Extensions of Remarks

June 25, 1981 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 14311 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS LESSONS OF IRAN Some argue that the hostage crisis would But a presentation that shows our resolve never have happened if we had, in the first can produce an agreement that withholds place, "stood by our friend," the Shah. But concessions and still saves lives. HON. LEE H. HAMILTON there was no way to do that, short of shoot Circumstances will differ from case to OF INDIANA ing our way in and occupying the country case. Sometimes a bold and skillful strike IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES with full military force. can be successful, as at Entebbe. But there Thursday, June 25, 1981 Alternatively, there were suggestions that will be other less propitious times as well. we should have encouraged repressive We must be prepared to adapt our strategy e Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I action by the Iranian military, in the con to suit the circumstances. A rigid "never ne would like to bring to the attention of text of a military coup against the Shah. gotiate" posture limits the government's my colleagues an excellent speech de Either course would have caused wide ability to find an acceptable outcome. Any livered by former Deputy Secretary of spread bloodshed. And neither would have predetermined strategy, slavishly followed, State Warren Christopher on the les worked. For such policies would have meant could draw us to nightmarish results. siding against most of the Iranian people, I believe we should grasp, as a central sons of Iran. who then had the idyllic expectation, and lesson of the crisis, the wisdom in seeking Mr. Christopher, who was intimately not the subsequent reality, of Khomeini's negotiated settlements to international dis involved in the negotiations through rule. putes. Algeria to end the hostage crisis, dis We should be thankful President Carter That principle was sorely tested in Iran. cusses the downfall of the Shah, the had the wisdom to reject such options. They Khomeini had called the United States the Iranian revolution, the hostage crisis, retain some adherents only because they "Great Satan" and had forbidden any diplo and the lesson of the experience for were not selected and we were spared their matic contact with us. We had enormously our dealing with developing countries, consequences. complex and painful issues, and no one with our international strategy, the role of There is also a lesson here for our broader whom to raise them. our diplomats, our stake in interna approach in the developing world. We must Nevertheless, in the end it was not the take care to recall that our relations are force of our arms, but the force of our argu tional law, and the role of American with countries, not just with leaders. We ments-and our economic and diplomatic le values in relations with other coun need to broaden our contacts, to make sure verage-that ultimately prevailed. tries. that all elements of the population under I recall this not to credit any person, least The speech follows: stand our purposes. We must guard against of all myself, but to celebrate the impor LESSONS OF IRAN the tendency to identify so narrowly with tance of negotiation. To be sure, the Algeri <By Warren Christopher) the personalities in power that we neglect an willingness to mediate, the continuing in cross-currents of opinion taking sway among "Bad times have scientific value," Emer ternal turmoil in Iran, the political evolu the people they rule. Unfortunately, there tion there, the Iran-Iraq war-these and son wrote. "These are occasions a good are too many examples of that tendency in other factors had a bearing. But the policy learner would not miss." U.S. policy around the world today. All of us, especially the people directly af of steady, methodical probing for a negoti In a second broad area, the Iran crisis ated result is what brought this crisis to an fected, would have preferred to miss the offers lessons for our international strategy, hostage ordeal in Iran. But it is there, sit end. in similar conditions and also more general This is a fact worth recalling when we ting squarely astride our collective memory. ly. We had best learn from it what we can. weigh our national budgets. Most diplomacy Perhaps we are now ready to begin that I take sharp issue with those who claim is conducted out of the public eye, and is process. The hostages have been home for our country lost face because we did not neither glamorous nor sensational. As we some four months. The national sense of somehow "force" Iran to surrender the hos build our defenses, we must also maintain relief is dispersing; the celebrations have tages. The most common formulation is the strength of the American Foreign Serv ended. Possibly even our sense of outrage that we should have issued an ultimatum: if ice where our national policies are designed toward the Iranians is beginning to abate. the hostages were not released by a certain and placed in effect. In a world where most We may be approaching the level of detach date, Iran would have been bombed or in things are done by persuasion, even the ment necessary to comprehend the crisis vaded. strongest arms cannot substitute for a clear, more fully. But consider the probable effects: convincing voice. There are five broad areas in which I The murder of the hostages; Unfortunately, our budgets do not now re think the Iran crisis holds valuable lessons. Greater internal and international sympa flect this truth. As the military threat First, the Iran experience should encour thy, even prestige, for Khomeini; grows, our defense budget rises accordingly. age a sense of realism in our dealings with An end to the international condemnation But as diplomatic challenges multiply, our developing countries. For their internal poli of Iran, and perhaps a shift of international professional Foreign Service remains the tics are shaped almost wholly by internal opinion in Iran's favor; same or declines. In 1960, we had diplomatic forces, and very little by external pressures. Disruption of petroleum exports from the relations with 81 countries; now we deal A wise nation, however powerful, under Middle East; with 53 more-but with the same number of stands the peril it invites in confronting the And to crown all of these, a probable professional diplomats in the State Depart will of another people. Outside powers have American entanglement in an Iranian civil ment that we had two decades ago. And an effect, if any, only at the margins. war. they must deal not only with 53 more coun The reasons the late Shah's regime shat However satisfying it might have felt to tries, but on a wider range of harder issues tered so swiftly are complex and cumulative. follow our stormier impulses, I fail to see than ever before. While there were impressive economic how such results would have served Ameri We also must take care to retain the achievements, deep inequities remained and can interests. people-the men and women of the Foreign corruption was rampant. Too little attention Speaking more broadly, I have yet to see a Service-whose wisdom and experience have was paid to religion and tradition. Political coherent alternative plan or proposal that been at the heart of our foreign policy suc rights were limited so rigidly for so long would have been likel~· to force the Iranians cesses, including the resolution of the hos that people throughout the country- direct to release the hostages. tage issue. I have never worked with a more ly or through family or friends-had been I also take issue with those who contend capable, devoted and imaginative group of personally touched by official repression we should never negotiate over hostages. professionals. Therefore, I am concerned by the Shah was seen to have sponsored. And It is a mistake to equate talking with reports that some of our best career offi the gap between the governing group and making concessions. On the contrary, we cers, who served prominently during the those governed remained awesome. can and should refuse, as we did in this case, last Administration, have yet to be assigned Whatever the cause, by 1978 the Shah's to make concessions that imply any form of to new posts commensurate with their abili collapse had become inexorable. By then victory for the kidnappers. We must reso ties and stature. This trend may lead to the there was probably nothing that he or we lutely resist the kind of outcome that could early retirement of many of the ablest pro could do to prevent it. invite similar acts in the future. fessionals in the Foreign Service, depriving • This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor. 14312 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS June 25, 1981 the country of incomparable experience and missions rests with the host country. That terest in world stability, grounded on the intellectual talent. is the only practical course. Transforming rule of law. In short, it is foolish policy and false econ our embassies into fortresses, or attempting Finally, I believe the crisis in Iran demon omy to fail to give strong support to this in to ring them with massive defenses of our strated the continuing role of our values in dispensable national asset. own, would defeat much of their purpose. our relations with the rest of the world. Along with the worth of diplomacy, the So as we do what we can to improve secu It was our system's inherent concern for Iran negotiations underscored the impor rity, we should also pay special tribute to human life that caused the government to tance of persistence and steadiness in for the gallantry of our Marine guards around undertake a massive effort in 1979 to evacu eign policy-of being prepared to wait, if the world.

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