Holger Sandte

Dutch election preview, part Tuuli Koivu 2: “Wilders offers the perfect package for one third of the electorate” Nordea Research, 28 February 2017

This is an interview with Hans Vollaard, a lecturer of Dutch and European Politics at the Institute of Political Science at University of Leiden in the . Dutch euroscepticism and European disintegration are among his focus areas.

The Dutch election on 15 March is the first of several this year, where a strong result for eurosceptical parties could disrupt financial markets due to the potential political and economic consequences of such an outcome. We interviewed Professor Vollaard in early February. An overview of the main political parties in the Netherlands is shown at the end of the article.

This is part 2 of our preview of the Dutch elections. See part 1 here. INTERVIEW

Is Dutch euroscepticism special compared to what we see in other countries?

There’s a major difference in euro scepticism between the North and the South. In the South of Europe, there’s much resistance against austerity, so it’s of a left-wing nature. Think of Syriza and Podemos for example. In the North, it’s more of a political nature, resisting the increasing power of Brussels – and the encroachment of the national identity. Of course, there’re also concerns about solidarity towards Greece and increasing competition due to Polish truck drivers, for example. So there are economic components, but at the end of the day the key question in the Netherlands is still political: With whom do we want to share our work, money and power? In that sense, Dutch euro-scepticism has much in common with England and Denmark.

nexus.nordea.com/research Opinion polls indicate that the eurosceptic Freedom Party (PVV) will get around 20% of the votes or 30 seats in the Second Chamber out of 150. What makes PVV so attractive for Dutch voters?

One third of the Dutch public favours more equal income distribution and is reluctant when it comes to immigration and European integration. ’ PVV is the only party catering for that one third of the electorate. The Socialist Party also favours a more egalitarian income distribution and is very concerned about labour migration, but it’s reluctant to resist refugee migration and Islam. Wilders is playing this card. He’s the only one who’s so far-going in his resistance towards political Islam and refugees. His profile is sufficiently to the left when it comes to the pension and health care systems to attract the votes of that one third of the public, which also has a far more pessimistic perspective on the economy than the rest of the electorate. Moreover, his anti-establishment style resonates well especially with people with lower education and a poor economic outlook. So he’s touching the right buttons for a large group of the electorate and offering the perfect package.

What are Wilders' plans for economic policy?

It’s good to remember that Geert Wilders is not a new figure in politics. He’s been in the parliament since the 1990s – which actually makes it quite funny that he is blaming politicians for everything given that he’s been active in parliament for so long. Anyway, he started as a split-off from the conservative liberals, the VVD, and supported austerity and cuts in the welfare state. But gradually he noticed that to be successful in an election a left-wing image wouldn’t hurt, so he shifted his economic policy agenda towards the left.

However, economic policies aren’t the cornerstone of his agenda at all. Wilders’ carelessness in terms of economic policy became clear after the election in June 2010, when he won 24 seats. One day after the election he changed his view by saying: “Well, I don’t care so much about the retirement age. Why should we necessarily keep it at 65?” – although, it had been one of his major messages during the campaign. This episode is now used by other parties to argue that “you can’t trust Wilders”. In April 2012, the government collapsed because Wilders withdrew his support, arguing that the elderly had to pay for Europe’s budget cuts. But it also had to do with the fact that he was no longer in a key position to support the government because of one of the split-offs. From the reconstructions of the negotiations, one could get the impression nexus.nordea.com/research that he rather regretted his weaker power position than had a strong stance against an austerity budget.

Didn’t that hurt his credibility?

His potential voters don’t always agree with him or the way he talks in the media, especially on the social media where he can be somewhat rude, but they rather take it with a pinch of salt. But seen from the voters’ perspective at least he dares to speak out against Islam, refugees and “lazy Greeks” … and in the forthcoming elections, these issues matter much more than the economy. And after all, Wilders still provides a better package for many people than other parties.

Is the PVV Geert Wilders’ one-man show?

Not entirely. For sure, if Geert Wilders leaves one day, the party might fall apart. But for example Martin Bosma is the second man in line, he invents many of the quotes that Wilders sends out. If not a member of the Freedom Party, he could’ve become Speaker of the House. People like the way he’s doing his job.

Next year, Wilders wants the PVV to run in local elections in all municipalities. The question is: Will he be able to manage his party alone? There are voices calling for a democratisation of the party. Because of these open questions, the PVV would be an uncertain coalition partner as there might be more split-offs.

Can Wilders come to power?

The chances of Wilders coming to power are small as most other parties, including the fiscal conservatives, the VVD, will refuse to cooperate. There are only two exceptions, the pensioners’ party 50+ and the tiny orthodox-protestant party SGP.

And I don’t think that Wilders wants to govern. Does he have potential ministers? Nobody knows. His position is much more powerful now. Why bear the costs of governing when you can have much more influence from an in-between position between opposition and government?

