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Filosofia Unisinos Unisinos Journal of 20(2):146-154, may/aug 2019 Unisinos – doi: 10.4013/fsu.2019.202.04

On the of “the meaning of ”

Sobre o significado do “sentido da vida”

Tufan Kıymaz1

ABSTRACT When it comes to a question as notoriously unclear as “What is the meaning of life?”, clarifying the question and its conceptual setting is a necessary step before attempting to answer the question. The analysis of the of “the meaning of life” is a twofold task; “the meaning” and “life” both need to be examined. In this paper, I primarily focus on “the meaning.” I argue that, although there is much disagreement and confusion in the literature about the meaning of “the meaning” as it is applied to life, there is one most plausible interpretation of this . In the end, even though I do not answer the question of the meaning of life, I propose an account of what a correct answer to the question is supposed to look like, based on my original function analysis of “the meaning”.

Keywords: the meaning of life, meaningfulness, meaning in life.

RESUMO No tocante a uma questão notoriamente pouco clara como “Qual é o sentido da vida?”, esclarecer a questão e seu marco conceitual é um passo necessário antes de tentar respon- dê-la. A análise do conceito “o sentido da vida” implica uma tarefa dupla: tanto “o sentido” quanto “vida” precisam ser examinados. Neste artigo, enfoco primordialmente o termo “o sentido”. Sustento que, embora haja muita divergência e confusão na literatura sobre o significado de “o sentido” quando este termo é aplicado à vida, há uma interpretação mais plausível dessa noção. No fim, embora não respondendo a questão do sentido da vida, apresento uma proposta de como poderia ser uma resposta correta a essa questão, com base em minha análise da função original de “o sentido”.

Palavras-chave: o sentido da vida, significatividade, sentido na vida.

1 Bilkent University, Department of Philosophy. H249, Bilkent, Ankara 06800, Turkey. Email: tufankiy- This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC [email protected]. BY 4.0), which permits , adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited. On the meaning of “the meaning of life”

To many who are not professional , “What worthwhile?” “Does (or can) life have any meaning?” is the meaning of life?” is the philosophical ques- (Edwards, 2000, p. 133); “What is it all for?” “Why am I here?” tion; however, partly because of its apparent unclarity, this “What is the point of it all?” (Britton, 1969, p. 3); “Does life question does not receive as much attention from academia have a purpose or point?” “Does life have some ?” “Does as is supposed in popular . Clarifying this question and my life signify something?” (Thomson, 2003, p. 12); “Why its conceptual setting is a necessary step before attempting to live?” “Why is life worth living?” (Thagard, 2010, p. 1, 3); and answer it. The analysis of the concept of “the meaning of life” many other variations. is a twofold task; “the meaning” and “life” both need to be ex- From the above interpretations, we can identify some amined. In this paper, I primarily focus on “the meaning.” I that are regarded to be closely related, even identical, argue that, although there is much disagreement and confu- to the meaning of life, such as the purpose of life, what makes sion in the literature about the meaning of “the meaning” as life valuable/worthwhile, and the /explanation of life. it is applied to life, there is one most plausible interpretation We also see that some interpretations of QML are about the of this notion. of human life in general, some are about the life of In the first section, I briefly explore some of the inter- the person who asks the question, and