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Communiqué No. 107, Page 10) Taiwan Communiqué Published by: Formosan Association for Public Affairs 552 7th St. SE, Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel. (202) 547-3686 International edition, June/July 2006 Published 6 times a year 109 ISSN number: 1027-3999 Opposition motion to recall President Chen Drifting into a Constitutional crisis On May 31 2006, the opposition KMT and People First Party (PFP) caucuses in the Legislative Yuan initiated a recall motion against President Chen Shui-bian, causing Taiwan to drift further into a Constitutional crisis. The two pro-China opposition parties were taking advantage of the fact that the President was in political trouble due to the fact that his son-in-law, Mr. Chao Chien- ming, had been arrested at the end of May on accusations of inside trading. At the present time, no formal charges have been brought against Mr. Chao yet, and there are no indications President Chen knew about the matter. However, in their relentless Copyright: Taipei Times campaign to undermine the democratically-elected President, the pro-China "pan-blue" legislators and sensationalist press have worked overtime to hound Chen and his family. It is ironic to see that PFP Chairman James Soong is one of those leading the charge: in the 1990s he was implicated in embezzling some US$ 400 mln in the Pan-blue hound to President Chen: "Did you think I Lafayette frigate purchase would stop chasing you? Taiwan Communiqué -2- June/July 2006 from France, but the judicial branch -- which is primarily dominated by KMT and PFP followers -- has yet to file charges against him. The recall motion reportedly received some 113 signatures from the KMT and PFP members in the legislature, but has no chance of succeeding, because it requires approval of 2/3 of the 225-member Legislative Yuan. Taiwan Communiqué comment: The recall move seems to be part of a deliberate campaign by the pro-China opposition to destabilize Taiwan and undermine the DPP government. One should not be surprised if at some time in the future it turns out that the Communist regime in China had a hand in it. It shows that at the present time, Taiwan’s democracy is being hollowed out from the inside by destructive elements of the old repressive Kuomintang regime, who never came to terms with the fact that they lost the 2000 and 2004 Presidential elections. It also shows the dire need for the United States to be much more supportive of the democratic forces on the island, and reach out to Taiwan instead of sidelining and cold- shouldering this fragile democracy. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * President Chen’s travels Around the world in 8 days From the third until the tenth of May 2006, President Chen Shui-bian engaged in an unparalleled globetrotting trip, that took him half-way around the world and back. The purpose of the trip was to pay a state visit to Paraguay and to attend the inauguration of President Oscar Arias in Costa Rica. As is customary for trips to Latin America, Taiwan intended President Chen to make stopovers in the United States on the way over and back. On previous occasions, stopovers were made in major cities such as Los Angeles, New York, Miami, Houston, San Francisco and Seattle. Although the plans were communicated to the US State Department earlier, the formal request was not submitted until 21 April, the day after the visit to Washington of China’s leader Hu Jintao. Taiwan Communiqué -3- June/July 2006 However, as the departure date of the second of May got closer, Washington still had not made a decision. When the word finally came on May 1st, it turned out to be a dud: the Bush Administration only granted a refueling stopover of a few hours in Anchorage, Alaska or Honolulu, Hawaii. Photo: CNA President Chen postponed his trip by a day, and eventually decided to fly around the world in the other direction, stop- ping in Abu Dhabi and Amsterdam. The itinerary had to be kept a secret in order to avoid that China bully the host authorities into refusing land- ing rights to President Chen’s plane. This did happen in the case of Lebanon, where the President Chen addressing the Legislature Chinese ambassador pres- in Paraguay sured the local authorities to deny a request for a landing. In Paraguay, President Chen had good Photo: CNA meetings with his counterpart, Presi- dent Nicanor Duarte, while in Costa Rica he was part of the festivities surrounding the inauguration of Presi- dent Oscar Arias, one of the most prominent peacemakers in Central America – who received the Nobel Peace price in 1987. Interestingly, during the celebrations, he met US First Lady Laura Bush, who – together with a Congressional delegation – was representing the United States. President Chen meeting US First Lady When time came to make the