China in the Arctic Implications of China’S Arrival in an Ice-Free Arctic
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China in the Arctic Implications of China’s Arrival in an Ice-Free Arctic Kyle D. Christensen DRDC CORA DRDC CORA TM 2011-196 November 2011 Defence R&D Canada Centre for Operational Research and Analysis Strategic Analyst Section China Research Team China in the Arctic Implications of China's Arrival in an Ice-Free Arctic Kyle D. Christensen DRDC CORA The views expressed in this Technical Memorandum are those of the author and do not represent, or otherwise reflect, any official opinion or position of DND or the Government of Canada. Defence R&D Canada – CORA Technical Memorandum DRDC CORA TM 2011-196 November 2011 Principal Author Original signed by Kyle D. Christensen Kyle D. Christensen Defence Scientist Approved by Original signed by Greg Smolynec Greg Smolynec DRDC CORA Section Head Strategic Analysis Approved for release by Original signed by Paul Comeau Paul Comeau DRDC CORA Chief Scientist Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2011 © Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2011 Abstract …….. This research paper assesses the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) long-term interests and activities in the Arctic. It is aimed at assessing China’s interests in the Arctic, its current activities, and its motivation for allocating increased resources for high Arctic research. This includes a thorough review of Beijing’s potential geostrategic interests in the Arctic. This research paper also supports two Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Applied Research Projects (ARPs). It supports ARP 10aa15, “Arctic Security and Sovereignty Assessment,” and ARP 10aa16, “The Rise of China: Strategic Assessment and Implications for Canadian Security.” The research paper assesses China’s interests and activities in the Arctic by analyzing existing data, research, and literature on China’s preparations for a climate changed and potentially ice- reduced Arctic. Research is based on an analysis of open source literature, electronic sources, published and unpublished reports and papers, and interviews. The major conclusions to be drawn from this study are that China’s activities in the Arctic have not been of the military variety, nor does it appear China will become militarily involved in the Arctic in the near-term. China’s involvement in the Arctic is focused on the scientific, environmental, and climatic consequences of melting sea ice, as well as the commercial and economic benefits of melting Arctic sea ice. This will also be the first time in the contemporary period that a major non-circumpolar power with global interests and aspirations will enter the Arctic region. Over the long term, this has the potential to not only affect the circumpolar balance of power, but also the strategic thinking of all states involved. As such, circumpolar states such as Canada must be prepared to prevent the potential exploitation of the Arctic by non-circumpolar states. Thus, circumpolar states, including Canada, must think about the Arctic as a strategic region. The Canadian Forces, for its part, should maintain its multi-purpose combat capabilities. A versatile and flexible military that can respond to challenges across a spectrum of non-combat and combat roles, including in the underwater environment, will serve the Canadian government best in addressing the challenges envisaged in the Arctic as non-circumpolar states enter the region. DRDC CORA TM 2011-196 i Résumé …..... Ce document de recherche évalue les intérêts et les activités à long terme de la République populaire de Chine (RPC) dans l’Arctique. L’étude vise à examiner les intérêts de la Chine dans l’Arctique, ses activités en cours et les raisons qui la poussent à consacrer davantage de ressources à la recherche dans le Grand Nord. Le dossier comprend une analyse en profondeur des intérêts géostratégiques potentiels de Beijing dans l’Arctique. Ce document de recherche soutient également deux projets de recherche appliquée (PRA) de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC). Le premier est le PRA 10aa15, « Évaluation de la sécurité et de la souveraineté dans l’Arctique », et le deuxième est le PRA 10aa16, « la montée de la Chine : évaluation stratégique et incidences sur la sécurité du Canada ». Le document évalue les intérêts et les activités de la Chine dans l’Arctique en analysant les données, la recherche et la littérature existantes sur la préparation de la Chine à un changement climatique et à une réduction de la glace en Arctique. La présente recherche est fondée sur une analyse de la littérature, des ressources électroniques, des rapports et des travaux publiés et non publiés, et des entrevues de source ouverte. Les principales conclusions à tirer de cette étude sont que les activités de la Chine en Arctique ne sont pas de nature militaire, et il ne semble pas que la Chine s’engagera militairement