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Nuclear Russia. International and Domestic Agendas Nuclear Russia: International and domestic agendas Tomsk University Press 2020 UDC: 327.37 LBC: 31.4; 60.527; 66.4(2Ɋɨɫ) Nuclear Russia: International and domestic agendas / Edi- ted by Andrey Pavlov and Larisa Deriglazova. – Tomsk: Tomsk University Press, 2020. – 210 ɪ. ISBN 978-5-7511-2606-3 DOI 10.17223/978-5-7511-2606-3 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or repro- duced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, not know or thereafter invented, including photocopying and re- cording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permis- sion in writing from the corresponding contributor. 1. Nuclear nonproliferation. 2. National security. 3. Nuclear energy – Social aspects. 4. Security, International. The fragment of Wassily Kandinsky’ drawing «Untitled» (1922) is used for the book cover Elena Bychkova, the book cover design UDC: 327.37 LBC: 31.4; 60.527; 66.4(2Ɋɨɫ) ISBN 978-5-7511-2606-3 © 2020 individual chapters, the contributors CONTENTS Foreword by Ambassador Sergey Batsanov........................................................... 3 I. Strategy and Politics........................................................................................ 11 1. Andrey Pavlov. Nuclear Weapons in the Russian Military Strategy ..................... 13 2. Andrey Bodrov. Reducing the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals: Yester- day, Today, Tomorrow.......................................................................................... 37 II. Nonproliferation and Disarmament............................................................... 65 1. Anastasia Malygina. Russia in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.................. 67 2. Ekaterina Mikhaylenko. Why Does Russia Not Support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons? ..........................................................................111 III. Societal Dimension........................................................................................129 1. Larisa Deriglazova, Nina Rozhanovskaya. Building Nuclear Consensus in Contemporary Russia: Factors and Perceptions......................................................131 2. Nikolai Dronishinets, Grigory Zinovyev. Nuclear Education as an Atomic Era Phenomenon...................................................................................................163 3. Dmitry Pobedash. The Russian Nonproliferation Research: State of the Field .....191 Authors ...............................................................................................................207 Foreword It gives me a great pleasure to recommend to English-speaking readers a new book about almost everything nuclear in Russia. It is a fascinating book – at least for three reasons. To start with, it is probably the first attempt by the Russian academic community to look comprehensively at a wide range of nuclear issues, includ- ing the evolution of nuclear industrial complex during the period after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992, nuclear weapons, respective political decisions and military doctrines regarding their use, nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, societal attitudes to nuclear weapons and to peaceful nu- clear activities (including environmental issues), system of “nuclear educa- tion”, state of play with non-proliferation research in Russia. Finally, in a separate chapter, it deals with Russian attitudes towards the Treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It is not that all these aspects have not been addressed in other publications. But here, to the authors’ credit, they have attempted to collectively address these different, but not really separate issues in a holistic manner. The second reason is that the book was written by researchers work- ing not in Moscow, but in several other Russian cities – St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Tomsk, Novo-Uralsk – and under the leadership of Prof. Andrey Pavlov from St Petersburg State University. This is important, because until recently Russian arms control, non-proliferation and “nu- clear-at-large” community was mainly concentrated in the capital, Mos- cow. This applies, of course, to political side of the research. The techni- cal side – nuclear engineers, designers, scientists – has been well repre- sented, since long time ago, in a number of other places across the country, including, in particular, such scientific and engineering centers as Tomsk, Novo-Uralsk and Ekaterinburg. But they could not really con- tribute to political science for several reasons. This “horizontal prolifera- tion” of non-proliferation expertise, research and teaching is a most wel- Foreword 5 come development, and I strongly hope this trend will continue and “pro- liferate” to more research centers and think tanks across Russia. The third reason is that majority of the authors are relatively young pro- fessionals with the gender ratio of 5 to 4 ( males still have a tendency to dominate, but things are changing, and Russia is not immune). It is also a sign that a new generation of Russian arms control, non-proliferation and nuclear affairs policy scholars is coming out from the shadow. Now, I am not sure I like the title so much – NUCLEAR RUSSIA – which may look a bit ominous. It seems a bit excessive and, maybe, a conces- sion to certain domestic political trends, and, after all, Russia is much more than nuclear. But that said, nuclear energy, with its military and peaceful ap- plications, occupies a special place in Russian history and present, and, no doubt, will occupy in future. That was the case in the second half of 1940s, when the then Soviet Un- ion, after having won the bloodiest and most destructive war the world had seen, with its many cities in ruins and countless villages burnt, facing uni- maginable reconstruction challenges, rushed towards acquiring its own nu- clear arsenal (and nuclear scientific-industrial complex to support it), which was believed, and not without a reason, to be a guarantee for national survival in the face of U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons during 1945-1949. That was also the case when, in 1954 the world’s first nuclear power plant, con- nected to the grid was opened in the city of Obninsk not far from Moscow. Approximately one decade later, in mid-1960s, due to the advent of nu- clear –tipped ICBMs and SLBMs in sufficient quantities the U.S. and the Soviet Union arrived at the shared conclusion of mutual vulnerability and of the need to cooperatively regulate and limit their strategic nuclear arms race, both in its offensive and defensive segments (certainly, the lessons of Cuban missile crisis played a big role). That opened the door for a whole series of bilateral, but also multilateral, agreements on arms control, disarmament, prevention of nuclear war and confidence building. Not everything was smooth; in the first half of the 1980s the crisis over Euromissiles pushed the world much closer to a nuclear conflagration. At that time both Moscow and Washington found the way to defuse the crisis by concluding the INF treaty. 6 Foreword But of equally high importance was a widely shared perception in the world that nuclear negotiations between the two superpowers were absolutely nec- essary not just in themselves, but as a stabilizing instrument in the context of improving their relations in general and, thus contributing to global stability. Then there have been several nuclear accidents, some with devastating consequences and many lives lost. Chernobyl disaster on 26 April 1986 was in all probability, the worst of them. It resulted in severe radioactive contami- nation of significant areas not only in the vicinity of that explosion itself – in the northern part of present-day Ukraine, but also in vast adjacent areas of Belarus and Russia, with radioactive cloud then traveling up to northern Europe and then south, to central Europe. The Chernobyl disaster has been correctly portrayed in many research papers and books (including this one) as a symbol of decay of the Soviet system of governance and of the then prevail- ing “culture” of secrecy in the USSR. But I feel obliged to add two more ob- servations, based on personal experience: Chernobyl opened the eyes of the Soviet leadership and of M. Gorbachev in particular, to the horrors of nuclear war and to the pressing need to prevent it, and it also became a starting point of a very serious, systemic change in the mindset of the Soviet leadership towards genuine transparency, openness and accountability in the military and nuclear spheres. And in the end, it changed a lot in the complex relation- ship among various power centers in the country. During the initial post-Soviet period Russian nuclear complex – both on the military and civilian sides – had to go through very difficult times, but it had survived and eventually after many trials and tribulations (and reorgani- zations) became again a show-case of modern Russia. On the military side nuclear weapons almost immediately started to play a more prominent role in the country’s defense – due to a number of systemic weaknesses affecting conventional forces. For example, Russia quickly abandoned a long-standing Soviet position in favor of the Non-First-Use of nuclear weapons. Both in the elites’ and popular mindsets nuclear weapons have again re-emerged as the ultimate protectors of the country’s independence. But, in reality, the in- creased reliance on nuclear weapons did not go as far as it could seem from the statements and articles of nuclear weapons enthusiasts in Russia
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