The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies The Teddy Kollek Center for Jerusalem Studies The Israeli-Palestinian Violent Confrontation 2000-2004: From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov Ephraim Lavie Kobi Michael Daniel Bar-Tal כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies The Teddy Kollek Center for Jerusalem Studies The Israeli-Palestinian Violent Confrontation 2000-2004: From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov Ephraim Lavie Kobi Michael Tal־Daniel Bar 2005 כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל The Teddy KoIIek Center for Jerusalem Studies Established by: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies & The Jerusalem Foundation The JUS Research Series # 102 The Israeli-Palestinian Violent Confrontation 2000-2004: From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov Ephraim Lavie Kobi Michael Daniel Bar-Tal Translation & Editing: Ralph Mandel This publication was made possible by funds granted by The Jacob and Hilda Blaustein Foundation The Frankel Foundation The Charles H. Revson Foundation The statements made and the views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. © 2005, The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies Hay Elyachar House 20 Radak St., 92186 Jerusalem Israel http://www.jiis.org.il כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל Acknowledgments This study is the product of a joint effort by a "think team" that convened at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies between September 2003 and December 2004. I want to take this opportunity to thank all the members of the team, each separately and as a group, for the devotion, diligence, and insight they brought to the project, out of a belief in its importance and in the hope that it will contribute to the public discourse. The members of the team are: Prof. Daniel Bar-Tal, Dr. Yossi Ben-Ari, Ephraim Halevy, Prof. Tamar Herman, Prof. Ruth Lapidoth, Ephraim Lavie, Reuven Merhav, Dr. Kobi Michael, Dr. Yitzhak Reiter, Prof. Ezra Sadan, Prof. Dan Zakai, and Dr. Yiftah Zilberman. Special thanks to the staff of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies: to Ora Achimeir, the Institute's director, and to Hamutal Appel and Ilanit Segen, without whose dedicated support it would not have been possible to move the project forward and bring it to fruition. Prof. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov Head, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל The Authors Prof. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov — Professor of international relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he also holds the Giancarlo Elia Valori Chair for the Study of Peace and Regional Cooperation; Director of the Swiss Center for Conflict Research, Management and Resolution at the Hebrew University; and head of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. He is the author or editor of eight books and has published numerous articles on conflict management and resolution, mainly in reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Colonel (res.) Ephraim Lavie — Middle East expert, researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University. Served in the Research Division of Military Intelligence as director of the Palestinian Arena and accompanied all the stages of the negotiations on the final-status settlement and the crisis that erupted in their wake. During the first intifada and throughout the 1990s was adviser on Arab affairs in the Civil Administration in the territories. Has also specialized in subjects relating to Egypt and Jordan and radical Islam. He is a graduate of the Departments of Middle East Studies and of Arabic Language and Literature at Tel Aviv University, an honors graduate of the National Security College, M.A. in political science from the University of Haifa, and currently a doctoral student at the School of History, Tel Aviv University. Dr. Kobi Michael—A research fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. Was one of the founders and senior commanders of the Israeli-Palestinian security coordination apparatus in the wake of the Oslo accords. Has written on aspects of political-military relations, security issues relating to Jerusalem, especially the "Jerusalem Envelope" security fence, characteristics of security cooperation in conditions of conflict, and the development of models for international involvement in regions of conflict. A lecturer at the National Security College and in programs for conflict research at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at Tel Aviv University. Prof. Daniel Bar-Tal — Professor of social and political psychology at the School of Education and director of the Walter Lebach Research Institute for Jewish- כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל Arab Coexistence through Education, Tel Aviv University. In 1999-2001 served as president of the International Society of Political Psychology. Areas of research deal with prevailing beliefs in societies, such as security-related beliefs about conflict ethos, delegitimization, siege mentality, and patriotism. A major area of study is the psychological foundations of intractable conflicts. He has authored and edited fifteen books and published more than one hundred articles and chapters in scholarly journals and books. כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל Contents Preface 9 Chapter One: The Israeli Conception and the Basic Assumptions of Israeli Policy in Relations with the Palestinians, 1993-2000 13 Chapter Two: A New Israeli Interim Conception: From the Start of the Intifada until the End of the Barak Government 21 Chapter Three: The New Conception in the Period of the Sharon Government and Its Assumptions 31 The political conception 31 The military-strategic conception 39 Operational patterns 47 Chapter Four: Interim Balance-sheet: Political and Security Deadlock with Adherence to the Basic Assumptions and the Conception 55 Chapter Five: Toward an Alternative Policy for Managing the Conflict 67 Bibliography 70 Sources in English 70 Hebrew and Arabic Sources 72 כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל Preface The violent confrontation which erupted between Israel and the Palestinians in September 2000 developed into a continuing low-intensity conflict which has claimed a steep price in blood on both sides, caused serious economic damage, and raised the level of mutual enmity and mistrust to heights that all but preclude dialogue. The sense of impasse and the failure of the efforts to end the confrontation or reduce its intensity led researchers of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies to reexamine Israel's modes of conflict management over the past four years. The goal is to propose a conceptual framework which offers conflict-management alternatives of a more controlled character, thus facilitating the transition from management to resolution. The Palestinians' conflict management, which also merits an in-depth examination, is not addressed here even though it is a major consideration in Israel's management of the conflict. The Institute's researchers felt that both the Israeli conception of managing the conflict and the strategies that were adopted in the past four years were inadequate. The high casualty rate and the economic and political price paid by Israel constitute an enormous sacrifice, and in addition our moral principles are constantly being tested as never before. Manifestly, a new and more creative way of thinking about this confrontation is urgently needed. Four initial insights concerning the outcome of the conflict have emerged from statements made by the political and military levels and from the public and media discourse in Israel: 1. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not conducive to a military solution. 2. Management of the conflict has played itself out in the present format and cannot end the confrontation or moderate it substantially. 3. The sides are not yet ripe to resolve the conflict, only to manage it by means of limited or partial political arrangements aimed at reducing its intensity and diminishing its damage. However, even here third-party assistance will likely be needed, owing to the residual hostility and mutual mistrust. 9 כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל 4. As long as Israel believes that it has "no partner" on the Palestinian side for a political and security dialogue, it will pursue (in coordination with the United States) a unilateral management strategy to enhance its security, by means such as the separation fence and the disengagement plan. In September 2003, as part of its effort to develop new conceptual modalities, the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies initiated the creation of a "think group" to analyze the situation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The group reexamined the underlying assumptions and the strategies of managing the confrontation and set out to formulate principles for alternative conflict-management strategies, consistent with the evolving risks and opportunities. The group, which held its first meeting on November 3, 2003, is multi- disciplinary in character and consists of experts from a range of fields: Prof. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Prof. Daniel Bar-Tal, Dr. Yossi Ben-Ari, Prof. Tamar Herman, Mr. Ephraim Lavie, Prof. Ruth Lapidoth, Mr. Reuven Merhav, Dr. Kobi Michael, Dr. Yitzhak Reiter, Prof. Ezra Sadan, Prof. Dan Zakai, and Dr. Yiftah Zilberman. Meeting regularly once every few weeks, the group engaged in a dynamic process of disseminating background and position papers, and of meetings