Paddling Pools for Democracy

Paddling Pools for democracy

A prefigurative approach to Tronto’s caring democracy

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Abstract In this thesis I will argue that the ideological role of democracy is an oppressive role that informs the current democratic deficit in Western democracies. I will draw on Tronto's (2013) analysis of the democratic deficit and take her analysis a step further. As I take Tronto's analysis a step further, I will not look at statistics or democratic theories, but at real world democracy. I will use an ideology critique as a method to dismantle the ideological role of democracy, and as I look behind the veil of democracy, I will unmask democratic ideology as an instrument to oppress people. Moreover, I will argue that ideologies do not function by themselves, and in this case, I will describe how democratic ideology is at the service of neoliberal ideology. I will argue that democratic ideology serves the interests of neoliberal ideology, in order for neoliberal ideology to survive and remain as it is, because I assume that people would never accept a society that operates solely on neoliberal ideological convictions, such as a corpocracy. As long as people believe they live in a democracy, they will not ask questions. Tronto proposes to realize a democracy that is driven by care values rather than economic values as democracy is driven today, by limiting and controlling the free market. I suggest taking a prefigurative approach to Tronto’s (2013) ‘caring democracy’ which I call ‘paddling pools for democracy’. These paddling pools for democracy are small learning zones where oppressive ideologies cannot influence the learning process. I will argue that the people who join to practice their democratic skills in the paddling pools for democracy will be the ones who will build our future care driven democracies.

3 Table of Contents

Abstract 3

Introduction 6

How democracy deals with corona 6

A pursuit of a caring democracy 6

Is limitation and control of market logic enough? 6

Scope and methodology 7

Thesis roadmap 7 Chapter 1 | The current state of democracy 10

1.1 Roadmap chapter 1 10

1.2 Three existing starting points 10

Departing from democratic statistics 10

Departing from democratic theory 11

Departing from democratic functioning 11

What do these three existing starting points have in common? 11

1.3 Introducing a fourth starting point 12

One step back, one step forward 12 Chapter 2 | The misleading idea of neoliberal individuation 14

2.1 Roadmap chapter two 14

2.2 Tronto’s critique on neoliberal individuation 14

A distorted view of human nature 14

The claim that the free market is neutral 15

The myth of personal responsibility 16

2.3 A confusion about individuation 17 Chapter 3 | Democratic individuation 19

3.1 Roadmap chapter three 19

3.2 Democratic caring and Caring democracy 19

3.3 Questioning democracy 19

Building on three points 20

4 The infusion of democratic thinking 21

Continuation 21 Chapter 4 | The ideological role of democracy 23

4.1 Roadmap chapter four 23

4.2 Ideology 23

4.3 Addressed as consumer 24

People as citizens 24

People as citizens and consumers 25

People as consumers 25

4.4 The illusion of participation 26

Democracy: a competition for voters 26

The ideal participatory democracy 26

The announcement of a participatory society in the Netherlands 27

Democratic ideology in practice 27

4.5 A dual ideology 29 Chapter 5 | Paddling pools for democracy 30

5.1 Roadmap chapter five 30

5.2 Prefigurative politics 30

5.3 What are paddling pools? 31

The conditions for preparing an environment 31

The tenets of a paddling pool for democracy 32

The surprise factor 32

How does this lead to a caring democracy? 32 Conclusion 34

Bibliography 36

5 Introduction

How democracy deals with corona I argue that we can see a democratic deficit when we look at how democratic governments are dealing with the corona pandemic. The democratic deficit refers to how democratic institutions fail to function properly and don’t reflect the ideals and values of the people (Letki, 2013). Three things stand out. First is the way decisions are being made by democratic governments concerning the corona crisis. Second are the ungrounded measures that are being taken and third is the reliance on market over care. If we look at the first thing that stands out, we see that decisions concerning the corona crisis are made from the top down. The people are left out of the debate and the experts at the National Institute of Public Health and the Environment rule the show. This leads me to the second thing that stands out which is a result of top down decision making. Top- down decision-making in the corona crisis has led to 'social distancing' measures that do not reflect the ideals and values of the people. The Dutch Prime Minister for example, announced on the 9th of April 2020 that people should prepare themselves to “think about what he calls ‘the new normal’: a society in which 1.5 metres of distance remains the norm for the time being.” (Nu, 2020). As a reaction to ‘the new normal’, which has been a one-way decision, people massively posted short videos on social media in which they reenacted everyday life situations in a socially distanced society in order to show the absurdity of these social distancing measures. The third thing that stands out is the reliance on market over care. If we look at the care deficit, many people are being told to stay at home, not for their own protection, but to disguise the shortage of care workers who have to deal with this immense pressure on the care sector. This is where the market has failed but when it comes to solutions, people still rely on a democracy driven by market values to come up with all the answers to the corona crisis, whether it’s creating a vaccine, disposable face masks or a respirator for intensive care. The solutions are all motivated by the pursuit of profit, instead of reducing the care deficit.

A pursuit of a caring democracy Joan Tronto (2013) describes current democracy as a ‘democratic deficit’ as well. But Tronto does not stop here with her analysis, and from the perspective of a feministic ethic of care she relates the ‘democratic deficit’ to the current ‘care deficit’. For Tronto both the democratic deficit and care deficit are two sides of the same coin and “neoliberalism has minted this coin of the realm” (pp. 37). Tronto’s (2013) critique of neoliberalism grounds her alternative vision of democracy driven by care values, rather than the market values that drive existing democracies. In Tronto’s (2013) vision of a ‘caring democracy’, “caring should become more democratic” and “democracy should become more caring” (pp. 18).

