Chapter4 3 A Dangerous Liaison The Monarchy and Their Military Maintaining the Dynastic Status Quo: The Revolution That Never Was In 750, the ruler of the Muslim world was Abu l-‘Abbas. 1 He was the first in a long line of caliphs who became known as the ‘Abba- sids thanks to their descent from the Prophet’s uncle ‘Abbas. The ‘Abbasids lost their temporal power in 945 but continued as spiritual leaders of the Muslim world until the Mongols invaded and destroyed their capital, Baghdad, in 1258. Even after that calamity, a surviving line of the dynasty retained influence as symbolic figureheads to the worldwide Muslim community, providing a link back to the days of the Prophet, until the last of them was swept off to Istanbul by the Ottomans in 1517. It was this connection with the Prophet that Abu l- ‘Abbas and his supporters exploited to gain power in 750. So well did their strategy work that his successors later claimed it as the moral legitimacy under- pinning their right to rule.2 The new caliph was a great-great- grandson of the Prophet’s uncle— a line of descent he claimed trumped that of his rivals in the Prophet’s family: the ‘Alids. (The fourth caliph ‘Ali was the Prophet’s cousin and son- in- law. Not a direct descendant of the Prophet himself, ‘Ali’s sons and grandsons were direct descen- dants thanks to their mother Fatima, Muhammad’s daughter.)3 These competing bloodlines were of such significance that Abu l- ‘Abbas and his inner circle did not declare their hand openly during their rebellion against the Umayyads. Instead they kept the identity of the movement’s leader a secret, citing security reasons, and called for M. E. McMillan, Fathers and Sons © M. E. McMillan 2013 44 Fathers and Sons the Islamic community to be led by Al- Rida min Al Muhammad, the Approved One from the Family of Muhammad. This rallying cry was vague enough to attract a broad base of support, and many supporters of ‘Ali’s family pledged allegiance to the movement in the mistaken belief they were backing an as- yet- unnamed descendant of the fourth caliph.4 The ‘Abbasid revolution succeeded where the ‘Alids had previously failed for two main reasons. First, the ‘Abbasids launched their bid for power when the Umayyads were dangerously divided. And second, the ‘Abbasids could count on armies from the province of Khurasan to provide the military support needed to translate their political aspira- tions into reality.5 The ‘Alids, for all the heroism and personal courage they showed in their many efforts to oust the Umayyads, were never able to count on such a loyal fighting force. Supporters of the new ‘Abbasid caliph believed they were part of a genuine revolutionary movement, one that would fundamentally alter the way power in the Muslim community was exercised. In some cases, expectations verged on the messianic. With the Umayyads con- signed to history, a new era of divinely inspired justice would surely prevail.6 Yet once the new caliph was safely installed in power, it soon became clear that even though the Umayyads had gone, the pillars of the dynastic state they created remained securely in place.7 From the outset, Abu l- ‘Abbas adopted many of their policies and showed that he, too, saw power as a family affair. In the first year of his caliphate, 750, he set the pattern for the rest of his time in office by awarding the most strategically significant governorships to his broth- ers, uncles, and nephews.8 This enabled senior members of the ruling family to become closely associated with particular areas, thus replicat- ing the Umayyad system of “personal fiefdoms,” which saw relatives of the ruler develop long-standing military, financial, and political ties with the areas they governed. The new caliph based himself in Iraq (first Kufa, then Hira, then Anbar) and sent his brother (and eventual heir) Abu Ja‘far to govern nearby al- Jazira, the area that was once the domain of the Umayyad family.9 Another brother, Yahya, was sent to the city of Mosul in north- ern Iraq.10 The southern cities of Iraq were also given to members of the new ruling family: Kufa was assigned to the caliph’s nephew (and second heir) ‘Isa ibn Musa and Basra to the caliph’s paternal uncle Sulayman.11 The caliph gave another paternal uncle, Dawud, the privilege of governing Islam’s Holy Cities and of leading the first hajj of the new era.12 Dawud’s aim in the Hijaz turned out to be less than holy: he A Dangerous Liaison 45 moved against any members of the Umayyad family still resident in Mecca or Medina. Many