Free Exercise Clause

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Free Exercise Clause THE “ESSENTIAL” FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JOSH BLACKMAN* In the span of a year, COVID-19 would affect every corner of the globe. During this period, governments were confronted with dif- ficult choices about how to respond to the evolving pandemic. In rapid succession, states imposed lockdown measures that ran head- long into the Constitution. Several states deemed houses of wor- ship as non-essential, and subjected them to stringent attendance requirements. In short order, states restricted the exercise of a con- stitutional right, but allowed the exercise of preferred economic privileges. And this disparate treatment was premised on a simple line: whether the activity was “essential” or “non-essential.” If the activity fell into the former category, the activity could continue. If the activity fell into the latter category, it could be strictly regulated, or even halted immediately. Houses of worship challenged these measures as violations of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This Article provides an early look at how the courts have inter- preted the “essential” Free Exercise Clause during the pandemic. This ongoing story can be told in six phases. In Phase 1, during the early days of the pandemic, the courts split about how to assess these measures. And for the first three months of the pandemic, the Supreme Court stayed out of the fray. In Phase 2, the Supreme Court provided its early imprimatur on the pandemic. In South Bay Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, the Court * Professor, South Texas College of Law Houston. I am grateful to the Liberty & Law Center at the Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, for providing funding to support this publication. I also am in debt to Nelson Lund for his insightful comments and feedback. 638 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 4 declined to enjoin California’s restrictions on religious gatherings. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a very influential concurring opinion that would become a superprecedent. Over the following six months, more than one hundred judges would rely on Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in cases that spanned the entire spectrum of con- stitutional and statutory challenges to pandemic policies. In Phase 3, the Roberts Court doubled-down on South Bay. A new challenge from Nevada, Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley Church v. Siso- lak, upheld strict limits on houses of worship. Once again, the Court split 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate dissent. He treated the Free Exercise of Religion as a “most-favored” right. Under Justice Kavanaugh’s approach, the free exercise of religion is presump- tively “essential,” unless the state can rebut that presumption. South Bay and Calvary Chapel would remain the law of the land through November. Phase 4 began when Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was replaced by Justice Amy Coney Barrett. The new Roberts Court would turn the tide on COVID-19 cases in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo. Here, a new 5-4 majority enjoined New York’s “cluster ini- tiatives,” which limited houses of worship in so-called “red” zones to ten parishioners at a time. Now, Chief Justice Roberts dissented. Roman Catholic Diocese effectively interred the South Bay superprec- edent. Phase 5 arose in the wake of Roman Catholic Diocese. Over the course of five months, the Court consistently ruled in favor of the free exercise of religion. South Bay II and Harvest Rock II enjoined California’s prohibitions on indoor worship. And Tandon v. Newsom recognized the right of people to worship privately in their homes. We are now in the midst of Phase 6. States are beginning to rec- ognize that absolute executive authority cannot go unchecked dur- ing ongoing health crises. Going forward, states should impose substantive limits on how long emergency orders can last, and es- tablish the power to revoke those orders. The COVID-19 pandemic will hopefully soon draw to a close. But the precedents set during this period will endure. No. 3] The “Essential” Free Exercise Clause 639 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 642 I. PHASE 1: THE CIRCUITS SPLIT IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE PANDEMIC ...................................................................................... 647 A. Prohibitions on “Non-Essential” Activities During “Marpril” 2020 ....................................................................... 648 B. COVID-19 restrictions on Houses of Worship did not neatly fit into the Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence ......................................................................... 654 C. Sixth Circuit: Maryville Baptist Church v. Beshear ............... 657 D. Seventh Circuit: Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker I .................................................................................. 661 II. PHASE 2: THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S SOUTH BAY STANDARD ............ 664 A. South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom ................. 665 B. Seventh Circuit: Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker II ............................................................................ 668 C. The Chief Justice’s unexpected superprecedent from the Shadow Docket ...................................................................... 676 III. PHASE 3: CALVARY CHAPEL AND THE “MOST-FAVORED” RIGHT ..................................................... 683 A. Lower Court proceedings in Calvary Chapel ...................... 684 B. The Supreme Court denies injunctive relief in Calvary Chapel ....................................................................................... 685 C. Justice Alito’s dissent ............................................................ 686 D. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent ...................................................... 687 E. Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent ................................................. 687 1. Four categories of law that favor or disfavor religion . 688 2. Calvary Chapel and Smith .................................................. 692 3. The Calvary Chapel Two-Step ........................................... 695 4. The Calvary Chapel framework as applied to the Nevada directives ............................................................................ 697 IV. PHASE 4: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN TURNS THE TIDE ......................................................................................... 700 A. Governor Cuomo’s Cluster Action Initiative .................... 701 640 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 4 B. The New Roberts Court in Red November ........................ 704 C. The Per Curiam Majority Opinion ...................................... 706 1. New York’s regulations were not “neutral” .................. 706 2. The Court reviewed New York’s orders with strict scrutiny ............................................................................... 709 3. The directives inflicted irreparable harm ...................... 710 4. An injunction was in the public interest ........................ 711 5. Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence ......................................... 712 D. Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence ....................................... 716 E. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent .................................................. 719 F. Equitable dissents from Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer ...................................................................................... 720 G. The Majority declined to consider Agudath Israel’s targeting claim ....................................................................... 725 V. PHASE 5: THE AFTERMATH OF ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE ..... 727 A. The Advent after Roman Catholic Diocese ........................... 728 1. Harvest Rock II ..................................................................... 729 2. High Plains Harvest Church and Robinson ........................ 729 3. Danville Christian Academy ................................................ 730 B. The return of South Bay II and Harvest Rock II ................... 731 1. Harvest Rock II district court proceedings ...................... 732 2. Harvest Rock II before the Ninth Circuit ......................... 734 3. Harvest Rock II before the Supreme Court ...................... 736 C. Gateway City Church v. Newsom ............................................ 739 D. Tandon v. Newsom .................................................................. 740 1. Tandon District Court proceedings ................................. 741 2. Tandon before the Ninth Circuit ...................................... 741 3. Tandon rockets through the shadow docket .................. 742 4. The Tandon per curiam opinion ....................................... 744 5. Justice Kagan’s Tandon dissent ........................................ 748 VI. PHASE VI: THE PANDEMIC WANES, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS ARE RESTORED ................................................................ 749 No. 3] The “Essential” Free Exercise Clause 641 A. Which branch of government decides during the pandemic? ............................................................................... 750 B. New York and other states reclaim power from the governors ................................................................................ 753 C. How legislatures should respond to COVID-19 ............... 756 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 760 642 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 4 INTRODUCTION In the span of a year, the coronavirus disease
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