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Coup in Egypt Coup in Egypt Standard Note: SNIA/6680 Last updated: 4 July 2013 Author: Ben Smith Section International Affairs and Defence Section A brief survey of the Egyptian military’s removal of President Mohamed Mursi. Contents 1 Collapsing support 2 2 Massive demonstrations 2 3 Mursi is removed 3 4 Economic and financial problems 4 5 Did the Army ever really go away? 4 6 Likelihood of violence 5 7 Reaction 5 1 Collapsing support In November 2012, President Mursi’s declaration awarding himself sweeping powers, including immunity from judicial intervention, caused a dramatic surge in resistance to his rule. It came just after the President had successfully negotiated a ceasefire in Gaza and the timing seemed opportunistic: to seize control of the situation in Egypt on the strength of political capital gained in Gaza. The declaration protected the Upper House of the Parliament and the Constituent Assembly from being dissolved (the Supreme Constitutional Court was due to rule a month later on the constitutionality of the Constituent Assembly). Not only did the move provoke big protests, the Mursi government reacted to them by backing down on some of its key provisions a few days later, perhaps giving the protesters encouragement. Far from reconsidering the constitution creation process, Mursi then had the Islamist- dominated (especially after almost all the non-Islamist members walked out) Constituent Assembly finish its deliberations quickly and brought forward the referendum on the finished document. The constitution was approved by about 57 percent of the votes on a turnout of perhaps one-third of the electorate,1 a figure which starkly underlined the growing disillusionment with the democratic process as offered by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Government had offered some concessions to the Army in the final draft of the constitution and authorised the military to protect national institutions until the referendum had taken place. The troops returned to the barracks after the vote, but soon afterwards violence broke out along the Suez Canal between supporters and opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood leading to scores of deaths. The head of the Armed Forces, General al-Sisi, warned in January 2013 of the potential collapse of the state. 2 Massive demonstrations Sporadic unrest continued to plague the country. In June, commemorating the first anniversary of the swearing-in of the new President, enormous demonstrations were organised by the Tamarud movement. Millions of people took to the streets, especially in Cairo. It was on 1 July that the Armed Forces issued an ultimatum for the Government to end the political crisis or have the Armed Forces intervene with its own ‘road map’. The statement said: • The national security of the state is exposed to extreme danger by the developments the nation is witnessing... • The armed forces repeat their call for the people's demands to be met and give everyone 48 hours as a last chance to shoulder the burden of the historic moment that is happening in the nation, which will not forgive or tolerate any party that is lax in shouldering its responsibility... • The armed forces put everyone on notice that if the demands of the people are not realised in the given time period, it will be obliged by its patriotic and historic responsibilities and by its respect for the demands of the great Egyptian people to 1 ‘Egypt’s constitutional referendum, A dubious yes’, Economist, 22 December 2012 2 announce a road map for the future and the steps for overseeing its implementation, with participation of all patriotic and sincere parties and movements - including the youth, who set off the glorious revolution and continue to do so - without excluding anyone.2 On 2 July, Mursi made a defiant statement, in which he rejected any challenge to his constitutional legitimacy and said that he was willing to die to defend it. He warned that there might be violence if any attempt were made to remove him. He said “I will not accept any measures that would shake legitimacy. This is rejected, it is rejected, it is rejected.”3 Three hours after Mursi’s televised speech, a message appeared on the Facebook page of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces making clear that the military was in no mood to back down either: “We swear to God that we will sacrifice even our blood for Egypt and its people, to defend them against any terrorist, radical or fool.”4 3 Mursi is removed At 9pm on 3 July, the military finally made its announcement. Al-Sisi said in a short televised address that Mursi’s response to the Army ultimatum “did not meet the demands of the people”. The Egyptian Armed Forces would act on its patriotic responsibility “without sidelining, marginalising any party”5 and implement the following plan, he said: • suspend the constitution provisionally • organise early presidential elections • give