Is limitation and control of market logic enough? Tronto’s (2013) proposed alternative is to limit and control market logic, and to not see market logic as “the only possible model for reasoning” (pp. 121). To limit and control market logic would be an important “part of what democratic political institutions should do” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 121). I agree with Tronto’s analysis of the democratic deficit and her critique of the dominant role of market logic in democratic relations and care, however,

6 Tronto’s analysis shows a dedication to democracy which she leaves unquestioned and as a consequence limits the depth of her critique. I argue that leaving democracy unquestioned causes problems when one wants to realize a vision of a democracy driven by care values. I argue this because one would expect that the corona crisis; a care crisis of this magnitude would lead to an awareness and a shift in political will, but it did not happen because it left democracy unquestioned. I propose to build on Tronto’s analysis and suggest a more thorough critique of the relationship between democracy and the market, and in so doing, provide grounds for an alternative route to change. In this thesis, I will argue that the realization of a democracy driven by care values will need us not only to limit and control market logic but also question the ideological role of democracy itself. In particular a crises situation like the corona pandemic reveals the oppressive ideological role of democracy if you ask yourself the following question: ‘during the corona crisis, has any measure been consulted with the people? The answer is no. This answer leads me to my main research question, which is: ‘how to describe the ideological role of democracy, and how does understanding this role help us think about how to realize a democracy that is driven by care values as Tronto proposes?’

Scope and methodology In describing the ideological role of democracy my research will focus on Western European democracies with Dutch democracy in particular. I will largely focus on the Dutch context as it is today, and not as democracy has developed in time and space. My analysis of the current state of democracy in the Netherlands could also be applied to other democracies, although there may be nuance differences. The analysis of the current state of democracy is done in various ways and also leads to different interpretations of the current state of democracy. I detect three different starting points to analyze the current state of democracy which depart from: 1) democratic statistics, 2) democratic theory and 3) democratic functioning. What I am going to do is to push forward the third starting point of departing from democratic functioning, which interprets the current state of democracy as a democratic deficit and introduce a fourth starting point. In pushing the third point of departure, I will base myself on Tronto's analysis of the democratic deficit and take her analysis a step further as mentioned before. To be clear, I will not look at statistics or democratic theory, but at real world democracy. How I am going to answer the main research question is by using an ideology critique. By looking behind the veil of democracy I will debunk democratic ideology as a tool to oppress people. This means that there are two realities. The first reality is what democratic ideology makes us believe that democracy is, how it functions and what place people have in democracy. The second reality is how democracy functions in the real world and what place people really have in today's democracy. This leads me to analyze democracy as a democratic deficit that is being informed by an oppressive ideology.

Thesis roadmap To answer the main research question, I have divided this thesis into five chapters. In the first chapter I will explore the three different starting points to analyze the current state of democracy that I mentioned before namely: democratic statistics, democratic theory and democratic functioning. Not only will these approaches show a different starting point, but each of them will also show different interpretations of the current state of

7 democracy. I suggest these three starting points share an unquestioned support for democracy. Therefore, as mentioned in the previous section I will push on the third starting point and introduce a fourth one that questions the functioning of contemporary Western democracy and perceives this kind of democracy as an oppressive ideology. I will also argue that ideologies don’t function alone, they are always in relation with another ideology. Therefore, I think it is important to also analyze the ideology related to democratic ideology, before going deeper into democratic ideology itself. I will argue that democratic ideology is in relation or reacts to neoliberal ideology. In the second chapter I will analyze neoliberal ideology by looking at Tronto’s ideology critique in which she connects the care and democratic deficit as a consequence of people embracing neoliberal ideology. I will further expand on the idea of neoliberal individuation as part of Tronto’s critique on neoliberal ideology by doing two things. First, I will analyze Tronto’s (2013) critique on neoliberal individuation and how this creates a “distorted reality” (pp. 26). I will focus on three points of critique concerning neoliberal individuation which are 1) market logic portraying people as independent individuals, 2) the claim that the free market is neutral and 3) the myth of personal responsibility. The second thing I will do is showing that 'neoliberal individuation' is often confused with 'individuation', and that people blame individuation for the hardening of society, whereas they should blame neoliberal individuation. I will argue that individuation is a good thing, because it can lead to “universal social individuals” (Gould, 1978, pp. 01). It's precisely these kinds of people on which a caring democracy can be built, but it takes more than convincing people that they are confused, it also needs a more substantive change, related to political condition, namely the current condition of democracy. According to Tronto (2013), the way to deal with the care deficit is to limit and control the market and thus limit and control market logic. And while market logic spreads to all “realms of life” including “political life” (pp. 121), limiting and controlling the market will also deal with the democratic deficit giving more room for a caring democracy to develop. I argue that for a caring democracy to develop, we also have to look at the ideological role of contemporary democracy itself. This brings me to my main thesis statement which is to prove that market logic not only spreads to all “realms of life” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 121) including the political resulting in a democratic deficit, but also infuses democratic thinking creating an oppressive ideology. Chapter three will be dedicated to proving my main thesis statement. I will do this by comparing the neoliberal ideology with the democratic ideology from an analysis of the three points of critique by Tronto as mentioned in chapter two. This analysis shows that the themes exclusion, blame and competition, which neoliberal ideology thrives on, have also infused democratic thinking. Besides these three themes, I will further elaborate on a fourth theme that makes an oppressive ideology effective and this theme is; ‘continuation’. Continuation is what keeps an ideology alive. Once the ideological role of contemporary democracy is proven we can have a better look behind the veil of democracy by revealing its oppressive ideology, which I will do in chapter four. In chapter four I will first deepen out the concept of ideology. Here we will see that ideology can be explained both positively and negatively. The negative approach to explaining an ideology sees ideology as an oppressive set of beliefs. This is also how I will depict democratic ideology: as oppressive. I will show that democratic ideology is oppressive in two ways. First, I will show how people are not seen as citizens but as consumers and how they are manipulated to behave as consumers all the time, which makes ruling a democracy very hard. Second, I will show how ruling in democracy is being made very difficult for ‘the people’ by showing how people are being tricked into the idea that they can participate, although they cannot, which makes

