The City University of New York

Ph.D. Program in of the City University of New York http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150176 .

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=phd. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York and The City University of New York are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Comparative Politics.

http://www.jstor.org Women'sMovements and DemocraticTransition in , Brazil,East Germany,and Poland

Lisa Baldez

In many countrieswomen have respondedto transitionsto democracyby mobilizing along gender lines to advance their own agendas. In countries as diverse as Argentina,Korea, Spain, and SouthAfrica, women saw populardemands for democ- racy as an opportunity to press for the democratization of everyday life and the extension of women's rights. They mobilized across class and party lines to demand that incoming democraticgovernments ensured women's equal participationin poli- tics. Yet not all transitionsto democracyhave been accompaniedby the mobilization of women as women. In most of the transitionsin Centraland East Europe women who participatedin dissident movements did not organize on the basis of their status as women. Within democratictransitions, when will women mobilize on the basis of their gender identity? There are three significant causes of women's mobilization: resources, the way issues are framed,and the exclusion of women from the agenda- setting process within the opposition. The key resources that lead to gender-based organizingare preexisting formal or informalnetworks in which women participate. Direct contact with the internationalfeminist community allows women to frame their situation in terms of their status as women and to organize separately from men. Finally, the systematic exclusion of women from the process of agenda setting affords them an opportunityto unite in a broad coalition on the basis of their shared identity. This article focuses particularlyon this last point. Women'smovements represent many differentidentities, interests, and issues.1Despite importantdifferences, however, many women's movementsexperience a particularmoment at which women unite on the basis of their genderidentity. At this moment,the peak of mobilizationin women's movements,a diverse arrayof women's organizationscomes togetherto form a coali- tion that transcendscleavages along class, race, or partisanlines. These peak moments typicallyoccur at a rally,a demonstration,or a conference.They differfrom other points in the evolution of a movementin terms of their size, breadthand significance.They frequentlyconstitute the largestconvocation of organizationsin the history of a move- ment. They representthe acme of unity and the ideal expression of the goals of the movement,while at the same time encompassinga wide arrayof interestsand issues.

253 ComparativePolitics April 2003

They typically inaugurate a movement in the public eye and introduce women's demandsinto the publicarena. Peaks of protest consolidate women's political clout. They attractthe attentionof (primarily)male political actors,who seek to harnesswomen's capacity to mobilize for their own electoral goals. Interestfrom political parties leads to the incorporationof women's demands in the political agenda and furtherfuels popular support for the movement.The coalitionsthat emerge out of such momentsoften come to serve as the institutionalrepresentatives of the women's movementin the political arena. Scholars and activistsalike uniformlyacknowledge the importanceof these momentsin the his- tory of a movement;they take on mythic proportionsin historiesof movementsand in the memoriesof activists. The formationof such coalitionsis not inevitable,as women'smovements typically include groupswith diverseand conflictingagendas. What prompts women's groups to coalesce is their exclusion from the process of realignment,the point at which actors within the democraticopposition form new allianceswith one another.The exclusionof women and women'sconcerns from the agendasarticulated by primarilymale opposi- tion leaders heightens the political salience of gender relative to other cleavages and triggersthe formationof a unitedfront among women's organizations. At the same time, these peak momentsprove difficult to sustain.Conflict seems to break out among groups within the women'smovement almost as soon as the peak of unity occurs.But the ephemeralnature of these momentsdoes not underminetheir sig- nificance. Peaks of protest demonstratewomen's capacity for mobilization, which attractsthe attentionof partyelites. Once male politicianssee women as a constituency worth coopting, they begin to compete for women's support.The advent of electoral competitionfragments the movement. This argumentwill be examined with regardto three countries in which women mobilized duringdemocratic transition-Brazil, Chile, and East Germany-and one in which women did not-Poland. These cases providevariation on the dependentvariable and enhancethe validity of the inferencesthat can be drawnfrom them.2The women's movementsthat emerged in Chile and Brazilwere two of the largestand most vibrantin Latin America;they joined human rights groups, feminist organizations,and shanty- town groups organizedaround issues of economic subsistence.In East Germanythe movementincluded women's peace organizations,lesbian collectives, radical feminists, socialists, and neighborhoodgroups. In Poland the level of autonomousorganizing amongwomen remainedminiscule in comparison. Organizational resources constitute a necessary but not sufficient variable for women's mobilization.In all these cases, women participatedin formal and informal networksthat provided the infrastructureto build a women'smovement. Only in Chile, Brazil, and East Germanywere the othertwo variablespresent. First, direct contact with feminist activistsin other countriespersuaded dissident women to considerthe advan- tages of gender-basedmobilization. Second, male oppositionleaders excluded women

254 Lisa Baldez and women's issues from the agendas they establishedduring the process of realign- ment, as groupswithin the oppositionformed new coalitionsthat challengedthe exist- ing regimes. In Polandonly one of these three factorswas present:Polish women were highly mobilized throughmembership in dissident unions. Yet they had very limited access to internationalfeminist ideas, and male opposition leaders included women's concernsin theirnegotiations with the existing authoritarianregime in the early 1980s. These two factorsgave Polishwomen less reasonto organizeautonomously.

Women's Movements and Democratization

Initially,research on democratizationpaid little or no attentionto women'sparticipation, but studies of the role of women'smovements in democratictransitions have exploded in the past decade and generateda wealth of informationand empiricaldetail about many cases.3 Many explanationsof the conditionsunder which women mobilize have been offered. Most studies concur that women's movementsemerge as a function of some combinationof resources,framing, and opportunities,but the way in which these variablesare defined differs from case to case. None can be generalizedto explain all cases. Systematiccomparison across cases and regionsreveals three factors as criticalto the mobilizationof women in democratictransitions: organizational networks, direct contactwith internationalfeminism, and exclusionfrom the process of decisionmaking withinthe opposition.

