Taiwan's Sunflower Occupy Movement As a Transformative Resistance to the "China Factor"

10 TAIWAN'S SUNFLOWER OCCUPY MOVEMENT AS A TRANSFORMATIVE RESISTANCE TO THE "CHINA FACTOR" Jieh-min Wu Historic events strike the world unexpectedly; social scientists cannot precisely predict the occurrence of a particular event, but when one does happen, we can explain why and how it happened with appropriate mechanisms and causal nar ratives.1 The Sunflower Occupy Movement broke out in March 2014, shaking Taiwan's political landscape and its relations with China. The Sunflower Move ment preceded the Umbrella Movement in just a few months. These two cam paigns fought for democracy and autonomy from China, both were mobilized by civil forces and led by the youth, and activists from both places interacted fre quently for mutual empowerment. The former caused the suspension of a trade agreement between Taiwan and China, a severe blow to Beijing's irredentism, while the latter failed to achieve the goal of direct election of the chief executive. Before the Sunflower Movement, a pessimistic atmosphere had overwhelmed people striving for political autonomy, as an ascendant China kept swaying the political direction of the island. Since the mid-2000s, Beijing had adroitly employed its resources and cooperation with the Kuomintang government to absorb Taiwan further into the Chinese economic sphere, thereby leveraging eco nomic dependence for political ends. Both sides signed a Services Trade Agree ment (STA) in 2013, intended to deepen cross-strait economic integration, but without due consultation with Parliament and civil society. Until early 2014, things had been set firmly on a path favorable to Beijing's irredentist agenda. Overnight, though, that seemingly inexorable trend slowed; a majority of Taiwanese publicly embraced the occupation of Parliament, and the movement 215 216 JIEH-MIN WU interrupted CCP-KMT cooperation and loosened a structure once deemed unbreakable. But how did this historic event happen, and why? The Occupy Movement crystalized a subtle change in public perception of the "China factor:' Hitherto deepening economic and social exchange with the Mainland had not brought the average citizen the benefits promised by the CCP-KMT cooperation platform. Instead, most of the economic advantages were reaped by the KMT's top leadership. Moreover, the STA, if implemented, would have posed a threat to Taiwan's disadvantaged industries and national security. The perception of a "China threat" loomed large in opposition to that of the "China opportunity." This helps to explain the legitimacy of Occupy as an act of civil disobedience, an unprecedented collective action initiated by youth and social movement groups at a time of political crisis. This chapter will dem onstrate that momentum for a contentious mobilization against CCP-KMT cooperation had been accumulating for several years before the outbreak of the Sunflower Movement, thanks to the activism of civic groups. That movement in turn transformed social attitudes toward China. First, the chapter accounts for the movement's emergence and immediate impact, and analyzes strategic interactions in light of short-term political oppor tunity. It then illustrates the "long path to the Sunflower Movement" by focusing on the turn of discourse, the surging protest cycle, and new protest repertoires leading to the Occupy actions. Thirdly, it elucidates the transformative nature of the movement. The final section will compare the cases of Taiwan and Hong Kong in terms of youth politics, civil society, and the China impact. The data used were collected through analysis of public opinion surveys, content analysis, in-depth interviews, and participant observation in Taiwan and Hong Kong from 2008 to 2016. The Outbreak of the Occupation At around ten past nine on the evening of March 18, 2014, some two hundred students, together with social movement activists, stormed into the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan's Parliament) and sat in the chamber for twenty-four days, further motivating nationwide protests. This action was intended to protest against the ruling Kuomintang's forcing through the ratification of a trade pact with China the previous day. The Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement had been signed the previous summer, prompting enormous criticism from the opposition and civil society-even from an ex-adviser to then president Ma Ying-jeou-over concerns regarding its undemocratic "black-box manipulation" and poten tial damage to vulnerable industries and national security. Civil and student TAIWAN'S SUNFLOWER OCCUPY MOVEMENT 217 organizations had fought it ever since, demanding that the government conduct a comprehensive consultation with wider society before initiating the legislative process. The KMT had, as a result, signed an agreement with the opposition that "the STA should be subject to reviewing and voting article by article:' Ma's gov ernment, however, broke its promise, determined as it was to pass the agreement hastily by using its parliamentary majority. Process and Immediate Impacts News of the occupation spread swiftly