Npr 3.3: Monitoring and Verification in A
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Jonathan B. Tucker MONITORING AND VERIFICATION IN A NONCOOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS FROM THE U.N. EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ by Jonathan B. Tucker1 Dr. Jonathan B. Tucker is Director for Chemical/Biological Weapons Proliferation Issues at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. Prior to this appointment, he worked at the U.S. Department of State, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, the Chemical and Biological Policy Division of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and on the staff of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses. He has also served as a UNSCOM inspector in Iraq. n the aftermath of the 1991 Per- and technical experts. UNSCOM’s ance with nonproliferation treaties. sian Gulf War, the U.N. Secu- task is to discover and destroy or It is therefore useful to reflect on Irity Council sought to ensure render harmless Iraq’s chemical, the lessons of the U.N. experience that a defeated Iraq would never biological, and long-range missile in Iraq for monitoring and verifica- again pose a threat to regional and capabilities and to assist the Vienna- tion of the nuclear Non-Prolifera- international security. To this end, based International Atomic Energy tion Treaty, the Chemical Weapons U.N. Security Council Resolution Agency (IAEA) in eliminating Convention, and the Biological 687, which specified the conditions Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. At Weapons Convention. for the cease-fire, mandated the dis- the outset, it was expected that the mantling of Iraq’s weapons of mass host country would be noncoopera- PHASES OF U.N. OPERATIONS destruction (WMD) and ballistic tive and perhaps even hostile. In- IN IRAQ missiles with a range exceeding 150 deed, over the past five years, Iraq kilometers, together with the infra- has engaged in a systematic effort The U.N. mission in Iraq has structure needed to produce them. of misrepresentation, concealment, gone through three phases. During Stripping Iraq of its WMD is a key and deception aimed at impeding the the initial “discovery” phase, the requirement for lifting the economic ability of the U.N. agencies to carry U.N. agencies sought to obtain a sanctions imposed on Baghdad in out their disarmament mission. full accounting of Iraq’s past WMD 1990 after the Iraqi invasion of Although the “anytime, any- programs and supplier networks and Kuwait. where” inspection system in Iraq to compile a comprehensive inven- To implement this program of en- was imposed on the losing side in a tory of dual-capable facilities that forced disarmament, the Security war and thus is far more intrusive could be used either for legitimate Council established the United Na- than any negotiated verification re- commercial activities or for illicit tions Special Commission on Iraq gime could be, future international weapons purposes. In the second (UNSCOM), a multinational agency inspectors are likely to face similar “destruction” phase, the U.N. agen- comprised of military, scientific, challenges when verifying compli- cies eliminated Iraq’s stockpile of The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 1 Jonathan B. Tucker chemical weapons and those facili- tions, which were communicated to tional inspection teams, transport ties that had been specifically in- Baghdad on May 6, 1991, in a pro- them to and around Iraq, prepare volved in its WMD programs. posed exchange of letters between and analyze the results of on-site in- In the third and current phase, then-U.N. Secretary-General Javier spections, and destroy weapons UNSCOM and the IAEA are put- Perez de Cuellar and Iraqi Foreign stockpiles and production facilities. ting in place an “ongoing monitor- Minister Ahmed Hussein. The Iraqi Over the past five years, hundreds ing and verification”(OMV) pro- authorities initially rejected the pro- of weapons experts from several gram to keep close watch on Iraq’s posed guidelines as an undue in- supporting countries (primarily dual-capable facilities and to track fringement on their sovereignty, and Australia, Canada, France, Ger- its imports and exports of sensitive it was only after the Security Coun- many, New Zealand, Russia, Swe- technologies, with the goal of pre- cil exerted heavy pressure—includ- den, Switzerland, the United King- venting Baghdad from reacquiring ing the implicit threat of renewed dom, and the United States) have WMD. To support this effort, the military action—that Baghdad fi- been assigned by their national gov- U.N. agencies have sought to as- nally executed the exchange of let- ernments to serve on IAEA and sess Iraq’s indigenous scientific and ters on May 14, 1991.2 UNSCOM inspection teams for a technological capabilities in areas The agreed provisions established period of two weeks or more. Team relevant to WMD (e.g., the design the right of UNSCOM and the size ranges from as few as three and manufacture of biological