Resource Mobilization One school of social movementanalysis points to organiza- tional resourcesas the factorthat gives rise to mobilization.According to this perspec- tive, movementsemerge as a functionof individualdecisions aboutthe costs and bene- fits of collective actionor as a functionof materialresources that can be broughtto bear on organizing.4Factors such as money, leadership,and (especially) existing organiza- tional networksfacilitate mobilization. People who alreadyparticipate in groupscan be mobilizedaround other issues more easily thanisolated individuals. Organizationalnetworks constitute a necessarybut not sufficientcause for the emer- gence of women'smovements. In all four cases discussedhere, significantnumbers of women participatedin both formal and informal groups that could have formed the organizationalinfrastructure of an autonomouswomen's movement. Many kinds of net- works can serve as cruciblesfor women'sorganizing; no one particulartype of network is required.In these four cases households,churches, and unions generallyprovided the foundationon which women's movements could be built. In Latin America political parties and international organizations also provided mobilizational resources for women. In some cases the demandsof domesticwork forced women to organizecollectively. The most explosiverates of mobilizationin LatinAmerica took place in poor and work-

255 ComparativePolitics April 2003 ing-class neighborhoods,where deep economic crisis promptedwomen to organize around household activities, forming soup kitchens, shopping collectives, and craft workshops. Many poor and working-class women became politicized as a result of these informal neighborhoodgroups.5 Housework did not have the same impact on women who could employdomestic servants to shop, cook, clean, and care for children. Freedomfrom the rigorsof householdlabor gave manywomen time thatcould be spent on political activities.It changed for women who went into exile and could no longer affordto hire maids. Many women became radicalizedas a result of doing housework for the first time. In the socialist countriesperforming household tasks in conditionsof scarcityalso fostered informal networks among extended family members, trusted friends, and neighbors.Accounts of the statusof women in Communistcountries consistently point to the "double burden" of formal employment and housework as an obstacle to autonomousorganizing among women, yet in many cases it promotedsocial ties.6 For example,waiting in long lines to buy food was conduciveto makingconnections. Churchesprovided dissident groups with space to meet, funding,and, most impor- tant, protectionfrom repression.In LatinAmerican countries the Catholicchurch fos- tered women'sparticipation at the grass-rootslevel throughecclesiastical base commu- nities and humanrights work.7 In Polandthe Catholicchurch supported dissident activi- ty throughthe Solidaritymovement. In East GermanyProtestant churches played a sim- ilar role; theirneutrality with regardto the Communistregime allowedthem to shelter the opposition. In LatinAmerica participation in politicalparties facilitated women's mobilization in two ways. First,it providedwomen with valuableorganizational skills. Second,it often broughtthem face to face with sexist attitudesof their male colleagues, which fueled awarenessof feminist concerns.Aid from internationalorganizations and foreign gov- ernmentshelped incipientwomen's groups build supportand become institutionalized. In the formerSoviet Union and East and CentralEurope dissident groups received far less supportfrom international organizations until after 1989. In all four countrieswomen were involved in a varietyof formal and informalnet- works that provided the mobilizational resources with which a women's movement could be built.Yet women'smovements developed in only threeof them.What prompt- ed women to perceivetheir participation in these networksin termsof women'sinequal- ity relativeto men and to organizeseparately from men?

Cultural Framing A second aspect of social movement theory has come to be knownas culturalframing. Frame analysis highlights the role thatideas, beliefs, culture, and discourseplay in shaping collective action. This approachfocuses on the way in which activistsperceive their statusand convey their concernsto the public.8The con- cept of framingsuggests thatmovement discourse is contingentand strategic.The deci-

256 Lisa Baldez sion to mobilize as women, for example,represents a decision abouthow to framecol- lective action.Women can participatein social movementson the basis of many identi- ties-as workers,students, poor people, or environmentalists-butthey will frametheir actions in terms of gender identityonly if they believe that their concerns stem from their statusas women and if they perceive some advantageto be gained by presenting themselvesas women to the outsideworld. Manyhave pointedto the diffusionof internationalfeminist discourse as a key factor in mobilizing women in Latin Americantransitions. According to this view, feminist ideas caught on in part because they differentiatedthe democraticopposition from the authoritarianstatus quo.9Nonetheless, while the discourse articulatedat international women's conferenceswas ostensiblyavailable to women from all countries,it did not foster mobilizationin all countries.Many women in the formerCommunist countries explicitly rejected international feminist perspectives. As Czech feminist Jana Hradilkovaiput it, "feminismsmells like an ideology, and people have had their fill of ideology here."'0Communist governments consistently claimed to have emancipated women and to have solved the "womanquestion" by institutingfull employmentfor women. But these claims rang hollow when participationin the work force did not resultin genderequality and did not improvethe qualityof women'slives. Thus, internationalfeminism fostered women's movements in Latin America but impeded them in the former Communist countries. However, not all women in Communist countries rejected feminist discourse. In East Germany women embraced international feminism; geographic and linguistic proximity to West Germanygave East Germanwomen access to informationthat allowed them to chal- lenge prevailing views. Moreover,while internationalfeminism inspired women to take action in Latin America, its impact was not automatic or unequivocal. Resistance to feminism has proven strong in Latin America, a region also character- ized by a traditionalculture that veneratesthe image of women as mothers. In Latin America women's acceptance of autonomous organizing emerged from long, often conflictual discussions and debates, usually initiated by women who learned about feminism in exile. Womenare more likely to frametheir situation in terms of theirstatus as women as a resultof directcontact with feministmovements abroad. While manywomen participat- ed in dissident organizationsthat included both men and women, only those women who learnedabout internationalfeminism firsthandperceived their problemsin terms of theiridentity as women and consideredthe advantagesof organizingseparately from men. Women who did not have this contact tended to maintainnegative stereotypes about feminism. This argument should not be understood to imply that women in authoritariancountries were incapableof reachingsuch conclusionson theirown or that they should have reached them at all. In fact, women broughtfeminist ideas back to their own countriesand served as the main interlocutorsof them. Direct and sustained

257 ComparativePolitics April 2003 contactwith feministsfrom other countriespresented women in relativelyclosed soci- eties with a new way to conceive of theirsituation.

Political Opportunities A third aspect of social movementtheory maintainsthat movementsrise and fall in partin responseto changeswithin the politicalarena, known as changes in political opportunities."This approachpoints to the state as the central interlocutorof collective actionin many cases. Recent studieshave soughtto narrowthe conceptof politicalopportunities in orderto increasethe possibilitiesof generatingpre- dictionsabout future outcomes.12 This analysisbuilds on them by identifyingthe politi- cal opportunitiesthat are relevantin women'smovements and explainingwhy they con- stituteopportunities for women in particular. Withincases of transitionin LatinAmerica, scholars generally concur that the sup- pressionof conventionalforms of politicalactivity under military rule provideda space for nontraditionalactors and nontraditionalforms of participationto emerge.More pre- cisely, repressiondirected primarily against male-dominated political partiesand trade unions allowed women to develop new styles of political engagement.These spaces expandedas military regimes liberalizedbut shrankwhen political parties (re)gained controlwithin the politicalarena.13 To what extent does this argument apply to women's movements in the former Communistcountries? The pervasivepower of Communistparties clearly limited the space for independentmobilizing, yet the breakdownof these regimes in the 1980s did not always fosterthe emergenceof women'smovements. The reasonhas to do with the dynamics within the opposition itself. One point on which almost all accounts of women'smovements and democratizationagree is thatwomen in these cases mobilized againstauthoritarian rule. Womenprotested against political oppressionand economic crisis engenderedby the existingregimes. But a closer look at the dynamicsof women's mobilizationamid transition suggests a more nuancedversion of this story.Women also mobilizedto protestagainst exclusion within the opposition.In fact, in transitionsaway from authoritarianrule women'smovements peaked at the point at which actorswithin the democratic opposition formed new alliances with one another.The absence of women and women'sconcerns from the agendasarticulated by primarilymale opposi- tion leadersprompted women's organizations representing diverse intereststo unite on the basis of genderidentity. To a certainextent, periods of realignmentprovided an opportunityfor all organized groupswithin civil society to press for the incorporationof their concernsin the politi- cal agenda.Yet in most cases the vast majorityof people involvedin these discussions were men. Despite whateverrole they may have playedin oppositionactivities up to this point, women suddenlyfound themselves frozen out of the process of negotiatingthe terms of transition.A close correlation between the timing of coalition formation among male oppositionleaders and the peak of mobilizationamong women indicates