some are about exis- pretations of the question “What is the meaning of life?” tence in its entirety. Most importantly, some questions in the 2 (hereafter QML) and the answers given in the philosophical list are descriptive/explanatory and some are normative . literature. In the second section, I discuss interpretive strate- Let us now briefly survey the answers given to QML gies for handling the apparent ambiguity of QML. In the third in the literature, which will help us better understand about and the fourth sections, I examine two concepts, namely the what different philosophers take the question to be. Accord- psychological meaning in life and the meaningfulness of life, ing to Metz (2001, 2002, 2007, 2013a, 2013b) and Seachris and point out the ways in which they are distinct from (2011), supernaturalism, subjective , and objective the naturalism are the standard categories of answers given to the meaning of life (hereafter ML) and the ways in which they are confused with ML in the literature. In the fifth section, I pro- normative versions of QML. pose and defend my analysis of “the meaning.” Supernaturalistic are those that derive the original function meaning of life from , from the , or from both. For In the end, even though I do not answer the question of the example, according to the “purpose ,” what gives a life meaning of life, I propose an account of what a correct answer meaning is ac ing according to God’s purpose for that life to the question is supposed to look like, for any given sense of (Metz, 2002, p. 784-7; 2013b, p. 79-117; also see Metz, 2000). the term “life.” Another supernaturalistic theory is ’s “infinity theory.” Nozick argues that life can only be meaningful if it I. The meaning of life: questions is linked to an infinite , because only an infinite being can be meaningful in itself (Metz, 2002, p. 788-789; Nozick, and answers 1989, p. 167). Similarly, Charles Hartshorne argues that a life can only be meaningful if there is a God who appreciates and Among the philosophers who offer answers to QML, immortalizes (by remembering/knowing) that life (Metz, there is no consensus on what the question is really about. 2002, p. 788). Some supernaturalistic theories emphasize the Here are some questions that are offered in the literature as importance of having an immortal soul. For example, accord- interpretations of QML. ing to “ultimate consequence theory,” life can be meaningful “What, if anything, makes a life meaningful?” (Metz, only if it makes a permanent difference and that is possible 2002, p. 781); “What is it all about?” “What is (are) the pur- only if life will not end (Metz, 2002, p. 789). pose(s) of life (my life)?” “What makes life valuable?” “What Subjective naturalistic theories assert that the meaning makes life worthwhile and not irredeemably futile?” “What of a person’s life consists in her subjective attitudes towards makes life significant?” “Does a particular life achieve a good life, such as setting one’s own purposes and following them, purpose?” “What makes life worth living?” (Seachris, 2011); loving something/someone, or engaging in creative ac ivities “What is the purpose of human existence?” “What should we (Metz, 2002, p. 793, 797). It is important to note that these seek?” “What ends (if any) are really worthwhile?” (Nielsen, so-called subjective naturalist theories are only subjective in 2000, p. 239, 246); “What is the use of a man’s life?” “Under the sense that they explain meaning in terms of subjective at- what conditions is a man’s life of some use?” (G. E. Moore, titudes, but, of course, if a subjective naturalist theory is true, quoted in Moorhead, 1988, p. 128), “Is human life ever then it is objectively true. For example, if the meaning of life is

