China Perspectives 2010/3 | 2010 Taiwan: The Consolidation of a Democratic and Distinct Society Mid-Term Analysis of the Ma Ying-jeou Administration The Difficulty of Delivering the (Right) Goods Frank Muyard Édition électronique URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5299 DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.5299 ISSN : 1996-4617 Éditeur Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine Édition imprimée Date de publication : 15 septembre 2010 ISSN : 2070-3449 Référence électronique Frank Muyard, « Mid-Term Analysis of the Ma Ying-jeou Administration », China Perspectives [En ligne], 2010/3 | 2010, mis en ligne le 01 septembre 2013, consulté le 28 octobre 2019. URL : http:// journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5299 ; DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.5299 © All rights reserved Special Feature s e Mid-Term Analysis of the v i a t c n i Ma Ying-jeou Administration e h p s c The Difficulty of Delivering the (Right) Goods r e p FRANK MUYARD Since his election as Taiwan’s president in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou has embarked on an active policy of rapprochement with China, leading to the signing of a string of economic and technical agreements with Beijing that have further liberalised and normalised cross-strait economic relations. But the way this rapprochement has been conducted, coupled with the economic crisis that has struck Taiwan for most of the first two years of Ma’s administration and a series of missteps and mismanagements by the president and the Kuomintang (KMT) government, have generated a crisis of confidence and widespread discontent among the Taiwanese. This has resulted in consistently low approval ratings and several setbacks in regional and by-elections in 2009 and 2010, as well as the resurgence of a reformed opposition under the leadership of Tsai Ing-wen. The discrepancy between Ma’s increasingly apparent Chinese nationalism and the Taiwan-centred national identity of the majority is further indication of a significant disconnect between the KMT administration and the Taiwanese mainstream. wo years after the large victory by Ma Ying-jeou The policies and achievements and the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan’s presi - of Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT T dential and legislative polls, the new KMT admin - since 2008 istration and president are facing high levels of discontent among the Taiwanese. Although Ma’s honeymoon with In 2008, the legislative and presidential elections gave the the electorate was bound to be short given the numerous KMT an overwhelming hold on all national political institu - economic and political challenges Taiwan was facing in tions. In the parliament, the KMT and its allies in the Blue 2008, his dramatic slide in popularity has surprised many camp (the PFP and the NP) won around 55 percent of the observers. (1) The Ma government’s rapprochement policy vote and more than two-third of the seats of the new 113- with China has seen some significant results and earned seats Legislative Yuan (LY), reinforcing their majority and support and applause in most foreign capitals. But the way the control of legislative affairs they have exercised continu - this policy has been conducted, and a series of missteps ously in Taiwan since the end of the 1940s. In the presiden - and shortcomings by the government and Ma himself, tial poll, the Kuomintang ticket of Ma Ying-jeou and vice- have combined with the global economic crisis to generate president Vincent Siew (Hsiao Wan-chang) won decisively, a serious crisis of confidence among the public regarding with 58.5 percent against the 41.5 percent for their Demo - the administration’s competence and its ultimate attach - cratic Progressive Party (DPP) opponents Frank Hsieh ment to Taiwan’s interests and sovereignty in relation to Chang-ting and Su Tseng-chang. (2) Riding the wave of dis - China. This article will look in greater detail at the first satisfaction against the DPP administration and former pres - two years of Ma’s administration and its policies, their ident Chen Shui-bian, embroiled in corruption scandals and level of success, and the opposition they have encoun - criticised for poor handling of the country’s economy, admin - tered. It will address the main challenges faced by the ad - ministration: relations with China, the economy, domestic 1. Shelley Rigger, “Ma’s Puzzling Midterm Malaise,” Brookings Northeast Asia politics and regional elections, and the question of na - Commentary , no. 37, 11 March 2010. 2. Cf. Frank Muyard, “Taiwan Elections 2008: Ma Ying-jeou’s Victory and the KMT’s tional identity. Return to Power,” China Perspectives , no. 73, 2008/1, pp. 79-94. 