258 Lisa Baldez that women mobilized in part to protest their exclusion from the decision-making process that occurredwithin the democraticopposition itself. In other words, the gen- dered dynamics of the transitioncatalyzed the peak moment of mobilization among women'sorganizations. The common experienceof exclusionprompted diverse groups to join togetherto demanda role in settingthe agenda.Where women were includedin the process,there was no catalystfor the formationof a women'smovement.

Brazil

When the Brazilianmilitary seized power in 1964, it sought to restructureBrazilian society fundamentally,in economic, political, and social terms. The militaryregime's policies createdthree sets of issues aroundwhich women mobilized:human rights vio- lations,economic subsistence,and women'srights.14 Women made up a majorityof the participantsin approximately100,000 Christianbase communities organizedby the Catholic church.'5Many of these women went on to organize in neighborhoodsto demand "adequateschools, health centers, running water, transportation,electricity, housing and other necessities of urbaninfrastructure."'6 The governmentdid not sup- press these groups, but the government'slack of responsiveness and refusal to take women'sconcerns seriously was a radicalizingexperience. Feministframing did not automaticallytake in Brazil. When U.S. feminist activist Betty Friedanvisited Brazil in 1971, for example, the press ridiculed her.17Things beganto changeduring the periodof liberalizationin the late 1970s as women who had been exiled beganto returnhome. The experienceof living in exile provedhumbling for women who had been active in leftist politics.Women suddenly found themselves with- outjobs, withoutthe supportof family and friends,and withoutdomestic servants. For many the loss of identity was acute. As one Brazilianwoman lamented:"[When we were in exile] I was his wife. [My husband]continued to be a political activist and I ceased being one."18Once abroad,contact with feministmovements then stronglybrew- ing in westernEurope and North America gave exiled women a languageto make sense of theirnew status.This languagecentered on women'sawareness of genderinequality and the value of organizingautonomously from men. Returningexiles broughtfeminist ideas back with them when they came home. They had a tremendousimpact on women'sorganizing in Brazil,particularly in regardto the issue of movement autonomy."The exiles literally flooded feminist groups in Sdo Paulo"and "sharedtheir experiencesin types of feministactivities unheard of in Brazil before the late 1970s,"one activist observed.19Women who had been in exile in Italy and France, for example, persuadedothers that it was possible to create a feminist movementin a predominantlyCatholic culture.20International organizations provided resourcesto bolsterthese efforts.A 1975 meetingorganized to markthe UnitedNations InternationalYear of the Womanled to the creationof severalgroups dedicatedto pro-

259 ComparativePolitics April 2003 motingawareness of the statusof women. Grantsprovided by the FordFoundation legit- imated research on women's issues and helped institutionalize women's centers.21 Internationaland regional feminist meetings had a multipliereffect, providingvenues for women from all over the worldto sharetheir experiences and createnetworks.22 By the late 1970s women'sorganizations flourished in Brazil. The peak of protest for the Brazilianwomen's movement occurred in 1979, in the midst of conflicts among the oppositionpolitical leadersthat ended in a majorrealign- ment of the party system. From 1965 to 1979 the military governmentretained the faqadeof electoraldemocracy but permittedonly two partiesto exist: the progovern- ment ARENA (Alliance for National Renovation)and the oppositionMDB (Brazilian DemocraticMovement). Growing popular support for the MDB in the 1970s prompted the regime to liberalize,although the governmentdid so in the hopes of remainingin power.To sow dissentwithin the MDB and weakenthe MDB's chances for a victory in the legislativeelections in November1978, the governmentdropped hints abouta future reformof the partysystem. This strategyworked; although the MDB increasedits sup- port in the elections,uncertain signals aboutthe likelihoodof reintroducingparty com- petition exacerbatedconflicts within the party.In the few months immediatelybefore and afterthe elections some MDB politiciansbegan "openlyworking for the creationof otherpolitical parties," while othersadvocated a united frontagainst the government.23 These conflicts within the oppositionand the effort to form new coalitionsduring this period(late 1978 to early 1979) constitutethe beginningof a process of realignment. Women'sgroups campaigned to put women'sissues on the oppositionagenda for the November1978 elections,but with little success. "Mostof the organizations[were] too small to have much impact on their own and [were] often frustratedin trying to make their demandsheard through other political channelssuch as unions and parties.Even the grass-rootsWorkers' Party ha[d] no women'srepresentation."24 Exclusion from the process of realignmentprovided the conditionsfor women to unite.Women's mobiliza- tion reacheda peak duringthis period. On March8, 1979, InternationalWomen's Day, close to one thousandwomen gatheredfor a two-dayWomen's Congress in Sio Paulo that includedwomen from tradeunions, neighborhoodgroups, feminist organizations, professionalassociations, mothers' clubs, black feministgroups, and academicresearch centers.25The FirstNational Women's Conference took place in Rio de Janeiroa month later. These events catalyzed mobilization across an even wider range of women's groups. Sonia Alvarez emphasizestheir significance in her widely cited study of the Brazilianwomen's movement. "By 1979, women activists had sparkeda burgeoning political movement that appearedto span all social classes, races, and ideologies."26 Thus, while Brazilianwomen began to organize against authoritarianismin the early 1970s, the movementdid not peak until the beginningof 1979. Its peak coincidedwith the emergenceof competingcoalitions within the opposition. Women'sorganizations continued to proliferatein the 1980s, but the unity evidentat the FirstWomen's Congress soon dissolved.The anticipatedreform of the partysystem

260 Lisa Baldez came in November1979, when PresidentGeneral Joao BatistaFigueiredo dissolved the two party system and decreeda law that permittedthe formationof new partiesout of the MDB. Five new opposition parties formed between 1979 and 1981: the Popular Party,the BrazilianLabor Party, the Partyof the BrazilianDemocratic Movement, the DemocraticWorkers' Party, and the Workers'Party. The militarygovernment hoped that the various factions would compete against one anotherand weaken supportfor the opposition, but its strategy strengthenedthe links between politicians and the grass roots.27All of the oppositionparties began to competefor the supportof women'sorga- nizations.Realignment thus furtherspurred popular support for the women'smovement because of a convergenceof interestsbetween the new parties and women's organiza- tions. As Alvarez writes, "duringabertura [opening], the opposition actively courted women'ssupport. And women'smovement organizations overwhelmingly supported the opposition,mobilizing thousandsof women for electoralparticipation and promoting antiregime mass rallies."28All the new parties included at least some of women's demandson their agendas.29Yet the realities of electoralcompetition also fragmented the movement,as differentgroups aligned themselves with particularparties.

