Npr 3.3: Monitoring and Verification in A

Jonathan B. Tucker

MONITORING AND VERIFICATION IN A NONCOOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS FROM THE U.N. EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ

by Jonathan B. Tucker1

Dr. Jonathan B. Tucker is Director for Chemical/Biological Weapons Proliferation Issues at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. Prior to this appointment, he worked at the U.S. Department of State, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, the Chemical and Biological Policy Division of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and on the staff of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses. He has also served as a UNSCOM inspector in Iraq.

n the aftermath of the 1991 Per- and technical experts. UNSCOM’s ance with nonproliferation treaties. sian Gulf War, the U.N. Secu- task is to discover and destroy or It is therefore useful to reflect on Irity Council sought to ensure render harmless Iraq’s chemical, the lessons of the U.N. experience that a defeated Iraq would never biological, and long-range missile in Iraq for monitoring and verifica- again pose a threat to regional and capabilities and to assist the Vienna- tion of the nuclear Non-Prolifera- international security. To this end, based International Atomic Energy tion Treaty, the Chemical Weapons U.N. Security Council Resolution Agency (IAEA) in eliminating Convention, and the Biological 687, which specified the conditions Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. At Weapons Convention. for the cease-fire, mandated the dis- the outset, it was expected that the mantling of Iraq’s weapons of mass host country would be noncoopera- PHASES OF U.N. OPERATIONS destruction (WMD) and ballistic tive and perhaps even hostile. In- IN IRAQ missiles with a range exceeding 150 deed, over the past five years, Iraq kilometers, together with the infra- has engaged in a systematic effort The U.N. mission in Iraq has structure needed to produce them. of misrepresentation, concealment, gone through three phases. During Stripping Iraq of its WMD is a key and deception aimed at impeding the the initial “discovery” phase, the requirement for lifting the economic ability of the U.N. agencies to carry U.N. agencies sought to obtain a sanctions imposed on Baghdad in out their disarmament mission. full accounting of Iraq’s past WMD 1990 after the Iraqi invasion of Although the “anytime, any- programs and supplier networks and Kuwait. where” inspection system in Iraq to compile a comprehensive inven- To implement this program of en- was imposed on the losing side in a tory of dual-capable facilities that forced disarmament, the Security war and thus is far more intrusive could be used either for legitimate Council established the United Na- than any negotiated verification re- commercial activities or for illicit tions Special Commission on Iraq gime could be, future international weapons purposes. In the second (UNSCOM), a multinational agency inspectors are likely to face similar “destruction” phase, the U.N. agen- comprised of military, scientific, challenges when verifying compli- cies eliminated Iraq’s stockpile of

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 1 Jonathan B. Tucker chemical weapons and those facili- tions, which were communicated to tional inspection teams, transport ties that had been specifically in- Baghdad on May 6, 1991, in a pro- them to and around Iraq, prepare volved in its WMD programs. posed exchange of letters between and analyze the results of on-site in- In the third and current phase, then-U.N. Secretary-General Javier spections, and destroy weapons UNSCOM and the IAEA are put- Perez de Cuellar and Iraqi Foreign stockpiles and production facilities. ting in place an “ongoing monitor- Minister Ahmed Hussein. The Iraqi Over the past five years, hundreds ing and verification”(OMV) pro- authorities initially rejected the pro- of weapons experts from several gram to keep close watch on Iraq’s posed guidelines as an undue in- supporting countries (primarily dual-capable facilities and to track fringement on their sovereignty, and Australia, Canada, France, Ger- its imports and exports of sensitive it was only after the Security Coun- many, New Zealand, Russia, Swe- technologies, with the goal of pre- cil exerted heavy pressure—includ- den, Switzerland, the United King- venting Baghdad from reacquiring ing the implicit threat of renewed dom, and the United States) have WMD. To support this effort, the military action—that Baghdad fi- been assigned by their national gov- U.N. agencies have sought to as- nally executed the exchange of let- ernments to serve on IAEA and sess Iraq’s indigenous scientific and ters on May 14, 1991.2 UNSCOM inspection teams for a technological capabilities in areas The agreed provisions established period of two weeks or more. Team relevant to WMD (e.g., the design the right of UNSCOM and the size ranges from as few as three and manufacture of biological fer- IAEA to conduct no-notice inspec- members to more than 50 in spe- menters) and to identify chokepoints tions of declared and undeclared cial cases. The inspectors include in Iraq’s abilities to reconstitute its facilities throughout Iraq, with full technical experts in a particular field WMD activities where future moni- access and no right of refusal. Pow- of weapons development and pro- toring efforts can most usefully be ers of inspection include the author- duction (often loaned from national focused. ity to request and retain data and defense laboratories), along with In practice, the three phases of documents, take photographs, con- support personnel such as an opera- the U.N. operation have overlapped duct interviews, install remote-con- tions officer, a photographer, a re- extensively. Although the OMV trolled monitoring equipment, per- port coordinator, an Arabic-English program is currently under way at form aerial reconnaissance, and interpreter, and one or more trans- many of Iraq’s dual-capable facili- collect samples for laboratory analy- lators for documentary material. All ties, other UNSCOM inspection sis. All of these rights have been members of a U.N. inspection team teams are still engaged in a process confirmed in subsequent Security are granted the privileges and of intensive discovery with respect Council resolutions, and together immunities of international civil ser- to Iraq’s biological weapons and they constitute the most intrusive vants for the duration of their mis- missile programs. Because the three international inspection regime ever sion, and are instructed neither to phases of the U.N. effort have dif- implemented. seek nor to accept instructions from ferent requirements, they offer dis- The first months of U.N. inspec- any government authority outside tinct lessons for future monitoring tions in Iraq were characterized by the United Nations. In practice, and verification efforts. improvisation and a degree of ex- however, the thinking of many perimental chaos as UNSCOM and inspectors is influenced—if only INSPECTION PROCEDURES the IAEA tried to find their way in unconsciously—by their national in- this new type of activity. Until Au- terests and perspectives. Security Council Resolution 687 gust 1991, when Germany contrib- Before a given inspection begins, mandated that Iraq was to “uncon- uted C-160 transport aircraft to fly UNSCOM’s analytical staff at the ditionally accept the destruction, inspection teams to Iraq, the United United Nations in New York plans removal or rendering harmless” of Nations leased a barely airworthy out the mission in detail. Each in- its WMD capabilities but did not plane from Tarom Airlines, the Ro- spection team is assigned a specific specify the rights of UNSCOM and manian national carrier.3 Largely mandate, such as performing a com- the IAEA in accomplishing this through a process of trial and er- plete inventory of dual-capable mission. U.N. officials drafted a set ror, UNSCOM and the IAEA equipment at a given facility, or as- of detailed provisions for inspec- learned how to assemble multina- sessing Iraq’s indigenous capabili-

