CAESAR AND THE HELVETIANS

David Potter

Th e Helvetian campaign was the turning point of Caesar’s career. His previous experience of command consisted of his term as pro-praeto- rian governor in Hispania Ulterior, with two (ultimately three) legions against enemies that appear to have lacked coherent organization. Th at he should have been successful is scarcely surprising, for his operations appear to have been little more than organized raids designed to win treasure and some credit at Rome with minimal risk.1 Th e situation that he would confront in Gaul during the spring of 58 bce would be very diff erent, and it was at this time that he appears to have begun to learn the art of command. Th us while the essential message of the Commentarii may be to demonstrate Caesar’s innate possession of the virtus required of a general, the text reveals, subconsciously, the growth of Caesar as a general as he absorbed the lessons of contemporary warfare. While read- ers are meant to feel ‘instinctive genius,’ what we may also see is the refi nement of the ability to command through trial and error.2 Amongst the unusual aspects of Caesar’s early career was the fact that he did very little military service. Although he might have had plenty of opportunity if he had chosen to serve (the account of youth in the bio- graphical tradition occludes closer connections with the Sullan elite than might have been expected of the son-in-law of Cinna), he appears

1 For discussion of the Spanish campaign see now A. Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a Colossus (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2006), 148–51. 2 A. Goldsworthy, “‘Instinctive Genius’: Th e Depiction of Caesar the General,” in Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: Th e War Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. K. Welch and A. Powell (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 1998), 193–219. On the issue of reliability, I am in general agreement with Goldsworthy, Caesar (n. 1), 185–90 that Caesar’s ability to distort the narrative of actual actions was limited, though the inter- pretation of events is manifestly tendentious. Th e point that, beyond the rhetoric, the Commentarii also refl ect Caesar’s progressive development as a general, is properly stressed by K. Kagan, Th e Eye of Command (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2006), 148–51. Good recent studies of the rhetorical aspects of Caesar’s writings are A. M. Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 2006); W. Batstone and C. Damon, Caesar’s Civil War (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006). Classic analyses of Caesar’s dishonesty remain M. Rambaud, L’art de la déforma- tion historique dans les Commentaires de César 2nd ed. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres,1966) and J. Collins, “Caesar as a Political Propagandist,” ANRW 1.1 (1972): 922–66. 306 david potter to have deliberately chosen to avoid service in areas where he would confront Marian armies.3 With exception of brief service under Marcus Th ermus at the siege of Mitylene, Caesar had not held any of the junior commands typical of Romans who might aspire to command armies of their own. For Caesar, the command of armies against serious oppo- nents was something that he knew only at second hand. To a greater degree than his narrative admits, the confl ict with the Helvetians involved signifi cant ‘on-the-job’ training for Caesar as a commanding offi cer. It appears that consciously and sub-consciously, Caesar turned to the example of his uncle, Gaius Marius, whose tactics proved insuffi - ciently well developed for the army of his own day.4 On the level of propaganda Caesar’s desire to present his campaign as a parallel to the campaigns of Marius against the Cimbrians and the Teutons was no more than a continuation of his use of Marius’ reputa- tion as part of his personal political fashioning. In addition, the fact that the Tigurini, part of the Helvetian confederation, destroyed a consular army in 107 gave Caesar the chance to claim that he was exacting per- sonal revenge.5 Such references are plainly conscious elements of the account, and remain so into the account of the campaigns of 57, where Caesar reminds his readers that the Belgae were the only Gallic people to resist the Cimbrians and Teutons, and that the Nervii were in fact related to those paragons of barbarism.6 It is perhaps signifi cant that no further reference is made to the Cimbrians and Teutons until book seven, when they are adduced in the speech that Critognatus gives at Alesia, advising his fellows to follow the example of their ancestors in the period of the Cimbrian invasion by eating their dead, and by a sort of rhetorical curiosity, equating the Romans with their former bogey- men.7 As Caesar gained confi dence that he could justify his actions sim- ply through his own success, he ceased to recall the distant past to justify himself. Such variations in style are a result of the serial composition.8 More serious issues arise with the specifi c narrative of the campaign.

3 For the nature of the biographical tradition see H. Strasburger, Caesars Eintritt in die Geschichte (Munich: Neuer Filserverlag1938), 72–80. 4 Th e possibility of Marian infl uence on Caesar is adduced by J. Harmand, L’armée et le soldat à Rome de 107 à 50 avant notre ère (Paris: A.J. Picard, 1967), 492. 5 Caes. B Gall. 1.7.4; 13.2; 14.3. For more on this theme see Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul (n. 2), 176–78. 6 Caes. B Gall. 2.29.4. 7 Caes. B Gall. 7.77. 8 T. P. Wiseman, “Th e Publication of the De Bello Gallico,” in Welch and Powell, Artful Reporter (n. 2), 1–10; for a review of diff erent positions, see Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul (n. 2), 9–14.