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Virtue Epistemology: Some Implications for Education Virtue Epistemology: Some implications for Education Sean Moran, BEd, BA, DPSE, MA Thesis Presented for the Award of Doctor of Philosophy Dublin City University, St Patrick's College, Drumcondra Education Department Supervisor: Prof. Joseph Dunne June 2011 l Declaration Ï hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme o f study leading to the award of Doctor of Philosophy is entirely my own work and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text o f my work. Signed: ID No.: 58262903 Date: 28 June 2011 Acknowledgements Thanks are due to my supervisor, Prof. Joseph Dunne, for his guidance, sungnome and courteous elenchus; to Dr. Eileen Brennan and Dr. Christopher Cowley for reading and commenting on earlier versions of chapters 1 and 2; to the internal and external examiners, Dr. Jones Irwin and Prof. David Carr, for an interesting viva and some useful suggestions; to my colleague Ms. Mary Fenton for her support; and to my beloved S. 3 Table of Contents A b s t r a c t ........ 8 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 9 Chapter 1 - Overview of Virtue Epistem ology ......................................................................2 1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................2 1 Traditional Definitions of Knowledge .........................................................................................21 Symbolic Conventions and Abbreviations..................................................................................25 Some Problems of Traditional Epistemology............................................................................26 Changing from a Belief-based to an Agent-based Epistemology ................................... 29 A Precursor to Ernest Sosa’s Epistemology: Robert Nozick’s 'Tracking’ Model 30 Virtue Epistemology (i) - Ernest Sosa ........................................................................................32 Sosa’s Agenda........................................................................................................................................35 Safety and Sensitivity......................................................................................................................... 36 Two Grades of Knowledge................................................................................................................41 An Archery Metaphor for Knowing................................................................................................43 Departures from Greek Tradition of Virtue...............................................................................45 Virtue Epistemology (ii) - Linda Zagzebski ........................................................................4 6 Zagzebski's Task...................................................................................................................................47 Differences Between Zagzebski and Sosa ...................................................................................50 Aristotle's Distinction Between the Intellectual and the Moral Virtues..........................51 Zagzebski on the Development of intellectual Virtue in the Agent................................... 57 Flourishing as a Unifying Principle................................................................................................62 Conclusions of Chapter 1 .............................................................. 63 Chapter 2 - Knowledge and Testim ony .................................................................................... 6 6 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 66 H istorical an d C ontem porary P h ilo so p h ica l S tan ces to w a rd s T e stim o n y ................6 7 Plato's Dismissal of Testimony as a Knowledge-source........................................................67 Descartes’ and Locke's Dismissal.................................... 70 Hume's Endorsement......................................................... 73 Legal and Natural Testimony........................................................................................................... 77 Proper Trust in Testimony............................................................................................................... 79 Language Learning and Testimony................................................................................................81 Auditing of Testimony: Reductionists vs. Anti-Reductionists.............................................82 4 Testimony as Important as Perception, Memory and Reasoning.................................. 86 Safety and Sensitivity of Testimony............................................................................. 87 Knowledge as a Communal Asset....................................................................................¡... 92 Empirical Questioning of Testimony’s Value.....................................................................93 Monitoring Testimony for Trustworthiness......................................................................95 The Cultivation of an Epistemically Virtuous Approach to Testimony........................ 97 Conclusions of Chapter 2........................................................................................................ 99 Chapter 3 - Other-regarding Epistemic Virtues........................................................1 0 1 Introduction.............................................................................................................................101 Self-regard and Other-regard.............................................................................................102 A Virtue-Epistemic Approach to ‘The Other'............................... 106 Virtue Ethics and Regard for the Other.............................................................................107 Epistemic Virtues as Other-regarding.............................................................................. 109 Complementary Intellectual Virtues................................................................................. I l l Beyond the Epistemic Dyad.................................................................................................115 A Different Perspective: The Field as 'Other'................................................................... 118 The Role of Benevolence in Regulating Regard for the Other...................................... 120 Speaking Out..........................................................................................................................121 Attunement Towards the Other's Epistemic Needs........................................................125 The Dangers of Epistemic Insincerity................................................................................127 Epistemically-justified Dissimulation................................................................................130 Childhood Myths...................................................................................................................134 The Importance of Timely Intervention .................................................................... 137 Taking Indirect Routes to Knowledge...............................................................................139 Conclusions of Chapter 3.......................................................................................................141 Chapter 4 - Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology and Education ................................ 1 4 4 Introduction.................................................................................................... 144 Aims of Education............................................................................................................. 147 Developing Reliabilist Construals of Knowledge in an Educational Context 149 Suitable Range of Propositions for the Learner - Including ‘Threshold Concepts'...150 Believing That p versus Being Able to State "That p"..................................................... 156 Sensitivity Towards Counterfactive Possibilities............................................................158 Acquiring Safe Beliefs.......................................................................................................... 159 Subjunctive Conditionals and Belief Formation.............................................................. 159 Artificial Intelligence Theory: Revising the Doxastic Web........................................ 164 Belief Revision, Contraction and Expansion................ 165 5 Closure of Belief Sets Under Logical Entailment.............................................................169 Analysing Learning, Using Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology and AI Theory 172 Belief Revision and Epistemic Virtue................................................................................172 Example of Non-sensitive True Belief Acquisition in the Classroom..........................175 The Importance of Counterfactives for Learning............................................................177 Socrates on Cognitive Dissonance....................................................................................
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