2 I use the term “normative” in the wider sense. A statement/theory is normative if it states what one should or ought to do, or what is right and what is wrong, but I will also regard any evaluative statement/theory as normative. So, a normative statement/theory is any statement/theory that declares something is better. Furthermore, a concept F is normative if and only if the statement “x is F” implies either that x is better than something else or something is better than x. For example, “good,” “right,” “wrong,” “worthwhile” are normative concepts, and so is “meaningful.” A meaningful life is better than a meaningless life ceteris paribus. I will talk more about the normativity of the term “meaningful” in section 4.

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engaging in creative ac ivities, the preferred creative ac ivities ing to John Cottingham, when we ask about the meaning of would change from person to person, since the desirability of life “we are asking about our relationship with the rest of the an ac ivity is a subjective , but, if this theory is true, ” (qtd. in Seachris, 2009, p. 5). then that one’s life is meaningful only if one engages in cre- Seachris argues that when we ask “What is the meaning ative ac ivities is an objective . of life?”, what we mean by “meaning” is what a father means Objective naturalistic theories state that a non-super- by “meaning” when he goes into his children’s playroom after natural objective/-independent component is necessary he hears screaming and yelling, finds the children fighting and for meaningfulness. For example, Susan Wolf (2010, 2015) asks in an authoritative manner “what is the meaning of this?” argues that, unless an ac ivity is objectively valuable, it can- (2009, p. 15-16). What the father is in search of is an expla- not make life more meaningful. According to Wolf, “mean- nation, a narrative, a story about the fighting. According to ing arises when subjective attrac ion meets objective attrac- Seachris, “the accurate story is the meaning the father seeks” tiveness” (2010, p. 9). Another objective naturalistic view is (2009, p. 16, emphasis in the original). that (objectively) morally good ac ions make life meaningful (Metz, 2002, p. 797-798). II. Two interpretive strategies: These theories are not only normative theories about what makes life meaningful (as opposed to meaningless), pluralist and monist they are also theoretical rather than factual. These are theories about what would make life meaningful under what condi- It seems that one can plausibly construe QML as a nor- tions. Metz writes, about one of the standard answers to the mative or as a descriptive question. Furthermore, QML can normative question: “[this] theory is a thesis about the con- be a question about life (or even existence) in general or a ditions for a meaningful life, not about whether these con- question about a generic person’s or a particular person’s life. ditions obtain” (Metz, 2002, p. 784). So, a supernaturalistic It can be posed as a theoretical question or a factual question. theory according to which the meaning of life is worshiping QML is apparently ambiguous in more than one dimension. God does not also claim that God exists; what this normative There are two main interpretive strategies to handle this theory of meaning asserts is merely that one’s life is meaning- apparent ambiguity of QML, which I will call, adopting the ful if and only if God exists and one worships God. terms from Metz (2013b, ch. 2), “The Pluralist Strategy” and Descriptive/explanatory answers are also given to QML. “The Monist Strategy.” According to Milton Munitz (1986), QML is a question The pluralist strategy is to deny that QML can be un- about the place of human existence in the universe (p. 258). derstood as a single question. According to this approach, When Stephen Hawking declared the death of philosophy the best way to interpret QML is to take it to be essentially and argued that now takes over the traditional philo- ambiguous among a cluster of different but interrelated ques- sophical endeavor of answering the most profound questions, tions and try to determine exactly which questions those are. he was talking about the descriptive interpretations of QML: Metz (2002) argues that QML can best be understood as a disjunction of the following interrelated questions: But almost all of us must sometimes won- der: Why are we here? Where do we come What should an agent strive for besides ob- from? Traditionally, these are questions taining and fulfilling obligations? for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. … Which aspects of a human life are worthy Scientists have become the bearers of the of great esteem or admiration? In what re- spect should a rational being connect with torch of discovery in our quest for knowl- value beyond his animal self? … Which edge (Hawking, qtd. in Warman, 2011). goods command our awe? How may an in- dividual identify with something incompara- In fact, any formulation of the QML as a why question about bly higher? What is worthy of our and existence, such as “Why do we (or I, or anything) exist?” is a allegiance? (2002, p. 802-803).3 descriptive/explanatory interpretation of QML. Seachris (2009), similarly, argues that the primary According to Metz, what makes these questions inter- meaning of “the meaning of life” is explanatory. The mean- related is that the standard answers given to QML in the ing of life, according to Seachris, is essentially a true narrative literature are in fact answers to these questions and those about life. He quotes philosophers who have similar views; answers exhibit family resemblances (2001, p. 150; 2002, p. Garrett Thomson writes that “to know the meaning of life 802; 2007, p. 211). is to know a true metaphysical narrative about human life in Baggini (2005) defends a similar view. He maintains that general that somehow makes sense of our ,” and accord- “What is the meaning of life?” is an unclear sentence and it is a

3 Metz gives slightly different lists of questions in his The Concept of a Meaningful Life (2001), p. 150-151, and New Developments in the Meaning of Life (2007), p. 211.