Chile

The militarygovernment that seized power on September11, 1973, employeddracon- ian measuresin its efforts to achieve economic stabilityand political order.It banned political parties, shut down congress, and engaged in a systematiccampaign of terror and repressionthat resulted in the torture,death, and disappearanceof thousandsof people. During the first ten years of military rule under GeneralAugusto Pinochet fierce repressioncurtailed overt expressions of oppositionto the regime. Scoresof orga- nizations formed clandestinely.Chilean women played a prominentrole in this under- ground opposition. They organized along three lines, in a pattern similar to Brazil. Human rights groups grew out of women's efforts to supportpolitical prisonersand locate relativeswho had been detained.Women in poor and working-classurban neigh- borhoodsorganized economic subsistencegroups to deal with economic crisis and cuts in social spending.In the late 1970s university-educatedwomen, many of whom had been active in SalvadorAllende's Popular Unity government,organized small, informal feminist discussion groups to reflect on the changes that living in a dictatorshiphad wroughton theirlives.30 International support proved critical in the emergenceand sur- vival of all of these groups.The Catholicchurch provided safe places to meet for many of them. Religious men and women helped to organizesoup kitchensand women'scen- ters in the shantytownsaround Santiago. By the early 1980s Chileanwomen had creat- ed a dense organizationalnetwork. Womenwho returnedto Chile afterspending time in exile broughtback ideas about feminismwith them, particularlyfrom countrieswith active feministmovements, such

261 ComparativePolitics April 2003 as Sweden,Canada, Austria, West Germany,and the U.S. As in Brazil,women living in exile bore the full responsibilityfor householdchores and child rearingfor the first time in their lives.31The experienceforced women to confrontthe oppressionof women in the domesticsphere firsthand. Ideas aboutfeminism were not new to Chile. Media sourcesfrom the periodindicate awarenessof women'sliberation movements in othercountries. Prior to the 1980s, how- ever, Chileanstended to view feminismeither as radicalman hatingthat violated tradi- tional gender norms or bourgeois false consciousness that betrayedthe prospects for socialistrevolution. Living in exile providedsome Chileanwomen with a differentcon- text in which to interpretfeminist ideas. Feminism gave these women a language to make sense of their experiencesand showedthem the value of identifyingwith women as women in a way that transcendednational boundaries and nationalidentity. Chilean women did not accept foreign ideas about feminism uncritically,but rather forged uniquelyChilean interpretations through a process of discussionand reflection. As in Brazil, funding from international organizations, particularly the Ford Foundation,allowed women academics to conduct researchon the status of women. Studies published by groups such as the Center for Women's Studies (CEM) raised awarenessof women's subordinationand helped to build supportfor the movement.32 Chilean sociologist JulietaKirkwood played a criticalrole in the process of "translat- ing" feminist ideas throughher writings and the many workshops she conducted in Chile.33Participation in regionaland internationalconferences strengthened the incipi- ent movementand provideda space for the furtherarticulation of autochthonousunder- standingsof feminism. Potest in the Chilean women's movementpeaked in 1983. In May 1983 Chileans opposed to the regime organizeda mass demonstrationin Santiago.Organizations rep- resentinglabor, students, human rights groups,the poor, and white collarprofessionals took the streetsto denouncethe regime. The surprisingsuccess of this demonstration triggereda series of general protests that took place every month for the next three years, until 1986. The oppositionpolitical partiesmoved quickly to assume leadership of the protests.Defying the regime'sban on partyactivity, opposition politicians formed two separatealliances. Both alliancessought to controlthe protestsand promotedpopu- lar mobilizationas a strategyto unseat the military,but they disagreedvehemently on otherpoints of strategy. On August 7, 1983, the centristChristian Democratic party joined moderatefactions of the Socialist Party and other leftist partiesto form the DemocraticAlliance (AD). Foremoston their agendawere acceptanceof democraticinstitutions, rejection of vio- lent tactics, and supportfor capitalism.This center-leftcoalition represented a signifi- cant shift within the oppositionforces; the ChristianDemocrats had initiallysupported the militarytakeover.34 The DemocraticAlliance initiatednegotiations about the terms of transitionwith the Pinochetgovernment, but it soon became clear that Pinochethad no intentionof giving controlback to civilians and that the AD had been prematurein

262 Lisa Baldez its effortsto engage in a dialoguewith the government.In responseto the AD's miscal- culation,the radicalleft partiesformed the PopularDemocratic Movement (MDP). The MDP coalitionfavored armed confrontation with the regime over a negotiatedreturn to democraticrule. The formationof these two competingcoalitions constituted a realign- ment, the emergenceof viable, coordinatedalternatives to the militaryregime for the first time since the coup. Conflictsover strategybetween these two coalitionsgalvanized women in the opposi- tion. In November1983 a groupcalled Women for Life (Mujerespor la Vida,MPLV) uni- fied women acrossparty lines. The sixteenwomen who formedthe grouprepresented the full spectrumof politicalparties within the opposition.They servedas referentsof various positionsbut did not representtheir parties in an official capacity.Even thoughthey were partyleaders, they framedtheir actions in termsof women'sstatus as politicaloutsiders in orderto highlighttheir exclusion from the decision-makingprocess. Women for Life saw the task of inspiringunity withinthe oppositionas one thatwomen were uniquelyquali- fied to carry out. In the oppositionpaper La Epoca, on January4, 1988, for example, Womenfor Life leaderFanny Pollarolo claimed that the group'stask was "to inspirethe spiritnecessary to unifythe opposition,to overcomethe ineffectivenessof the men." On December 29, 1983, Women for Life held a massive rally in the Caupolicdn Theaterin downtownSantiago. This event drew 10,000 women representinga diverse arrayof issues and interestsfrom all the factionswithin the opposition,the Democratic Alliance and the Popular Democratic Movement, and activists from human rights groups, subsistenceorganizations, and feminist collectives.The rally catalyzedthe for- mation of a broad-based,multisector women's movement. Women had formedseparate organizationsprior to this point, and many of them had participatedin the general protests,but not in a coordinatedway undera single banner.35 The success of the Caupolicdnrally got the attentionof partypoliticians. As Maria ElenaValenzuela notes: "Womenfor Life became the referencepoint for political orga- nizationson women'sissues as well as the most importantarena for conveningand dis- cussing the social mobilizationof women."36MPLV sent a representativeto the Civic Assembly,the main forumfor hammeringout an agendafor the transition,and political partiesacross the political spectrumadopted women's concernsonto their platforms.37 But the unity expressedat the Caupolicanrally did not last long. Soon afterwards,the movement split along partisanlines. Ultimately,women in the opposition overcame these divisions enough to create anotherumbrella group, the Coalition of Women for Democracy, to force the incoming democratic government to adopt some of their demands,but they were neverable to recapturethe Caupolicainmoment.38

