreement with IAEA”), Yadernoe nerasprostraneniie, ed. A.V. Khlopkov (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009), 123. 61 Doomed to Cooperate: How American and Russian scientists joined forces to avert some of the greatest post-Cold War nuclear Dangers 1, ed. S.S. Hecker (Los Alamos, New Mexico: Bathtub Row Press, 2016), 36. 86 A. Malygina was rapidly deteriorating. The disintegration processes within Russia fueled by nationalism and ethnic separatism were dangerously increasing. There was insufficient clarity in the division of responsibilities within Russian government and federal government control over local affairs in the regions was weak. Along with constructing a legal framework and determining the strategic priorities of Russian nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policies, Moscow had to take care of nuclear safety and security, as well as improve nuclear export and custom controls. At the early stages of eliminating its nuclear arsenal, Moscow understood that Russia needed financial and technical assistance in order to secure national compliance with its nonproliferation and disarmament obligations.62 The first Atomic En- ergy Minister of Russian Federation Viktor Mikhaylov advocated for ar- ranging a program of technical assistance to Russia and did much to prepare an agreement between Moscow and Washington, which later was realized within the framework of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Pro- gram. During the first five years, the Russian government, including the Russian MFA, acted as a fire brigade balancing between short-term national needs and long-term international commitments. The power and the resources of the Russian MFA at that time were relatively poor. The head of the Russian MFA pursued the goal of creating a favorable international environment for Russia’s domestic reforms. The democratic reformists in Moscow believed that the future of Russia’s reforms could be secured if Russia became an integral part of the Western world. Russia hoped that if it demonstrated responsible and coherent behavior as a member of the international community it would be treated with deserved respect and attention to its national security concerns. Compliance with arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation obligations was seen by the Russian government in the context of securing Russia’s reputation as a predictable and trustworthy player in international relations. As prominent researcher, arms control expert and former deputy of the Russian Parliament Aleksey Arbatov stated, the end of the Cold War created something similar to euphoria in Russia and in the West. The Russian leadership, according to Arbatov, shared a common belief that “if Russia chose a democratic way, then the West would take care of Russia’s interests and would help it taking into consideration the peculiarities of Russia’s economic and geopolitical status.” The strong and to some extent naïve belief that “the West will not let us down” and that “there will come help from abroad” formed the opinion among the Russian leadership that Moscow did not need to formulate, articulate and take care of Russia’s national interests. As Arba- tov thinks, “such opinions were to some extent directly connected with the dependence of Russian economic reforms on the loans and huge financial assistance which came from the West in the 1990s.” He recollects that, “in almost all significant international cases including the disarmament negotiations, Russia went in the wake of American foreign policy.” Arbatov, who

62 V. Mikhaylov, I am a Hawk: Memoirs of Atomic Energy Minister Mikhaylov (Pentland Press, 1996). Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 87 was actively involved in international communication in the 1990s, recalls that when in conversation with foreign colleagues he expressed his anger about some aspects of foreign policy of the U.S. and its allies from Western Europe, he quite often heard the reply: “Why don’t you there in Moscow make official statements about Russia’s concerns and disagreements? We cannot determine your interests for you! If you had said openly and earnestly what you want, we would naturally have taken it into consideration.”63 By the beginning of the NPT Review conference of 1995, Russia had finished resolving the most critical legislative and diplomatic issues in the field of sharing with the newly independent states of the CIS the nuclear nonproliferation responsibilities. There was still much to be done in respect of the administrative dimension of Russian nonproliferation policies. Nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation efforts by Moscow were crucial for guaranteeing the extension of the NPT for an indefinite period. By 1995, Russia had proved that it was continuing to behave consistently as a responsible member of the NPT regime. Summarizing the overview of the first years of Russian foreign policy its basic principles in the NPT regime may be formulated as the following: – sustainability, effectiveness and universality of international arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation agreements are critical for Russian national security; – Russia-U.S. nuclear arms control is a cornerstone of global strategic stability and the foundation of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime; – any attempts to adapt the NPT regime to the changing geopolitical context should be done through an inclusive dialogue when the national interests and security concerns of the corresponding nations are taken into consideration; – further steps toward nuclear disarmament must be progressive and gradual, and should involve other nuclear-weapon-state parties to the NPT; – the IAEA safeguards system plays a fundamental role in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime; – the leading role of the UN arms control and disarmament machinery is critical for preserving international peace and security.

The Russian nuclear nonproliferation policy since 1996

To some extent, Yeltsin’s decision to replace Andrey Kozyrev with Yev- geny Primakov64 was an attempt to reach a compromise with the parliament and reconcile tensions between the liberal reformists in the government and conservative nationalists in the Russian parliament. In comparison to the liberal reformists from Yegor Gaidar’s democratic team, Primakov was a conservative. However, in terms of his political beliefs Primakov was a pragmatic centrist. Before getting the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pri- makov managed different institutions within the Soviet Academy of Sciences

63Ⱥ. Ⱥɪɛɚɬɨɜ, ɂɧɬɟɪɜɶɸɪɟɞɚɤɬɨɪɭ (A. Arbatov, Interview given to the editor), Mezhdu- narodnye processy (2007), http://intertrends.ru/old/fourteen/010.htm. 64 Evgeniy Primakov was Foreign Minister from January 1996 till September 1998. 88 A. Malygina and in the early 1990s served as the head of the Russian Intelligence Service. He had a degree in Middle East Studies and was an intellectual with a solid academic reputation and profound bureaucratic experience. He was famous for his strategic mind, well-developed emotional intellect, and specific attention to local traditions, mindset and perceptions of regional political leaders. Primakov’s attention to cultural traditions and mentality made him a good mediator. He could have a constructive dialogue even when he disagreed with his counterpart. In many different situations, both domestically and internationally, he turned out to be a compromise figure for conflicting parties. He was respected both in Russia and abroad. Primakov’s reputation was critical in managing different sorts of crises both at the domestic and international levels. He showed his wisdom and negotiation skills during the Iraq crises in the 1990s and in 2003, during the Balkan crisis of 1997–1999, and during the governmental crises in Russia in 1991 and in 1998. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Primakov increased the influence of the Russian MFA among the governmental institutions and started improving the living and working conditions of Russian diplomats. All those measures helped to stop the brain drain from the Russian MFA. The younger generation of diplomats saw some social stability and possibility for career promotions, which facilitated the retention of young and middle career professionals. There were no dramatic shifts in Russian nonproliferation policy during the 2.5 years when Primakov was Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, Pri- makov established the foundation for reconstructing Russia’s international relations strategy. Primakov’s foreign policy doctrine was based on the principle of “multivectorness” (synonymous to multipolarity). He was the first to suggest the format of a triad in relations between Russia, China, and India. Primakov also insisted that Russia needed to develop an independent policy in the regions of South Asia and the Middle East. At the same time, Primakov regarded efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, achieve limitation and reductions in nuclear armaments and settlement of regional conflicts as “strategic values of Russo-American cooperation.”65 Summarizing Primakov’s role in Russian foreign policy strategy, Sergey Lavrov stated in 2014 that Primakov “managed to stabilize Russian foreign policy and made it sustainable and independent.”66 Primakov served as Minis- ter of Foreign Affairs from January 1998 until September 1998 and as Prime Minister from September 1998 until May 1999. As the head of Russian government, he continued to influence Russia’s foreign policy. As Prime Minis- ter, he made several steps, which predetermined the further configuration of relations between Russia and the West. Among other cases, Primakov is famous for his decision to call off his official visit to Washington when he was flying over the Atlantic Ocean. On May 24, 1999, he ordered his airplane back to Russia as a sign of disagreement with NATO’s decision to start

65 ȿ. ɉɪɢɦɚɤɨɜ, Ɇɢɪ ɛɟɡ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ: Ʉ ɱɟɦɭ ɜɟɞɟɬ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɚɹ ɛɥɢɡɨɪɭɤɨɫɬɶ (E. Primakov, The world without Russia: Where does political myopia lead?) (Moscow: IIK “Rossiiskaia gazeta”, 2009), 214. 66 “Ʌɚɜɪɨɜ: ȼɧɟɞɚɥɟɤɨɦɛɭɞɭɳɟɦɢɫɬɨɪɢɤɢɫɮɨɪɦɭɥɢɪɭɸɬ ɬɚɤɨɟ ɩɨɧɹɬɢɟ, ɤɚɤ ɞɨɤ- ɬɪɢɧɚɉɪɢɦɚɤɨɜɚ” (“Lavrov: the historians will soon formulate the notion of the term Prima- kov’s Doctrine”), Russian information agency TASS, October 28, 2014, https://tass.ru/politika/1537769. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 89 bombing Serbia during the Kosovo crisis. Primakov insisted that Russia had not lost the Cold War and Russia should be treated respectfully. Primakov was sure that Russia should not passively follow U.S. foreign policy, but should be proactive, pragmatic, and defend its national interests using the whole spectrum of diplomatic tools.67 For Primakov, the word disagreement was not a synonym for confrontation and did not have a negative connotation. Primakov insisted that Russia should not be afraid of expressing disagreement with the U.S. and other Western democratic states. For him integration into the institutions of global politics did not mean homogeneousness. He was sure that Russia could act together with the West in spheres of mutual interest and could act independently in the domains where Russia and the West had conflicting interests. As Nikolay Sokov points out, at that time “Moscow sought to institution- alize its role as a legitimate center of multilateral decision-making through membership in existing structures.”68 He believes that Primakov planned to construct an international system similar to the “concert of powers” which emerged after the 1814 Congress of Vienna.69 On April 19–20, 1996, Moscow hosted the Nuclear Safety and Security Summit. The leaders of the U.S., Canada, France, the U.K., Germany, Italy and Japan joined Russia to discuss the issues of using safe and secure nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. The president of Ukraine was invited to participate in the discussion concerning the liquidation of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and other issues of the nuclear security and safety in Ukraine. The Chair of the European Commission was present at the summit as an observer. It was a large-scale event organized jointly by different Russian federal governmental institutions. Igor Ivanov, who later in 1998 replaced Primakov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, served as the General Secretary of the Sum- mit.70 Russian experts from the Ministry of Defense, Intelligence Service and Ministry of Energy who later in the 2000s retired to become chief consultants to Russian and foreign think tanks, were actively involved in preparations for the Moscow summit. An interservice working group lead by the minister of atomic energy, Viktor Mikhaylov, prepared the agenda and drafted the final documents of the Moscow summit.71

67 ȿɆ. ɉɪɢɦɚɤɨɜ, Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ ɜ ɫɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɨɦ ɦɢɪɟ. ɉɪɨɲɥɨɟ, ɧɚɫɬɨɹɳɟɟ, ɛɭɞɭɳɟɟ (E.M. Primakov, Russia in the modern world. Past, present and future) (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2018), 549. 68 N. Sokov, “Russian perspective on nuclear disarmament and the post-nuclear world” in Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, political, and regional perspectives, ed. N. Hynek and M. Smetana (Routledge, 2017), 209. 69 N. Sokov, “Russian perspective on nuclear disarmament and the post-nuclear world” in Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, political, and regional perspectives, 208. 70 Ɋɚɫɩɨɪɹɠɟɧɢɟ ɉɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɨɬ 17.07.1996 ɝ. ʋ 364-ɪɩ ³Ɉɩɨɨɳɪɟɧɢɢ ɚɤɬɢɜɧɵɯ ɭɱɚɫɬɧɢɤɨɜ ɨɪɝɚɧɢɡɚɰɢɢ, ɩɨɞɝɨɬɨɜɤɢɢ ɩɪɨɜɟɞɟɧɢɹ Ɇɨɫɤɨɜɫɤɨɣ ɜɫɬɪɟɱɢɧɚɜɵɫɲɟɦɭɪɨɜɧɟɩɨɜɨɩɪɨɫɚɦɹɞɟɪɧɨɣɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ” (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 17, 1996 no. 364-rp “On Encouraging Active Participants in Or- ganizing, Preparing and Holding the Moscow Nuclear Security Summit), http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/9729. 71ɉɨɥɟɬɹɫɬɪɟɛɚ: ɜɨɫɩɨɦɢɧɚɧɢɹɨȼɇ. Ɇɢɯɚɣɥɨɜɟ (The flight of a hawk: reminiscences about V.N. Mikhailov), ed. N.P. Voloshin (Snezhinsk: Izdatelstvo RFYC VNIITF, 2015), 56. 90 A. Malygina

The idea of a nuclear safety and security summit was suggested by Russian president B. Yeltsin at the G7 summit in Halifax in 1995.72 In 1997, Russia had officially joined G7 and until 2014 the forum existed under the brand of G8. Being a recipient of technical and financial assistance within G8’s Global Partnership Program in the 1990s, in the 2000s Russia started contributing to the Global Partnership’s capacity-building programs as a donor. During the early 1990s, the most terrible nightmare in the West was the image of a “nuclear mafia” stealing uncontrolled nuclear materials some- where from Russia’s territory. So Russia, who wanted to build the reputation of a responsible and predictable player, needed to reassure the West that it should trust Russia in all aspects of nuclear safety and security. In 1996, the Moscow summit became a significant event not only in Russian foreign policy but in domestic affairs as well. President Yeltsin needed some symbolic support from the West, as his chances in the upcoming presidential elections of 1996 were quite weak. The fact that the leaders of the G7 received invita- tions from Yeltsin and came to Moscow to discuss critical issues of global security was used by Russian pro-Yeltsin political forces in their political campaign against Russian communists. Thus, during the Moscow summit, Russia and the West refrained from any mutual criticism and demonstrated that they shared common approaches in nuclear nonproliferation. The first day of the summit was dedicated to bilateral consultations. The agenda of the second day of the summit was broad and included issues of nuclear material protection, control and accounting; combating illicit nuclear trafficking; nuclear test ban negotiations; the ecological situation in Ukraine after the Chernobyl nuclear accident; the safety of civilian nuclear reactors; nuclear waste management; and the safe storage of fissile materials no longer required for defense purposes. According to the press, President Yeltsin proposed a joint statement considering the possible establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe.73 After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the War- saw Pact, Russia had continually called for non-deployment of nuclear weapons in the East European countries, which were going to join NATO.74 However, this proposal was not discussed during the second day of the summit. Although Russian newspapers reported that during bilateral consultations some countries called Russia’s proposal “realistic and reasonable,” no statements reflecting the results of those bilateral consultations were included in the final communiqué of the Moscow nuclear security summit.75

72Ⱥ. Ɂɭɥɶɯɚɪɧɟɟɜ, “Ɇɨɫɤɨɜɫɤɚɹɜɫɬɪɟɱɚɧɚɜɵɫɲɟɦɭɪɨɜɧɟɩɨɹɞɟɪɧɨɣɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ” (A. Zulkharneev, “Moscow Nuclear Security Summit”), Yadernoe nerasprostraneniie, ed. A.V. Khlopkov (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009), 191. 73Ⱥ. Ʉɨɪɟɰɤɢɣ, “əɞɟɪɧɵɟɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵɧɟɬɟɪɩɹɬɢɦɩɪɨɜɢɡɚɰɢɢ” (A. Koretskii, “Nuclear issues do not tolerate improvisation”), Kommersant, no. 68, April 20,1996, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/131495; V. Orlov, “Nuclear safety: before and after the Moscow Summit”: 17. 74 A. Koretskii, “Nuclear issues do not tolerate improvisation”. 75 A. Koretskii, “Nuclear issues do not tolerate improvisation”; V. Orlov, “Nuclear safety: before and after the Moscow Summit”: 17. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 91

Having initiated the summit, Russia demonstrated that despite its economic and social difficulties it was ready to continue improving legal and technical aspects of nuclear safety and security at national and international levels. Although there was some criticism that the Moscow nuclear safety and security summit ended with no clear results,76 history proved that there were some achievements for the further development of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. First, the concept of comprehensiveness in the nuclear-test-ban treaty was finally agreed upon. Russia expressed readiness to support the so- called Australia formula that prohibition must cover all types of nuclear tests. Secondly, the G7 and Russia set the timeframe when the nuclear-test-ban treaty should be open for signature. Thirdly, significant achievements were made to overcome distrust in the relations between Russia and the West regarding the irreversible character of nuclear disarmament. The core issue of disagreements and concerns addressed the ways of converting fissile materials extracted from nuclear warheads. In April 1996, the Moscow summit launched a sustainable process of consultations at the level of experts and the first meeting of experts convened in October 1996 in Paris where technologies of weapon grade plutonium conversion were discussed.77 Fourthly, the Moscow summit adopted the concept of nuclear security culture, which was further developed at the Nuclear security summit hosted by the U.S. in 2010. Fifthly, the participants of the Moscow summit agreed about the joint measures to combat illicit nuclear trafficking. Before the Moscow Summit, there were discussions at different levels on whether the threat of illicit nuclear trafficking really existed. The Moscow summit established the framework for comprehensive practical measures of combating nuclear smuggling in all its aspects. Moreover, the threat of illicit nuclear trafficking was put into the context of combating nuclear terrorism. Russia and the U.S. agreed to become the contact points for this type of activity, and Russia immediately started development of a coordination and information center.78 The financial crisis of August 1998 followed by the government crisis of September 1998 increased the difficulties of the transition period for Russia. After a series of discussions, Yeltsin persuaded Foreign Minister Primakov to agree to head the Russian government. Primakov’s appointment as Russian Prime Minister was to some extent a desperate solution and a necessary step to overcome the political crisis, which threatened Yeltsin with impeachment. The Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov79 replaced Primakov as the head of the Russian MFA. During the times of turbulence in domestic affairs, Russia’s international relations strategy remained unchanged be-

76(A. Zulkharneev, “Moscow Nuclear Security Summit”), Yadernoe nerasprostraneniie, ed. A.V. Khlopkov (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009), 191. 77 “Ɉ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɦ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ ɜ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɢ ɭɬɢɥɢɡɚɰɢɢ ɢɡɛɵɬɨɱɧɨɝɨ ɨɪɭɠɟɣɧɨɝɨɩɥɭɬɨɧɢɹ” (Reference information on the official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry of March 11, 2001 “On international cooperation of Russia in the field of disposal of surplus weapons-grade plutonium”), http://www.mid.ru/obsie-voprosy-mezdunarodnoj-bezopasnosti-i-kontrola-nad-vooruzeniami/-/asset_publisher/6sN03cZTYZOC/content/id/588696. 78Ⱥ. Ʉɨɪɟɰɤɢɣ. Ɇ. ɋɟɪɝɟɟɜɚ, “ɂɬɨɝɢɫɚɦɦɢɬɚɩɨɹɞɟɪɧɨɣɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ: Ɏɚɤɬɨɪɜɥɚ- ɫɬɢ – ɫɚɦɵɣɨɩɚɫɧɵɣɜɹɞɟɪɧɵɯɜɨɩɪɨɫɚɯ” (A. Koretskii, M. Sergeeva, “The results of the Nuclear Security Summit: The factor of power is the most dangerous in the nuclear issues”), Kommersant, no. 69, April 23,1996: 4. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/131593. 79 Igor Ivanov was Foreign Minister from September 1998 till March 2004. 92 A. Malygina cause the MFA under Ivanov`s leadership continued Primakov’s policy. Ivanov had become the First Deputy Foreign Minister in 1993. His professionalism and ability to control his emotions in any critical situation made him capable of getting along with such different bosses as Kozyrev and Primakov. In June 1999, Russia was involved in an incident at Pristina airport. A small group of military and political leaders had secretly developed a plan of rapid deployment of Russian troops ahead of a NATO deployment in Pristina International Airport. Formally, Russian troops were part of a joint NATO-Russian peacekeeping force, which was to be placed in Kos- ovo after the end of the war in Kosovo. Contrary to Moscow’s expecta- tion, the Russian peacekeepers did not receive a peacekeeping sector independent of NATO. The rapid projection of Russia’s military force at the Pristina airport happened unexpectedly both for the Russian and NATO leadership. The situation turned into a confrontation between Russia and NATO. During June 11-12, Ivanov was communicating with his Western counterparts reassuring them that the Russian troops who had started moving in the early morning of June 11 had stopped and would not move until further orders from Moscow. Nevertheless, about two hundred Rus- sian troops and about 30 armored vehicles continued their march and in the morning of June 12 reached Pristina airport. Neither the Russian For- eign Minister nor the Russian president knew about the operation secretly planned by Russian military and could not control the events in Kosovo from Moscow.80 By 2000, Ivanov had set a priority for the Russian MFA “to renew the mechanism of foreign policy decision making”81 and increase the role of the Russian MFA in the structure of the government. Ivanov considered the lessons learned by the Russian MFA in the early 1990s and advocated for the improvement of communication between the executive and legislative branches; specifying the role of parliament; and division of power between the president, the federal government in Mos- cow and the regions of the Russian Federation. The bitter lessons of globalization when Russia suffered greatly from the global economic crisis of 1998 led to a shift in Moscow’s attitude toward economic integration and other aspects of globalization. The new Russian president, Vladimir Putin, elected on March 26, 2000, during the preterm presidential elections called by the parliament after Yeltsin resigned in late 1999, set a priority for the government to ensure the economic security of the nation and minimize the negative consequences of globalization.82 The new concept of Russia’s foreign policy,83 which Foreign Minister Ivanov presented at a press conference on June 10, 2000, stated that although Russia had limited resources which during the previous decade did not provide proper

80 L. Mlechin, MFA. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Russia’s foreign policy from Lenin and Trotsky to Putin and Medvedev, 70. 81ɂɋ. ɂɜɚɧɨɜ, ɇɨɜɚɹɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɚɹɞɢɩɥɨɦɚɬɢɹ. Ⱦɟɫɹɬɶɥɟɬɜɧɟɲɧɟɣɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɢɫɬɪɚɧɵ (I.S. Ivanov, New Russian diplomacy. Ten years of the country’s foreign policy) (Moscow: Olma- Press, 2002), 20. 82 Ibid. 83 The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (In Russian), Nezavisimaia gazeta, July 11, 2000. http://www.ng.ru/world/2000-07-11/1_concept.html. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 93 support for Russia’s foreign policy, Moscow’s intention was to realize a coherent, predictable, and pragmatic foreign policy based on a balance between the set goals and available capabilities. In terms of nuclear export control, these strategic priorities meant that Russia needed financial investment into the legislative and administrative reforms to secure its national economic interests and facilitate technological development. On the one hand, Moscow strived to develop sustainable intergovernmental cooperation and sufficient governmental control over foreign trade. On the other hand, foreign and domestic nuclear export policies were to take into consideration the economic interests of Russian enterprises and not prevent national economic growth.84 Ivanov launched a revision of the Russian MFA’s public relations policy and encouraged Russian diplomats to work proactively with public opinion in Russia and abroad. In the Soviet Union, the issues of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation were traditionally the fields of expertise of a small group of governmental experts from the MOD and MFA and a group of scientists from the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Neither the broader academic community nor civil society were involved in discussions about Moscow’s policy in the NPT and other arms control and disarmament treaties. The common practice of the Soviet government was to inform society about already agreed international arrangements and treaties without giving it a chance to express any kind of feedback. The government did not request independent foreign policy expertise from either the mass media or research institutions. Russia as the successor of the U.S.S.R. in the nuclear nonproliferation regime had neither institutional memory nor a general culture of participation in a public discussion about national foreign policy. Although there is still little diversity in the sources of Russian nuclear nonproliferation expertise and in its content, the Russian MFA had certain achievements in facilitating a public discussion on nuclear nonproliferation. Since 2000, the Russian MFA started publishing regularly the materials covering Russia’s policy in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The government started to learn how to communicate with Russian society and with the parliament. In the 1990s, when there was a confrontation between the Russian parliament and the government, there were critical moments when the future of arms control and nonproliferation treaties depended on the decision of parliament regarding the ratification of certain agreements. The Russian parliament perceived disarmament and arms control agreements very critically and sometimes almost negatively. So, education and outreach activities in nuclear nonproliferation got the MFA’s attention. The Russian MFA started to see public relations as an instrument of securing the sustainability of disarmament and nonproliferation agreements. This effort was supported by other governmental institutions. For instance, in 2000, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) published a report “New challenges after the end of the Cold War: WMD proliferation,” prepared by the SVR in 1993 under the leadership of Evgeniy Primakov. The comprehensive report was published in Russian on

84ȼ. ɉɭɬɢɧ, ȼɫɬɭɩɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɟɫɥɨɜɨɧɚɡɚɫɟɞɚɧɢɢɋɨɜɟɬɚȻɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ, ɩɨɫɜɹɳɟɧɧɨɦɭ ɭɤɪɟɩɥɟɧɢɸɫɢɫɬɟɦɵɷɤɫɩɨɪɬɧɨɝɨɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɹ (V. Putin, Introductory notes at the Federal Secu- rity Council dedicated to the enforcement of the national export control system on February 22, 2001), http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22322. 94 A. Malygina the official website of the Foreign Intelligence Service and covered all aspects of nonproliferation. The report discusses the complexity of the challenges of nuclear proliferation in the context of regional security and in conjunction with the challenges of proliferation of chemical weapons, biological weapons and missile technologies. In the introduction to the report, then head of the SVR Evgeniy Primakov stated that by publishing the report the SVR “hopes to contribute to overcoming one of the main threats to the international community” and that “monitoring of the process of WMD proliferation; detection of its catalyzers; mapping the signs that allow us with a sufficient degree of probability to determine the position of a country on the way to the creation of weapons of mass destruction; participation in creating mechanisms that impede these processes are all now the priority tasks of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation”.85 Ivanov continued to solve the problem of institutional weakness of the Russian MFA. Some measures of bridging the generation gap were aimed at retaining mid-career professionals and ensuring the supply of young diplomats. The solution of the cadre problem let Moscow increase the number of staff in the offices of the permanent representatives at international organizations in Vienna, Geneva and New York and in the Department of Arms Con- trol, Disarmament and Nonproliferation in Moscow. These measures had a long-term positive effect. Firstly, the communication of the Russian MFA with the local expert communities in Moscow and abroad became more regular and covered a broader agenda. Secondly, the Russian MFA could better defend its position before the stakeholders in the Russian government and in the parliament. Thirdly, Russia’s representation at the venues of disarmament diplomacy in Vienna, Geneva and New York expanded and received better analytical and expert support from Moscow. Fourthly, Russia’s disarmament and nonproliferation policy became more proactive and got better coverage in mass media. At that time, Russian intellectuals were trying to critically revise the So- viet diplomatic legacy. Thus, Ivanov facilitated the Russian MFA to exploit the accumulated positive potential, preserve the traditions of Soviet diplomacy and keep “the heritage of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy.”86 It was admitted that the Soviet foreign policy based on the theory of class struggle led to a sharp confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and the West and to the protracted arms race, which exhausted the nation’s economy. At the same time, the Russian political elite paid tribute to such achievements as the efforts of Soviet diplomacy to prevent a global nuclear conflict; bilateral and multilateral agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament; the resolution of international crises and the creation of conditions for cooperation of states with different socio-political systems; the involvement of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America in world politics as equal players.87

85ɇɨɜɵɣɜɵɡɨɜɩɨɫɥɟ "ɯɨɥɨɞɧɨɣɜɨɣɧɵ": ɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟɧɢɟɨɪɭɠɢɹɦɚɫɫɨɜɨɝɨɭɧɢɱ- ɬɨɠɟɧɢɹ. ɈɬɤɪɵɬɵɣɞɨɤɥɚɞɋȼɊɡɚ 1993ɝ. (A new challenge after the Cold War: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Open report of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Rus- sian Federation), http://svr.gov.ru/material/2-1.htm. 86 I.S. Ivanov, New Russian diplomacy. Ten years of the country’s foreign policy, 33. 87 I.S. Ivanov, New Russian diplomacy. Ten years of the country’s foreign policy, 28-33. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 95

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union often used the UN disarmament diplomacy for the ideological struggle with the U.S. In some cases, it dimin- ished the chances of the U.S.S.R.’s arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation proposals being attentively considered by the U.S. and its allies. Re- vising the Soviet diplomatic legacy in the 2000s, the Russian MFA turned its attention back to the Non-aligned Movement and the non-nuclear-weapon states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, Moscow could not construct a new vision of being proactive and promoting alternative initiatives independently from the West while avoiding a confrontational tone and po- larization within the NPT regime. The confrontation between Russia and the West in the context of crises in Syria and Ukraine has sharpened that problem of the lack of support for Russia’s initiatives. In the end of the NPT Review Conference in 2015 the U.S., Canada and the United Kingdom did not support the final document regarding the establishment of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East. As that document included a significant number of ideas developed with the participation of Russian diplomats, Russia was especially concerned that the NPT Review Conference in 2015 ended with no clear results. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the use of military force by the USA and its allies became much more common than Russia expected. The force projection in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) was not sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. In Moscow’s eyes, the unilateralist policy of the U.S. caused instability in different regions of the world while the USA demonstrated an inability to restore peace and stability after the interventions. To mitigate the negative effect of American unilateral policy Russia insisted that the great powers should share responsibility for international security and should make all key decisions jointly with the UN Security Council as a core decision-making forum.88 Moscow used nuclear nonproliferation fora and disarmament diplomacy venues to communicate Russia’s concerns about the negative consequences of further militarization of international relations. At the NPT Review Con- ference in 2000, Ivanov stated that the NATO peace-enforcement operation in former Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis “from the military-political point of view… harmed seriously the regimes of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction” because it demonstrated that the U.S. ignored basic principles of international law and that neither the UN Charter nor international law could secure a sovereign state from intervention and that the only solution could be procuring such weapons, which would have a sufficient deterrent effect being sufficiently lethal and advanced.89 However, at the end of 1999 Ivanov stated that he believed in “the acquired margin of safety” of the Rus- sian-American partnership, which could sustain the load created by the crises of the 1990s. Such a type of confrontation that existed between Moscow and Washington during the Iraq and Kosovo crises was characterized by Ivanov as “fluctuations of conjuncture,” which could not change the nature of the

88 A. Arbatov, Interview given to the editor, Mezhdunarodniie processy (2007). 89ɂɋ. ɂɜɚɧɨɜ, ȼɧɟɲɧɹɹɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɚɊɨɫɫɢɢɢɦɢɪ. ɋɬɚɬɶɢɢɜɵɫɬɭɩɥɟɧɢɹ (I.S. Ivanov, Russia’s foreign policy and the world. Articles and speeches) (Moscow: MGIMO; ROSSPEN, 2001), 228. 96 A. Malygina strategic partnership between two countries.90 In 2000, Russia evaluated the prospects for the NPT regime in the context of U.S.-Russia relations. The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept of Russia stated that although Moscow and Washington had serious disagreements, which in some cases had the character of fundamental differences, Russia-U.S. cooperation was a prerequisite for the improvement of the international environment and securing global strategic stability. In Moscow’s eyes, Russia and the U.S. had no longer seen each other as adversaries and had to act jointly to mitigate common threats of the twenty-first century including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The effectiveness of the NPT regime depended, as viewed by Moscow, on the sustainability of U.S.-Russian strategic dialogue on a broad spectrum of issues including disarmament, strategic nuclear arms limitation and reduction, WMD nonproliferation, and the prevention and resolution of the most dangerous regional conflicts. 91 In the early 2000s, Russia believed that the international environment, including the NPT regime, could be improved and had the intention “to preserve and project into the future the recently acquired solid positive potential of Russia-U.S. relations.”92 To do that, Russia intended to maintain regular bilateral contacts on all levels, prevent pauses in the relations or disruption of the continuing negotiations on the core political, military, and economic issues.93 As further events proved, the sustainability of the U.S.-Russian strategic partnership was significantly shaken by the increasing disagreements. Additionally, the lack of political will in Washington to preserve the irreversible character of nuclear arms control arrangements created existential challenges for the architecture of the NPT regime. In the late 1990s, the U.S. leadership started considering the possibility of withdrawal from the ABM treaty (1972). American president Bill Clinton did not risk withdrawing from the treaty, but his successor George W. Bush at the end of 2001 did announce the withdrawal, which occurred in 2002. Mos- cow tried to use the NPT review process to gain support in its persistent struggle to save the ABM Treaty. During his speech at the NPT Review Con- ference in 2000, Ivanov warned the states who were party to the NPT that the U.S.’s withdrawal from the ABM treaty in combination with Washington’s attempts to use military force in violation of the basic principles of the UN Charter and international law could be interpreted “as a direct invitation for a new arms race.”94 In his speeches of that time Ivanov repeatedly stated that the series of bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R./Russia arms control agreements helped to build the solid architecture of international security, which “is an interconnected system” with the ABM treaty as one of its corner stones. Ivanov in-

90 I.S. Ivanov, “Speech at the conference celebrating the 90-years anniversary of Soviet Foreign Minister A. Gromyko” in I.S. Ivanov, Russia’s foreign policy and the world. Articles and speeches, 341. 91 The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (In Russian), Nezavisimaia gazeta, June 11, 2000, http://www.ng.ru/world/2000-07-11/1_concept.html. 92 I.S. Ivanov, New Russian diplomacy, 79. 93 The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (In Russian), Nezavisimaia gazeta, June 11, 2000. 94 I.S. Ivanov, Russia’s foreign policy and the world, 112. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 97 sisted that without the ABM Treaty, the whole structure of international security would be at stake.95 Russia proposed a series of initiatives in support of its position and presented its struggle to save the ABM Treaty as efforts aimed at preserving the NPT regime. Among other solutions, Russia proposed the enforcement of a multilateral regime of nonproliferation of missile technologies as an alternative to the unilateral development of national ABM systems.96 The promotion of the idea of a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology (GCS initiative) in the context of Russian disagreement with Washington’s plans to expand the ABM system resulted in a negative reaction from the leading European nations. Part of the international expert community interpreted Russia’s GCS initiative as an attempt to undermine the attractiveness of the Hague Code of Conduct proposed by Canada in 1999 and formally known as The International Code of Conduct against Bal- listic Missile Proliferation. This non-formal multilateral arrangement was established in November 2002 and was a result of a long-lasting search for compromise, which occurred in 2000-2001 among states who were party to the Missile Technology Control Regime.97 The GCS idea was tentatively introduced by Russian president Boris Yeltsin in June 1999 during the G8 Summit and was officially proposed to the international community for consideration at the NPT Review Conference in 2000. The efforts and initiatives of Russian diplomacy did not help to preserve the ABM Treaty, but facilitated the consolidation of a significant number of developing countries who were not satisfied with the American policy of unilateralism. Among those states supporting the GCS initiative were Iran, India and North Korea. During subsequent years, Russia kept suggesting different initiatives at different arms control and disarmament diplomacy venues but most often they were interpreted by the West as elements of old-school Soviet propaganda and in the context of Russia’s geopolitical struggle with the U.S. and therefore did not gain support among a majority of European states. The Foreign Policy Concept of Russia in 2000 stated the goal of acquiring such a place in international institutions, which would correspond to Rus- sia’s national interests and her understanding of her geopolitical status. The Foreign Policy Concept literally stated that it was important for Russia that the international community would take into consideration Russia’s national interests and security concerns. To reach that goal, Moscow started expanding its involvement in the regulation of regional security crises and became more proactive in nuclear nonproliferation dialogue with different regional powers. Since 2003, Russia has been part of the six party talks launched to solve the security problem on the Korean peninsula, Moscow has continued to clarify its position regarding the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Central Asia, continued cooperation in the format of the G8 partnership

95 I.S. Ivanov, New Russian diplomacy, 78. 96 International Global Control System Experts Meeting occurred in Moscow on March 16, 2000. Unofficial Transcript of the Meeting: https://fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/ news/GSC_content.htm. 97ȼɂ. Ɇɢɡɢɧ, ɊɨɫɫɢɹɢɊɄɊɌ: ɷɜɨɥɸɰɢɹɩɨɞɯɨɞɚɢɛɭɞɭɳɟɟɪɟɠɢɦɚɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɹ (V.I. Mizin, Russia and MTCR: the evolution of the approach and the future of the control regime) (Moscow: MGIMO, 2009), 51, https://mgimo.ru/files/127183/kb-10_Mizin.pdf. 98 A. Malygina against WMD proliferation and in May 2004 joined the Proliferation Security Initiative launched by the U.S. at the end of May 2003. The Russian MFA stated in a press release of June 1, 2004, that “the principles for the Prolifera- tion Security Initiative… correspond to the Russian line in the field of nonproliferation” and that Moscow had the intention “of making its contribution to implementing the PSI with consideration for the compatibility of the actions with the rules of international law, for their conformance to national legislation and for commonality of non-proliferation interests with their partners.”98 In 2000, a week after the end of the NPT Review Conference Russia ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and started developing the national component of the global International Monitoring System. A significant part of the Russian parliament was skeptical about the need for joining the CTBT.99 CTBT ratification was not only a demonstration of Moscow’s political will to play a visible role in the development of new institutions of the NPT regime. It was also a significant achievement by Russia’s MFA, which facilitated the public discussion and persuaded both chambers of the Russian parliament to ratify the CTBT. Although in 2020 the CTBT was not yet in force and its chances of entering into force in the foreseeable future remained unchangingly poor, Russia continued to sustain the efficiency of national components of the International Monitoring System, regularly renewed the equipment and undergone certification procedures conducted by the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organi- zation. In February 2020, the Russian segment of the International Monitor- ing System consisted of 28 certified facilities (out of 32 planned) including seismic stations, infrasound stations, radionuclide stations and a radionuclide laboratory, 100 National Data Center in Dubna and the national segment of the CTBT Global Communication Infrastructure.101 In the early 2000s, multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation regimes faced difficult times. The process of constructing a Protocol on verification for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention failed due to the refusal of the U.S. to support the drafted document. CTBT had no chances of entering into force. The stalemate in negotiations on the fissile materials cut- off treaty started. However, the fundamental disagreements existing in some areas of relations between Russia and the U.S. did not negatively affect con-

98 Cited by: A. Kaliadine, “The Challenges of the Proliferation Security Initiative” in Rus- sia: arms control, disarmament and international security: IMEMO supplement to the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2004, ed. A. Kaliadine, A. Arbatov (Moscow: IMEMO, 2005), 44, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB2004IMEMO.pdf. 99 A. Koretskii, M. Sergeeva, “The results of the Nuclear Security Summit: The factor of power is the most dangerous in the nuclear issues”), Kommersant, no. 69, April 23,1996: 4. 100 “ɈȾɨɝɨɜɨɪɟ ɨɜɫɟɨɛɴɟɦɥɸɳɟɦɡɚɩɪɟɳɟɧɢɢɹɞɟɪɧɵɯɢɫɩɵɬɚɧɢɣ (ȾȼɁəɂ) ɢɞɟɹ- ɬɟɥɶɧɨɫɬɢ ɉɨɞɝɨɬɨɜɢɬɟɥɶɧɨɣ ɤɨɦɢɫɫɢɢ Ɉɪɝɚɧɢɡɚɰɢɢ ɩɨ ȾȼɁəɂ” (Reference note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation “On the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO”), 25 January, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/regprla/-/asset_publisher/ YCx- LFJnKuD1W/content/id/2344409. 101 “Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɫɟɝɦɟɧɬ Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɣ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɵ ɦɨɧɢɬɨɪɢɧɝɚ (ɆɋɆ) ɜ ɪɚɦɤɚɯ ȾȼɁəɂ” (Reference note of the Permanent mission of the Russian Federation to the international organizations in Vienna “Russian segment of the CTBT International Monitoring System”), http://rusmission.org/6/1/70. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 99 tinuing collaboration within the NPT regime. That was the time when neither the domestic affairs of the NPT member states nor the global geostrategic environment created such problems for the strategic dialogue of states parties to the NPT, which could not be settled through a careful search for compromise. On May 31, 2003, U.S. president George W. Bush announced the launch of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and on September 4, 2003, at the first international meeting of the PSI, the Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles was endorsed by the eleven participating states. Washington presented the PSI as “an innovation in the fight against the proliferation of WMD” and as “a prototype for other nonproliferation efforts.”102 On September 23, 2003, President George W. Bush in his speech to the UN General Assembly stated, “Because proliferators will use any route or channel that is open to them, we need the broadest possible cooperation to stop them. Today, I ask the UN Security Council to adopt a new anti-proliferation resolution. This resolution should call on all members of the UN to criminalize the proliferation of weapons – weapons of mass destruction, to enact strict export controls consistent with international standards, and to secure any and all sensitive materials within their own borders. The United States stands ready to help any nation draft these new laws, and to assist in their enforcement.”103 Although the PSI was an informal arrangement with voluntary membership and PSI members stated their intention to “seek to involve ‘in some capacity’ all states that are able and willing to take measures to stop the flow of proliferation-related items,” the U.S. pressured some states including China and India to join the PSI.104 China, India, Russia and some other states had concerns about the legality and legitimacy of the PSI and also saw it as inter- fering with national sovereignty. However, Russia joined the PSI after Mos- cow’s concerns about the legality of that arrangement were allayed. The first year after the PSI initiative was launched, Russia was involved in the PSI’s activities both on the political and operational levels,105 but Moscow attempted to maintain a low profile during the subsequent years.106 In April 2004, the UN Security Council was discussing a resolution aimed at preventing the spread of WMD, their means of delivery and related technologies to non-state actors. In September 2003, American president George W. Bush placed the initiative for that resolution in the context of the PSI. Russia and China were concerned that the U.S. initiative for the resolution in the case of its adoption in the form suggested by the U.S. would create a legal basis for interdictions in the context of the PSI. Moreover, the proposed resolution was to be the next step in criminalizing the proliferation of WMD and placed that issue in the context of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which in the end could have resulted in the creation of a legal basis for the use of military force against states of proliferation concern and, therefore,

102 O. Meier, “Non-cooperative arms control” in Arms Control in the 21st century: between coercion and cooperation, ed. Ch. Daase and O. Meier (Routledge, 2013), 42. 103 President Bush Addresses United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 2003, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030923-4.html. 104 O. Meier, “Non-cooperative arms control”, 42. 105 A. Kaliadine, “The Challenges of the Proliferation Security Initiative”, 44–48. 106 O. Meier, “Non-cooperative arms control”, 42. 100 A. Malygina could legitimize military interventions under the umbrella of nonproliferation efforts. Russia expressed its criticism and clearly articulated its concerns, which were taken into account by the members of the UN Security Council. In UNSC Resolution 1540 adopted on April 28, 2004, reference to the PSI was considerably weakened and the focus of the resolution was shifted to the national implementation of arms control and disarmament obligations. UNSC Resolution 1540 required states to adopt effective laws and improve domestic controls so that access of non-state actors to WMD-related materials and technology was prevented.107 Defending its interests, Russia was able to find support among other concerned states and managed to change the framework for the decision of the UN Security Council. That was a considerable achievement for Russian nonproliferation diplomacy, which proved that Rus- sia was willing to play an active role in setting the terms for the global nonproliferation agenda.