dans l’Arctique dans un avenir rapproché. L’engagement de la Chine dans l’Arctique se concentre sur les conséquences scientifiques, environnementales et climatiques de la fonte des glaces en mer, de même que sur les avantages économiques et commerciaux de ce phénomène dans la mer Arctique. Il s’agit également de la première fois dans la période contemporaine qu’une des principales puissances non circumpolaires ayant des aspirations et des intérêts mondiaux entrera dans la région de l’Arctique. À long terme, cette situation a le potentiel d’influer non seulement sur l’équilibre du pouvoir circumpolaire, mais également sur la pensée stratégique de tous les États touchés. Ainsi, les États circumpolaires comme le Canada doivent réaliser qu’il est possible que l’Arctique soit exploité par des États non circumpolaires, et doivent l’empêcher. Les États circumpolaires, notamment le Canada, doivent donc considérer l’Arctique comme une région stratégique. Les Forces canadiennes, pour leur part, devraient maintenir leurs capacités de combat polyvalent. Des forces militaires souples et polyvalentes pouvant aborder les enjeux en adoptant une variété d’approches allant du non-combat au combat, notamment dans l’environnement sous-marin, pourront au mieux aider le gouvernement du Canada à relever les défis pressentis à la suite de l’intervention dans l’Arctique d’États non circumpolaires. ii DRDC CORA TM 2011-196 Executive summary China in the Arctic: Implications of China's Arrival in an Ice-Free Arctic Kyle D. Christensen; DRDC CORA TM 2011-196; Defence R&D Canada – CORA; November 2011. Background: As the current strategic environment continues to evolve, so too does the possibility that the Arctic will become an important geostrategic region. One underlying assumption of this assessment is that climate change will make the Arctic more accessible for longer periods, and this accessibility may bring with it a variety of new challenges. One new challenge may be increased activity by non-circumpolar states in the region. One non-circumpolar country that has become increasingly active in the Arctic has been the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This research paper assesses China’s long-term interests and activities in the Arctic. It is aimed at assessing China’s interests in the Arctic, its current activities, and its motivation for allocating increased resources for high Arctic research. This includes a thorough review of Beijing’s potential geostrategic interests in the Arctic. The research paper assesses China’s interests and activities in the Arctic by analyzing existing data, research, and literature on China’s preparations for a climate changed and potentially ice- reduced Arctic. Research is based on an analysis of open source literature, electronic sources, published and unpublished reports and papers, and interviews. Results: This report offers a number of important findings. Overall, climate change has the potential to make the Arctic more accessible for longer periods, and this accessibility will bring with it a whole host of potential challenges. These developments increase the likelihood that non- circumpolar states will become active in the region. Beijing is well aware that, as a rising global power, its activities in the Arctic might be cause for alarm among circumpolar states. China, therefore, has taken a cautious approach to its involvement in the Arctic. To date, China’s activities in the Arctic have not been of the military variety. Therefore, it does not currently pose a significant challenge or threat in the Arctic, particularly in the traditional military and security sense. For the time being, China’s involvement in the Arctic is focused on the scientific, environmental, and climatic consequences of melting sea ice, as well as commercial and economic benefits of melting Arctic sea ice. Beijing, however, does have, and will likely maintain, long-term aspirations in the region that could eventually pose a security challenge. The release of China’s 12th Five Year Plan, which was approved by the PRC National People’s Congress on March 14, 2011, included a commitment to continue polar and oceanic scientific investigation activities. In addition, the use of the term “polar regions,” for the fist time in a Chinese National Defense White Paper, suggests that Chinese officials are attributing an increasing level of importance to the polar regions not only from a scientific and research point of view, but from a security and defence perspective as well. DRDC CORA TM 2011-196 iii Significance: The major conclusions to be drawn from this study are that China’s activities in the Arctic have not been of the military variety, and it does not appear that it will become militarily involved in the Arctic in the near-term. China’s involvement in the Arctic is focused on the scientific, environmental, and climatic consequences of melting sea ice, as well as commercial and economic benefits of melting Arctic sea ice.