fer- IAEA to conduct no-notice inspec- members to more than 50 in spe- menters) and to identify chokepoints tions of declared and undeclared cial cases. The inspectors include in Iraq’s abilities to reconstitute its facilities throughout Iraq, with full technical experts in a particular field WMD activities where future moni- access and no right of refusal. Pow- of weapons development and pro- toring efforts can most usefully be ers of inspection include the author- duction (often loaned from national focused. ity to request and retain data and defense laboratories), along with In practice, the three phases of documents, take photographs, con- support personnel such as an opera- the U.N. operation have overlapped duct interviews, install remote-con- tions officer, a photographer, a re- extensively. Although the OMV trolled monitoring equipment, per- port coordinator, an Arabic-English program is currently under way at form aerial reconnaissance, and interpreter, and one or more trans- many of Iraq’s dual-capable facili- collect samples for laboratory analy- lators for documentary material. All ties, other UNSCOM inspection sis. All of these rights have been members of a U.N. inspection team teams are still engaged in a process confirmed in subsequent Security are granted the privileges and of intensive discovery with respect Council resolutions, and together immunities of international civil ser- to Iraq’s biological weapons and they constitute the most intrusive vants for the duration of their mis- missile programs. Because the three international inspection regime ever sion, and are instructed neither to phases of the U.N. effort have dif- implemented. seek nor to accept instructions from ferent requirements, they offer dis- The first months of U.N. inspec- any government authority outside tinct lessons for future monitoring tions in Iraq were characterized by the United Nations. In practice, and verification efforts. improvisation and a degree of ex- however, the thinking of many perimental chaos as UNSCOM and inspectors is influenced—if only INSPECTION PROCEDURES the IAEA tried to find their way in unconsciously—by their national in- this new type of activity. Until Au- terests and perspectives. Security Council Resolution 687 gust 1991, when Germany contrib- Before a given inspection begins, mandated that Iraq was to “uncon- uted C-160 transport aircraft to fly UNSCOM’s analytical staff at the ditionally accept the destruction, inspection teams to Iraq, the United United Nations in New York plans removal or rendering harmless” of Nations leased a barely airworthy out the mission in detail. Each in- its WMD capabilities but did not plane from Tarom Airlines, the Ro- spection team is assigned a specific specify the rights of UNSCOM and manian national carrier.3 Largely mandate, such as performing a com- the IAEA in accomplishing this through a process of trial and er- plete inventory of dual-capable mission. U.N. officials drafted a set ror, UNSCOM and the IAEA equipment at a given facility, or as- of detailed provisions for inspec- learned how to assemble multina- sessing Iraq’s indigenous capabili- 2 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Jonathan B. Tucker ties in a militarily relevant field of coordinated internal Iraqi govern- or failure of the mission. The most technology. ment activities related to the U.N. effective chief inspectors possess a As a staging area for inspections inspections and serves as Baghdad’s rare blend of talents, combining the in Iraq, UNSCOM has established official liaison with the United Na- discretion of a diplomat, the tech- a regional field office in Manama, tions. At the initial meeting with nical knowledge and objectivity of the capital of Bahrain, an island- NMD officials, the chief inspector a trained scientist, and the skepti- nation in the Persian Gulf. Mem- formally presents the team’s creden- cal intellect of a trial lawyer. bers of each inspection team as- tials, explains the purpose of the Third, evidence of weapons-re- semble in Manama for acclimatiza- planned mission, and requests the lated activities at a dual-capable tion and training before travelling cooperation of the Iraqi hosts. Over facility typically resides in subtle de- to Baghdad to begin their mission. the next two weeks, the inspection tails that can only be detected by The inspectors are issued a cash team travels to facilities in and individuals with a trained eye, a advance and a blue U.N. certificate around Baghdad by bus or Land solid technical grasp of the produc- to be used in Iraq in lieu of a na- Rover and to more distant tion process, and a familiarity with tional passport. After orientation facilities by helicopter. Iraqi gov- the history of Iraq’s WMD pro- and mission planning in Bahrain, the ernment escorts or “minders” grams. For this reason, inspectors team flies in a military transport air- accompany the U.N. inspectors on who have served on multiple inspec- craft to Iraq’s Habbaniyah Air Base, every site visit and videotape walk- tions are particularly valuable.