were killed; some were fettered in irons, while others were exiled or sent to prison where a number of them died.13 Another of the caliph’s paternal uncles, Salih, was made gover- nor of Palestine, and yet another paternal uncle, Abdullah, was sent to run the former fortress of Umayyad power: Syria.14 This was no random appointment. It was Abdullah’s army who tracked the last Umayyad caliph all the way to Egypt and killed him in 750.15 By mak- ing Abdullah governor of the Umayyad heartland of Syria, the caliph sent a message to anyone harboring nostalgia for the old regime that resistance would not be tolerated. As proof of this, the new gover- nor arranged for a “last supper” for any Umayyads living locally. He invited around eighty of them for a meal where, unknown to them, executioners lay in wait. The massacre was justified as revenge for the murder of the Prophet’s grandson in 680 by troops loyal to the Umayyads.16 With the old elite so thoroughly extinguished, the new one was able to consolidate its position. Abu l- ‘Abbas kept the privileges of power largely in the hands of his family and the ‘Abbasids became a monarchy in all but name. The caliph did not, however, forget that in the eyes of the believ- ers his authority came from God and his primary responsibility was to ensure Muslims were free to practice the rituals of their faith. It became a key plank of ‘Abbasid policy for caliphs to build mosques, lead the pilgrimage, and send their closest relatives to lead the jihad against the Byzantines. Nor did the caliph forget to make space in the power structure for the military that helped elevate him from revo- lutionary to ruler. The most high- profile example was Abu Muslim, leader of the armies from Khurasan, who was made governor of the province.17 With this appointment, the caliph created his own version of the monarchy- military pact, which had so successfully underwritten Umayyad power for almost a century. Military influence, however, had its limits, as was shown at the pil- grimage in 754. That year, Abu Muslim sought permission to lead the ritual, but Abu l- ‘Abbas was reluctant to grant it. So far in his caliph- ate, he had followed the Umayyad example of keeping leadership of the hajj a privilege of the ruling family.18 But the caliph was equally reluctant to decline Abu Muslim’s request and risk a confrontation with the head of the military. So he resorted to subterfuge and sent his brother, the heir apparent Abu Ja‘far, to Mecca. Abu Muslim knew he could not take precedence over the second most important man in the 46 Fathers and Sons caliphate and was heard complaining to friends as to why Abu Ja‘far had to choose that year of all years to make his hajj.19 It was during the pilgrimage season that Abu l- ‘Abbas fell ill and died from smallpox. His caliphate had been a great success for his family. He had succeeded in securing their position as the supreme force in Islamic politics. To do so, he adopted many of the policies of his Umayyad predecessors. But in one key area, he differed: unlike many of the Umayyad caliphs, Abu l- ‘Abbas did not pass power to a son. And for a very simple reason: the first ‘Abbasid caliph was in his early thirties when he died and had no sons old enough to succeed him.20 It was left to his brother, Abu Ja‘far, to reintroduce the system of fathers and sons— and all the problems that went with it— into the highest office in Islam. The Politics of Paternity: ‘Abbasid Fathers and Their Sons Abu Ja‘far (r. 754– 75) gave himself the name al- Mansur, the victori- ous. Rarely was a name so well chosen. This was the caliph who built Islam’s first imperial city, Baghdad, the setting where so many ‘Abba- sid sons would succeed their fathers. But before the new caliph could place his own son into the succession, he had to deal with a series of challenges to his authority. The first came from within the ruling family itself: from the caliph’s uncle Abdullah ibn ‘Ali, the man who played a key role in defeating the Umayyads in 750. Having contributed so much to the revolution, Abdullah believed he should be caliph. But when he rebelled in 754, he found little support from within the ruling family. The caliph sent Abu Muslim and the armies of Khurasan against him, and the defeated prince was left with no choice but to backtrack and pledge allegiance to al- Mansur.21 Abdullah’s rebellion highlighted one of the dilemmas of dynastic power: how to balance the interests of the ruling family against those of the ruler’s own branch of it.