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place-holder for a of questions such as “Why are we here? factual questions about the actual meaningfulness of partic- What is the purpose of life? Is it enough just to be happy? Is my ular lives. Although Metz argues that the bearer of meaning life serving some greater purpose? Are we here to help others or is particular lives, his question “What, if anything, makes a just ourselves?” (Baggini, 2005, p. 1)4. According to Mawson’s life meaningful?” (Metz, 2002, p. 781) is also about the life of hypothesis of polyvalence, when one asks what the meaning of life a hypothetical generic human individual. QML can also be is, “one asks an assemblage of largely overlapping, but signifi- asked about existent particular lives, and most importantly cantly different, questions at once” (2010, p. 20). one’s own life. One of the most popular formulations of QML Seachris (2009), however, rejects this pluralistic strate- is about the life of the person who asks the question (Thom- gy and offers his Narrative Interpretation instead, according to son, 2003, p. 12; Britton, 1969, p. 3; Mawson, 2010, p. 21). which QML demands a meta-narrative of life. He interprets This is also how Tolstoy (1987, p. 19-80) and Camus (1991, QML as a single question and, without rephrasing QML, expli- p. 4) understood the question of the meaning of life, as they cates the term “meaning.” Seachris’s Narrative Interpretation is regarded the question to be basically about . one of the possible interpretations of QML in accordance with Probably a pluralist strategy would be the right to the Monist Strategy. Seachris (2009) argues that his interpreta- examine the concept of “life” in QML, but the questions that tion of QML is more plausible than the pluralist interpretations Metz and other pluralists enumerate do not differ from one because his Narrative Interpretation retains the original ques- another significantly with res ect to their employment of dif- tion and retaining the original question is more desirable than ferent senses of “life;” rather, they focus on different senses of reformulating it, and when we rephrase QML as a collection “the meaning.” What I argue is, contrary to the pluralists, that of various questions about purpose, value, worth, etc., QML if we choose one of the senses of “life” and ask QML s ecifical- becomes a question about those concepts, which are logically ly about that, then QML will not be an ambiguous question. distinct from the concept of the meaning of life. Furthermore, Before I offer my analysis of the concept of the meaning, he points out that his interpretation gives a unified account and I want to examine two concepts that are sometimes confused hence his interpretation, as opposed to the pluralist interpre- with the meaning of life (ML), namely psychological meaning tive strategy, does not ignore the definite article in the question in life and meaningfulness of life. “What is the meaning of life?” (p. 27-29). I submit that, for the that Seachris elaborates, a monist analysis is preferable III. The psychological and a pluralist strategy must be adopted only if no acceptable monist analysis is available. meaning in life If there is no plausible monist analysis of QML, then this can be due to the inherent ambiguity of “the meaning” The central matter of contemporary positive or “life” or both. Instead of analyzing the ambiguity of QML psychology is meaning in life. is “the sci- as a whole, it would be easier to inquire the notions of “the entific study of what makes life most worth living” (Peter- meaning” and “life” separately. My aim in this paper is to ana- son, 2008) from the pers ectives of how pleasant, good (eu- lyze the concept of “the meaning” in QML, so I will not offer daimonic) and meaningful one’s life is (Seligman and Pawelski, a thorough examination of the concept of “life,” but I will just 2003). Various studies report that having meaning in life has mention some of the interpretations of “life” in the meaning positive effects on psychological well-being and lack of it im- of life literature. After that, I will examine “the meaning” and pacts psychological well-being negatively (Cohen and Cairns, argue that a monist analysis of this notion is possible. 2010, p. 2; Klefteras and Psarra, 2012, p. 337). According to Metz (2013b, p. 37-58), the bearers of The psychological notion of meaning in life is substan- meaning are particular human lives (and parts of those lives). tially different from the philosophical notion of the meaning However, questions such as “What is it all about?” (Seachris, of life. Psychological meaning in life (hereafter P-MiL) is the 2011), “Why does the universe exist? Why does something perceived meaningfulness of one’s life from one’s point of view. exist rather than ?” (Britton, 1969, p. 3) are also stat- It is “the cognizance of order, coherence, and purpose in one’s ed as interpretations of QML in the literature. Some philos- existence, the pursuit and attainment of worthwhile goals, ophers interpreted QML as a question about existence of the and an accompanying sense of fulfillment” (Reker and Wong, human s ecies, such as Nielsen when he asked “What is the 1988, p. 221, emphasis added). The Meaning in Life Ques- purpose of human existence?” (1981, p. 186). “Why are we tionnaire, one of the most commonly used tools to measure here?” is also a question about humanity in general (Mawson, P-MiL, is constructed to measure “sense made of, and signif- 2010, p. 21). Normative questions about the meaning of life, icance felt regarding, the of one’s being and existence” such as “Is human life ever worthwhile?” “Does (or can) hu- (Steger et al., 2006, p. 81). Another questionnaire that is fre- man life have any meaning?” (Edwards, 1981), typically are quently used to measure meaning in life, namely the Purpose theoretical questions about a generic human life, rather than of Life Questionnaire, is designed to measure “the ontological

4 Note that Baggini’s list contains both normative and descriptive questions. Metz, on the other hand, includes only the normative ques- tions and dismisses descriptive/explanatory questions about life.