the Chief Justice presidential powers • set up a technocratic and capable national government • secure and guarantee freedom of expression, freedom of media • stand up firmly and strictly to any act deviating from peacefulness.6 The defence minister was flanked by the three armed services chiefs, opposition leaders including former presidential candidate and former head of the IAEA Mohammed ElBaradei, the sheikh of most important Islamic institution in the region, the al-Azhar Mosque, and the Coptic Pope, Tawadros II. Al-Sisi also took pains to eulogise the popular demonstrations, in further attempts to cloak the Army’s move in some sort of popular legitimacy. Adli Mansour, who had been Chief Justice and head of the Supreme Constitutional Court for two days, was sworn in as the interim President on 4 July. He had been deputy head of the Supreme Court since 1992 and is reported to be a low-profile figure. Despite the assurances that freedom of expression would be guaranteed, there were reports that the Army had closed three Islamist television stations. Mohammed Mursi was placed under house arrest and some of his close colleagues from the Freedom and Justice party were also arrested. It is also reported that warrants were issued for the arrest of the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood itself, Mohammed Badie and his deputy Khairat el- 2 ‘Egypt army statement in full’, Al-Jazeera, 1 July 2013 3 ‘Morsi rebuffs calls to step down’, Financial Times, 3 July 2013 4 ‘Morsi on collision course with Egypt’s military’, Financial Times, 3 July 2013 5 ‘Transcript: Egypt's army statement’, Al-Jazeera, 3 July 2013 6 ‘Transcript: Egypt's army statement’, Al-Jazeera, 3 July 2013 3 Shater, in connection with the deaths of protesters in disturbances outside a Muslim Brotherhood building. According to al-Ahram, an Egyptian newspaper, the police have received orders to arrest more than 200 members of the Muslim Brotherhood.7 It was also reported that leaders of religious parties had been banned from leaving the country. Many analysts have said that the Mursi government failed to establish any national consensus and acted in a ‘winner takes all’ manner, ignoring the majority of the electorate which did not vote for the President or the Constitution. Right from the start, when the Brotherhood promised not to dominate the parliament and not to contest the presidency, and then went ahead and did exactly those two things, the opposition has complained of a ‘democratic coup’ on the part of the Brotherhood. On the other hand, the opposition has not been much better at cooperating with the Government and has seemed to write off entirely the significance of the Brotherhood’s electoral success. Consensual politics may take more than one year to establish in Egypt. 4 Economic and financial problems One of the main drivers of the 2011 revolution was the full-blown economic crisis that was besetting the country. With a rapidly growing population and growing inequality, growth (even though the headline figures had been relatively strong) was insufficient to provide jobs for the young, and the standard of living of the poorest was threatened, especially with the rising prices of imported commodities, on which Egypt depends. With the revolution of 2011, Egypt’s economic situation worsened dramatically and economic problems quickly became a financial crisis. Tourism receipts were severely hit and foreign investment declined, leaving the country’s foreign reserves to fall to dangerously low levels: they fell to $13.5 billion at the end of February 2013 from $36 billion just before the uprising in 2011.8 The external trade deficit and the government’s budget deficit also grew very quickly, while the Egyptian pound dropped more than 10% against the dollar in the first four months of 2013. The official unemployment rate was below 10% before the 2011 revolution. The latest figures put it at over 13% and the US Ambassador recently said that the difficulties associated with unemployment are the most fundamental currently facing the Egyptian government.9 The Mursi Government has negotiated with the International Monetary Fund to receive a loan but political unrest along with disagreement over economic reforms have delayed an conclusion. The Government may have been on the brink of agreeing terms for the $4.8 billion loan with the IMF when the Army moved to remove Mursi. Meanwhile, Egypt has received loans from other Muslim countries, including particularly Qatar, which has a policy of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. With such mountainous economic problems to deal with, it is difficult to imagine that any new government could have fared a lot better than the Mursi Government after just one year. 5 Did the Army ever really go away? Ever since the coup that brought Gamal Nasser to power in 1952, deposing King Farouk, the Egyptian Army has been close to the centre of power.
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