The Russian nuclear nonproliferation policy in the 21 century

Sergey Lavrov got the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 2004. He started his diplomatic career in 1972 and was among those young professionals who prepared Mikhail Gorbachev`s keynote speeches which defined the policy of New Thinking. He became Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs after spending ten years in New York as Russia’s permanent representative to the United Nations. Before Lavrov took up his post in the permanent mission of Russia to the United Nations, he served as a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for two years. Lavrov is one of the most popular and noticeable figures among Russian ministers. He is famous for his sharp mind, long-lasting working capacity, good sense of humor, and imposing appearance. As Foreign Minister, Lavrov has played a decisive role in shaping the new image of the Russian MFA. Lavrov himself, his deputies, and senior diplomats regularly meet NGOs to discuss existing issues of international security and arms control. Lavrov hosted his first meeting with Russian NGOs in 2004. Since then such meetings are held regularly, and the transcripts of the discussions are published on the official website of the Russian MFA.108 Issues of nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control are always

107 O. Meier, Non-cooperative arms control, 46. 108 Transcript of the annual meeting of Foreign Minister Lavrov with NGOs in 2018, http://www.mid.ru/press_service/minister_speeches/- /asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/3260122?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_7OvQR5KJ WVmR&_101_INSTANCE_7OvQR5KJWVmR_languageId=en_GB; Transcript of the annual meeting of Foreign Minister Lavrov with NGOs in 2017, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2694280? p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=e n_GB; Transcript of the annual meeting of Foreign Minister Lavrov with NGOs in 2016, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2298815? p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=e n_GB; Transcript of the annual meeting of Foreign Minister Lavrov with NGOs in 2015, https://gorchakovfund.ru/news/view/vystuplenie-sergeya-lavrova-na-vstreche-s-predstavitelyami- Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 101 in the agenda of such annual meetings. Understanding the importance of public diplomacy, Lavrov and his deputies use every opportunity to talk to influential international non-governmental organizations109 and academia.110 In the early 2000s, diplomats from the Russian MFA were regular guests at workshops and conferences hosted by PIR-Center.111 Lavrov and his deputies participate annually in the meetings of the Valdai Discussion Club established in 2004112 and the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference113 held biennially since 2010. Lavrov regularly speaks at the Moscow conference on international security114 hosted by the Russian Ministry of Defense. After New START was signed, in spring 2010 Deputy Minister Anatoli Antonov together with his American counterpart, Rose Goettemoeller, briefed the Russian expert community on how negotiations were held and what would be the next steps after the treaty entered into force. In 2012, Antonov published a book where he presented Moscow’s understanding of the history and future of arms con- rossiyskikh-nko/; Transcript of the annual meeting of Foreign Minister Lavrov with NGOs in 2014, https://www.rusemb.org.uk/foreignpolicy/1907/. 109 P. Jenkins, The INF Affair And Nuclear Arms Control Prospects, February 28, 2019, https://lobelog.com/the-inf-affair-and-nuclear-arms-control-prospects/; Press release of the Min- istry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation “On the meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov with the leaders of the Pugwash Movement of Scientists” (in Russian), January 28, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/ru/rossia-nepravitel-stvennye-organizacii-i-oon/- /asset_publisher/aLRfN6MT9msV/content/id/3486559; Press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation “On the meeting of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Ryabkov with the leaders of the Pugwash Movement of Scientists” (in Russian), January 28, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/ru/rossia-nepravitel-stvennye-organizacii-i-oon/- /asset_publisher/aLRfN6MT9msV/content/id/3484848. 110 Speech of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey A. Ryabkov at MGIMO (University) of MFA of Russia at the conference of the Russian Council on Interna- tional Affairs “Nuclear disarmament and international security in the 21st Century”, November 8, 2012, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/obsie-voprosy-mezdunarodnoj-bezopasnosti-i-kontrola- nad-vooruzeniami/-/asset_publisher/6sN03cZTYZOC/content/id/ 135618. 111 International conference hosted by PIR-Center “Multilateral approaches towards nuclear disarmament: the next steps”, June 3, 2009, http://www.pircenter.org/en/events/1774- international-conference-multilateral-approaches-towards-nuclear-disarmament-the-next-steps. 112ɋ. Ɋɹɛɤɨɜ: ȼɵɯɨɞɋɒȺɢɡɫɞɟɥɤɢɫɂɪɚɧɨɦɧɚɧɟɫɟɬɜɪɟɞɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ (S. Ryab- kov: The U.S. withdrawal from the deal with Iran will undermine security”), Valdai Discussion Club, May 15, 2018, http://ru.valdaiclub.com/about/media/ryabkov-vykhod-ssha-iz-sdelki-s- iranom/. 113 Interview of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.A. Ryabkov to the Inter- fax agency, September 6, 2012, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/us/- /asset_publisher/unVXBbj4Z6e8/content/id/144802; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, October 20, 2017, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2913751? p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=e n_GB. 114 Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the Third Moscow Interna- tional Security Conference, May 23, 2014, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/59058; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s address at the Fifth Moscow Conference on International Security, April 27, 2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/ 2256120; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at the Sixth Moscow Conference on Inter- national Security, April 26, 2017, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2737799; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at the Seventh Moscow Conference on International Security, April 5, 2018, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/ content/id/3153953. 102 A. Malygina trol, disarmament, and nonproliferation.115 It was the first time in Russia’s modern history when an MFA official expressed his views on different aspects of the NPT regime and discussed them comprehensively in a book. Dur- ing the previous two decades, senior Russian MFA officials did not pay so much attention to the NPT regime in their publications. A significant detail was that one sixth of the book was dedicated to the threat of weaponization of outer space and the need to prevent an arms race in outer space, which demonstrated that Russia was revitalizing the ideas that had matured in the 1980s and which were to some extent forgotten during the 1990s. Moscow started to demonstrate that it was seriously concerned about the prospects for strategic stability and the sustainability of the NPT regime, which in Mos- cow’s eyes were interconnected issues. After the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iranian nuclear deal, was adopted in 2015, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov briefed Russian researchers, experts, and foreign diplomats at a meeting hosted by the Center for Energy and Security Studies. In his answers to the questions from the audience Ryabkov explained how Russia evaluated the results of the negotiations with Iran, what practical steps should be expected regarding the implementation of the deal and how the provisions of the JCPOA corresponded to Russian national interests. The transcript of the discussion was published on the official website of the Russian MFA.116 Since 2004, senior Russian MFA officials have often given interviews to Russian and foreign mass media to present Russia’s position on the topical issues of nonproliferation, disarmament and nuclear arms control.117 In the 2010s, the Russian MFA started to translate into English key texts on its official website. Since 2013, all key documents on the official website of the Russian MFA have been translated into English, French, Spanish and Ger- man. On 5 March 2020, the three NPT depository governments (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the NPT entry into force by publishing declassified documents related to the negotiations of the Treaty. Russian segment of this project was posted on the official website of the MFA of Russia in the form of the brochure which included short introductory notes in Russian and Eng- lish, archival photos and scanned copies of documents with handwritten notes of the Soviet officials involved in the negotiations.118

115 Ⱥ. Ⱥɧɬɨɧɨɜ, Ʉɨɧɬɪɨɥɶ ɧɚɞ ɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹɦɢ: ɢɫɬɨɪɢɹ, ɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɟ, ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɵ (A. Antonov, Arms Control: History, State of Affairs, Perspectives) (Moscow: ROSSPEN, PIR- Center, 2012). 116 The Transcript of the meeting at the Center for energy and security studies with the participation of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S. A. Ryabkov “The Vienna agreements on the Iranian nuclear program: the role of Russia and the perspectives for realization” (in Russian), August 14, 2015, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/ interna- tional_safety/regprla/-/asset_publisher/YCxLFJnKuD1W/content/id/1671196. 117 Article by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, The Washington Times, March 23, 2012, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/obsie-voprosy-mezdunarodnoj-bezopasnosti-i-kontrola- nad-vooruzeniami/-/asset_publisher/6sN03cZTYZOC/content/id/163712. 118 Press release on the publication of materials related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, March 5, 2020, www.mid.ru/ru/adernoe- nerasprostranenie/-/asset_publisher/JrcRGi5UdnBO/content/id/4072068. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 103

By the beginning of the 21st century, Russia had accumulated profound experience of productive cooperation with the U.S. within the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (the so-called Nunn-Lugar Program). Substantial results had been achieved within the format of G8 nonproliferation initiatives launched in the early 2000s. Moscow seriously considered the bitter lessons of the global economic crisis of 1998 and used that experience to mitigate the negative consequences of the financial crisis of 2008. As Russia was more weakly integrated into the global economy than the U.S. and the states of the Western Europe, it suffered less from the global crisis, which forced the West to reconsider its strategic priorities and adopt an austerity approach in all kind of spending. The negative trends in the global economy created a situation when the donors of the G8 Global Partnership Program had to postpone the realization of some financial commitments. Some disarmament projects in Russia, which depended on external aid, faced the risk of significant delay. In 2012 and 2013, the Russian MFA had to put much effort in securing the sustainability of those projects and negotiated revised timelines for the supply of financial support with the G8. That situation demonstrated that in critical circumstances of budget austerity the West would focus on short-term priorities of solving domestic problems and would postpone the long-term arrangements with Russia. Moscow realized that the mantra of the 1990s “the West will not let us down” and “there will be financial support from abroad” did not work. Although at the end of the first decade of the 21 century Russia was sometimes close to confrontation with the West, a significant part of the Russian political elite still expected that the financial assistance from the West would be unchangeably stable. Thus, the unexpected breaks in the flow of financial assistance needed for finalizing Russia’s disarmament projects caused emotions of disappointment and frustration among part of Rus- sia’s political elite. Ten years after the NPT was extended for an indefinite time, Russia had a clearer vision of its national interests in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Russia no longer wanted to follow the U.S. and revised its expectations toward strategic partnership with the West. This shift in Russia’s understanding of its place and role in international relations, including the nuclear nonproliferation regime, was reflected in the new edition of the Foreign Policy Con- cept of the Russian Federation published in 2008 that stated: “International developments in the field of international relations at the beginning of the 21st century and the strengthening of Russia have required reassessment of the overall situation around Russia, a rethinking of the priorities of Russian foreign policy with due account for the increased role of the country in international affairs, its greater responsibility for global developments and related possibilities to participate in the implementation of the international agenda, as well as in its development. As regards the international situation, along with a positive trend, i.e. the strengthening of the positions of the Russian Federation in international affairs, negative trends emerged that are to be considered in conducting foreign policy of Russia in specific areas.”119 In the Foreign Policy Concept 2008, the sustainability of the NPT regime was for the first time in the history of modern Russia addressed in

119 The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, January 12, 2008, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116. 104 A. Malygina the broader context of nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control. The section of the Foreign Policy Concept on arms control and disarmament diplomacy was unprecedently detailed and comprehensive. Russia has changed its narrow practical approach to a more holistic one. Under the conditions of turbulence and multipolarity, Russia saw a need for ensuring the universalization of earlier established agreements and the involvement of China, the UK and France into a substantial discussion about further nuclear reductions. Russia continued calling for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, suggested universalizing obligations under the INF Treaty and did not yet give up the idea of establishing a global missile nonproliferation regime on the basis of a legally binding agreement. From 2008, Russia extended its efforts aimed at reestablishing partnership relations with the countries of Latin America, Middle East and Southeast Asia. In terms of the NPT regime, it meant that Moscow activated its efforts as a player who pro- tects the principles of international law from revisionism or sophistic mis- interpretations. Moscow believed that it could succeed in gathering support from other members of the international community who were similarly concerned about the possible negative consequences of unilateralism and departure from cooperative diplomacy. In the 2000s, the dynamics of world prices for oil and gas, which Russia traditionally exported, played in favor of the Russian economy and allowed Russia to invest in social, economic and administrative reforms which enabled Moscow to try to convert Russia’s profound intellectual and technical potential into political influence within the NPT regime. For instance, keeping basic principles of its foreign policy unchanged, the Russian MFA tested different approaches in cooperation with NGOs, exploited extensively the format of track II diplomacy and coordinated its IAEA related policy with the Russian nuclear energy corporation, Rosatom. During the first decade of the 21st century, Russia was trying to balance between confrontation and cooperation with the West. The tendencies of coercive counter-proliferation in U.S. foreign policy were not as strong as they later became, and Russia believed that in being part of the U.S.-led nonproliferation arrangements Moscow had a greater opportunity to frame the rules and practices through facilitating multilateral inclusive activities and gathering support from other members of the international community who were similarly concerned about the possible negative consequences of unilateralism and departure from cooperative diplomacy in WMD nonproliferation. In Moscow’s eyes, it was vitally important to facilitate the search for innovative solutions, enforce such traditional elements of the NPT regime as the IAEA safeguard system, negative security assurances, and zones free of nuclear weapons, but also to prevent new disruptive precedents in international law or diplomatic practices. Russia continued joint efforts in facilitating a dialogue on the Iranian nuclear program and was involved in the search for a solution to the security problems on the Korean peninsula. Moscow was also proactive in the negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and suggested proposals for the NPT Review conferences in 2005, 2010 and 2015. Russia continued to be part of the Proliferation Security Initiative and supported the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership launched by the U.S. in February 2006. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 105

Moscow took part in all P5 conferences convened regularly since 2009 and participated in the Nuclear Security Summit hosted by US president Barack Obama in 2010. Although in 2010 and 2012 Russia participated actively in Nuclear Secu- rity Summits, the Summits in 2014 and 2016 were held without Russia’s participation. The 2015 NPT Review Conference failed to adopt the Final Document because the U.S., the U.K. and Canada opposed the provisions on the Zone free of WMD in the Middle East (ME WMDFZ) to be included in the draft Final Document. The experience of Russia’s participation in the formats of the P5 Conference and Nuclear Security Summits showed that in cases of fundamental disagreements between Russia and the West regarding the architecture of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, China was be- having independently and pragmatically, not demonstrating readiness to support any Russian initiative by default. By that time, having dissociated itself from the West, Moscow had insufficient resources to build a solid coalition, which could counterbalance the trends promoted by Washington’s nonproliferation policy. By 2013, the bilateral formats of international collaboration between Russia and the West had outgrown the goals that led to the launch of such formats. Basic priorities in the sphere of safe nuclear arms reduction and in nuclear safety and security had been realized. Russia was interested in continuing international collaboration but was not ready to preserve the formats without meaningful content and without reciprocity. In 2013, Russia finished its cooperation in the Nunn-Lugar Program but expected that the experience and potential of that cooperation could be extended in order to address the outstanding issues of global nonproliferation and nuclear security.120 In 2015, Russia withdrew from the International Science and Technology Center. In 2016, Russian president Vladimir Putin set a moratorium on the US-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement. By 2013, both Russia and the West through informal channels of communication had assured each other of their readiness to continue collaboration. A new agenda for bilateral cooperation could have been agreed but the complex geopolitical circumstances turned the situation of bifurcation into a crisis. By 2014, the Russian leadership had reached dissatisfaction on how the U.S. and its allies among the leading European states respected Russia’s changed status and its right to secure its national interests in all aspects including military, foreign affairs, economic and public diplomacy.121 The Ukrainian Crisis did not let the parties reframe the agenda and find new formats for cooperation between Russia and the West. The crisis in Syria in combination with the confrontation relating to the crisis in Ukraine decreased the effectiveness of other multilateral nuclear nonproliferation activities, and

120 V. Dvorkin, “Brief comments on the expiring of the Nunn-Lugar Program” (In Russian), February 6, 2015, https://carnegie.ru/2015/02/06/ru-pub-58994. 121 Ⱦɨɤɥɚɞ “ɉɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɵ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɝɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɚ ɜ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɢ ɧɟɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚ- ɧɟɧɢɹɈɆɍɢ ɮɢɡɢɱɟɫɤɨɣɹɞɟɪɧɨɣɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ” (Report “The prospects for international cooperation in the field of WMD non-proliferation and nuclear security”) (PIR-Center, 2013), http://www.pircenter.org/articles/1567-doklad-pircentra-perspektivy-mezhdunarodnogo- sotrudnichestva-v-oblasti-nerasprostraneniya-omu-i-fyab. 106 A. Malygina since 2018 part of the Russian political elite has been talking about Russia’s geopolitical loneliness as a fait accompli.122 In the second decade of the 21st century the U.S. were still stuck in Iraq, Europe was busy solving its domestic problems, China and India together with other developing economies continued to demonstrate increasing independence in their behavior, and countries like Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela were openly challenging the U.S. in different domains.123 The events in Iraq after 2003 activated Moscow’s concerns formed during the international crises of the 1990s. The U.S.-led coalition operation in Libya in 2011 strengthened Russia’s conviction that to secure its national interests, Russia should be more proactive in its foreign policy and during times of turbulence should take responsibility for shaping the framework of the global international order. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2013 stated Russia's increased responsibility for setting the international agenda and shaping the system of international relations: “Fundamental and rapid changes not only create serious risks but also provide the Russian Federation with new opportunities. Russia pursues an independent foreign policy guided by its national interests and based on unconditional respect for international law.”124 The Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 kept the principles of nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control stated in 2008 almost unchanged. At the same time, the need for the high standards of nuclear safety and security, as well as the priorities of export control were restated. The speech given by Russian president Vladimir Putin at the Valdai Dis- cussion Club in 2017 demonstrated that Russia has reconsidered its experience of disarmament and arms control cooperation within bilateral and multilateral formats.125 Moscow has adopted the strategy of pragmatism in nuclear nonproliferation which is based on the following principles: 1) Progress towards lesser reliance on nuclear weapons must take into account all factors affecting strategic stability and security and not lead to new misbalances or unilateral security advantages; particular attention should be paid in this context to the potential impact of missile defense, new weap-

122ȼ. ɋɭɪɤɨɜ, “Ɉɞɢɧɨɱɟɫɬɜɨ ɩɨɥɭɤɪɨɜɤɢ” (V. Surkov, “The loneliness of the half- blood”), Rossia v globalnoi politike, April 9, 2018, https://globalaffairs.ru/global- processes/Odinochestvo-polukrovki-14-19477; Ⱥ. ɏɪɚɦɱɢɯɢɧ, “ɑɟɦɨɛɭɫɥɨɜɥɟɧɨɝɟɨɩɨɥɢɬɢ- ɱɟɫɤɨɟɨɞɢɧɨɱɟɫɬɜɨɊɨɫɫɢɢ” (A. Khramchikhin, “The reasons for Russia’s geopolitical loneliness”), Nezavisimoie voiennoie obozreniie, June 15, 2018, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2018-06- 15/3_1000_loneliness.html; Ⱦ. Ɍɪɟɧɢɧ, “Ʉɨɧɬɭɪɧɚɹɤɚɪɬɚɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɝɟɨɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɢ: ɜɨɡɦɨɠ- ɧɚɹɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɹɆɨɫɤɜɵɜȻɨɥɶɲɨɣȿɜɪɚɡɢɢ” (D. Trenin, “Outline map of Russian geopolitics: a possible strategy of Moscow in the Big Eurasia”), Moscow Carnegie Center, February 11, 2019, https://carnegie.ru/2019/02/11/ru-pub-78328 ; Ⱥ. Ȼɚɭɧɨɜ, Ⱦ. Ɍɪɟɧɢɧ, Ⱥ. Ʉɨɪɬɭɧɨɜ. “Ɉɞɢɧɨɱɟ- ɫɬɜɨɫɭɜɟɪɟɧɚ: Ʉɚɤɨɣɛɭɞɟɬɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɚɹɜɧɟɲɧɹɹɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɚ” (A. Baunov, D. Trenin, A. Kor- tunov, “The loneliness of the sovereign: future configuration of Russian foreign policy”), April 17, 2019, Podcust of Moscow Carnegie Center, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78913; 123 A. Arbatov, Interview given to the editor, Mezhdunarodniie processy (2007). 124 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, February 18, 2013, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/ id/122186?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_CptICkB6BZ29&_101_INSTANCE_CptICkB6BZ29_lang uageId=en_GB. 125 V. Putin, Keynote speech and Q&A session at the Valdai Discussion Club, October 19, 2017, kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882. Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 107 ons technologies and new potential theaters of the arms race, such as in Outer Space. 2) Political relations between major powers must be based on reciprocity, international law and the principles of the UN charter. 3) A responsible attitude to earlier concluded arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation agreements is fundamentally important. 4) There is a need to restore and improve genuine dialogue and reinvent the art and knowhow of a common search for security solutions. After the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Russia continued facilitating dialogue between the Arab States and persistently resisted any attempts to move the issue of ME WMDFZ out from the scope of the NPT Review Con- ference - 2020. The Russian MFA has put much effort in preserving the impartial, depoliticized, technically justified nature of the IAEA system of safeguards. After Washington’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Russia continued dialogue with European states and Iran aimed at securing a deal. Moscow continued dialogue with North Korea and South Korea. Moscow insisted that the responsible behavior of Tehran and Pyongy- ang and their consistency in the implementation of previously reached agreements should be respected and rewarded through different measures, including the easing of sanctions. Russia continued implementation of the UN Secu- rity Council resolutions but looked for opportunities to extend humanitarian and trade cooperation with Iran and North Korea. In spring 2020, the prospects for the NPT Review conference which was postponed until 2021 because of the global coronavirus pandemic were more than just pessimistic with a bleak outlook for further steps toward nuclear disarmament. The nuclear nonproliferation architecture faced a severe crisis due to the reemergence of great power rivalries and deterioration of the system of bilateral U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control.

Conclusion

For the first five years, Russia considered its role in the WMD regimes narrowly and without long-standing ambitions. During this period, Russia did not see itself as a global player in the nuclear nonproliferation regime in terms of influencing the architecture of the regime but recognized its exclusive responsibility for the sustainability of the regime as the state that inherited from the U.S.S.R. one of the largest nuclear arsenals. Moscow interpreted the priorities of the nuclear nonproliferation policy in terms of preventing the emergence of nuclear weapons in the regions bordering Russia and in terms of continuing the reductions in its nuclear arsenal. Russia wanted to become an integral part of the Western community, was a recipient of extensive financial and technical assistance and tried to be as cooperative and easygoing as possible. By the end of the 1990s, Russia realized that it should use the intellectual wealth and reputation of the Soviet diplomatic tradition wisely and pragmatically. Due to routine interaction within the framework of Soviet-American bilateral negotiations, a unique culture of diplomatic work was formed, im- plying the ability to listen to each other, and to recognize the differences in 108 A. Malygina the perception of threats to national security. Soviet and American diplomats were able to reach a number of important bilateral agreements on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. These agreements were the only concrete achievements in the spirit of article VI of the NPT. During the Cold War, France, Great Britain, and China did not take any practical steps towards limiting their nuclear arsenals. As part of the Soviet-American agreements on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, a set of verification procedures, as well as transparency and confidence building measures, were developed. Moscow and Washington made significant efforts to develop national means of technical control over compliance with the agreements reached. This experience was useful for developing verification mechanisms for international disarmament agreements such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996). The terminology that describes the components of strategic nuclear forces, the understanding of factors affecting strategic stability, the approaches to reducing nuclear threats – these results of joint Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons have been the subject of careful study for other nuclear powers, including those states who are not parties to the NPT. Moreover, the profound experience and solid reputation of the former Soviet diplomatic school happened to be extremely helpful when the international community started negotiating with the regional powers in the Middle East and Asia on the possible extension of the NPT for an indefinite time period and made attempts to facilitate the establishment of new zones free of nuclear weapons. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, when all political and economic connections were rapidly collapsing, Russia had to do as soon as possible what no other state in the world had done before. First, control over the nuclear arsenal was secured. It was necessary, in cooperation with other states who were party to the NPT, to minimize the damage to the nuclear nonproliferation regime caused by the disintegration of a large geopolitical player and one of the two nuclear superpowers. Secondly, relatively quickly, Moscow managed to reach agreement with other former Soviet republics on how the nuclear forces deployed on the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine would be withdrawn. In order to secure the agreements reached during the Cold War it was necessary to establish international cooperation with the countries of the West and with the newly independent states in order to adapt nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agreements to the changed geopolitical circumstances. Thirdly, the NPT Review and Extension Conference occurred 3.5 years after the U.S.S.R. legally ceased to exist. In order to ensure the universality and sustainability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, nuclear-weapon states who were party to the NPT had to demonstrate success in all three dimensions of the NPT regime (peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nonproliferation, disarmament). It was important for Russia to provide political and economic support to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine who made the decision to join the NPT in the status of non-nuclear-weapon states. Together with its Western partners, Russia managed to protect the nuclear nonproliferation regime from unbearable shocks. Fourthly, torn by domestic problems of a political, social and economic nature, Russia was able to continue the implementation of its obligations under the NPT. An unprecedented reduction Russia in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 109 in nuclear arsenals was carried out, the system of national nuclear export control was reformed, and measures were taken to raise nuclear security and safety standards. At the same time, in the economic sphere, Moscow sought to secure national economic interests, stop the brain drain, and preserve the unique scientific and technical potential of the country in the realm of nuclear technologies. These considerations defined how Russia articulated its national interests within the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Russia has come a long way, starting from being the recipient of foreign aid and finishing as a donor and a co-sponsor of multilateral initiatives designed to strengthen the NPT. Fifthly, Moscow moved from a romanticized view of allied relations with the West to a pragmatic attitude toward participation in a multilateral nuclear nonproliferation regime. Russia took an active part in the search for solutions to the security crisis on the Korean peninsula. Russia played a proactive role in resolving the crisis around the Iranian nuclear program. As soon as the most acute domestic problems were resolved, Moscow began to make attempts to influence the developments in the architecture of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Moscow took upon itself the task of mitigating the negative tendencies, which contradicted Russia’s national interests. In the realm of nuclear nonproliferation, Moscow continues to implement consistently the principles formulated in the 1990s: 1) Arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation are essential elements of global security architecture. Therefore, a responsible attitude to earlier concluded arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation agreements is fundamentally important. 2) A departure from the rule of reciprocity, norms of international law and the principles of the UN charter may shake the very basis of the world order and, as a consequence, may result in further deterioration of the whole system of WMD nonproliferation. 3) Further steps towards nuclear disarmament must be consistent, progressive and gradual. 4) The progress toward lesser reliance on nuclear weapons must take into account all factors affecting strategic stability and not lead to new misbalances or unilateral security advantages. 5) Russia-U.S. nuclear arms control is a corner stone of global strategic stability and the foundation of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. 6) Any attempts to adapt the NPT regime to the changing geopolitical context should be made through an inclusive dialogue when the national interests and security concerns of the corresponding nations are taken into consideration. The pragmatism of Russia’s policy is based on the following principles: – Moscow is not afraid to disagree with other players in the international arena but is open to cooperative search for mutually beneficial solutions. – Before acting, Moscow sends signals, expresses concern and informs. If the messages are ignored, it acts as promised. – As a big player who has interests in regions from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the Arctic to the Antarctic, Moscow does not rely on one partner but proactively develops strategic partnerships with different players. 110 A. Malygina

Thus, Russia’s nonproliferation policy relates directly to Russia’s understanding of its place and role in the world. Moscow regards the NPT regime in the broader context of nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control, which Moscow considers as essential elements of the global world order. The effectiveness of the NPT regime depends, as viewed by Moscow, on the sustainability of the U.S.-Russia strategic dialogue on the broad spectrum of issues including disarmament, strategic nuclear arms limitation and reduction, WMD nonproliferation, and the prevention and resolution of the most dangerous regional conflicts. The concept of multipolarity has become the be- loved child of Russian foreign policy and is regarded as an alternative to U.S. hegemony. The idea of a common search for security solutions has been in- strumentalized by Russia in many formats including negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and fissile material cut-off; fostering the creation of new zones free of nuclear weapons; facilitating agreement on JCPOA; set- tling crises in Syria and the Korean peninsula. However, having disentangled itself from the dream of an exclusive strategic partnership with the West, Moscow accumulated insufficient resources, tools and influence to build a solid international coalition, which could counterbalance the trends defined by Washington’s nonproliferation policy of unilateralism and coercive diplomacy. 2 Why does Russia not support the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons?

Ekaterina Mikhaylenko

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), or the Nu- clear Weapon Ban Treaty, opened for signature at the United Nations on 20 September 2017. The speed with which the text was passed is astonishing. The adoption of this treaty attests to the existing split within the nuclear nonproliferation regime between nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear- weapon states (NNWS). While some states, primarily those that do not possess nuclear weapons, believe that these new norms would enhance the regime, others, primarily the NWS, see the treaty as potentially destabilizing for the regime. Eighty-one countries signed and 36 countries ratified the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty,1 whereas the treaty’s entry into force requires ratification by 50 signatory states. Russia considers the nuclear ban initiative to be ill-timed and believes that efforts ought to be aimed instead at strengthening the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime and eliminating the “grey” zones, such as CTBT ratification, creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East, etc. In his remarks at the 2017 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that those “who initiated the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in fact took the path of ignoring the real threats to strategic stability and security <…> The establishment of a second, parallel non-proliferation regime must not be allowed <…>.”2 The academic and expert community is actively debating the role of the TPNW in the global nonproliferation regime and its effect on the NPT and the policies of the NWS. Numerous publications that emerged in the course of 2017 and 2018 highlighted the importance and relevance of the TPNW and discussed how it affected the normative field of the nonproliferation regime.3 The Russian research discourse mainly focuses on the treaty as a challenge to

1 “Signature and ratification Status”, ICAN, accessed February 20, 2020, https://www. icanw.org/signature_and_ratification_status 2 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media questions at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, 20 October 2017, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federa- tion”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/video/-/asset_publisher/i6t41cq3VWP6/content/ id/2913751. 3 See, for instance, Ray Acheson, “The nuclear ban and the patriarchy: a feminist analysis of opposition to prohibiting nuclear weapons”, Critical Studies on Security, no. 7 (2019): 78-82, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2018.1468127; John, Borrie, Michael Spies and Wilfred Wan, “Obstacles to understanding the emergence and significance of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons”, Global Change, Peace and Security, no. 30 (2018): 95-119, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/14781158.2018.1467394; Laura Considine, “The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the question of nuclear meaning”, Critical Studies on Security, no. 7 (2019): 87-90, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2018.1468131; Kjølv Egeland, “Introduction: the nuclear ban treaty as negation of negation”, Critical Studies on Security, no. 7 (2019): 69-72, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/21624887.2018.1468102; Harald Müller, “The Future of the Non-proliferation Treaty” in International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non- proliferation–60 Years of IAEA and EURATOM, ed. by Luciano Maiani et al. (Berlin: Springer Proceedings in Physics, 2018), 139-147, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-57366-2_22. 112 E. Mikhaylenko the nonproliferation regime.4 There are scholars who are trying to assess the prospects of this treaty entering into force and estimate its effects on the nonproliferation regime as a whole.5 Nevertheless, most Russian experts share the view that even if the TPNW enters into force, it will not work. There are many reasons for this skepticism: not a single nuclear-weapon state or NATO member state signed it; the treaty lacks an implementation mechanism for nuclear disarmament, etc. In the meantime, its adoption may render further negotiations within the NPT more problematic and conflict-ridden. One can identify three stages in the evolution of the Russian diplomatic discourse regarding the TPNW. Before the treaty opened for signature and during the first six months after the United Nations vote, the position of the Russian MFA was unequivocally negative.6 The main argument against the treaty was that it would undermine the NPT regime. Up until February 2018, when the United States adopted their new nuclear strategy, the Russian MFA officials spoke about the TPNW as “controversial by nature” and “prepared in a hasty manner.”7 Starting from mid-2018, after the U.S. Nuclear Posture

4 See, for instance, Andrei Baklitsky, “A Safe Treaty: How the UN Member States Are Try- ing to Ban Nuclear Weapons” [in Russian], RBK, 10 July 2017, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.rbc.ru/opinions/politics/10/07/2017/596331a09a7947283d8458d5; Vladimir Orlov, “The Glass Menagerie of Non-Proliferation”, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 3 (2015), accessed June 9, 2029, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Glass-Menagerie-of-Non-Proliferation- 17708; Bruno Tertrais, “Advancing the Disarmament Debate: Common Ground and Open Ques- tions” in Abolishing Nuclear Weapons. A Debate, ed. By George Perkovich and James M. Acton (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), 179-186. 5 Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, “Entry into Force of the Nuclear Weapons Convention May Take Years” [in Russian], PIR-Center, accessed May 10, 2019, http://pircenter.org/articles/2106-na- vstuplenie-v-silu-konvencii-o-zapreschenii-yadernogo-oruzhiya-mogut-ujti-gody; Tim Caughley and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: Nuts and Bolts of the Ban (UNIDIR, 2017), accessed May 10, 2019, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/nuts-and- bolts-en-684.pdf; Peter Meyer and Nick Ritchie, The NPT and the Prohibition Negotiations: Scope for Bridge Building (UNIDIR, 2017), accessed May 10, 2019, http://www.unidir. org/files/ publications/pdfs/the-npt-and-the-prohibition-negotiation-en-682.pdf; Gaukhar Mukhatzhano-va, “The Nu- clear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: Negotiations and Beyond // Arms Control Association, Arms Con- trol Association, September (2017), accessed May 10, 2019, https:// www.armscontrol. org/act/2017- 09/features/nuclear-weapons-prohibition-treaty-negotiations-beyond. 6 See, for instance, “Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Foreign Ministry De- part-ment for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control and Representative of the Russian Federation at the First Committee of the 71st Session of the UNGA, within the General Debate, New York, October 4, 2016”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/general_assembly/-/asset_publisher/lrzZMhfoyRUj/content/ id/2488843; “Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control and Representative of the Russian Federation at the First Committee of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly, within the General Debate”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid. ru/web/guest/general_assembly/-/asset_publisher/lrzZMhfoyRUj/content/id/2887054. 7 “Statement by Alexey Karpov, Deputy Head of the Russian delegation and Deputy Per- manent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organisations in Vienna, at the 49th session of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), Vienna, November 13, 2017”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/vistupleniya_ rukovod- stva_mid/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/2963218; “Statement by the Delega- tion of the Russian Federation on nuclear disarmament at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, April 26, 2018”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/ news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3195373. Why does Russia not support the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons? 113

Review8 and especially after the U.S. statements about withdrawing from the INF Treaty, the topic of the TPNW took the back seat. What became more and more frequent were the statements acknowledging the importance of building a world free of nuclear weapons, but emphasizing that, given that U.S. policies are undermining international stability, Russia cannot give up its nuclear arsenal.9 The goal of this chapter is to trace the evolution of Russia’s position concerning the TPNW. In the first section, we shall examine how the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons came to be. Then we shall analyze its strengths and weaknesses. The third section will focus on why Russia refuses to sign the TPNW. Finally, we shall consider the problems associated with Russia’s non-participation in discussions of the TPNW and related issues.

Formation of the nuclear weapons ban regime

The idea of banning nuclear weapons is not new, and one can identify several stages in the evolution of approaches to banning/eliminating nuclear weapons after the Cold War. In the 1970-80s, the anti-nuclear movement was rather strong both in the USA and in Europe and its goal was to preserve peace in the context of the Soviet-American standoff. After the end of the bloc confrontation, the activities of the anti-nuclear movement gradually sub- sided. The period from 1995 to 2005 can be considered the first stage. The crucial impetus to the emergence of the TPNW was provided by decisions adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC). In his 1999 article about the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Confer- ence, Vladimir Orlov notes that debates over the treaty’s extension clearly highlighted the conflict of values and the clash of interests.10 One of the serious questions at the conference was whether the NPT ought to be extended indefinitely. Orlov points out that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members actively opposed the indefinite extension, but later they split and a number of leading NAM countries, such as South Africa, Mexico and China, chose to support the indefinite extension after all. Prior to the NPTREC, NAM organized a conference in Bandung to formulate a common position. One of the reasons why countries were reluctant to extend the NPT unconditionally and indefinitely was the fact that NNWS were not satisfied with the

8 “US Nuclear Posture Review. February 2018”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, accessed May 10, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018- NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF. 9 “Statement by the Russian delegation in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on "Nuclear Weapons" cluster, New York, October 22, 2018”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/web/ guest/adernoe- nerasprostranenie/-/asset_publisher/JrcRGi5UdnBO/content/ id/3381378; “Inter-v'yu Direktora Departamenta po voprosam nerasprostraneniya i kontrolya nad vooruzheniyami V.I.Ermakova informacionnomu agentstvu "Interfaks", 12 fevralya 2019 goda” (Interfax inter-view with Direc- tor of Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, 12 February 2019), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www. mid.ru/web/guest/about/professional_holiday/news/-/asset_publisher/I5UF6lkPfgKO/content/id/ 3513588. 10 Vladimir Orlov, “The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: Distinctive Fea- tures, Results, and Lessons Learnt [in Russian]”, Naucnhye Zapiski, No. 11,1999. 114 E. Mikhaylenko pace and manner of further nuclear weapons reductions. In addition to the NAM states, Japan, Sweden, Austria, Ireland, and New Zealand also suggested adopting a strict timeframe of nuclear disarmament leading up to complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Different NNWS groups put forward their proposals and advocated the need to sign additional documents, besides the indefinite extension, to regulate further nuclear disarmament and measures for efficient NPT implementation. In the end, the conference adopted the legally binding decision to extend the NPT indefinitely based on article X.2. This decision was adopted without voting, by means of “practical consensus,” which caused debates and explains the dissatisfaction of some NNWS. The decision on unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT became the “triumph of NWS diplomacy.”11 The nuclear-weapon states ensured indefinite extension of the NPT without making concessions that would in- fringe on their national interests. Nevertheless, the conflict of values, namely the juxtaposition of universal human values and national interests, became a crucial starting point for a transnational advocacy network pursing the nuclear weapons ban. Jackie Cabasso, Executive Director of the Western State Legal Founda- tion and one of the founders of the Abolition-2000 initiative, argues that the decisions of the NPTREC became the starting point for resurgence of the anti-nuclear movement.12 In the mid-1990s, several projects were put forward, primarily by non-governmental organizations, to promote the liquidation of nuclear weapons. An appeal to eliminate nuclear weapons by 2000 was issued in April 1995.13 This was a joint initiative of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) and the International Coalition for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The latter consisted of the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms,14 the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Re- sponsibility (INES),15 the International Peace Bureau,16 and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW).17 In the same year, the government of Australia established the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.18 In 1998, the Middle Powers Initiative comprising eight international non-governmental groups was formed with the purpose of influencing the governments of non-nuclear-weapon states and “middle powers.”19 One of the crucial achievements of this NGO group was

11 Orlov, “The 1995 NPT Review”, 33. 12 Jackie Cabasso, “The Role of NGOs in promoting TPNW”, interviewed by Ekaterina Mikhaylenko, Geneva, 29 April, 2018, audio. 13 “Abolition 2000 - Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons”, accessed May 10, 2019, http://www.abolition2000.org/en/. 14 “International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms (IALANA)”, accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.ialana.info/. 15 “International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES)”, accessed May 10, 2019, http://inesglobal.net/. 16 “International Peace Bureau (IPB)”, accessed May 10, 2019, http://www.ipb.org/. 17 “International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)”, accessed May 10, 2019, http://www.ippnw.org/. 18 “Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”, accessed May 10, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20071010003458/http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html. 19 “Middle Power Initiative”, accessed May 10, 2019, http://www.middlepowers. org/history-achievements/. Why does Russia not support the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons? 115 their participation in developing the “13 Practical Steps” at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In June 1998, the foreign ministers of New Zealand, Brazil, Egypt, Ire- land, Mexico, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden decided to unite their efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation within the New Agenda Coalition.20 On 12 January 1999 the Coalition submitted a draft resolution “A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda” that gained the overwhelming support at the UN General Assembly. With the exception of China who chose to abstain, all the NWS, as well as Israel, India and Pakistan voted against. The United States, UK and France opposed the resolution because it threatened the nuclear deterrence policy. Acting through ministerial meetings, the New Agenda Coalition took an active part in the NPT Review Conferences and drafted working papers and resolutions on disarmament and future nuclear-free world. The period from 2005 to 2016 was the second stage. The failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference to adopt the final document was a turning point. NNWS further intensified their activities and some of them started to support and finance anti-nuclear NGOs. In October 2005, 28 states announced the establishment of the Article VI Forum21 at the United Nations to study the legal, technical and political aspects of creating a world without nuclear weapons. The Middle Powers Initiative provided financial support to the Forum. Ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the Middle Powers Initiative drafted the working paper on disarmament. In 2007, the government of Australia started to support the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) that later turned into the moderator of a major transnational advocacy network comprising various NGOs and NNWS representatives. In 2008, the Global Zero movement was launched. It comprised over 100 political, civil and military leaders who announced the framework plan of nuclear weapons elimination, starting from major reductions of the U.S. and Russian arsenals. This action plan envisaged gradual nuclear disarmament and was supported by the Obama Administration. One can see the Nuclear Security Summits and conclusion of START III as major achievements of that period. By 2010, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement joined the anti-nuclear movement and contributed to the issues of humanitarian law becoming part of the anti-nuclear agenda. Some governments, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and various UN agencies and NGOs began joint work to review approaches to nuclear weapons. This new joint effort came to be known as the Humanitarian Initiative. In November 2011, the International Committee of the Red Cross adopted a resolution calling on all countries to engage in negotiations on “a

20 “New Agenda Coalition”, accessed May 10, 2019, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and- regimes/new-agenda-coalition/. 21 Under Article VI of the NPT “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” in Text of the NPT Treaty, UN, accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text. 116 E. Mikhaylenko legally-binding international agreement” that would ban and completely eliminate nuclear weapons.22 In May 2012, Switzerland, on behalf of 16 countries, presented the first document in a series of joint statements on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons, calling on all countries to “in- tensify their efforts to outlaw nuclear weapons and achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.”23 In March 2013, Norway hosted the first intergovernmental Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which brought together the representatives of 128 countries. Mexico hosted the second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, with representatives of 146 countries. It called on the international community to launch a diplomatic process to discuss a legally binding document that would ban nuclear weapons as a prerequisite for their subsequent liquidation. The third Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons took place in Vienna and brought together 158 countries. It ended with a promise to cooperate in efforts to “fill the legal gap” in the international regime regulating nuclear weapons. Within several months, the representatives of 127 countries approved the document that came to be known as the Hu- manitarian Pledge. The third stage began in 2016, when discussion of the treaty text started at the UN General Assembly. It was initially planned to conclude a nuclear weapons convention similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The initiative was supposed to come from the nuclear-weapon states and they were expected to take an active part in subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons. However, due to the unwillingness of NWS to engage in discussions on that issue, the emphasis shifted and it was suggested to discuss the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons initiated by the representatives of NNWS and NGOs. The open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament held meetings in Geneva in February, May and August 2016 to discuss the new legal measures to bring about a world free of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons were deemed necessary. In December 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted an important resolution on conven- ing a conference in 2017 to discuss “a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination.” In July 2017, the overwhelming majority of member states (122) voted at the UN headquarters in New York City for adoption of the landmark global agreement on the nuclear weapons ban officially known as the TPNW.24 On 20 September 2017, the TPNW opened for signature.

22 “International Committee of the Red Cross”, accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/resolution/council-delegates-resolution-1- 2011.htm. 23 “Joint Statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament by Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Holy See, Egypt, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zea- land, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland // First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, Reaching Critical Will, accessed May 10, 2019, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament- fora/npt/prepcom12/statements/2May_IHL.pdf. 24 “United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nu- clear Weapons, Leading Towards their Total Elimination. 16 February, 27-31 March, 15 June-7 July 2017”, UN, accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.un.org/disarmament/ptnw/index.html. Why does Russia not support the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons? 117

Thus, even though experts draw attention to the somewhat hasty process of TPNW adoption, one cannot claim that the idea of a nuclear weapons ban is new. The emergence of the TPNW idea was associated with problems of the NPT implementation and disappointment of NNWS in the pace of nuclear disarmament. Voting on the TPNW became possible owing to the efforts of the major anti- nuclear transnational advocacy network under the leadership of ICAN that managed to create conditions for the discussion of a nuclear weapons ban and mobi- lize a large number of supporters among NNWS and NGOs.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: pros and cons

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons became a landmark event for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In accordance with the UNGA procedures, a two-thirds majority is required to adopt a treaty text. In this case, 122 member states voted in favor, which demonstrated the mass support of the TPNW at the United Nations. Let us draw your attention to the fact that NWS were not involved in the negotiations process. NATO member states and states that have security agreements with the United States did not vote. The Netherlands was the only NATO member state that took part in the discussion, but they refused to vote in favor of the treaty. The TPNW was a crucial step towards outlawing nuclear weapons as the only weapons of mass destruction that are not banned yet. The TPNW is meant to fill the legal gap and stigmatize nuclear weapons. The treaty bans the development, testing, production, manufacturing, transfer, possession, stockpiling, and use or threat to use nuclear weapons, as well as the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of the TPNW member states (Article 1). A country possessing nuclear weapons can join the treaty if it agrees to destroy its nuclear weapons and delivery systems in accordance with “a legally binding, time-bound plan” (Article 4). In the same way, a country that has another state’s nuclear weapons on its territory can join if it agrees to withdraw them by a specified date. The text does not specify the timeframe or specific measures for disarmament, as they will be coordinated with the corresponding state when it joins the treaty. The TPNW became a crucial step in promoting humanitarian law and gender issues within the nuclear nonproliferation regime. According to the treaty provisions, the member states are to assist all victims of nuclear weapons use and testing and undertake measures for the “environmental remedia- tion” of contaminated areas (Article 6). The treaty preamble specifies that the damage inflicted by nuclear weapons has “a disproportionate impact” on women and girls, as well as indigenous peoples around the world. Therefore, the TPNW supplements the treaties banning biological and chemical weapons, anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, and rein- forces various other legal documents regulating nuclear weapons, including the NPT. It strengthens the normative component of the present-day nuclear nonproliferation regime, namely the global taboo on the use and possession of nuclear weapons. The treaty clearly states that the use of nuclear weapons contradicts the norms of international humanitarian law. 118 E. Mikhaylenko

What questions did the TPNW raise during discussion of the text and after its adoption? During the TPNW discussion, all countries involved noted that emergence of the treaty became possible due to the need to strengthen the NPT regime and the Article VI commitments. Nevertheless, serious disagreements arose during the negotiations process.25 One of the tricky issues was the international legal correlation between different treaties, such as the NPT and the TPNW. Indeed, the TPNW preamble mentions the NPT, and NAM representatives stated on multiple occasions that the TPNW is com- plementary to the NPT. However, the question is how these two regimes would function simultaneously. Article VIII of the TPNW envisages conven- ing a consultative meeting of its member states. So how will the interaction of countries within different institutions be organized? 26 Another issue is the clash between the terms “nuclear weapons ban” and “disarmament.” The former is not the same as the latter, despite the codified commitment to NPT Article VI. The TPNW lacks a provision on how the nuclear weapons ban will be accomplished and a description of the stage-by- stage disarmament process.27 Third, the states failed to agree on the need to include the provisions on IAEA safeguards into the treaty, namely the Additional Protocol.28 It was decided that verification of TPNW compliance will be carried out by the “competent international authority” to be established at the first meeting of the TPNW member states after the treaty enters into force. Fourth, due to the dispute between states on whether the treaty ought to include detailed provisions on the nuclear weapons test ban, the parties agreed on a simple reference to the ban on testing in the first article. At the same time, one should keep in mind that the CTBT does not cover subcritical experiments and computer simulations. According to researchers from the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (KazISS), Alimzhan Akhmetov and Timur Zhantikin, inclusion of the widest possible nuclear testing ban, including a ban on subcritical testing and computer simulations, would have strengthened the TPNW and would have allowed to supplement the CTBT provisions in a meaningful way.29 Fifth, the TPNW text did not include a number of crucial provisions, such as a ban on funding nuclear weapons research and a ban on nuclear weapons transit. Such a ban would cause discomfort to NWS and many countries supported it. However, according to KazISS researchers, in this case the

25 Mukhatzhanova, “The Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty”. 26 See, for instance, “Report of the Working Group to analyse the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, accessed May 12, 2019, https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/sicherheitspolitik/ 2018-bericht- arbeitsgruppe-uno-TPNW_en.pdf. 27 See, for instance, “Report of the Working Group to analyse the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”; “Review of the consequences for Norway of ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, Government.no, accessed May 12, 2019, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/review_tpnw/id2614520/#overall. 28 “Review of the consequences for Norway of ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”. 29 Alimzhan Akhmetov and Timur Zhantikin, “Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons — for and against”, Central Asia’s Affairs, no. 1 (2018): 29–39. Why does Russia not support the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons? 119 majority failed to overcome the resistance of the minority, i.e. such countries as Austria and Singapore. Sixth, the TPNW also does not ban military or other preparations for nuclear weapons use. For instance, it does not ban participation in planning a nuclear war, development of security doctrines justifying the use of nuclear weapons or the creation of alliances involving NWS. Finally, Article 18 of the TPNW stipulates that it “shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements,” but only if those “obligations are consistent with the Treaty.” This article made it impossible for NATO member states and countries that have security agreements with the USA to join the TPNW. Adoption of the TPNW is a crucial step in efforts to delegitimize nuclear weapons. It fills a problematic legal gap and, according to its advocates, strengthens the implementation of obligations under NPT Article VI. How- ever, failure to adopt a number of important provisions turned the treaty into a compromise and declarative document, rather than a strictly legally binding one. Almost two years after the UN voted on the TPNW, still none of the NWS signed it and a number of NNWS that were involved in discussion of the text and voted in favor still hesitate about signing. Discussion of the treaty’s importance and the possibility of its integration into the international nuclear nonproliferation regime goes on.