through social media and TY. Within hours, thousands of citizens had rushed to the scene, surrounding the Parliament compound to "defend" the students while NGO activists set up logistical support outside. The police tried at first to evict the occupiers, but in vain, and the speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Wang Jin-Pyng, decided not to summon additional forces to eject them. The core leadership of the protesters soon formed and demanded "retraction of the STA" and "enactment of an Oversight Law regulating the cross Strait agreements." On March 23, President Ma held a press conference, saying that he agreed with the principle of "reviewing and voting article by article" but refusing to retract the STA. Ma also condemned the occupation as illegal, while the protesters claimed it as an act of civil disobedience. On the evening of that same day, several groups of militant protesters, impatient with the stalemate and irked by Ma's intransigence, dared to escalate matters by trying to occupy the main building of the Executive Yuan. 2 This move was met with a fierce reaction by riot police, resulting in hundreds of injuries and scores of arrests. When photos and footage of the police beating unarmed protesters circulated in the following days, needless to say, the political crisis heightened. The violent crackdown enraged the public and triggered a massive demonstration in front of the Presidential Palace on March 30. Half a million citizens turned out, the largest rally in Taiwan's history. At this stage, the occupation enjoyed its highest approval in public opinion polls.3 President Ma remained uncompromising in the face of growing public dis content. The protest leaders were also faced with increasing pressure as the stalemate became a war of attrition, while their approval ratings began to dwindle. Both sides were competing for public support and legitimacy while seeking exit strategies. But fortune favored the occupiers. Through rounds of communication (about which the details remain unclear), on April 6 Wang Jin-Pyng announced as speaker that he would not convene the interparty nego tiation on the STA until the aforementioned Oversight Law had been enacted; this amounted to an indefinite suspension of the review of the trade pact and 218 JIEH-MIN WU came close to the occupiers' demands.4 The next day, the leadership decided to end the occupation on April 10. The movement delivered a severe blow to President Ma, to his ruling Kuomin tang, and to CCP-KMT cooperation. When a Chinese official in charge of Tai wan affairs visited the country afterward, he encountered protests wherever he went and was forced to truncate his schedule. Consequently, that year's annual CCP-KMT forum was suspended. In November, the KMT lost the local elections to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which would go on to win the 2016 presidential and legislative elections. Political Opportunity in Short-Term Perspective With hindsight, speaker Wang honored his "tacit pact" with the movement, and the STA has not been ratified thus far. 5 Wang's decision was widely believed to have been motivated by his power struggle with President Ma, who had since the previous year alienated Wang by accusing him of illegal lobbying and attempting to bring him down. The Ma-Wang split within the KMT had in effect created a political opportunity for the movement. But the protesters evidently did not realize it as an opportunity to be exploited at the time of launching the occupa tion; they only discovered it ex post facto during the movement.6 From a short-term perspective, the struggle between Ma and Wang was key to shaping the dynamics of the Sunflower Movement. Let us illustrate the multi lateral interaction step by step. To begin with, since 2005 the KMT had adopted a rapprochement with its arch-rival CCP, based on the so-called "1992 Consen sus" (the one-China principle), aiming at slowing the tide toward Taiwanese independence. When the KMT won the presidential election in 2008, it began to implement the mutually agreed cooperation agenda, including signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010. The disputed STA of 2013 was one subsequent pact within the ECFA. Beijing proceeded by offering "concessionary policies" to Taiwan, but the so-called "peace dividends" were nothing but political prizes granted to a cross-strait government-business coalition. Under the monopolized CCP-KMT platform, the DPP had virtu ally no say on issues concerning Mainland affairs until the outbreak of the Sunflower Movement. During President Ma's tenure (2008-2016), civil soci ety kept a watchful eye on KMT policies insofar as they touched upon preda tory developmental projects, democratic careening, and an overly pro-China stance. Civil groups and the social movement sector maintained a conditional, issue-by-issue coalition with the DPP. As the DPP was sidelined by the KMT, it was civic activism that created "opposition momentum" over many issues such as anti-land-grab protests, environmental protection, labor disputes, and TAIWAN'S SUNFLOWER OCCUPY MOVEMENT 219 China policies.

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