5 N o 2010/3 Special Feature s e v i a t istrative affairs, and external relations, especially with China In practice, the 20 May 2008 inauguration of Ma as the c n i e and the United States, Ma Ying-jeou led a campaign based Republic of China (ROC)'s president was followed rapidly h p on three pillars: reviving the economy, rapprochement with by the resumption of official talks with the PRC through the s c r China, and the fight against corruption, together with a strong established channels of semi-governmental entities, the Strait e p commitment to Taiwan’s sovereignty and identity. His “6-3-3” Exchange Foundation (SEF) for Taiwan and the Association economic program promised a 6 percent yearly GDP growth, for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) for China. less than 3 percent employment, and a per capita GDP of Their first meeting in 10 years took place in Beijing in June US$30,000 by 2016. Ma also advocated closer economic re - 2008 and signed off on agreements on direct weekend char - lations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — pre - ter flights and the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists com - sented in pragmatic terms as the best way to improve the Tai - ing directly from China. These agreements were largely nego - wanese economy and the stability in the region — starting with tiated and concluded in 2007 by the previous Chen adminis - the establishment of the three direct links (air, sea, and tration, but had been delayed by Beijing to await the KMT’s postal) between the two sides, and the opening of Taiwan to return to power. Since then, “Chiang-Chen meetings” be - Chinese tourists and Chinese investment. On the cross-strait tween the SEF and the ARATS have taken place every six political front, Ma announced a policy of “no unification, no months, (3) resulting by the end of 2009 in a total of 12 tech - independence, and no use of force,” with the commitment not nical agreements between the two sides on regular direct pas - to undertake negotiations on unification during his tenure. In senger and cargo flights, sea links, postal service links, Chi - domestic affairs, Ma promised a highly efficient and compe - nese tourists, food safety, crime fighting and judicial mutual as - tent administration to reverse the DPP’s alleged incompe - sistance, standards and metrology, agricultural product inspec - tence and corruption. Finally, he called for a politics of na - tion and quarantine, fishing crews, and financial cooperation, tional reconciliation after eight years of partisan polarisation. as well as three separate financial memoranda of understand - ing (MOU). (4) Taipei also adopted a series of unilateral meas - Taiwan-China relations ures to facilitate economic relations with China. It has ex - tended access to the direct mini-links (through the Kinmen The rapprochement between Taiwan and China has been at and Matsu islands), authorised exchange of the PRC cur - the core of the KMT’s national policies since its return to rency, the renminbi , in Taiwan, raised the maximum limits of power, and it is here that the most concrete results can be Taiwanese investments in China, authorised Taiwan’s mayors seen. Three aspects of this policy will be analysed here: and county chiefs to travel in China, relaxed restrictions on cross-strait agreements, the Taiwan sovereignty issue, and Taiwanese investment in foreign funds with Chinese assets, Taiwan’s international space. Although improvements to simplified the process of hosting Chinese professional experts cross-strait relations were expected with the new administra - in Taiwan, and relaxed rules for initial public offering of for - tion in power, Ma’s government surprised many with the eign companies and for investment by Chinese funds in the speed and primary focus it put on dealing with Beijing, Taiwanese Stock Exchange. As a result, the door to China is rather than concentrating on economic revival as declared in now open for most Taiwanese high-technology investments as his presidential campaign. One reason is that the KMT ac - well as banking, insurance, and financial investments, although tually views the future economic development of Taiwan as with some limits in term of the quantity of capital and re - dependent on its integration within the Chinese economic sources and of the levels of technology poured into Chinese sphere, while its goal of eventual unification is seen as pred - operations to ensure that these companies maintain a strong icated on an intensification of economic and cultural rela - base in Taiwan. Chinese investments in 100 sectors of the tions with China. Ma’s and the KMT’s new China policy economy are now also allowed for the first time. (5) In May therefore advocates a gradual economic, symbolic, and polit - ical rapprochement with China with four objectives: lower - 3. The Chiang-Chen tag refers to the names of the two main negotiators, the chairman of ing political and military tension in the Formosa Strait, the SEF, Chiang Pin-kun, and the chairman of ARATS, Chen Yunlin. strengthening economic ties with China to closely integrate 4. For the details of these cross-strait agreements and their negotiations, as well as the Ma government’s current Mainland policies, cf.