East Germany

The SocialistUnity Partyof Germany(SED) exerciseda remarkabledegree of control

263 ComparativePolitics April 2003 over the lives of East Germancitizens. It forbadeany groups that did not supportthe party.Yet dissidentactivity among women emergedin the 1980s, primarilyin the uni- versities and under the protection of the Protestantchurch.39 The church sheltered peace, environmental,gay and lesbian,and women'sgroups. It providedphysical space for them to meet, publicizedtheir events in the churchpress, and held annualrallies that facilitatedregular contact among dissidents.40The churchsponsored informal discus- sion groups for women duringtheir "babyyear," mandatory one year maternityleave, which helpedto raise theirconsciousness about gender inequality.41 The most prominentof the East Germanpeace groupswas Womenfor Peace, which mobilized in oppositionto a 1982 law that allowed women to be draftedinto military service. Womenfor Peace actively sought out contactsin the West,particularly in West Germanywhere sharedlanguage facilitated communication. They took inspirationfrom the Greens and the GreenhamCommon Women in England.Access to international conceptionsof feminismalso came from East Germanintellectuals themselves. Thanks in part to a liberaltravel policy for artists,writers such as ChristaWolf "providedthe language for feministsto free themselves from the official value system."42The ruling partypermitted the publicationof foreignfeminist writings, although it prohibitedthem from being discussed.43Regular contact with westernfeminists and awarenessof femi- nist ideas changedEast Germanwomen's perceptions about their role in the dissident peace movementand convincedthem of the advantagesof women-onlypeace groups. The Communistregime's increasingly conservative policies towardwomen, known as "mommypolitics," further enhanced the appealof feminism. Internationalattention shielded women's groups from repression. Amazingly, despite its notoriously pervasive surveillance, the East German security forces (the Stasi) provedunable to stop Women for Peace from holding demonstrations.Women's struc- turelessand leaderlessprotests stymied the Stasi'scustomary strategy of "roundingup the ringleaders"of dissidentgroups, at least initially.44When the Stasi arrestedthe core leadersof the groupin December 1983, the women calledupon theirforeign contacts to pressurethe regime for theirrelease. It helped that one of the five women arrestedwas BarbaraEinhorn, a feminist scholar from New Zealand.45As one supporterrecalled, "westernpublicity became our best protection"against repression.46 Nonetheless, the Stasiprevented the growthof popularsupport for the group.47 Women'smobilization in East Germanypeaked in a climateof politicalrealignment. In the first few weeks of September1989 four distinctcitizens' movementsemerged, each offeringa differentset of proposalsfor constructinga new state.New Forum,the largestof the fourwith more than200,000 members,called for democraticdialogue but did not offer a clear programmaticalternative to Communistrule. Dissidents loosely affiliated with the Protestantchurch formed Democracy Now. This group included approximately4,000 people and supportedthe democraticrenovation of socialism. Another group of Protestantchurch leaders organizedDemocratic Awakening, which

264 Lisa Baldez also called for a renewalof socialism.A fourthgroup, United Left, was more tolerantof the ruling party and "openly identified itself as a Marxist leftist, socialist group."48 These groups did not constitute formal political parties but ratherproto-parties that articulatedalternatives to the Communistsystem. Their formationmarked the public emergenceof democraticalternatives to the Communistregime and constituteda period of realignment.As BrigitteYoung affirms, "virtuallynone of the citizens' movements includedwomen's issues in theirplatforms."49 September 1989 was thus a ripe moment for women's organizationsto coalesce. Femalepolitical entrepreneursresponded publicly to the absence of women'sissues on the agendas of the new coalitionsjust a few weeks later and "organizedin virtually every city in the formerGDR" aroundthe goal of participatingin the politicalprocess as women. The movementquickly gained momentum.On October 11, 1989, a group called Lila Offensive staged a protest during a government-sponsoredrally in which they called for women to participateas equals in society and politics. Their slogans demanded that women have a place in political decision making. On November 6 prominentfeminists began to circulatea public letterthat demanded women's participa- tion in the transitionprocess. On December3, a month afterthe collapse of the Berlin Wall,women's groups came togetherto form the IndependentWomen's League (UFV), a coalition that representeda wide arrayof organizations,including radical feminist groups,lesbians, socialists, groups with nationalvisibility, and local grass-rootsorgani- zations.50Twelve hundred women attendedthis initialgathering, which took place at the People'sTheater in East Berlin. The main slogan of the demonstrationwas "Without women thereis no state."51 The UFV rally representedthe peak of women's mobilizationin East Germany,a point Einhornaffirms.

Initially,it had seemed as if the UFV would become a mass movement,with considerableinfluence and a large presence in the mainstreampolitical process. There was a feeling of exhilarationand the hope that, inadequateas the GDR's approachto "emancipation"had been, it neverthelessprovided a basis upon which demandsfor measureswhich they saw as guaranteeingreal equalityof opportunity for women could build.52

Youngreports that participants described the protestas "themoment of euphoria,"and she herself describes it in Aristide Zolberg's terms as a "moment of madness.""53 Adherentsof the organizationsaw their main task as "organiz[ing]women's politics among women's groups independentof political party structures."54They claimed to have modeled their agenda on Swedish genderpolicy, furtherdemonstrating the influ- ence of internationalfactors.55 The UFV won concessions from the oppositionin the short term. Membersof the group representedwomen's issues at the National Roundtablein 1989-90 and fielded candidatesin the 1990 parliamentaryelection. Yet none of the UFV candidateswon, and

265 ComparativePolitics April 2003 women's influence waned as the issue of reunificationmonopolized the agenda. The movementcontinues to exist apartfrom the WestGerman feminist movement, but many UFV members remain wryly realistic about its small impact on the democratization process. UFV memberslater held a mock funeralfor the East Germanwomen's move- ment underthe slogan"Yes, without women there can be a state."56