8 contemporary Western democracies a form of one-way politics. If we then add neoliberal ideology and democratic ideology together, it seems to me that people who live in contemporary democracies live in a 'dual ideology' that consists of two oppressive ideologies. I will argue that in the mutual relationship between the two ideologies, the second ideology, namely democratic ideology is repressed by neoliberal ideology, resulting in a toxic relation between these two ideologies. But what to do to realize a democracy that is driven by care values as Tronto proposes?” This is what chapter five will deal with. As I have mentioned before I follow Tronto’s pursuit for a more caring democracy. But while Tronto ends her crusade for a more caring democracy with imagining democratic practices and caring democracies, I would like to take this ‘imagining’ a step back by choosing for a prefigurative approach. Instead of arguing for a mass shift in values in how to deal with caring responsibilities, controlling and limiting the market and arguing for creating a more caring democracy, as Tronto (2013) argues, I will argue for ‘paddling pools of democracy’, which is my interpretation of prefigurative politics. In chapter five I will unroll this prefigurative approach towards a more caring democracy by deepening out the concept of prefigurative politics, followed by an analysis of paddling pools for democracy in which I will first go into the conditions for preparing a prefigurative environment, second, the tenets of a paddling pool for democracy and third, the surprise factor. The surprise factor emphasizes the importance of not delivering a fully designed blueprint of a future society, because we have to rely on the unexpected capabilities of the people who will build it. Making a detailed blueprint of a future society will only suppress these unexpected capabilities. I will end this fifth chapter with the argument that this will lead to caring democracies. In the conclusion, I return to answering the main research question and argue how I proved my main thesis statement, followed by a suggestion for the direction of future research.

9 Chapter 1 | The current state of democracy

1.1 Roadmap chapter 1 The analysis of the current state of democracy is done from different angles, which also lead to different interpretations of the current state of democracy. As mentioned in the introduction, I detect three starting points. One approach departs from statistics and calls the current state of democracy a ‘crisis’, another approach departs from democratic theory and argues that people have to accept democracies flaws, and yet another approach departs from democratic functioning and argues that there is a problem with democracy which we need to ‘fix’. In this first chapter I will elaborate on these three existing starting points and introduce a fourth one. The first three starting points are: 1) departing from democratic statistics, 2) departing from democratic theory and 3) departing from democratic functioning. Implicit in these angles is the presumption that democracy is the right approach, although it must either be seriously helped to overcome the crisis, left alone, or somehow repaired or reformed. But if we push on the presumption that ‘democracy is the right approach’ and try to find out what is left to scrutinize from the existing points of departure, I argue that one can notice that we need a fourth angle, an angle that calls democracy into question. Therefore, I will introduce a fourth starting point that does call democracy into question in which I will propose to interpret the current state of democracy as an interplay between the world as it is and the reality in which democratic ideology makes people believe. I will also argue that ideologies do not emerge naturally and that it is important to analyze the ideology with which the democratic ideology is related. But before we enter the realm of ideologies, I will start with the three existing starting points.

1.2 Three existing starting points

Departing from democratic statistics Foa’s research, done at the University of Cambridge’s Centre for the Future of Democracy, departs from analyzing a “global dataset on attitudes towards democracy, based on four million people in 3,500 surveys” (Coughlan, 2020). The data show that “public confidence in democracy is at the lowest point on record in the United States, the major democracies of Western Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America” (Mounk & Foa, 2020). Foa notes three other observations: first, he mentions that in the past twenty-five years the concept of democracy has lost support all over the world (Mounk & Foa, 2020). Second, this loss of confidence in democracy was especially noticeable in stable developed countries where people have a high income (Mounk & Foa, 2020). Third, the decline in confidence in democracy has been rapid since the economic crises started in 2008 and has accelerated since (Mounk & Foa, 2020). Besides this, Mounk and Foa (2020) noticed that in some countries, such as the United States, more people are dissatisfied than satisfied with the current state of democracy. Mounk and Foa (2020) argue that the loss of confidence in democratic institutions is a consequence of the inability of democratic institutions to cope with the crises of our time, such as the economic crisis of 2008, the refugee crisis from 2015 onwards or the global warming crisis. On the basis of their statistical research, Mounk and Foa (2020) interpret the current state of democracy as a “crisis of faith” or in other words a collective loss “in faith in democratic systems”.