Why does Russian oppose the nuclear weapons ban?

As with all the countries possessing nuclear weapons, the Russian Fed- eration unequivocally opposed the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty. After the voting on the TPNW, France, UK and the United States issued a joint press statement saying that they were not going to sign, ratify or ever become a member state: “there will be no change in the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons.”30 Russia adopted the same position regarding the TPNW. At the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference in Octo- ber 2017, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov confirmed this position explain- ing that this initiative of several states can undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime.31 In October 2018, the P5 jointly stated that the TPNW “fails to address the key issues that must be overcome to achieve lasting global nuclear disarmament. It contradicts, and risks undermining, the NPT.”32 NWS confirmed their commitment to the main NPT provisions and clarified that the TPNW cannot establish any new norms. The Chinese delegation, on behalf of the

30 “Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Following the Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons. July 7, 2017. New York City”, United States Mission to the United Nations, accessed May 10, 2019, https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7892. 31 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at the Mos- cow Nonproliferation Conference, October 20, 2017”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/as- set_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2913751. 32 “P5 Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, Gov. UK, accessed May 1, 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/p5-joint-statement-on-the- treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons. 120 E. Mikhaylenko permanent members of the UN Security Council, also voiced the joint NWS position at the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference. Ac- cording to that statement, the TPNW contradicts the NPT provisions and NWS will not sign it.33 One gets an impression that there is some consensus between the five NWS regarding the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty. Maybe this consensus does exist, but each party presents its own rationale. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on multiple occasions that Russia does not intend to join the TPNW: “We believe that complete elimination of nuclear weapons is only possible in the context of general and complete disarmament amid equal and indivisible security for all, including those possessing nuclear weapons, as it is stipulated in the NPT.”34 This is not the first statement of the Russian Foreign Minister on this issue. Official discourse on the matter is very narrow. Analysis of official statements made in 2017-2019 allows several suggestions to be made regarding why Russia will not even discuss the issue of a nuclear weapons ban in the near future. According to the Russian MFA officials, the TPNW is not part of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Moreover, they argue that it undermines the foundations of the NPT. The remarks that Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control and Russian Representative at the First Committee of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly, made during the General Debate demonstrate that his Department has done some analytical work on that matter. What are the problems of the TPNW text from the standpoint of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control? First, unlike the TPNW advocates who believe that the new treaty is an additional instrument strengthening the NPT provisions on disarmament, the Russian MFA considers the NPT as the only treaty that one should appeal to. According to the MFA officials, the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty violates the nuclear nonproliferation regime by suggesting an alternative treaty. Mean- while, it is the goal of the NPT “to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,”35 and that obligation is further expanded in Article VI. According to Mr. Ulyanov, the TPNW provision on building a nuclear-free world “essentially differs from our vision on ways towards a nuclear-free world” and “nuclear weapons are to be eliminated from national arsenals ‘pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disar-

33 “Statement by H.E. Mr. Fu Cong, on Behalf of the P5 States,̘at the General Debate in the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference.1 May 2019, New York, UN, accessed May 10, 2019, http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/ 21491982/china-behalfofthep5states-general-debate.pdf. 34 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at a UN Security Council meeting on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Confidence Building Measures, New York, January 18, 2018”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/- /asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/3024503. 35 “Text of the NPT Treaty”, UN, accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text. Why does Russia not support the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons? 121 mament.’”36 This is not the first such reference to the need to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament, but the Russian MFA documents do not offer any specific suggestions regarding that treaty. Why can the TPNW not become such a treaty? The working paper submitted by the Russian Federation in May 2019 to the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference states: “The Russian Federation has no doubt that a ban on nuclear weapons could be introduced as an effective nuclear disarmament measure in line with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, this can only be done in the final phase of the multilateral disarmament process, to ensure its irreversibility. Such a step would be pre- mature in view of the current circumstances.”37 Thus, Russia stands for literal compliance with NPT Article VI, i.e. stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament that may eventually lead to general and complete disarmament. The second Russian argument against the TPNW concerns the unrefined wording of some treaty provisions. The main problem is the right to withdraw from the treaty in the case of extraordinary events that jeopardize the state’s supreme interests (Article 17), i.e. the nuclear weapons ban may be “not irreversible.”38 The Russian MFA is primarily concerned about the possibility of a precedent when NNWS might abandon the nuclear weapons ban. Does that go well with the NPT obligations?39 Article 18 of the TPNW prompted Rus- sia to object to the formula that the TPNW shall not prejudice other obligations, as long as they are consistent with the treaty. It looks as if TPNW member states can, at their own discretion, abandon their obligations under other treaties, including, it seems, the NPT. If so, then can one really argue that the new treaty strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime, as its authors claim?40 Another problem is Article 3 on safeguards. Russian officials find it alarming that there is no clarity regarding the “competent international authority” that is meant to play the key role in TPNW implementation. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Con- trol opposes the transfer of these functions to the IAEA. “Such attempts can be devastating for the agency, and its mandate and capacity do not and should not have anything in common with nuclear disarmament and verification thereof.”41 Another Russian argument against the TPNW is the alleged negative effect of such initiatives when NNWS put them forward unilaterally. In October

36 “Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Non- Proliferation and Arms Control and Representative of the Russian Federation at the First Com- mittee of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly, within the General Debate”, The Mi- nistry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/general_assembly/-/asset_publisher/ lrzZMhfoyRUj/ content/ id/2887054. 37“Nuclear Disarmament. Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation, 15 March 2019”, UN, accessed May 10, 2019, https://undocs.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.6. 38 “Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Non- Proliferation and Arms Control and Representative of the Russian Federation at the First Com- mittee of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly, within the General Debate”, UN, accessed May 10, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/general_assembly/-/asset_publisher/ lrzZMhfoyRUj/content/id/2887054 39 “Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov”. 40 “Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov”. 41 “Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov”. 122 E. Mikhaylenko

2018, the representative of the Russian delegation at the First Committee noted that even before having entered into force the TPNW had drawn additional divisive lines between parties to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, while existing global problems require consolidated efforts on the part of the international community.42 In May 2019, the Russian delegation voiced this argument yet again at the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Con- ference. The emergence of the TPNW and NNWS actions are claimed to con- tradict the principles of international stability and equal and indivisible security for all, and allegedly lead to growing contradictions between the international community members. Russia’s opposition to the TPNW can be explained by protection of its national interests and security considerations. “Attempts to compel the nuclear-weapon States to give up their stockpiles unconditionally, without taking into consideration their strategic realities and legitimate security interests, are counterproductive.”43 One of the main challenges to Russian national interests is America’s unilateral policy in the field of arms control.44 Overall, the new complex of factors affecting the international situation includes the following: U.S. plans to create a global missile defense system, development of non-nuclear long-range precision weapons, the U.S. global strike concept, absence of progress on CTBT ratification, U.S. unwillingness to abandon the idea of weapons deployment in the outer space, qualitative and quantitative imbalances in the field of conventional weapons, problems with the viability of multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation instruments, and U.S. actions contravening the INF Treaty.45 Thus, in Russia’s eyes, the TPNW may have negative consequences for the NPT, and one of the reasons is that it does not take into account the legitimate security interests of nuclear-weapon states.46 The TPNW also contradicts Russian national interests, because some nuclear weapons possessors are not members of the NPT, and the new treaty may undermine the process of NPT universalization. Russia presently has no domestic or foreign policy stimuli for disarmament and a nuclear-weapons-free status. One can define strategic culture as common societal perceptions about the world (world outlook, foreign policy, attitude to the army, war, alliances, other countries, traditional and new threats, etc.) and about what tools the society considers acceptable to employ in order to neutralize threats and challenges that are existential or require

42 “Statement by the Russian delegation to the First Committee of the UN General Assem- bly on the “Nuclear Weapons” Cluster, New York, October 22, 2018”, Embassy Russian Federa- tion in Japan, accessed October 10, 2018, https://tokyo.mid.ru/-/vystuplenie-rossijskoj-delegacii- v-pervom-komitete-general-noj-assamblei-oon-po-razdelu-adernoe-oruzie-n-u-jork̂22- oktabrâ2018-goda. 43 “Nuclear Disarmament”. 44 “Nuclear Disarmament”. 45 “YAdernoe nerasprostranenie, 16.07.2018” (Nuclear Disarmament), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/adernoe-nerasprostranenie/- /asset_publisher/JrcRGi5UdnBO/content/id/2612366. 46 “Interview of Ambassador Anatoly Antonov to Rossiya Segodnya”, The Ministry of For- eign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/ nota-bene/-/asset_publisher/dx7DsH1WAM6w/content/id/3023149. Why does Russia not support the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons? 123 government intervention.47 In that case, Russia’s present-day strategic culture assigns and, one can predict, will continue to assign a special role to nuclear weapons in preservation of the country’s integrity, independence and power. The besieged fortress concept became the official paradigm of the 2018 Rus- sian presidential campaign.48 Sergey Karaganov, Honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, published a number of analytical papers where he justified the role of nuclear weapons as a tool of deterrence and self-deterrence.49 “Relations between the nuclear superpowers – Russia and the United States – are worse than ever since 1950s and the Cu- ban missile crisis.” That is why nuclear weapons perform the positive function of nuclear deterrence.50 The 2015 version of the Russian Military Doctrine envisages the right to use nuclear weapons in response to “the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.”51 The decision to use nuclear weapons is made by the Russian President. On 1 March 2018, President Vladimir Putin in his Address to the Federal Assembly stated that after U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty Russia had made “a breakthrough in developing new models of strategic weapons.”52 He warned, “Any use of nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies <…> will be considered as a nuclear attack on this country. Retaliation will be immediate, with all the attendant consequences.”53 Worsening relations with the West, exacer- bation of Russian-U.S. bilateral tension, and the role of nuclear weapons as a crucial element in Russia’s national security certainly do not encourage Rus- sia to participate in talks on a nuclear weapons ban. Therefore, Russia considers it important to balance the three pillars of the NPT – nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy – and consistently complies with its NPT obligations, includ-

47 Mikhail Rykhtik, “Strategicheskaya Kul'tura I Novaya Koncepciya Nacional'noj Be- zopasnosti SSHA” (Strategic Culture and the New Concept of U.S. National Security), Vestnik of Nizhny Novgorod University, Series: International Relations, Political Science, Regional Studies, no. 1 (2003): 203-219. 48 “Putin idet na vybory pod lozungom "Rossiya v kol'ce vragov", govoryat eksperty” (Putin is Running in the Elections Under the Slogan: ‘Besieged Fortress’, the Experts Say), NEWSru.com, accessed May 1, 2019, https://www.newsru.com/russia/07dec2017/theme.html. 49 Sergey Karaganov, “Taking a New Look at Nuclear Peace: How to Enhance Deterrence and Preserve Peace”, Russia in Global Affairs, 06.06.2017, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www. globalaffairs.ru/number/O-novom-yadernom-mire-18644; Sergey Karaganov, “God Gave Man Nuclear Weapons to Deter World Wars”, Russian Council of Foreign Affairs, 07.10.2017, accessed May 1, 2019, http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/comments/bog-dal- yadernoe-oruzhie-cheloveku-kak-faktor-sderzhivaniya-mirovykh-voyn/. 50 Sergey Karaganov, “Strategiya uprezhdayushchego sderzhivaniya” (The Strategy of Pre- emptive Deterrence), Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 12.03.2018, accessed May 1, 2019, https://rg. ru/2018/03/12/sergej-karaganov-o-tom-pochemu-rossii-vazhno-imet-iadernoe-oruzhie.html. 51 The Military Doctrine Of The Russian Federation (Translation from Russian), Ap- proved by the President of the Russian Federation on December 25, 2014, No. Pr.-2976, The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, accessed May 1, 2019, https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029. 52 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly. 1 March 2018”, President of Russia, accessed May 1, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 53 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”. 124 E. Mikhaylenko ing NPT Article VI.54 On the other hand, according to Defense Minister Ser- gei Shoigu, “our strategic nuclear forces have been maintained at a level that makes it possible to guarantee nuclear deterrence.”55 Official MFA representative Mikhail Ulyanov justifies Russia’s position and argues that the TPNW “is at variance with Russia’s national interests and our vision of movement towards nuclear disarmament.” According to Ulyanov, we “have always reaffirmed our support for the idea of a nuclear-free world and joined many politically binding declarations to this effect. At the same time, we pointed out that this is a strategic goal and that any movement towards it must proceed in stages, that it must be accompanied by the strengthening of strategic stability as well as it must respect the national security interests of all countries, including Russia, of course.” Hence, raising “the topic of a nuclear weapons ban today would be untimely.”56

What are the possible repercussions of the Russian position on the TPNW?

Adamant rejection of the TPNW is an understandable position for a nuclear-weapon state. There are two parallel interpretations of NPT provisions among its member states. NWS and their supporters interpret NPT provisions in the context of arms control. The arms control regime centered on the deterrence concept does not envisage abandoning nuclear weapons. Anatoly An- tonov suggests interpreting the arms control regime as a twofold process: limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons (disarmament) and prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation (nonproliferation).57 TPNW proponents propose to abandon this interpretation of the NPT Article VI and move on to a concrete disarmament plan with a goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The problem of the present-day arms control regime is that this regime is bilateral and that it relies on nuclear deterrence as an integral component of relations between the great powers and on security guarantees offered to the allies.58 The task of creating the multilateral disarmament format is a difficult one,59 while further worsening of Russian-U.S. relations undermines not only the existing

54 Vladimir Putin, “Address to the Participants of the NPT Review Conference”, President of Russia, accessed May 1, 2019, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/letters/26308. 55 Sergey Shoigu, “Remarks at the Extended Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board”, President of Russia, accessed May 1, 2019, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53571. 56 “Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov’s interview with the newspaper Kommersant, published on September 13, 2017’, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/vistupleniya_rukovodstva_mid/-/asset_publisher/ MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/2862117. 57 Anatoly Antonov, Arms Control: History, State, and Prospects (Moscow, ROSSPEN, PIR Center, 2012), 9. 58 Russia and the Dilemmas of Nuclear Disarmament, ed. Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev, (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2012), 256-273. 59 See, for instance, Alexei Arbatov, “The Concept of Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament” in Polycentric Nuclear World: Challenges and New Opportunities, ed. Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2017),198-210. Why does Russia not support the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons? 125 agreements,60 but also the chances of success for further disarmament negotiations. Both countries are modernizing their nuclear programs, which casts doubt on the efficiency and effectiveness of the arms control regime and compliance of the current situation with the NPT Article VI. Despite the formal coordination of positions by NWS, there is a serious split on a number of issues. Russia, having found itself in a complex diplomatic standoff with the EU and NATO member states, does not share an agreement with other NWS on how to act with regards to the TPNW. In contrast, the United States managed to present a united position of NATO member states and U.S. allies not only concerning the TPNW, but also regarding their allegations of Russia’s non-compliance with the INF Treaty. Meetings of the 2018 and 2019 Preparatory Committees became a field of dispute between Russia on the one hand and the United States and their allies on the other. In 2018, British and American official statements cited the Salisbury incident as an example of Russia’s violations of its international obligations, which unsurprisingly provoked Russia’s negative reaction. In 2019, the U.S. officials and NATO allies started to appeal to the need to force Russia to fulfill its INF Treaty obligations.61 The UK follows the diplomatic line of the United States. France optimistically states that French nuclear weapons do not create any risks for international security. China traditionally calls on Russia and the United States to disarm and reiterates the need to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. According to China, the states possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should “fulfill in earnest their special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, keep and renew their bilateral nuclear disarmament treaties and take further steps to make drastic and substantive cuts of their nuclear weapons.”62 Thus, true consensus between nuclear-weapon states seems unattainable. Russian MFA officials claim progress in nuclear disarmament,63 while most participants of negotiations within the NPT Preparatory Committee talk about a major crisis of the arms control regime and failure of NWS to fulfill their Article VI obligations and call on the NWS to return to the disarmament negotiations table. The delegates more and more often voice concerns about

60 Andrey Pavlov, “Preservation of Russian-Usa Arms Control Regime and the Future of Nuclear Non-Proliferation” in Nuclear World: New Challenges To The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, ed. Ekaterina Mikhaylenko (Yekaterinburg: Publishing House of the Ural University, 2017), 74-88. 61 “Statement delivered by Cindy Termorshuizen, Director General, International Security Policy, Global Affairs Canada New York, April 29, 2019”, Reaching Critical Will, accessed May 1, 2019, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament- fora/npt/prepcom19/statements/29April_Canada.pdf 62 “Statement by H.E. Mr. Fu Cong, Head of the Chinese Delegation at the General Debate at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference. 29 April 2019, New York, UN, accessed May 1, 2019, http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/ 21491703/china-e-.pdf. 63 See, for instance, “Statement by Alexei Karpov”; “Statement by Vladimir I. Yermakov, Head of delegation of the Russian Federation to the First Committee of the 73th UNGA session, Director of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, within the General Debate, New York, October 9, 2018”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/ web/guest/adernoe-nerasprostranenie/-/asset_publisher/JrcRGi5UdnBO/content/id/3370468. 126 E. Mikhaylenko serious problems within the NPT regime and erosion of the arms control regime. Most countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and South- East Asia continue to appeal to the need to ban nuclear weapons.64 The absence of progress on Article VI is becoming a weighty argument in favor of a nuclear weapons ban. The Non-Aligned Movement in its working paper submitted to the 2019 Preparatory Committee argues that indefinite extension of the NPT does not mean indefinite nuclear weapons possession by NWS. They also offer a set of recommendations, stressing “the need to start negotiations without further delay on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,” and urging NWS to “prohibit completely nuclear weapons research, and to immediately cease all plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives or other measures regarding the qualitative improvement of their nuclear weapons and related facilities,” and so on.65 NAM also drafted a stage-by-stage plan of nuclear weapons liquidation consisting of three phases from 2020 to 2035.66 A group of NNWS drafted a document on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use, where they explain the need for the TPNW and the importance of taking into account the humanitarian dimension when drafting the final document of the 2020 Review Conference. Despite the fact that within the NPT negotiations process the TPNW is overshadowed by the NWFZ in the Middle East, the problem of DPRK and Iran’s nuclear program, it is more and more often mentioned when discussing the lack of progress in disarmament and the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use. What can Russia offer in response to the grievances of NNWS? Russia insists that it complies with its Article VI commitments, because it has radically reduced its strategic arsenal – to less than 15% of the maximum size the USSR had during the arms race.67 One can summarize Russia’s proposals on strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime as follows: launching multilateral disarmament talks; strengthening interaction between Russia and the United States; working to create a NWFZ in the Middle East; working to ensure the entry into force of CTBT, negotiating FMCT, and preserving JCPOA. Furthermore, Russia undertook a unilateral political obligation not to

64 “Statement by H.E. Mr. Samuel Moncada, Ambassador. Permanent Representative of The Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela To The United Nations. On Behalf Of The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). During The General Debate Of The Third Session Of The Preparatory Com- mittee For The2020review Conference Of The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation On Nuclear Weapons (NPT) New York, 29 April 2019”, UN, accessed May 1, 2019, http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/21491697/venezuela-on-behalf-of-nam-e-.pdf. 65 “Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, UN, accessed May 1, 2019, https://undocs.org/NPT/ CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.11. 66 “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, UN, accessed May 1, 2019, https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/ WP.10 67 “Statement by the Russian delegation in the First Committee of the UN General Assem- bly on “Nuclear Weapons” cluster, New York, October 22, 2018, The Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs of the Russian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/adernoe- nerasprostranenie/-/asset_publisher/JrcRGi5UdnBO/content/id/3381378. Why does Russia not support the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons? 127 be the first to deploy space-based weapons.68 In the meantime, according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, U.S. withdrawal first from the ABM Treaty, then from the INF Treaty may lead to a large-scale and disastrous arms race.69 At the third session of the 2019 Preparatory Committee, Russia cited these concerns to justify the need to possess nuclear weapons as “a necessity and the only possible response to very specific external threats.” In other words, Russia cannot renounce nuclear weapons, until these threats are addressed, but the role of nuclear weapons “could be further defined and reduced in the light of developments and changes in the strategic situation.”70 There is an impression that Russian nuclear disarmament policy, just as Russia’s position regarding the TPNW, largely depends on the Russian-U.S. relations in this area. Delegates of the third session of the 2019 Preparatory Committee put forward various proposals and action plans to preserve and strengthen the NPT regime: specific disarmament programs suggested by NAM, restrained suggestions about “taking forward nuclear disarmament”71 and “stepping stones,”72 as well as a U.S. proposal on creating an “environment for nuclear disarmament.”73 The Russian delegation did not put forward any qualitatively new proposals that could generate serious interest and collective discussion. In our point of view, realistic proposals by Russian diplomats regarding the TPNW, as well as the inclusion of disarmament and a humanitarian dimension in the Russian working papers, would allow a new level to be reached in negotiations and would improve Russia’s international image. Attempts to go back to the previous international security architecture and the “good old times” of arms control seem futile. Behind the scenes of the 2019 Preparatory Committee, the delegates discussed the possible con- figurations of a future arms control regime without the cornerstone agreements, such as INF and START. Russia ought to participate in formulating a new nuclear disarmament agenda in the light of new circumstances and in pursuit of its national interests.

68 “Preventing the Weaponization of Space”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rus- sian Federation, accessed May 1, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/mnogostoronnij-razoruzenceskij-me- hanizm-oon/-/asset_publisher/8pTEicZSMOut/content/id/1127371. 69 “Russian Foreign Minister Addresses Conference on Disarmament”, UN, Geneva, accessed May 1, 2019, https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/2DD705E0025A7CD 8C12583C30055C9D2?OpenDocument. 70 “Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation. Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap- ons”, UN, accessed May 1, 2019, https://undocs.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.6. 71 “Taking forward nuclear disarmament. Working paper submitted by the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil on behalf of Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa), UN, accessed May 1, 2019, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp- content/uploads/2019/02/NPT_CONF.2020_PC.III_WP.35-WP.35-Papersmart-New-Agenda- Coalition-III-PrepCom-.pdf. 72 “Unlocking disarmament diplomacy through a “stepping stone” approach. Working paper submitted by Sweden”, UN, accessed May 1, 2019, https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2020/ PC.III/WP.33. 73 “Operationalizing the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) Initia- tive. Working paper submitted by the United States of America, UN, accessed May 1, 2019, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp- content/uploads/2019/02/NPT_CONF.2020_PC.III_WP.43-WP.43-FINAL-US-Working-Paper_ 2019-PrepCom_CEND.pdf. 128 E. Mikhaylenko Conclusion

The TPNW marks a new stage for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Despite the fact that the notion of a “nuclear weapons ban” is absent from the NPT, this treaty can be considered the peak on the evolutionary path towards disarmament and elimination of all existing nuclear weapons stockpiles. Rus- sia refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of the TPNW, drawing attention to its potentially destructive potential for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. One can hardly disagree with Alexei Arbatov that all nuclear disarmament talks have hit a dead end. The existing treaties and the nonproliferation regime are starting to crumble. In this context, the passive position of nuclear- weapon states regarding the TPNW and imitation of disarmament by them may lead to the formation of an alternative regime. Indeed, the TPNW set the vector for further divergence of positions within the nuclear nonproliferation regime and growing tension between NWS and NNWS. One can agree with Dmitry Stefanovich that contradictions between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states will continue to grow and will create problems for intergovernmental interaction.74 Mean- while, the third session of the 2019 Preparatory Committee revealed other fracture lines: absence of progress in disarmament, paralysis of cornerstone agreements in arms control, and an overall lack of readiness on the part of NWS to engage in productive negotiations. In this situation, the Russian position looks rather passive. On the one hand, it denies the legitimacy of the TPNW. On the other hand, it does not offer an active stance for strengthening of the NPT, does not initiate a new nuclear disarmament agenda and risks losing the understanding of its position and potential support of states that support the TPNW.

74 Dmitry Stefanovich, “Dogovor o zapreshchenii yadernogo oruzhiya mozhet rasshatat' situaciyu v Evrazii” (The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty is Capable of Undermining the Situation in Europe), Eurasia Expert, accessed May 12, 2019, http://eurasia.expert/dogovor-o- zapreshchenii-yadernogo-oruzhiya-evrazii/. Part III

Societal Dimension

1 Building Nuclear Consensus in contemporary Russia: factors and perceptions

Larisa Deriglazova, Nina Rozhanovskaya

The chapter aims to present and analyze the shared perceptions of nuclear matters that the Russian public has demonstrated since 1991, the year of the USSR’s collapse. The range of issues under scrutiny includes nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and (non)proliferation, nuclear energy, and nuclear safety and security. Public opinion is regarded as an important source of legitimacy in democracies. Nevertheless, even in countries with well- established democratic institutions, such as the USA, France, the United Kingdom and Germany, it took several decades for activists, concerned scientists and politicians to secure the right of the public to be informed about national nuclear projects and to participate in decision-making concerning nuclear matters. Russia’s case is rather special in this regard. The Soviet public was not involved in formulating official policy on nuclear issues through media or public movements, nor were there any open studies of public opinion that would examine and articulate public concerns. The Soviet nuclear effort was driven first by the need to overcome the U.S. atomic monopoly and then to achieve parity. It was shrouded in secrecy throughout the Cold War era, and from 1953 up until 1989, the ministry in charge of nuclear warheads production was called the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building Industry, this unassuming title concealing its actual scope of activities. The general public was unaware of the situation in the nuclear sector, be it nuclear power or nuclear weapons production, and the public debate on the role of nuclear weapons was limited. It is remarkable that not only did the Soviet authorities try to conceal information on the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986, despite the on- set of glasnost (the Soviet policy of open discussion of political and social issues), but the Russian authorities behaved similarly and tried to hide a smaller-scale accident at the nuclear plant near Tomsk in April 1993. The Soviet citizens had their share of civil defense drills similar to the American “Duck and Cover,” but, unlike average Americans, they did not grow up watching movies with plots revolving around nuclear apocalypse. In fact, there are only two noteworthy Soviet films with a focus on nuclear matters. Nine Days in One Year is a 1962 drama about nuclear physicists, and Dead Man’s Letters is a 1986 award-winning film set in a world after an accidental nuclear exchange. Interestingly, according to the movie trivia on the Kinopoisk website, the latter film was paired with another nuclear apocalypse story – the American-made The Day After – for prime-time broadcasting on Soviet television on two consecutive evenings in 1987.1 The relative scarcity of Soviet nuclear Armageddon stories stands in contrast with the wide variety of nuclear narratives and post-apocalyptic plots in American popular culture. Nuclear shelters at industrial facilities and civil defense training programs starting as early as high school could of course fuel Soviet citizens’ concerns

1 «ɇɚɫɥɟɞɭɸɳɢɣɞɟɧɶ»: Ɂɧɚɟɬɟɥɢɜɵ, ɱɬɨ…» (“The Day After: Did You Know That…”), Kinopoisk, accessed March 24, 2020, https://www.kinopoisk.ru/film/257368/. 132 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya about the possibility of nuclear war between the USSR and the USA. Never- theless, possible fears and concerns about a nuclear conflict were not a subject for public discussion, except when officials made public statements to expose the alleged nuclear brinkmanship of Western powers. Soviet citizens were familiar with the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but did not nec- essarily see the connection between the risk of such events and the nuclear posturing of their own country. In this context, it is noteworthy that the danger of nuclear energy featured in Nine Days in One Year had to do with exposure to radiation during experimental research rather than an industrial disaster or military confrontation. Additionally, while Dead Man’s Letters is an undisguised nuclear apocalypse story, the city is not specified and all the characters’ names sound European. In the post-Cold War period, mass culture and mass media became more exposed to nuclear images. Russian state television keeps its viewers up to date on major developments in the Russian defense complex. Channel 1, the country’s primary federal TV channel, offers regular coverage of both Rus- sian missile tests and other military developments and nuclear matters on the diplomatic agenda. Therefore, the general public may not be tech- or politics- savvy, but is kept more or less informed. Analysis of post-Soviet public opinion provides an interesting picture of the public mood that could be influenced by a combination of events, actual and perceived threats, fears and emotions. The end of the Cold War changed the role that the nuclear weapons play in the international security system and the way they are perceived by nuclear and non-nuclear states. In addition to subtle policy changes that went unnoticed by the public, there were also events and trends that could have affected the public sentiments: large-scale nuclear power plant accidents in Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011), international debates surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, nuclear weapons tests by India (1998), Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2017), Russian-U.S. nuclear arms reduction talks and treaties, etc. To understand Russia’s complex relationship with its nuclear weapons, one should, no doubt, examine official statements and documents, and carefully study publications by Russian experts, but an overview of the nuclear weapons coverage by the media can provide additional insights. While many authors in media studies focus on the so-called CNN effect, i.e. the way in which the news can make policy, there also exists the ‘manufacturing consent’ school of thought, where the focus is on how governments influence the media and prompt them to interpret the news in a certain way.2 Russia offers a particularly compelling case study for this second approach, given the government control over the key media outlets. Besides, nuclear technology is a complex matter, both when it comes to the technical aspects of nuclear power production and political and military implications of nuclear weapons possession, so it may be relatively easy for governments and non-governmental actors to manipulate the public opinion and manufacture consent using mass media.

2 Piers Robinson, “The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?,” Review of International Studies 25, no. 2 (April 1999): 301–309. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 133

When it comes to public opinion, there is plenty of data to examine, as several Russian polling agencies and research centers conduct nation-wide surveys on a variety of issues, including nuclear-related matters: WCIOM (All-Russia Centre of Public Opinion Research), ROMIR, Levada-Center and FOM (Public Opinion Foundation). Russian research centers conducted surveys on nuclear-related issues with different frequency over the period under study. Some surveys assessed reactions to nuclear accidents, such as the Chernobyl disaster and its anniversaries or the Fukushima accident of 2011. Such studies measured how those accidents had influenced public perception of nuclear technologies and traced changes in public opinion concerning those events. Other surveys were prompted by instances of increased international tension as a result of military conflicts and actions of great powers possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are considered to be one of the attributes of great power status and the inclusion of questions about them in post-Cold War public opinion polls reflected societal perception of Russia’s place in world affairs. Surveys are mostly quantitative studies that track fluc- tuation of public opinion at large. In addition, there have been large-scale studies by think tanks on perceptions of WMD,3 as well as qualitative studies focusing on nuclear perceptions in the Russian regions heavily affected by developments in the Russian nuclear complex.4 Let us outline several distinctive features of the post-Soviet period that are relevant for our line of inquiry. Firstly, policy-makers can draw legitimacy from public opinion and rely on its trends when shaping discourse on major nuclear energy and military policy initiatives. Secondly, public opinion studies identify key areas of concern, which gives policy-makers an opportunity to monitor the sources of possible discontent and adjust policies accordingly. Thirdly, media coverage raises public awareness and contributes towards building public consensus on matters of national importance. Thus, it makes sense to examine the complex interrelationship between the public, the media and official institutions reflected in how they all treat nuclear matters. Mass policy preferences may be influencing elite preferences and hence public policies, while elites may be using the media to influence the mass preferences, but when it comes specific policy issues, it is difficult to clearly

3 ɂȺ. Ⱥɯɬɚɦɡɹɧ, ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɨɩɪɨɫ. «Ɋɨɫɫɢɹɧɟɨɛ ɭɝɪɨɡɚɯ, ɫɜɹ- ɡɚɧɧɵɯɫɨɪɭɠɢɟɦɦɚɫɫɨɜɨɝɨɭɧɢɱɬɨɠɟɧɢɹ». ȾɨɤɥɚɞɉɂɊɐɟɧɬɪɚ (Ildar Akhtamzyan, All- Russian Sociological Survey. “Russians on Threats Associated with Weapons of Mass Destruc- tion.” PIR Center Report). Moscow: Prava cheloveka, 2006; Valentin Tikhonov, Russia’s Nu- clear and Missile Complex: The Human Factor in Proliferation. Carnegie Endowment for Inter- national Peace, 2001; Ɋɨɫɫɢɹɧɟɨ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɦɨɪɭɠɢɢɢɹɞɟɪɧɵɯɭɝɪɨɡɚɯ (Russians on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Threats). PIR Center, 2000. 4 Vitaliy V. Kashpur, Dina O. Afanasieva, Svetlana V. Negrul, and Sergey N. Kirpotin, “Public Attitude to the Development of Nuclear Power Industry and Ecological Risks (The Case of the Tomsk Region),” International Journal of Environmental Studies 72, no. 3 (2015): 592– 598, https://doi.org/10.1080/00207233.2015.1012359; Ⱥɇ. Ⱦɪɨɧɢɲɢɧɟɰ, «Ɉɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɟ ɦɧɟɧɢɟ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢɢəɩɨɧɢɢɨɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɢɹɞɟɪɧɨɣɷɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɢ: ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣɚɧɚɥɢɡ» (An- drey Dronishinets, “Public Opinion in Russia and Japan on Nuclear Energy Development: Socio- logical Analysis”) (diss., Ural State University, 2008); ɇɉ. Ⱦɪɨɧɢɲɢɧɟɰ, ɇȺ. ɇɨɫɵɪɟɜ, ©əɞɟɪɧɚɹɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɶ, ɹɞɟɪɧɵɟɭɝɪɨɡɵɢɹɞɟɪɧɨɟɧɟɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟɧɢɟɜɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɟɰɟɧɧɨ- ɫɬɟɣ ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɯɫɬɭɞɟɧɬɨɜ» (N.P. Dronishinets and N.A. Nosyrev, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Nonproliferation in the Value Structure of Russian Students”), Fundamen- talnye issledovaniia, no. 2 (2005): 60–63, http://www.fundamental- research.ru/ru/article/view?id=5738. 134 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya establish these reciprocal influences. Moreover, the period under study is a time when Russia has undergone a major transformation in all aspects of life, including public perceptions, the media landscape and setup of public institutions. This would make establishing causal links an even more challenging task than normally is the case. Instead we intend to examine the results of public opinion surveys that were carried out over the post-Soviet period and that may reveal the factors that affect public sentiments. Doing so, we will pay special attention to the role of the media. We will try to identify key narratives and matching trends in both coverage and perceptions that could make it possible to present a more comprehensive picture of public attitudes towards nuclear technologies at the crossroads of everyday life and high politics. Therefore, while acknowledging that it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between domestic and international events and media coverage thereof on the one hand and public perceptions on the other, we intend to address the following two major questions: What was the Russian public attitude towards nuclear energy use for military and peaceful purposes over the period under study and how did it change? What were the key factors that may have shaped the public attitude towards nuclear issues? We will put Russia’s case into perspective by invoking the data from global public opinion studies and comparing Russian public attitudes to those of other major nuclear powers. Our goal is to find out if there is a national consensus in Russia regarding nuclear technologies for peaceful and military use, and if so, what this consensus is like.

Chapter structure

The period we chose to study is of great research interest because it was a time of upheaval, when political, social and economic transition affected every aspect of public and private life in Russia. During that same period, the Russian nuclear sector experienced a dramatic change in size, status, organizational arrangement and public accountability. First, we will provide a brief overview of the changes and continuity in the nuclear power sector in post-Soviet Russia. Then, we will present and discuss Russian public opinion on nuclear matters during the same period. We will contrast the results of Russian opinion polls with public opinion surveys carried out in other countries. This comparison will help determine the factors that influence public perceptions of nuclear energy. Based on such a comparison, one can draw a conclusion about whether the Russian case stands out or is in line with the general trends. The second part of the chapter will consider Russian public attitudes to nuclear weapons and their role in national security. We will pay special attention to one specific factor – mass media, which according to many researchers plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion. In order to narrow down the field, we will follow the Russian media presentation of nuclear issues (primarily nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament) throughout the “reset” of Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 135 bilateral relations under Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev to subsequent fallout and then a full-scale crisis in relations between Russia and the West during President Vladimir Putin’s third term in office. This period witnessed major developments in international relations and presented the fluctuations of levels of trust between Russia and its Western counterparts – from partnership and profound cooperation manifested in the 1990s and early 2000s to open confrontation and backing of opposing sides in militarized conflicts in the 2000s. We expect that this affects the manner in which the Rus- sian media presents nuclear weapons and consequently the Russian public perceives them.

Continuity and change in the Russian nuclear sector

According to the Survey of Energy Policies of the Russian Federation conducted by OECD’s International Energy Agency in 1995, Russia inherited 80% of the Soviet Union’s nuclear complex.5 Russia has all the necessary technological, infrastructural, material and human resources to advance in both military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The country is a major actor in the global market of nuclear technologies and materials. Since 1991, the nuclear sector in Russia underwent substantial changes in terms of its property, labor force, management, strategic development and its relations with the state and the public. In 1989 the Soviet Ministry of Medium Machine-Building Industry was merged with the Ministry of Atomic Energy and in 1992 the Russian part of this new ministry was transformed into the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry (Minatom). Minatom inherited nine NPPs (nuclear power plants) with 28 operating nuclear reactors. In 2004, Minatom was reorganized into the Federal Agency on Atomic Energy, which in turn was transformed into the State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) by presidential decree in December 2007. Rosatom was reported to have 258 thousand employees in 2014, with about 1 million family members and over 2 million people living in municipalities connected to Rosatom’s activities – 3.3 million people altogether. Rosatom’s territorial presence in Russia includes ten cities that are located near nuclear power plants, more than 70 municipalities, 37 regions and 10 so- called “closed cities” (the Russian abbreviation for them is ZATO).6 The official July 2018 statistics from Rosatom reports that more than 250 thousand employees work at more than 350 organizations and their subdivisions.7 According to official statistics, in 2014 Rosatom had 33 operational energy units/reactors and was constructing 9 reactors in Russia and 11 reactors

5 Energy Policies of the Russian Federation: Survey 1995 (Paris: OECD/IEA, 1995), 241. 6 Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ: ɉɭɛɥɢɱɧɵɣɝɨɞɨɜɨɣɨɬɱɟɬ – 2014 ɝɨɞ (Rosatom: Annual Public Report – 2014), Rosatom, 194, https://rosatom.ru/upload/iblock/28e/28e6864617b177fc10b55d1e7e 8cf544. pdf. 7 “Atomic Industry of Russia,” Rosatom, accessed March 24, 2020, http://www. rosatom.ru/about-nuclear-industry/atomnaya-otrasl-rossii/. 136 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya abroad.8 In 2018 there were 10 operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Russia with 35 energy units/operating reactors with overall energy capacity of 27.9 GW, or 18.9% of Russia’s total electric energy production. Rosatom is constructing 6 energy units in Russia and 35 abroad, including in such countries as Finland, Hungary, Belarus, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, India, and China.9 On a global scale, Rosatom ranks second in natural uranium deposits, third in mining volume, and second in terms of nuclear energy production volume. It claims 36% of the world enriched plutonium market and 17% of nuclear fuel production.10 Thus, Rosatom is one of the top three global suppliers of natural uranium along with Kazatomprom (Kazakhstan) and Cameco (Canada) and the global leader of nuclear fuel production, also ranking fourth in terms of the number of operating reactors. However, one should keep in mind that Russia’s nuclear heritage is diverse. It includes large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, but it also includes liabilities, such as territories that need deactivation and cleanup. Perestroika and glasnost changed the status of the nuclear sector in Rus- sia. Since the early 1990s, there have been many publications concerning the Soviet and Russian nuclear industry. Some of them concentrated on the history of the Soviet atomic project, others focused on the present-day environmental problems. In 1989, special bodies were created to facilitate information flow and exchange between executive bodies and the public. The inter- departmental coordination council for information and public relations in the sphere of nuclear energy was created, and the Ministry of Atomic Energy started issuing the periodical Bulletin of the Centre for Public Information on Atomic Energy. Since 2001, this periodical has been published under the title Bulletin on Atomic Energy. National and international media, the expert community and governmental and nongovernmental organizations contributed to the rise in the Russian public’s awareness about history, the current situation and the possible future of the country’s nuclear sector. The policy of glasnost allowed the revealing of the previously mostly unknown history of the Soviet nuclear program.11

8 Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ: ɉɭɛɥɢɱɧɵɣɝɨɞɨɜɨɣɨɬɱɟɬ – 2014 ɝɨɞ (Rosatom: Annual Public Report – 2014), Rosatom, 25, https://rosatom.ru/upload/iblock/28e/28e6864617b177fc10b55d1e7e8cf 544.pdf. 9 “Atomic Industry of Russia,” Rosatom, accessed March 24, 2020, http://www. rosatom.ru/about-nuclear-industry/atomnaya-otrasl-rossii/. 10 “History of Russia’s Atomic Industry,” Rosatom, accessed March 24, 2020, http://www.rosatom.ru/about-nuclear-industry/history/. 11 See, for instance: Boris N. Porfiriev, “Environmental Aftermath of the Radiation Acci- dent at Tomsk-7,” Environmental Management 20 (1996): 25–33, https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00006699; ȼɂ. Ȼɭɥɚɬɨɜ, 200 ɹɞɟɪɧɵɯɩɨɥɢɝɨɧɨɜɋɋɋɊ: Ƚɟɨɝɪɚɮɢɹ ɪɚɞɢɚɰɢɨɧɧɵɯɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɢɡɚɝɪɹɡɧɟɧɢɣ (V.I. Bulatov, “Two Hundred Nuclear Test Sites of the USSRL Geography of Radiation Disasters and Pollution”) (Novosibirsk, TSERIS, 1993); Ɉɬɜ. ɪɟɞ. ɢ ɫɨɫɬ. ȼɉ. ȼɢɡɝɢɧ, ɂɫɬɨɪɢɹɫɨɜɟɬɫɤɨɝɨɚɬɨɦɧɨɝɨɩɪɨɟɤɬɚ: ɞɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɵ, ɜɨɫ- ɩɨɦɢɧɚɧɢɹ, ɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹ (V.P. Vizgin, ed., History of the Soviet Atomic Project: Documents, Memoirs, Research), Vol. 1 (Moscow: Yanus-K, 1998); Ɉɬɜ. ɪɟɞ. ɢɫɨɫɬ. ȼɉ. ȼɢɡɝɢɧ, ɂɫɬɨ- ɪɢɹɫɨɜɟɬɫɤɨɝɨɚɬɨɦɧɨɝɨɩɪɨɟɤɬɚ: ɞɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɵ, ɜɨɫɩɨɦɢɧɚɧɢɹ, ɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɹ (V.P. Vizgin, ed., History of the Soviet Atomic Project: Documents, Memoirs, Research), Vol. 2 (St. Peters- burg: RKhGI, 2002); ȼɆ. Ʉɭɡɧɟɰɨɜ, «ɋɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɢɟɚɬɨɦɧɨɝɨɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɚɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟ- ɪɚɰɢɢ: ɢɫɬɨɪɢɤɨɬɟɯɧɢɱɟɫɤɢɣɚɧɚɥɢɡɤɨɧɫɬɪɭɤɰɢɨɧɧɵɯ, ɬɟɯɧɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɯɢɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɨɜɟɞ- ɱɟɫɤɢɯɪɟɲɟɧɢɣ» (V.M. Kuznetsov, “The Making of the Russian Atomic Complex: Analysis of Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 137

President Boris Yeltsin’s decree of February 1995 launched the publication of official documents on the “Atomic Project of the USSR” which aimed “to reconstruct the objective picture of establishment of the country’s atomic industry and history of nuclear weapons creation in the USSR.”12 Twelve massive volumes of documents were published between 1998 and 2010. Later Rosatom launched an impressive Electronic Library of Rosatom History, which is a vast online collection of books, periodicals and archival materials on nuclear physics, the history of the Soviet nuclear project, nuclear nonproliferation, etc., mostly covering the period between 1938 and 2015.13 Nu- clear institutions and closed nuclear cities also have websites that serve as additional sources of unclassified information on the Russian nuclear sector.14 Public discussion became an integral part of political life and a lot of debate revolved around public concerns over environmental damage caused by nuclear production, as well as around governmental solutions to inherited and new problems.15 The Chernobyl legacy became a crucial factor feeding the public concerns. Public discussion became possible because perestroika removed an existing taboo on debate. Some political parties included nuclear matters into their agendas and manifestos. For instance, the Yabloko party has addressed this issue since early 1990s, supporting publication and distribution of materials concerning nuclear heritage and urgent problems of the nuclear sector in Russia. Nongovernmental organizations that started to sprout in Russia in the late 1980s also addressed the issue of nuclear safety and nuclear heritage. In 1994, Russia was among the first countries to sign the IAEA’s Con- vention on Nuclear Safety.16 The national legislation on nuclear sector operation was influenced by existing international norms and provisions. The federal law On the Use of Nuclear Energy adopted in 1995 is very comprehensive and covers all nuclear sector activities, social responsibilities, and environmental liabilities, as well as the international obligations of the Rus- sian Federation to cooperate with the IAEA and to comply with international standards and agreements. One should also mention three other important pieces of legislation: the laws On Radioactive Safety for the Population and On Financing Urgent Radioactively Dangerous and Nuclear Dangerous Pro- ductions and Sites (1996) and federal law On the Administrative Responsibil- ity of Organizations Violating Legislation in the Sphere of Nuclear Energy (2000). In 2008, Rosatom developed its Environmental Policy and annually