Poland

Fromthe Communisttakeover of 1945 to the emergenceof Solidarityin 1980, dissident women'sorganizations were extremelyrare in Poland.Their rarity can not be explained as a function of limited mobilizationalresources.57 Women participatedin dissident unions; they made up half the members of Solidarity, for example. Many women workedin primarilyfemale fields, such as textiles and nursing,but only on a handfulof occasions did female-dominatedunions engage in oppositionactivities that emphasized their statusas women.58The high level of mobilizationin Polandin the late 1970s and early 1980s begs the question of why a women'smovement did not emerge in Poland duringthis period.59 Awarenessof internationalfeminism inhibitedwomen's independentmobilizing in Poland,exactly the oppositeeffect that it had in Brazil, Chile, and East Germany.Poles were awareof internationalfeminist ideas, but they associatedthem with the Women's League, the official women's organization,and thus discreditedthem. The state both mediated and monopolized informationfrom abroad,rendering foreign ideas suspect among ordinaryPoles. Poles traveledabroad frequently in the 1970s, making"four mil- lion tripsto Westerncities" duringthe decade,but the staterestricted international trav- eling privilegesto partyloyalists.60 For dissidents,direct contact with the westernworld remainedvery limited. These and other privileges extendedto party elites bred deep antipathyamong ordinaryPoles-and contemptfor the ideas they broughtback with them from abroad.In this context,women were likely to have associatedwestern femi- nist ideas with the partyand thus to have seen them as (another)source of oppression, ratherthan as a potentialsource of liberation.61 A conferenceheld by the Women'sLeague in 1981 providessuggestive evidence for this claim. The slogans that party leadersintoned at this meeting echo the concernsof westernfeminists and suggest thatPolish partyofficials were influencedby internation- al events such as the United Nations' Women'sConferences. These slogans included: "The corset with which they once laced us keeps disablingus," "Why are we so weak and helpless?,"and "Democracyis impossiblewithout women's involvement."62 It is lit- tle wonder that Polish women were skepticalof groups whose views elided so neatly with those of party officials.63With very few exceptions,Polish female dissidentssaw feminismas taintedby associationwith the regime. The absence of autonomousorganizing by women in Poland stands out in relief

266 Lisa Baldez againsta cycle of antiregimeprotests that broke out in the late 1970s. The cycle began in June 1976 when workersstaged a protestagainst recently announced price increases. The governmentresponded to these strikespromptly-it eliminatedthe price increases and brutallysuppressed the workers-but its actions set off explosive levels of popular mobilizationthat lasted severalyears.64 A visit fromthe newly elected Polishpope, John Paul II, in June 1979 furtherbolstered the strengthof the opposition.By 1980 the eco- nomic situation had deteriorated,resulting in widespread food shortages. Another attemptto impose price increasesin June 1980 promptedthe Gdanskshipyard workers to go on strike,triggering a wave of strikesthat quickly spreadthroughout the country. Theirefforts brought the governmentto the negotiatingtable in August 1980 and result- ed in a series of concessions to workersknown as the GdanskAgreements. The emer- gence of Solidarityconstitutes a realignment:the formationof a new coalition within the antiauthoritarianopposition. The success of the Solidaritymovement sparkedwhat political scientist Grzegorz Ekiertcalls a "civic fever"that he claims "spreadto all social groups,cities and villages in the country, and to all organizationsand institutions of the Polish party-state."65 Nonetheless,this fever did not spreadto women. Dissidentstook over unions and other party-dominatedgroups, but the Women'sLeague remainedimmune to pressuresto democratize.66Why did women'sgroups not form duringthis periodof realignment? The main reasonis thatwomen did not considerthemselves to be excludedfrom this process. The strikeleaders explicitly addressedwomen's issues duringthe Roundtable discussions between Solidarity and the Gierek regime. The Interfactory Strike Committeewon several concessions that women stronglysupported: a three-yearpaid maternityleave, guaranteedday care slots for workingwomen, and, for nurses,higher wages and housing.67 Women made up a minority of the delegates to the 1981 SolidarityCongress (only 8 percent),and many women were conscious of the degreeto which men dominated the Solidarity leadership.68But the vast majority of women raisedlittle objection.69 A very small group of women took action to contest women's exclusion from Solidarity'sleadership. The women who organizedseparately to challengewomen's sta- tus within the movementmade up a tiny fractionof Solidaritymembers-forty to fifty women out of five million.70The Polish FeministAssociation grew out of a series of seminarsthat Polish sociologist RenataSiemienska held at the Universityof Warsawin the late 1970s. The group organized"consciousness-raising groups, held lectures and debateson women'sissues and deliveredleaflets roundfactories and schools" in order to raise awarenessabout women's status.71Comments from Beata Ficzer, one of the group'sfounders, point to the influenceof internationalfeminism.

When I was a studentat the sociology departmentI saw a notice abouta meeting on feminist move- ments in the world.Then I realizedthat I knew a lot about various social movementsbut very little about feminism.All I knew was about bra-burningand so on....[thismeeting made me awareofJ my

267 ComparativePolitics April 2003

need, then subconscious,to think about myself as a woman. Duringthis meeting I met other young women who had the same need and were far more advancedin theirsearch than I was.72

The imposition of martial law in 1981 pushed these groups underground,impeding effortsto build support. The climate for women'sorganizing in Polandchanged in 1989, when the proposal of an antiabortionlaw in the Sejm in June 1989 "activated"the women'smovement.73 Thirtywomen's groups emerged during the abortiondebate, but they were "dramatical- ly fragmentedand reluctantto enteralliances or to createa united front,in part for fear of being associatedwith the communists."74Women created a formal separatedivision within Solidarityin fall 1989, but demandsfor the inclusion of women did not enjoy popularsupport. Opportunities and issues aroundwhich women could mobilize exist, but feminist organizationsremain "tiny minority groups," a far cry from the explosive levels of mobilizationthat occurred in Brazil,Chile, and East Germany.75

Conclusion

Threevariables are significantin explainingwomen's mobilization during democratiza- tion. Formal and informal networks in which women were involved constitutedthe organizationalinfrastructure to build women'smovements. Direct contact with the inter- nationalfeminist community prompted women to frametheir situationin terms of their status as women and to organize separately from men. Finally, exclusion from the process of realignmentwithin the democraticopposition catalyzed the formationof a formalcoalition among diversewomen's organizations. When women mobilizedagainst authoritarian regimes, they did so aroundmany dif- ferentinterests, including human rights, peace, feminism,sexual orientation,and pover- ty. Even within single countries,women held differentvisions of what the fall of the authoritarianregime would bring:justice for victims of humanrights violations, a new way of doing politics, an end to economic crisis, a covetedspot in the new government, or the freedomnot to work.Yet the sharedexperience of exclusion transcendedother substantivedifferences among women'sgroups. Finding themselves suddenlyrendered voiceless as their male comradesin arms constructedthe new polity, women who had supporteddistinct agendas discovered a sharedset of concerns.Exclusion from critical decisions aboutthe shape of the new polity triggereda peak protestamong a group of already highly mobilized women. Poland demonstratesthat, when the credibility of feminism is underminedand when male oppositionleaders address women's concerns, the impetusfor women'smobilization diminishes. Nevertheless,women's movements have a seeminglyinevitable tendency to fragment in the posttransitionperiod. Peaks of protestproved ephemeral. In most cases moments of unity amongwomen dissipatedalmost as soon as they occurred.These momentsgar-