10 Departing from democratic theory A “crisis of faith” (Mounk & Foa, 2020) may not be something to worry about at all. As de Ceulaer (2019) puts it, we are at a point in the democratic evolution where “the political landscape, representative democracy, is being re-parcelled by the voters”. Departing from the democratic theory, de Ceulaer (2019) mentions six flaws in democracy, namely: democracy is unsatisfactory, elusive, unjust, irreconcilable, unwise and impossible. 1) Unsatisfactory, because democracy gives us hope for equality, but can never give us full equality. 2) Elusive, because new challenges such as climate change, globalization and migration call for new political parties that re-parcel the political landscape and make democracy always elusive. 3) Unjust, because there will always be a tension between the protection of human rights and minorities versus the majority that rules in a democracy. 4) Irreconcilable, because without division there would be no democracy. This means there must always be political struggle, which is in line with the vision of Chantal Mouffe. Verheien (2010) does not refer so much to irreconcilability but to ‘indetermination’ as the essence of democracy, which means that that there should always be struggle for power, because every other attempt to ground political power would lead to a totalitarian regime, which is also in line with Chantal Mouffe’s vision. 5) Unwise, because new long-term challenges, such as climate change, show the inconsistency with democratic thinking and decision-making in the short term. 6) Impossible, because “there's no single, coherent way of translating the individual preferences of a population into a collective policy” (de Ceulaer, 2019). According to the Ceulaer (2019), if we were to embrace these flaws of democracy, we would find that democracy is not in crisis, but that we could interpret the current state of democracy as imperfect.

Departing from democratic functioning In addition to the possibility of accepting that democracy is imperfect, as de Ceulaer (2019) states, I would like to elaborate a third approach. This third approach deals with a concern for democratic deficit. A deficit means that something is lacking. If we compare the concept of a democratic deficit with de Ceulaer’s (2020) argument of an imperfect democracy, we could use the metaphor of a glass half-full or half-empty. An imperfect democracy then is a glass half-full, which is accepting that there still is a democracy even though it has its flaws. A democratic deficit is a half-empty glass that has to be filled up in order to pursue a better functioning democracy. What is perceived as lacking in current democracies is transparency in the “procedural aspects of democracy”, accountable politicians, and “participation of citizens in policy making” (Letki, 2013). “Decisions are thereby viewed as legitimate if they fulfill certain procedural requirements” (Rittberger, 2013). Moreover, decisions only made by a small group of people lead to “incapacities of governmental institutions to reflect the real values and ideas of citizens” (Tronto, 2011, pp. 17).

What do these three existing starting points have in common? I argue that what these three existing starting points have in common is an unquestioned support for democracy, without questioning what kind of ideological role democracy is playing. Instead of questioning the role of democracy these approaches focus on how people should adapt their perception of democracy, how people should regain faith in democracy or how people should improve transparency, accountability and

11 participation. I suggest that we question the ideological role of democracy, rather than focusing on what people should do, not because democracy has failed or because it is not the right political system, but because I assume there is more behind the ideological veil of democracy than we think there is. This in-depth examination of the ideological role of democracy will lead to another focus on what people could do, and therefore I suggest introducing a fourth starting point to analyze the current state of democracy that does call democracy into question.

1.3 Introducing a fourth starting point The fourth starting point that I introduce also departs from democratic functioning, like the third starting point, but questions whether the democratic ideology in which people believe corresponds to its functioning. A helpful metaphor to illustrate this approach is to perceive democratic ideology as an actor, playing a role in a theatre play. This metaphor describes two realities, the first is the reality in which people watch the play, or in other words; ‘the real world’, and the second reality is the world as described by the actor. The metaphor illustrates that democracy in the context of theatre could function differently in our minds than in the real world. Democracy as we experience it now can read a script or improvise for its audience; the people. I think this is what we have to find out, we have to look behind the veil of democracy and find out its true nature before thinking about how to regain confidence in its systems or before tweaking its deficits. Because I argue that the ideological role of democracy is an oppressive role, a role that keeps the audience, the people, in the theatre as long as possible and makes the people forget that they are looking at an actor. Looking at an actor that never leaves the podium, because that is its oppressive ideology: the promise that people can always leave the room, even though this promise will never be gratified. This means that one day one has to start asking questions about the ideological role of democracy.

One step back, one step forward What I think is important to explain in this thesis before I start asking questions about the ideological role of democracy is to understand that an ideology does not emerge spontaneously. An ideology always appears as a reaction to another ideology (Kuo, 2018). The question is to which ideology the democratic ideology reacts? I argue that democratic ideology reacts to neoliberal ideology. Thus, in order to better understand the ideological role of democracy, in the next second chapter I will take a step back by focusing on understanding neoliberal ideology. In the third chapter I will take a step forward by showing how these two ideologies are connected. To get a better understanding of neoliberal ideology, I will build on Tronto's (2013) theory of a caring democracy. There are two things that make Tronto’s theory highly relevant for this thesis. 1) First of all, I agree with Tronto that we should strive for a more caring democracy from a ‘feminist ethic of care’ point of view. Moreover, the caring aspect plays a role in chapter five, in which I will propose setting up 'paddling pools for democracy'. Second, I agree with Tronto’s analysis of the relationship between neoliberal market ideology and democracy and care, and how Tronto points out the role of ideology in informing perceptions and ideals. I will take up this method and line of inquiry, but I want to investigate further via questioning of the assumption of democracy that she makes. There is a certain element in Tronto’s initial analysis that creates a doorway for the questioning of the assumption of democracy. This element in Tronto’s (2013) analysis is

12 ‘neoliberal individuation’ which portrays people as “autonomous actors” (pp. 31). I argue that individuation also plays a major role in democratic ideology, and thus becomes useful when I start questioning the ideological role of democracy. That is why I will dedicate the next chapter to further deepening ‘neoliberal individuation’ by building on Tronto's (2013) critique of neoliberal ideology.

