China Local Government Financing Vehicles a Rough (And Tough) Ride Ahead Given Limited Transparency, but There Are Alternatives
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Completed 04 Jun 2018 05:55 PM HKT Disseminated 04 Jun 2018 06:08 PM HKT Asia Pacific Credit Research 04 June 2018 China Local Government Financing Vehicles A rough (and tough) ride ahead given limited transparency, but there are alternatives The emergence of LGFVs and their growing representation in the USD bond Asia Corporate Research markets continues to catch investor interest. Major policy shifts have raised Varun Ahuja, CFA AC questions as to whether all LGFV can be considered provincial debt, and this is (852) 2800 6038 further underscored by recent onshore defaults, including some SOEs, leading to [email protected] more muted supply and wider spreads for the LGFV sector. In this report, we Tiantian Teng AC present an update on recent policy changes as well as our views on their impact (852) 2800-7024 on the LGFV sector. In an environment where onshore default rates are rising and [email protected] transparency stays low, we remain cautious on the sector as a whole, preferring J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited to own stronger SOEs rather than LGFVs. That said, we do make exceptions for a few LGFVs that play strong policy roles (willingness) and backed by stronger provincial governments (capacity). We also believe that while one or a few LGFV defaults would be acceptable to the central government, widespread defaults are unlikely given the larger implications for the financial sector. We initiate coverage of Wuhan Metro and its ‘19s with OW, Neutral on BJSTAT and its ‘20s and ‘25s, on Yanzhou Coal and its perps ‘c20s, '22s with OW with the bonds trading wider than even Indika, which we think does not make complete sense. The central government would continue to make LGFVs more market- oriented, as part of the ongoing deleveraging drive. Since the budget law revision in 2014, the government has released a number of documentations around LGFV operations and their funding, which we discuss in this note. Pace of issuance has slowed down in recent times. The issuance of LGFVs USD bonds had increased substantially over 2015-2017 due to onshore issuance policy tightening as well as LGFV’s funding diversification. However, this has slowed drastically in recent months, due to the central government’s tightening policy to address debt overhang problems in the system. In addition, recent onshore defaults have given further apprehension about exposure to the sector, where underlying information flow remains very limited. Staying cautious on sector and preference for LGFVs with clear policy role only. While LGFVs have risen to be a ‘too big to ignore’ sector in JACI, the lack of information flow and opacity in underlying businesses remain key concerns, especially in the current environment. We would stick to LGFVs with clear strategically important roles and ideally with decent standalone credit profiles. Having said that, there are certain LGFVs that are quite wide in the 1-2yr duration bucket, which present investors with the conundrum of missing out on better yields if not invested but having a high ‘jump risk’ if any of these LGFVs widen materially due to financial constraints, which are difficult to monitor given inadequate underlying information flow. Hence, in this note, while we categorize LGFVs based on factors such as policy role, social and economic importance, etc., given that most LGFVs are trading as a ‘group’ in different yield buckets, we would look to take selective exposure in LGFVs through credits in the ‘preferred’ and ‘some comfort’ categories, while for exposure to higher yields, we are more comfortable with the risk-reward and information flow in other China SOEs and HY corporates as presented in this report. See page 33 for analyst certification and important disclosures. J.P. Morgan does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. www.jpmorganmarkets.com Varun Ahuja, CFA Asia Pacific Credit Research (852) 2800 6038 04 June 2018 [email protected] Tiantian Teng (852) 2800-7024 [email protected] Table of Contents Onshore defaults back in focus ..............................................3 LGFV policy changes in recent years.....................................5 Document No.50 & No.87: weakening the ties between local governments and LGFVs....................................................................................................................5 Relative value............................................................................7 Sector strategy and key recommendations ...........................9 Background of LGFVs ..........................................................................................16 Categorization of LGFVs........................................................18 Technicals: Less negative due to lower supply but