268 Lisa Baldez neredthe attentionof male politicalelites and forcedthem to put women'sissues on the agenda.Once the oppositionparties incorporated women's demands onto theiragendas, the initial impetus for uniting on the basis of gender,women's exclusion,became less salient. Cross-sectorunity among women proved difficult to sustain once women had won even limitedaccess to the decision-makingprocess.

NOTES

I would like to thankGardiner Bovingdon, John Carey,Christian Davenport, Frances Henderson, Mala Htun, PadraicKenney, Matthew Krain, Andrew Mertha,Celeste Montoya,Andrew Rehfeld,Meg Rincker,Rachel Roth, ValerieSperling, and four anonymousreviewers for theirvery helpful commentsand suggestions,and Shelby Wolff for her researchassistance. An earlierversion of this paperwas presentedat the 2001 Annual Meetingof the AmericanPolitical Science Association in San Francisco. 1. AmritaBasu, ed., TheChallenge ofLocal Feminisms(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 2. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba,Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress, 1994). 3. See Karen Beckwith, "Beyond Compare? Women's Movements in Comparative Perspective," European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 431-68; Valerie Sperling, Organizing Womenin ContemporaryRussia (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1999); LorraineBayard de Volo, Mothersof Heroes and Martyrs (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Lee Ann Banaszak, Karen Beckwith et al., eds., Women's MovementsFacing the ReconfiguredState (New York:Cambridge University Press, forthcoming);Jill M. Bystydzienskiand Joti Sekhon, eds., Democratizationand Womens Grassroots Movements(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); Karen Kampwirthand VictoriaGonzalez, eds., Radical Womenin Latin America: Right and Left (University Park:Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001); Temma Kaplan, Crazyfor Democracy (New York:Routledge, 1997); Jane S. Jaquette, ed., The Women's Movementin Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Jane S. Jaquetteand Sharon L. Wolchik,eds., Womenand Democracy(Baltimore: The JohnsHopkins University Press, 1998); JoanWallach Scott et al., eds., Transitions,Environments, Translations (New York:Routledge, 1997); LynnStephen, Women and Social Movements in Latin America (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997); Monica Threlfall, Mapping the Women's Movement (London: Verso, 1996); Georgina Waylen, "Women'sMovements and Democratization in Latin America," Third WorldQuarterly 14 (1993); Georgina Waylen, "Women and Democratization,"World Politics, 43 (1994). 4. John D. McCarthyand Mayer N. Zald, The Trendof Social Movementsin America (Morristown: GeneralLearning Press, 1973). 5. Philip Oxhorn,Organizing Civil Society (UniversityPark: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); CathyLisa Schneider,Shantytown Protest in Pinochets Chile(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995). 6. KatherineVerdery, What Was Socialism, and WhatComes Next? (Princeton: Press, 1996). 7. PamelaLowden, Moral Oppositionto AuthoritarianRule in Chile, 1973-90 (New York:Macmillan, 1996). In Argentinathe churchplayed a more ambiguousrole. See Alison Brysk, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Rita Arditti, Searching for Life: The Grandmothersof the Plaza de Mayo and the Disappeared Childrenof Argentina(Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1999); MarysaNavarro, "The PersonalIs Political:Las Madresde la Plaza de Mayo,"in Susan Eckstein, ed., Power and Popular Protest (Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress, 1989); Anthony JamesGill, Renderingunto Caesar (Chicago:University of ChicagoPress, 1998). 8. Lee Ann Banaszak, WhyMovements Succeed or Fail (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1996);

269 ComparativePolitics April 2003

David E. Snow,"Master Frames and Cycles of Protest,"in Aldon D. Morrisand CarolMcClurg Mueller, eds., Frontiersin Social MovementTheory (New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1992); David E. Snow and Robert Benford,"Ideology, Frame Resonance, and ParticipantMobilization," in Bert Klandermanset al., eds., From Structureto Action (Greenwich:JAI Press, 1988);Ann Swidler,"Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," AmericanSociological Review, 51 (1986). 9. Jaquette,ed., Womenand Democracy,p. 7. 10. BarbaraEinhorn, Cinderella Goes to Market(London: Verso, 1993), p. 188. 11. Mary FainsodKatzenstein and Carol Mueller,eds., The Women's Movementsof the UnitedStates and WesternEurope (Philadelphia:Temple University Press, 1987); Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Herbert Kitschelt, "PoliticalOpportunity Structures and Political Protest,"British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986); Joyce Gelb, Feminismand Politics (Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress, 1989);Anne N. Costain, Inviting Women's Rebellion (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); Charles Tilly, From Mobilizationto Revolution(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Sidney G. Tarrow,Power in Movement(New York:Cambridge University Press, 1994). 12. Doug McAdamet al., Dynamicsof Contention(New York:Cambridge University Press, 2001). 13. ElisabethJ. Friedman,Unfinished Transitions: Women and the GenderedDevelopment of Democracy in Venezuela,1936-1996 (UniversityPark: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000). 14. See Sonia E. Alvarez, Engendering Democracy in Brazil (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1990); MarianneSchmink, "Womenin Brazilian 'Abertura'Politics," Signs, 7 (1981); Vera Soares et al., "BrazilianFeminism and Women'sMovements," in Basu, ed.; June EdithHahner, Emancipating the Female Sex (Durham:Duke UniversityPress, 1990); FannyTabak, "Women in the Strugglefor Democracyand Equal Rights in Brazil,"in BarbaraNelson and Najma Chowdhury,eds, Womenand Politics Worldwide(New Haven:Yale University Press, 1994). 15. Alvarez,p. 70. 16. Soareset al., p. 311. 17. Hahner,pp. 188-191, 195. 18. Angela Neves-Xaiverde Brito, "BrazilianWomen in Exile,"Latin American Perspectives, 13 (1986), 64. 19. Alvarez,pp. 118-19. 20. SoniaAlvarez, "The Politics of Genderin LatinAmerica" (Ph.D. diss., YaleUniversity, 1988), p. 355. 21. Schmink. 22. Nancy SaportaSternbach, Marysa Navarro-Arangurenet al., "Feminismsin Latin America: From Bogota to Taxco,"Signs, 17 (1992). 23. Maria Kinzo, Legal OppositionPolitics underAuthoritarian Rule in Brazil (New York:St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 206. 24. Schmink,p. 124. 25. Alvarez,Engendering Democracy in Brazil,p. 113. 26. Ibid. 27. Scott Mainwaring,Rethinking Party Systems in the ThirdWave ofDemocratization (Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress, 1999). 28. Alvarez,Engendering Democracy in Brazil,p. 11. 29. Ibid.,p. 161. 30. See Ann Matear,"Desde la Protestaa la Propuesta,"Democratization, 3 (1996); Veronica Schild, "New Subjectsof Rights?,"in Sonia Alvarez et al., eds., Politics of Culture,Cultures of Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998); Maria Elena Valenzuela,"The Evolving Roles of Womenunder MilitaryRule," in Paul W Drake and Ivan Jaksic,eds., The Strugglefor Democracyin Chile (Lincoln:University of Nebraska Press, 1995); MariaElena Valenzuela,"Women and the DemocratizationProcess in Chile,"in Jaquetteand Wolchik, eds.; MarjorieAgosin, Tapestriesof Hope, Threadsof Love (Albuquerque:University of New