13 Chapter 2 | The misleading idea of neoliberal individuation

2.1 Roadmap chapter two In the previous chapter I ended with introducing a fourth point of departure for analyzing the current state of democracy. This fourth starting point suggests an ideology critique and perceives democracy as an oppressive ideology, which I illustrated as an actor playing a role in a theatre play. I have argued that the play is not a one-man show. I argue that the play is dominated by two actors and that their relationship on stage is rather toxic. In this second chapter I will deal with the other actor in the play, namely: neoliberal ideology. What I will focus on is individuation as a consequence of neoliberal ideology. I will do two things. First, in line with Tronto’s (2013) critique of neoliberal individuation, in which people falsely have come to believe that they are “autonomous actors” (pp. 31) in society, I will argue that the idea of neoliberal individuation is misleading and creates a “distorted reality” (pp. 26). Second, I will argue that in addition to creating a distorted reality, the term 'neoliberal individuation' is often confused with the term 'individuation', while the term 'individuation' is not necessarily a bad thing. This confusion does not give the merit that the term 'individuation' should have, because I argue that 'individuation’ is the driving force behind the creation of a caring democracy.

2.2 Tronto’s critique on neoliberal individuation What the idea of neoliberal individuation seems to accomplish is that it gives people the feeling that they can live as individuals in society without the need for care or help of others. The free market promises to help people determine their own direction in life, and as Brown (2003) puts it: “the model neo-liberal citizen is one who strategizes for her or himself among various social, political and economic options” (para. 14). From that point on that person’s “moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for self-care”, and as a result, there is no need for a state to intervene in the lives of these “rationally calculating individuals” who bear “full responsibility for the consequences of their actions” (Brown, 2003, para. 14). In an ideal neoliberal society, all people are model neo-liberal citizens who can take care of themselves and “overcome any obstacle if they work hard enough” (Brown, 2003, para. 14). Although Tronto (2013) offers a comprehensive and detailed critique of this ideal neoliberal society, in this section I will focus purely on three points she criticizes concerning neoliberal individuation. The three points I will focus on are 1) a distorted view of human nature, 2) the claim that the free market is neutral and 3) the myth of personal responsibility.

A distorted view of human nature First, to portray all people as model neoliberal citizens who can take care of themselves “constructs citizens as somehow independent” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 26). This now normalized idea of citizens as independent individuals distorts the reality of our human nature because “in reality, all humans are interdependent, relying upon the care of others in differing degrees throughout the course of their lives” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 26). The last part of the former sentence shows what is misleading about neoliberal ideology. Not all people in a society are healthy middle-aged people who can care for themselves and do not rely on the care of others. This ideal neoliberal characteristic misses the essence of human life as Tronto argues. To get a better understanding of

14 Tronto’s critique on neoliberal individuation I have drawn two axes. The vertical choice-axis and the horizontal care-axis. See image below.

The image shows what is misleading when democratic political theories take “the existence of autonomous actors as starting point for democracy” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 31). A feminist democratic ethic of care, an ethic supported by Tronto, defends a different starting point. It is a starting point which acknowledges our real human nature. The feminist democratic ethic of care has three main points. First, “individuals are conceived of as being in relationships” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 30-31), this relates to Marx holding “that individuals cannot be understood apart from their relations” (Gould, 1978, pp. 03) as mentioned in the previous section. Second, “all humans are vulnerable and fragile” and third, “all humans are at once both recipients and givers of care” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 30-31). Coming back to the idea of ‘autonomous actors’, this idea only focusses on individuals who can care for themselves and have a choice to be poor or rich, which is represented in the vertical choice-axis. This vertical choice-axis simply neglects children and elderly on the left or right side of the vertical axis and neglects individuals who do rely on care. I argue that one can clearly see in the image above that a majority of the people in society is neglected in the concept of neoliberal individuation, because the majority of people are not represented on the vertical axis which also leads to a distorted image of diversity of age in a society.

The claim that the free market is neutral The second point I will now focus on is the claim that the free market is neutral. If we have a closer look at the image above with the two axes, we can analyze another error of thought in neoliberal individuation. The free market claims to be a neutral domain where all people have the same opportunities. In neoliberal theory, ending up poor or rich is thus simply a matter of choice. In reality the free market “is not neutral but supports some at the expense of others” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 40). First of all, as mentioned before there is a natural diversity of age in society, not everybody in society is middle-aged. Secondly, there are for example also differences in ethnicity, ability, class, religion and or gender. All these differences among people, affect our chances on the free market. I argue that even if we would not want this to be so, in current society these differences do determine our chances on the free market. Only the people “who are most skilled at manipulating the market to their own advantage” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 39) make a good chance of being successful in the market. In contrast to what was mentioned before, this means being poor or rich is thus not a matter of choice.