2 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Jonathan B. Tucker ties in a militarily relevant field of coordinated internal Iraqi govern- or failure of the mission. The most technology. ment activities related to the U.N. effective chief inspectors possess a As a staging area for inspections inspections and serves as Baghdad’s rare blend of talents, combining the in Iraq, UNSCOM has established official liaison with the United Na- discretion of a diplomat, the tech- a regional field office in Manama, tions. At the initial meeting with nical knowledge and objectivity of the capital of Bahrain, an island- NMD officials, the chief inspector a trained scientist, and the skepti- nation in the Persian Gulf. Mem- formally presents the team’s creden- cal intellect of a trial lawyer. bers of each inspection team as- tials, explains the purpose of the Third, evidence of weapons-resemble in Manama for acclimatiza- planned mission, and requests the lated activities at a dual-capable tion and training before travelling cooperation of the Iraqi hosts. Over facility typically resides in subtle de- to Baghdad to begin their mission. the next two weeks, the inspection tails that can only be detected by The inspectors are issued a cash team travels to facilities in and individuals with a trained eye, a advance and a blue U.N. certificate around Baghdad by bus or Land solid technical grasp of the produc- to be used in Iraq in lieu of a na- Rover and to more distant tion process, and a familiarity with tional passport. After orientation facilities by helicopter. Iraqi gov- the history of Iraq’s WMD pro- and mission planning in Bahrain, the ernment escorts or “minders” grams. For this reason, inspectors team flies in a military transport air- accompany the U.N. inspectors on who have served on multiple inspec- craft to Iraq’s Habbaniyah Air Base, every site visit and videotape walk- tions are particularly valuable. Be- about 70 kilometers west of throughs, meetings, and interviews. cause assessing the purpose of a Baghdad, and travels into the city Upon completion of the team’s mis- dual-capable facility often requires by bus. (Although Germany has sion, the chief inspector holds a the specialized knowledge and ex- provided military transports, heli- final meeting with NMD officials perience of several individuals, copters, and pilots for the first five to seek answers to outstanding ques- team-members must communicate years of U.N. inspections in Iraq, tions. The team then flies back to well so that they can combine their flight operations will be taken over Bahrain for debriefing and report technical perspectives and reach a in the fall of 1996 by Argentina and writing, after which it disbands. consensus judgement on the signifi- Chile.) cance of an ambiguous site, piece Once in Baghdad, inspection TEAM COMPOSITION of information, or item of equip- teams work out of UNSCOM’s ment. Inspection teams that suffer Baghdad Monitoring and Verifica- UNSCOM has learned some im- from interpersonal conflicts and tion Centre (BMVC), housed on the portant lessons about the composi- poor communication tend to be in- third floor of the former Canal Ho- tion of inspection teams. First, to effective. In most cases, however, tel. The BMVC comprises a con- minimize logistical burdens and team members from different coun- ference room, a medical clinic, of- costs, it is important to keep inspec- tries and technical backgrounds fices for permanent staff, working tion teams as small as possible— quickly establish a cohesive esprit areas for visiting inspection teams, except when the use of complex de corps and come to identify laboratories for conducting chemi- technologies such as ground-pen- strongly with the goals of the United cal and biological analyses, and an etrating radar requires a large num- Nations mission in Iraq.4 operations center that maintains ber of technicians. Broad geographi- UNSCOM has also learned the radio contact with in-country inspec- cal representation is essential for importance of creating a well- tion teams and also monitors doz- political reasons, and the team must staffed, competent, and professional ens of dual-capable factories have the appropriate mix of techni- organization at its headquarters in throughout Iraq with closed-circuit cal skills so that it can accomplish New York and its field offices in video cameras. its assigned mission. Manama and Baghdad. This staff One of the first tasks for the chief Second, it is important to foster provides analytical, administrative, of an incoming inspection team is a cohesive group dynamic, a task and logistical support to the inspec- to meet with Iraqi officials from the requiring strong leadership skills on tion teams in the field, and main- National Monitoring Directorate the part of the operations officer and tains continuity and institutional (NMD), which in recent years has the chief inspector, who are ulti- memory. mately responsible for the success

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 3 Jonathan B. Tucker

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT The use of sensitive national in- shaped objects that U.S. intelligence telligence brings with it certain con- analysts had been unable to inter- An “anywhere, anytime” inspec- straints. Since the resolution of sat- pret. The giant saucers turned out tion regime is only effective if the ellite photographs is highly classi- to be powerful electromagnets inspectors know where to go. The fied, they can only be used to brief known as “calutrons,” which sepa- UNSCOM experience in Iraq has the Office of the Executive Chair- rate isotopes by their atomic weight demonstrated the key role of intel- man and chief inspectors, and can- and can be used to enrich uranium ligence in guiding the work of an not be retained by UNSCOM staff for nuclear weapons. This informa- international inspectorate, particu- for independent analysis or refer- tion helped the IAEA team to un- larly in a noncooperative environ- ence purposes. Moreover, satellite cover Iraq’s use of a nearly forgot- ment. Under the terms of Security photographs of sites of particular in- ten but still workable enrichment Council Resolution 687, Iraq was terest may not be available on a technology known as Electro-Mag- required to submit declarations stat- timely basis. As a practical alterna- netic Isotope Separation (EMIS).8 ing the types, numbers, and loca- tive to reliance on satellite imag- Good intelligence is particularly tions of all its prohibited weapons ery, UNSCOM accepted the loan essential when planning no-notice and related facilities, which would from the United States of a U-2 or “challenge” inspections, which then be verified through on-site high-altitude surveillance plane, are designed to detect illicit weap- inspections by U.N. teams. In prac- which is based in Saudi Arabia and ons or activities at undeclared sites. tice, Baghdad submitted initial dec- equipped with cameras for aerial Before a typical challenge inspec- larations that were both incomplete photography.6 tion, the U.N. inspection team and misleading. UNSCOM distrib- In September 1991, this aircraft receives a briefing on the suspect uted copies of the declarations to began regular survey flights over facility and studies a detailed site about 60 U.N. member states for Iraq that have continued ever since. map derived from overhead photog- comment, and some countries pro- Before each U-2 flight, UNSCOM raphy. The team then travels to the vided useful intelligence on suspect informs the U.S. government of the chosen site by helicopter or by road, facilities that had not been de- particular locations it wishes to have taking a circuitous route to keep the 5 clared. photographed. After the flight, Iraqi minders in the dark until the A few supporting countries have UNSCOM analytical staff receive last possible moment about the tar- shared high-quality intelligence the developed film to retain for their get of the inspection. When the products with UNSCOM and the own analysis. The main uses of inspectors arrive at the site, they IAEA, including satellite photo- aerial photography are to identify typically order the plant workers not graphs, line drawings derived from undeclared sites that might be en- to leave until the search has been overhead imagery, defector reports, gaged in illicit activities, to plan new completed. Hovering helicopters and information on “signatures,” or inspections, and to verify that no monitor the perimeter of the site to indicators of illicit weapons activ- suspect or prohibited activities are ensure that key items of equipment ity. At first, national intelligence under way at sites that have already or material are not removed surrep- officials had reservations about shar- been inspected.7 To supplement the titiously.9 The team then conducts ing sensitive information with the U-2 flights, UNSCOM employs a visual inspection of the facility and United Nations because of concern three helicopters for low-level aerial interviews plant personnel. At some about compromising clandestine reconnaissance using hand-held still dual-capable chemical or biological sources and methods. Given that the and video cameras. facilities, inspectors collect samples U.N. presence in Iraq offers the Human sources have also pro- from inside and outside the plant only means to eliminate Baghdad’s vided valuable intelligence for tar- and take them back to the BMVC remaining WMD capabilities, how- geting inspections. For example, the for analysis. ever, several countries have decided second IAEA nuclear inspection Thanks to the use of the U-2 air- that it is in their national interest to team that entered Iraq in June 1991 craft and other independent moni- ensure that UNSCOM and the received information from a human toring assets, the locus of informa- IAEA do their job as effectively as source that helped explain some tion and expertise on Iraq’s WMD possible. mysterious images of large saucer- programs has shifted in recent years