270 Lisa Baldez

Mexico Press, 1996); Patricia Chuchryk, "From Dictatorship to Democracy," in Jaquette, ed.; Alicia Frohmannand TeresaVald6s, "Democracy in the Countryand in the Home,"in Basu, ed.; JulietaKirkwood, Serpolitica en Chile (Santiago:FLACSO, 1986); TeresaVald6s and MarisaWeinstein, Mujeres que suenian (Santiago:FLACSO, 1993). 31. Diana Kay, Chileans in Exile (Houndmills:Macmillan, 1987); Thomas C. Wrightand Rody Ofiate, Flightfrom Chile (Albuquerque:University of New Mexico Press, 1998). 32. Centrode Estudiosde la Mujer,Mundo de mujer(Santiago: Ediciones CEM, 1988). 33. Kirkwood. 34. To be more precise, the conservativefaction of the ChristianDemocrats, which controlledthe party leadershipat the time, supportedthe coup. 35. Chuchryk. 36. Valenzuela,"The Evolving Roles of Womenunder Military Rule," p. 172. 37. Ibid,pp. 177-82. 38. Lisa Baldez, "CoalitionPolitics and the Limitsof StateFeminism," Women and Politics,22 (2001). 39. See HildegardMaria Nickel, "Womenin the GermanDemocratic Republic and in the New Federal States," in Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller, eds, Gender Politics and Post-Communism(New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 144; BrigitteYoung, Triumphof the Fatherland(Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 1999); MyraMarx Ferree, "The Rise and Fall of 'MommyPolitics'," Feminist Studies, 19 (1993); Lynn Kamenitsa,"East German Feminists in the New Democracy,"Women and Politics, 17 (1997); Eva Maleck- Lewy,"The East GermanWomen's Movement after Unification," in Scott et al., eds. 40. ChristinaSchenk, "Lesbians and Their Emancipation in the FormerGerman Democratic Republic," in Funk and Mueller,eds.; ChristianJoppke, East GermanDissidents and the Revolutionof 1989 (New York: NewYork University Press, 1995). 41. Anne Hampele, "The OrganizedWomen's Movement in the Collapse of the GDR," in Funk and Mueller,eds., p. 181. 42. Young,p. 70. 43. Ibid.,p. 72. 44. BarbaraEinhorn, "Where Have All the Women Gone? Womenand the Women'sMovement in East CentralEurope," Feminist Review (1991), 26. 45. Einhorn,Cinderella Goes to Market,p. 207. 46. Joppke,p. 93. 47. Einhom, CinderellaGoes to Market,pp. 207-8. 48. Young,p. 84. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid.,pp. 82-84. 52. Einhorn,Cinderella Goes to Market,p. 204. 53. Young,p. 87. 54. Ibid.,p. 89. 55. TatianaBohm, "TheWomen's Question as a DemocraticQuestion," in Funkand Mueller,eds., p. 153. 56. SabineLang, "TheNGOization of Feminism,"in Scott et al., eds., p. 108. 57. GrzegorzEkiert and Jan Kubik,"Contentious Politics in New Democracies:East Germany,Hungary, Poland,and Slovakia,"World Politics, 50 (1998), arguethat Poland was resourcerich in this regard. 58. PadraicKenney, "The Genderof Resistancein CommunistPoland," American Historical Review, 104 (1999). 59. See Ewa Hauser et al., "Feminismin the Intersticesof Politics and Culture,"in Nanette Funk and MagdaMueller, eds., Political Changein Poland (New York:Routledge, 1993); Kenney;Renata Siemienska, "Consequencesof Economic and Political Changes for Women in Poland,"in Jaquetteand Wolchik, eds.; Anna Titkow,"Political Change in Poland:Cause, Modifier or Barrierto ?,"in Funk and

271 ComparativePolitics April 2003

Mueller,eds., GenderPolitics and Post-Communism;Joanna Regulska, "Transition to Local Democracy:Do Polish Women Have a Chance?,"in Marilyn Rueschemeyer,ed., Womenin the Politics of Postcommunist Eastern Europe (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); Judy Root Aulette, "New Roads to Resistance," in Bystydzienskiand Sekhon,eds. 60. GrzegorzEkiert, The State againstSociety (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 220. 61. Membersof the GreenhamCommon Women eventually visited Polandas well, but not until later,in 1983. PadraicKenney, A CarnivalofRevolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 100. 62. MalgorzataFuszara, "Women's Movements in Poland,"in Scott et al. eds., p. 133. 63. CompareVaclav Havel's views about Italianfeminist peace activists who visited Czechoslovakiain "Anatomyof Reticence"in Viclav Havel and Jan Vladislav,Vdclav Havel: Living in Truth(London: Faber and Faber,1989). 64. Ekiert,p. 232. 65. Ibid.,p. 242. 66. Jean Robinson, "The Liga Kobiet in Poland,"in Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur, eds., ComparativeState Feminism (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995),p. 204. 67. Renata Siemienska, "Dialogue:Polish Women and Polish Politics since WorldWar II,"Journal of Women'sHistory, 3 (1991). 68. KristiS. Long, WeAll Foughtfor Freedom(Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 168. 69. Hauseret al., p. 263. 70. Ibid.,p. 258. 71. Anna Reading,Polish Women,Solidarity and Feminism(Houndmills: Macmillan, 1992), p. 201. 72. Ibid.,p. 202. 73. Fuszara,p. 134. 74. Hauseret al., p. 258. 75. Einhorn,Cinderella Goes to Market.

272