1 Introduction to the Enhancement Debate

Notes 1 Introduction to the Enhancement Debate 1. Here, it is taken that the human condition is not the same as human nature. The term ‘human condition’ is not only a simple collection of basic features characterising humans, nor implies an essence that remains identical from birth to death; rather, the term implies something dynamic and in a process of continuous development and negotiation. For more on this see Arendt, The Human Condition (1998), and Carnevale and Battaglia, ‘A Reflexive Approach to Human Enhancement’ (2014). 2. Consider for example that nowadays people sometimes talk about them- selves in terms that in the past we only used for our creations, such as updating and even upgrading ourselves. 3. Here and in what follows, the term ‘individualistic’ will be used as a view resulting from holding the concept of the liberal individual. 4. According to the report it is a ‘non-medical’ typology since there is no specific definition of health involved. However, it is plausible to argue that by including the term ‘therapeutical’, they are indirectly referring back to a biomedical-based definition. 5. In the rest of this book, science and technology will be referred to inter- changeably, even though it is acknowledged that there are differences between them. For the purpose of this work it is enough to understand that both science and technology have affected and shaped the material condition of our lives as well as the way we understand ourselves as humans and social beings. 6. Here, the term ‘nanoscale’ is used to refer to the nanometre scale. 7. In his book Engines of Creation (1986), Eric Drexler uses interchange- ably the term ‘molecular technology’ with nanotechnology, as a result of nanotechnology’s power to manipulate molecules. 8. Available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_technical_committee?commid=38 1983. 9. For arguments about the ambiguity of the US Nanotechnology National Initiative definition of nanotechnology see Fritz Allhoff’s paper ‘On the Autonomy and Justification of Nanoethics’ (2007). 10. Buckyball is the short form of buckminsterfullerene, a molecule cluster of 60 carbon atoms with a geodesic structure. 11. Bottom-up self-assembly occurs when structures are built up by adding atoms or molecules in the right sequence under the right conditions. 12. For specific companies and product names, the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies (PEN) keeps an inventory of products on the market that uses nanotechnology. Available at: http://www.nanotechproject.org/. 13. The NNTI definition was first suggested by the Neurotechnology Industry Organization (NIO) in their Neurotechnology Public Policy Tour, and later introduced to both houses of the US Congress in the NNTI Act. 169 170 Notes 14. Lynch has described in this field neuroceuticals as neuromodulators that, contrary to current psycho pharmaceuticals, have high efficacy and neg- ligible side effects (2004). Among the neuroceuticals the envisions are cogniceuticals (focused on learning, decision-making, memory processes and attention), emoticeuticals (influence awareness, moods, motivation and feelings) and sensoceuticals (focused on the capacity of our senses). 15. These different fields are based on the NIO classification (2007) and Lynch’s classification (2005). 16. The experts referred to Kant’s distinction between a physiological anthropology and a pragmatic anthropology. The former is based on a scientific understanding and manipulation of the brain, whereas the latter is based on knowledge about the social sphere, the world and human behaviour. 17. These features are a summary from those mentioned in the HLEG Report (Nordmann, 2004). 18. Quote from the first Spider-Man story: ‘Amazing Fantasy #15’. Later quoted in the Spiderman 2 movie, 2002. 2 The Biomedical Paradigm 19. Epistemological dualism differentiates between the knowledge and power of the known (the physician) and the known (the patient). 20. Pathophysiology refers here to the concatenation of biological events that distinguishes function from malfunction. 21. Not everyone believes that disease has a normative component that calls for treatment. Christopher Boorse (1977), for instance, has argued that disease description can be value neutral; however, others such as George Agich (1983) and myself have questioned this position. 22. This relationship became known as the patient–physician relationship in biomedicine. 23. Some scholars have argued that medicine has no essential domain of practice, hence a coherent distinction between medical and non-medical interventions can never be drawn in the first place (Engelhardt, 1976). 