Design, Technology and Materials Science Solutions from the Historical and Engineering Stand- points”) (diss., S.I. Vavilov Institute for the History of Science and Technology, 2006). 12ɉɨɞɨɛɳ. ɪɟɞ. Ʌ. Ⱦ. Ɋɹɛɟɜɚ, ȺɬɨɦɧɵɣɩɪɨɟɤɬɋɋɋɊ: ɞɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɵɢɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɵ: ɜ 3 ɬ. (L.D. Riabev, Atomic Project of the USSR: Documents and Materials: in 3 volumes), Ɍ. II ©Ⱥɬɨɦɧɚɹɛɨɦɛɚ. 1945-1954» (Vol. II “Atomic Bomb. 1945-1954”), Book 6 (Sarov: RFNC- VNIIEF, 2006), 3. 13 Electronic Library “Rosatom History,” accessed March 24, 2020, http://elib.biblioatom.ru. 14 See, for instance: Russian Federal Nuclear Center (RFNC-VNIIEF), accessed March 24, 2020, http://www.vniief.ru/en/. 15 Ⱥɬɨɦɧɚɹɷɧɟɪɝɢɹ, ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɨ, ɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɶ. Ɏɨɪɭɦɵɞɢɚɥɨɝɢ 2010. ɋɛɨɪɧɢɤɦɚɬɟ- ɪɢɚɥɨɜ (Atomic Energy, Society, Safety and Security. Forum Dialogues. 2010. Collection of Writings) (Moscow, 2011). 16 “Convention on Nuclear Safety,” International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed March 24, 2020, http://www-ns.iaea.org/conventions/nuclear-safety.asp?s=6&l=41. 138 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya allocates resources to cover possible damage and implement environmental projects. As official successor to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited its entire nuclear weapons arsenal and the international commitments that come with it. It is one of the five nuclear-weapon states under the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the United States’ counterpart in bilateral nuclear arms reduction talks. Despite its Article VI commitment (under the NPT) to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,”17 Russia maintains its reliance on nuclear weapons in its security posture. It reserves the right to use its nuclear weapons “in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”18 According to experts, Russia is relatively transparent when it comes to its strategic forces.19 The latest bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaty, The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, was signed by Russia and the USA in 2010 and entered into force in 2011. It sets a limit of 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers for each country, as well as 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.20 According to SIPRI, Russia met the mandated ceiling of deployed warheads in 2012, but temporarily moved back above the ceiling in September 2014. According to the official START declaration by the Russian Federation on February 2018, the Russian nuclear arsenal includes 527 deployed strategic launchers (ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers); 1,444 deployed nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; and 779 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.21 The Russian nuclear arsenal also includes non-strategic weapons, and Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda

17 “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” United Nations, accessed March 24, 2020, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html. 18 “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, accessed March 24, 2020, https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029. 19Ⱥ. Ⱥɪɛɚɬɨɜ, «ɋɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɵɟɚɪɫɟɧɚɥɵɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜ» (Alexey Arbatov, “The Modern Ar- senals of Nuclear States”) in əɞɟɪɧɚɹɩɟɪɟɡɚɝɪɭɡɤɚ: ɫɨɤɪɚɳɟɧɢɟɢɧɟɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟɧɢɟɜɨɨ- ɪɭɠɟɧɢɣ (Nuclear Reset: Arms Reduction and Nonproliferation), ed. Alexey Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin (2011), 52–57. 20 “New START Treaty,” U.S. Department of State, accessed March 24, 2020, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm. 21 “Foreign Ministry Statement,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed March 24, 2020, http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3054864?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02B w&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 139 estimate their number at around 1,830 warheads “assigned for delivery by air, naval, ground, and various defensive forces” as of early 2019.22

Russian public opinion on nuclear power and nuclear energy sector safety

Public attitudes towards nuclear energy reveal the inescapable duality of nuclear power. An advanced nuclear sector is often seen as the ultimate con- firmation of a given country’s superiority in science and technology. At the same time, nuclear technology is associated with dangerous accidents, radioactive waste and environmental hazards. Many American and European analysts have studied public attitudes to nuclear power in recent decades, trying to understand public concerns about nuclear power and, in some cases, trying to find ways for meeting and overcoming mass opposition to further development of the nuclear energy sector. It is interesting to examine if the Russian public is different in this regard or shows a similar attitude towards development of the nuclear energy sector and shares fears and concerns about nuclear energy production. Public opinion studies showed a dramatic change in the attitude of Rus- sians from overall negative in the early 1990s towards support of the nuclear energy sector’s development. Two major public opinion research centers in Russia – WCIOM and Levada-Center – confirm this change. According to a WCIOM study conducted in April 2016, on the 30th anniversary of the Cher- nobyl accident, 58% of respondents supported the development of nuclear energy compared to 14% in 1990, while 28% were against it (vs. 56% in 1990).23 Even though the Russian public saw nuclear technology as one of the biggest national achievements and symbols of the 20th century, it also inspired concerns and fears. Surveys by WCIOM regularly revealed public concern over nuclear power plants, as well as transportation and disposal of radioactive waste as extremely dangerous sources of pollution. In 2005 respondents named severe environmental pollution (41%) one of the biggest threats to human life in Russia, after drugs (61%), alcoholism (46%), war in Chechnya (42%), and crime (42%). Disposal of radioactive waste (39%) and nuclear power plants (29%) ranked third and sixth among the most dangerous pollutants.24 According to the public opinion poll of 2007, environmental problems were evaluated as urgent by 57% of respondents. The following pollutants were named: industry (41%); transportation and disposal of nuclear waste (36%); nuclear power plants (31%).25 A survey in 2016 showed that radioac-

22 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 2 (March 2019): 73–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 00963402.2019.1580891. 23 «Ɉɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɟ: 30 ɥɟɬɫɩɭɫɬɹ» (“On Chernobyl: Thirty Years Later”), WCIOM, April 26, 2016, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=304. 24 ɇȺ. Ɍɢɯɨɦɢɪɨɜɚ, «ɗɤɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɚɹ ɨɛɫɬɚɧɨɜɤɚ ɝɥɚɡɚɦɢ ɪɨɫɫɢɹɧ» (N.A. Tikho- mirova, “Environmental Situation Through the Eyes of Russians”), Ɇɨɧɢɬɨɪɢɧɝɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨ- ɝɨɦɧɟɧɢɹ: ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɢɟɢɫɨɰɢɚɥɶɧɵɟɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ 76 (Public Opinion Monitoring: Economic and Social Problems 76), no. 4 (November-December 2005): 103, 106. 25 «ɗɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɚ ɩɪɨɬɢɜ ɷɤɨɥɨɝɢɢ?» (“Economy vs. Ecology?”), WCIOM, April 9, 2007, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=2499. 140 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya tive waste dropped in its perceived importance as a pollutant: from 30% in 1990 to 6% in 2016.26 In the 1990s some experts argued that Russians had radiophobia – unmo- tivated fear of any nuclear technology. The reason for this phobia could be limited knowledge and understanding of nuclear technologies in a society with such a long tradition of high secrecy surrounding all nuclear facilities and projects, both military and civilian. This tradition persisted in Russia in the 1990s, which was demonstrated by the existence of the closed nuclear cities and protection of information related to nuclear research and even the training of nuclear engineers at civilian universities. One could take a look at the city of Tomsk as an example. It is located next to the closed nuclear city of Seversk, where there was an accident at the nuclear facility in 1993. The 2003 plan to build a MOX fuel production plant in Seversk was met with protests by environmental activists and concerned citizens and later suspended. Current Rosatom projects in Seversk include the construction of a radioactive waste repository and a BREST-300 nuclear reactor. The debates about these plans were limited to the city of Seversk and did not involve the residents of Tomsk, despite the close proximity of these cities. Secrecy may be a way to protect dangerous facilities, but it is also a feeding ground for public concerns. It reflects the lack of governmental transparency and gives rise to public mistrust. In such situations, rumors rather than knowledge shape public perceptions.27 Terrorists were seen as the main threat to nuclear security. 90% of respondents in 2000 and 84% in 2006 feared that terrorists could target nuclear plants and other nuclear facilities in Russia.28 Later studies showed that citizens now less frequently link terrorism threats and nuclear facilities in their minds. One could argue that this fear in the early 2000s to a large extent reflected the fear of terrorism itself and low public trust towards the authorities that were supposed to provide viable protection from this threat. Studies of 2017 and 2018 showed that a general fear of terrorism in Russia persists, although Russians are now much more confident that authorities can provide the necessary protection in comparison to the early 2000s. According to the studies by WCIOM, the fear of being targeted by terrorists was shared by 78% of respondents in 2002 and by 66% in 2017, while trust in protection by the authorities has increased from 20% in 2002 to 82% in 2017.29 Another matter of concern for the public was the safeguarding of nuclear materials. According to polls conducted in 2000, 83% of respondents thought that it was possible to steal nuclear materials from plants, while only 10% considered it impossible and 7% were not sure. Experts offered two possible explanations: 1) these responses reflect the old Soviet habit of smuggling out valuables from one’s working place and 2) they reflect the widespread Rus-

26 «Ɉɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɟ: 30 ɥɟɬɫɩɭɫɬɹ» (“On Chernobyl: Thirty Years Later”), WCIOM, April 26, 2016, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=304. 27 V.M. Kuznetsov is writing about the Tomsk case as an example of failed public hearings procedure. In 2003-2008, there was a debate in Tomsk, and tempers flared. 28 ɂȺ. Ⱥɯɬɚɦɡɹɧ, ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɨɩɪɨɫ (Ildar Akhtamzyan, All- Russian Sociological Survey), 12. 29 «Ȼɨɪɶɛɚɫɬɟɪɪɨɪɨɦ: ɤɬɨɩɨɛɟɠɞɚɟɬ?» (“The Fights Against Terrorism: Who Is Win- ning?”), WCIOM, September 5, 2017, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=3559. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 141 sian practice of getting around rules and procedures using money.30 The fear of accidents similar to Chernobyl has been shared by many Russians for a long time. In 1995, 45% of respondents feared the possibility of similar accidents, 36% were uncertain, and only 4% of respondents believed that this could not happen again according to the FOM study.31 Levada-Center reported that 68% respondents in 2000, 76% in 2001, 59% in 2006 and 56% in 2011 believed that an accident of such a scale could happen again. The situation surprisingly changed in April 2016, when the number of those who thought that such an accident was almost impossible outnumbered those who were concerned about the recurrence of that disaster (46% vs. 33%).32 The result of the Levada-Center study is confirmed by a WCIOM study in April 2016: 73% of respondents trusted the safety of modern NPPs (9% did not) and 64% believed the probability of another Cher- nobyl-like accident to be extremely low.33 As in many other countries, Russian public opinion was affected by the Fu- kushima accident, but, according to a WCIOM study conducted in 2012, the Rus- sian public rather quickly recovered from its negative influence. In 2011, right after Fukushima, only 16% of respondents were in favor of increasing the number of nuclear power plants vs. 27% in 2012 (the same number as in 2006). Support for development of the nuclear energy sector is primarily demonstrated by those who are young (32%), have a higher education degree (31%), and live in big cities with a population above one million people and in medium-sized cities (30- 33%). Still, more respondents suggested keeping the same number of NPPs: 38% in 2012 and 45% in 2011. The highest support for this option was among residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg (53%). Among those who believed that the number of NPPs should go down (26%), 31-33% had a low education level and 34% were from the rural areas. This study of 2012 confirmed the main concerns regarding the nuclear energy sector. Fifty-seven percent of respondents believed that existing NPPs were not safe/secure enough (vs. 45% in 2011). This opinion prevailed among Russians living in medium-size cities – 69%. Furthermore, the majority of Russians did not like the idea of NPPs being built in their home cities and regions: 82% in 2011 and 74% in 2012 opposed such plans. The most negative attitude was indicated by women and residents of medium-size cities (78%). The lowest degree of support was demonstrated by people living in the Ural (15%) and Siberian (12%) federal districts. Not coincidentally, these are the areas with many sites already contaminated by nuclear production.34 Levada-Center studies also confirmed the fast recovery of public support for the nuclear energy sector in Russia after the Fukushima accident in 2011. The

30 Ɋɨɫɫɢɹɧɟɨ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɦɨɪɭɠɢɢ ɢ ɹɞɟɪɧɵɯɭɝɪɨɡɚɯ (Russians on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Threats) (PIR Center, 2000), 42, 45. 31 «ɍɜɟɪɟɧɵ, ɱɬɨɱɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɚɹɚɜɚɪɢɹɧɟɩɨɜɬɨɪɢɬɫɹ, 4% ɪɟɫɩɨɧɞɟɧɬɨɜ, ɛɨɥɶɲɢɧɫɬ- ɜɨɠɟɧɟɪɚɡɞɟɥɹɸɬɬɚɤɨɣɭɜɟɪɟɧɧɨɫɬɢ» (“4% of Respondents are Convinced that a Disaster Like Chernobyl Will Never Happen Again, but the Majority of Respondents Do Not Share This Confidence”), FOM, April 28, 1995, http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/finfo/ finfo1995/of1995_16/of19951601. 32 «ɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɶɫɤɚɹɤɚɬɚɫɬɪɨɮɚ» (“Chernobyl Disaster”), Levada-Center, April 22, 2016, http://www.levada.ru/2016/04/22/chernobylskaya-katastrofa/. 33 «Ɉɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɟ: 30 ɥɟɬɫɩɭɫɬɹ» (“On Chernobyl Thirty Years Laters”), WCIOM, April 26, 2016, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=304. 34 «Ⱥɬɨɦɧɚɹɷɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɚ: «Ɋɚɡɜɢɜɚɬɶɧɭɠɧɨ, ɧɨɩɨɞɚɥɶɲɟɨɬɧɚɫ» (“Atomic Energy: It Needs to Be Developed, but Not in Our Back Yard”), WCIOM, April 26, 2012, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=1432. 142 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya survey conducted in March 2013 showed that 33% of respondents were in favor of active continuation of nuclear energy development and 38.5% approved of keeping the production at current level. Opponents of NPPs constituted about 20%, where 14% of respondents advocated a reduction in the nuclear energy sector and 6% its complete termination.35 Answering the question about what an alternative source of energy could be, given that Russia would run out of oil and gas in twenty years, more respondents supported the development of the nuclear energy sector (39%) than other commonly used energy resources in Russia, such as coal (10%) or hydropower (21%).36 One can provide wider context by contrasting Russian public opinion surveys with opinion polls carried out in other countries. In 2003, the Massa- chusetts Institute of Technology published an interdisciplinary study devoted to the future of nuclear energy. It stated that one must address four crucial problems to make a large expansion of the nuclear power sector possible: cost, safety, waste and proliferation.37 A special chapter of the book focuses on public attitudes and public understanding. The study notes the “surprising lack of survey data in the public domain that would allow us to understand why people oppose and support specific power source.” In general the study confirms that the public in the United States and elsewhere is skeptical of nuclear power, and the majority of Americans simultaneously approve of the use of nuclear power, but oppose building additional nuclear plants to meet future energy needs. Researchers stress that incidents similar to what happened at the Three Mile Island power plant in 1979 and the issue of waste loom large in public mind. Statistical analysis of public attitudes identified three major factors that determine support for nuclear power among the public: perceived environmental harm; safety and waste; and perceived costs of nuclear power.38 Interestingly, political beliefs and demographics, such as age, gender, and income, mattered relatively little, if at all. The general conclusion was as follows: “American public opinion toward energy is not the product of political ideology or party politics. Rather, public opposition to nuclear power in the United States is due primarily to the public reaction to the concrete problems of the technology and the industry, notably concerns over safety, toxic waste, and poor economics. It is not surprising that the public is skeptical about a technology that has over promised”.39 Another important study “Public Attitudes to Nuclear Power” was published in 2010 by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. It included surveys conducted by Eurobarometer and by the IAEA.40 According to that study, only a minority of Europeans were in favor of nuclear energy in their country – 20%, with 36% having balanced views, and 37% clearly opposing it.

35 «Ɋɨɫɫɢɹɧɟɩɨɞɞɟɪɠɢɜɚɸɬɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɟɚɬɨɦɧɨɣɷɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɢ» (“Russians Support the De- velopment of Atomic Energy”), Levada-Center, March 29, 2013, https://www.levada. ru/2013/03/29/rossiyane-podderzhivayut-sohranenie-i-razvitie-atomnoj-energetiki/. 36 Ibidem. 37 The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003), IX, https://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/. 38 Ibid., 71–72. 39 Ibid., 72. 40 Public Attitudes to Nuclear Power (Nuclear Energy Agency, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2010), https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2010/6859-public- attitudes.pdf. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 143

Many of the respondents agreed that nuclear power made their country less dependent on energy imports, ensured lower and more stable energy prices and helped prevent climate change. Nevertheless, they thought that the risks outweighed the benefits (53%). It is noteworthy that respondents perceived the risks as lower if their countries already had existing nuclear power programs.41 The study concluded that better information on nuclear energy and safety/security would increase public support for nuclear power. The following sources of information were listed among the most trusted ones: scientists – 71%; environmental protection organizations or consumer associations – 64%; national nuclear safety authorities – 51%; energy companies that oper- ate nuclear power plants – 46%; TV, radio, newspapers – 31% and national government – 29%. As one can see, people tend to mistrust the mass media, but they trust their governments even less.42 The GlobeScan poll conducted for the IAEA in 18 countries (including Russia and the USA) in 2005 also demonstrated rather low support for nuclear power: 34% of respondents believed that NPPs should be used, but not expanded; 28% believed that nuclear power was a safe and important source of energy and supported the construction of new plants; 25% believed that nuclear power was dangerous; and 59% were not in favor of new NPPs. It is quite interesting that Russian and U.S. respondents’ concerns about terror attacks against nuclear weapons or materials was higher than the average figure: 63% and 56% respectively (as opposed to 54%).43 A comparison of Russian public attitudes towards nuclear security with other countries showed that Russians had the highest rate of fear (63%) of nuclear terrorist acts after the Japanese (79%), followed by respondents in Indonesia (62%), Germany (60%) and France, Mexico, Morocco (57%), USA (56%) and UK (55%).44 There was moderate public support for peaceful applications of nuclear technologies, with medical use being in the first place (39%) and generation of electricity ranking second (26%). Here Russian public support was the lowest among 18 countries – 17th place with 17% for medical use and 32% for electricity. The public in Mexico, Germany, Australia, Canada, Argentina, France and Japan primarily supported the medical usage of nuclear technologies (between 56% and 48%), while support for generating electricity in these countries varied from 13% in Argentina to 32% in Japan.45 Support figures for nuclear power as a safe source of energy and for the construction of new NPPs showed that the public was hesi- tant. Only the American public were overall positive – 40%, while respondents in the UK (33%), France (25%), Germany (22%), Russia (22%) and Japan (21%) were rather skeptical about the safety of NPPs. Public support for keeping the same number of NPPs without building

41 Public Attitudes to Nuclear Power (Nuclear Energy Agency, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2010), https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2010/6859-public- attitudes.pdf. 22–26. 42 Ibid., 32. 43 Global Public Opinion on Nuclear Issues and the IAEA: Final Report from 18 Countries (GlobeScan Incorporated, October 2005), http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2015/ph241/ llanos1/docs/globescan.pdf. 44 Ibid., 15. 45 Ibid., 17. 144 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya new ones was almost twice higher than for building new NPPs in France (50%), Germany (47%), Russia (41%) and almost three times higher in Japan (61%).46 The next GlobeScan poll report was published in November 2011, i.e. after the major accident at Fukushima NPP in March 2011. The results of public opinion surveys in 23 countries showed growing opposition to nuclear technology in comparison to the 2005 data with most respondents believing that conservation and renewable energy could meet future energy needs without nuclear power.47 Below we present the data of GlobeScan polls in 2005 and 2011 focusing on six countries including Russia. Comparison of the figures confirms the impact of major accidents on public opinion in these countries, with the exception of the UK and USA where the public perceptions seem relatively unaffected by the Fukushima disaster. Table 1. Public attitude towards nuclear power, GlobeScan study, 2005, 2011 (as percentages)

Russia France Germany UK USA Japan Country/ question 2005 2011 2005 2011 2005 2011 2005 2011 2005 2011 2005 2011 Support for nuclear power/ 22 9 25 15 22 7 33 37 40 39 21 6 nuclear is safe; build more plants Support for nuclear power/ use what's 41 37 50 58 47 38 37 44 29 44 61 57 there; don't build new plants

One can conclude that the Russian public is not very different in its concerns about the safety and security of nuclear power. These concerns primarily revolve around the danger of large-scale accidents and terror attacks. An- other big concern is associated with the environmental consequences of nuclear energy production and nuclear waste management. Over the past few years, one could observe a decrease in the degree of such concerns in Russia, which could be attributed to the environmental policies pursued by Rosatom in the 2000s and the creation of its information centers in communities where it has nuclear facilities or plans to build them. Rosatom has been more transparent and open to the public by advertising its projects, resources and oppor-

46 Global Public Opinion on Nuclear Issues and the IAEA: Final Report from 18 Countries (GlobeScan Incorporated, October 2005), http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2015/ph241/ llanos1/docs/globescan.pdf., 19. 47 “Opposition to Nuclear Energy Grows: Global Poll,” GlobeScan, accessed March 24, 2020, https://globescan.com/opposition-to-nuclear-energy-grows-global-poll/#methodology. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 145 tunities for employees. Rosatom acts as a modern, dynamic and profitable company with strategic plans and a conscious public relations policy. Another positive development is that the government invests a lot in the nuclear power sector and creates new jobs and career opportunities for the new generation of nuclear engineers. The corporation attracts ambitious young people and offers appealing career opportunities to skilled personnel. Its network of information centers across Russia serves to educate the public, particularly high school students, about nuclear power, while its other public relations initiatives, such as sponsorship of the popular erudite TV game Chto? Gde? Kogda?, have been successful in promoting the corporation’s image as a hub of state-of-the- art technology and intellectual excellence. Yulia Baskakova, a researcher from WCIOM, pointed out the importance of another factor, which was revealed in the MIT study – the cost of energy for public consumption. She believes that the issue of energy is of public concern in Russia because of growing electric energy tariffs and ongoing public debates regarding the ageing infrastructure. In this context, nuclear power, which is presented as a cheaper source of energy, is gaining popularity among Russians. She also argues that fear of accidents inspired by the Chernobyl disaster is gone and that most Russians pragmatically support development of the nuclear energy sector, believing that technologies are now much more advanced.48 A recent survey by Levada- Center confirms this trend. In July 2019, only 30% of respondents envisaged the possibility of such accidents, while in 2001 this number was 76%. A growing number of respondents believe that such an event is not possible – 64%.49

Russian public opinion on nuclear weapons

One can trace several major trends in public opinion polls throughout the entire period under study and these trends emerged in the context of international events and Russia’s relations with other countries. Nuclear weapons are considered an attribute of a great power. According to a 1996 survey, more Russian respondents saw the Soviet Union as a great power than the Russian Federation (82% of respondents thought that the USSR was a great power and only 21% that modern Russia was one), and they ranked the great power attributes as follows: a strong, modern army – 57%; a high living standard of the population – 52%; authori- tative, wise country leaders – 51%; financial wealth – 50%, and developed science and high culture – 49%.50 And in 2000 those who considered Russia to be a great power mentioned its “vast territory, nuclear weapons and rich

48 «Ɉɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɟ: 30 ɥɟɬɫɩɭɫɬɹ» (“On Chernobyl: Thirty Years Later”), WCIOM, April 26, 2016, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=304. 49 «ɋɬɪɚɯɪɨɫɫɢɹɧɩɟɪɟɞɧɨɜɵɦɑɟɪɧɨɛɵɥɟɦɫɧɢɡɢɥɫɹ» (“The Russians’ Fear of a New Chernobyl Has Gone Down”), Levada-Center, July 17, 2019, https://www. levada.ru/2019/07/17/strah-rossiyan-pered-novym-chernobylem-snizilsya/. 50 «əɜɥɹɟɬɫɹɥɢɫɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɚɹɊɨɫɫɢɹɜɝɥɚɡɚɯɪɨɫɫɢɹɧɜɟɥɢɤɨɣɞɟɪɠɚɜɨɣ» (“Is Today’s Russia a Great Power in the Eyes of Russians?”), FOM, January 16, 1997, http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/of19970107. 146 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya natural resources.”51 In 2001, nuclear weapons were considered an attribute of a great power by 17% of respondents, in 2002 – 30%, in 2005 – 22%.52 In 2001, respondents ranked the top factors of Russia’s greatness in the following order: rich natural resources (71%), vast territory (56%), military power and nuclear weapons (50%).53 In 2006 the question “What is the basis for Russia’s membership in the great powers’ club?” prompted the following answers: rich natural resources – 55%, strong military forces, including nuclear weapons – 40%, and 32% named the fact that Russia exerts an influence on world politics and is a permanent member of the UN Security Council.54 One should stress that over the past years Russians have assigned growing importance to such indicators of a country’s greatness as high living standards, developed industry, high educational level of the population, human rights and freedoms, and great cultural heritage.55 In fact, by the late 1990s some researchers mentioned with surprise that human rights and high living standards had become more important indicators of a country’s greatness than military strength. Thus, one can conclude that in the 1990s and early 2000s the role of nuclear weapons was not pivotal. However, the crisis in and around Ukraine has changed the situation and prompted sociologists Liubov Borusyak and Alexei Levinson to conclude that Russians now preferred greatness to democracy.56 The figure below presents the long-term trends based on Levada- Center polls. One can clearly see that the Russian public has considered nuclear weapons to be an important attribute of a great power throughout the entire period and two visible increases in its perceived importance occurred after the worsening of Russia’s relations with its neighbors and the West in 2008 and 2014. Fig. 1. What, in your opinion, makes a country a “Great Power”?

51 «Ɋɨɫɫɢɹɤɚɤɜɟɥɢɤɚɹɫɬɪɚɧɚ» (“Russia as a Great Country”), Levada-Center, November 20, 2000, https://www.levada.ru/2000/11/20/rossiya-kak-velikaya-strana/. 52 «Ⱥɬɨɦɧɚɹɛɨɦɛɚ – ɜɚɠɧɵɣɚɬɪɢɛɭɬɜɟɥɢɤɨɣɞɟɪɠɚɜɵ. ɇɨɞɚɥɟɤɨɧɟɟɞɢɧɫɬɜɟɧɧɵɣ» (“Atomic Bomb Is an Important Attribute of a Great Power, but Hardly the Only One”), WCIOM, August 5, 2005, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=3242. 53 «Ɋɟɫɭɪɫɵɢɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɹ – ɨɫɧɨɜɧɚɹɝɨɪɞɨɫɬɶɪɨɫɫɢɹɧ» (“Resources and Territory Are the Main Sources of Pride for Russians”), Levada-Center, December 1, 2010, http://www.levada.ru/2010/12/01/resursy-i-territoriya-strany-osnovnaya-gordost-rossiyan/. 54 «Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ ɜ ɜɨɫɶɦɟɪɤɟ: ɪɚɜɧɚɹɫɪɟɞɢɪɚɜɧɵɯ – ɢɥɢ «ɦɥɚɞɲɚɹ ɫɟɫɬɪɚ»?» (“Russia in G8: An Equal or a Younger Sister?”), WCIOM, July 10, 2006, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=2702. 55 «Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ ɜ ɜɨɫɶɦɟɪɤɟ: ɪɚɜɧɚɹɫɪɟɞɢɪɚɜɧɵɯ – ɢɥɢ «ɦɥɚɞɲɚɹ ɫɟɫɬɪɚ»?» (“Russia in G8: An Equal or a Younger Sister?”), WCIOM, July 10, 2006, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=2702; «Ⱥɬɨɦɧɚɹ ɛɨɦɛɚ – ɜɚɠɧɵɣ ɚɬɪɢɛɭɬ ɜɟɥɢɤɨɣ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɵ. ɇɨɞɚɥɟɤɨɧɟɟɞɢɧɫɬɜɟɧɧɵɣ» (“Atomic Bomb Is an Important Attribute of a Great Power, but Hardly the Only One ”), WCIOM, August 5, 2005, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=3242. 56 «ȼɟɥɢɱɢɟ ɜɦɟɫɬɨ ɞɟɦɨɤɪɚɬɢɢ: ɤɚɤ Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ ɞɨɝɧɚɥɚ ɋɒȺ ɜ ɭɦɚɯ ɫɜɨɢɯ ɠɢɬɟɥɟɣ» (“Greatness Instead of Democracy: How Russia Caught Up with the United States in the Minds of its Residents”), Levada-Center, February 4, 2016, http://www.levada.ru/2016/02/04/velichie- vmesto-demokratii-kak-rossiya-dognala-ssha-v-umah-svoih-zhitelej/. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 147

Source of information: Ɉɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɟɦɧɟɧɢɟ – 2018: ȿɠɟɝɨɞɧɢɤ (Public Opinion – 2018: Yearbook) (Moscow: Levada-Center, 2019), 33.

One should pair this indicator with the growing confidence of the majority of Russians that Russia is a great power (31% in 1999 and 75% in 2018).57 The Russian public has also become more confident in the army’s ability to defend the country “in a case of real military threat coming from other countries”: 60% in 2000 and 88% in 2018, with the share of “Definitely yes” answers growing from 19% in 2000 to 50% in 2018.58 Military or officer (15%) was named among the most preferred future professions for one’s children and grandchildren in 2018 along with medical doctor (20%), lawyer, econo- mist and financier (15%); businessman and entrepreneur (15%); IT and high technologies specialist (15%).59

Nuclear weapons are viewed as essential for deterrence and national security. Although the end of the Cold War brought some expectations about a decrease in the importance of nuclear weapons, public opinion reflects perceptions of threats and dangers beyond official declarations. As Maria Katsva evaluated this trend in 2000, “in contrast to official doctrines that do not propose any adversaries and assign the label of partnership to relations with former opponents, public opinion shows in a straightforward manner what countries or military alliances are considered at least as potential adversaries.”60

57 Ɉɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɟɦɧɟɧɢɟ – 2018: ȿɠɟɝɨɞɧɢɤ (Public Opinion – 2018: Yearbook) (Mos- cow: Levada-Center, 2019), 33, https://www.levada.ru/cp/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ OM- 2018.pdf. 58 Ibid., 90. 59 Ibid., 120. 60 Ɇ. Ʉɚɰɜɚ, «Ɋɨɥɶɢ ɦɟɫɬɨ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ ɨɪɭɠɢɹ ɜ ɤɨɧɬɟɤɫɬɟ ɜɡɚɢɦɨɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɹɊɨɫɫɢɢ ɢ ɢɧɫɬɢɬɭɬɨɜ ɟɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɨɣ ɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢ» (Maria Katsva, “The Role and Place of Nuclear Weapons in the Context of Russia’s Interaction with the European Security Institutions”) in Ɋɨɫɫɢɹɢɨɫɧɨɜɧɵɟɢɧɫɬɢɬɭɬɵɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢɜȿɜɪɨɩɟ: ɜɫɬɭɩɚɹɜ XXI ɜɟɤ, ɪɟɞ. Ⱦȼ. Ɍɪɟ- ɧɢɧ (Russia and the Main Security Institutions in Europe: Entering the XXI Century, ed. Dmitry Trenin) (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2000). 148 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya

One can trace the effect of international crises on nuclear weapons perceptions. A sharp increase in positive attitudes towards nuclear weapons was recorded in Russia in 1999 after the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia. Even though the majority of Russian respondents expressed their support for nuclear disarmament in 1998 and 1999, 70% believed that nuclear weapons should be kept as a national security guarantee. In an April 1999 poll by FOM, 78% of respondents said that Russia needed nuclear weapons as a national security guarantee, and 12% believed that Russia should develop new types of nuclear weapons.61 In 2000, 39% of respondents believed that during the previous 15-20 years the danger of a nuclear war had increased and 33% that the nuclear danger had increased in the last six months. Forty-four percent of respondents said that the threat of a possible nuclear conflict came from the USA (vs. 3% from the UK and 2% from France).62 After the NATO campaign of 1999, the perception of the United States as Russia’s primary adversary significantly increased. In 1997, only 44% of respondents thought that Russia had enemies and 33% ranked the United States number one among them, while in April 1999, 73% Russians thought that Russia had enemies and almost half of respondents named the USA as enemy number one.63 Three different polls conducted in April 1999 showed that 70-73% of respondents regarded the NATO campaign as a direct threat to Russia’s national security.64 Russians have feared NATO countries throughout the entire post-Soviet period. In 2006 respondents ranked the following countries in terms of their WMD threat to Russia: USA (33.2%), Iran (15.2%), China (14.5%), Pakistan (11%), and North Korea (6.8%). The results of this survey concur with a poll conducted by ROMIR in July 2003 on the threat assessment regarding the USA and DPRK, but demonstrate a growing concern over terrorism. The question “What is the primary source of danger of nuclear weapons use today?” had the following answers: USA (32%), international terrorists (32%), North Korea (7%), China (6%), India and Pakistan (4%).65 In April 2013, 47% of Russians believed that the DPRK had developed nuclear weapons and felt a real threat coming from it, while 39% thought that the DPRK was just bluffing.66 In the early 2000s, the main threat of WMD use against Russia was seen as coming from terrorist groups. This observation was confirmed by PIR Cen- ter studies in 2000 and 2006: 86% and 83.24% of respondents accordingly. Chechen terrorists (55.11%), Al Qaeda (37.84%) and other terrorist groups

61 «Ʉɚɤɜɵɞɭɦɚɟɬɟ, ɧɚɲɟɣɫɬɪɚɧɟɧɭɠɧɨɢɥɢɧɟɧɭɠɧɨɹɞɟɪɧɨɟɨɪɭɠɢɟ?» (“Do You Think Our Country Needs or Does Not Need Nuclear Weapons?”), FOM, August, 11, 1999, http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/t906006. 62 Ɋɨɫɫɢɹɧɟɨɹɞɟɪɧɨɦɨɪɭɠɢɢɢɹɞɟɪɧɵɯɭɝɪɨɡɚɯ (Russians on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Threats), 24, 25. 63 «Ɉ ɜɪɚɝɚɯ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ» (“On Russia’s Enemies”), FOM, April 23, 1999, https://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/inter_pol/_west_rel/of19991601. 64 «ɊɨɫɫɢɹɧɟɨɩɚɫɚɸɬɫɹɇȺɌɈ» (“Russians Are Wary of NATO”), FOM, May 28, 1999, http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/of19992106. 65 ɂȺ. Ⱥɯɬɚɦɡɹɧ, ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɨɩɪɨɫ (Ildar Akhtamzyan, All- Russian Sociological Survey), 31. 66 «ɋɬɪɚɯ ɚɬɨɦɚ: Ɋɨɫɫɢɹɧɟ ɫɱɢɬɚɸɬ, ɱɬɨ ɋɟɜɟɪɧɚɹ Ʉɨɪɟɹ ɦɨɠɟɬ ɪɚɡɜɹɡɚɬɶ ɹɞɟɪɧɭɸ ɜɨɣɧɭ» (“The Fear of Atom: Russians Believe that North Korea May Unleash a Nuclear War”), RBC, April 22, 2013, http://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2013/04/22/56c1a9a19a7947406ea09c9e. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 149

(33.71%) were listed among those that could threaten Russia with WMD. At the same time, fear of another state’s aggression with nuclear weapons went down from 52% to 29% over the course of six years.67 The Ukrainian crisis increased the fear of an armed conflict involving nuclear weapons among many Russians (64%). In a July 2014 poll, respondents listed the following countries that pose such a threat to Russia: USA (52%), North Korea (15%), and Pakistan (9%). Sixty-seven percent of respondents expressed a negative attitude to the increases in the number of nuclear weapons states. More than half (53%) believed that the danger of a nuclear conflict had gone up over the past 15-20 years, while 26% believed that it remained at the same level.68 An August 2019 survey by WCIOM examines how the Russian public perceives the possibility of a nuclear war. According to the data, 52% of respondents are concerned, to different degrees, about such a possibility, while 46% are not concerned. The highest level of concern is among the elderly and women (68%), while the majority of young people from 18 to 34 are not very concerned – 59% and 58% respectively. However, 79% of respondents are sure that it is impossible to survive in a nuclear conflict and believe that the largest threat to Russia comes from the USA (60%) and China (13%).69 This threat assessment that places the United States so much ahead of the second potential adversary highlights both the public perception of nuclear weapons matters primarily as part of the Russian-U.S. bilateral dynamic and the currently predominant anti-American sentiment, both of which are in line with the framing of international events by Russian state television.

Many Russians believe that Russia should have nuclear weapons and even expand its nuclear arsenal. In 2006, 76% of respondents were convinced that Russia needed nuclear weapons, while 18% disagreed. About 60% of respondents supported short- term “preservation” of the nuclear arsenal and 44.25% supported it in the long run, while 18.54% and 18.98% were in favor of its “increase” in the short and in the long run accordingly.70 Public support for nuclear weapons possession almost doubled from the mid to late 1990s. As researchers observed in 2000, 74% of “doves,” 90% of “hawks” and 84% of “alarmists” among respondents – a majority in all the groups – were in favor of nuclear weapons as a national security guarantee.71 They differed only in degree of such support and attitude to military readiness, non-targeting, no-first-use principle and international negotiations about nuclear disarmament. Mean- while, 33.1% of respondents supported the idea of aiming nuclear arms at certain countries in peaceful times, while 56.6% were against it. Interestingly,

67 ɂȺ. Ⱥɯɬɚɦɡɹɧ, ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɨɩɪɨɫ (Ildar Akhtamzyan, All- Russian Sociological Survey), 5-6, 31. 68 «Ɉ ɹɞɟɪɧɵɯ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɚɯ ɢ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɣ ɭɝɪɨɡɟ» (“On Nuclear Powers and the Nuclear Threat”), FOM, July 15, 2014, https://fom.ru/Mir/11608. 69 «əɞɟɪɧɚɹ ɜɨɣɧɚ: ɪɟɚɥɶɧɚɹ ɭɝɪɨɡɚ ɢɥɢ ɦɢɮ?» (“Nuclear War: A Real Threat or a Myth?”), WCIOM, August 6, 2019, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=9837. 70 ɂȺ. Ⱥɯɬɚɦɡɹɧ, ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɨɩɪɨɫ (Ildar Akhtamzyan, All- Russian Sociological Survey), 16, 18, 19. 71 Ɋɨɫɫɢɹɧɟɨɹɞɟɪɧɨɦɨɪɭɠɢɢɢɹɞɟɪɧɵɯɭɝɪɨɡɚɯ (Russians on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Threats) (Moscow: PIR Center, 2000), 64–67. 150 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya opinions were the most split in Siberia: 45.3% for aiming nuclear weapons, and 46.8% against.72

Attitudes to nuclear disarmament depend on the international situation and threat perception. In the first half of the 1990s, the idea of comprehensive nuclear disarmament seemed to be attractive, but in 2006 it was supported only by a very small fraction of respondents – 2–3.5%.73 In 2005, only 3% of Russians thought that Russia should completely give up nuclear weapons.74 In 2006, 1.84% were for the total liquidation and elimination of nuclear weapons in the nearest future (3–5 years) and 3.43% within the next 25–30 years.75 In contrast, in July 2014 an overwhelming majority expressed the need for comprehensive nuclear disarmament (76%), although 54% believed that it would be impossible within the next 20–30 years.76 Perceived hostility of the international environment coupled with an understanding that one cannot survive a nuclear war may be behind the increased support for nuclear disarmament, even if only as a long-term goal. Most respondents (74%) expressed a negative attitude to U.S. ballistic missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech Republic and saw them as anti- Russian, while the rest were split between positive (2%), neutral (15%), and uncertain (9%) attitudes. Open-ended questions prompted the following explanations for these plans: 21% – “to threaten Russia, to weaken Russia, to put pressure on Russia, to prepare for the occupation of Russia,” 11% – “to approach Russian boarders, to surround, to control air space around Russia, to control Russia,” 10% – “to expand U.S. influence,” “the desire for world leadership,” 5% – “to attain military superiority,” “demonstration of force,” 3% – “for their own security,” 2% – “to strengthen control over Europe,” 2% – “to defend from Russia,” and 1% – “to defend from Asian countries, Middle East countries, China, Iran, North Korea.”77

Most Russians support the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and believe that Russia should not facilitate proliferation. This attitude is one of the constants present during the entire period, although it is not as simple as it seems. In 2006, 82.4% of respondents thought that the world would not be safer if more countries were to acquire nuclear status.78 Nevertheless, many Russians demonstrate tolerance towards nuclear

72 ɂȺ. Ⱥɯɬɚɦɡɹɧ, ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɨɩɪɨɫ (Ildar Akhtamzyan, All- Russian Sociological Survey), 21. 73 Ibid., 24. 74 «Ⱥɬɨɦɧɚɹɛɨɦɛɚ – ɜɚɠɧɵɣɚɬɪɢɛɭɬɜɟɥɢɤɨɣɞɟɪɠɚɜɵ. ɇɨɞɚɥɟɤɨɧɟɟɞɢɧɫɬɜɟɧɧɵɣ» (“Atomic Bomb Is an Important Attribute of a Great Power, but Hardly the Only One”), WCIOM, August 5, 2005, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=3242. 75 ɂȺ. Ⱥɯɬɚɦɡɹɧ, ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɨɩɪɨɫ (Ildar Akhtamzyan, All- Russian Sociological Survey), 18. 76 «Ɉ ɹɞɟɪɧɵɯ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɚɯ ɢ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɣ ɭɝɪɨɡɟ» (“On Nuclear Powers and the Nuclear Threat”), FOM, July 15, 2014, https://fom.ru/Mir/11608. 77 «ɉɥɚɧɵ ɪɚɡɦɟɳɟɧɢɹ ɚɦɟɪɢɤɚɧɫɤɢɯ ɫɢɫɬɟɦ ɉɊɈ ɜ ȼɨɫɬɨɱɧɨɣ ȿɜɪɨɩɟ» (“Plans to Deploy U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Systems in Eastern Europe”), FOM, May 3, 2007, https://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/inter_pol/pro_snv/d071823. 78 ɂȺ. Ⱥɯɬɚɦɡɹɧ, ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɨɩɪɨɫ (Ildar Akhtamzyan, All- Russian Sociological Survey), 34. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 151 technology development in new countries, especially in developing countries, based on the principles of equal rights and fairness. One can explain this tendency by the traditions of Soviet anti-Western rhetoric during the Cold War and active use of this posture during the deterioration of Russian-Western relations in the late 1990s and during President Putin’s second term. WCIOM polls in July 2005 showed that 51% Russians believed that Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and other countries had the same right to have nuclear weapons as “established” nuclear countries, such as the United States, Russia and China, and thus there should be no punitive policy towards countries pursuing nuclear weapons programs. Yet, 29% respondents agreed that the international community should isolate “new nuclear countries” and apply economic and other sanctions to prevent a new nuclear arms race. Interestingly, the residents of the two capital cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, showed especially high support (67%) for equal rights to nuclear weapons.79 Nuclear proliferation crises related to Iran and DPRK enable the tracking of variations in this public opinion trend. According to Levada-Center polls, when asked to pick the most important events of 2006, respondents selected “nuclear test and missiles launches by North Korea” as the 20th and “conflict between Iran and UN about Iran’s nuclear program” as the 21st most important (8 and 7% respectively). These events ranked lower than “the devaluation of the U.S. dollar” (9%, 18th position) and “Dima Bilan’s 2nd place in the Eurovision contest” (9%, 19th position), but scored higher than the screening of the new Russian blockbuster (Devyataya rota) – 6% and 22nd position.80 The number of those who thought that Russia should share its nuclear technologies and arms dropped from 14% in 2000 to only 6.29% in 2006.81 It seems that the opinions on the Iranian nuclear program depend more on that country’s perception as a “friend” of Russia rather than an impartial assessment of the situation. In April 2006, 37% of respondents called Iran a “friendly” and 27% an “unfriendly” country to Russia.82 Exactly a year later, 45% of respondents said that Iran was friendly to Russia and about 25% disagreed. Fifty percent of respondents thought that Iran was pursuing a military program, and 68% thought that Iran’s nuclear weapons would be a threat to other countries, but fewer people (52%) thought they would be a threat to Russia.83 In April 2006, when asked whether the Iranian nuclear program endangered Russian security, 38% respondents answered “yes” and 39% – “no.”84 By the end of 2006 attitudes to this potential threat continued to be