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significance of life from the point of view of the experiencing meaningfulness of life are not as conceptually distinct from individual” (Crumbaugh and Maholick, 1964, p. 201). each other as ML and P-MiL are. Both the meaning and the The most salient difference between the concepts of meaningfulness of a given life exist objectively, if they exist P-MiL and ML is that, conceptually, P-MiL is subjective but at all. The correct theory of ML could turn out to be a sub- ML is not. Theories of P-MiL are about the conditions under jective naturalistic theory which asserts that, say, “setting and which one perceives her life to be meaningful. Theories of ML pursuing one’s own purposes in life” is the meaning of life, but (including so-called subjective naturalist theories), on the other if this is the correct answer to QML, then it is objectively the hand, are about the objective conditions of meaning which are correct answer. And if the correct answer to QML is “setting not contingent upon one’s of meaning. Consider a and pursuing one’s own purposes in life,” then unless one sets newborn child. She clearly does not have P-MiL, but according and pursues her purposes in life, her life is objectively mean- to some theories of ML, such as supernaturalist theories, her ingless, even though she might be satisfied with her life. life can still have objective meaning (maybe God’s purpose for However, meaning and meaningfulness are not equiva- creating her constitutes the meaning of her life). To see the dif- lent to each other. Unlike meaning, I take meaningfulness to be ference more clearly, let’s take a subjective naturalist theory of an obviously normative term. Imagine two lives. These two ML, say, Harry Frankfurt’s theory that ML is “devoting oneself lives have exactly the same amount (and type, if you think to what one ” (2002, p. 250). According to Frankfurt’s the- that is important) of happiness, satisfac ion, , free- ory, if one devotes herself to something she loves, even though dom, , etc., but they differ in that one of these lives is she does not feel or think that her life is meaningful, her life still meaningful, and the other one is meaningless. Which life is has meaning. P-MiL, however, cannot exist if one does not per- better? Which life is preferable, more intrinsically choicewor- ceive it. Similarly, it is conceptually possible that one’s life may thy? If you don’t think that the difference in meaningfulness be objectively meaningless even though one has P-MiL. Fur- breaks the axiological balance between these otherwise indis- thermore, P-MiL is more like a general state of mind (or mood) tinguishable lives, then you are using the term “meaningful- and does not signify something unique. The meaning of life, on ness” in a different sense than I and many other philosophers the other hand, at least prima facie, is supposed to be unique, as who interpret meaningfulness of a life to be about worth- the definite article suggests. whileness of a life use the term. When people ask “How can In the literature on ML, there is some confusion be- I make my life more meaningful?” I take it that they ask a tween ML and P-MiL. For example, Rudolf Wohlgennant question about a better life. takes “meaningful life” to be synonymous with “[life in which Unlike the meaningfulness of life, the meaning of life a person] feels satisfied upon achieving her aims” (quoted in is not an obviously normative concept. A meaningful life is Metz 2002, p. 801). Wohlgennant offers his account not as a better than a meaningless life, but, as we have seen, many phi- subjective naturalistic theory of ML, but as an analysis of the losophers regard ML as a descriptive concept, or at least they concept of ML, which indicates that what he has in mind is recognize that a descriptive sense of meaning is as plausible as not ML but P-MiL. a normative sense. Any interpretation of QML that regards Paul Edwards (2000) argues that there cannot be ML it as a question about some kind of explanation of life (or ex- independent of one’s knowledge about and attitude towards istence) rather than an evaluative question about the condi- it. He writes, tions of meaningfulness employs a descriptive notion of ML. If a superhuman being has a plan in which I There are other ways in which meaning and meaning- am included, this fact will make (or help to fulness differ from each other. Suppose that a supernatural- make) my life meaningful in the terrestrial istic theory is the correct answer to QML. In that case, say, sense only if I know the plan and approve of worshipping God is the meaning of all lives but only the lives it and of my place in it, so that working to- of the people who actually worship God are meaningful (pro- ward the realization of the plan gives direc- vided that God exists). So, the fact that there is an overarch- tion to my actions (Edwards, 2000, p. 145). ing meaning of life, which is the meaning of every life, does not guarantee that every life is meaningful. Meaning is not Again, what cannot possibly exist unless one knows and approves the same as meaningfulness and confusing meaningfulness of of it is P-MiL, not ML. Similarly, A. J. Ayer equivocates between life and the meaning of life causes serious problems for the ML and P-MiL when he writes: “I do not think there can be any analysis of the concept of the meaning. general answer to the question, what is the meaning of life. Our Furthermore, QML asks what meaning of life is. The individual lives have whatever meaning, or meanings, we succeed the definite article before “meaning” indicates that there is only in giving them” (quoted in Moorhead, 1988, p. 20). one meaning of life (given a particular sense of “life”). More than one thing can make life meaningful together, but there IV. Meaningfulness of life can be only one the meaning of life. Lastly, a meaningful life can be more meaningful than another meaningful life, but, in- Meaningfulness of life is another concept that can be con- tuitively, the meaning of life does not come in degrees; either fused with ML; and it is easier to confuse because ML and there is a meaning or there is not.

