Moral Obligations to Non-Humans Alasdair David Charles Cochrane PhD Government London School of Economics and Political Science UMI Number: U615648 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615648 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 I confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own: Alasdair Cochrane n Jbrary imtisfr Library o* Potttrcdf :nd. Fconomic Sciftncft. Abstract: Moral Obligations to Non-Humans My PhD thesis provides an account of the moral obligations we have to non-humans. The project is divided into two sections: the theoretical and the applied. In the first section I examine the foundations of our moral obligations, answering two key questions: what types of thing have moral status, and how can we delineate our obligations to them? I maintain that those entities with the capacity for ‘well-being’ have moral status. I refute the claim made by some that all living organisms have well-being, and argue that only beings with ‘phenomenal consciousness’ (sentience) have lives that can go well or badly for themselves. At this point then, the thesis turns its focus towards sentient animals. Next I consider just how we should structure our moral obligations. I argue that a utilitarian or aggregative framework fails to individuate entities with moral status, treating them as mere ‘receptacles’ of value. I thus propose that an interest-based rights theory provides the appropriate means for delineating our obligations to non-human animals. The second part of the thesis involves teasing out the implications of this interest-based rights theory for the ways in which we treat animals. To this end, I evaluate four different contexts in which we use non-human animals: in experiments, in agriculture, in entertainment, and by cultural groups. During these considerations, I argue that animals’ interests in avoiding pain and continued life ground prima facie animal rights not to be made to suffer and not to be killed. This renders many of the ways we currently use animals impermissible, particularly with regards to factory farming and experimentation. However, unlike other proponents of animal rights, I do not see the use of animals as impermissible in itself. This is because I claim that animals have no intrinsic interest in liberty, whether liberty is construed as the absence of interference or as the ability to govern one’s own life. Since animals h a ^ n o interest in liberty for its own sake, this means that they ordinarily have no right not\> be used or interfered with by humans. Thus, the ultimate conclusion of my thesis is that the moral obligations we have to animals do not involve liberating them from zoos, farms and our homes. Rather, they necessitate putting an end to the suffering and death that animals endure at our hands. 3 Acknowledgements I became fascinated by the question of what we owe to non-human entities when studying as an undergraduate in the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield. Indeed, it was there that I decided I would like to write a thesis on the topic. For giving me the opportunity to go there, I would like to thank my Mum and Dad: it was undoubtedly the best present I have ever received. For sparking my interest in animal rights, environmental philosophy and political philosophy more generally, I would like to thank James Meadowcroft, whose courses at Sheffield were hugely enjoyable. If it were not for a scholarship from the AHRC, I would not have been able to afford to come to the LSE for my Masters, so I would like to thank them for that. Moreover, I am extremely grateful for the various research scholarships and teaching studentships that I have been awarded by the LSE throughout studying for my PhD. My greatest intellectual debt is owed to my PhD supervisor, Cecile Fabre. From when she first taught me in my Masters, to when she read the penultimate draft of this thesis, she has always made my attempts to do political philosophy richly rewarding. Furthermore, her professionalism, insightfulness and depth of feedback have simply been amazing. I would like to thank her for these efforts, and for helping to make the whole process of writing the thesis so enjoyable. While Cecile Fabre has read the whole thesis, others have read parts of it, and I would like to thank them for their feedback. In particular, my PhD advisor Paul Kelly read early parts of what are now Chapter 2, and an early draft of Chapter 5. Fintan McCullagh also read an early draft of Chapter 