79 «Ⱥɬɨɦɧɚɹɛɨɦɛɚ – ɜɚɠɧɵɣɚɬɪɢɛɭɬɜɟɥɢɤɨɣɞɟɪɠɚɜɵ. ɇɨɞɚɥɟɤɨɧɟɟɞɢɧɫɬɜɟɧɧɵɣ» (“Atomic Bomb Is an Important Attribute of a Great Power, but Hardly the Only One”), WCIOM, August 5, 2005, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=3242. 80 «ȼɚɠɧɟɣɲɢɟ ɫɨɛɵɬɢɹ 2006 ɝɨɞɚ» (“The Most Important Events of 2006”), Levada- Center, December 24, 2006, https://www.levada.ru/2006/12/24/vazhnejshie-sobytiya-2006- goda/. 81 ɂȺ. Ⱥɯɬɚɦɡɹɧ, ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɨɩɪɨɫ (Ildar Akhtamzyan, All- Russian Sociological Survey), 7. 82 «ɂɪɚɧ: ɹɞɟɪɧɚɹ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɚ» (“Iran: Nuclear Program”), FOM, April 27, 2006, https://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/count_/iran/dd061724/printable/. 83 «əɞɟɪɧɚɹ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɚɂɪɚɧɚ ɢ ɪɟɡɨɥɸɰɢɹ ɋɨɜɛɟɡɚɈɈɇ» (“Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Resolution of the UN Security Council”), FOM, April 5, 2007, https://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/count_/iran/d071423. 84 «ɂɪɚɧ: ɹɞɟɪɧɚɹ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɚ» (“Iran: Nuclear Program”), FOM, April 27, 2006, https://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/count_/iran/dd061724/printable/. 152 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya closely split: 42.2% – “yes,” 35.9% – “no.”85 Thus, it is not surprising that, as of April 2007, almost the same number of respondents (30% and 29% respectively) approved and disapproved of the UN Security Council resolution that tightened economic sanctions against Iran, while 41% were uncertain.86 In 2018, when asked by Levada-Center whether there was a threat to Russia coming from other countries, 56% of respondents answered in the affirmative. When asked whether Russia had enemies, 81% said yes.87 Among those, none specifically named Iran or DPRK as enemies, but there were respondents who named them among Russia’s close friends: 5% and 4% respectively. Not surprisingly, the United States came out as number one both among Russia’s enemies and countries that are hostile to Russia: 70% and 78% respectively.88

Media coverage of nuclear weapons and public discourse

In March 2014, notorious Russian TV anchor Dmitry Kiselyov reminded his viewers that Russia was the only world power capable of turning the United States into “radioactive ash.”89 Controversial statements like that are part of his signature style and conform with the general anti-American rhetoric that has come to dominate on Russian state television over the last few years. This particular statement became an Internet meme, and some segments of Kiselyov’s audience were probably amused. However, many others were shocked and saw it as yet another sign that Russian public discourse on nuclear issues had become reckless.90 As the successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited its entire nuclear arsenal. It is an active member of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and together with the USA proceeds along a more or less steady path of nuclear arms reductions, despite periods of bilateral tension. However, the ongoing crisis in relations between Russia and the West prompted some public figures, including journalists and politicians, to brandish the nuclear sword and express views that are particularly extreme compared to the official Rus- sian position on the nuclear issues. Experts, such as Alexey Arbatov of the Carnegie Moscow Center, voiced concern about these routine appeals to the

85 ɂȺ. Ⱥɯɬɚɦɡɹɧ, ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɫɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɨɩɪɨɫ (Ildar Akhtamzyan, All- Russian Sociological Survey), 30. 86 «əɞɟɪɧɚɹ ɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɚɂɪɚɧɚ ɢ ɪɟɡɨɥɸɰɢɹ ɋɨɜɛɟɡɚɈɈɇ» (“Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Resolution of the UN Security Council”), FOM, April 5, 2007, https://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/count_/iran/d071423. 87 Ɉɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɟɦɧɟɧɢɟ – 2018: ȿɠɟɝɨɞɧɢɤ (Public Opinion – 2018: Yearbook) (Mos- cow: Levada-Center, 2019), 146, https://www.levada.ru/cp/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ OM- 2018.pdf. 88 Ibid., 147–149. 89 «Ʉɢɫɟɥɟɜ: ɊɨɫɫɢɹɫɩɨɫɨɛɧɚɩɪɟɜɪɚɬɢɬɶɋɒȺɜɪɚɞɢɨɚɤɬɢɜɧɵɣɩɟɩɟɥ» (“Kiselyov: Russia Is Capable of Turning the United States into Radioactive Ash”), Novaya gazeta, March 17, 2014, https://novayagazeta.ru/news/2014/03/17/98050-kiselev-rossiya-sposobna-prevratit- ssha-v-radioaktivnyy-pepel. 90ɘɪɢɣɋɚɩɪɵɤɢɧ, «Ʉɚɤɦɵɩɟɪɟɫɬɚɥɢɛɨɹɬɶɫɹɢɩɨɥɸɛɢɥɢɛɨɦɛɭ» (Yury Saprykin, “How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb”), Republic, January 28, 2015, http://slon.ru/insights/1209561/. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 153 country’s nuclear arsenal.91 Some journalists echoed this concern, recalling that such irresponsible rhetoric was unheard of in Soviet times.92 The problem is that even though federal television journalists in Russia rely overwhelmingly on elite sources when constructing the news and seldom question the official position, they happen to be less reserved in their commentary than public officials and sometimes offer interpretations that are more populist or extreme. Nuclear weapons related topics seem to encourage that, as both journalists and viewers appear to be fascinated and awed by them. Nuclear weapons hold a special place in the arsenals of the few states that possess them and they clearly warrant special treatment in official and public discourse. Their enormous destructive potential is intertwined with great symbolic power. “No other weapon system is as iconic as nuclear weapons,” argues Jarrod Hayes from the Georgia Institute of Technology in his piece “Nuclear Disarmament and Stability in the Logic of Habit.”93 One can hardly disagree. Average Americans have opinions about them, and so do average Russians. These opinions may to some extent be simply passed on from generation to generation, but to some extent they are shaped by the current mass media coverage and public debate. Generally, Russian citizens do not seem averse to arms control and disarmament initiatives. According to a 2008 global survey, when asked about nuclear disarmament, the Russian public showed very similar attitudes to those of the public in the other four P-5 countries. Large majorities favored complete elimination of nuclear weapons according to a timeline: the United States (77%), Russia (69%), China (83%), France (86%), and Great Britain (81%). Only 20 percent opposed this idea in the United States; 14 percent in Russia and China; 12 percent in France; and 17 percent in Britain. Still, the degree of support varied: in China (60%), France (58%) and Great Britain (55%) the overwhelming majority strongly supported the elimination of nuclear weapons, while in Russia (38%) and the USA (39%) respondents expressing strong support were less numerous.94 Russia advocates multilateral disarmament talks, but so far has been quite satisfied with bilateral negotiations, as they are seen as an implicit acknowledgement of its equal status with the USA. As for unilateral nuclear disarmament, one can safely argue that it is out of the question. Complete disarmament would mean giving up the “nuclear shield” and exposing one’s vulner- abilities to partners who are not always trustworthy. This could be one of the reasons why in Russia nuclear disarmament as a process is often discussed and reflected upon, but its presumable final stage, complete nuclear disarmament, is rarely mentioned. Let us recall, for instance, that when ICAN (International Cam-

91 Ⱥɥɟɤɫɟɣ Ⱥɪɛɚɬɨɜ, «əɞɟɪɧɵɣ ɩɨɹɫ ɲɚɯɢɞɨɜ» (Alexey Arbatov “Nuclear Suicide Belt”), Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 30, 2015, http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2015-09-30/5_ nuclear.html. 92ɘɪɢɣɋɚɩɪɵɤɢɧ, «Ʉɚɤɦɵɩɟɪɟɫɬɚɥɢɛɨɹɬɶɫɹɢɩɨɥɸɛɢɥɢɛɨɦɛɭ» (Yury Saprykin, “How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb”), Republic, January 28, 2015, http://slon.ru/insights/1209561/. 93 Jarrod Hayes, “Nuclear Disarmament and Stability in the Logic of Habit,” The Nonpro- liferation Review 22 (2015): 505–515, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1159374. 94 “Publics Around the World Favor International Agreement to Eliminate All Nuclear Weapons,” WorldPublicOpinion.org, accessed March 24, 2020, http://worldpublicopinion. net/publics-around-the-world-favor-international-agreement-to-eliminate-all-nuclear-weapons/. 154 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya paign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 and Russian news programs mentioned it, they failed to mention the position of the de jure and de facto nuclear weapons states on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and specifically whether Russia was planning to sign it.95 Let us recall here that, in the words of MFA officials, Russia considers “the development of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to be a mis- take” and argues that it “does not contribute to nuclear disarmament, undermines the NPT and provokes growing contradictions among its Parties.”96 But Russian television did not go into such detail in its coverage. In November 2014, Levada-Center carried out a public opinion survey on whether Russia is a great power.97 It turned out that 44% of respondents saw military might and nuclear missiles among great power attributes (compared to 44% in 2012, 37% in 2008, and 30% in 1999). This attribute ranked lower than the prosperity of citizens (60%) and economic and industrial potential of the country (60%), but higher than great culture, science and arts (23%) or abundant natural resources (20%). It is also noteworthy that 68% of respondents believed that Russia was now a great power (compared to 48% in 2012, 49% in 2008, and 14% in 1994). As one can see from this and other opinion polls, both the sense of national pride and the link between Russia’s international status and nuclear weapons possession have been growing stronger over the past few years, and there are reasons to believe that the mass media played a crucial role in this process. Nuclear ICBM systems Topol and Yars, and the short-range ballistic missile system Iskander, can be seen at the annual military parades in Mos- cow on Victory Day and have come to be closely associated with the country’s military might. So it does not come as a complete surprise that two of those weapon systems ended up on anti-Western T-shirts with the following quips: “Sanctions? Don’t make my Iskanders laugh” and “Topol is not afraid of sanctions.”98 This is not entirely new. Milder versions of such humor were present even before the current rise of anti-Western sentiments. Back in 1999, a popular Russian stand-up TV show featured a song in which the Russian Prime Minister was asking the IMF for money and mentioned missiles in the refrain in an implicit threat.99 Back then, however, the focus was on the con-

95 «ȼ ɇɨɪɜɟɝɢɢ ɨɛɴɹɜɢɥɢ ɥɚɭɪɟɚɬɚ ɇɨɛɟɥɟɜɫɤɨɣ ɩɪɟɦɢɢ ɦɢɪɚ» (“The Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Was Announced in Norway”), Channel One, October 6, 2017, https://www.1tv.ru/news/2017- 10-06/333987-v_norvegii_ob_yavili_laureata_nobelevskoy_premii_mira. 96 “Statement by the Representative of the Russian Federation at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the Issues of Nuclear Disarmament (Cluster 1), New York, May 2, 2019,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed March 24, 2020, https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/ id/3631627?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_l anguageId=en_GB. 97 «68% ɪɨɫɫɢɹɧɫɱɢɬɚɸɬɊɨɫɫɢɸɜɟɥɢɤɨɣɞɟɪɠɚɜɨɣ» (“68% of Russians Consider Rus- sia a Great Power”), Levada-Center, December 11, 2014, https://www.levada. ru/2014/12/11/68- rossiyan-schitayut-rossiyu-velikoj-derzhavoj/. 98 See: “Russians Hand In Western T-shirts in Patriotic Fashion Drive,” The Moscow Times, September 25, 2014, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2014/09/25/russians-hand-in-western-t- shirts-in-patriotic-fashion-drive-a39800. 99 See: «Ⱦɚɣɧɚɦɞɟɧɟɝ, Ʉɚɦɞɟɫɫɸ» (“Give Us Money, Camdessus”), accessed March 24, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5gYiNSA2m0. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 155 trast between Russia’s technological and military power and its economic weakness. Today’s message is not about weakness, it is about strength. One can claim that there is a shared perception in Russia that Russian- U.S. nuclear disarmament talks constitute an implicit acknowledgement of Russia’s special status in the international arena. This perception is reinforced by mass media. “On new principles of equal security of two great powers” – these were the words with which a TV anchor introduced an almost 13- minute Channel One report on the new START entitled “A Farewell to Arms” back in April 2010.100 By the way, the new START was extensively covered by Russian television and its value for Russia and the world was carefully explained. Journalists and commentators drew particular attention to the balance of the two parties’ rights and obligations and the treaty’s economizing effect. According to the Channel One reporter, there were three main indicators of that treaty’s importance: mutual trust, commitment to NPT and saving of money.101 The viewers see Russian missile tests and new weapons complexes on the TV screen and should feel protected, but they should not think that protection comes at an excessively high cost to them. However, the public does not seem to pay too much attention to details when it comes to international agreements, even those dealing with nuclear weapons. Despite extensive coverage of the new START, in May 2010, more than half of respondents (52%) did not know about the treaty, and only 8% of respondents clearly knew what the treaty was about.102 These figures did not improve after ratification: in summer 2011, 45% of Russian respondents knew about this treaty, but of those, 43% were not sure what the treaty was about.103 A survey carried out by Gallup in December 2010 revealed: if it were up to them, “51% of Americans would ratify the START nuclear arms agreement with Russia and 30% would vote against it, while 19% were unde- cided.”104 Alas, the survey did not examine how familiar the respondents were with the details of this international agreement. It is noteworthy that Russian initiative is always emphasized when it comes to progress in nuclear disarmament. In a lengthy report on President Medvedev’s participation in the 2010 Nuclear Summit the point was made that the very first “nuclear security summit” after the end of the Cold War had taken place in Moscow.105 According to the special Channel One report on

100 «ɊɨɫɫɢɹɢɋɒȺɞɨɝɨɜɨɪɢɥɢɫɶɨɫɨɤɪɚɳɟɧɢɢɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɯɧɚɫɬɭɩɚɬɟɥɶɧɵɯɜɨɨ- ɪɭɠɟɧɢɣ» (“Russia and the United States Agreed to Reduce Strategic Offensive Weapons”), Channel One, April 11, 2010, http://www.1tv.ru/news/polit/152116. 101 «ȾɦɢɬɪɢɣɆɟɞɜɟɞɟɜɢȻɚɪɚɤɈɛɚɦɚ 8 ɚɩɪɟɥɹɜɉɪɚɝɟɩɨɞɩɢɲɭɬɧɨɜɨɟɫɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɩɨɋɇȼ» (“Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama Will Sign the New START Agreement in Prague on April 8 ”), Channel One, March 26, 2010, http://www.1tv.ru/news/polit/151135. 102 «Ⱦɨɝɨɜɨɪ «ɋɇȼ-3»: ɜɵɝɨɞɧɨ, ɧɨ ɦɚɥɨɩɨɧɹɬɧɨ» (“START-3 Treaty: Advantageous, but Difficult to Understand”), WCIOM, May 12, 2010, http://wciom.ru/index.php?id= 515&uid=13478. 103 “əɞɟɪɧɨɟ ɪɚɡɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɟ: ɤɨɦɭ ɜɵɝɨɞɧɨ?» (“Nuclear Disarmament: Who Benefits?”), WCIOM, July 4, 2011, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=1635. 104 Frank Newport, “In U.S., Majority Supports Ratification of START Treaty,” Gallup, December 10, 2010, https://news.gallup.com/poll/145184/majority-supports-ratification-start- treaty.aspx. 105 «ɂɬɨɝɢɜɢɡɢɬɚɉɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚɊɎȾɦɢɬɪɢɹɆɟɞɜɟɞɟɜɚɧɚɫɚɦɦɢɬɜȼɚɲɢɧɝɬɨɧɢɟɝɨ ɩɨɟɡɞɤɢɩɨɘɠɧɨɣȺɦɟɪɢɤɟ» («The Results of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s Visit to 156 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya the signing of START, Russia had suggested drafting a new nuclear reductions treaty back in 2006, but then this initiative had been rejected by Ameri- can counterparts.106 All in all, the issue of nuclear disarmament is primarily presented as a bilateral one, and after the hopes of “reset” faded away, images of America as a reliable and pragmatic partner gave way to discussions of alleged U.S. violations in the arms control field. The main claims and accusations are as follows: nuclear sharing and joint military exercises with non-nuclear- weapon states, problems with fulfilling obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention, upload potential, U.S. nuclear bombs in Germany that are a provoca- tion against neighbors107 and so on. As mentioned earlier, the United States is not just the primary potential partner for Russia (in the nuclear field and beyond), but also the primary potential opponent. One can argue that at the height of the Cold War the United States needed nuclear weapons, especially nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, to bridge the power gap created by the USSR’s conventional superiority. The tables were reversed after the Cold War, and it is believed that the Russian elite now sees nuclear weapons as a way to compensate for the country’s conventional inferiority compared to the USA and its NATO allies. The question is whether the public has noticed that change. However, even if average Russians do not realize that Russia is weaker in conventional terms than the USA, they do know that the U.S. is a much stronger economy and they see nuclear weapons not just as one of the sources of national power in general, but as the primary source of power vis-à-vis the USA. Talking about other countries’ nuclear weapons, one should not forget about delivery systems, particularly nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, as both a potential way to attack Russia and as a factor in U.S. missile defense planning. The missile endeavors of other countries (e.g., India, DPRK, and Iran) are sometimes covered by the media, but not framed as a threat to Russia. For instance, a Channel One report on a successful Indian missile launch mentioned that the Indian missiles could reach China and Europe108 and another report claimed that North Korean missiles could reach the USA.109 Neither presented those missiles as a threat to Russian security. On the other hand, the U.S. ballistic missile defense program gets a lot of coverage during both rosy and thorny periods of bilateral relations, and it is emphasized that the missile defense is capable of undermining strategic stability. A lot of attention was paid to the North Korean nuclear test of 2017 and the subsequent reaction of

Washington and His Trip to South America»), Channel One, April 18, 2010, http://www.1tv.ru/news/polit/152534. 106 «ȼɉɪɚɝɟɧɚɱɢɧɚɟɬɫɹɰɟɪɟɦɨɧɢɹɩɨɞɩɢɫɚɧɢɹɧɨɜɨɝɨȾɨɝɨɜɨɪɚɩɨɋɇȼɦɟɠɞɭɊɨɫ- ɫɢɟɣɢɋɒȺ» (“The Signing of the New START Treaty between Russia and the USA Is Start- ing in Prague”), Channel One, April 8, 2010, http://www.1tv.ru/news/polit/151925. 107 «ɇɟɦɟɰɤɢɟɠɭɪɧɚɥɢɫɬɵ: ȺɦɟɪɢɤɚɧɰɵɝɨɬɨɜɵɪɚɡɦɟɫɬɢɬɶɜȽɟɪɦɚɧɢɢɧɨɜɵɟɚɬɨɦ- ɧɵɟɛɨɦɛɵ» (“German Journalists: Americans Are Ready to Deploy New Atomic Bombs in Germany”), Channel One, September 23, 2015, https://www.1tv.ru/news/2015-09-23/10609- nemetskie_zhurnalisty_amerikantsy_gotovy_razmestit_v_germanii_novye_atomnye_bomby. 108 «ɂɧɞɢɹ ɢɫɩɵɬɚɥɚ ɧɨɜɨɟ ɦɨɳɧɨɟ ɨɪɭɠɢɟ» (“India Tested a Power New Weapon”), Channel One, April 19, 2012, http://www.1tv.ru/news/world/204899. 109 «ɋɟɜɟɪɧɚɹɄɨɪɟɹɨɛɥɚɞɚɟɬɛɚɥɥɢɫɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɦɢɪɚɤɟɬɚɦɢ, ɤɨɬɨɪɵɟɫɩɨɫɨɛɧɵɞɨɫɬɢɱɶ ɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɢɋɒȺ» (“North Korea Has Ballistic Missiles that Are Capable of Reaching the U.S. Territory”), Channel One, October 9, 2012, http://www.1tv.ru/news/world/217213. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 157 the international community, particularly the United States. In the Russian coverage, geographic proximity was overshadowed by political rationale: arguably, there are no reasons for the DPRK to attack Russia, hence its nuclear program is not seen as even an accidental threat. The focus was on whether a North Korean missile could reach Alaska, even though TV reports did show the residents of Vladivostok who had felt the aftershocks of the nuclear test (but did not ask for their opinion about the test itself).110 Russian media offered plenty of positive coverage of “reset” and START negotiations in 2009 and 2010. Not surprisingly, the public attitude to the United States, which was very negative right after the Russian conflict with Georgia in 2008, significantly improved by 2011.111 Then the “reset” gave way to disagreements followed by a full-scale crisis in relations between Rus- sia and the West, which caused positive attitudes towards the United States in general and President Obama in particular to be forgotten.112 However, that does not mean that future talks on further nuclear reductions will be met with public disapproval. Over the past several years, Russian mass media proved capable of manufacturing exactly the kind of public consensus that is needed for pursuit of any agenda desired by policy-makers. Today’s TV news bulle- tins, newspaper articles and even press releases of the Russian Foreign Minis- try are filled with Brezhnev era stylistic clichés, but this can change over- night. A variety of metaphors are used for the Russian nuclear arsenal in the media and in official rhetoric, but Russian nuclear forces have traditionally been presented as primarily defensive in nature, so the most widely used term is “nuclear shield” inherited from the Soviet era. Therefore, missile launches are presented as “successful tests of the Russian nuclear shield,” even though missiles could also be seen as “swords.” Channel One reports on such tests on a regular basis, and the viewers are probably expected not just to feel safe, but also to feel proud. For that reason it is emphasized that Topol is a purely Rus- sian creation with no foreign components113 (probably to contrast it with many other products of Russian industries in the post-Soviet period that came to rely on overseas parts or production technologies) and the most reliable weapon system in the world that is gradually being replaced by an even better

110 «ɂɫɩɵɬɚɧɢɹɜɨɞɨɪɨɞɧɨɣɛɨɦɛɵɜɄɇȾɊɜɵɡɜɚɥɢɡɟɦɥɟɬɪɹɫɟɧɢɟ, ɨɬɝɨɥɨɫɤɢɤɨɬɨ- ɪɨɝɨɞɨɲɥɢɞɨȼɥɚɞɢɜɨɫɬɨɤɚ» («Hydrogen Bomb Testing in DPRK Caused an Earthquake the Aftershocks of Which Reached Vladivostok»), Channel One, September 3, 2017, https://www.1tv.ru/news/2017-09-03/331912- ispy- taniya_vodorodnoy_bomby_v_kndr_vyzvali_zemletryasenie_otgoloski_kotorogo_doshli_do_vla divostoka. 111 «ɊɨɫɫɢɹɋɒȺ: «ɩɟɪɟɡɚɝɪɭɡɤɚ» ɧɚɛɢɪɚɟɬ ɯɨɞ» (“Russia and the United States: the Reset Is Gaining Momentum”), WCIOM, June 28, 2010; «ɊɨɫɫɢɹɋɒȺ: ɫɩɭɫɬɹɞɜɚɫ ɩɨɥɨɜɢɧɨɣɝɨɞɚɩɨɫɥɟ «ɩɟɪɟɡɚɝɪɭɡɤɢ» (“Russia and the United States: Two and a Half Years after the Reset”), WCIOM, September 13, 2011, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=1580. 112 «Ⱥɦɟɪɢɤɚɧɫɤɢɣɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɜɩɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɥɟɧɢɹɯ ɪɨɫɫɢɹɧ» (“American President in the Eyes of Russians”), WCIOM, December 23, 2014, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=642. 113 «ɋɤɨɫɦɨɞɪɨɦɚ «ɉɥɟɫɟɰɤ» ɷɬɢɦɭɬɪɨɦɩɪɨɢɡɜɟɞɺɧɩɭɫɤɆȻɊ «ɌɨɩɨɥɶɆ» ɲɚɯɬɧɨ- ɝɨ ɛɚɡɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɹ» (“Silo-Based ICBM Topol-M Was Launched This Morning from Plesetsk Launch Site), Channel One, November 1, 2014, http://www.1tv.ru/news/techno/270991. 158 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya system – Yars – that is referred to as a “truly Russian weapon.”114 Regular military exercises improve the efficiency of interaction between different agencies dealing with military aspects of nuclear technology and President Putin has been personally involved in practical testing of the Russian nuclear triad.115 And when the term “arms race” is invoked, it is usually to state that Russia will not let itself be drawn into it. Television reports on the exhibition celebrating 60 years of the Soviet atomic project116 or the anniversary of serial bomb production in the city of Sarov117 convey a complex message. Today’s nuclear arsenal is part of the country’s historical heritage. It is a symbol of both military might and technological breakthrough. Nuclear energy is not something to be feared, because humankind has tamed it. The Soviet nuclear project was a great endeavor undertaken by truly dedicated scientists and engineers, and Russia is grateful for their effort. What they had created helped prevent otherwise inevitable global conflict and continues to fulfil its deterrent function today. Nuclear research centers remain cradles of innovative technologies, and military factories continue producing state-of-the-art military complexes, so Russia is safe. Thus, for many Russians, nuclear weapons constitute an important part of national identity to which they appeal in times of crisis (for instance, when facing economic sanctions imposed by the West). This perception was to some extent inherited from Soviet times and is deeply entrenched, but it is also actively reinforced by official discourse and media framing. According to a poll carried out in August 2009 (60 years after the first Soviet nuclear test), 60% of Russians believed that the development of atomic weapons had helped restore military parity and ensure peaceful coexistence of the USSR and the USA. What is even more important, 53% of respondents thought that nuclear weapons remained the main guarantee of Russian security (27% shared the view that nuclear weapons played an important, but not a decisive role).118 In the course of the past several years, Russian state-aligned TV channels backed tough official statements addressed to NATO and the USA with images of missile launches and military exercises, in order to reassure their viewers and convey the message of a strong country. They repeated that Rus- sia was doing its best to avoid a new arms race and a new Cold War, but all those numerous references to nuclear deterrence and retaliation might have created a feeling of danger and vulnerability in the minds of TV viewers. Ac-

114 «Ɋȼɋɇɩɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɢɥɢɭɧɢɤɚɥɶɧɨɟɨɪɭɠɢɟ – ɩɟɪɟɞɜɢɠɧɨɣɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫ «əɪɫ» (“Russian Strategic Missile Forces Presented a Unique Weapon – Mobile Complex Yars”), Channel One, September 23, 2011, http://www.1tv.ru/news/techno/186236. 115 «ɆɚɫɲɬɚɛɧɵɟɚɪɦɟɣɫɤɢɟɦɚɧɟɜɪɵɩɪɨɲɥɢɧɨɱɶɸɩɨɜɫɟɣɊɨɫɫɢɢ, ɭɱɚɫɬɢɟɜɤɨɬɨ- ɪɵɯɩɪɢɧɹɥȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪɉɭɬɢɧ» (“Large-Scale Military Maneuvers Were Held All Over Russia During the Night, and Vladimir Putin Took Part in Them”), Channel One, October 27, 2017, https://www.1tv.ru/news/2017-10-27/335220-masshtabnye_armeyskie_manevry_proshli_ no- chyu_po_vsey_rossii_uchastie_v_kotoryh_prinyal_vladimir_putin. 116 «ȼɫɹɩɪɚɜɞɚɨɛɚɬɨɦɧɨɦɩɪɨɟɤɬɟɋɋɋɊ» (“The Whole Truth about the Soviet Atomic Project”), NTV, July 24, 2009, http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/169824. 117 «ɒɟɫɬɶɞɟɫɹɬɥɟɬɡɚɹɞɟɪɧɵɦɳɢɬɨɦ» (Sixty Years Behind the Nuclear Shield), NTV, December 2, 2011, http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/247372. 118 «1949: ɤɚɤ ɚɬɨɦɧɚɹ ɛɨɦɛɚ ɫɩɚɫɥɚ ɦɢɪ» (“1949: How the Atomic Bomb Saved the World”), WCIOM, August 27, 2009, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=2192. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 159 cording to a November 2014 public opinion survey, many felt that the threat of a new Cold War was more real now than in the course of the past seven years, and 25% of respondents believed that it already existed.119 Ironically, in praising nuclear deterrence and Russia’s ability to turn America into radioactive ash, Russian media talked so much about nuclear weapons over the past few years, that nuclear conflict started to seem real to at least some of the TV viewers. When asked to select up to five things that scared them most of all, 17% of respondents stated in January 2015 that they were concerned about the possibility of a nuclear war, while two years earlier this figure had been only 8%.120 In 2010, a Communist Party MP demanded the dismissal of renowned Russian TV journalist Vladimir Pozner from Channel One, offering the following justification: television is a “nuclear weapon” and cannot be entrusted to a person “who does not love their country.”121 This metaphor seems especially appropriate in the context of this chapter. Just like nuclear weapons, television is a powerful tool with great destructive potential that should not be underestimated. Russian mass media managed to convince the audience that the main threat to the country was coming from the West. This can be to a large extent explained by the fact that threats associated with NATO and the USA were emphasized, while potential threats posed by nuclear weapons and missiles in the hands of other countries (be it China, North Korea, India or Iran) were downplayed. The crisis in Ukraine overshadowed most other international topics in media coverage, and nuclear weapons issues became intertwined with Ukrainian events, partly because all roads in the current Russian media discourse lead to the USA. The post-Maidan Ukrainian leadership that came to power in 2014 was presented as a potential problem for the nuclear nonproliferation regime, because of Ukraine’s alleged intention to withdraw from the NPT and because of alleged risks associated with illicit trafficking of Ukrainian nuclear materials and technologies. Meanwhile, hints were also made relating to the nefarious plans that the U.S. allegedly had for the Ukrainian nuclear industry. Out of the five filters that shape the news media output, according to Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky,122 two are especially relevant in the Russian case.123 One is the news journalists’ overwhelming reliance on elite

119 «ɏɨɥɨɞɧɚɹɜɨɣɧɚ – ɜɫɤɨɪɟɧɚɱɧɟɬɫɹɢɥɢɭɠɟɢɞɟɬ?» (“The Cold War – Starting Soon or Already Underway?”), WCIOM, December 1, 2014, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id= 236&uid=659. 120 «ɑɟɝɨɛɨɢɬɫɹɊɨɫɫɢɹ?» (“What Is Russia Afraid of?”), WCIOM, January 29, 2015, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=619. 121 See: «Ⱦɟɩɭɬɚɬɤɨɦɦɭɧɢɫɬ ɩɨɬɪɟɛɨɜɚɥ ɨɬɫɬɪɚɧɢɬɶ ɉɨɡɧɟɪɚ ɨɬ «ɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ ɨɪɭɠɢɹ» (“A Communist MP Demanded That Pozner Be Kept Away from the ‘Nuclear Weapon’”), TeleVesti.ru, May 6, 2010, http://www.televesti.ru/tvnews/2186-deputat-kommunist-potreboval- otstranit-poznera-ot.html. 122 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Econ- omy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). 123 Eric Herring and Piers Robinson label the filters suggested by Herman and Chomsky “corporate, advertising, sourcing, flak and ideological”: interests of corporate conglomerates, media reliance on advertising revenue, media reliance on elite sources, attacks against controversial stories, and the prism of anti-communism. For more details, see Eric Herring and Piers Rob- 160 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya sources, and the other is the importance of ideology as a prism. Herman and Chomsky talk about anti-communism that provided American journalists with “a readymade template with which to ‘understand’ global events” during the Cold War, while in Russia, arguably, such a template is currently that of anti- Americanism, which one can clearly discern in the media coverage of nuclear weapons matters. Russian television’s (other mass media share the blame, though) routine appeals to the country’s nuclear arsenal, such as speculation about the possibility of nuclear retaliation for Western sanctions, represent a very reckless attitude towards nuclear weapons – much more careless than attitudes ever demonstrated by the Soviet leadership or citizens.124 Such carelessness may become an obstacle in the pursuit of the international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. Such bold statements by Russian politicians and media figures send a signal to the international community. For instance, American “hawks” may use them to justify greater military expenditure and expansion of the missile defense plans, while proponents of reviving Ukraine’s nuclear program may see this inflammatory rhetoric as an argument in favor of nuclear rearmament. And while public opinion does not directly affect Russia’s official position on nuclear matters, brandishing a nuclear sword now may make it more difficult to “sell” nuclear disarmament deals to the domestic audience in the future.

Conclusion

Some of the ambiguity of public opinion on nuclear matters comes from the inherent duality of nuclear technology as a source of military power and a source of energy. Degrees of “accessibility” are different in both cases. In today’s Russia, there is more information in the public domain on the nuclear energy projects than on the nuclear weapons program. Citizens, primarily in those areas where NPPs satisfy some of the energy needs, are in more direct contact with the nuclear energy sector and they can draw information from different sources to weigh the pros and cons of nuclear power on the national or global scale. In the meantime, all aspects of military nuclear technology remain highly classified and government agencies have a monopoly on formulating the role of nuclear weapons and shaping the public discourse around them. The international/diplomatic dimension of this subject area also contributes to greater dependence of members of the general public on the government narrative and media framing, when forming their opinion about nuclear weapons in general and the Russian nuclear arsenal in particular. The Russian public’s understanding of nuclear energy was affected by nuclear disasters in Chernobyl and Fukushima, but according to opinion polls, those effects were more short-lived than one might expect. Perceived environmental harm, the problem of safety and waste, and perceived costs of nuclear power are the three key factors that determine support for nuclear en- inson, “Too Polemical or Too Critical? Chomsky on the Study of the News Media and US For- eign Policy,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 4 (October 2003): 553–568. 124ɘɪɢɣɋɚɩɪɵɤɢɧ, «Ʉɚɤɦɵɩɟɪɟɫɬɚɥɢɛɨɹɬɶɫɹɢɩɨɥɸɛɢɥɢɛɨɦɛɭ» (Yury Saprykin, “How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb”), Republic, January 28, 2015, http://slon.ru/insights/1209561/. Building nuclear consensus in contemporary Russia 161 ergy, according to the above-mentioned MIT study, and they all are relevant in the Russian case. Lack of governmental transparency and the So- viet/Russian track record of concealing information from citizens explain the general mistrust and suspicion when it comes to nuclear energy and its perceived dangers. The Russian public, similarly to the public in other nuclear countries, realizes the benefits associated with peaceful use of nuclear technologies, but at the same time Russians are concerned about the safety of nuclear facilities and the need to find a long-term solution for nuclear waste disposal. The attitudes towards peaceful use of nuclear technologies show that the Russian society is split: there are people who support further development of the nuclear energy sector and those who have reservations about it because of the potential risks and long-term effects. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the topic of nuclear technology became open to public debate and this resulted in the sprouting of environmental movements and organizations in the 1990s. Despite their efforts, there remains a need for a more open public discussion of both opportunities and risks associated with nuclear energy in order for Russian society to be more aware of government plans in that field and be able to express its concern and voice its reservations. Those reservations did result in the adjustment of NPP construction plans in Voronezh, Seversk, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Cases where major nuclear power projects are launched without sufficient public scrutiny become the feeding ground for rumors. Unfortunately, the 2000s saw a reverse trend towards the tightening of government control over independent environmental expertise and the environmental agenda in Russia.125 At the same time, Rosatom’s efforts to publicize its international projects, promote its image as a high-tech hub and present attractive career opportunities have paid off and helped somewhat alleviate the alarmist sentiments among the Russian public. Russians see Russia’s nuclear weapons as a way to deter aggression and ensure national security, but they also assign them special meaning as a great power attribute and a source of national pride. The idea of complete nuclear disarmament meets their approval as a long-term objective, but Russian unilateral nuclear disarmament is out of the question, and the issue of nuclear arms control is presented by the media and perceived by the public in close connection with the bilateral dynamic of Russian-U.S. relations. Russian attitudes to defectors in the nuclear non-proliferation regime and their nuclear threat perceptions correlate with what Russia’s relations with a particular country look like at a given moment. Importance assigned to nuclear weapons and concerns over a possible nuclear conflict are linked to international crises, particularly those that pit Russia against the West. Many Russian media outlets currently employ the template of anti-Americanism to cover international and domestic news, and this template’s effects can be seen in the coverage of nuclear weapons issues too. In the context of Russia’s confrontation with the West, the general public cannot help but feel worried about the pos-

125Ⱥ. ɀɟɪɦɨɧ, «əɞɟɪɧɚɹɷɧɟɪɝɢɹɢɝɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɤɨɟɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɨɜɊɨɫɫɢɢ: ɨɩɵɬɌɨɦɫɤɚɱɟ- ɪɟɡɩɪɢɡɦɭɟɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɨɣɦɨɞɟɥɢ» (Alexis Germon, “Nuclear Energy and Civil Society in Rus- sia: Tomsk Experience Through the Prism of the European Model”) in əɞɟɪɧɵɣɦɢɪ: ɧɨɜɵɟ ɜɵɡɨɜɵɪɟɠɢɦɭɧɟɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟɧɢɹ (Nuclear World: New Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime), ed. Ekaterina Mikhailenko (Yekaterinburg: Ural University Press, 2017), 320–343. 162 L. Deriglazova, N. Rozhanovskaya sibility of a nuclear conflict. This worry coupled with understanding that one cannot survive in a nuclear war encourages support for comprehensive nuclear disarmament, albeit as a long-term objective. It is difficult to establish a causal link between media coverage and public perceptions on specific issues. Besides, surveys indicate that Russian citizens show low levels of trust in mass media. On the other hand, Russia does present a compelling case for the “manufacturing consent” approach, given that a handful of state-affiliated television channels reach a huge audience and broadcast government-approved narratives. One can expect that a nuclear accident in Russia or another country would fuel a temporary increase in concerns about nuclear technology, provided that it gets wide media coverage. It remains to be seen if the August 2019 incident in Severodvinsk will have a long-term effect. On the other hand, improvements in Russia’s relations with the West are likely to partially alleviate the fear of an imminent nuclear war. They may even shift some of the emphasis on nuclear threat perception from the United States as a potential opponent in a nuclear exchange to, for instance, North Korea as a country destabilizing the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Frames and filters offered by the media blend with deeply ingrained perceptions to form a complex consensus. When it comes to a national consensus about nuclear energy, one can see that the Russian case is mostly in line with the cases of other major nuclear powers and the Russian public shares the same concerns about nuclear safety. Given the government control over the main television channels, these concerns mainly stem from recent international incidents, traditional radiophobia and longstanding mistrust in government transparency rather than from an open public debate on the pros and cons of nuclear energy. When it comes to nuclear weapons, changes in the international environment and in media framing (e.g., a focus on the shared disarmament agenda and cooperation instead of the current anti-American prism) may bring about corresponding changes in the national consensus. However, the core perception of the nuclear weapons as a source of national pride and Russia’s great power status dates back to Soviet times and may prove to be quite stable. 2 Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon

Nikolai Dronishinets, Grigory Zinovyev

Every year the World Bank devotes its World Development Report to one of the topics that are of fundamental importance on a global scale. The 2018 WDR for the first time in history is entirely focused on education, and this is not a coincidence: education has for a long time had a decisive impact on wellbeing, but now this is even truer in the context of rapid economic and social changes.1 These changes became especially visible in the second half of the 20th century. During this period, humankind found a practical solution to the nuclear fission problem and obtained an extremely powerful and extremely dangerous source of energy at its disposal. It became clear that nuclear energy opened a new era and would have a crucial effect on civilization. The Soviet Union’s atomic project essentially became the driving force of its scientific and technological revolution and gave a powerful boost to basic and applied research, contributing to the growing prestige of science and enhancing the quality of education, primarily engineering. Mastering of the new energy source required researchers, engineers and technicians who would be up to date on the most recent developments in physics and engineering. To achieve this goal, the country needed new methods and forms of education and training and created the system of physics and technology education that became the foundation of a new phenomenon – nuclear education. Nuclear education consolidated for the first time two relatively new fields of science (nuclear physics, electronics and automation) as well as absolutely new disciplines – nuclear safety, radiation safety, reactor materials, etc. The training programs turned out to be extremely large and more complex than ever before. In addition, a large amount of practical training was required in conditions as close as possible to nuclear facilities, which required measures relating to nuclear security and nuclear materials nonproliferation. The Soviet system of nuclear education started to gain shape in the late 1940s. Its first centers were established in Moscow, Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) and Tomsk in the 1950s, and later other Soviet cities followed suit. The new departments and lines of study covered all major areas of scientific knowledge and technical tasks, the resolution of which enabled the So- viet nuclear industry to occupy one of the leadership positions globally. Physicists, especially such renowned scholars as Igor Kurchatov, Abram Ioffe, and Peter Kapitza, played the role of intermediaries between the government (or bureaucracy, to be more precise) and the scholarly community, the intellectual elite, which found its most visible manifestation in discussions of genetics and cybernetics. As famous academician V. Alekseev emphasizes,

1 World Development Report 2018. LEARNING to Realize Education’s Promise. www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2018. 164 N. Dronishinets, G. Zinovyev the intellectualization of the military, policy makers and economic executives took place, because without it they would not have been able to meet the demands of that time and preserve their positions in the context of the nuclear arms race.2 Hence the concentration of enormous resources in terms of materials and equipment, impressive education projects, unprecedented – in terms of scale and delivery – intelligence efforts, involvement of foreign researchers, including Germans (even those who in the times of NSDAP rule did not manifest any opposition to Nazi ideology and provided the USSR with no indica- tions of loyalty).3 All these efforts were driven by one primary objective – mastering the secrets of nuclear weapons. Achieving this objective required personnel, hence the need for a nuclear education system. The goal of this chapter is to analyze the development of nuclear education in the USSR/Russia and characterize different stages of its evolution. For that purpose, the authors aim to summarize and analyze the information on the genesis and evolution of nuclear education; examine the government’s activities to form and develop nuclear education in the late 1940s – early 1950s, including in the closed nuclear cities; explore the specifics of nuclear industry personnel training in the 1960-1980s; determine what effect socio-economic reforms had on the essence of nuclear education from the 1990s up to the present day; and analyze the involvement of Russian nuclear universities in international education projects.