4 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Jonathan B. Tucker from national intelligence agencies disclosure. This pattern of “cheat claimed had been limited to defen- to the United Nations itself. An In- and retreat” continued throughout sive research. UNSCOM, however, formation Assessment Unit (IAU) the period of baseline inspections. noticed a lack of middle managers at UNSCOM headquarters in New The Iraqi authorities also tried to between the top officials and the York evaluates the data generated misdirect the U.N. inspectors away technical staff and deduced that Iraq by on-site inspections and correlates from sensitive sites and developed was concealing the identities of them with intelligence flowing in elaborate cover stories to protect many senior weapons scientists.11 from other sources, such as that pro- their clandestine programs. For ex- Eventually, UNSCOM was able to vided by companies that sold equip- ample, they claimed that the large determine that more than 150 sci- ment and materials to Baghdad prior uranium-enrichment facility at entists and senior technicians had to the Gulf War. At present, the IAU Tarmiya was a high-voltage trans- worked on the Iraqi BW program.12 identifies most of the suspect sites former testing facility, and that the U.N. inspectors have also iden- for no-notice inspections in Iraq and first calutrons seen by inspectors tified discrepancies between legiti- analyzes the results. were scientific mass spectrom- mate production activities declared eters.10 When the IAEA and by Iraq and the technical character- IRAQI RESPONSES TO UNSCOM managed to penetrate istics of certain items of dual-ca- INSPECTIONS such cover stories, Baghdad aban- pable equipment. For example, the doned them in a gradual manner. Iraqis claimed that the Al Hakam Throughout the period of baseline In general, the Iraqi authorities tried Factory, a biological fermentation inspections, Iraq engaged in a cat- to assess the extent of the U.N. plant located in the desert about 80 and-mouse game with the United agencies’ knowledge and tailored kilometers southwest of Baghdad, Nations in a deliberate effort to con- their declarations to conceal facili- was engaged in the commercial ceal the full scale and scope of its ties and programs that had not been manufacture of two products: a mi- WMD programs. This interaction detected. The end-result of this pro- crobial pesticide (Bacillus continues today with respect to bio- cess was that Iraq’s declarations thuringiensis, or BT) and single-cell logical weapons and missile inspec- came increasingly to resemble protein for use as an animal feed tions. Iraq’s various means of Western intelligence assessments: in supplement. However, the spray obstruction, concealment, and de- effect, the Iraqis told UNSCOM and drier in the BT production line was ception are described below. the IAEA what they already knew. capable of generating particles Because of Iraq’s persistent mis- whose size was inconsistent with the Incomplete and Misleading representations, the U.N. agencies declared purpose of dispersing BT Declarations recognized that they could not rely bacteria as a biological pesticide. on official declarations to obtain a The particles were too small to settle Security Council Resolution 687 full accounting of Baghdad’s WMD out of the air onto crops but were required Iraq to make “full, final, programs. Nevertheless, the decla- in the appropriate size range for ef- and complete declarations” in which rations were useful as a point of ficient dispersal of a BW agent as it listed all of the facilities and ac- departure and provided a basis for an aerosol that would remain sus- tivities related to its WMD pro- planning and carrying out the ini- pended in the atmosphere for long grams. From the outset, however, tial set of inspections. Moreover, periods and could be inhaled deep Iraq’s declarations were incomplete when examined for internal consis- into the lungs to cause a fatal infec- and contained numerous false state- tency and compared with indepen- tion.13 This and other technical evi- ments and distortions. When the dent evidence obtained from outside dence raised suspicions that the Al U.N. agencies eventually uncovered sources, the official declarations Hakam Factory had been intended irrefutable evidence of an unde- revealed discrepancies that offered as a BW agent production facility— clared site or activity and demanded valuable leads. For example, the an assessment later borne out by that Baghdad account for the miss- Iraqi authorities declared early on documentary evidence. Accord- ing data, the Iraqi authorities typi- that only 10 scientists had been in- ingly, UNSCOM used high explo- cally responded with another par- volved in the pre-war biological sives to level the Al Hakam Fac- tial admission, indicating at each warfare (BW) program, which they tory in June 1996.14 stage that they were making a full