Most probably, the largest party, which seems to be the PVV, will try to form a government first. Wilders won’t manage to put a coalition together, and then other parties will try: VVD, D66, Green Left and perhaps the Christian Union.

nexus.nordea.com/research Can a broad coalition of parties forming the next government agree on the economic policy?

Dutch parties are used to making compromises also on economic policies and to execute them effectively. For instance, the present coalition of fiscal conservatives (VVD) and social democrats (PvdA) managed to adopt major social-economic reforms with support from the oppositional parties such as the centrist D66. After the collapse of the previous government, after Wilders had withdrawn his support, several parties from government and opposition also quickly managed to agree on a draft budget in order to meet EMU requirements.

The next parliament will probably be more right-wing, also in socio-economic terms. Further economic and monetary integration will be more difficult. D66 is the most pro-European party, but doesn’t want to support mutualisation of debt in the Eurozone. So they basically stick to the German/Dutch austerity view. The Green Left and Labour Party favour more European solidarity and also argue for a budgetary capacity at the European level in the long run. The conservative-liberal VVD and the Christian Democrats are much more reluctant in this respect, arguing that a budgetary capacity at the European level or Eurobonds would create moral hazard problems. In its election programme, the VVD also criticises the ECB lax policies.

Eventually, I think that the VVD, even grudgingly, would accept some form of budgetary capacity at the European level, some form of debt restructuring for Greece, and also some backup for Italy, if Germany would accept to do so, and keep the EU moving. As history showed before, solidary doesn’t start from charity but happens out of necessity.

Has the public opinion towards the EU changed after the Brexit vote?

No, I wouldn’t say so. The important change already came after 2008 with the start of the debt crisis in the Eurozone. More and more people realised that the EU membership means a loss of sovereignty, Dutch identity and possibly money. About 10% of the people has always strongly opposed the EU membership and some 10-15% has always been in favour of closer integration and a federal political union. But the big chunk in between, are rather pragmatic about European integration. For a very long time trade opportunities worked fine for EU support, but with the euro crisis, many felt that the Netherlands were shackled to poor countries. That also played a role in the referendum about the EU association nexus.nordea.com/research agreement with the Ukraine (which the Dutch rejected in a referendum in April 2016). So the Dutch don’t favour enlargement very much – except for Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, decently governed countries that won’t cost much money. Pragmatism also leads part of the public to support international cooperation for a small country such as the Netherlands. A considerable share of the public, however, is also concerned that Dutch power and identity would diminish by more European integration and enlargement.

What does the Brexit vote mean to the EU? Possibly more exits?

Well, to some extent the UK referendum actually shows that one shouldn’t be scared of a French or a German exit. The British Tories had been eurosceptics for so long together with a large part of the media, and still almost half of the people voted in favour of remaining. There have been no hard eurosceptic parties in government in France, Germany and the Netherlands in recent years, and the media are more in favour of European integration – even if only for pragmatic reasons. Brexit rather confirmed some Dutch that ceding more power to Brussels is not a good idea. But that’s how they already felt before the Brexit vote. Right now, it very much depends on the negotiations on Brexit whether an exit would be attractive. As of now, most Dutch do not perceive a Nexit attractive, however grumpy they might be about the current developments in the EU.

By the way, even if Marine Le Pen becomes president, she can’t hold a referendum without majority support from the parliament either. I can’t see that happening for constitutional reasons.

The same holds true for the Dutch parliament. I can’t see a majority for a referendum. Both chambers of parliament would have to adopt an ad-hoc law to allow for a (legally) non-binding referendum. And in June 2016, a large majority turned down a request by Wilders to hold a referendum on Nexit. In December, the parliament rejected a resolution to hold a parliamentary inquiry on the introduction of the Euro. Instead, it asked the main advisory body of the government, the Council of State, to explore all future options for the Eurozone.

Imagine you had to give the EU advice on how to stabilise the European project and create a better image? What would that be?

I often get that question – how can we sell the EU better? I don’t think it’s so much an issue of image. The key issue is that there are economies in the Eurozone that don’t fit together. This wouldn’t nexus.nordea.com/research be a problem if there was sufficient labour mobility and sufficient budgetary capacity. But both are sensitive issues, because that concerns the basic question of every political community: who wants to share money, work and power with whom?

This means that moving on with the current Eurozone is moving on the path of deteriorating the relationships between a couple of economies and also between people within the EU. Some of my colleagues who are also working on European disintegration argue that if you want to foster a better cultural understanding and growing mutual trust, then it might be better to change the composition of the Eurozone to some extent. The problem is of course that the costs of breaking up are difficult to estimate and quite scary, too. But the relationship can easily deteriorate further.

The Northern core is stronger than the Southern periphery. It’s the sad story of many empires that in the end the rich core decides. Sometimes, the periphery joins and sometimes it gets lost.

Will the Netherlands still be a Eurozone country in five years’ time?

Yes.

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