return Laura Bush flight to Taiwan, suspense rose again: was President Chen going to take up the US refueling offer or not? In the end he decided to fly East instead of Northwest, made a stopover in Libya, and then on to Indonesia, where he stayed at the island of Bantam in the Moluccas. Taiwan Communiqué -4- June/July 2006 The pan-blue press in Taiwan tried to put the Libya visit into a negative light, but without success: a few days later the US normalized its relations with the Libyan government in recognition of its cooperation in countering international terrorism. What prompted the American cold-shoulder? Pundits in and outside Washington have given a variety of explanations for the American cold-shouldering of President Chen in this stopover saga. The first one is that the White House wanted to have the stopover as low-profile as possible in view of China’s ruffled feathers about the two gaffes that took place during Hu Jintao’s April 20 visit to Washington: a) the Copyright: Taipei Times interruption in the welcoming ceremony by Falung Gong re- porter Dr. Wenyi Wang, and b) the announcement by the White House announcer of the Chinese national anthem as being from the “Republic of China” (Taiwan’s anachronis- tic name, to which Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang still clings). The second reason given, was that the US wanted to get China Taiwan stop-over diplomat to the US: "You seem to agree to a stronger resolu- to have your hands full." tion in the UN Security Council, mandating Article VII sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program. Reportedly, China had given some indications to this effect during Hu Jintao’s visit. The US didn’t want to give China any excuse to back out of its promises. As it was, China reneged on its commitments, and didn’t support a stronger resolution, but only a very weak expression of concern without any teeth. The third explanation, mentioned particularly by the extremist partisan pan-blue press and KMT/PFP politicians in Taiwan, was that the US wanted to slap President Chen across the wrist for the demise of the National Unification Council in February / March 2006. According to this thesis, the US was still not satisfied, and wanted President Chen to reiterate the arcane “Four Noes and one will-not” (see “State Department mantra” in Taiwan Communiqué no. 107, page 10). Taiwan Communiqué -5- June/July 2006 Taiwan Communiqué comment: We would consider the first reason to be an understandable but still very improper linkage: The gaffes were of the United States’ own making, and didn’t have anything to do with Taiwan. “Punishing” Taiwan for them is unfair and unreasonable. The second explanation – get China to support a resolution on Iran in the UN – is a more substantial reason. But, as expected, it did not get the desired results anyway, and China continued its lack of cooperation on the Iran nuclear issue. Using this tool was thus an effort in futility. The third rationale – a lingering ill-feeling because of the Unification Council case – would be silly: in March and April 2006, the State Department repeatedly emphasized that the case was “closed”. We simply cannot imagine that US policymakers would be so petty as to continue to nag about this issue: it was fully discussed with the Taiwan authorities, a conclusion reached, and it is time to move on to more relevant issues. Below, we present an additional piece on the stopover issue: a letter by seventeen Taiwanese-American organizations to US Secretary Condoleezza Rice, urging her to be more supportive of Taiwan’s fragile democracy. Letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Dear Secretary Rice: The undersigned Taiwanese-American organizations would like to express our deep concern about the State Department’s decision to allow Taiwan President Chen Shui- bian only a refueling stop in Hawaii or Alaska on his travel to Latin America. We do not believe this is the right way to treat one of our closest democratic allies, certainly not after the White House just recently rolled out the red carpet for the leader of a very undemocratic China. Taiwan is a proud, free, democratic and prosperous nation which only recently went through its transition to democracy. If the United States is to foster democracy around the world, we would do well to strengthen our ties with those who have worked hard for, and achieved, democracy. Taiwan Communiqué -6- June/July 2006 Instead of continuing the unfair and unjust isolation of Taiwan which was imposed during its martial law years under the Chinese Nationalists, we should celebrate the island’s desire to be a free and democratic nation, and welcome Taiwan in the international community. America’s position and actions towards Taiwan should be inclusive rather than exclusive.
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