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 5 Jonathan B. Tucker

Confrontation and Intimidation vanished. With the aid of U.S. sat- spection to proceed, resulting in a ellite intelligence, however, standoff that lasted for 17 days. Baghdad’s response to U.N. on- UNSCOM headquarters in New Only when the U.N. Security Coun- site inspections has varied depend- York was able to track the move- cil threatened Baghdad with mili- ing on the sensitivity of the targeted ment of the trucks to the Military tary action did the Iraqis finally back site. Iraqi minders and plant man- Transport Command facility in down and allow a full inspection.18 agers tend to be cordial and super- Fallujah and conveyed this informa- There were no further major ficially cooperative during inspection to the inspection team through standoffs between Iraq and the tions of declared facilities, yet they a secure communications link. The United Nations until March 1996, can quickly become hostile and IAEA inspectors arrived in Fallujah when an UNSCOM inspection team threatening when an UNSCOM or just as the flatbed trucks were exit- was detained five times over a 10- IAEA inspection team makes a sur- ing the facility and followed in hot day period. The 43-member team prise visit to an undeclared site that pursuit. In a desperate attempt to was searching for components and Baghdad has sought to conceal. force the inspectors to back off, documents related to Iraq’s past bal- During the first two years after the Iraqi soldiers fired warning shots listic missile program. On March Gulf War, the Iraqi authorities re- over their heads.16 This incident 8, Iraq prevented the team from en- sorted to verbal and physical intimi- elicited a stern warning from the tering and searching for documents dation in an effort to deter the U.N. U.N. Security Council and stiffened in a building in central Baghdad agencies from making such intru- the IAEA’s resolve to uncover and belonging to the Ministry of Irriga- sive inspections. According to eliminate Iraq’s nuclear weapons tion. After the inspectors were de- former IAEA inspector David Kay, programs. nied entry, they camped outside the Inspectors were awakened with telephoned threats; There have also been a number building and photographed anyone obscene and threatening of incidents in which Iraq has sought entering or leaving. The standoff notes were slipped under to prevent U.N. inspectors from ended after 18 hours, when Iraqi hotel doors; hotel rooms were ransacked; verbal entering an undeclared site, result- Deputy Prime Minister Tariq ‘Aziz abuse on the street and at ing in a tense standoff that at times and UNSCOM Executive Chairman inspection sites became has lasted for several days. On Sep- Rolf Ekeus worked out a compro- common; on several occa- sions inspectors were physi- tember 24, 1991, for example, Iraqi mise in which a subgroup of the cally attacked by outraged minders prevented the sixth IAEA team was allowed to search the Iraqi ‘civilians’; UN ve- inspection team from removing building. UNSCOM deputy chair- hicles were bombed and tires slashed; and shots documents and microfilm related to man Charles Duelfer admitted, were fired over the heads the design of a nuclear weapon from however, that the delay of 18 hours of inspectors as a team pho- the Nuclear Design Center in meant that any incriminating docu- tographed Iraq’s secret uranium enrichment equip- Baghdad. Iraqi soldiers held the in- ments—if they existed—had prob- ment.15 spectors captive in the building’s ably been destroyed.19 The Iraqis, The last reference is to an inci- parking lot and said they would be for their part, remained inscrutable. dent that occurred on June 28, 1991, allowed to leave only if they left When questioned about a burning when Iraq tried to conceal several the documents behind. After a four- incinerator found inside the minis- calutrons from an IAEA inspection day standoff, the Iraqi authorities try building, Iraq’s U.N. ambassa- team. The Iraqis transported the finally relented and let the team dor Nizar Hamdoon replied, “Ev- giant electromagnets on flatbed depart with the documents.17 ery building has some kind of smoke trucks from the Nuclear Research Similarly, on July 5, 1992, coming out. It is bad for the envi- Center at Tuwaitha to the military UNSCOM requested a no-notice ronment but that is life.”20 barracks at Abu Ghraib. Although inspection of the Agriculture Min- Another standoff occurred two the IAEA team caught a glimpse of istry building in Baghdad, based on days later, on March 11, when the the calutrons in transport, they were an intelligence tip that documents same UNSCOM missile inspection denied access to the barracks; by on the Iraqi ballistic-missile pro- team sought to enter an underground the time they were allowed in, the gram were stored there. The Iraqi barracks and training center for trucks and their secret cargo had authorities refused to allow the in- Saddam Hussein’s elite Republican

6 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Jonathan B. Tucker

Guards in Sarabadi, about 50 kilo- Counterintelligence and Infiltration As a result of Iraq’s intensive sur- meters southeast of Baghdad. A veillance and infiltration efforts, the U.S. official said that the facility The initial U.N. no-notice inspec- targets of several no-notice inspec- was suspected of harboring banned tions of undeclared sites were highly tions were compromised in advance. launchers for Scud medium-range productive, yielding extensive infor- U.N. inspectors arrived unan- missiles. After an 11-hour standoff, mation about Iraq’s clandestine nounced at a suspect facility, expect- the Iraqis finally relented and al- nuclear and missile programs. ing to find incriminating material, lowed the team to enter the com- After 1992, however, UNSCOM only to discover that the site had pound.21 and IAEA inspectors repeatedly been painstakingly swept clean as During the week of June 10, Iraq came up empty-handed after raid- if they had been expected. Despite upped the ante in its confrontation ing facilities suspected by cooper- obvious signs that something was with the United Nations by declar- ating national intelligence agencies amiss, it took a long time for the ing that five Revolutionary Guard of hiding Scud missiles, chemical U.N. agencies to come to grips with bases in and around Baghdad, which or biological weapons, or nuclear the problem. Part of the reason was UNSCOM sought to search for materials. One reason for these di- a cultural disconnect. Although equipment, documents, and mate- minishing returns was Iraq’s many of the people who work for rials related to banned weapons pro- increasingly effective use of coun- UNSCOM have military or intelli- grams, were strictly off-limits to terintelligence techniques. To fer- gence backgrounds and are thus fa- U.N. inspectors because the ret out which undeclared sites would miliar with the need for operational searches would threaten Iraq’s na- be targeted for surprise visits, the security, such measures are entirely tional security. Iraqi troops trained Iraqi intelligence services engaged foreign to the organizational culture antiaircraft missiles on UNSCOM in intensive surveillance of U.N. in- of the United Nations, which fos- helicopters overflying the suspect spectors. Iraqi agents bugged hotel ters the free and open exchange of sites, and Iraq defied a unanimous rooms, conference rooms, and of- information. resolution by the U.N. Security fice spaces used by the inspectors, Eventually, however, the U.N. Council demanding that Iraq per- monitored U.N. radio frequencies, agencies took some modest steps to mit “unrestricted access” to and tapped telephones. enhance security. UNSCOM cre- UNSCOM inspection teams. This The Iraqi government also infil- ated “secure areas” at the BMVC blanket refusal introduced a new trated a number of spies into and at U.N. headquarters in New dimension in Iraqi noncompliance: UNSCOM’s Baghdad field organi- York. Inspectors were given radio in the past, Baghdad had delayed zation. One such agent was dramati- call-signs to use instead of names, inspections but never rejected them cally exposed after the defection to so that Iraqis monitoring the air- outright. On June 22, however, af- Jordan in August 1995 of Lt. Gen. waves would not know who was ter a meeting between Rolf Ekeus Hussein Kamel al-Majid, the Iraqi talking to whom. Internal docu- and Tariq ‘Aziz, Iraq agreed to grant armaments director and a son-in-law ments such as inspection reports UNSCOM inspectors access to all of President Saddam Hussein. When were classified “UNSCOM-Sensi- five suspect sites.22 sitting down for a meeting in tive” and given restricted circula- Direct confrontations with the Amman with UNSCOM Executive tion, and only the chief inspector United Nations have been relatively Chairman Rolf Ekeus, Hussein of each team was authorized to com- rare in recent years as Iraq has Kamel was shocked to recognize the municate with members of the news sought to improve its international U.N. envoy’s interpreter—as a spy, media. image in the hope of achieving an whom he himself had infiltrated into UNSCOM. According to an ac- end to the trade embargo. At the Destruction of Evidence same time, the Iraqis have contin- count in the German news maga- ued to obstruct the U.N. mission in zine Der Spiegel, the Iraqi defector Before the first U.N. inspection more subtle ways, as described be- snapped angrily, “Piss off, damn teams entered Iraq, and later as they low. you. You worked for me, and I began to close in on major elements refuse to make statements in the of the secret nuclear and biological presence of my own agents.”23 weapons programs, the Iraqis sys-