Formation of the nuclear education system (1945–1953)

The colossal efforts of the Soviet government paid off and created within a very short timeframe (1945–1953) a complex education system to train physicists and engineers for the nuclear weapons industry. Engineering education was held in high esteem by the government at that stage. Two weeks after the nuclear bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a Special Committee headed by Lavrentiy Beria was established at the Soviet State Defense Com- mittee on August 20, 1945. It was endowed with extraordinary powers and charged with creating Soviet nuclear weapons. Ten days later, the First Chief Directorate was created at the Soviet Council of People's Commissars to pursue practical aspects of nuclear weapons creation. The Special Committee included practically all the top officials representing the Communist party and government bodies associated with development of the country’s new defense industry. In order the accomplish the goal, the country urgently needed a large number of research organizations and factories and a large number of

2Ⱥɥɟɤɫɟɟɜȼȼ., ȼɥɢɹɧɢɟɚɬɨɦɧɨɝɨɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɚɧɚɩɨɫɥɟɜɨɟɧɧɨɟɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɟɋɋɋɊ (V.V. Alekseev, The Impact of Atomic Complex on Post-Soviet Development of the USSR), http://mirznanii.com/a/119177-3/vliyanie-atomnogo-kompleksa-na-poslevoennoe-razvitie-sssr\). 3 ɇɟɦɟɰɤɢɟɫɩɟɰɢɚɥɢɫɬɵ ɜ ɫɨɜɟɬɫɤɨɦɚɬɨɦɧɨɦɩɪɨɟɤɬɟ: ȿɦɟɥɶɹɧɨɜ ȻɆ., Ƚɚɜɪɢɥɶ- ɱɟɧɤɨȼɋ. Ʌɚɛɨɪɚɬɨɪɢɹ «Ȼ». ɋɭɧɝɭɥɶɫɤɢɣɮɟɧɨɦɟɧ. (German Specialists in the Soviet Atomic Project: B.M. Emelyanov, V.S. Gavrilchenko. Laboratory B. The Sungul Phenomenon) (Snez- hinsk: VNIITF publishing house, 2000), 11–18); David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: the Soviet Union and atomic energy, 1939 – 1956 (Yale University Press. New Haven and London, 1994), 96–115. Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 165 specialists, especially physicists and radiochemists, as the Soviet Union suffered from a lack of them. The Soviet government got down to the business of training specialists for the new industry and made a number of crucial decisions. On September 20, 1945, a month after the Special Committee was established, the Council of People's Commissars issued a Regulation on Organization of the Engineer- ing and Physics Faculty at the Moscow Mechanics Institute (MMI) of the First Chief Directorate. It articulated the need to reorganize the Faculty of Precision Mechanics of Moscow Mechanics Institute into the Engineering and Physics Faculty, in order to provide comprehensive engineering education and teach students about the state-of-the-art machinery, devices and equipment, and increase the number of students to 700 persons in 1947. The First Chief Directorate was given a month to come up with a list of majors and departments and develop curricula for the Engineering and Phys- ics Faculty that were to be approved by the Committee for Higher Education Affairs. The Committee for Higher Education Affairs was also given a month to recruit 200 interested senior high-achieving students from other universities and technical institutes and transfer them to the Moscow Mechanics Insti- tute. The First Chief Directorate was allowed to reorganize the temporary preparatory department for prospective students of MMI into a permanent one. The duration of studies at the Engineering and Physics Faculty was set at five years, and one of them was allocated to the final-year thesis or design project. The Regulation tasked the Institute with organizing all the necessary experi- ment workshops and special design offices. The Special Committee members were to develop and submit for the Special Committee’s approval a proposal on bringing laboratory equipment from Germany to equip special labs and design offices of the MMI Engineering and Physics Faculty. The Regulation also addressed social matters: MMI was provided with four cars and additional (beyond the existing limitations) ration cards for food and goods; and salaries were increased.4 Thus, the analysis of just one regulation dealing with one higher education institution in Moscow demonstrates that the first efforts to train personnel for the nascent nuclear industry were well thought-through and had profound implications. The Regulation of the Council of People's Commissars of January 28, 1946 on Training Engineers-Physicists, Atomic Nucleus Physicists and Ra- diochemistry Specialists, as with all other top-secret regulations from the so- called special folder5 signed by Joseph Stalin tasked the Committee for Higher Education Affairs, as well as the People's Commissariats for Educa- tion of the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic with organizing the training of physical engineers, atomic nucleus physicists, and radiochemistry specialists: 15 physical engineers, 70 atomic nucleus physicists, and 30 radiochemists were to graduate in 1946. In 1947, the numbers

4Ⱥɬɨɦɧɚɹɛɨɦɛɚ. 1945-1954. Ɍ. 2. Ʉɧɢɝɚ 2 ɜ ȺɬɨɦɧɵɣɩɪɨɟɤɬɋɋɋɊ: Ⱦɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɵɢ ɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɵɜ 3 ɬɨɦɚɯ,ɩɨɞɨɛɳ. ɪɟɞ. ɅȾ. Ɋɹɛɟɜɚ. (Atomic Project of the USSR: Documents and Materials: in 3 Volumes, ed. L.D. Ryabev. Atomic Bomb. 1945-1954. Vol. 2. Book 2) (Rus- sian Ministry for Atomic Energy, Sarov: VNIITF, 2000), 24–25. 5 Ibid, p.102-105. 166 increased to 65 physical engineers, 120 atomic nucleus physicists, and 50 radiochemists. By March 1, 1946, the Committee for Higher Education Af- fairs was to provide the fourth and fifth years of MSU’s atomic nucleus majors with additional students by bringing forty senior physics students from other universities – twenty to each year. It was also suggested to select 30 senior physics and chemistry students from other universities and technical institutes and bring them to study at the fourth and fifth years of the Lenin- grad State University majoring in radiochemistry. As the nuclear industry expanded, the demand for personnel grew too. In 1948, the government adopted several documents to regulate personnel training for the First Chief Directorate. Special departments were organized at 17 universities and institutes to offer degrees in 66 specializations and as early as in 1950 they had 1,210 graduates and 1,315 in 1951. The government tasked the First Chief Directorate with coordinating and approving the specialist profiles, curricula and training programs. At the same time, the Directorate was to develop procedures for industry placements and pre-graduation internships at nuclear facilities, oversight of persons enrolled in special departments, and assistance to the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education in equipping the special departments with equipment that was difficult to procure and the required materials and chemical agents for lab work. The government regulation of January 20, 1949 expanded the geographi- cal scope of training for personnel with higher education degrees. The plan was to open two specialized institutes in Sverdlovsk and Tomsk and build all the necessary facilities for that purpose: education space, specialized facilities, student accommodation and housing for faculty. The special Physics Institute was to be established at the Physics and Technology Faculty of the Moscow State University to train personnel for the First Chief Directorate. The Chief Directorate of Industrial Construction of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs was in charge of its construction. The committee was given two weeks to plan the work, working towards a 1950 deadline. The Soviet Ministry of Higher Education was to establish special requirements to prospective students of specialized divisions and departments and recruit them primarily from among men demonstrating an inclination to STEM disci- plines6. Thus, active work was being completed in the major cities to supply the nascent nuclear industry with personnel. However, the numbers were insufficient for the needs of nuclear factories under construction. In order to increase the numbers, it was decided to organize, starting from January 11, 1950, external training at several enterprises of the First Chief Directorate. Twelve specializations were offered. The necessary facilities were allocated, the labs were set up, and qualified faculty members were selected to ensure a high quality of personnel training. The education process relied on curricula of the Moscow Mechanics Institute and Ural Polytechnic Institute. However, starting from August 1, 1952 it was decided to reorganize the system of external education. The

6Ⱥɬɨɦɧɚɹɛɨɦɛɚ. 1945-1954. T. 4, Ʉɧɢɝɚ 4 ɜ ȺɬɨɦɧɵɣɩɪɨɟɤɬɋɋɋɊ: Ⱦɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɵɢ ɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɵɜ 3 ɬɨɦɚɯ, ɩɨɞɨɛɳ. ɪɟɞ. ɅȾ. Ɋɹɛɟɜɚ. Ɍ. ɉ. (Atomic Bomb. 1945-1954. Vol. 2. Book 4 in Atomic Project of the USSR: Documents and Materials: in 3 volumes, ed. L.D. Ryabev) (Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, Sarov: VNIITF, 2003), 240–243. Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 167

Regulation notes that the external education system is advisable in those cases when students have no territorial connection to their education institution, but not when students have an opportunity to interact with the institution on a daily basis and attend evening classes. That is why a draft regulation of the Council of People's Commissars was suggested on transformation of the existing system of external education at certain nuclear enterprises into a system of evening courses – without taking time off and without leaving the enterprise premises. Transitioning to on-site evening studies was to offer an opportunity to combine systematic lectures with the required amount of practical classes and create conditions for the better training of personnel. The creation of branches of the Moscow Mechanics and Ural Polytechnic Institutes at nuclear enterprises to offer evening courses established a foundation for providing higher education to practitioners and technicians who had a secondary technical education in one of the specialized fields required at nuclear enterprises. The creation of branches of the Moscow Mechanics and Ural Polytechnic Insti- tutes at enterprises of the Soviet Glavgorstroy to provide evening courses was coordinated with the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education.7 For instance, Evening Department No. 2 of Moscow Mechanics Institute (in the closed nuclear city of Sverdlovsk-44, now Novouralsk) was created in 1952 in accordance with Regulation of the Soviet Council of Ministers No. 22633-rs of September 2, 1952. It was based on the training and organization office of an industrial combine that used to provide external training. The first enrolment comprised 65 students, and the number increased to 254 persons, including former external students. The 1968/1969 report of Evening De- partment No. 2 notes that there had been 13 graduations and 577 engineers graduated, including 14 graduates with honors. Students who wanted to continue their studies and get a Candidate of Science degree (the Soviet equivalent of a PhD) had an opportunity to pass the qualifying exams in a foreign language and philosophy. Forty persons passed the qualifying philosophy exam in July 1969 and 27 postgraduate students were enrolled on a foreign language course. Sixteen passed the qualifying foreign language exam.8 In September 1952, in accordance with the Council of Ministers Regulation No. 22633, Evening Department No. 3 of Moscow Mechanics Institute was established on the basis of the training and methodology office that had existed in the closed nuclear city of Sverdlovsk-45 (Lesnoy) since 1950. In 1953, a decision was made to concentrate the training of nuclear industry personnel in one institution and its branches. Students and professors of the corresponding disciplines were transferred from other universities and

7Ⱥɬɨɦɧɚɹɛɨɦɛɚ. 1945-1954. Ɍɨɦ 2. Ʉɧɢɝɚ 5 ɜ ȺɬɨɦɧɵɣɩɪɨɟɤɬɋɋɋɊ: Ⱦɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɵɢ ɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɵɜ 3 ɬɨɦɚɯ, ɩɨɞɨɛɳ. ɪɟɞ. ɅȾ. Ɋɹɛɟɜɚ. Ɍ. ɉ. (Atomic Bomb. 1945-1954. Vol. 2. Book 5 in Atomic Project of the USSR: Documents and Materials in 3 volumes, ed. L.D. Ryabev) (Federal Atomic Energy Agency, Sarov: VNIITF, 2005), 753–754. 8 ɇɨɜɨɭɪɚɥɶɫɤɢɣ ȽɄ Ʉɉɋɋ. ɋɜɟɪɞɥɨɜɫɤɚɹ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɶ. ɋɜɟɪɞɥɨɜɫɤɢɣ ɨɛɥɩɚɪɬɚɪɯɢɜ, ɮɨɧɞ 5459, ɨɩɢɫɶ 17, ɞɟɥɨ 22ɚ, ɫ.1,2,34,41(Novouralsk City Committee of the Soviet Commu- nist Party. Sverdlovsk Region. Sverdlovsk Regional Party Archive, archive fund 5459, inventory 17, case 22ɚ, p. 1, 2, 34, 41). 168 Nikolai Dronishinets, Grigory Zinovyev institutes for that purpose. Moscow Mechanics Institute was renamed Mos- cow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI).9 Evening departments of MEPhI had to deal with a lot of financial and organization difficulties during the start-up stage. For instance, Evening De- partment No. 3 was to train personnel only for one specific enterprise, just like all the other evening departments, and the enrolment plan was to be determined by the estimated demand of the enterprise for personnel, taking into account the available teaching and laboratory facilities. According to the report of the Ministry’s Senior Executives Department for the academic year 1955/56, the first engineering class of 11 students graduated from Evening Department No. 3, seven of them got A grades for their final-year thesis and 4 got B grades. Two students graduated with honors.10 Analysis of archive materials related to the activities of MEPhI departments in closed cities shows that academic institutions training personnel for nuclear factories had to meet very high requirements. The same report mentioned a serious problem: academic performance declined by 1.5% compared to the previous academic year, and as many as 6.7 percent of students dropped out. Laboratory facilities were still insufficient, and classes were often cancelled due to business trips by part-time faculty members.11 A memo on the staff of Evening Department No. 3 criticized the department leadership for not paying enough attention to hiring highly qualified faculty.12 On the other hand, the leadership of Evening Department No. 3 had justified concerns about contradictory policies of the Ministry’s Senior Executives Department. For instance, Institute Director Razumov states in his internal memo “On Staff Reduction at the Evening Institute and Vocational School” that despite the increase in the number of enrolled students from 200 to 270 (i.e. by 35%) and despite the more than four-fold expansion of learning facilities and installation of new equipment that cost over 300 thousand rubles, laboratory staff and faculty numbers were not increased in 1959, while the administrative personnel was cut and three staffing positions

9 Ȼɚɪɛɚɲɢɧɚɇɋ., Ƚɟɪɚɫɤɢɧɇɂ., ɌɢɯɨɦɢɪɨɜȽȼ., “əɞɟɪɧɨɟɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɟɜɆɂɎɂ”, (Barbashina N.S., Geraskin N.I., Tikhomirov G.V., “Nuclear Education at MEPhI”), Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii, no. 6 (213) (2017), 102. 10 Ɂɚɤɥɸɱɟɧɢɟ ɍɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɹ ɪɭɤɨɜɨɞɹɳɢɯ ɤɚɞɪɨɜ Ɇɢɧɢɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɚ ɨ ɪɚɛɨɬɟ ɜɟɱɟɪɧɟɝɨ ɨɬɞɟɥɟɧɢɹʋ3 ɆɂɎɂɡɚ 1955/56 ɭɱɟɛɧɵɣɝɨɞ.\\ ɅɟɫɧɨɣȽɄɄɉɋɋɝ. ɋɜɟɪɞɥɨɜɫɤ 45, ɋɜɟɪɞɥɨɜɫɤɚɹɨɛɥɚɫɬɶ. Ɉɬɱɟɬɵ, ɫɩɪɚɜɤɢɢɡɚɤɥɸɱɟɧɢɹɨɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɢɭɱɟɛɧɨɣɢɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɨ – ɜɨɫɩɢɬɚɬɟɥɶɧɨɣ ɪɚɛɨɬɵ ɜ ɭɱɟɛɧɵɯ ɡɚɜɟɞɟɧɢɹɯ. ɋɜɟɪɞɥɨɜɫɤɢɣ ɨɛɥɩɚɪɬɚɪɯɢɜ. Ɏɨɧɞ 4458, ɨɩɢɫɶ 1, ɞɟɥɨ 39, ɫ. 2. (Conclusion of the Ministry’s Senior Executives Department on Opera- tion of the Evening Department No. 3 pf MEPhI for the Academic Year 1955/56 [in Russian] // Lesnoy City Committee of the Communist Party. Sverdlovsk-45, Sverdlovsk Region. Reports, Memos and Conclusions on Political and Educational Outreach at Academic Institutions. Sverd- lovsk Regional Party Archive. Archive fund 4458, inventory 1, case 39, p. 2). 11 Ibid. 12 Ɂɚɤɥɸɱɟɧɢɟ ɍɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɹ ɪɭɤɨɜɨɞɹɳɢɯ ɤɚɞɪɨɜ Ɇɢɧɢɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɚ ɨ ɪɚɛɨɬɟ ɜɟɱɟɪɧɟɝɨ ɨɬɞɟɥɟɧɢɹʋ 3 ɆɂɎɂɡɚ 1955/56 ɭɱɟɛɧɵɣɝɨɞ \\ ɅɟɫɧɨɣȽɄɄɉɋɋɝ. ɋɜɟɪɞɥɨɜɫɤ 45, ɋɜɟɪɞɥɨɜɫɤɚɹɨɛɥɚɫɬɶ. Ɉɬɱɟɬɵ, ɫɩɪɚɜɤɢɢɡɚɤɥɸɱɟɧɢɹɨɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɢɭɱɟɛɧɨɣɢɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɨ – ɜɨɫɩɢɬɚɬɟɥɶɧɨɣ ɪɚɛɨɬɵ ɜ ɭɱɟɛɧɵɯ ɡɚɜɟɞɟɧɢɹɯ. ɋɜɟɪɞɥɨɜɫɤɢɣ ɨɛɥɩɚɪɬɚɪɯɢɜ. Ɏɨɧɞ 4458, ɨɩɢɫɶ 1, ɞɟɥɨ 39, ɫ.33 (Conclusion of the Ministry’s Senior Executives Department on Opera- tion of the Evening Department No. 3 pf MEPhI for the Academic Year 1955/56 [in Russian] // Lesnoy City Committee of the Communist Party. Sverdlovsk-45, Sverdlovsk Region. Reports, Memos and Conclusions on Political and Educational Outreach at Academic Institutions. Sverd- lovsk Regional Party Archive. Archive fund 4458, inventory 1, case 39, p. 33). Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 169 were reduced: the director and senior accountant of the vocational school, and special unit inspector of the institute (for a total of 53,200 rubles a year). Razumov believed that further staff reduction was not advisable and also spoke against the suggested merger of the institute’s and vocational school’s library with the factory library for the sake of staff reduction.13 Vocational schools became another regular feature of nuclear education in closed cities. Government regulations issued in 1948 and 1949 allowed the First Chief Directorate to organize, starting from 1949, the secondary technical education of personnel in closed settlements, where nuclear factories were being built, to satisfy the need for professions that were in short supply. Another reason for creating vocational schools in closed settlements was the fact that young people who graduated from seven-year and ten- year schools in the vicinity of nuclear facilities could not be allowed to pursue further studies in other Soviet cities.14 There were certain limitations, when organizing secondary technical education. For instance, an evening vocational school was to satisfy only the needs of the nuclear facility in the closed city in terms of specializations and numbers, so the first class of just 18 students graduated from the evening vocational school in Sverd- lovsk-45 in 1956. The graduation projects of some of the graduates focused on real-life problems and found application in practice. Neverthe- less, the report of the Ministry’s Senior Executives Department for the academic year 1955/56 indicated a number of serious problems: low academic performance, inferior results in Russian language, and unsatisfac- tory attendance, when school absences ranged from 20% of the number of students during the first year to 36% during the fifth year. Dropout and expulsion rates were very high: 71 persons (22.7%) in the 1955/56 academic year, including 38 persons (11.8%) without a valid excuse. As a result, there were only three groups in the senior years, ranging from 6 to 9 students. The management of the evening vocational school violated the enrolment rules established for specialized secondary education institutions and enrolled students whose jobs did not correspond to the chosen lines of study. Despite the warning that those persons would be transferred to staff positions corresponding to the chosen line of study, these problems were not fixed. For instance, out of 13 fourth-year analytical chemistry students only three were working in that field. The school had no lab space, so the practical exercises envisaged by the curriculum were not completed to the necessary extent or were not carried out at all. The learning process lacked visual aids. The teaching and material resources were not improved or replenished. The planned figure of 180 thousand rubles was cut to 25 thousand, and equipment procurement requests were not fully satisfied.15

13 Ibid, p. 32. 14Ⱥɬɨɦɧɚɹɛɨɦɛɚ. 1945-1954. Ɍɨɦ 2, Ʉɧɢɝɚ 4 ɜ ȺɬɨɦɧɵɣɩɪɨɟɤɬɋɋɋɊ: Ⱦɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɵɢ ɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɵɜ 3 ɬɨɦɚɯ, ɩɨɞɨɛɳ. ɪɟɞ. ɅȾ. Ɋɹɛɟɜɚ. Ɍ. ɉ. (Atomic Bomb. 1945-1954. Vol. 2. Book 4 in Atomic Project of the USSR: Documents and Materials in 3 volumes, ed. L.D. Ryabev) (Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, Sarov: VNIITF, 2003), 688–689. 15ɅɟɫɧɨɣȽɄɄɉɋɋɝ. ɋɜɟɪɞɥɨɜɫɤ 45, ɋɜɟɪɞɥɨɜɫɤɚɹɨɛɥɚɫɬɶ. Ɉɬɱɟɬɵ, ɫɩɪɚɜɤɢɢɡɚ- ɤɥɸɱɟɧɢɹɨɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɢɭɱɟɛɧɨɣɢɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɨ – ɜɨɫɩɢɬɚɬɟɥɶɧɨɣɪɚɛɨɬɵɜɭɱɟɛɧɵɯɡɚɜɟɞɟɧɢ- 170 Nikolai Dronishinets, Grigory Zinovyev

One should note that military personnel also studied at vocational schools, and their training was associated with certain difficulties. A vocational school director wrote a letter to the party committee of Sverdlovsk-45 on November 18, 1958 indicating the low attendance rate among the enrolled military members. He explained their low attendance as being due to the cas- ual attitude of their superiors who sometimes reproached those students, transferred them to remote work locations, and often sent them on work trips. As for students who were members of the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) or the Communist Party, neither organization reached out to the school management to inquire about their progress or discussed it at the official meetings. The director concluded that students from among the military had to study in an unbearable environment, while their superiors should have been proud of those officers, created favorable conditions for them, held them as an example for others, discussed their learning achievements at staff meetings, and encouraged them by offering assistance related to their accommodation or work. The director asked for urgent assistance in this matter, and the local party committee confirmed these facts and undertook measures to improve the situation of student officers.16 V.N. Kuznetsov notes that for many years education in closed nuclear cities of the Ural region was better in terms of objective indicators than in other Soviet cities.17 First, the Soviet government was interested in the speedy creation of nuclear weapons and saw the system of higher and secondary education in the Urals as its priority. Second, it invested enormous resources into the development of those academic institutions. Third, it provided the nascent institutions with the best faculty members and invested in retraining and professional development at the leading academic institutions of Moscow. As a result, in the course of the first post-war decade the closed nuclear cities of the Ural region gained a multi-level system of personnel training for the So- viet nuclear industry. This is still the case. In February 2018 Novouralsk mu- nicipal district head Aleksandr Baranov noted that Novouralsk schools for many years ranked second in the Sverdlovsk region in terms of students graduating with honors, outperforming such major cities as Nizhny Tagil, Pervouralsk, and Kamensk-Uralsky. This strong education system still exists thanks to Rosatom’s support.18 Analysis of the history of nuclear education in the closed nuclear cities of the Urals demonstrates that from the late 1940s to the early 1950s it was directed to the goal of nuclear weapons development and improvement. Thus, support for nuclear education was a government priority, and the Soviet leadership appointed the best personnel – researchers, engineers, skilled workers, and graduates of the best universities – to create nuclear enterprises in the

ɹɯ. ɋɜɟɪɞɥɨɜɫɤɢɣɨɛɥɩɚɪɬɚɪɯɢɜ. Ɏɨɧɞ 4458, ɨɩɢɫɶ 1, ɞɟɥɨ 39, ɫ.5-6 (Lesnoy City Committee of the Communist Party. Sverdlovsk-45, Sverdlovsk Region. Reports, Memos and Conclusions on Political and Educational Outreach at Academic Institutions. Sverdlovsk Regional Party Ar- chive. Archive fund 4458, inventory 1, case 39, p. 5-6). 16 Ibid, p. 29–31. 17Ʉɭɡɧɟɰɨɜȼ. ɇ.,Ⱥɬɨɦɧɵɟ ɡɚɤɪɵɬɵɟɚɞɦɢɧɢɫɬɪɚɬɢɜɧɨɬɟɪɪɢɬɨɪɢɚɥɶɧɵɟɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚ- ɧɢɹ ɍɪɚɥɚ: ɢɫɬɨɪɢɹɢɫɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɨɫɬɶ. ɑɚɫɬɶ 1. ɋɨɜɟɬɫɤɢɣɩɟɪɢɨɞ. (V.N. Kuznetsov, Closed Atomic Administrative and Territorial Entities of the Urals: History and Present Situation. Part 1. Soviet Period). (Yekaterinburg, 2015), 375. 18ɋɬɪɚɧɚɊɨɫɚɬɨɦ. ɋɩɟɰɜɵɩɭɫɤ (Strana Rosatom. Special Issue) (February 2018): 12. Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 171

Ural region. Specialists from those enterprises and their leading researchers became the first faculty members of the new external education institutions established at nuclear plants. Progress in this titanic effort to develop the nuclear education system and train personnel for the nascent nuclear weapons industry was regularly reported to the top leadership. For instance, the First Chief Directorate report to Joseph Stalin of March 25, 1951 stated that there were 63,208 employees at the main enterprises of the Directorate, including 5863 engineers and scientific staff with higher education degrees. Seventeen specialized departments were created at higher education institutions to train personnel for the Direc- torate. Four thousand six hundred specialists graduated from these departments in 1948-1950, including 736 physicists and 359 chemists. In the course of the following four years, the plan was to train around 7000 new specialists, including 1413 physicists and 1320 chemists. The task of providing the nuclear industry with qualified personnel was successfully resolved. The training of senior engineers and senior technical personnel for new enterprises of the First Chief Directorate was organized at old enterprises in the form of shadowing and internships at research organizations.19 Thus, within less than a decade the Soviet Union created a unique multi- level, industry-specific system of education organized in different forms: full- time, evening and external. It extended not only to major cities, but also to closed settlements where workers of nuclear manufacturing facilities and their families lived. The problem of training and retraining of personnel for the nascent nuclear weapons industry was resolved. This happened largely due to the highest government priority assigned to the Soviet nuclear project at the time when the USSR rushed to overcome the US nuclear monopoly. Without qualified personnel, this unprecedented goal would not have been achieved within such a short period.

Evolution of Nuclear Education (1960–1980s)

Throughout the 1960-1970s and early 1980s, the nuclear industry remained a government priority, which ensured the high level of funding and high quality of personnel training. Exciting research topics and excellent career opportunities attracted many talented youth to universities providing personnel for nuclear industry. At the same time, universities training personnel for the nuclear weapons complex and the peaceful atom were getting specialized. For instance, starting from 1958, Admiral Makarov Higher Engineering Maritime Academy trained the first atomic icebreaker crew and then started training engineers for Soviet nuclear-powered vessels and specialists for the Northern Sea Route. This included not only the command for atomic ice- breakers, but also meteorologists, oceanographers, hydrographers, and radio engineers.

19Ⱥɬɨɦɧɚɹɛɨɦɛɚ. 1945-1954. Ɍɨɦ 2. Ʉɧɢɝɚ. 2 ɜ ȺɬɨɦɧɵɣɩɪɨɟɤɬɋɋɋɊ: Ⱦɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɵ ɢ ɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɵ ɜ 3 ɬɨɦɚɯ, ɩɨɞ ɨɛɳ. ɪɟɞ. ɅȾ. Ɋɹɛɟɜɚ. Ʉɧɢɝɚ 2 (Atomic Bomb. 1945-1954. Vol. 2. Book 2 in Atomic Project of the USSR: Documents and Materials in 3 volumes, ed. L.D. Ryabev (Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, Sarov: VNIITF, 2000), 675. 172 Nikolai Dronishinets, Grigory Zinovyev

In the early 1960s, a school of cybernetics emerged at MEPhI, and MEPhI became one of the founders of modern-day Russian IT. That was another case of knowledge synthesis in the history of MEPhI: engineering and natural science education was supplemented with IT disciplines. The university trained nuclear industry specialists in the widest possible range of disciplines, including biophysics, economics of the industry, environmental studies etc. – 50 specializations altogether. Tomsk Polytechnic University, the oldest engineering university in the Asian part of Russia, also supplied personnel to the nuclear industry, and it is the only Russian university that has its own research nuclear reactor that students have access to for study purposes. TPU has trained nuclear industry personnel for over 65 years.20 Specialized nuclear education manifests itself in a special way in closed nuclear cities, where MEPhI has six branches, four of which were created in 1952. For instance, the Seversk branch trains specialists specifically for the Siberian Chemical Plant that works with unique technologies for fissile material production within the full nuclear fuel cycle. The Novouralsk branch trains personnel for the first Soviet industrial enterprise to carry out the separation of uranium isotopes by gaseous diffusion. Six MEPhI branches in closed cities constituted a de facto network university, where the head institution for the training and methodology oversight of evening departments was MEPhI, while the funding of evening departments and management was in the hands of the First Chief Directorate, and then the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building Industry. In other words, evening departments were industry-specific financially independent institutions. In the late 1980s, the Board of Evening Department Directors was created at MEPhI (later to become the Board of MEPhI Institute Rectors). The MEPhI vice-rector for industry education chaired it. This structure was in place until 2001. This was an optimal network system to train personnel of all levels for the nuclear industry. ME- PhI was not burdened with the organization or financial management of the branches, these matters were the responsibility of the Soviet Ministry of Me- dium Machine-Building Industry and later Russian Minatom and Rosatom. The level of specialists graduating from the branches was very high and they received MEPhI diplomas. For instance, during the first graduation years (1956–1960) around 200 specialists graduated from the evening department in Arzamas-16 many of whom later became doctors and candidates of sciences, and winners of Lenin and State Prizes. Scientists with global reputa- tions, such as academicians Yulii Khariton, Yakov Zeldovich, Viktor Mik- haylov, Evgeny Negin, Aleksandr Pavlovskiy, were actively involved in the university’s work, including as professors.21 In 1971, the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building Industry put forward an idea that was quite novel at the time: to combine day-time (three-year) and evening (three-year) classes. Thus the industry universities for the first time gained the right to enroll school

20 “ɂɧɫɬɢɬɭɬɊɨɫɚɬɨɦɚɢɌɨɦɫɤɢɣɩɨɥɢɬɟɯɧɢɱɟɫɤɢɣɭɧɢɜɟɪɫɢɬɟɬɞɨɝɨɜɨɪɢɥɢɫɶɨɩɨɞ- ɝɨɬɨɜɤɟɤɚɞɪɨɜɞɥɹɡɚɪɭɛɟɠɧɵɯȺɗɋ” (“Rosatom Institute and Tomsk Polytechnic University Agreed to Jointly Train Personnel for Foreign NPPs”), http://www.sib- science.info/ru/heis/rosatom-i-tomskiy-politekh-02062016. 21ȼɚɫɢɥɶɟɜ Ⱥ., “ɋɬɭɩɟɧɢɪɨɫɬɚ «ɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɜɭɡɚ»” (A. Vasilyev, “Growth Stages of the ‘Nuclear University’”, Rodina), no. 6 (2012): 160. Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 173 leavers in full-time courses. During the three years of daytime classes, students mastered physical and mathematical disciplines, and placement at an enterprise and transfer to evening courses after the third year allowed students to adapt to their future profession in the course of their studies. A nuclear enterprise essentially got a qualified employee with all the required competences. One can call this method ‘an individual learning trajectory’.

Nuclear education at the turn of the century The turn of the century was characterized by a gradual humanization of nuclear education. Little by little, the focus shifted from purely scientific and technical aspects of training and research to human relations and moral and ethical norms. Large-scale accidents at nuclear facilities with disastrous effects for people and the environment forced the nuclear industry to grasp the fact that technical progress needs to be accompanied by increased responsibility and awareness about consequences. The 1986 Chernobyl disaster was a sobering moment. The same year the IAEA published the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group’s Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident (INSAG-1), which featured the term ‘nuclear security culture’ for the first time.22 The report acknowledged that the personnel of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant lacked the internalized need to accurately follow the instructions and operating rules, lacked a sense of danger when operating radiation equipment, lacked an understanding of the potential disastrous consequences of their violations, and that this had been one of the reasons for the accident. All these components of the interrelationship between nuclear technology and the human factor make up the ‘nuclear security culture’. Radical transformations in Russia in the early 1990s led to a change in government priorities, shrinking of the physicists’ field of work, and expansion of non-military uses of military technologies. The Russian industrial complex was undergoing a conversion, and there was a decreased demand for specialists in physics and technical skills. The new market relations set new tasks: to train nuclear industry specialists able to work in market conditions, familiar with marketing, knowing how to search for investments and sell their product in the context of harsh competition. There came a demand for ‘integral education’ and specialists informed about advanced technologies, possessing solid knowledge of international economy and law, and familiar with contemporary information technology and foreign languages. The Institute of Economics and Analysis (IEA) became the pioneer of this approach at MEPhI. It was created in 1996 to meet the demand of the real sector and its task is to ensure the integration of all MEPhI departments to train highly qualified economists and managers well versed in mathematics and information technology and capable of making new science-intensive technologies commercially successful and finding optimal solutions to complex social and engineering problems. The majors

22ɋɟɪɢɹɢɡɞɚɧɢɣɩɨɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢɆȺȽȺɌɗ, ʋ 75-INSAG-1, 1986 (IAEA Safety Se- ries, No. 75-INSAG-1, 1986). 174 N. Dronishinets, G. Zinovyev and specializations offered by the Institute of Economics and Analysis reflect the experience and traditions of natural science and computer technology instruction at MEPhI as applied to science-intensive industries. IEA trains economists / mathematicians, economists / information scientists, and economists / managers. These processes naturally led to MEPhI acquiring the status of a state university (which in Russia implies degrees in both hard and soft science) and a core university of the Russian nuclear sector.23 Around the same time, Russia started its first education and research activities in the field of nuclear weapons nonproliferation. This is not a coincidence. At the turn of the century, the need to teach and enlighten young people about nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation became vital. After the end of the Cold War, the security concepts and threat perceptions changed, and this called for new thinking. Addressing this need, in 2002 the UN Secre- tary-General presented the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non- proliferation Education at the 57th General Assembly session. This report stated that the “overall objective of disarmament and nonproliferation education and training is to impart knowledge and skills to individuals to empower them to make their contribution, as national and world citizens, to the achievement of concrete disarmament and nonproliferation measures and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.”24 Russia was one of the countries that took active steps to implement this agenda. In 2003-2004, around a dozen Russian engineering universities introduced courses on nuclear nonproliferation and security for the first time.25 In 2002, the Center for Security and Nonproliferation Research and Education was launched in Yekaterinburg. Owing to collaboration with the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (Sweden), the James Martin Center for Nonprolif- eration Studies (USA), and PIR Center (Russia), a group of enthusiasts started teaching and conducting research on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation topics at Ural State University. One should note that the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden and some other countries made a considerable contribution to expanding the circle of nuclear nonproliferation experts in Russia. International partners provided support and assistance to academic institutions offering programs on nuclear material protection, control and accounting and to engineering universities that were starting to offer nuclear nonproliferation courses, including universities located in closed nuclear cities. The U.S. Department of Energy launched a project to assist Russia in training MPC&A and nuclear nonproliferation specialists. In addition to becoming MPC&A professionals, these specialists would also become security culture ‘ambassadors’, which is important when working with nuclear materi-

23ɇɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɵɣɢɫɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɬɟɥɶɫɤɢɣɹɞɟɪɧɵɣɭɧɢɜɟɪɫɢɬɟɬ «ɆɂɎɂ». ɂɫɬɨɪɢɹȼɍɁɚ (National Research Nuclear University MEPhI. History of the University, http://www. planetaedu.ru/articles/487. 24 UN Secretary-General. United Nations Study on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education. http://undocs.org/ru/A/57/124. 25 ȼɟɫɬɧɢɤ. ɂɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɨɧɧɵɣ ɛɸɥɥɟɬɟɧɶɉɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɵ ɩɨ ɢɡɭɱɟɧɢɸ ɧɟɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟ- ɧɢɹɜɇɇȽ. (Vestnik. Information Bulletin of the Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program) (CNS, MIIS), no. 18 (Spring 2006): 3–4. Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 175 als. DoE supported the development of two new engineering degrees at ME- PhI, the leader of personnel training for the Russian nuclear energy sector. The first new MEPhI program was a master’s degree program in MPC&A and by 2005 it already had 56 graduates working in governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations, research centers, and in some cases at nuclear enterprises. The second new MEPhI program was an engineering degree in “Security and Nonproliferation of Nuclear Materials” that trained engineers specifically for the nuclear industry.26 In 2005, the DoE started providing support to Tomsk Polytechnic Uni- versity, the second Russian university to offer the new engineering degree in “Security and Nonproliferation of Nuclear Materials.” TPU has also been one of the primary suppliers of employees for Rosatom and Rosenergoatom. TPU graduates tend to work at nuclear fuel cycle enterprises in Siberia and the Ural region, while MEPhI graduates tend to seek employment in the Euro- pean part of Russia. The U.S. Department of Energy provided active support in creating and strengthening these programs at MEPhI and TPU and making them sustainable. Nuclear nonproliferation education in Russia began in 1997, when the U.S. Department of Energy via Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the first time engaged the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey to work with Russian universities on MPC&A and nuclear nonproliferation programs. This work started from assistance in creating and expanding the curriculum for the new MEPhI master’s degree program, but later the range of CNS activities expanded to include assistance to Russian engineering universities in developing and introducing courses on nuclear security and nonproliferation, including by sharing experience, providing faculty training, supplying teaching materials, and sending guest lecturers if necessary. CNS focused on two ways to enhance the level of faculty in the area of nuclear nonproliferation: 1) inviting faculty from engineering universities from different parts of Russia to Monterey as visiting fellows and 2) organizing seminars and study programs in Russia. In the early 2000s, the CNS Vis- iting Fellows Program hosted faculty from Tomsk Polytechnic University, Novouralsk Technological Institute, Snezhinsk State Academy of Physics and Technology, Ozersk Institute of Technology, and Sarov State Institute of Physics and Technology. These engineering universities train specialists for the key nuclear enterprises located in the vicinity. Visiting fellows attended a course on international security, international treaties, regimes and organizations in the field of WMD nonproliferation, new threats and challenges, and regional specifics of nonproliferation. While in Monterey, visiting fellows together with CNS staff worked on syllabi of the future courses for their institutes and departments. At TPU, this course has been offered since 2002, at UrSU (now UrFU) – since 2003, in Novouralsk and Sarov – since 2004, in Ozersk – since 2005. Around the same time, the first student conferences on nuclear nonproliferation were held. For

26 ȼɟɫɬɧɢɤ. ɂɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɨɧɧɵɣ ɛɸɥɥɟɬɟɧɶɉɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɵ ɩɨ ɢɡɭɱɟɧɢɸ ɧɟɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟ- ɧɢɹ ɜ ɇɇȽ (Vestnik. Information Bulletin of the Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program) (CNS, MIIS), no. 16 (Summer 2005): 7. 176 N. Dronishinets, G. Zinovyev instance, on April 21, 2005 Novouralsk State Technological Institute (NSTI) held the first Ural student conference on nonproliferation that brought together around 150 students from NSTI, UrSU, Ural State Pedagogical Uni- versity, and Moscow International Higher Business School (Yekaterinburg branch). In 2006, the student research Polar Lights conference in St. Peters- burg for the first time organized a nonproliferation section with CNS support. This annual conference for many years brought together students from the leading Russian universities that train nuclear industry specialists and had Rosatom and a number of international organizations among its partners and sponsors. One of the latest examples of U.S.-Russian cooperation that Dr. William Potter, a renowned nuclear nonproliferation expert and founding father of many nonproliferation research and education projects, offers in his 2017 paper is the double degree program in nonproliferation launched in 2016 by the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) and Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Students of this master’s degree program study in both Moscow and Monterey and spend a semester as interns at an organization working in the nonproliferation area.27 In 2011, St. Petersburg State University launched a master’s degree program in Strategic and Arms Control Studies that also offers courses on nuclear nonproliferation.

Participation of Russian nuclear universities in international education projects

Another consistent pattern in the development of nuclear education is participation by Russian universities in international education projects. The country became open in the course of reforms in the 1990s, and Russian universities established contacts with their overseas counterparts. MEPhI started accepting applications to its undergraduate and postgraduate programs from international students in 1992, and the first international students appeared at MEPhI in the 1992/1993 academic year, although up until 2000 their number did not exceed several dozen. For instance, in the 1998/1999 academic year MEPhI had 35 international students from 10 countries: 13 from Turkey, 8 from China, 4 from Syria, 3 from Pakistan etc.28 Over the last few years, the number of international faculty and students has increased considerably. In 2014, MEPhI had somewhat fewer than 2% international faculty and staff and only 6.6% international students, but in 2015 already, almost 14% of faculty and 12% of students were from abroad. By 2020 every fifth faulty member and student at

27 William C. Potter, “Celebrating 15 Years of Disarmament and Nonproliferation Educa- tion”, Revisiting disarmament and non̂proliferation education, UNODA Occasional Papers no. 31 (December 2017), 57. 28 ɋɬɪɢɯɚɧɨɜɆɇ., ȾɦɢɬɪɢɟɜɇɆ., “ɇɂəɍ «ɆɂɎɂ»: ɨɬɢɧɫɬɢɬɭɬɚɛɨɟɩɪɢɩɚɫɨɜɞɨɭɧɢɜɟɪ- ɫɢɬɟɬɚɦɢɪɨɜɨɝɨɤɥɚɫɫɚ”, Ƚɪɚɧɢɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɝɨɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɹ (M.N. Strikhanov, N.M. Dmitriev, NRNU MEPhI: From the Institute of Ammunition to the World-Class University in Facets of Russian Education) (Moscow: Centr Sotsiologitscheskikh issledovaniy, 2015), 562. Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 177

MEPhI will be international.29 Fig. 1 presents the dynamic of increase in the number of international students.

Fig. 1

Source: ɂɬɨɝɢɞɟɹɬɟɥɶɧɨɫɬɢȽɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɣɤɨɪɩɨɪɚɰɢɢɩɨɚɬɨɦɧɨɣɷɧɟɪ- ɝɢɢ «Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ» ɡɚ 2016 ɝɨɞ. ɉɭɛɥɢɱɧɵɣɝɨɞɨɜɨɣɨɬɱɟɬ, ɫ.255 (Results of Rosatom Operations in 2016. Annual public report, p. 255 http://www.rosatom.ru/upload/iblock/374/3748b4891b0b9250fa3a8d471542a36e.pdf).

The willingness of Russian nuclear universities to pursue international cooperation naturally follows from the strategic objectives of Rosatom, and also from the grand concept adopted by the Ministry of Education, National research universities and other similar programs that require international faculty and students, the primary employers of their graduates. One of Rosa- tom’s long-term strategic objectives for the period to 2030 is increase its international market share. In order to ensure a leading position in the global nuclear energy market, Rosatom is expanding its presence in over 40 countries and its portfolio of international orders for the ten-year period exceeds 133 billion USD. It plans to increase its share of international business projects from 47% in 2016 to 65% in 2030.30

29 “ɄɚɠɞɵɣɩɹɬɵɣɫɬɭɞɟɧɬɢɩɪɨɮɟɫɫɨɪɇɂəɍɆɂɎɂɤ 2020 ɝɨɞɭɛɭɞɟɬɢɡɡɚɪɭɛɟ- ɠɚ” (“Every Fifth Student and Professor of MEPhI Will Be a Foreigner by 2020”), https://ria.ru/society/20161111/1481150667.html. 30 ɂɬɨɝɢ ɞɟɹɬɟɥɶɧɨɫɬɢ Ƚɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɣ ɤɨɪɩɨɪɚɰɢɢ ɩɨ ɚɬɨɦɧɨɣ ɷɧɟɪɝɢɢ «Ɋɨɫɚ- ɬɨɦ» ɡɚ 2016 ɝɨɞ. ɉɭɛɥɢɱɧɵɣɝɨɞɨɜɨɣɨɬɱɟɬ (Results of Rosatom Operations in 2016. Annual public report) (2016), 43, http://www.rosatom.ru/upload/iblock/374/ 3748b4891b0b9250fa3a8d471542a36e.pdf. 178 N. Dronishinets, G. Zinovyev

In order to achieve this goal, in 2016 Russia concluded eight intergovernmental accords and reached 20 inter-agency agreements (for comparison: 8 and 16 respectively in 2015; 11 and 18 respectively in 2014). This number includes four framework intergovernmental agreements with Bolivia, Zam- bia, Tunisia, and Cuba, that lay the foundation for bilateral cooperation with these countries in the nuclear field. Russia signed intergovernmental agreements with Bolivia and Nigeria to build nuclear research and technology centers there. Those centers will provide training for the local researchers and engineers and supply the competences required for practical projects in the nuclear area. The work of these centers will allow for the wide application of radiation technologies in agriculture, medicine, and industry. In 2016, Rosa- tom was involved in a project to construct a Russian-designed Center for Nu- clear Science and Technology in Vietnam. Russian experts were in regular contact with Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry and Trade and Ministry of Sci- ence and Technology. When the National Assembly of Vietnam took the decision to postpone the construction of Ninh Thuұn 1 nuclear power plant, talks were launched with specialized Vietnamese agencies to address the practical implications of that decision.31 In order for Russia and Vietnam to successfully engage in joint nuclear projects, Vietnamese students studied at MEPhI for six years specializing in “Nuclear Stations: Design, Operation, and Engineering,” and in 2017 the first 28 students graduated. They successfully defended their theses and five of them graduated with honors, even though six years earlier they did not speak a word of Russian. Their thesis work was supervised by leading MEPhI experts and was carried out for a little under a full academic year. All the theses received official reviews by specialists and researchers from Rosatom in addition to academic advisors’ feedback. The Vietnamese students also visited MEPhI branches during their studies. For instance, Volgodonsk Engineering Technical Institute, the branch of MEPhI, welcomed the first international student visitors as part of the Volgodonsk resource center initiative. What makes this project unique is that in the course of their studies the international students had an opportunity to supplement their theoretical knowledge with practical skills. In other words, they could “touch the hardware,” and 20 Vietnamese students did that at Atommash factory. Let us provide another example. Russia and Egypt also pursue academic cooperation in the nuclear field. In March 2017, a delegation from Rosatom and Russian universities paid a visit to leading Egyptian universities. Valery Karezin, Educational Projects Director at Rosatom, headed the Russian delegation that included representatives of MEPhI, Ural Federal University, Mos- cow State University of Civil Engineering, Tomsk Polytechnic University, and Pushkin State Russian Language Institute. They visited Alexandria Uni- versity, Arab Academy for Science Technology and Maritime Transport, Cairo University, Ain Shams University, and Egyptian Russian University. The Russian delegation met with the leadership and faculty of the Egyp- tian universities, learnt about their curricula and research infrastructure, and discussed cooperation opportunities. The main purpose of the visit was to discuss the possibility of creating a system to train Egyptian engineering stu-

31 Ibid, 47, 72. Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 179 dents for future work at El Dabaa nuclear power plant and relying on curricula developed together with the Russian universities to do so. In Cairo, the Russian delegation presented Rosatom’s approaches to HR planning and development for its partner countries and collaboration ideas and opportunities put forward by the Russian universities. During that same visit, Alexandria University and MEPhI signed a memorandum on cooperation to jointly develop nuclear research programs, share infrastructural opportunities, exchange research information and methodology, and develop student exchange programs.32 In order to identify the most promising school and university students and offer them future nuclear education opportunities in Russia, Egypt holds “Nuclear Education in Russia” contests. In April 2016, the Russian Center for Science and Culture in Cairo hosted the awards ceremony for the winners of that contest. The contest was supported by the Rosatom Corporate Academy and organized as part of bilateral cooperation in education, in order to offer Egyptian students an opportunity to study at Rus- sian nuclear universities. Students of the leading engineering universities and senior year school students interested in studying nuclear energy in Russia took part in the competition.33 Ural Federal University will also teach future personnel of Egypt’s nuclear industry. This agreement was reached during a meeting between UrFU Rector Victor Koksharov and President of the Egyptian-Russian Foundation for Culture and Science Dr. Hussain al-Shafei in April 2017. Collaboration will focus on Russian language courses, double degree programs, and translation of study materials. Personnel training for the nuclear industry is becoming especially important, because of the first nuclear power plant to be constructed in Egypt at El Dabaa. According to the intergovernmental agreement between Egypt and Russia, the power plant will have four power units with a capacity of 1.2 GW each and four water desali- nation units. This will make Egypt the regional technology leader and the only country in the region with a Generation III+ NPP. This large-scale project will take 12 years to complete and will require a large number of qualified specialists. “We are interested in double degree programs implemented by Egyptian universities together with UrFU. Also very promising and relevant may be the opening in Egyptian universities of basic departments of UrFU, specializing in nuclear energy and the study of Russian as a foreign language. ” noted Hussain al-Shafei.34 The two parties also outlined additional promising cooperation areas: renewable energy sources, additive technologies, and remote Earth probing