15 The myth of personal responsibility The third point I want to focus on is the myth of personal responsibility. What can be said until now about a feminist democratic ethic of care is that it does not look at an ideal image of human nature but rather at the reality of human nature. And within this reality of human nature, Tronto (2013) argues that ‘care’ plays an essential role in human lives and society. In addition to that, caring, the actual act of care is defined as a process which includes the following four steps. These four steps are: 1. noticing, a person first notices whether care is needed, 2. responsibility, a person takes responsibility to act, 3. care, a person does the act of care, 4. feedback, a person asks for feedback about the care he or she has provided (Tronto, 2013). Tronto (2013) argues that if you alter the second step in the caring process: ‘responsibility’ into ‘personal responsibility’ it corrupts the entire caring process. And this is exactly what happens in neoliberal society where all individuals are constructed as “entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life” (Brown, 2003, para. 14). ‘Personal responsibility’ by itself is not wrong, but as people have become accustomed to the neoliberal economic worldview, many people have become to believe personal responsibility is the only way to understand responsibility (Tronto, 2013). From an entrepreneurial neoliberal perspective ‘personal’ means that you are on your own, and ‘responsibility’ means you can be blamed for something that happened in the past (Tronto, 2013). I argue that it is no wonder that whenever something happens in public life, people in modern neoliberal Western democracies rely upon the mantra: ‘that is not ‘my’ responsibility’. What people actually mean to say is that they don’t want to take responsibility and don’t want to be included in thinking about a solution for the problem because they have become to believe that they are allowed to be too busy managing their own lives as real neoliberal model citizens should do. Whenever people show aggressive behavior in public transport, other people rarely intervene, or when they intervene these people end up in the news as heroes because it is so rare. Whenever a garbage container tips over on the street because of heavy winds, many people tend to cycle around it instead of picking it up, because it is not their responsibility. Whenever the elderly are sitting lonely at home, many people are touched, but cannot help because they are too busy managing their own lives. People do notice care is needed, which is step one in the caring process as described by Tronto (2013) but taking the next step: ‘taking responsibility’, is being mistaken by the idea of ‘personal responsibility’. What the myth of personal responsibility shows is that this mantra is a false mindset whispered in our ears by neoliberal ideology. Personal responsibility is not a natural thing but is a norm we have become accustomed to. It is a norm that makes us think that we don’t have to take responsibility, only personal responsibility, while the rest of the responsibility is filled in by the free market. In the example of aggressive behavior in public transport it could be a hired security agent who should handle these issues. In the case of a tipped over garbage container it should be the municipal clean-up service who should deal with this, and in the case of the lonely elderly it should be home care who could provide some company. Tronto points out two things I think are worth mentioning here. First, the meaning of the word responsibility, which in political terms, has its etymological roots in the word ‘response’ (Tronto, 2013). The word responsibility is thus about responding and about interacting with other people (Tronto, 2013). Responsibility is thus not about ‘personal responsibility’, as we may have become to believe, but “is by nature

16 relational, existing in the relationships among people rather than in individuals themselves” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 51). The neoliberal idea of being on your own and taking the blame for something that happened in the past, totally dilutes the relational concept of responding. Furthermore, the second point I want to mention here is that “feminists have begun to develop a model that is forward looking” rather than “backward-looking” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 51). In the forward-looking model responsibility is about “how to make change rather than simply assign blame” (Card 1996, as cited in Tronto, 2013, pp. 51). Just imagine how people would act when they would think about how to make change, when they notice aggressive behavior, a tipped over garbage container or a lonely elderly person.

2.3 A confusion about individuation Before people can start thinking about how they can make change, they will first have to develop themselves, which is part of the process of individuation. What I constantly notice in news media but also when I talk to others is that many people believe that because of ‘individuation' people only think of themselves and that this leads to a hardening of society. This is not a fact but a mere observation. I notice that the term individuation is usually associated negatively. In contrast to this negative association with individuation, my associating with individuation is a positive one. Positive, because when I look at my experience of coaching students in which I stimulate students to individualize, I see how much students grow personally and professionally. I argue that what people seem to overlook when they blame ‘individuation’ for a hardening of society is that they actually refer to ‘neoliberal individuation’. So, what we have to find out is what is meant by 'individuation' in order to be able to compare it with 'neoliberal individuation'. From my own professional experience, working as a coach with students, I stimulate students to take care of themselves and to learn how to be self-reliant. It makes the students more individuated, and I see this as a good thing. If we have a look at ancient Athenian democracy for example, it was Socrates who acted as a coach. Socrates was not known for telling his fellow citizens what to do, but instead for the endless stream of questions he posed them. These questions were mainly about “what it takes to live well” and the aim of this method was “to get at people’s presuppositions and have them rethink their opinions” (Dooremalen & Regt, 2007, pp. 20). In the case of modern coaching, whether it be study coaching, life coaching or any other form of coaching it is also of great importance not to tell the coachee (the person who is being coached) what to do. A coach should merely ask questions to make the coachee rethink his or her past actions critically, in order to have the coachee learn from them and have him or her know how to act in future events. I argue that coaching also does one other important thing with people. Although it trains people to be self-reliant it also teaches people that one needs a dialogue with another person to rethink one’s opinions. This means a person does not undergo the process of living a better life alone; it is a social process. When we now relate coaching to Carol Gould’s (1978) examination of the emergence of “the universal social individual” (pp. 01), we will see something interesting. In Gould’s (1978) interpretation of Marx’s work, she argues that if we look at how history develops, Marx’s sees a logic in this development which takes the same steps as in Hegel’s dialectics namely: thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Marx’s describes a pre-capitalist era in which people lived in communities. This is the thesis, like in Hegel’s dialectic. Then Marx’s describes a capitalist era, the antithesis, in which people live individuated and are “externally social” (Gould, 1978, pp. 05), and finally Marx’s describes a future society,