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 7 Jonathan B. Tucker tematically destroyed, removed, or claiming that everything erally not allowed to interview more was destroyed by the bomb- dispersed evidence so that the true ing. Although none of us than a few senior engineers and purpose and sophistication of key wanted to admit it, one technicians employed at an in- facilities could not be determined. thing became painfully spected facility, regardless of the clear: the only thing we For example, the large calutron test were going to get from the type of site visited. During plant facility at the Nuclear Research Iraqis was what they wanted walk-throughs, minders from the Center in Tuwaitha was razed to the to give us.24 National Monitoring Directorate ground and the site covered with dirt may prevent plant workers from re- before the first IAEA team arrived. Impeding Inspections sponding to inspector questions or At other nuclear sites, incriminat- pressure the few individuals who During no-notice inspections of ing equipment was removed and speak some English to work through sensitive sites, the Iraqi minders either buried or shuttled around the an interpreter. In addition, the fact have found excuses ranging from country on trucks, concrete was that the minders videotape all in- transportation bottlenecks to bad poured over characteristic features, terviews has a chilling effect on the weather to delay the U.N. team’s and floors were painted in an effort willingness of plant workers to arrival and buy time to remove in- to foil attempts at sampling and speak freely. criminating evidence. Since inspec- analysis. At times, Iraqi stalling tactics tions of undeclared sites far from The systematic destruction of evi- have verged on intimidation. Dur- Baghdad require the use of a heli- dence also took place at sites in- ing a biological weapons inspection copter to transport the inspection volved in the Iraqi BW program. at Salman Pak, for example, Iraqi team, the Iraqi authorities insist on Two weeks before the first soldiers deliberately placed live mu- 15 hours’ notice to “stand down” UNSCOM biological inspection nitions and a radioactive source in- their air defenses so that the U.N. team visited the research laboratory side bunkers that were to be in- helicopters can fly safely. Although at Salman Pak in August 1991, the spected. In addition to frightening inspection teams try to avoid reveal- Iraqis tore down several structures the UNSCOM inspectors, this tac- ing the location of the target site by at the site that had survived the tic delayed the inspection until the declaring a large block of airspace Coalition bombing campaign ordnance had been removed and a for the helicopter to fly through, the unscathed, including buildings hous- nuclear expert had been called to Iraqis still derive useful clues from ing fermenters, an aerosol inhala- check the radioactive source.26 the advance notice, particularly if tion test chamber, and a small On another occasion, the Iraqi they are concerned about a particu- incinerator. The steel aerosol cham- authorities tried to prevent the ex- lar clandestine facility within the ber was crushed and deposited at a cavation of a field near Salman Pak declared zone.25 On a few occa- dump several kilometers away. The suspected of containing buried bio- sions, the Iraqis have also threat- Iraqis then bulldozed the site and logical munitions. The Iraqi officials ened to open fire on UNSCOM covered it with fresh dirt to erase brought in Moslem clergymen who helicopters if they approach secure any remaining evidence. They also spent two hours pleading with the areas such as presidential palaces. burned reams of documents, leav- UNSCOM team that the field was Once the inspectors arrive on- ing melted looseleaf binders and a grave site and that digging would site, plant managers sometimes piles of ashes scattered around the be sacrilegious. Although the chief refuse to provide requested docu- site. According to a member of the inspector finally ordered the exca- ments or give answers that are in- UNSCOM team that visited Salman vation to proceed, only one trench appropriate to the questions asked. Pak: had been completed before the back- Another common delaying tactic is Although the Iraqis were hoe broke down and work had to for Iraqi officials to feign incom- able to produce some origi- cease because of the intense mid- nal research papers and prehension and request the services hand-drawn sketches of the day heat. On subsequent days the of an interpreter even though they layout of the buildings now clergymen did not return and the are capable of speaking fluent En- reduced to rubble, they excavation proceeded, but no in- were unable to produce any glish in other situations. documentary evidence to criminating evidence was found.27 support their assertions, U.N. inspection teams are gen-

8 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Jonathan B. Tucker

Deception and Denial Techniques photo-interpreters would look for man and material resources, could facilities structurally similar to those compel Iraq to move its hidden Iraq has paid close attention to in the United States and the Soviet weapons and equipment, increasing the monitoring methods employed Union, Iraq turned to EMIS, a the probability of detection. by the U.N. agencies and Western 1940s-era enrichment technology Second, Iraq sought to confuse intelligence agencies and attempted with which nearly all U.S. photo- outside observers by using multiple to counter them by various means. interpreters were unfamiliar. and shifting codenames for the same In particular, Baghdad has been In addition, Iraqi engineers de- program or site. Moreover, in the highly skilled in suppressing the tell- vised several deception techniques venerable tradition of the U.S. tale signatures of WMD production to disguise the main EMIS facility “Manhattan Engineer District” and facilities through the application of at Tarmiya. The plant had no secu- the British “Tube Alloys” project, deception and denial techniques. rity fence or visible supply of elec- Iraq selected innocuous cover names Deception involves the use of ac- tricity, suggesting to Western photo- for its clandestine WMD activities, tive or passive measures to convey interpreters that it was of little such as “Petrochemical Project 3” a false or inaccurate picture of a strategic significance. Only after the for the nuclear weapons program clandestine activity, such as disguis- war did UNSCOM inspectors dis- and “State Establishment for Pesti- ing a biological weapons production cover that the Tarmiya facility was cide Production” for the chemical facility as a vaccine plant. In con- powered by a 30 kilovolt under- weapons production facility at trast, denial entails the use of ground cable from a 150 megawatt Muthanna. active measures (camouflage, elec- substation several kilometers away. Third, Iraq employed a byzantine tronic emission control, and vari- The EMIS plant was also situated procurement network involving ous forms of physical, personnel, within a large military security multiple shell companies and trans- and communications security) to zone, so that it did not require any shipment points to conceal its ac- conceal the very existence of a clan- additional perimeter security or quisition of sensitive technologies destine activity. military defenses.28 Other deception from abroad. Components for key Because of the earlier U.S. deci- techniques employed by Iraq include factories and weapon systems were sion to share satellite imagery with the construction of WMD facilities imported from several suppliers or Baghdad during the 1980 to 1988 inside existing buildings or under- in unfinished form so that the in- Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi counterintelli- ground; the minimization of off-site tended military end-use would not gence officials possess a familiar- emissions; and the movement of be apparent. For example, to avoid ity with the resolution and cover- critical pieces of equipment at arousing suspicion, Iraq imported age of U.S. reconnaissance satel- night.29 the giant 4.5-meter-diameter elec- lites. The Iraqis also have an un- Iraq has also used deception and tromagnets used in calutrons from derstanding of the technical limita- denial strategies to prevent foreign a European foundry in the form of tions of these systems and of how intelligence services and the U.N. crude castings. A factory in Iraq the data they generate are analyzed agencies from grasping the full scale then finished the magnets to the nec- and interpreted. With this knowl- and scope of its WMD programs. essary technical specifications.31 edge in hand, Baghdad has under- First, the Iraqi authorities duplicated Fourth, Iraqi counterintelligence taken costly steps to conceal or dis- and dispersed their weapons devel- officials have sought to exploit deep- guise many of the key installations opment and production activities at seated misconceptions and preju- involved in its WMD programs a large number of sites. There is no dices on the part of Western intelli- from the eyes of Western intelli- shortage of potential hiding places gence analysts. They are aware that gence agencies. in Iraq, a large country containing Western analysts tend to engage in For example, Iraqi nuclear engi- many thousands of buildings, ware- “mirror-imaging”—the false as- neers studied uranium enrichment houses, factories, bunkers, and un- sumption that other countries use facilities in other countries and de- derground installations, most of the same production technologies liberately designed their plants not which have never been inspected.30 and safety and environmental stan- to contain characteristic design fea- Only a regime of “saturation” moni- dards as those employed in the tures that might give away their real toring, far exceeding the U.N.’s hu- West. For example, the lack of function. Knowing that Western