investor base still narrow .....................................................................20 Bond supply should slow going forward ................................................................21 Investor base remains narrow as Asia continues to dominate..................................22 Background of Individual LGFVs..........................................24 2 Varun Ahuja, CFA Asia Pacific Credit Research (852) 2800 6038 04 June 2018 [email protected] Tiantian Teng (852) 2800-7024 [email protected] Onshore defaults back in focus Focus is back on onshore defaults, especially from the weaker government- owned entities, after China Energy Reserve and Chemicals Group (CERCG, not covered) defaulted on the principal repayment of its US$350 million offshore bonds, which triggered a cross-default to all of its outstanding debt. While the company classifies itself as an SOE in the bond prospectus, there remains a question-mark on the company's actual shareholding structure, as per newswires (e.g. Debtwire and other local news). The company was reportedly ~30% owned by the Beijing Municipal Commission of Commerce, 28% by CNPC through its engineering arm; and ~15% by China Economic Cooperation Center, however, its shareholding structure has since changed based on the company’s latest presentation. Interestingly, just a few months ago, the company was in news (source: SCMP) to buy a marquee commercial building in Central, Hong Kong, from CK Assets for ~US$5 billion. CERCG is involved in the oil & gas trading, logistics and distribution, etc. segments. In its disclosure announcement post its principal repayment default, it guided that it is unable to make the payment due to tightening conditions in the PRC over the last two years, which restricted its financing channels, including access to bank funding. As per CERCG, it aims to divest some assets to improve its cash flow situation. Separately, there has been more news on LGFV defaults. Reuters recently reported that a firm controlled by a city government in Inner Mongolia region had failed to pay interest and principals on about RMB4 billion of off balance sheet loans. The article suggested that the firm should be technically in default after missing payments but more information is needed to determine whether it was actually a missing payment or a delayed payment. Figure 1: Onshore defaults in China (US$ million) 6,000 4,815.0 5,000 4,000 3,547.1 3,000 2,364.7 2,465.1 2,000 750.6 1,000 157.5 0 2016 2017 2018YTD SOE Non-SOE Source: WIND and J.P. Morgan estimates. Defaults in China, including those from the SOEs, are not something that is entirely new, but have been ongoing for quite some time now. At the time of commodity downturn in 2015-16, there were several credits, mainly in the metals and mining sector, that faced liquidity pressure. While 2016 was a recent high, we think the government will slowly but surely let more companies including some local SOEs default, as long as it does not present a systemic risk to the broader financial sector. 3 Varun Ahuja, CFA Asia Pacific Credit Research (852) 2800 6038 04 June 2018 [email protected] Tiantian Teng (852) 2800-7024 [email protected] Table 1: List of defaults from Chinese issuers in 2018 SOE or Non- Issuer Province Industry Default date Amt (US$ mm) Coupon SOE CEFC China Energy Co. Shanghai Oil & Gas Non-SOE 21-May-18 315.0 6.00 Sichuan Coal Industry Group Sichuan Metals & Mining SOE 21-May-18 78.7 5.94 Fuguiniao Co. Fujian Consumer Non-SOE 9-May-18 204.7 6.50 Kaidi Ecological and Env. Tech. Co. Hubei Utilities Non-SOE 7-May-18 103.5 6.27 China Security Co. Shanghai TMT Non-SOE 7-May-18 14.4 7.00 Evergreen Holding Group Zhejiang Industrial Non-SOE 24-Apr-18 85.0 7.78 Fuguiniao Co. Fujian Consumer Non-SOE 23-Apr-18 126.0 6.30 Yiyang Group Holdings Heilongjiang Diversified Non-SOE 17-Apr-18 190.6 7.10 Shenwu Env Tech Co. Beijing Industrial Non-SOE 14-Mar-18 70.9 8.00 Dandong Port Group Liaoning Transport Non-SOE 13-Mar-18 141.7 5.67 Dandong Port Group Liaoning Transport Non-SOE 12-Mar-18 157.5 6.00 China City Construction Beijing Infrastructure Non-SOE 1-Mar-18 283.5 3.97 Yiyang Group Holdings Heilongjiang Diversified Non-SOE 28-Feb-18 118.9 7.10 Dalian Machine Tool Group Corp Liaoning Industrial Non-SOE 7-Feb-18 78.7 7.80 Dandong Port Group Liaoning Transport Non-SOE 29-Jan-18 315.0 5.50 Yiyang Group Holdings Heilongjiang Diversified Non-SOE 27-Jan-18 32.9 7.10 Dandong Port Group Liaoning Transport Non-SOE 15-Jan-18 78.7 7.60 Dalian Machine Tool Group Corp Liaoning Industrial Non-SOE 15-Jan-18 63.0 7.00 Sichuan Coal Industry Group Sichuan M&M SOE 9-Jan-18 78.7 7.70 Source: WIND, Bloomberg and J.P. Morgan estimates. Similarly, some LGFVs default(s) are possible, but a widespread phenomenon would be too disruptive. We believe that while the probability of one / a few LGFV defaults exists, the Chinese government is unlikely to allow multiple / large-scale defaults from the sector.