17 the synthesis between the two previous era’s as a “communal society” (Gould, 1978, pp. 04) in which people become “universal social individuals” (Gould, 1978, pp. 01). Although the idea of social individuals might sound contradictory, for Marx, reaching this communal society can’t do without the previous step of a capitalist era (Gould, 1978). I assume we can all agree that we haven’t reached this communal society yet, but what is interesting is that if we relate coaching to Gould’s examination, we can see coaching also pursues “universal social individuals” (Gould, 1978, pp. 01). This could mean, and this is just another assumption, that the flourishing of 'coaching' in today's society, which we can see in the emergence of many different types of coaches in all niches of society, could be an indication of a long-term transition towards Marx’s description of a “communal society” (Gould, 1978, pp. 04) in which people become both self-reliant and social, or in other words: social individuals. If we now look back at what people seem to overlook when they blame ‘individuation’ for a hardening of society, it is not the same form of individuation Gould (1978) refers to, the social form of individuation, but instead they are blaming an unsocial form of individuation: namely ‘neoliberal individuation’ which is related to the free market. What we can see here is that a neoliberal individual is very different from a social individual. The main difference is that a neoliberal individual is an individualist, while “Marx’s conception of individuality is not an individualist conception” (Gould, 1978, pp. 03). Moreover, a neoliberal individual could do without the help of others, while Marx believes “that individuals cannot be understood apart from their relations” (Gould, 1978, pp. 03). I argue that these persons, those who cannot be understood apart from their relations, will be the driving force behind the creation of a caring democracy. I will come back to this in the fifth chapter on ‘paddling pools for democracy’. For now, I conclude that it will take more than convincing people that they are confused, democracy as it currently operates according to an oppressive set of beliefs will also have to change.

18 Chapter 3 | Democratic individuation

3.1 Roadmap chapter three Now that I have taken a step back in the previous chapter by arguing for the other actor in the play, namely: neoliberal ideology and how it influences our idea of what individuation is, I will take a step forward. This chapter brings me to my main thesis statement. I will argue that neoliberal ideology not only creates a democratic deficit as Tronto (2013) argues, but also infuses democratic thinking, creating an oppressive ideology. This democratic ideology leads to distinguishing another form of individuating namely: democratic individuation. This means that I will build on Tronto's ideology critique to distinguish this other form of individuation. I will do this by taking the following five short steps. 1) First, I will look at how Tronto aims to deal with today’s democratic deficit and how she aims to establish her ideal: a more caring democracy. 2) By looking at how Tronto approaches today’s democratic deficit, I will argue to take her approach a step further by taking a second step which is to also question democracy. Questioning democracy leads me to my main thesis statement, which is proving that market logic also infuses democratic thinking. 3) I will prove my main thesis statement by first taking a third step which is building on the three points from the previous chapter that Tronto (2013) criticizes concerning neoliberal theory and extract three themes: exclusion, blame and competition. 4) The fourth step will show how these three themes infuse democratic thinking. 5) The fifth step will show how the ‘continuation’ factor creates the oppressive democratic ideology which leads me towards the next chapter.

3.2 Democratic caring and Caring democracy In order to establish her ideal of a more caring democracy, Tronto (2013) argues we should prioritize care in society. Prioritizing care could do two things. One, prioritizing care could solve the care deficit, when “caring becomes more democratic” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 18). This means that more people need to take responsibility for caring, which will make caring a more equally distributed task among all citizens. Two, prioritizing care could solve the democratic deficit as “democracy becomes more caring” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 18). This means governmental institutions should better reflect the real values and ideas of their citizens. Although prioritizing care might solve two deficits, this could only work if people come to have a different mindset. As Tronto (2013) argues, our mindset is now being influenced by market logic through neoliberal individuation. Thus, if we want people to have a different mindset we need to rethink “the place of the market” and rethink “the relationship of the market and the democratic state” (pp. 170). Tronto (2013) argues “a change like this can be controlled, and in a caring democracy such a limitation would be an important part of what democratic political institutions should do” (pp. 121).

3.3 Questioning democracy If we go back to the first chapter, we can see that Tronto’s ideology critique goes further than the third angle of a democratic deficit, because her ideology critique also connects democracy with market logic and with the care deficit. However, her solution of a more caring democracy leaves democracy itself largely unquestioned. My question is whether controlling and limiting the market will be enough to realize the caring democracy Tronto visualizes? Is Tronto relying too much on a functioning democracy to pursue her ideals? I think so.

19 I argue we do have to question democracy and lift up the curtain to see what is behind, because only tweaking democracy and not questioning it, is precisely what the influence of market logic is about, it gives a false promise to be able to escape the democratic deficit, which continues the democratic ideology. I will come to the theme of continuation in a later step. For now, it means that for the realization of a democracy driven by care values, we will need not only to limit and control market logic but also question the ideological role of democracy itself and examine the two-man show. This brings me to my main thesis statement which is to prove that market logic not only spreads to all “realms of life” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 121) including the political creating a democratic deficit, but also infuses democratic thinking creating an oppressive ideology.

