by Jorge Morales PedrazaBurying the Nuclear Sword New Roles for the IAEA?

liminating nuclear weapons — or at the One objective then was to establish confidence in very least reducing their numbers — stands the verification mechanism. It aimed to detect any Eamong the most important challenges of deviation or the non-authorized use of safeguarded the . Progress will require effective ver- nuclear materials, equipment, facilities, information ification mechanisms, so that any violation or non- and knowledge, including that acquired by any IAEA compliance with nuclear arms-control agreements Member State through the organization, or through is detected, especially those that could jeopardize the cooperation with other States. international peace and security. It is important to stress that the former and current The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — IAEA safeguards system — including the Additional which already performs valuable verification func- Protocol adopted by the Board of Governors tions — could play an even greater role in years in the 1990s — does not have the objective of ahead to help the world control and bury nuclear impeding the military use of the nuclear materials, weapons. This article offers a group of proposals equipment, facilities, information and knowledge. regarding possible new roles for the IAEA in the field The system works only to detect any violation of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. They or non-compliance with the obligations and include steps for the verification of commitments assumed by States having IAEA from dismantled weapons now in the arsenals of safeguard agreements under the NPT. In my view, the world’s military nuclear powers. the IAEA safeguards system is now facing five major obstacles:

Nuclear Safeguards ➊ The lack of universality of the NPT; The IAEA was constituted in 1957 to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but under strict ➋ Political decisions of the USA in the field of international verification measures. The initial IAEA disarmament, particularly in the field of nuclear safeguards system to ensure the peaceful use of disarmament; nuclear energy suffered a significant transforma- tion in the 1970s. This transformation was tied to the ➌ The limited application of the IAEA safeguards on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons system among its Member States and NPT State (NPT), which entered into force in 1970. Parties; 10 Steps Toward Trust The world’s regime against nuclear weap- Restarting negotiations between the ons can be strengthened. In the views of Mr. USA and on nuclear arms reduc- Pedraza, ten confidence-building measures ➌ tions, and extending the talks to other could help States reinforce it. nuclear-weapon States when US and Russian nuclear arsenals are cut to 90% of their current An agreement to withdraw the combat levels; readiness of all nuclear weapons of any ➊ type and power; A binding international agreement for all nuclear-weapon States that for- The safe dismantling of all nuclear ➍ bids the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the storage of all nuclear weapons against any NPT State; ➋ warheads separated from their deliv- ery systems while awaiting future destruction;

52 | IAEA Bulletin 49-2 | March 2008 Burying the Nuclear Sword The world’s regime against the spread of nuclear weapons faces serious obstacles. A stronger IAEA could help States overcome them.

➍ The status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, against the country. Concerning , the Security which has yet to enter into force; and Council adopted economic and political sanctions against the country, and presently is considering fur- ➎ The failure of the Conference of Disarmament ther measures. Concerning the DPRK, the Security to conclude negotiations on the Agreement for Council has not adopted political, military or eco- the Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable nomic sanctions. Six-party talks involving the DPRK, Material for Nuclear Weapons and for Other Nuclear Republic of Korea, , , Russia and the USA Explosive Device (the so-called cut-off agreement) have reached agreements on their road of negoti- and the adoption of any other measure to move for- ation, including the shutdown of specified nuclear ward at the multilateral level. facilities with the verification of IAEA inspectors.

These obstacles have been evident in practice. The NPT has no internal mechanism to respond to a Reinforcing Nuclear Safeguards potential breach of its provisions. This is left to the In 1997, the adoption of the Additional Protocol to IAEA Board of Governors. If the Board finds grounds IAEA safeguards agreements enlarged the scope for non-compliance that warrants further action of nuclear verification. All NPT States have the in the interests of international peace and security, obligation to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol, it has the obligation to inform the which grants the IAEA broader inspection rights, Security Council. including the right to visit facilities beyond those that a State has declared in line with its NPT safeguards Since the 1990s, the IAEA has reported three serious agreement. cases of non-compliance to the Security Council. They have involved , the Democratic People’s However, it is important to stress that the strength- Republic of Korea (DPRK, ), and Iran. ened IAEA system does not include so-called chal- Concerning Iraq, the Security Council approved lenge inspections — such as those found in the the application of military and global verification system for chemical weapons.