8. The Political Theory Workshop at the LSE has heard versions of Chapters 3 and 4 and I would like to thank all who attended for their comments. Of particular help were comments from: Garrett Brown, Katrin Flikschuh, Andrej Keba, Alex Leveringhaus, Christian List, Panos Papoulias, Kai Spiekermann, Laura Valentini and Jeremy Williams. A reworked version of Chapter 5 is to be published in Res Publica, and I would like to thank the editors and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. No doubt part of the reason that I have enjoyed writing this thesis so much is down to the fact that I have left it alone at evenings and weekends. For not discussing animal rights with me at these times, I would like to thank my family, friends, and especially Susie. 4 Table of Contents Abstract 3 Acknowledgements 4 Table of Contents 5 1 Introduction 8 1.1 The Contribution of the Thesis 9 1.2 The Method and Assumptions of the Thesis 11 1.2.1 Analytical Philosophy 11 1.2.2 Reflective Equilibrium 12 1.2.3 Foundations, Rationalism, Impartiality and Universalism 13 1.3 The Outline of the Thesis 17 2 Well-Being and Moral Status 20 2.1 The Meaning of Well-Being 21 2.1.1 The Prudential Value of Well-Being 21 2.1.2 Interests 22 2.1.3 Harm 23 2.2 Well-Being and Our Moral Obligations 24 2.2.1 Is Well-Being Necessary to Have Moral Status? 24 2.2.2 Is Well-Being Sufficient to Have Moral Status? 27 2.3 Life, Consciousness and Well-Being 30 2.3.1 Is Life Necessary for Well-Being? 30 2.3.2 Is Life Sufficient for Well-Being? 32 2.3.3 Is Consciousness Necessary for Well-Being? 33 2.3.4 Is Consciousness Sufficient for Well-Being? 36 2.4 Locating Phenomenal Consciousness and Moral Status 40 2.4.1 Evidence in Favour of Animal Experience 41 2.4.2 Objectively Proving the Subjective 42 2.4.3 Drawing the Line 43 2.5 Conclusion 47 3 The Well-Being of Non-Human Animals 48 3.1 The Well-Being of Persons 50 3.1.1 Pleasure 50 3.1.2 Desires 52 3.1.3 Goals 53 3.1.4 Needs, Functionings and Capabilities 54 3.2 The Well-Being of Non-Persons 57 3.2.1 Capabilities and Non-Persons 58 3.2.2 Achieved Functionings, Needs and Non-Persons 59 3.2.3 Desires and Non-Persons 60 3.2.4 Pleasure and Non-Persons 61 3.2.5 Potentiality and Drawing the Line for Personhood 64 3.3 A Hierarchy of Moral Status? 65 3.4 Conclusion 66 5 4 Non-Human Animals and Moral Rights 68 4.1 What Kinds of Thing Are Rights? 69 4.1.1 Legal Rights, Moral Rights and Hohfeldian Incidents 69 4.1.2 The Will Theory of Rights 70 4.1.3 The Interest Theory of Rights 72 4.1.4 The Entitlement and Several Function Theories of Rights 73 4.2 Assigning Moral Rights 76 4.2.1 Joseph Raz’s Interest Theory 77 4.2.2 The Peremptory Force of Rights 78 4.3 Can Non-Human Animals Have Moral Rights? 80 4.3.1 Choice and Autonomy 80 4.3.2 Reciprocity and Moral Agency 83 4.3.3 Well-Being 87 4.4 Conclusion 88 5 Non-Human Animals and Experimentation 89 5.1 Establishing the Strength of an Interest 90 5.1.1 Value to the Individual and Psychological Continuity 90 5.2 A Right Not to Be Subject to Painful Experimentation? 92 5.2.1 The Benefits of Experimentation Justify its Continuation 94 5.2.2 Species Membership is Ethically Significant 95 5.2.3 Human Life is Worth More than Animal Life 99 5.3 A Right Not to Be Killed by Experimentation? 102 5.3.1 Do Animals Have an Interest in Continued Life? 103 5.3.2 The Strength of the Interest in Continued Life 105 5.3.3 A Moral Right Not to Be Killed by Experimentation? 106 5.4 A Right Not to Be Used in Experimentation? 109 5.4.1 Do Animals Have an Interest in Negative Freedom? 110 5.4.2 Do Animals Have an Interest in Positive Freedom? 112 5.4.3 Human Non-Persons, Freedom and Experimentation 114 5.5 Conclusion 116 6 Non-Human Animals and Agriculture 117 6.1 Applying the Rights Theory to Animals in Agriculture 118 6.1.1 Factory Farming 119 6.1.2 Killing Animals for their Flesh 120 6.1.3 Raising Animals for their Milk and Eggs 122 6.2 Animals Killed in the Field 124 6.2.1 Crop Cultivation and Numbers of Animals Killed 125 6.2.2 Crop Cultivation and Rights Violations 126 6.3 The Predation Argument 127 6.3.1 Animals Are Not Moral Agents 127 6.3.2 Killing for Survival and Overall Harm 128 6.4 The Non-Identity Problem and Farm Animals 130 6.4.1 The Non-Identity Problem 130 6.4.2 Is Modifying Animals Inherently Wrong? 135 6.4.3 Is Modifying Animals Ever Wrong? 137 6.5 Conclusion 142 7 Non-Human Animals and Entertainment 143 6 7.1 Implications of the Rights Theory for Animals in Entertainment 144 7.1.1 Pet-Keeping 144 7.1.2 Circuses