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Let’s see an example of the confusion between the mean- cause even if you save all of your earnings, you cannot afford ing of life and the meaningfulness of life. According to Metz, a Malibu beach house. For similar reasons, drinking water to it is obvious that meaning comes in degrees: “Nearly all those get drunk is meaningless. writing on meaning in life believe that it comes in degrees, What is common in all these examples is that there is a so that, say, some lives as a whole are more meaningful than purpose that cannot be achieved. The purpose of s eaking to others” (2013b, p. 4). Metz takes the question “What is the someone is to be understood, the purpose of reading a book is meaning of life?” to be synonymous with “What (if anything) to understand it. And, in the last two examples, your purpose makes life meaningful?” (2002, p. 781; 2007, p. 196) and “How for saving money is to buy a house at the Malibu Beach and (if at all) [can] one’s life … be meaningful?” (2013b, p. 17). your purpose for drinking water is to get drunk. If the ac iv- From his pers ective, a life has meaning if and only if that life ity you are engaging in is incapable of producing the relevant is meaningful, because he takes both “the meaning of life” and result, then we think that that ac ivity is meaningless, in the “meaningfulness of life” to denote importance/significance of sense that it is pointless and futile. 5 life . According to him, meaning has “inherent desirability and So, at first glance, it might seem that the purpose of an choiceworthiness” (2001, p. 140). This approach conceptu- ac ivity is its meaning and that ac ivity is meaningful as long ally excludes all descriptive accounts of meaning. According as it serves its purpose. But this is not exactly true. Buying the to his view, all those philosophers who interpret QML to be Malibu beach house and getting drunk are set as purposes of about why we exist drastically misunderstand the question. saving money and drinking water by the person who engag- Furthermore, intuitively, there are conceptually possible cases es in these ac ivities. But the meaning of life is supposed to in which a life is not meaningful even though there is a mean- be objective, one cannot just attribute an arbitrary meaning ing of life. For example, as I mentioned above, according to to her life as ML6. The examples of s eaking and reading are some god-centered supernaturalistic theories, each life has more apt. To be understood is not just a purpose one subjec- a meaning, namely God’s purpose in creating that life, but tively attributes to s eaking. Similarly, understanding a text is the life of an atheist can be regarded as meaningless and not the essential and objective purpose of reading. Understanding worth living, since the atheist rejects to serve the purpose that a text is what reading is for. is assigned to her life by God. We cannot explain this concep- In my view, the meaning of s eaking is to be understood tual possibility unless we distinguish between meaning and by others and the meaning of reading is to understand a text; meaningfulness. however, some points need to be clarified about the notion of The meaning of life and the meaningfulness of life are meaning and its relation to meaningfulness. First of all, the separate but related notions. A successful analysis of the con- meaning is more like a function, rather than a purpose that cept of ML, I believe, must account for the distinction and is deliberately set by someone. The function of a thing, as I connection between the meaning and the meaningfulness. understand the term, does not need to be intentionally set According to my view, as I explain in the next section, exis- by some agent. For example, getting nutrients is the biological tence of the meaning of life is a necessary but not a sufficient function of eating and reproduction is the biological function condition for the meaningfulness of life. of sexual intercourse. They are functions, rather than purpos- es, since eating and mating did not evolve teleologically for V. The meaning as the some future purpose or goal, but instead their function was realized as they evolved (cf. Searle, 1995). original function I will call the function that explains existence of a thing the “original function.” Not everything exists to serve a func- Suppose that you are s eaking to your friend, telling her tion. An original function features in a functional explanation about your latest philosophical discovery. Then you realize of the existence of a thing; it is what that thing is for. Functional that she wears earphones and could not hear you. She was not explanations are predominantly used in , aware that you were s eaking to her the whole . When but also if a thing is intentionally created for some purpose, you realize this, you stop s eaking, because s eaking to her then serving that purpose counts as its original function. To be while she is not even aware that you are s eaking is meaning- clear, the original function explains why something exists, but less. When you were s eaking to her without realizing that fulfilling the original function might not be a persistence con- she was not listening, your s eaking was meaningless. Similar- dition for that thing. Detecting light is the original function of ly, trying to read a book in a foreign language that you don’t eyes in general, which also explains the existence of each indi- know is meaningless. Or, suppose you want to buy a Malibu vidual eye, but blind eyes still exist even if they can’t serve their beach house but you work for the minimum wage. Saving original function. They are supposed to see, but they don’t cease money for the Malibu beach house is meaningless for you, be- to exist just because they cannot see.

5 Metz maintains that the phrase “meaningful life” is synonymous with the phrases “significant existence,” “life that matters” (Metz, 2002, p. 801); “important [life],” “[existence that] has a point” (Metz, 2001, p. 138); “way of being that matters” (Metz, 2013b, p. 21). 6 This point is systematically ignored by those who mistakenly equate ML with P-MiL, as I discussed in section 3.