32 “Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ ɢ ȿɝɢɩɟɬ ɪɚɡɜɢɜɚɸɬ ɦɟɠɜɭɡɨɜɫɤɨɟ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɨ ɜ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɣ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɢ”, Ⱦɟɩɚɪɬɚɦɟɧɬ ɤɨɦɦɭɧɢɤɚɰɢɣ Ƚɨɫɤɨɪɩɨɪɚɰɢɢ «Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ» (“Russia and Egypt Are Pursuing University Cooperation in the Nuclear Field”, Communications Department of Rosatom, http://www.atomic-energy.ru/news/2017/03/24/74017. 33 “ȼ Ʉɚɢɪɟ ɨɛɴɹɜɥɟɧɵ ɩɨɛɟɞɢɬɟɥɢ ɨɥɢɦɩɢɚɞɵ «Ⱥɬɨɦɧɨɟ ɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɟ ɜ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ»”. Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ – Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɚɹ ɫɟɬɶ (Winners of the “Nuclear Education in Russia” Competition Were Announced in Cairo. Rosatom – International Network), http://www.atomic- energy.ru/news/2016/04/21/65223. 34 “ɍɪɚɥɶɫɤɢɣɮɟɞɟɪɚɥɶɧɵɣɭɧɢɜɟɪɫɢɬɟɬɛɭɞɟɬɝɨɬɨɜɢɬɶɤɚɞɪɵɞɥɹɚɬɨɦɧɨɣɷɧɟɪɝɟ- ɬɢɤɢȿɝɢɩɬɚ” (“Ural Federal University Will Train Personnel for Egypt’s Nuclear Industry”), http://www.atomic-energy.ru/news/2017/04/12/74723. 180 N. Dronishinets, G. Zinovyev from space. “UrFU is a multidisciplinary university. In addition to nuclear energy expertise, the university has a strong department of Russian as a foreign language teaching international students from dozens of countries. This has to do with another crucial area of joint work, as the quality of personnel training for construction and operation of the new NPP depends on it. It concerns translation of reference literature on that topic from Russian to English. UrFU Rector Victor Koksharov stated that his university was well equipped to solve these tasks that are so important for Egypt.35 Starting from 2015, Tomsk Polytechnic University also carries out personnel training for Egyptian nuclear industry together with the Egyptian Rus- sian University.36 On September 19, 2017, Russia and Cambodia signed an agreement on cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It lays down the legal foundation for bilateral collaboration and outlines its specific areas: training of nuclear energy sector personnel, basic and applied research, application of radiation technologies in industry, medicine, agriculture, and environmental protection. This agreement opens up a possibility for joint strategic projects, such as the construction of Russian-designed nuclear power units in Cambo- dia. The parties agreed to create a coordinating committee to oversee the implementation of the agreement.37 In 2015, Rosatom and the Department of Energy of South Africa signed a memorandum of understanding on personnel training for the South African nuclear energy sector. Russia and South Africa intend to implement a number of joint nuclear education projects. Their goal is to train five categories of specialists: NPP personnel, engineering and construction personnel, non- energy sector personnel, nuclear infrastructure personnel, as well as students and faculty. The parties will undertake the necessary steps to offer studying opportunities for 200 South African applicants at Russian universities and research organizations. The document also envisages preparation of research and teaching materials on nuclear energy, student exchanges, organization of summer schools and internships, competitions and faculty training.38 To sum up, Rosatom’s long-term portfolio of international orders contributes to the growing export of Russian nuclear education to the markets that hold potential interest for Rosatom. By December 31, 2016, there were 1400 international students in all Russian nuclear universities, including students from Vietnam, Bangladesh, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Cuba

35 “ɍɧɢɜɟɪɫɢɬɟɬɩɨɦɨɠɟɬȿɝɢɩɬɭɜɩɨɞɝɨɬɨɜɤɟɤɚɞɪɨɜɞɥɹɚɬɨɦɧɨɣɷɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɢ” (“The University Will Assist Egypt in Training Personnel for the Nuclear Industry”), https://urfu.ru/ru/news/19400. 36 “ɊɨɫɚɬɨɦɛɭɞɟɬɝɨɬɨɜɢɬɶɜɌɨɦɫɤɟɢɧɠɟɧɟɪɨɜɞɥɹɡɚɪɭɛɟɠɧɵɯȺɗɋ” (“Rosatom Will Train Engineers for Foreign NPPs in Tomsk”), http://www.strf.ru/ material.aspx?CatalogId=221&d_no=118305#.WcnjfIVOJZV. 37 “Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ ɢ Ʉɚɦɛɨɞɠɚ ɩɨɞɩɢɫɚɥɢ ɫɨɝɥɚɲɟɧɢɟ ɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟ ɜ ɢɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɢ ɚɬɨɦɧɨɣɷɧɟɪɝɢɢɜɦɢɪɧɵɯɰɟɥɹɯ”, ȾɟɩɚɪɬɚɦɟɧɬɤɨɦɦɭɧɢɤɚɰɢɣȽɨɫɤɨɪɩɨɪɚɰɢɢ «Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ» (“Russia and Cambodia Signed an Agreement on Cooperation in Using Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes”, Communications Department of Rosatom), http://www. rosatom.ru/journalist/news/rossiya-i-kambodzha-podpisali-soglashenie-o-sotrudnichestve-v-is- polzovanii-atomnoy-energii-v-mirnykh/. 38 “Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ" ɩɨɦɨɠɟɬɩɨɩɭɥɹɪɢɡɢɪɨɜɚɬɶɚɬɨɦɧɭɸɷɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɭɜɘȺɊ” (“"Rosatom"” Will Help Make Nuclear Energy More Popular in South Africa), RIA Novosti, http://www.atomic-energy.ru/news/2015/07/09/58248. Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 181 and other countries – 37 countries altogether. The universities were planning to enroll 300 new students in 2017.39

Collaboration of Russian universities with the IAEA

The IAEA from the first years of its existence recognized the need for a focused and consolidated approach to assisting the member states in their efforts to preserve nuclear education systems and train personnel for peaceful atom purposes. The IAEA has been a reservoir of knowledge about peaceful uses of nuclear energy since the organization’s creation in 1957. Since the early 2000s, many IAEA programs address the need to preserve and expand nuclear knowledge and ensure the availability of qualified personnel for the nuclear industry. IAEA Director General’s reports at the 2003 and 2004 Gen- eral Conferences and on subsequent occasions urged the member states to unite education institutions into networks, in order to preserve nuclear education and train nuclear industry personnel.40 In 2012, the IAEA and NRNU MEPhI signed Practical Arrangements to cooperate in the preservation and development of nuclear knowledge and nuclear education, including training and retraining of personnel. In 2014, the IAEA spent 11.5% of its budget on knowledge accumulation and management.41 Ensuring a ‘one-house’ approach to knowledge management became the main task for the interdisciplinary Capacity Building and Liaison Group that includes representatives of all key programs.42 A number of Russian universities and nuclear industry enterprises participate in nuclear knowledge management programs. For instance, MEPhI works together with the IAEA to manage and preserve the nuclear knowledge and develop model curricula on “Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security” and “Nuclear Technologies and Nuclear Machine-Building.” In September 2015, the IAEA and MEPhI signed an agreement and MEPhI became a member of the International Nu- clear Management Academy that aims to enhance the competences of nuclear industry managers by launching international master’s degree programs at leading universities. The University of Manchester launched such a program in 2015. On September 1, 2016, MEPhI launched the first master’s degree program in Rus- sia with a focus on management in the nuclear industry corresponding to IAEA requirements.43 The 2016 IAEA Annual Report noted that MEPhI had become the

39ɂɬɨɝɢɞɟɹɬɟɥɶɧɨɫɬɢȽɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɣɤɨɪɩɨɪɚɰɢɢɩɨɚɬɨɦɧɨɣɷɧɟɪɝɢɢ «Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ» ɡɚ 2016 ɝɨɞ. ɉɭɛɥɢɱɧɵɣɝɨɞɨɜɨɣɨɬɱɟɬ (Results of Rosatom Operations in 2016. Annual public report): 253, http://www.rosatom.ru/upload/iblock/374/3748b4891b0b9250fa3a8d471542a36e.pdf . 40əɞɟɪɧɵɟɡɧɚɧɢɹ. ȾɨɤɥɚɞȽɟɧɟɪɚɥɶɧɨɝɨɞɢɪɟɤɬɨɪɚ (Nuclear Knowledge. Report of Di- rector-General): 1, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/GC48Documents/Russian/ gc48-12_rus.pdf; Ɉɛɡɨɪ ɹɞɟɪɧɵɯ ɬɟɯɧɨɥɨɝɢɣ–2016, (Nuclear Technology Review–2016): 3, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC60/GC60InfDocuments/Russian/gc60inf-2_rus.pdf. 41 ȿɠɟɝɨɞɧɵɣ ɞɨɤɥɚɞ ɆȺȽȺɌɗ ɡɚ 2014 ɝɨɞ (IAEA Annual Report for 2014): 114. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc59-7_rus.pdf. 42əɞɟɪɧɵɟɡɧɚɧɢɹ. ȾɨɤɥɚɞȽɟɧɟɪɚɥɶɧɨɝɨɞɢɪɟɤɬɨɪɚ (Nuclear Knowledge. Report of Di- rector-General): 2, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/GC48Documents/Russian/ gc48-12_rus.pdf. 43ɄɪɸɱɤɨɜɗɎ., əɞɟɪɧɨɟɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɟɢɨɛɭɱɟɧɢɟɜɊɨɫɫɢɢ (E.F. Kryuchkov, Nuclear Education and Learning in Russia), http://www.atomic-energy.ru/articles/2012/07/23/35002; ɉɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɢɬɟɥɢɇɂəɍɆɂɎɂɜɨɲɥɢɜɍɩɪɚɜɥɹɸɳɢɣɫɨɜɟɬɆɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɣɚɤɚɞɟɦɢɢɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ 182 N. Dronishinets, G. Zinovyev second university after the University of Manchester to offer an International Nu- clear Management Academy curriculum and that 15 students were already studying within this program.44 Nuclear industry facilities also implement nuclear knowledge management projects. For instance, in 2013 the Smolensk nuclear power plant became the first Rosenergoatom enterprise to introduce a technique to manage the risks of critical knowledge loss that had been tested at U.S. nuclear power plants and then adopted by the IAEA. The Smolensk NPP successfully adapted this methodology and introduced it into practice. The NPP specialists did the mapping of knowledge, collected and documented the necessary information, and established the procedure for nuclear knowledge management integration into the overall management system at the enterprise. In the future, there are plans to make the process of nuclear knowledge management part of the enterprise’s routine activities. It will require certain structural changes, additional outreach, interaction with the HR department, quality control office, education and practical training division, and IT service. One needs to carry out regular assessments, form target-oriented programs with a focus on selected topics, integrate them with mentoring programs, conduct regular personnel training, and submit operation reports. Statistically, 80% of accumulated experience is undocumented, and so it needs to be transferred to instructions, guidelines, and education materials, thus making the nuclear knowledge management system part of the overall management system at the enterprise.45 In 2015, representatives of the IAEA and the International Nu- clear Management Academy visited the Smolensk NPP. During that visit, they paid primary attention to deepening the understanding of strategic importance of the common task, joint responsibility, exchange of experience, and specific problems associated with the sustainable maintenance of the nuclear knowledge base needed to ensure a high level of security.46 The IAEA provides consistent assistance to member states, at their request, in strengthening and preserving nuclear education and personnel training across a wide range of nuclear technologies and disciplines for peaceful purpose. It provides assistance in the development of principles and techniques for planning, design and implementation of nuclear knowledge management programs. It offers reliable information resources in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy, and it continues the development of tools and methods to preserve, share and use nuclear knowledge. Head of the IAEA Nuclear Knowledge Management Section, John de Grosbois, outlined the general challenges of knowledge management in the nuclear industry, such as its complex technology base, long life cycle, and regulation structures, and the lack of understanding in knowledge management issues. He emphasized that a lack of knowledge management would lead to indecision and could

ɦɟɧɟɞɠɦɟɧɬɚ (MEPhi Representatives Joined the Board of the International Nuclear Management Academy), https://mephi.ru/content/news/1810/111320/?sphrase_id=8831891. 44ȽɨɞɨɜɨɣɞɨɤɥɚɞɆȺȽȺɌɗɡɚ 2016 ɝɨɞ (IAEA Annual Report for 2016): 43. 45ɉɪɨɟɤɬɩɨɭɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɸɡɧɚɧɢɹɦɢɜɋɦɨɥɟɧɫɤɨɣȺɗɋ (Nuclear Management Project at Smolensk NPP), http://www.up-pro.ru/library/personnel_management/training/znaniya-aes.html. 46 Ƚɨɞɨɜɨɣ ɞɨɤɥɚɞ ɆȺȽȺɌɗ ɡɚ 2015 ɝɨɞ, (IAEA Annual Report for 2015): 39, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC60/GC60Documents/Russian/gc60-9_rus.pdf. Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 183 ultimately lead to bad decisions. Knowledge management issues are high on the agenda for many countries.47 Russian nuclear universities are also in contact with other international organizations that offer assistance in personnel training for the nuclear industry, such as the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD), the World Nuclear University, the Euro- pean Nuclear Education Network (ENEN), the Asian Network for Education in Nuclear Technology (ANENT), and major research centers and universities in Europe, Asia, and the United States. Network education projects are one of the main forms of international collaboration for universities. Article 15 of the Federal Law on Education in the Russian Federation indicates that network education is a format of collaboration that engages the resources of several education organizations, including foreign ones, and when necessary other types of organizations.48 MEPhI offers an excellent example of involvement in international network nuclear education projects. In 2016, the IAEA and the Regional Net- work for Education and Training in Nuclear Technology (STAR-NET) signed a cooperation agreement.49 STAR-NET unites 13 universities with nuclear physics programs from six countries. STAR-NET was created in 2015 at the IAEA General Conference and became a new regional nuclear education network, analogous to ENEN and ANENT and covering Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Creation of STAR-NET was preceded by preparatory work by the IAEA, when in January 2014, a consul- tation meeting was held and several universities in Central and Eastern Europe confirmed their interest in creating a regional nuclear education network that came to be known as STAR-NET: Regional Network for Education and Training in Nuclear Technology. It initially comprised 12 universities from Russia, Bela- rus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. STAR-NET is an international organization established by public and private universities, research institutions, industrial enterprises and other interested parties. The goal of STAR-NET is to contribute to the development, management and preservation of nuclear knowledge and assist in the training of qualified nuclear industry personnel in the member states. MEPhI was one of the STAR-NET founders, along with the Belarusian State University of Informatics and Radio- electronics and the Nizhny Novgorod State Technical University named after R.E. Alekseev. It is possible that the leading universities of Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary and some other countries will eventually join the network. Starting from 2014, MEPhI has pursued active cooperation with the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN). ENEN involves around 50

47 The Challenge of Managing Nuclear Knowledge, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/ news/challenge-managing-nuclear-knowledge. 48Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɥɶɧɵɣɡɚɤɨɧɨɬ 29.12.2012 N 273-ɎɁ (ɪɟɞ. ɨɬ 03.07.2016) "Ɉɛɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɢɜ ɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ" (ɫɢɡɦ. ɢɞɨɩ., ɜɫɬɭɩ. ɜɫɢɥɭɫ 01.09.2016) (Federal Law on Educa- tion in the Russian Federation no. 273-FZ of 29.12.2002 (amended version entered into force on 01.09.2016). 49 ɆȺȽȺɌɗ ɢ Ɋɟɝɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɚɹ ɫɟɬɶ ɩɨ ɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɸ ɜ ɨɛɥɚɫɬɢ ɹɞɟɪɧɵɯ ɬɟɯɧɨɥɨɝɢɣ STAR-NET ɞɨɝɨɜɨɪɢɥɢɫɶ ɨ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɟ (IAEA and Regional Network for Education and Training in Nuclear Technology STAR-NET Agreed to Cooperate), http://www.rosatom.ru/ journalist/news/magate-i-regionalnaya-set-po-obrazovaniyu-v-oblasti-yadernykh-tekhnologiy-star-net- dogovorilis-o-sot/. 184 N. Dronishinets, G. Zinovyev

European organizations, both universities and nuclear centers. MEPhI and Rosatom Central Institute for Continuing Education and Training are associate members of ENEN. The network has a project ENEN-RU II specifically focusing on collaboration with Russia. In 2016, there were three PhD students from Italy, Romania and Slovakia at MEPhI who came for an internship through ENEN. MEPhI management and its European partners discussed the possibility of creating joint English-language programs at MEPhI in partnership with ENEN universities. According to the then dean of the Physics and Technology Faculty, a double degree program could be on the agenda.50 On November 24, 2015, a meeting of the ENEN-RU II project took place in Russia. It focused on short-term and long-term strategies of project development and cooperation. The meeting brought together representatives of ENEN organizations from Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Germany, Spain, and Italy. ENEN and Russia (represented by MEPhI and Rosatom’s Central Institute of Advanced Training) agreed to develop a joint Russian- European master’s degree in nuclear engineering, relying on ENEN’s experience of creating EMSNE (European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineer- ing). Participants of the forum suggested a joint ENEN/Rosatom course on nuclear security culture for the Russian audience to be held at Rosatom’s Central Institute of Advanced Training.51 MEPhI has traditionally been a network university with branches in closed nuclear cities. In 2016, it signed an agreement with schools in such cities, so that future Rosatom employees could start their education from a young age. MEPhI offers its network technologies to school students within its lyceums. MEPhI has a Network School project that offers a special education environment combining teaching and information resources, as well as various learning formats for school students who show an interest in physics and engineering. This project essentially builds upon all MEPhI projects oriented toward school students. To sum up, networks of education institutions offering nuclear education programs are an efficient tool for information exchange and personnel training, and they contribute to knowledge creation in nuclear security and nuclear nonproliferation.

Rosatom’s cooperation with specialized universities As shown above, the First Chief Directorate and then the Ministry of Medium Machine Building played a major role in the creation and development of the Soviet/Russian nuclear education system. Later, when Rosatom State Corporation was established, this system of industry-specific education institutions was transferred to the supervision of the Russian Education and Science Ministry and the network-based National Research Nuclear Univer-

50 ȾɟɤɚɧɆɂɎɂ: ɪɚɫɲɢɪɢɦɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɟ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɨ ɩɨ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɦɭ ɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚ- ɧɢɸ (MEPhI Dean: We Will Expand International Collaboration in Nuclear Educatio), https://ria.ru/authors/20160608/1444446498.html. 51 ȼɇɈɍȾɉɈ «ɐɂɉɄɊɨɫɚɬɨɦɚ» ɩɪɨɲɥɚɜɫɬɪɟɱɚɎɨɪɭɦɚɩɪɨɟɤɬɚ ENEN-RU II (Rosatom’s Central Institute of Advanced Training Hosted the Meeting of ENEN-RU II), http://rosatom.ru/journalist/news/v-nou-dpo-laquo-tsipk-rosatoma-raquo-proshla-vstrecha- foruma-proekta-enen-ru-ii-15/. Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 185 sity MEPhI was established. This signified a new stage in the nuclear industry’s relationship with higher education. Today, the model of Rosatom’s interaction with education institutions is built on partnership principles and includes a variety of tools. Rosatom and the Russian Education Ministry together act as stakeholders in the process aimed at creating a world-class specialized research university capable of resolving the education and research tasks offered by the nuclear industry. NRNU MEPhI comprises 11 higher education institutions and 13 colleges, which trains specialists for Rosatom focusing on specific industry related specializations.52 Rosatom is a player that defines the most urgent tasks in the field of nuclear education. A Consortium of Rosatom Supporting Universities was established in 2011 within Rosatom’s program entitled “Innovative Development and Tech- nological Modernization until 2020.” One of the primary tasks of this Consor- tium is concerted effort and coordination of the interaction among the leading Russian universities to assist in Rosatom’s innovation and modernization activities. This Consortium comprises 14 universities: National Research Nu- clear University MEPhI, National Research Tomsk Polytechnic University, Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B. N. Yel- tsin, Nizhny Novgorod State Technical University named after R.E. Alek- seev, Peter the Great St. Petersburg State Polytechnic University, Bauman Moscow State Technical University, Ivanovo State Power Engineering Uni- versity named after V.I. Lenin, National Research University “Moscow Power Engineering Institute”, National University of Science and Technology “MISIS”, Mendeleev University of Chemical Technology of Russia, Moscow State University of Construction, Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod, St. Petersburg State University, and Admiral Makarov State Uni- versity of Maritime and Inland Shipping. Chairman of the inaugural conference MEPhI rector Mikhail Strikhanov noted that the goal of the Consortium is to facilitate the efficient research and education collaboration of higher education institutions with Rosatom and the Skolkovo Foundation. The decision to create the Consortium was approved at the session of the Nuclear Technologies working group of the Presidential Commission for the Modernization and Technological Development of Rus- sia’s Economy within Rosatom’s Program of Innovative Development and Technological Upgrading to 2020. Valery Karezin, Project Director from Rosatom’s HR Department, outlined the priority tasks associated with improving the quality of education, training personnel for international partners and enhancing the qualifications of Rosatom’s research and engineering personnel.53 In 2012, Rosatom adopted a knowledge management program. Its objective is to provide infrastructural support to the innovative development of the nuclear industry. In 2016, Rosatom and the Russian Ministry of Education and Science agreed that the former will grant the latter the right to use the second version of Rosatom’s Knowledge Management System and put it into

52 ©Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ» ɞɟɥɢɬɫɹ ɡɧɚɧɢɹɦɢ. Ƚɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɚɹ ɤɨɪɩɨɪɚɰɢɹ «Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ» (“Rosa- tom” shares knowledge. State Corporation “Rosatom”) (Moscow: VShE Publishing House, 2012), 85. 53 ɍɱɪɟɠɞɟɧɚ Ⱥɫɫɨɰɢɚɰɢɹ «Ʉɨɧɫɨɪɰɢɭɦ ɨɩɨɪɧɵɯ ɜɭɡɨɜ Ƚɨɫɤɨɪɩɨɪɚɰɢɢ «Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ» (Consortium of Rosatom Supporting Universities Was Established), http://ispu.ru/node/9355. 186 N. Dronishinets, G. Zinovyev practice at Russian universities. This Knowledge Management System was developed at Rosatom and is a product that allows its users to manage knowledge and intellectual property relying on advanced techniques and information systems. Thirty universities voiced their interest in using this system in 2016. Deputy Director General of Rosatom Vyacheslav Parshukov notes that Rosatom’s knowledge management system has practically no rivals in Russia and the world. This system covers the entire life cycle of knowledge from creation to application, while most companies use knowledge management in certain areas only, for instance in data management or HR. In 2014, this project gained the approval of the IAEA support mission as one of the best industry projects in the field of knowledge management.54 Missions to facilitate knowledge management are among the most important services offered by the IAEA. During these missions, the primary focus was on improving the understanding of strategic importance, shared responsibility and specific problems of maintaining a sustainable nuclear knowledge base that is needed to ensure a high level of safety and security in the nuclear industry, as well as on exchanging the experience of corresponding programs. National Research Tomsk Polytechnic University (TPU), one of Rus- sia’s leading nuclear universities, is a good illustration of how a system of knowledge management is created in cooperation with Rosatom. The university has a complex organization structure, deals with a huge flow of knowledge and information, and thus needs an appropriate knowledge management system. That is why TPU is now studying Rosatom’s experience of knowledge management system creation and is taking steps to introduce such a system at its Institute of Physics and Technology (IPT). Introducing this concept into the institute structure will allow for better access to the existing nuclear knowledge legacy, facilitate the transfer of knowledge to the new generation, and help fill the gaps whenever nuclear knowledge is lost. However, as Maria Perminova and Dmitry Demyanyuk point out, the process of creating the nuclear knowledge management system at TPU is in its opening stages. IPT is starting the digitalization of all accumulated knowledge and institute’s documentation and is expanding its e-library. Once the system is in place at IPT, TPU intends to expand the concept and implement it in all of its institutes.55 Another area of Rosatom’s cooperation with higher education institutions concerns the widespread practice of creating so-called corporate departments of Rosatom enterprises at specialized universities. As a rule,

54ɊɨɫɚɬɨɦɢɆɢɧɨɛɪɚɡɨɜɚɧɢɹɢɧɚɭɤɢɊɎɞɨɝɨɜɨɪɢɥɢɫɶɨɛɢɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɢɋɢɫɬɟɦɵ ɭɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɹɡɧɚɧɢɹɦɢɊɨɫɚɬɨɦɚɜɜɭɡɚɯɫɬɪɚɧɵ (Rosatom and Russian Ministry of Education and Science Agreed to Use Rosatom’s Knowledge Management System in Russian Universities), http://www.atomic-energy.ru/news/2016/06/14/66674); ɋɢɫɬɟɦɚ ɭɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɹ ɡɧɚɧɢɹɦɢ (Knowledge Management System), http://ar2013.rosatom.ru/168); ɋɢɫɬɟɦɚ ɭɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɹ ɡɧɚ- ɧɢɹɦɢɜɤɨɪɩɨɪɚɰɢɢ «Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ» (Knowledge Management System at “Rosatom” Corporation), http://isicad.ru/ru/articles.php?article_num=17753. 55ɉɟɪɦɢɧɨɜɚɆȼ., ȾɟɦɹɧɸɤȾȽ, “ɍɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɟɹɞɟɪɧɵɦɢɡɧɚɧɢɹɦɢɜɜɵɫɲɢɯɭɱɟɛ- ɧɵɯ ɡɚɜɟɞɟɧɢɹɯ” (M.V. Perminova, D.G. Demyanyuk, “Nuclear Knowledge Management at Higher Education Institutions”), http://earchive.tpu.ru/bitstream/11683/14802/1/ conference_tpu- 2015-C15-V1-166.pdf. Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 187 the heads of departments are top managers of those enterprises. Studying at those departments and undertaking internships at Rosatom enterprises give students an opportunity to learn about the specifics of production activities of their future employer from the inside, even before graduation. This offers a chance to enhance the quality of professional training and bridge the gap between education, research and industry. In 2014, specialized universities had 11 base departments created by 8 nuclear industry organizations. Fourteen more were created in 2015. For instance, the corporate department “Construction of Nuclear Industry Facilities” was established in 2013 at the leading Russian construction university – Mos- cow State University of Civil Engineering.56 Another example is JSC Nizhny Novgorod engineering company “Atomenergoproekt” (NIAEP), which sets the following three strategic tasks in terms of personnel training and cooperation with specialized universities: retaining existing competences, creating a system of transfer of critically important knowledge, and ensuring the influx of new knowledge and skills in accordance with business needs. The company’s management team does not live by the Soviet model, “When you come to work at an enterprise, forget everything you were taught at the university, you will learn everything from scratch.” According to NIAEP President Valery Limarenko, this is a costly approach. That is why in 2010 NIAEP signed an agreement with Nizhny Novgorod State Technical University (NNSTU) and in 2013 – with Nizhny Novgorod State University of Architecture and Civil Engi- neering. Thus, students can undergo different kinds of internships at the company and acquire additional knowledge at the base department of NIAEP at NNSTU. Forty-five employees of NIAEP are involved in the teaching process.57 In 2014, Moscow State University of Civil Engineering selected 80 strong university applicants, who were not only enrolled with free tuition, but also signed a company-sponsored education contract with one of Rosatom’s enterprises. Students from 33 cities and villages of Russia study within Rosa- tom-sponsored enrolment programs. This initiative involves around 20 enterprises that are part of the Rosatom system. In 2014, within the state program of personnel training for the military industrial complex, Rosatom also selected 45 senior students of the Moscow State University of Civil Engineer- ing to work at seven leading Rosatom’s nuclear weapons enterprises upon graduation: Mayak, Elektrokhimpribor, All-Russian Scientific Research Insti- tute of Experimental Physics, Instrument-Making Plant in Trekhgorny, and Eleron. Industry-sponsored students will be involved in large-scale innovative projects of the nuclear industry and in the future will become successful employees of Rosatom enterprises, helping to bring the corporation’s ambitious plans to life. These students will enjoy the opportunity of interact- ing with top managers of nuclear industry companies, and each of them will have a mentor. Rosatom enterprises will provide different kinds of

56©Ɋɨɫɚɬɨɦ». ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɹ ɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɹ ɤɚɞɪɨɜ (“Rosatom”. HR Decelopment Strategy), http://www.akvobr.ru/rosatom_strategiya_razvitiya_kadrov.html. 57 “Ɉɬɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɤɨɜɦɵɬɪɟɛɭɟɦɨɫɨɛɵɯɡɧɚɧɢɣ” (“We Demand Special Knowledge from Employees”), Kommersant, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3094605. 188 N. Dronishinets, G. Zinovyev support to their industry-sponsored students, such as internship opportunities and scholarships. So one can say that the fine traditions of the Soviet Ministry of Medium Machine-Building Industry have been revived when it comes to enrolment, teaching and intergenerational continuity. This will encourage the influx to Rosatom enterprises of young specialists armed with the latest scientific knowledge, and this knowledge is assessed on a regular basis. In November 2017, a pilot version of qualification assessment examination was organized at the Expertise and Methodology Cen- ter for Assessment and Certification of Nuclear Industry Specialist Quali- fications. Twenty-three nuclear power plant employees are students of the MEPhI master’s degree program (Department of Power Engineering). Assessment sets approved in 2017 and used in this examination were developed by experts of the Consortium of Supporting Universities in 2016- 2017. Starting from 2012, MEPhI faculty and staff have taken an active part in the development of professional standards and introduction of a qualification assessment system for the nuclear industry. It is especially important that university experts do this work in close cooperation with industry specialists, who believe that a qualification assessment system ought to become a powerful motivation factor for professional development and career advancement. The Council for Professional Qualifica- tions in the Nuclear Energy Field authorized the previously created Cen- ters of Independent Qualification Assessment to perform the relevant procedures. One of them is the head expertise and methodology center for assessment and certification of nuclear industry specialists that carries out qualification exams at its MEPhI-based examination site. In accordance with the regulations, professional exams are meant to verify the appli- cant’s qualification claims. At the first stage, the knowledge of theory is verified, and applicants who successfully pass that stage are admitted to the practical exam.58 At Rosatom’s request, the Rosatom Corporate Academy established in 2011 together with other engineering universities of Russia is carrying out extensive work to attract young talents to the nuclear industry.59 The so-called Rosatom Career Day is one its activities. Every year the number of people attending Rosatom Career Days organized by the Corporate Academy together with MEPhI grows, and in 2016 the number reached 8,000 people in seven Russian cities. There were career fairs and panel discussions where representatives of 35 enterprises of the nuclear industry answered their potential employees’ questions. Top managers of Rosatom delivered lectures for students about the future of the nuclear industry, and Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev gave a speech during the final event in Moscow. Another project of the Rosatom Academy is the Young Professionals Tournament TeMP that in 2016 brought together 3,500 participants from

58 “ɉɪɨɲɥɢ ɷɤɡɚɦɟɧɵ ɩɨ ɨɰɟɧɤɟ ɤɜɚɥɢɮɢɤɚɰɢɣɪɚɛɨɬɧɢɤɨɜ ɚɬɨɦɧɵɯ ɫɬɚɧɰɢɣ – ɫɬɭ- ɞɟɧɬɨɜɆɂɎɂ” (“Exams Were Held to Assess Qualifications of Nuclear Power Plant Employ- ees Who Are MEPhI Students”), http://www.atomic-energy.ru/news/2017/12/11/81580. 59Ɉɬɱɟɬɨɫɚɦɨɨɛɫɥɟɞɨɜɚɧɢɢ. ȺɇɈ «ɄɨɪɩɨɪɚɬɢɜɧɚɹȺɤɚɞɟɦɢɹɊɨɫɚɬɨɦɚ» ɡɚ 2016 ɝɨɞ (Self-Examination Report. Rosatom Corporate Academy 2016): 11–12, http://rosatom- academy.ru/ob-akademii/godovoi-otchet. Nuclear education as an atomic era phenomenon 189 among the students of specialized and supporting universities of Rosatom. In 2017, its scope was expanded and now it also welcomes young staff members of Rosatom organizations. Furthermore, the tournament now includes not just practical exercises, but the development and implementation of participants’ own startup projects. Rosatom Academy monitors the industry’s demand for university graduates on an annual basis. In the follow-up of the monitoring, the Russian Ministry of Education and Sci- ence received admission quota numbers for seven key Rosatom majors. An employer-sponsored education request was formulated for the nuclear industry organizations within the government plan to provide personnel for the Russian military industrial complex for 2018 – 2021. According to the monitoring data, in 2016 Rosatom enterprises hired 1,085 university graduates. Their grade point average was 4.32 (out of 5.00). More than half of them were graduates of the so-called supporting universities (not counting MEPhI branches). The 2017-2027 employment forecast for university graduates is 16,713 persons.

Conclusion

Analysis of the history and evolution of the Russian nuclear education system shows that in the 1940-1950s it was appointed the goal of nuclear weapons creation and improvement, and so the government assigned it a high priority. In the 1960-1980s, the government started to shift its policy emphasis from the military industry to the creation and development of the nuclear energy sector, atomic fleet, nuclear medicine and other peaceful atom areas. Universities started to offer a wide variety of specializations and majors for the future nuclear industry specialists. In the late 20th and early 21st century new problems and trends came to the fore of nuclear education. Humanization of nuclear education began and the focus started to shift from purely scientific and technical aspects of training toward human relations and moral and ethical norms, and such notions as nuclear security culture and radiation ethics appeared. Globalization and nuclear security requirements affect the content of nuclear education. It is a highly competitive area and requires nuclear knowledge management programs and active involvement in international education initiatives. By taking part in international nuclear education projects, Russian universities aim to solidify their global reputation and further improve the quality of nuclear education by means of a more efficient use of available education resources, including more active student exchanges, faculty mobility, and mutual quality control. University networks became a special part of the nuclear knowledge management system, as they contribute to the accumulation of knowledge, its preservation, strengthening, and transfer at the national, regional and global levels. Collaboration of Rosatom enterprises with specialized universities continues the tradition founded by the Ministry of Medium Machine Building with its emphasis on the close cooperation of nuclear enterprises with educational institutions. This is manifested in the creation of corporate 190 N. Dronishinets, G. Zinovyev departments of Rosatom enterprises at universities to train personnel for the nuclear industry, in lectures by Rosatom staff, and other such initiatives. All this serves the ultimate purpose of enhancing the level of knowledge and competences in students who are ready to work at nuclear facilities, improve global nuclear security and safety, and contribute to nuclear nonproliferation and world peace. 3 The Russian nonproliferation research: state of the field

Dmitry Pobedash

The aim of this article is to assess what Russian academia thinks about non-technical issues of nuclear nonproliferation, how we study this field and what approaches we use. I included physics, technology, chemistry, biology and medicine into the category of technical approaches. Most of the remainder of nonproliferation researchers fall into separate fields that practically do not overlap, that is, history, law and modern-day international relations. I set aside pure historical research of, for example, the Manhattan project, the early stages of the Soviet nuclear project or descriptions of treaty negotiations held in the 1960s. Legal scholars form a field of their own and extremely seldom do they address the work done in the fields of history and political science. The studies in recent history and current politics are intertwined to the point that sometimes it is difficult to draw a line between them. The joint field of recent history and current politics falls into the following categories: 1) research of global nonproliferation issues; 2) work aimed at studying the role and place of the USA in the structures and processes of nuclear nonproliferation; 3) research of bilateral, regional or local issues that do not involve the USA. Further analysis showed that there is a relatively small body of Russian experts writing extensively on the political aspects of nuclear nonproliferation issues. All of them consider the nation-state as the major – if not the only – actor in global politics, and all accept that nuclear weapons remain an important instrument of power politics. The main difference between them is that the “doves” insist that Russian national interests demand deeper and broader participation in nuclear nonproliferation regimes, while the “hawks” posit that Russian national interests demand more reliance on the nuclear deterrent and, therefore, Russia should unilaterally develop and strengthen its nuclear arsenal. Apart from this state-centrist mainstream, there exist few studies on issues that do not appear in the sights of the realist paradigm, for example, comparison of the ethos of Rus- sian and American nuclear scientists1 or semiotic analysis of power and influence in Russian-American relations2. Precise delineation of what nuclear nonproliferation studies cover is not easy. Nuclear nonproliferation is usually defined as a process of preventing

1ȼɉ. ȼɢɡɝɢɧ, “ɗɬɨɫɭɱɟɧɨɝɨɹɞɟɪɳɢɤɚ: ɢɫɬɨɤɢɢɮɨɪɦɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɟ (1940–1950-ɟɝɝ., ɧɚ ɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɟ ɢɫɬɨɪɢɢ ɫɨɜɟɬɫɤɨɝɨ ɚɬɨɦɧɨɝɨ ɩɪɨɟɤɬɚ)” (V.P. Vizgin, “The ethos of a nuclear scientist: origins and formation (1940–1950s, based on the history of the Soviet atomic project)”), Filosofia nauki 11 (2005). 2ɂȺ. Ɂɟɜɟɥɟɜ, ɆȺ. Ɍɪɨɢɰɤɢɣ, ɋɢɥɚɢɜɥɢɹɧɢɟɜȺɦɟɪɢɤɚɧɨɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɯɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɹɯ: ɫɟɦɢɨɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɣɚɧɚɥɢɡ (I.A. Zevelev, M.A. Troitskiy, Power and influence in US-Russia relations: semiotic analysis) (Moscow: NOFMO, 2006). 192 D. Pobedash states that do not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them as well as preventing nuclear weapon states from increasing their arsenals. The former aspect is also referred to as horizontal nonproliferation, non-dissemination, or non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. The latter is referred to as vertical nonproliferation, preventing growth of nuclear arsenals, and, ideally, nuclear disarmament. The term “disarmament” is ambiguous as it can be interpreted both as limitation or reduction of nuclear arsenals and as their complete elimination. Russia’s official position is that Russia is a world leader in arms reduction, but sees complete elimination of nuclear weapons as unrealistic and dangerous. Russian diplomats insist that the process of reducing and limiting nuclear weapons should not endanger security by eroding strategic stability. Russian leadership sees nuclear deterrence, a strategic concept of using the possession of nuclear weapons to prevent potential aggression, as an inalien- able part of ensuring strategic stability. Interestingly, A. Arbatov, in direct contradiction with the official Russian stance, believes that the concept of nuclear deterrence has become an anachronism. He argues that nuclear deterrence “causes further nuclear proliferation and at a certain point will lead to the deliberate or accidental use of nuclear weapons (or a nuclear explosive device) by a state or as an act of terrorism.3” In his opinion, relying solely on nuclear deterrence undermines strategic stability and threatens the nonproliferation regime in general. Russian scholars agree that in addition to concerns about nation-states acquiring or accumulating nuclear weapons, non-state actors that would like to acquire nuclear materials and technologies are going to pose a serious threat. Accordingly, they include issues of nuclear security and control over related materials and technologies in the field of nuclear nonproliferation. The article deals with post-Soviet period of nonproliferation studies conducted in the Russian Federation. The period starts with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and consequent rearrangement of the world order. There have been several reviews of different aspects of Russian nonproliferation research. Yu. Krupennikova4 and Ye. Borovka5 described the Rus- sian historiography of the North Korean nuclear problem. V. Tolstikov6, A. Zhuk, I. Bochkareva, and A. Yefremov studied the historiography of different issues connected with the Soviet nuclear project and building of nuclear facilities. A. Zhuk, M. Golovko, and Yu. Evdoshkina give an overview of historiographical research of nuclear security and safety culture both in Russia and

3 Ⱥ. Ⱥɪɛɚɬɨɜ, “Ɋɚɡɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɟ ɢ ɧɟɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟɧɢɟ: ɞɢɚɥɟɤɬɢɤɚ ɜ ɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɢ” (A. Arbatov, “Disarmament and nonproliferation: dialectics in action”) in ȼɡɚɢɦɨɫɜɹɡɶɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ ɪɚɡɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹɢɧɟɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟɧɢɹ: ɪɟɚɥɶɧɨɫɬɶɢɥɢɦɢɮ? (The interaction between nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation: the reality or a myth?), ed. A.G. Arbatov, V.Z. Dvorkin, S.K. Oznobischev (Moscow:IMEMO RAN, 2011), 84. 4ɘȿ. Ʉɪɭɩɟɧɧɢɤɨɜɚ, “əɞɟɪɧɚɹɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɚɄɇȾɊɜɫɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɨɣɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɢɫɬɨɪɢɨ- ɝɪɚɮɢɢ (2007-2009)” (U.E. Krupennikova, “DPRK nuclear problem in contemporary Russian historiography (2007-2009)”), Vestnik Buriatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Pedagogika. Filologia. Filosofia, 2010. 5ȿȺ. Ȼɨɪɨɜɤɚ, “ɋɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɚɹɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɚɹɢɫɬɨɪɢɨɝɪɚɮɢɹɨɫɟɜɟɪɨɤɨɪɟɣɫɤɨɣɹɞɟɪɧɨɣ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɟ” (E.A. Borovka, “Contemporary Russian historiography on North Korean nuclear problem”), Vestnik Grodnenskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seria 1: 64–71. 6 ȼɋ. Ɍɨɥɫɬɢɤɨɜ, “ɋɨɜɟɬɫɤɢɣɚɬɨɦɧɵɣ ɩɪɨɟɤɬ ɜ ɨɬɟɱɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɣ ɢ ɡɚɪɭɛɟɠɧɨɣ ɢɫɬɨ- ɪɢɨɝɪɚɮɢɢ” (V.S. Tolstiokov, “Soviet atom project in the domestic and foreign historiography”), Voprosy istorii, no. 6 (2013). The Russian nonproliferation research: state of the field 193 internationally. The authors believe that there has been no comprehensive historiographical research of nuclear security culture issues7. T. Kashirina reviewed the historiography of Soviet/Russian-American disarmament. She insists that there is no historiographical research in Russian that covers both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods of Russian-American relations in the field of strategic arms control and disarmament8. A.A. Manukhin aims to describe the contemporary state of the field in Russian nuclear disarmament research. Manukhin divides all Russian nuclear disarmament scholarship into three groups: historical-institutional, international-institutional, and military-institutional9. Historical-institutional scholarship in his opinion deals with the state of national economies and national military doctrines of the USA and Russia. The eight researchers of this school whose work Manukhin reviews try to assess how the state of the American and Russian economies and the doctrines of the two counties influenced the processes of disarmament in the USA and Russia. The eight scholars who belong to the first group are historians or political scientists specializing in studying the USA. The second group – the one that Manukhin calls international- institutional – includes scholars who work in the leading academic institutions that deal with international security issues. These researchers pay attention to international legal aspects of nuclear disarmament and emphasize its global character that is impossible to reduce to Russian-American relations. This group includes seven monographs, but only one edited by S. Rogov; the rest are written by A. Arbatov, V. Dvorkin, and S. Oznobishchev. The word “legal” in this context means more like institutional analysis, examining how countries behave within frameworks of treaties, rather than juridical analysis of provisions and legal terms of those treaties. The third group Manukhin calls military-institutional, as it focuses on issues of weapons, military strategy, and tactics. These researchers – many of them are or used to be in the military, or work as technical experts or career diplomats – focus on security issues relevant to Russia and on evolutions of threats to Russian security from NATO and the USA. Manukhin’s article was quite valuable as it demonstrates the strong bias Russian research has toward Russian-American relations and arms control issues. In Manukhin’s opinion, only experts belonging to the second group – he refers to the works of A. Arbatov – insist that political and academic elites should understand that nonproliferation and disarmament are interconnected. The Russian Science Citation Index (RINTs), a database of scientific publications in Russian, is a convenient tool to study Russian research as the

7Ⱥɧɞɪɟɣɀɭɤ, ɆɢɤɨɥɚȽɨɥɨɜɤɨ, ɘɥɢɹȿɜɞɨɲɤɢɧɚ, “Ɉɬɟɱɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɚɹɢɡɚɪɭɛɟɠɧɚɹɢɫ- ɬɨɪɢɨɝɪɚɮɢɹɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɤɭɥɶɬɭɪɵɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢɜɚɬɨɦɧɨɣɷɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɟ” (Andrey Zhuk, Mikola Golovko, Ulia Evdoshkina, “Domestic and foreign historiography of the problems of nuclear security culture”), Globalnaia yadernaia bezopasnost (2017). 8 Ɍȼ. Ʉɚɲɢɪɢɧɚ, “ɂɫɬɨɪɢɨɝɪɚɮɢɹ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ ɪɚɡɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹ ɜ ɫɨɜɟɬɫɤɨɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨ- ɚɦɟɪɢɤɚɧɫɤɢɯɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɹɯɜ 1969-2012 ɝɝ” (T.V. Kashirina, “The historiography of the problem of disarmament in Soviet/Russian-American relations in 1969-2012”), Vestnik MGU. Seria Istoria i Politicheskie nauki, 2014: 58-66. 9ȺȺ. Ɇɚɧɭɯɢɧ, “ɋɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɚɹɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɚɹɢɫɬɨɪɢɨɝɪɚɮɢɹɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɪɚɡɨ- ɪɭɠɟɧɢɹ” (A.A. Manukhin, “The contemporary Russian historiography of the problem of nuclear disarmament”), Gumanitarniy vestnik, 2014. 194 D. Pobedash service contains the results of scholarly research including dissertations, articles, and conference papers. The RINTs database lists thousands of items linked with nuclear nonproliferation in its broad sense described above. Among about 5,200 dissertations written on nuclear issues in the RINTs database most by far were written for academic degrees in physics, technics, chemistry, biology, medicine. These “technical” dissertations sometimes deal with issues of nonproliferation, safety, and security, or even the history of the Soviet nuclear project, but do it from a technical perspective. For example, a dissertation about the creation of the Russian nuclear complex (Kuznetsov, 2007) describes technical solutions worked out in different periods and, in the author’s own words, provides a “historical-technical analysis of technical solutions, design concepts, and choice of materials.10” There are several dissertations on pedagogy, for example, how to teach nuclear security in higher education. There is a dissertation studying the psy- chology of people who live near nuclear facilities. There is research on how society in Russia and Japan assesses nuclear energy11. If we do not limit our search in the RINTs database to dissertations only, but look at all non-technical nonproliferation research, the field is still too vast. Even if we separate “technical” research from that of humanities, we still have thousands of works published on nonproliferation issues. These non-technical publications fall within the following categories: 1) History – works that give descriptions of past events and processes like the Manhattan project, the Soviet nuclear project in 1950s, or discussions of NPT or SALT. 2) Political science – these articles provide descriptions of what is happening now, of decision-making mechanisms and processes. They can also delineate scenarios and predictions of prospects we have for the future. 3) Law – articles on purely legal aspects of disarmament and nonproliferation treaties. Another way to narrow down the scope of the review is to select non- technical dissertations. Only 70 dissertations were linked with “nuclear nonproliferation”. A disproportionately large number of forty-one dissertations out of 70 were defended in Moscow. Other universities that focus on nonproliferation research are located in St. Petersburg – six dissertations, Tomsk and Nizhniy Novgorod – five dissertations each. Then we can separate studies that do not deal with current international problems directly. That includes purely historical research, like studying the role of nuclear weapons in the foreign policy of France in 1958–1981 or comparison of Soviet and American nuclear projects in 1939–1949. There is a separate cluster of work on Soviet/Russian nuclear history. Dissertations – written in Chelyabinsk or Nizhny Novgorod as two large uni-