Exchanging information regarding all Withdrawal of all nuclear weapons types of nuclear weapons in military deployed in the territory of a third non- ➎ arsenals, without exception; ➑ nuclear-weapon country;

Applying IAEA safeguards to all fission- Deleting from all military doctrines any able and other nuclear materials for the and all reference to the use of nuclear ➏ production of nuclear weapons; ➒ weapons; and

Definitive suspension of all nuclear Suspending production and testing of tests, while awaiting entry into force of intercontinental multiple warhead bal- ➐ the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban ➓ listic missiles and cruise missiles that Treaty; can carry nuclear warheads.

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In my view, this shortcoming should be remedied in my view would reduce considerably the risk of as part of work to further strengthen IAEA safe- nuclear proliferation. guards for nuclear non-proliferation and disar- mament. The work includes a set of confidence- building measures that in my view should be Eliminating Nuclear Weapons considered by States, including those that already NPT non-nuclear-weapon States should use all pos- possess nuclear weapons. (See box, ‘Ten Steps sible and appropriate international fora, including Toward Trust’). the IAEA, the United Nations General Assembly and the NPT Review Conferences, to press all nuclear- weapon States (China, , Russia, UK, USA, , Challenge Inspections , , as well as North Korea) to accelerate IAEA Member States should consider so-called chal- progress toward the elimination of nuclear weap- lenge inspections in any future modification of the ons. They should be pressed to begin, as soon as safeguards system, in order to expand the scope of possible, the implementation, step-by-step, of a set the ‘special inspection’ that the Director General of confidence-building measures, in order to cre- can already request under existing provisions. Such ate the necessary conditions to initiate, in the near challenge inspections would expand upon mea- future, a negotiation process toward the complete sures incorporated in the Additional Protocol, and elimination, once and for all, of all nuclear weapons No Nukes for Old Enemies

2007 poll, conducted in the US and Russia, The WorldPublicOpinion.org poll was developed in finds robust support for a series of cooper- conjunction with the Center for International and A ative steps to reduce nuclear dangers and Security Studies at the USA’s University of Maryland move toward the global elimination of nuclear (CISSM) and fielded by Knowledge Networks in the weapons. US and the Levada Center in Russia.

Large majorities of Americans and Russians favor The goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, estab- taking nuclear weapons off high alert, sharply cut- lished in the world’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation ting the numbers of nuclear weapons, banning the Treaty (NPT), is endorsed by 73% of Americans and production of weapons-grade nuclear material, and 63 % of Russians. Around 79% of Americans and 66 — once advanced methods of international verifi- % of Russians want their governments to do more cation are established — undertaking the complete to pursue this objective. In the USA, majorities of elimination of nuclear weapons. both Democrats and Republicans agree on these points, although the Democratic majorities are These steps correspond to key elements of a plan larger. for A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, developed by a bipartisan group that includes two former US secre- Steven Kull, Director of WorldPublicOpinion.org, taries of state (George Schultz and Henry Kissinger), a commented: “In contrast to the growing tension former US defense secretary (William Perry) and the between their governments, publics in the US and former chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Russia show enthusiasm for dramatic cooperative Committee () — sometimes called the steps to reduce the nuclear threat.” Reykjavik Revisited plan. Some have been included in recent legislation, such as a bill introduced in the John Steinbruner, director of CISSM noted: “Current US Congress by Senators Chuck Hagel and Barack US security policies do not reflect underlying pub- Obama (S.1977). lic opinion.”

A systematic, global endeavor to eliminate nuclear One of the first steps called for in the Reykjavik weapons has also been endorsed by former Russian Revisited plan is to take nuclear weapons off high President Mikhail Gorbachev, then-British Foreign alert so as to increase warning time and reduce the Secretary Margaret Beckett, and US Presidential can- danger of their accidental or unauthorized use. Eight didates. in ten Americans and two in three Russians favor this Public54 | IAEA Bulletin 49-2 | March 2008 Opinion A Safer World | Burying the Nuclear Sword

and all nuclear production facilities in the posses- Military Stocks sion or under their jurisdiction or control. All nuclear-weapon States should place all military stock of fissionable materials, including materials from dismantled nuclear weapons, under IAEA sur- Counting Weapons veillance; this would create the indispensable con- All nuclear-weapon States should prepare, or update, fidence that theses materials will not revert back an inventory of all their nuclear weapons and related to military use. Again, this should be done before production facilities located within their territories, beginning negotiations for the destruction of all or under their jurisdiction or control. nuclear weapons and related production facilities.