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 9 Jonathan B. Tucker biocontainment measures at the Al sourceful detective work and dogged larations and statements. Although Hakam Factory led many persistence, the U.N. agencies have Iraqi officials are carefully coached, UNSCOM inspectors to conclude managed to discern the broad out- they sometimes inadvertently let slip that BW agents could not have been lines—if not the full details—of some significant piece of informa- produced there because of the high Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear, tion. risk of contaminating plant work- and missile programs. Indeed, Baghdad’s initial success ers and the surrounding environ- Ironically, Iraq’s initial efforts at at deceiving the United Nations ment. Yet, the Iraqis later confessed intimidation only stiffened the re- made the Iraqi authorities overcon- to having produced thousands of li- solve of the U.N. agencies and fident and careless, so that they ters of anthrax spores and botuli- caused them to adopt more aggres- failed to prepare convincing cover num toxin at the site, indicating that sive tactics. This change of approach stories. For example, UNSCOM Baghdad was prepared to cut cor- was possible because UNSCOM learned from Western suppliers that ners on worker safety and environ- and the IAEA were backed by the during 1988 alone, Iraq had im- mental protection to an extent authority of a united U.N. Security ported nearly 39 tons of “complex unthinkable in the West. The same Council and the tacit threat of mili- growth media” suitable for grow- cavalier attitude was characteristic tary force. For example, faced with ing large quantities of bacteria as of Iraq’s treatment of chemical mu- Iraqi declarations containing obvi- well as culturing patient specimens nitions, which were routinely ous omissions and misrepresenta- for hospital use. Yet, UNSCOM handled by soldiers without protec- tions, the U.N. agencies stopped could account for only 22 tons of tive masks or suits. revealing everything they knew to the media, leaving 17 tons unex- In yet another form of deception, make it harder for Baghdad to tai- plained.33 When confronted with the Iraqis have sought to reinforce lor its responses. They also placed this evidence, the Iraqi authorities Western stereotypes about the tech- greater reliance on technical means stated that the missing media had nical incompetence of Arabs. Al- of monitoring and verification (such been imported for medical diagnos- though many of Iraq’s key WMD as U-2 aerial surveillance), confis- tic purposes and distributed to four facilities were sophisticated and cation of documentary evidence, regional health clinics, all of which well-maintained by Western stan- and no-notice inspections of unde- had burned down during riots after dards, Iraqi engineers often pretend clared sites.32 the Gulf War. to be poorly trained and equipped Over the past five years, U.N. Three aspects of this story did not so as to lower the U.N. inspectors’ analysts have learned to piece to- add up, however. First, Iraq’s total expectations of the level of military gether bits of information from a hospital consumption of diagnostic technology they are capable of de- wide range of sources, including media over the period 1987 to 1994 veloping. aerial and satellite imagery, confi- was less than 200 kilograms per dential trade data from Western year. Second, UNSCOM analysts U.N. ACCOMPLISHMENTS companies that supplied materials determined from the suppliers that and equipment for Baghdad’s WMD the culture media that Iraq had im- Iraq’s sophisticated strategies of programs before the Gulf War, the ported in large quantities did not deception and denial prevented both ongoing monitoring of Iraq’s im- include the types used most often national intelligence services and the ports of sensitive technology, and by hospitals for diagnostic purposes, U.N. agencies from assessing the reports by Iraqi defectors. These although they were suitable for cul- full scale and scope of its WMD various sources of information have tivating BW agents such as anthrax. programs for more than four years. helped to guide and amplify the re- Third, since culture medium spoils Faced with pervasive noncoopera- sults of the on-site inspections. rapidly once the package has been tion and obstruction, UNSCOM and Important insights into Iraq’s WMD opened, media intended for hospi- the IAEA found it extremely diffi- programs have also been gleaned tal diagnostic purposes are normally cult to penetrate Iraq’s clandestine from lengthy interviews with senior sold in small packages of 0.1 to 1 activities, particularly with respect Iraqi officials in which UNSCOM kilogram, yet Iraq had imported to its pre-war programs and its dual- interrogators have hammered away media in 25 to 100 kilogram capable facilities. Still, thanks to re- at inconsistencies in previous dec- drums.34 These discrepancies made