10ȼɆ. Ʉɭɡɧɟɰɨɜ, ɋɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɢɟɚɬɨɦɧɨɝɨɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɚɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ: ɢɫɬɨɪɢ- ɤɨɬɟɯɧɢɱɟɫɤɢɣ ɚɧɚɥɢɡ ɤɨɧɫɬɪɭɤɰɢɨɧɧɵɯ, ɬɟɯɧɨɥɨɝɢɱɟɫɤɢɯ ɢ ɦɚɬɟɪɢɚɥɨɜɟɞɱɟɫɤɢɯ ɪɟɲɟ- ɧɢɣ (V.M. Kuznetsov, Formation of the atomic complex of the Russian Federation: historical and technical analysis of structural, technological and materials science solutions. PhD dissertation) (2006). 11 A.ɇ. Ⱦɪɨɧɢɲɢɧɟɰ, Ɉɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɟ ɦɧɟɧɢɟ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ ɢ əɩɨɧɢɢ ɨ ɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɢ ɹɞɟɪɧɨɣ ɷɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɢ (A.N. Dronishinets, Public Opinion of Russia and Japan on the Development of Nuclear Energy) (2008). The Russian nonproliferation research: state of the field 195 versity centers close to clusters of nuclear facilities – describe the building of nuclear facilities and deal with social issues in the so-called closed cities that appeared around those nuclear facilities. There are 16 dissertations on legal issues. One is on legal instruments that local communities can use to participate in decision-making; two are on domestic issues of responsibility for violating laws applied to the nuclear sphere. The rest deal with different aspects of international laws that regulate disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The legal scholars cite almost exclusively the work of other jurists and extremely seldom mention their colleagues from fields of history or political science. When they do so, they refer most often to work of A. Arbatov and R. Timerbaev12. The two dissertations about the establishment of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in Central Asia mention articles by Ildar Akhtamzyan and Vladimir Orlov when describing the relevant historiography. Otherwise, the political and the legal dissertations cite dozens of authors, but only within their own respective academic field13. Interestingly, two legal dissertations published in 2010 by Sidorova and Sinyakin, in their review of previous research in their field mention Georg Schwarzenberger, a founding father of political realism as a method of political science and a prominent scholar of international law who seems to bridge the gap between researchers of legal and political spheres. Apart from legal research and historical studies that relate to events of long ago, there are only 49 dissertations in the Russian Science Citation Index that deal with current nonproliferation issues directly; 33 dissertations out of the 49 were written in 2007-2017. Out of the 49 dissertations, 21 were in history, 22 in political science, one in philosophy, one in sociology, and one in economics. The difference between dissertations for different degrees like in history and political science seems rather arbitrarily drawn. For example, a dissertation that studied nuclear issues in US-Indian relations was in history14. Another dissertation that studied the development of U.S. policy towards the Indian nuclear program was in political science15 (Olsufyev, 2011). Both dissertations dealt with history leading to the current state of affairs, both referred to political realism as one of theories they used. Putting one into the category of history and the other into politics may have something to do with

12 ɂɂ. ɋɢɧɹɤɢɧ, Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɩɪɚɜɨɜɨɣɪɟɠɢɦɧɟɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟɧɢɹɨɪɭɠɢɹɦɚɫ- ɫɨɜɨɝɨ ɭɧɢɱɬɨɠɟɧɢɹ ɜ ɫɜɟɬɟ ɛɨɪɶɛɵ ɫ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɵɦ ɬɟɪɪɨɪɢɡɦɨɦ (I.I. Siniakin, The international legal regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the light of the fight against international terrorism. PhD dissertation) (2010); ɉȼ. Ʉɨɦɚɪɨɜ, Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚ- ɪɨɞɧɵɣɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɶɜɨɛɥɚɫɬɢɧɟɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟɧɢɹɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɨɪɭɠɢɹ (P.V. Komarov, Interna- tional Nuclear Non-Proliferation Control. PhD dissertation) (2004). 13 ɇ.A. Ʉɭɬɧɚɟɜɚ, ɉɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ ɚɫɩɟɤɬɵ ɫɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɢɹ ɰɟɧɬɪɚɥɶɧɨɚɡɢɚɬɫɤɨɣ ɡɨɧɵ, ɫɜɨɛɨɞɧɨɣɨɬɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɨɪɭɠɢɹ (N.A. Kutnaeva, Political Aspects of the Development of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. PhD dissertation) (2013). 14 ɋȺ. Ɉɛɨɪɨɬɨɜ, əɞɟɪɧɵɣ ɮɚɤɬɨɪɜɚɦɟɪɢɤɚɧɨɢɧɞɢɣɫɤɢɯɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɹɯ: 1991-2006 ɝɝ. (S.A. Oborotov, The Nuclear Factor in US-Indian Relations: 1991-2006. PhD dissertation) (2008). 15 ɂȼ. Ɉɥɫɭɮɶɟɜ, ɎɨɪɦɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɟɢɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɟɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɢɋɒȺɜɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɢɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨ ɩɨɬɟɧɰɢɚɥɚɂɧɞɢɢ: 1998-2008 ɝɝ. (I.V. Olsufiev, Shaping and Development of the US Nuclear Policy in India: 1998-2008. PhD dissertation) (2011). 196 D. Pobedash the traditional institutional divide between studies of international relations at the Moscow State University and at MGIMO16. The 49 dissertations can be divided into the following three groups: 1) Seven dissertations dealing with global issues or the nuclear nonproliferation regime in general. 2) Twelve dissertations studying U.S. policy, and role and place of the USA in the world either in general, or in regional, multilateral and bilateral settings. 3) The remainder are dissertations addressing issues limited to a region, to relations between countries other than the USA, or to one specific country. Six of these were on Iran, 5 dealt with North Korea, 4 with nonproliferation issues in South Asia. There are also cases when one may assume that certain research should address nuclear nonproliferation issues when it does not. For example, there was a dissertation defended in 2015 on theoretical and practical aspects of providing for national security of the Russian Federation. This research deals with contemporary security issues but mentions nuclear weapons in passing only as an item in a list of all security threats17. Another interesting example is A.A. Kovalev who studied the governmental mechanisms of providing for military security of Russia in his dissertation. He does mention nuclear weapons but asserts that deterrence has always been wrongly seen as a function of nuclear weapons. In his opinion, though, nuclear deterrence leads to the arms race and economic collapse. As opposed to nuclear deterrence, a country can deter an aggressor through joining military alliances, through a system of bilateral treaties, and through use of information technologies to project to a potential aggressor an image of one’s nation as united and powerful18. All these dissertations contain references to the most important literature in the field of their research. Unfortunately, they usually list several authors without giving a detailed review of their work. An attempt to gather the names all of the authors mentioned in the literature reviews of these dissertations resulted in a list of about 60 names. Most often mentioned by far were the names of A. Arbatov, V. Dvorkin, R. Timerbaev and a dozen others. The same 10–15 names are given in most articles dealing with nonproliferation issues. In a review of research conducted in the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) Yuri Oleshchuk claims that there are only a dozen of experts in Russia who write on nuclear nonproliferation issues and almost all of them participate in IMEMO monographs19.

16 Ⱥ. Ȼɨɝɚɬɭɪɨɜ, “ɉɨɧɹɬɢɟ ɦɢɪɨɜɨɣ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɢ ɜ ɬɟɨɪɟɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɦ ɞɢɫɤɭɪɫɟ” (A. Bogaturov, “The notion of world politics in the theoretical discourse”), Mezdunarodnie prot- sessy, http://www.intertrends.ru/system/Doc/ArticlePdf/666/Bogaturov-04.pdf. 17ȼ. ȼ. Ʉɥɢɦɨɜɚ, Ɍɟɨɪɟɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɟɢɩɪɚɤɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɟɚɫɩɟɤɬɵɨɛɟɫɩɟɱɟɧɢɹɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɣ ɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢɜɭɫɥɨɜɢɹɯɝɥɨɛɚɥɢɡɚɰɢɢ (V.V. Klimova, Theoretical and practical aspects of ensuring national security in the context of globalization. PhD dissertation), 2015. 18ȺȺ. Ʉɨɜɚɥɟɜ, ȼɥɚɫɬɧɵɟɦɟɯɚɧɢɡɦɵɨɛɟɫɩɟɱɟɧɢɹɜɨɟɧɧɨɣɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ (A.A. Kovalev, Power mechanisms to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation PhD dissertation), 2014. 19 ɘ. Ɉɥɟɳɭɤ, “ɂɆɗɆɈ 2011: ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɜɡɝɥɹɞ ɧɚ ɪɚɡɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɟ ɜ XXI ɜɟɤɟ” (“IMEMO 2011: The Russian view on disarmament in XXI century”), Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie ontosheniia, no. 7 (2011), 107–114. The Russian nonproliferation research: state of the field 197

It might be worthwhile to study the major academic institutions where such expertise is concentrated. Several organizations consistently publish on nonproliferation: the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Science (IMEMO RAS) runs several projects, and publishes numerous monographs and articles on nonproliferation. Alexei Ar- batov – according to the Russian Science Citation Index arguably the most prolific and the most cited Russian researcher in the sphere of nuclear nonproliferation – is affiliated with this institution. Then there is the Institute of Problems of International Security of the Russian Academy of Science. Its director Andrey Kokoshin has about half the number of Arbatov’s citations and publications in the Russian citation system. There is also the Carnegie Moscow Center. Its director, Dmitry Trenin, has about one-third the number of citations and publications of Alexei Arbatov. There is the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Science (ISKRAN). Its director, Sergei Rogov, has a lesser number of both citations and publications in comparison with Arbatov but publishes much more work on non-nuclear issues than Arbatov. The PIR-Center is well-known in the Russian nonproliferation community as arguably the best school and social lift for young researchers in the sphere of nuclear nonproliferation. It produces hundreds of high-quality publications (RINTs gives about 900 results), mostly on issues linked with nuclear nonproliferation. Roland Timerbaev, the venerable patri- arch of Soviet diplomacy and Russian nonproliferation research, is listed in RINTs as associated mostly with the PIR-Center, as is Vladimir Orlov, who founded the center in 1994. It would not be advisable to rely on RINTs data only. Anton Khlopkov, Director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies, authored and co- authored monographs on issues of nuclear proliferation, and cooperated for several years with PIR-Center. He is very well-known in the Russian nonproliferation community. Yet, his footprint in the RINTS database is negligible. Interestingly, the UPenn World ranking of think tank lists the Carnegie Mos- cow Center, IMEMO, MGIMO and ISKRAN, but completely ignores the PIR-Center and Center for Energy and Security Studies20. Russian researchers mention the following institutions in addition to the above: the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, the Institute of International Security Problems of RAS and the Russian Insti- tute for Strategic Studies21. Each of these institutions has a list of experts directly affiliated with them. On the other hand, there is a core community of

20 Pennsylvania University Ranking 2016, Top World think tanks (non-US): Carnegie Mos- cow Center – 26, IMEMO RAS – 45, MGIMO – 95. Top World (US and non-US): Carnegie Moscow Center – 24, IMEMO – 31, MGIMO – 124. Top in Central and Eastern Europe: Carne- gie Moscow Center – 2, IMEMO – 4, MGIMO – 13, ISKRAN – 26, Russian International Af- fairs Council (RIAC) – 63. PIR-Center not included. Top in Defense and national security: ISKRAN – 33, IMEMO – 52, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) (Russia) – 58, MGIMO – 65, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) (Russia) – 107. Top foreign policy and international Affairs: IMEMO – 32, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) (Rus- sia) – 41, ISKRAN – 48, MGIMO – 129, RIAC – 133. Best Government affiliated: IMEMO – 19, SVOP – 24. Most significant impact on public policy: MGIMO – 32. 21ȺȺ. Ȼɚɤɥɚɧɨɜ, Ɏɨɪɦɢɪɨɜɚɧɢɟɢɤɪɢɡɢɫɪɟɠɢɦɚɧɟɪɚɫɩɪɨɫɬɪɚɧɟɧɢɹɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɨɪɭ- ɠɢɹ ɧɚ ɩɪɢɦɟɪɟ ɂɪɚɧɚ. (A.A. Baklanov, The formation and the crisis of nuclear nonproliferation regime and the case of Iran. PhD dissertation) (2011). 198 D. Pobedash nonproliferation experts who participate in the work of different think tanks simultaneously. For example, Alexey Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin often participated in monographs published by the Carnegie Center. In 2010, a new think tank, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), was established to serve as “a link between the state, scholarly community, business, and civil society in an effort to find foreign policy solutions to complex conflict issues.”22 All of the above scholars participate in the work of RIAC both through partnerships between their own organizations with RIAC and personally as RIAC experts. It could be of interest to conduct further research to delineate the differences between these think tanks and try to see if the differences are of an institutional character and/or depend on the relations of these institutions with different elites, donors, and lobbying groups. In the absence of such research, we can use the existing rankings of Russian nonproliferation experts. The Russian Political Environment Center creates a list of top ten Russian experts on international relations who do not work for the government directly23. The list includes Fedor Lukyanov, Andrey Kortunov, Dmitry Trenin, Sergey Karaganov, Vitaly Naumkin, Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir Frolov, Sergey Markedonov, Andrey Sushentsov, and Aleksandr Baunov. All of them, with the exception of Aleksandr Baunov, the Chief Editor of Carnegie.ru, are members of RIAC. Sergey Markedonov does not address nuclear nonproliferation issues as such; he specializes in conflicts in the western and south- western areas of the post-Soviet space, like the Caucasus and Ukraine. He works at the Russian State University for the Humanities based in Moscow and contributes to publications of the Carnegie Moscow Center. RIAC members Andrey Kortunov and Alexey Arbatov are also contributors to the Mos- cow Carnegie Center. RIAC and MGIMO established the Valdai discussion club. Among members of the Valdai club, we see some of the same names of the top ten experts: Lukyanov, Kortunov, Trenin, Karaganov, Naumkin, Sushentsov. The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) established in 1992 in close collaboration with the Russian government includes the following names from the list of top ten experts: Arbatov, Karaganov, Kortunov, Lukyanov, Trenin, Sushentsov, Naumkin. In general, an overview of “nuclear nonproliferation” papers in the social sciences leaves the following overall impressions: 1) The vast majority of academic work on nuclear nonproliferation is descriptive, rather than analytical. Oleshchuk justifies it by a necessity to “fix the field.” It is quite possible that a predominance of such descriptive work leads scholars from other areas of expertise to believe that they need no background in history or political science to write on nuclear nonproliferation issues.. 2) Almost a third of all work deals either directly with the USA, or with Russian-American relations.

22 Russian International Affairs Council, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/about/. 23Ɍɨɩ-10 ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɯɷɤɫɩɟɪɬɨɜɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɢɤɨɜ (Top-10 Russian experts on international relations), http://actualcomment.ru/top-10-rossiyskikh-ekspertov-mezhdunarod-nikov- 1804130931.html. The Russian nonproliferation research: state of the field 199

3) There are very few pieces that deal with the psychological, sociological, or economic aspects of nuclear nonproliferation. The Russian nonproliferation research deals almost exclusively with arms control issues. A. An- tonov raises an interesting point that Soviet scholars used to criticize the term “arms control” used by their American colleagues as an attempt to justify US policies. Russian academic discourse used the terms “arms limitations” or “arms reductions” and only relatively recently accepted the term “arms control.”24 4) All nonproliferation – or, rather, arms control – research is state- centric, taking it for granted that the nuclear arsenal is a valuable instrument in the state’s toolkit designed to work through power to pursue national interests. All experts recognize both the use of nuclear deterrence in power politics and the importance of a nuclear nonproliferation regime. Although it may seem that issues of Russian-American arms control draw inordinate attention in Russian nonproliferation research, the bias is even more disproportionate in general political discourse. Articles and interviews for public in general address nuclear nonproliferation issues solely through the prism of the Rus- sian-American nuclear standoff. 5) Discussions of theories or methods of research are not included in papers or monographs on nonproliferation. Papers on theories of nuclear proliferation analyze only works by Western scholars and list no Russian authors25. When describing Western theories, they tend to limit themselves to the structural realism of the Sagan-Waltz debates. It is necessary to describe previous research, theories and research methods in dissertations. Interestingly, in such cases Russian scholars provide a separate list for researchers who analyze arms control and security issues, the most common names being Arbatov, Dvorkin, Orlov, Trenin and Timerbaev. A different list usually includes authors who write about theories and methods of studying international relations and security26. Very seldom can we see explicit discussion of different nonproliferation theories in a dissertation. I would argue that almost all Russian scholars of nuclear nonproliferation tend to see their field from a national security perspective and accept the following assumptions of realist paradigm as axiomatic: 1) The nation-state is the only actor in international relations. 2) The mechanisms and processes of working out a foreign policy can be quite complicated, but in international politics, the nation-state is a rational unitary actor that pursues its national interests that are understood in terms of power and national security. 3) The most important systemic factor is the global distribution of power. 6) The small group of experts who write on the issues of Russian- American arms control can be divided into two groups that suggest different courses of political actions for Russia. One group (Arbatov, Trenin, Dvorkin) believes that there are already too many nuclear weapons out there and Russia should try to strengthen its own security and stability in the world through

24ȺɧɚɬɨɥɢɣȺɧɬɨɧɨɜ, Ʉɨɧɬɪɨɥɶɧɚɞɜɨɨɪɭɠɟɧɢɹɦɢ: ɢɫɬɨɪɢɹ, ɫɨɫɬɨɹɧɢɟ, ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢ- ɜɵ (Anatoliy Antonov, Arms Control: History, Status, Prospects), (Moscow: ROSSPEN; PIR- Center, 2012), 9. 25 A.A. Baklanov, The formation and the crisis of nuclear non-proliferation regime and the case of Iran. 26 Anatoliy Antonov, Arms Control. 200 D. Pobedash limited, gradual, and mutual disarmament. The other group (Karaganov, Fenenko) warns that further disarmament may be detrimental to Russia’s security and emphasizes the necessity of having a sufficiently large and diverse arsenal. Experts of both groups belong to the Russian political mainstream, engage in an ongoing dialog with each other, and share premises of sovereign state primacy and the importance of nuclear deterrence for maintaining stability. All see the global distribution of power as the major systemic factor. We can assume that in terms of theoretical underpinnings both groups belong to the neorealist-neoliberal consensual field with the first group leaning slightly more toward neoliberal institutionalism and the second belonging to the neorealist camp with variations between defensive and offensive realisms. We can see both a common ground and diverging conclusions in the dialog between Mikhail Troitsky and Alexey Fenenko on the RIAC site in Au- gust 2015. Neither of them explicitly refers to famous theoretical concepts. Yet, the position of Troitsky is a textbook example of the “security dilemma” of John Herz. Troitsky argues that our large nuclear arsenal makes other actors suspicious and creates prerequisites for the escalation of tensions. There- fore, he considers it logical that Russia and other nuclear powers could profit from becoming leaders in global processes of nuclear disarmament. That would bolster the power and authority of Russia among non-nuclear developing countries. Besides, Troitsky asserts that nuclear military technologies neither saved nation-states nor created advantages that would significantly outweigh risks27. Fenenko retorts that had it not been for the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal, the USA and their allies could have communicated with Russia differ- ently during the Georgian and Ukrainian crises. In his opinion, aggression becomes much less costly for an aggressor in a nuclear-free world28. Troitsky agrees that we should not “risk our nuclear shield;” he amplifies that he did not call for an immediate nuclear disarmament. He specifies that nuclear weapons cannot protect a nation-state against any threat – apart from a direct large-scale military aggression that he believes to be highly unlikely. Then Troitsky insists that nuclear weapons beget many risks for international security. Many countries, including Russia, agree that transnational terrorist threats are growing as well as the financial and organizational capabilities of terrorists. In his opinion, Moscow and Washington should accept the lack of utility of large nuclear arsenals both as deterrents and, simultaneously, as targets for their adversaries and should refocus their attention on a wider scope of security issues of mutual interest.29

27 Ɇɢɯɚɢɥ Ɍɪɨɢɰɤɢɣ, “əɞɟɪɧɵɣ ɮɚɤɬɨɪ ɜ ɦɢɪɨɜɨɣ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɟ: ɦɢɮɵ ɢ ɪɟɚɥɶɧɨɫɬɶ” (Mikhail Troitskiy, “Nuclear Factor in World Politics: Myths and Reality”), Rossiiskiy sovet po mezdunarodnym delam (Russian International Affairs Council), August 07, 2015, http://old.russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=6457#top-content. 28ȺɥɟɤɫɟɣɎɟɧɟɧɤɨ, “Ɉɩɚɫɧɚɹɚɥɶɬɟɪɧɚɬɢɜɚ” (Aleksey Troitskiy, “A Dangerous Alter- native”), Rossiiskiy sovet po mezdunarodnym delam (Russian International Affairs Council), August 12, 2015. http://old.russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=6463#top-content. 29ɆɢɯɚɢɥɌɪɨɢɰɤɢɣ, “ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɚɹɛɟɫɩɨɥɟɡɧɨɫɬɶɹɞɟɪɧɨɝɨɨɪɭɠɢɹ” (Mikhail Tro- itskiy, “Why Nuclear Weapons Are Strategically Useless? Response to Alexei Fenenko”), Ros- siiskiy sovet po mezdunarodnym delam (Russian International Affairs Council), August 14, 2015, The Russian nonproliferation research: state of the field 201

In the next round, Fenenko agrees that only nuclear weapons can protect a country against all-out military aggression. Then he insists that nuclear weapons are now the only instrument of peace enforcement. Only a threat of nuclear retaliation – real or imagined – can make possible outcomes uncom- fortably uncertain for a potential aggressor. Fenenko does not see what can replace large nuclear arsenals in this function. He says that the war of sanctions between the USA and Russia “can help us imagine how Moscow and Washington would be speaking in a world without deterrents.”30 Comparing papers by Arbatov and Karaganov gives us another illustration of the similarities and differences of the two groups. An example of the first group’s thinking is the paper “Collapse of the World Order?” by Alexey Arbatov that “Russia in Global Affairs” published originally in September 2014 and again in December 2017. Arbatov uses the premises of structural realism to analyze changes in the distribution of power and comes to a neoliberal conclusion that to become a global power in the new polycentric world Russia has to undergo “democratic political and institutional reforms: genuine separation and regular change of political leadership, fair elections, disen- gagement of government officials and lawmakers from business, an active civil society, independent media, and much more.”31 Sergey Karaganov is an example of the second group. Unlike Arbatov, who sees economic development and political reforms as prerequisites for Russia joining the club of great powers, Karaganov emphasizes only the nuclear arsenals and their value for deterrence that great powers should maintain and develop to ensure world stability. Envisaging a new Concert of Nations, he insists that the three great powers – Russia, China, and the USA – can keep peace if they rely “not only on moral principles and the balance of power, but also on mutual nuclear deterrence”.32 After the release of the U.S. National Security Strategy of December 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of February 2018, Putin’s Federal Assembly Address of March 2018, and escalation of Russian-Western tensions over the civil war in Syria, the deterioration in Russian-American relations reached its lowest point in post-Soviet history, while the use of nuclear rhetoric increased inversely. These developments correlated with the fact that Russian research on issues of nuclear nonproliferation had focused predominantly on arms control in Russian-American relations. After this significant deterioration in Russian- American relations, the positions of Russian arms control experts did not change dramatically, but their articles for the general public acquired an air of http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/strategicheskaya-bespoleznost- yadernogo-oruzhiya-otvet-aleks/. 30ȺɥɟɤɫɟɣɎɟɧɟɧɤɨ,“ɉɨɥɟɡɧɨɥɢɹɞɟɪɧɨɟɨɪɭɠɢɟ? ɈɬɜɟɬɆɢɯɚɢɥɭɌɪɨɢɰɤɨɦɭ” (Alek- sey Fenenko, “Are Nuclear Weapons Useful? A Response to Mikhail Troitskiy”). Rossiiskiy sovet po mezdunarodnym delam (Russian International Affairs Council), August 17, 2015, http://old.russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=6471#top-content. 31 Ⱥɥɟɤɫɟɣ Ⱥɪɛɚɬɨɜ, “Ʉɪɭɲɟɧɢɟ ɦɢɪɨɩɨɪɹɞɤɚ” (Aleksey Arbatov, “Collapse of the World Order”), Rossiia v globalnoy politike, December 8 ɞɟɤɚɛɪɹ, 2017, http://www. globalaffairs.ru/number/Krushenie-miroporyadka-19205. 32 Sergey Karaganov, “Taking a New Look at Nuclear Peace. How to Enhance Deterrence and Preserve Peace”, Rossiia v globalnoy politike (Russia in Global Affairs), June 6, 2017, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Taking-a-New-Look-at-Nuclear-Peace-18752. 202 D. Pobedash urgency. As Arbatov puts it, “After more than two decades in obscurity, nuclear strategy and the threat of Armageddon have returned to the forefront of U.S. – Russia and NATO – Russia relations, reviving old fears and mutual suspicions”33. Arbatov keeps insisting that in the collapsing world-order with no trust left in Russian-American relations it becomes vitally important to strengthen arms control or, at the very least, try to save what there is left of it.34 On February 20, 2018, Arbatov again warns the public that the threat of nuclear war is high and we should think how to save the nuclear arms control system. In his opinion, the threat of a nuclear war now is larger than ever for the last three decades. Russia and the USA are on the threshold of a new large-scale arms race. Moscow should be more interested in de-escalation of this new arms race than anyone else should, including the USA and NATO. We (Russia and the USA) must save the INF Treaty, coordinate approaches to anti-ballistic missile defense and to new strategic non-nuclear arms. Russia together with the USA and other countries should also resume cooperation in physical protection and security of nuclear facilities and fissile materials. We should also strengthen the NPT and the MTCR, and coordinate measures aimed at preventing arms race in the space, preventing cyberattacks on strategic information and control systems. Overall, Arbatov suggests a gradual nuclear disarmament with strict limitation of conventional forces and new armaments, implementation of strict international laws concerning the use of force, and creation of efficient mechanisms of conflict settlement. Arbatov admits that such plans may seem utopian. In his opinion, however, it is no less utopian to hope that in order to secure the existence of our civilization we can keep on relying exclusively on nuclear deterrence, as deterrence depends on the ability and readiness of states to kill hundreds of millions and to destroy within hours what we have been creating for centuries.35 His appeals to reason and morals, as well as his focus on domestic economic development and democratic reforms made me believe that Arbatov leaned toward the neoliberal, rather than neorealist, camp. Responding to the publication of the new American strategic documents Arbatov insists that doctrines are only papers that pose no threat by themselves. He believes that rather than being drawn into a new nuclear arms race Russia must initiate talks with the USA about further arms control. That will alleviate security concerns without having to spend a lot of money.36

33 Alexey Arbatov, “Understanding the US–Russia Nuclear Schism.” Survival: Global Poli- tics and Strategy, https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2017/survival-global-politics-and- strategy-aprilmay-2017/592-06-arbatov. 34ȺɥɟɤɫɟɣȺɪɛɚɬɨɜ, “ɂɧɬɟɪɟɫɵɧɟɫɨɜɩɚɞɚɸɬ. ȼɨɜɫɟɦ” (Aleksey Arbatov, “Interests Do Not Converge. In Anything”). Ogonek, no. 50, December 12, 2017, https://www. kommersant.ru/doc/3480617. 35Ⱥɥɟɤɫɟɣ Ⱥɪɛɚɬɨɜ, “Ʉɚɤ ɫɩɚɫɬɢ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɭ ɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɹɧɚɞɹɞɟɪɧɵɦɨɪɭɠɢɟɦ” (Aleksei Arbatov, “How We Can Save Nuclear Arms Control System”), Politika. RBK Gazeta, no. 32 (2756) (2012), February 20, 2018, https://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2018/02/21/ 5a8bf1389a79474081914794. 36ȺɥɟɤɫɟɣȺɪɛɚɬɨɜ, “əɞɟɪɧɚɹɞɨɤɬɪɢɧɚɋɒȺɩɨɤɚɟɳɟɬɨɥɶɤɨɛɪɨɲɸɪɚ - ɷɬɨɧɟɧɨ- ɜɚɹɹɞɟɪɧɚɹɭɝɪɨɡɚ“ (Aleksey Arbatov, “US Nuclear Doctrine Is Only A Brochure Yet, Not A New Nuclear Threat”), Infox.ru, February 8, 2018, https://www.infox.ru/press/193953-a-arbatov- adernaa-doktrina-ssa-poka-ese-tolko-brosura-eto-ne-novaa-adernaa-ugroza. The Russian nonproliferation research: state of the field 203

In response to the spreading global campaigns for nuclear disarmament, Alexey Arbatov posits that the whole nuclear nonproliferation regime is in deep crisis, on the verge of complete collapse. In his opinion, to reduce the threat of a global nuclear war we have to preserve the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control regime. The most important and urgent task in this regard is to save the INF Treaty37. In his opinion, Russia does not violate the treaty; responsibility for its collapse lies with the USA. Arbatov in October 2018 warns that the U.S. withdrawal from the INF treaty dramatically undermines the whole system of controlling and limiting nuclear weapons, including the Nonproliferation Treaty38. Karaganov in February 2018 stated that the major strategic challenge for Russia – apart from the impending danger of a global war – is that we have no strategy of economic and social growth and development. We cannot make up for a lack of internal development with foreign policy achievements. Karaganov insists that we need new approaches to preserving peace in the world. In his opinion, we should develop and strengthen nuclear deterrence as the main tool of preventing a large war that could become the end of history. Russia should avert this and should declare it openly. In his words, Russia is the largest security provider in the world, specifically in the Middle East, Central Asia and Europe – where Russia prevents the enlargement of military alliances that could lead to a war. Karaganov asserts that this provision of security includes deterrence of the USA and of other great powers.39 In 2018, Putin made several remarks about the possible use of nuclear weapons that I would call a resort to brinkmanship. For example, he said in an interview for a Russian documentary “The World Order 2018,” that a nuclear war “would be a global disaster for humanity; a disaster for the entire world.” Then he added that “as a citizen of Russia and the head of the Rus- sian state I must ask myself: Why would we want a world without Russia?”40 On a similar, or even more dangerous, note, in October 2018, Putin described the Russian doctrine of nuclear retaliation and made his famous remark that, “we as martyrs would go to Heaven while they will simply perish because they won’t even have time to repent their sins.”41 Following these troubling remarks by the President, both groups of Russian nonproliferation experts agreed that the priority is to avoid a war. Again, the first group hints that fewer nuclear weapons could be a good thing, while the second group emphasizes the necessity of a reliable nuclear deterrent. Referring to Putin’s remark about Russian nuclear retaliation, Arbatov responded that hypersonic missiles

37 Ⱥɥɟɤɫɟɣ Ⱥɪɛɚɬɨɜ, “Ʉɨɦɭ ɫɧɨɜɚ ɧɭɠɧɚ ɯɨɥɨɞɧɚɹ ɜɨɣɧɚ” (Aleksey Arbatov, “Who Needs a Nuclear War Again”), Sovet po vneshney i oboronnoy politike, March 1, 2018, http://svop.ru/main/26206/. 38ȺɥɟɤɫɟɣȺɪɛɚɬɨɜ, “ȼɫɹɫɢɫɬɟɦɚɨɝɪɚɧɢɱɟɧɢɹɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɹɧɚɞɹɞɟɪɧɵɦɨɪɭɠɢɟɦɬɪɟ- ɳɢɬɩɨɲɜɚɦ” (Aleksey Arbatov, “The Whole System of Limiting Control Over Nuclear Weap- ons Is Crumbling”), Business FM, October 21, 2018, https://www.bfm.ru/news/397682. 39ɋɟɪɝɟɣɄɚɪɚɝɚɧɨɜ, “Ɇɢɪɧɚɜɵɪɨɫɬ” (Sergey Karaganov, “The World with Room to Grow into”), Rossiia v globalnoy politike, no. 1, February 13, 2018, https://globalaffairs.ru/number/Mir-na-vyrost-19357. 40 “Why would we want a world without Russia?” Putin on Moscow’s nuclear doctrine. RT, March 7, 2018, https://www.rt.com/news/420715-putin-world-russia-nuclear/. 41 President of Russia “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club”, October 18, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848#sel=129:1:I,129:1:I. 204 D. Pobedash or American deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe would annul the very concept of a retaliatory counter-strike that the Russian president so eloquently described. With bitter irony Arbatov says that we, Rus- sians, may indeed go to Heaven, but he feels no optimism on that score.42 Arbatov reproaches current leaders for disregarding lessons of history. In his opinion, withdrawing from arms control treaties has always undermined national security. He warns that withdrawal from the INF Treaty could lead to collapse of the whole system of controlling nuclear weapons. That in turn is fraught with chaos that would be pernicious to security of both superpowers, and for global security as well.43 Dmitri Trenin also belongs to the first group that tends to imply that fewer nuclear weapons could be not such a bad idea. He states that great powers now are inclined to act unilaterally and believes that it is important that we shape mechanisms to curb confrontation between the USA and Rus- sia. Our two countries need reliable round-the-clock communication channels between military and political elites. We also need coordinated protocols to avoid the escalation of conflicts. There should be regular contacts between military leaders, dialog between intelligence services, and national security councils. Trenin believes that such multi-level dialog on issues of strategic stability can in itself become a stabilizing factor44. Karaganov, a representative of the second group, agrees in his November 2018 op-ed, that the most important thing now is to avoid an increasingly impending large war that would annihilate both those who are currently “winning” and those who are “losing”; such a war would end human history. That is why campaigning for peace should become the priority for foreign policy. He agrees that multilateral communication of the military and politicians can be of help, but he places efficient deterrence in first place and adds another tool – public exposure of countries that provoke confrontations and unleash a new arms race. Karaganov apparently understands that his words sound exactly like the Soviet propaganda of the Cold War, but calls his wording a “straightforwardness that is out of vogue now.”45 Karaganov also believes that Russia should abandon the principle of strategic parity. According to him, Russia should keep, maintain and develop its strategic nuclear arsenal both to preserve its great power status and to keep the adversary afraid of our massive and inevitable retaliatory counter-strike. In addition, he suggests that Russia should “go into a grey zone.” In his opinion, we should concentrate on using asymmetrical, covert, and cheap options.

42ȺɥɟɤɫɟɣȺɪɛɚɬɨɜ, “Ɂɚɷɬɢɦɩɨɪɨɝɨɦ – ɧɟɪɚɣ” (Aleksey Arbatov, “It Is No Paradise beyond That Threshold”), Novaya Gazeta, December 3, 2018, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/12/03/78784-za-etim-porogom-ne-ray. 43 Ⱥɥɟɤɫɟɣ Ⱥɪɛɚɬɨɜ, “ɑɟɦ ɨɩɚɫɟɧ ɞɥɹ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ ɜɵɯɨɞ ɋɒȺ ɢɡ Ⱦɨɝɨɜɨɪɚ ɨ ɪɚɤɟɬɚɯ ɫɪɟɞɧɟɣɢɦɚɥɨɣɞɚɥɶɧɨɫɬɢ.” (Aleksey Arbatov, “Why US Withdrawal from INF Treaty is Dangerous for Russia”). Partiia Yabloko, October 23, 2018, https://www.yabloko. ru/publikatsii/2018/10/23-0. 44 Ⱦɦɢɬɪɢɣ Ɍɪɟɧɢɧ, “ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɚɹ ɫɬɚɛɢɥɶɧɨɫɬɶ ɜ ɏɏI ɜɟɤɟ. Ʉɚɤ ɟɟ ɫɨɯɪɚɧɢɬɶ” (Dmitriy Trenin, “Strategic Stability In The 21st Century. How We Can Keep It”), Tsent Aziia, November 1, 2018, https://centrasia.org/newsA.php?st=1541089020. 45ɋɟɪɝɟɣɄɚɪɚɝɚɧɨɜ, “Ɇɢɪɜɝɨɞɋɜɢɧɶɢ” (Sergey Karaganov, “The World in the Year of the Pig”), Sovet po vneshney i oboronnoy politike, November 20, 2018. http://svop. ru/main/27963/. The Russian nonproliferation research: state of the field 205

He agrees that openness theoretically helps to increase the predictability of a strategic environment but asserts that such openness is more beneficial for a richer country that can lead in the arms race. In his words, if we fail to stop the arms race, we should win it, if not by numbers, then by skill. For example, Russia can use the concept of “strategic ambiguity” when the adversary cannot understand whether you put your hand into your pocket to take out a candy, a handkerchief, or a handgun.”46 Thus, the difference between the two groups is more about the actions they propose for Russia, while they are united in their assumptions about the nature of international relations and the place for Russia within them. This common ground for the two groups is what A. Tsygankov and P. Tsygankov called “enlightened statism.”47 All “enlightened statists” emphasize the importance for Russia to remain a strong and independent sovereign state. Inter- estingly, the authors of the paper posit, “Russia’s academic experience teaches us to not be limited to schools and paradigms, but instead develop approaches and concepts grounded in empirical realities.” This statement fits in with the lack of theoretical discussions in Russian academic nonproliferation discourse.

Conclusions

1) The vast majority of Russian academic work on nuclear nonproliferation is descriptive, rather than analytical. 2) Almost a third of all the work deals either directly with the USA, or with Russian-American relations. 3) Russian nonproliferation research deals almost exclusively with arms control issues. 4) All arms control research is state-centric, taking it for granted that the nuclear arsenal is a valuable instrument in the state’s toolkit designed to work through power to pursue national interests. All experts recognize both the use of the nuclear deterrence in power politics and the importance of a nuclear nonproliferation regime. Although it may seem that issues of Russian-American arms control draw inordinate attention in Russian nonproliferation research, the bias is even more disproportionate in general political discourse. Articles and interviews for the public in general address nuclear nonproliferation issues solely through the prism of the Russian-American nuclear standoff. 5) Discussions of theories or methods of research are not included in papers or monographs on nonproliferation. Papers about theories of nuclear proliferation analyze only works by Western scholars, listing no Russian au-

46ɋɟɪɝɟɣɄɚɪɚɝɚɧɨɜ, “Ɇɢɪɜɝɨɞɋɜɢɧɶɢ” (Sergey Karaganov, “The World in the Year of the Pig”), Sovet po vneshney i oboronnoy politike, November 20, 2018. http://svop. ru/main/27963/. 47Ⱥɧɞɪɟɣɐɵɝɚɧɤɨɜ, ɉɚɜɟɥɐɵɝɚɧɤɨɜ, “ɉɪɨɫɜɟɳɟɧɧɨɟɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɨ”: ȺȾ. Ȼɨɝɚ- ɬɭɪɨɜ ɢ ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɚɹ ɬɟɨɪɢɹ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɵɯ ɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɣ (Andrey Tsygankov, Pavel Tsygankov, “Enlightened Statism”: A.D. Bogaturov and Russian International Relations Theory). Polis. Polititscheskie issledovaniia, no. 4 (2017): 175-185, https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2017.04.13. 206 D. Pobedash thors. When describing Western theories, they tend to limit themselves to the structural realism of the Sagan-Waltz debates. 6) The small group of 10–15 experts who write on the issues of the Rus- sian-American arms control can be united under the umbrella of “enlightened statism” and divided into two groups that suggest different courses of political actions for Russia. One group, tentatively called “institutionalists,” (Arba- tov, Trenin, Dvorkin) believes that there are already too many nuclear weapons out there and Russia should try to strengthen its own security and stability in the world through limited, gradual, and mutual disarmament with the help of international treaties. The other group that is closer to offensive realism (Karaganov, Fenenko) warns that further disarmament may be detrimental to Russia’s security and emphasizes the necessity of having a sufficiently large and diverse arsenal. Authors

Andrey Bodrov is associate professor at St. Petersburg State University, where he teaches the history of international relations and the theory of historical studies. A. Bodrov is also involved in lecturing for students of the Strategic and Arms Control Studies Master’s Program. He is the author of three monographs and several dozens of articles ranging from the history of the Franco-German war of 1870-1871 to studies on European security. He was participant of the Interna- tional nonproliferation school in Odessa (2013), the International school on global security in Moscow (2017) and the International School on Disarmament and Research of Conflicts (2018).

Larisa Deriglazova is a professor at Department of World Politics, Head of Cen- tre for European Studies and Head of Master Degree Program on EU Studies at Tomsk State University, Russia. Her main areas of expertise are international conflicts and European Union studies. Larisa had a Kennan-Fulbright Fellowship at Wilson Center for International Scholars in 2009. She has been Jean Monnet Chair, 2012-2015, and Head of Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, 2015-2018. Her publications with overall number of 150 include Great Power, Small Wars: Asymmetric Conflict since 1945 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Nuclear Non-proliferation. Teaching manual. (ed., Tomsk State University Press, 2017); “Still Looking for a Partnership? EU-Russia Cooperation in the Field of Higher Education” in Journal of Contemporary European Studies. 2019. Vol. 27, ʋ 1 (with Makinen S.); “Russia and the European Union in Eulerian Circles of “Europe” in Russia in Global Affairs. 2018. #4.

Nikolay Dronishinets is a professor at the Novouralsk Institute of Technology of the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI, The Head of Department of Philosophy. He has published more than 200 works, most of them about issues of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security culture and nuclear education include National Defense Strategies and Reform in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Third Global International Studies Conference, University of Porto. 17-20 August 2011 (with Gregory Gleason); Social Factor in the Work Attitudes to Nuclear Industry of Russian High School Graduates. 2nd SSR International Conference on Social Science and Information (SSR-SSI 2017). June 28-29, 2017, Moscow, Russia (with Merenkov A., Antonova N.). He was a visiting Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Middlebury Institute of Interna- tional Studies at Monterey in 2004. Since 2004 he participated in several nuclear education projects in cooperation with the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) and the CNS.

Grigory Zinovyev, Ph.D. in Engineering Science, the Acting Director of Institute and Head of Industrial Electronics Department at the Novouralsk Institute of Technology of the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI. He was a visiting scholar at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey in 2009. Since 2007, he participated in several nuclear education projects in cooperation with the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) and the CNS. He was also participant of IAEA international schools on nuclear security (2012) and nuclear energy management 208 Authors

(2014). He is a member of International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) and World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS). Research interests include nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security culture and nuclear education.

Anastasia Malygina received a PhD in political science. She is an associate professor at Saint Petersburg State University, where she teaches courses on arms control, multilateral nonproliferation regimes, and military innovations for students in the Strategic and Arms Control Studies Master’s Program. In 2007, she participated in the Summer School on International Security held by Moscow PIR Center and contributed to several research projects. In 2015-2017, Dr. Malygina participated in the Program on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE) and co- authored with Dr. Andrey Pavlov a chapter on Russian approach to strategic stability for the book “The End of Strategic Stability? Regional Approaches to Stra- tegic Stability” edited by Adam Stulberg and Larry Rubin. In February-April 2016, Anastasia was a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Non-Proliferation Stud- ies (CNS) in Monterey. In 2016, Dr. Malygina wrote a chapter on international arms control regimes for the book “Russia and the World: Understanding Interna- tional Relations” edited by Dr. Natalia Tsvetkova. She has published on the history of disarmament diplomacy, international arms control regimes, nuclear nonproliferation and arms control and was involved in a number of nuclear arms control Track-II diplomacy events in London, Berlin, and Washington.

Ekaterina Mikhaylenko is an associate professor at the Department of Interna- tional Relations of Ural Federal University, Russia. A graduate of the Ural state University (1998); she received her PhD in history of International Relations and Foreign Policy in 2002. Dr. Mikhaylenko started her research in security studies with the examination of EU Foreign and Defense Policy. In 2011, she received an IAEA grant for training in the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in Monterey (USA). Dr. Mikhaylenko is a Director of the Center for Security and Non-proliferation Research and Educatioon at Ural Federal University. Dr. Mikhaylenko has more than 20 publications, published both in English and Russian, on NPT regime, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Andrey Pavlov holds a PhD in history. He is a professor at Saint Petersburg State University and the chair of the Strategic and Arms Control Studies Master’s Pro- gram. He co-authored a chapter on Russian approach to strategic stability for the book “The End of Strategic Stability? Regional Approaches to Strategic Stability” edited by Adam Stulberg and Larry Rubin. He wrote a chapter on Russia’s national security for the book “Russia and the World: Understanding International Relations” edited by Dr. Natalia Tsvetkova. His research interests include strategic studies, nuclear strategy, World War I military strategy, Russian national security policy.

Dmitry Pobedash, an associate professor at the Department of International Re- lations, Ural Federal University, Russian Federation, Yekaterinburg. Dmitry Po- bedash has been teaching at the Department of International Relations, Ural Fed- eral University, since 1998. In 2005, Dmitry taught a summer course “History of Diplomacy” for “Tomorrow People” organization at Belgrade, Serbia. In 2012- 2013 Dmitry was a Fulbright Scholar-in Residence at Wayne State College, USA, Authors 209 where he taught International Relations, Introduction to World Politics, and Rus- sian Language. In 2017, he taught Russian-American Relations in 1990-2016 at Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic.

Nina Rozhanovskaya is the Kennan Institute’s Coordinator and Academic Liai- son in Russia. Nina holds a Master of Arts degree in Political Science from Cen- tral European University, Hungary, and undergraduate degree in International Relations from Tomsk State University. She has conducted research and published on the topics of nuclear nonproliferation and the U.S.-Russian disarmament dialogue. From 2008 to 2014, Nina worked as a research fellow at Tomsk State University, Russia, where she was in charge of the nuclear nonproliferation project and taught classes on nonproliferation, disarmament and security. She is the author of two chapters in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Textbook. Nuclear Russia: International and domestic agendas

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