Country Policy and Information Note Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood Version 3.0 July 2017 Preface This note provides country of origin information (COI) and guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights claims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the guidance contained with this document; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies. Country information COI in this note has been researched in accordance with principles set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI) and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology, namely taking into account its relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability. All information is carefully selected from generally reliable, publicly accessible sources or is information that can be made publicly available. Full publication details of supporting documentation are provided in footnotes. Multiple sourcing is normally used to ensure that the information is accurate, balanced and corroborated, and that a comprehensive and up-to-date picture at the time of publication is provided. Information is compared and contrasted, whenever possible, to provide a range of views and opinions. The inclusion of a source is not an endorsement of it or any views expressed. Feedback Our goal is to continuously improve our material. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team. Independent Advisory Group on Country Information The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office‘s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office‘s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may be contacted at: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 5th Floor, Globe House, 89 Eccleston Square, London, SW1V 1PN. Email: [email protected] Information about the IAGCI‘s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector‘s website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/ Page 2 of 33 Contents Policy guidance ........................................................................................................ 4 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Basis of claim ........................................................................................... 4 2. Consideration of issues ................................................................................... 4 2.1 Credibility .................................................................................................. 4 2.2 Exclusion .................................................................................................. 4 2.2 Assessment of risk ................................................................................... 4 2.3 Protection ................................................................................................. 5 2.4 Internal relocation ..................................................................................... 5 2.5 Certification .............................................................................................. 6 3. Policy summary ............................................................................................... 6 Country information ................................................................................................. 7 4. Muslim Brotherhood: history, structure, ideology and activities ....................... 7 4.1 History ...................................................................................................... 7 4.2 Size, structure and ideology ..................................................................... 7 4.3 Involvement in violence .......................................................................... 10 5. Muslim Brotherhood in power: 2011 to 2013 ................................................. 13 6. Treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood since 2013 ......................................... 17 6.1 Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated groups banned ................................. 17 6.2 Police use of excessive force, arrests and trials ..................................... 18 6.3 Disappearances ..................................................................................... 26 7. Journalists/media ........................................................................................... 29 Version control and contacts ................................................................................ 33 Page 3 of 33 Policy guidance Updated: 20 June 2017 1. Introduction 1.1 Basis of claim 1.1.1 Fear of persecution or serious harm by the state because of the person’s actual or perceived involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Back to Contents 2. Consideration of issues 2.1 Credibility 2.1.1 For guidance on assessing credibility see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. 2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants). 2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis). Back to Contents 2.2 Exclusion 2.2.1 A minority of Muslim Brotherhood supporters have reportedly engaged in violent acts. Some senior leaders have publicly reiterated the Muslim Brotherhood’s commitment to non-violence, but others have failed to renounce the calls for retribution in Muslim Brotherhood statements (see Muslim Brotherhood: history, structure, ideology and activities). 2.2.2 Where a person is accepted as a member of the MB, decision makers will need to consider the person’s role and activities on behalf of the group. If there are serious reasons for considering that the person has committed a crime or act contrary to Article 1F of the Refugee Convention then decision makers must consider whether one of the exclusion clauses is applicable. 2.2.3 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection. 2.2.4 For further guidance on the exclusion clauses, discretionary leave and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instructions on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and Restricted Leave. Back to Contents 2.2 Assessment of risk 2.2.1 The MB remains the main political opposition to the government despite being banned in 2013, with an estimated one million members. The group has faced a prolonged crackdown by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s Page 4 of 33 government following the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013 and its designation on 25 December 2013 as a terrorist organisation (see Muslim Brotherhood: history, structure, ideology and activities and Treatment of Muslim Brotherhood). 2.2.2 Journalists affiliated with, or perceived to be sympathetic to, the MB have also been targeted by the state. The government has also closed hundreds of civil society groups with links to the MB (see Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated groups banned). 2.2.3 Many hundreds of MB members have been killed or injured during protests, while thousands have also reportedly been detained, some in unofficial places of detention. There are also reports of MB supporters dying in police detention, instances of persons tortured to death and other allegations of killings in prisons and detention centres. Death sentences have been handed down to senior leaders in the MB for charges that include violence, espionage and jailbreak (see Arrests and trials). 2.2.4 Under the Penal Code, the government is able to detain anyone suspected of membership of the MB. However, in practice, arrests and prolonged detentions have primarily been of high- and mid-level leaders, and those taking part in protests against the government which became violent (see Arrests and trials). 2.2.5 The authorities are unlikely to have the capacity, capability or interest in seeking to target all persons associated with the MB given the size and variety of its membership and support base. The evidence does not establish that merely being a member of, or, in particular, a supporter of the MB, or being perceived to support the MB, will place a person is at risk of persecution or serious harm. 2.2.6 Whether a person is at risk of ill-treatment because of their involvement with, or perceived support for, the MB will depend upon their circumstances, profile, activities, and previous contact