24. Higher integration density refers to the higher number of channels in a system. Higher numbers of channels are also needed to handle larger amounts of raw data without increasing the size, power consumption or compromising long-term stability of the system. 25. A good example is the development of in vivo lab-on-a-chip (LOC) systems. LOC systems promise to be less invasive (owing to miniaturization), to require less sample material than previous diagnostics tests and to provide real-time monitoring of biometric indicators (Tomellini, Faure, & Panzer, 2006). 26. Selgelid has used the example of baldness to make the point that therapy and enhancement can be seen as the extremes of a continuum. 3 The Transhumanist Paradigm 27. For an analysis of Nietzsche’s work and transhumanism see Sorgner, ‘Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism’ (2009). For a critique Notes 171 of Nietzsche’s work being used to support the transhumanist agenda see Bainbridge, ‘Burglarizing Nietzsche’s Tomb’ (2010). 28. The WTA was an international non-profit organisation whose activities ranged between Internet discussion, development of documents, represen- tation in the media, organizing the annual conference ‘TransVision’ and publication of the online Journal of Evolution and Technology. The associ- ation as such was ended in 2009 and transformed into the humanity+ organization. See http://humanityplus.org/. 29. These are just some examples from the different forms of transhumanism mentioned in the FAQ list of transhumanism and Anissimov ‘Transhumanist Sects’ (2006, December 19). 30. http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/singularity. 31. Bostrom uses general central capacity to refer to: health span, cognition and emotion. However, he also acknowledges that by limiting his list he does ‘not mean to imply that no other capacities are of fundamental importance to human or posthuman beings’ (Bostrom, 2009). 32. Some people prefer using the term ‘post-biological’ (Kurzweil, 2005) to stress the technological dominance over the biological, without having to go into the murky area of what it means to be human in the first place. 33. Here by biopolitics it is understood all specific contestations and strategies over problematisations of collective human vitality, morbidity and mor- tality; over regimes of authority, the forms of knowledge and practices of intervention that are legitimate, desirable and efficacious, that have the potential for developing new dimensions of political opinion (Rabinow & Rose, 2006). 34. Clark and Chalmers in their paper suggested certain criteria to be met by non-biological candidates for inclusion into an individual’s cognitive system, such as (1) the resource be typically invoked and reliable available; (2) that the retrieved information is ‘more-or-less automatically endorsed’ just as we generally do with the information we retrieved from our biological brains; (3) that the ‘information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). 35. David Kirsh and Paul Maglio (1994) calculated that for the Tetris game, the physical rotation of a shape through 90 degrees takes about 800–1,200 milliseconds by mental rotation (unchanged brain), physical rotation can be performed in as few as 100 milliseconds, plus about 200 milliseconds to select the button. Here it is worth mentioning that neither Clark and Chalmers or Kirsh and Maglio argued for preference towards a neuro- implant. 36. The term ‘cyberspace’ is used here to refer to a produced space that moves the subject’s relation to reality inside a ‘non-space’, in this case a digital format common to our ICTs. 37. There are, of course, many versions of transhumanism; as such, some of the criticisms made here may not apply to all versions. These critics are focused on the particular view of transhumanism put forward in the transhumanist paradigm section. 38. The biomedical paradigm also has deterministic views but with an emphasis on biological determinism (such as genetic determinism or neurodeterminism). 172 Notes 39. Bostrom has argued (2005c) that transhumanism does not imply technological optimism; however this is not the general ethos of the transhumanist movement. Bostrom has (recently) tried to use a more value-neutral term such as ‘technological development’ instead of ‘progress’ in order to avoid the problems arising from a focus on progress. 40. Philippe Verdoux pointed out the historical argument as another argument to consider; however, here the historical and the over-generalisation arguments are considered together (Verdoux, 2009). 41. By technogenic it is emphasised not only that something is caused by technology but also that it is anthropogenic (Verdoux, 2009). 42. Bostrom explicitly leaves aside the question of whether all pairs of possible lives have commensurable value. 43. I have argued elsewhere that depending on which view we hold and promote about the posthuman,

Load more