10 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Jonathan B. Tucker

it clear that the official explanation ongoing monitoring and verification warfare agents, and then go back to some permitted ac- was false, and provided strong cir- (OMV) program at suspect dual-ca- tivity. That means you have cumstantial evidence that Iraq had pable facilities, including the instal- to monitor the chemical in- produced large quantities of BW lation of closed-circuit video cam- dustry very carefully. In the biological field it is the agents. eras and other remote sensors at same. We need to keep a UNSCOM’s successful detective high-risk sites.36 The purpose of this special eye on the work persuaded the U.N. Security regime is to increase the difficulty, laboratories...with high Council of the need to maintain eco- expense, and political cost to Iraq protection for dangerous organisms or materials.38 nomic sanctions against Iraq despite of attempting to reacquire WMD, Given Iraqi President Saddam strong political pressures from thereby serving to deter future vio- Hussein’s apparent determination to France and Russia to lift them. The lations. The U.N. agencies have reacquire WMD, Ekeus has said new revelations also put senior Iraqi also put in place a system to moni- that the United Nations may have officials in the increasingly unten- tor Iraqi imports and exports of sen- to keep Iraq under surveillance for able position of being caught tell- sitive dual-use technologies. Ac- the next 20 years with aerial over- ing outright lies, generating tensions cording to a senior IAEA official, flights, closed-circuit television within the regime that may have while blueprints and computer codes cameras, and teams of specialist in- contributed to the defection in Au- may be hidden and experts and tech- spectors.39 Nevertheless, once eco- gust 1995 of Lt. Gen. Hussein nicians remain, “Iraq’s coherent, in- nomic sanctions against Baghdad are Kamel al-Majid, the mastermind be- dustrial-scale support infrastructure lifted, it is questionable whether the hind Baghdad’s WMD programs. has been devastated and cannot be international community can sustain Shortly after the defection, the Iraqi re-established as long as effective the political will needed to fund and government—in an apparent effort monitoring of the country is in operate the OMV and import-export ”37 to undercut the value of Kamel’s place. monitoring programs indefinitely. likely revelations—released to Nevertheless, monitoring is par- UNSCOM some 40 tons of docu- ticularly difficult in the ballistic IS IRAQ A UNIQUE CASE? ments, videotapes, photographs, missile area, since Iraq is allowed computer diskettes, technical draw- under U.N. Security Council Reso- Iraq’s vast oil wealth relative to ings, and prohibited hardware com- lution 687 to manufacture missiles its small population, and its large ponents, which were stored in crates with a range up to 150 kilometers. pool of Western-educated scientists inside a chicken house at a farm These legal missile factories could and engineers, have made that coun- outside Baghdad purportedly owned potentially be diverted to the illicit try a particularly tough case of by Hussein Kamel.35 Together with production of longer-range missiles, WMD proliferation. In particular, Kamel’s own testimony, this trove while providing a cover for the im- Baghdad’s deep pockets have en- of documentary evidence proved to port of dual-capable parts and abled it to: be an intelligence windfall about materials. Preventing Iraq from re- • pursue every conceivable path Iraq’s pre-war weapons programs acquiring chemical and biological for the development of nuclear, that confirmed many of weapons will also be difficult. chemical, and biological weapons UNSCOM’s suspicions. Weapons stockpiles could be con- and missile delivery systems; The U.N. inspection regime has cealed underground, and short pro- • establish global procurement also been successful at physically duction campaigns of chemical or networks for WMD-related eliminating major elements of Iraq’s biological warfare agents might be equipment and materials; WMD programs, setting them back carried out at dual-capable facilities. • pay a substantial premium for several years. Tens of thousands of According to Rolf Ekeus: the procurement of sensitive Iraqi chemical munitions have been We know that it is not that goods shipped in violation of na- difficult to hide chemical destroyed, as well as key facilities weapons production, or tional export-control laws; involved in the nuclear, chemical, even to make limited • duplicate and diversify its biological, and missile production batches—you can have a WMD production facilities at production line where, for complexes. Furthermore, the IAEA one or two months or even multiple sites; and and UNSCOM have established an less, you make chemical • make extensive use of costly

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 11 Jonathan B. Tucker

deception and denial strategies to zation for the Prohibition of Chemi- formed UNSCOM that satellite conceal its vast WMD programs cal Weapons in The Hague), the imagery had indicated the presence from Western intelligence ser- United States and other like-minded of undeclared Scud missiles at an vices and later from the United countries should share sensitive in- Iraqi military base, and an inspec- Nations. telligence information, while invest- tion team was sent to Iraq within Few other proliferators in the de- ing in new collection methods to 48 hours to investigate. The mis- veloping world have the financial replace those that have been com- siles proved to be decoys, which and technical resources required to promised. At the same time, a mul- were destroyed to facilitate overhead pose such a formidable challenge to tinational monitoring agency must accounting.40 an international monitoring and have its own intelligence-gathering 5. An effective way to investi- verification regime. Nevertheless, assets (e.g., UNSCOM’s U-2 air- gate clandestine WMD programs future weapons inspectors are likely craft) and internal analytical capa- is to identify and interrogate key to face similar types of noncoop- bilities (e.g., UNSCOM’s Informa- managerial and technical person- erative behavior, albeit on a lesser tion Assessment Unit) to ensure its nel. Important breakthroughs in scale, in other proliferant states such political independence from both the UNSCOM’s investigation resulted as North Korea and Iran. inspected state and the supporting from multiple interviews with Iraqi states, thereby enhancing the cred- weapons scientists and technicians LESSONS FOR FUTURE ibility of its findings in the interna- over a period of years, in which REGIMES tional arena. UNSCOM interrogators hammered 3. Short-notice inspections can away at inconsistencies revealed by The U.N. experience in Iraq of- increase the likelihood that a vio- evidence from outside sources and fers a number of lessons for future lator will make mistakes and leave their own internal analysis. nonproliferation monitoring and behind telltale indicators of illicit 6. Only one agency should be verification regimes. activity. A short time interval be- assigned responsibility for coor- 1. Intrusive on-site access is a tween notification of an inspection dinating all aspects of an inter- necessary but not sufficient con- and the arrival of an inspection team national inspection regime. Secu- dition for obtaining evidence of at the site will force a violator to rity Council Resolution 687 was noncompliance. On-site inspections rush cleanup operations, increasing flawed in that it gave the lead for will rarely turn up conclusive, the odds of finding telltale evidence nuclear inspections to the IAEA and “smoking gun” evidence of a vio- of a violation. In the context of a for all other inspections to lation, particularly when the negotiated monitoring and verifica- UNSCOM. The resolution also inspected facility is dual-capable. tion regime, however, the desirabil- mandated an awkward division of Nevertheless, inspections can indi- ity of short inspection timelines to labor between the two agencies: the cate unresolved suspicions and con- increase confidence in compliance IAEA headed the nuclear inspection cerns that can then be followed up judgements must be balanced teams, provided experts in fissile with other verification measures. against the host country’s legitimate material accounting, and evaluated The existence of a short-notice in- need to safeguard national security the results, while UNSCOM helped spection regime also has a valuable and proprietary business informa- to designate the inspection sites and deterrent effect by increasing the tion unrelated to the purpose of the recruited national inspectors with financial costs and political risks of inspections. expertise in nuclear weapons design noncompliance. 4. The combined use of vari- and production. Unfortunately, 2. A multilateral inspection re- ous monitoring tools (e.g., over- these overlapping areas of respon- gime can be effective only to the head surveillance, monitoring sibility led to bureaucratic turf extent that it is coupled with ac- trade flows, visual inspection, and battles between the two agencies that curate and timely intelligence. To sampling and analysis) can yield made their collaboration tense and, enhance the effectiveness of inter- valuable synergies. For example, at times, openly hostile. (The insti- national monitoring and verification overhead reconnaissance can be tutional conflict was not reflected regimes (such as those conducted used to “cue” on-site inspections. in personal relationships between by the IAEA and the new Organi- In July 1991, the United States in- UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors,