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I believe that “original function” is an appropriate syn- In my view, the meaning of life is the original function onym for “meaning” in QML. It is related to the notion of of life, and life is meaningful if and only if it has an objectively purpose, although not identical to it, which explains why the positive/valuable original function and fulfills that function. concept of the meaning of life is often confused with the con- So, a life can be meaningless in the following ways: cept of the purpose of life. The original function of a life is 1. The life does not have an original function. objective, in the sense that one cannot subjectively attribute 2. The life has an original function, but its original func- an original function to an existent life. The original function tion is not objectively valuable. of a life can be unique and not a cluster of different things, as 3. The life has an objectively valuable original function, the concept of “the meaning of life” suggests. The equivalence but it doesn’t serve this function. of the meaning of life and the original function also explains To be clear, I don’t claim that there actually is an objec- why QML is interpreted as a question about why we exist by tively valuable original function for our lives. Maybe there is many philosophers. no original function, maybe there is an original function but Now, given this analysis of the meaning, let us look at the it is objectively negative, or maybe objective values don’t exist relation between the meaning and the meaningfulness of life at all. My claim is conceptual. My claim is that, conceptually, more closely. If something does not satisfy its original function, our lives can be meaningful only if there is such an objectively then it is objectively meaningless in the relevant sense. For ex- valuable original function of life, and a fortiori, only if there is ample, eating non-nutritious things, however delicious they objective value at all (cf. Wolf, 2010, 2015). may be, is meaningless, provided that, as an objective - This is a monist analysis of the concept of the meaning, ary fact, receiving nutrition is what eating is for. It is important but it is different from Seachris’s . As we have seen to see, however, that its meaninglessness does not mean that above, according to Seachris, the meaning of life is the true one should not eat anything non-nutritious or that there is any- existential narrative of life, which is the concept of meaning a thing morally wrong with this ac ivity. Receiving can father employs when he asks to his fighting children “What’s be a subjective purpose of engaging in objectively meaningless the meaning of this fight?” Seachris argues that what the fa- ac ivities and this would be enough reason to engage in them. ther wants is a true narrative about the fight, but according to Similarly to the fact that one can have an objectively meaning- my view, provided that the “meaning” in the father’s question less life but have P-MiL, an ac ivity that does not serve its origi- is same as the “meaning” in QML, what the father wants to nal function can be desirable and satisfactory for other reasons. know is the original function of the fight. In other words, his Another important point about the original function question can be rephrased as “What is this fight for?” Suppose is that it can be negative. For example, if we are created by that the fight is due to a misunderstanding, then there is no Descartes’ evil demon who deceives us about everything, in- original function of the fight. There is a reason and explana- cluding the existence of the external , then the original tion of it, which can have the form of a narrative, but it is not function, and hence the meaning, of life is a global deception. an original function. In this case, the narrative about the mis- Or, suppose there are some people who are created by God to understanding would be the meaning of the fight according to deterministically live a life that inevitably leads to Hell. Go- Seachris’s Narrative Interpretation, but the fight would have ing to Hell is the original function and the meaning of their no meaning according to my analysis. lives. Arguably, being created for being globally deceived or Not any explanation/narrative of existence of some- for Hell makes one’s life less meaningful and worthwhile than thing counts as the meaning of that thing. Every person’s ex- a life of a person who was not created for constant deception istence is caused by her mother and father having sex, but we or Hell. So, not every life that fulfills its original function is do not see it even as a candidate for the meaning of one’s life. meaningful. Although “the meaning of life” is a neutral con- It is an explanation, but not a functional explanation. Sup- cept, the actual meaning of life can be negative or positive, pose, on the other hand, a clone is created by geneticists to that is, it can be objectively bad or objectively good/valuable. be scientifically examined and studied. Then, that clone has And, of course, a negative meaning does not make life more an original function, which is also the meaning of her life: to meaningful, since, conceptually, a meaningful life is ceteris pa- contribute to science by being scientifically examined. And if ribus better than a meaningless life. A life created for constant that is a positive/valuable function (which is very question- deception or Hell is not ceteris paribus better than a life that able, es ecially from a Kantian pers ective), then being stud- is not created for constant deception or Hell. For something ied by scientists makes her life meaningful (whether she has to be meaningful, aside from having and serving an original P-MiL or not is another question). function, it must have a positive original function. A positive Let us return to Seachris’s fighting children example. original function of life is such that, when it is fulfilled, it Now suppose that one of the children got jealous since she makes one’s life more worth living independent of the subjec- that her sister was prettier than she was, wanted to tive satisfac ion one might or might not have from her life. In make her less pretty by punching her in the face and that’s this sense, being deceived by the evil demon and waiting to go why she started the fight. In this case, deforming the sister’s to Hell does not add to the meaningfulness of one’s life, but, face is the original function of the fight, and it is the meaning for example, arguably, serving a benevolent god does. of the fight according to my view, but it is not a positive mean-

Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 20(2):146-154, may/aug 2019 152 On the meaning of “the meaning of life”

ing. So, even though the fight serves its original function, it is CRUMBAUGH, J.C.; MAHOLICK, L.T. 1964. An Experimen- not a meaningful fight. tal Study in : The Psychometric Approach to Although the original function account of meaning re- Frankl’s Concept of Noogenic Neurosis. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 20:200-207. gards ML not as a normative notion but as a descriptive one, EDWARDS, Paul. 2000. The Meaning and Value of Life. In: E.D. it still captures the basic intuitions of those who pose QML KLEMKE (Ed.), The Meaning of Life. Oxford, Oxford Univer- as a normative question. I take the normative interpretations sity Press, p. 133-152. of QML to be most directly about the meaningfulness rather FRANKFURT, Harry. 2002. Reply to Susan Wolf. In: Sarah BUSS; than the meaning of life, but of course any question about the Lee OVERTON (Eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on meaningfulness of life is indirectly also about the meaning of Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, Bradford Books, p. 248-252. life, since meaningfulness is fulfilled positive original function and the original function is the meaning. All normative theo- KLEFTERAS, George; PSARRA, Evangelia. 2012. Meaning in ries of ML, i.e. the supernaturalistic, subjective naturalistic and Life, Psychological Well-Being and Depressive Symptom- atology: A Comparative Study. Psychology, 3(4):337-345. objective naturalistic theories, are theories about a ML. positive MAWSON, T. 2010. Sources of Dissatisfaction with Answers to the Question of the Meaning of Life. European Journal for VI. Conclusion Philosophy of , 2:19-41. METZ, Thaddeus. 2000. Could God’s Purpose Be the Source of I have argued that the best way to understand the con- Life’s Meaning? Religious Studies, 36(3):293-313. cept of is to interpret it as METZ, Thaddeus. 2001. The Concept of a Meaningful Life. the meaning of life the original func- American Philosophical Quarterly, 38(2):137-153. tion of life. As I mentioned above, the concept of life must also be analyzed and I concede that a pluralist strategy would METZ, Thaddeus. 2002. Recent Work on the Meaning of Life. , 112(4):781-814. probably be more appropriate for the analysis of the concept METZ, Thaddeus. 2007. New Developments in the Meaning of of life. However, there is no inherent ambiguity in the notion Life. Philosophy Compass, 2(2):196-217. of in QML. In my view, whether we ask QML about meaning METZ, Thaddeus. 2013a. The Meaning of Life. In: Edward N. existence as a whole, or about the existence of the human s e- ZALTA (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy., cies, or about a hypothetical generic human life, or about a Summer 2013. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/ar- particular human life such as the life of the person who asks chives/sum2013/entries/life-meaning/. the question, we ask what its original function is. If a life has METZ, Thaddeus. 2013b. Meaning in Life. Oxford, Oxford Uni- no original function or has a negative original function, then it versity Press. cannot be meaningful. The search for what makes life objec- MOORHEAD, H.S. 1988. The Meaning of Life. Chicago, Ill., tively meaningful is the search for a positive original function Chicago Review Press. of life and the ways to fulfill that function. MUNITZ, Milton Karl. 1986. Cosmic Understanding: Philoso- I have tried to clarify the meaning and the meaningfulness phy and Science of the Universe. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. of life conceptually, but I haven’t analyzed every concept that I use in my proposed analyses of these terms. I didn’t, for exam- NIELSEN, Kai. 2000. Linguistic Philosophy and ‘The Meaning of Life.’ In: E.D. KLEMKE (Ed.), The Meaning of Life. Oxford, ple, discuss in detail what “positive” and “negative” mean when Oxford University Press, p. 233-256. they are applied to the meaning. Before attempting to answer NOZICK, Robert. 1989. The Examined Life. New York, Simon QML, these terms also need to be clarified. Even though my & Schuster. analysis of QML is not complete, I do think my original func- PETERSON, Christopher. 2008, May 16. What Is Positive tion view of ML and the related analysis of meaningfulness Psychology, and What Is It Not? Available at http://www. in terms of ML provide a good starting point and conceptual psychologytoday.com/blog/the-good-life/200805/what-is- framework for those who are in search of the meaning of life. positive-psychology-and-what-is-it-not. REKER, G.T.; WONG, P.T.P. 1988. Aging as an Individual Pro- cess: Towards a Theory of Personal Meaning. In: J.E. BIR- References REN; V.L. BENGSTON (Eds.), Emergent Theories of Aging. New York, NY, Springer Publishing Co., p. 214-246. BAGGINI, Julian. 2005. What’s It All About? Philosophy and SEACHRIS, Joshua. 2009. The Meaning of Life as Narrative: A the Meaning of Life. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 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