Controlling Nuclear Materials Global Oversight All nuclear-weapon States should prepare, or update All nuclear-weapon States should obtain and main- their inventory of all fissionable materials, as well tain accurate information on world sources of ura- as other nuclear materials ready to be used for the nium and , and bring them under interna- production of nuclear weapons, before beginning tional control before beginning negotiation for the negotiations for the destruction of all nuclear weap- destruction of all nuclear weapons and related pro- ons and related production facilities. duction facilities.

American and Russian Publics Strongly Support Steps to Reduce and Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

idea. Provided there is a system for verifying inter- Americans and Russians also favor concrete steps national compliance, 64 % of Americans and 59 % to increase the transparency between the nuclear of Russians would favor taking all nuclear weapons powers. Majorities in both the US (75%, with 22% off high alert. opposed) and Russia (52%, with 24% opposed) favor an agreement among all nuclear powers to share The UN Disarmament Committee recently voted information about the number of nuclear weapons 124-3 in favor of total de-alerting with the US, France and the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material and Britain opposed. they each have.

Deep cuts in nuclear arsenals also receive robust Support is strong for the Comprehensive Test Ban support. Nearly nine out of ten Americans and Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits nuclear explosive 65% of Russians endorse the US-Russian Strategic testing and thus makes it more difficult for countries Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) to reduce the to develop or improve nuclear weapons. Eight in ten number of active nuclear weapons in each arse- Americans and Russians approve of their country’s nal to about 2,000 weapons by the end of 2012. In participation in this treaty. Indeed, 56% of Americans fact, most Americans (71%) and Russians (55%) favor believe, incorrectly, that the US is already a member reaching this level even sooner. of the treaty. Russia ratified the treaty in 2000 but the US Senate voted against ratification in 1999. Furthermore, 71 % of Americans and 58 % Russians favor reducing their arsenals to significantly less than Ideas for exerting international control over nuclear- 2,000 weapons. Majorities of both Americans (59%) weapons grade material — a means to prevent the and Russians (53%) would even support cutbacks proliferation of nuclear weapons or terrorist acqui- to 400 nuclear weapons each (38% of Americans sition of a dirty bomb — get wide endorsement. and 21% of Russians are opposed). This would make Two-thirds of Americans and 55% of Russians favor the US and Russian arsenals comparable to those of an international ban on any further production of other nuclear powers. suitable for nuclear weapons.

Most Americans (92%) and Russians (65%) believe that an international body, such as the UN, would need to monitor and verify compliance with such deep reductions. www.worldpublicopinion.org Public Opinion IAEA Bulletin 49-2 | March 2008 | 55 A Safer World | Burying the Nuclear Sword

Nuclear-Free Road Map facilities on a commercial basis that is fair and non- A concrete plan for the future elimination of all discriminatory. nuclear weapons should be elaborated, discussed and, if possible, approved by the NPT Review The IAEA can play key roles in regional or multilateral Conference in 2010, with the purpose of facilitating approaches to the cycle. In my view, the the destruction of all nuclear weapons and related IAEA should support the establishment of interna- production facilities. tional or regional centers for the enrichment of ura- nium, the reprocessing of , and the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. These would be on hand for NPT States that require such services. Since the NPT’s entry into force, the At the same time, the IAEA should support propos- world has moved forward in efforts to als to stop the establishment of any new reprocess- ing and enrichment facilities until such time as an curb the spread of nuclear weapons. agreement on this issue is reached internationally.

It has seen a significant decrease Up to now, the NPT stands among the most accepted international in history, having 188 countries in the number of nuclear weapons, as parties. Even so, the Treaty (as negotiated in the particularly those in the hands of the 1960s) authorizes 2.7% of its State Parties to possess nuclear weapons for national defence and security USA and Russia. against military aggression. This represents a strong incentive to other countries to try to access these weapons for similar reasons. This multi-step roadmap should be elaborated in line with a set of principles that I have previously The international community must be aware of this defined and whose negotiation and implementa- reality and demonstrate its readiness to strengthen tion would engage the IAEA. the world’s regime — both to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarma- It is my conviction that it is completely unacceptable ment in a realistic and reasonable period. for a small group of countries (around 4.6% of the total membership of the UN) to impose upon the rest of the international community its conditions What Limits the NPT? in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. This stands in clear violation of inter- The NPT has limitations which prevent the achieve- national commitments and obligations, freely ment of these objectives. They can be summarized assumed in the framework of the NPT. as follows:

● The NPT lacks provisions to compel its recog- Future of the NPT nized nuclear-weapon States (China, France, Russia, Since the NPT’s entry into force, the world has moved UK, and USA) to destroy all their nuclear weapons for ward in effor t s to curb the spread of nuclear weap - and related production facilities in a realistic but ons. It has seen a significant decrease in the number defined period, under international supervision. of nuclear weapons, particularly those in the hands of the USA and Russia. The treaty also has helped Among the NPT’s different provisions, only one calls reduce, in one way or another, the danger of an NPT for all nuclear-weapon States (as well as other State nuclear-weapon State actually using nuclear weap- Parties) to begin negotiations in good faith with the ons in a military conflict. Additionally, the Treaty has ultimate goal to achieve nuclear disarmament. The made the dissemination of nuclear weapons more Treaty does not specify when these negotiations difficult internationally. should begin or finish, or when the destruction of all nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related There is no doubt that the NPT’s sustainability — production facilities. Neither does it say how this as well as the lifetime of the world’s overall regime process would be supervised and by whom, among against nuclear weapons — depends upon a num- other specific questions. ber of conditions. They include a brake on the num- ber of countries possessing sensitive nuclear tech- Perhaps the international community should con- nologies and installations capable of producing sider discussions on a convention that sets a time- nuclear weapons; and a commitment by these table for the destruction of all nuclear weapons in countries to allow other NPT States to use these the near future.

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● The NPT relies on the application of IAEA safe- tion or non-compliance with nuclear non-prolifer- guards to verify the peaceful uses of nuclear energy ation and disarmament treaties and agreements, in States that do not possess nuclear weapons. The including cases in which they themselves may be Treaty does not have its own verification system. involved. Neither is the IAEA the legal depositary of the NPT — the Agency has its own Statute and responsibili- Such a proposal, if adopted by the Security Council, ties, with governing bodies that set the budget and would be a positive sign of the body’s willingness to programmes. shed elements of a discriminatory character, at least with respect to issues concerning NPT obligations This does not mean, of course, that another interna- and commitments. tional organization is needed to verify compliance with the NPT. However, some experts consider that the establishment of such an organization could be Challenging Road Ahead a realistic option — one that should be considered Over the coming months and years, States will be thoroughly by the international community for the faced with important decisions shaping the world’s Treaty to play the role for which was adopted. regime to control and the IAEA’s role within that regime. Proposals sketched here ● A State can withdraw from the NPT citing its seek to draw more attention to serious problems supreme national interests, even without providing that, once solved, will lead to a safer nuclear world. assurances to the international community about the use of the nuclear materials, installations, equip- ment, technology, knowledge and information that it acquired while a party to the NPT. NPT States should adopt, as soon as possible, additional measures to ● The NPT lacks an internal mechanism to consider alleged systematic violations or non-compliance of explicitly prohibit nuclear trade and the a State Party with its Treaty obligations. Such cases are funneled through the IAEA Board of Governors, transfer of sensitive advanced nuclear which can refer cases that affect global peace and security to the UN Security Council. technology and equipment between NPT States and other States; the In my view, these limitations seriously impair the Treaty’s power to influence and move forward the measures could take effect within three nuclear disarmament process at the multilateral level. years of their adoption.

● The NPT has no provisions that specifically prohibit nuclear trade or the transfer of sensitive As States move toward the next NPT Review advanced nuclear technology and equipment from Conference in 2010, new opportunities will open to the standpoint of nuclear proliferation, between move forward on nuclear proliferation and disarma- NPT States and other States. ment issues at the multilateral level. Additionally, the IAEA’s own study of its evolving role over the com- So how can we curb the chance that an NPT State ing decade will cast valuable light on proposals out- indirectly or directly supports the development of lined here to make the Agency a stronger player on a military nuclear programme elsewhere? In short, the international nuclear landscape. stronger international measures are needed.

Nuclear Trade. NPT States should adopt, as soon as possible, additional measures to explicitly prohibit nuclear trade and the transfer of sensitive advanced nuclear technology and equipment between NPT Jorge Morales Pedraza is a former Ambassador of States and other States; the measures could take Cuba and Permanent Representative to the IAEA and effect within three years of their adoption. to the Preparatory Commission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. He Veto Powers. The five permanent members of the also served as a senior officer at the IAEA. Security Council (China, France, Russia, UK, and USA) E-mail: [email protected] should refrain from using their veto during the con- sideration of any case involving the possible viola- This article expresses his personal views.

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