12 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Jonathan B. Tucker which were generally cordial.) The The continued diffusion of such tion of Iraq’s compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council Resolution 687 inspection regime would have “deceptogenic” technologies will (1991),” U.N. Document S/1995/284, April 10, worked more smoothly had make identifying and tracking for- 1995, p. 21. UNSCOM been given the lead for eign nuclear, chemical, biological, 14 Associated Press, “U.N. and Iraqis Begin to Dismantle Arms Plant,” The New York Times, all categories of banned weaponry, and missile programs more difficult. June 10, 1996, p. A6; Leon Barko, “U.N. De- with the IAEA serving in an advi- Future WMD proliferation analysts stroys Iraqi Germ Warfare Plant,” Reuters News Service, June 14, 1996. sory role. will therefore need to extract faint 15 Kay, “Denial and Deception Practices,” pp. 7. Effective verification cannot patterns of suspicious activity from 96-97. 16 be based on periodic on-site in- large amounts of extraneous noise, Molander, “The United Nations and the Elimi- nation of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” spections alone, but requires the perhaps with the aid of artificial- p. 147. integration of data from a wide intelligence software. 17 Tim Trevan, “UNSCOM Faces Entirely New Verification Challenges in Iraq,” Arms Control variety of sources to monitor pat- Today 23 (April 1993), p. 13. terns of host-country activity over 18 Ibid. 19 Leon Barkho, “U.N. Team Enters Building in an extended period of time. This Baghdad,” The Washington Post, March 10, task entails considerable analytical 1996, p. A21. 1 and inferential work on the part of The author is grateful to Tim McCarthy of the 20 Evelyn Leopold, “U.N. Reports Arms Dis- Center for Nonproliferation Studies for review- putes With Iraq in Last 10 Days,” Reuters News a staff of proliferation specialists ing the manuscript and providing useful com- Service, March 18, 1996. ments. 21 John M. Goshko, “U.N. Inspectors Enter Iraq who possess the appropriate tech- 2 Johan Molander, “The United Nations and the Military Installation After 11-Hour Standoff,” nical expertise. For this reason, the Elimination of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruc- The Washington Post, March 12, 1996, p. A9; international community must tion: The Implementation of a Cease-Fire Con- “U.N. and Baghdad Scale a 3d Diplomatic recognize from the outset that moni- dition,” in Fred Tanner, ed., From Versailles to Hurdle,” The New York Times, March 12, 1996, Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of De- p. A4. toring WMD programs is a long- feated States (New York: United Nations, 1992), 22 Barbara Crossette, “Iraq Probably Hiding pp. 146-147. Arms, Chief U.N. Inspector Says,” The New term activity that requires a major 3 David A. Kay, vice president, Hicks & Asso- York Times, June 13, 1996, p. A8; Associated commitment of expert knowledge, ciates, McLean, Virginia, telephone conversa- Press, “Iraq Bars U.N. Arms Experts From 2 resources, and money. tion with author, October 18, 1995. More Suspected Sites,” The New York Times, 4 Johan Molander, “The United Nations and Iraq: 8. In the future, the task of veri- June 14, 1996, p. A6; Leon Barko, “Iraq Seen A Case of Enforced Verification and Disarma- Unlikely to Yield to U.N. Demands,” Reuters fying nonproliferation treaties ment?” in J.B. Poole and R. Guthrie, Verifica- News Service, June 17, 1996; Associated Press, and drawing compliance judg- tion Report 1992 (London: VERTIC, 1992), p. “Iraq Yields on Inspections,” The New York 247. Times, June 23, 1996, p. 8. 5 ments will grow more difficult as Molander, “The United Nations and the Elimi- 23 “Painstakingly Emptied,” Der Spiegel, Octo- technologies capable of support- nation of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” ber 23, 1995, p. 158; in FBIS-NES-95-205 (23 p. 147. October 1995). ing deception and denial efforts 6 Johan Molander, “Mandated Aerial Inspections: 24 Karen Jansen, “Biological Weapons Prolifera- become more widely available. By The Iraqi Case,” in Michael Krepon and Amy tion,” in Steven Mataija and J. Marshall Beier, employing pollution-control sys- E. Smithson, eds., Open Skies, Arms Control, Multilateral Verification and the Post-Gulf En- and Cooperative Security (New York: St. vironment: Learning from the UNSCOM Experi- tems, computer data encryption, and Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 147-162. ence (Toronto, Canada: York University Centre 7 electronic emission control, deter- Ibid., p. 155. for International and Strategic Studies, Decem- 8 Molander, “The United Nations and the Elimi- mined proliferators will be able to ber 1992), p. 113. nation of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 25 National Security Research, Inc., Iraq Inspec- conceal WMD programs within p. 148. tions: Lessons Learned, p. 47. 9 their civilian industrial infrastruc- R. Jeffrey Smith, “Secretive Iraq Parries U.N. 26 Ibid. Arms Inspectors,” The Washington Post, No- 27 41 Alan J. Mohr, “Biological Sampling and ture. For example, Iraq’s EMIS vember 4, 1991, p. A1. Analysis Procedures for the United Nations Spe- 10 facility at Tarmiya contained a so- David A. Kay, “Denial and Deception Prac- cial Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq,” Politics tices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond,” phisticated, multimillion-dollar and the Life Sciences 14 (August 1995), p. 242. The Washington Quarterly 18 (Winter 1995), pp. 28 “Iraq’s Attempts to Conceal or Suppress Sig- “chemical wash” system for recov- 97-98. natures,” in U.S. Congress, Office of Technol- 11 ering enriched uranium from refur- National Security Research, Inc., Iraq Inspec- ogy Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weap- tions: Lessons Learned, Technical Report No. ons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 bished calutron components. Efflu- DNA-TR-92-115 (Alexandria, Virginia: Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Nuclear Agency, October 20, 1992), pp. 46-47. Office, December 1993), pp. 168-169. ents were triple-filtered so as not to 12 Mary Frances Tracy, “Iraq Discloses Biologi- 29 release traces of radioactive mate- Kay, “Denial and Deception Practices,” p. 94. cal Weapons Capabilities,” CBIAC Newsletter 1 30 Gary Milhollin, “Nuclear Needles in an Iraqi rial into the atmosphere that might (Fall 1995), p. 1. Haystack,” The Washington Post, June 28, 1992, 13 have led to the detection of this plant United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-Gen- p. C4. eral on the status of the implementation of the 31 Jay C. Davis and David A. Kay, “Iraq’s Se- after it became operational.42 plan for the ongoing monitoring and verifica-

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 13 Jonathan B. Tucker cret Nuclear Weapon Program,” Physics Today (July 1992), pp. 21-27. 32 Trevan, “UNSCOM Faces Entirely New Veri- fication Challenges,” p. 14. 33 Barbara Crossette, “Iraq Hides Biological War- fare Effort, Report Says,” The New York Times, April 12, 1995, p. A4. 34 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-Gen- eral....” U.N. Document S/1995/284, p. 20. 35 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-Gen- eral....”, U.N. Document S/1995/864, October 11, 1995, pp. 6-10. 36 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Remote Monitoring of Dual-Capable Biological Facilities in Iraq,” Poli- tics and the Life Sciences 14 (August 1995), pp. 19-26. 37 Mario Zifferero, “The IAEA: Neutralizing Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Potential,” Arms Con- trol Today 23 (April 1993), p. 10. 38 Arms Control Association, “Ambassador Rolf Ekeus: Unearthing Iraq’s Arsenal [Interview],” Arms Control Today 22 (April 1992), p. 8. 39 Michael Dynes, “UN Warning of 20-Year Arms Watch on Iraq,” London Times, March 14, 1996. 40 Molander, “The United Nations and the Elimi- nation of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” p. 147. 41 Kay, “Denial and Deception Practices,” p. 101. 42 “Iraq’s Attempts to Conceal or Suppress Sig- natures,” p. 169.

14 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996