Building on three points To build on Tronto's (2013) ideology critique, I take a step back and look at the previous chapter. In the section of Tronto’s critique on neoliberal individuation I discussed three points Tronto criticizes concerning neoliberal theory. 1) The first point is that neoliberal thinking promotes the view that people are independent individuals who can take care of themselves in every stage of life, which according to Tronto (2013) is an illusion. 2) The second point is that the free market is not neutral and only works for some people but not for all people (Tronto, 2013), and 3) the third point is that people should not only see personal responsibility as the only responsibility they have, according to Tronto (2013) people should also respond to others, that is the whole idea of responsibility. If we analyze these three points, we see a form of exclusion in the first point, a form of blame in the second point and a form of competition in the third point. In the first point, neoliberal thinking excludes the majority of people, because not everybody is a healthy middle-aged person, as shown in the previous chapter, in the image of the two axes: the choice-axis and the care-axis. In the second point we can discover a form of blame. If people don’t succeed in the free market, that is their own fault. Inequality is therefore due to the people themselves. As Tronto (2013) argues, inequality has not disappeared throughout history. Although we don’t live anymore in a medieval feudal system in which feudal lords exert power over serfs, today’s free market system “supports some at the expense of others” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 40), which produces inequality. Tronto (2013) describes this historical transition from one system to another as a “two-step process” (pp. 125). The first step in this process is exerting “power over others”, like in feudal times, and the second step in this process is to forget the first step and “blame the powerless for their incapacity” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 125). In current market thinking, it is irrelevant whether people enter the market from an unequal background, because in the free market they are suddenly autonomous actors and are all supposed to have the same choices in life, therefore the people who don’t succeed in the free market can be blamed for not succeeding. In the third point we can recognize a form of competition, in which all individuals are constructed as entrepreneurs with personal responsibility who have to compete with others in the free market (Tronto, 2013). In short, in a neoliberal society there are winners and losers, and the winner takes all.

20 The infusion of democratic thinking This brings me to proving my main thesis statement. I argue neoliberal ideology not only influences democracy by creating a democratic deficit but also infuses democratic thinking. I argue democratic thinking is infused by the three themes of exclusion, blame and competition. First, we will look at the theme of exclusion. I argue that in a representative democracy, where the people rule, representing these people should be about listening and responding. This only works if all people in a democracy have a fair chance to be represented. I argue these days, as a result of thinking from market logic, in which we only have to look at the choice axis and not the care axis (as shown in the previous chapter), and exclude the majority of the people from the frame of a model neoliberal citizen, only the model neoliberal citizen is represented in democracy. For example, rich entrepreneurs who have succeeded in life “pay a much lower share of their income in Social Security taxes than do working-class people” (Yglesias, 2019). This means that the representatives, only represent model neoliberal citizens, or in other words: the ruling class. This type of representation excludes all other non- model neoliberal citizens from the possibility of being properly represented. What we can see here is that “the forces that shape and maintain ideological thinking, are the interest of the ruling class” (Elster, 1986, pp. 168). If we look at the theme of blame, we can see something interesting as well. From neoliberal thinking it is people’s own fault if they don’t succeed in the free market. If people don't succeed, it's because they haven't worked hard enough and been lazy. I argue these days, as a result of thinking from market logic, in which people are blamed for their incapacities, people are being blamed as well for their incapacity to vote rationally. Voters are supposedly “moved by their emotions” when they vote, instead of being moved by “facts”, and this causes them “to make bad political decisions” (Tsipursky, 2016). From this perspective a democratic deficit is not due to a lack of transparency or accountable politicians, but because of a lack of capable and rational voters. When it comes to the theme of competition, neoliberal thinking is clear: everybody is an entrepreneur and has their own responsibilities. I argue these days, as a result of thinking from market logic, in which everyone competes with everyone else, living in a democratic society is all about surviving and getting your own act together. I argue that the infusion of democratic thinking by neoliberal thinking has led to people being in the mode of survival, rather than in a participatory mode.

Continuation One could exclude a person once; one could blame a person once or a person could be in survival mode for just a short while, but what makes an oppressive ideology effective is the ‘continuation’ factor. Continuation is what keeps representatives representing the model neoliberal citizen, continuation is what gives people the idea that they are continuously making "bad political decisions" (Tsipursky, 2016), and continuation keeps people in survival mode rather than in participatory mode. Continuation is important because “an ideology is averse to change” (Kuo, 2018). Moreover, an ideology has an urge to survive and will do anything to continue to exist as it is. Or as Elster (1986) puts it: “ideologies are shaped by deep-seated tendencies that help them survive criticism and refutation for a long time” (pp. 168). In the case of neoliberal ideology, this deep-seated tendency is the positive attitude of the free market, which constantly asks us to reinvent ourselves and never stop coming up with new ideas to succeed in life. How

21 could one refute this positive attitude? I argue that one cannot. In the case of the democratic ideology, this deep- seated tendency is the positive attitude of democracy, which tells us that if you don't like the way things are going politically, just vote next time, sometime in the next four years and you will be able to make a change. How could one refute democracy if there is always a new chance to make things right? I argue again that one cannot.

22 Chapter 4 | The ideological role of democracy

4.1 Roadmap chapter four I concluded chapter three by arguing that one cannot refuse the positive attitude of democracy, which perpetuates this ideology. And although many people still believe democracy is the only legitimate form of rule, I argue democracy today is a false consciousness or ideology which suggests a democracy. If we were to hypothetically call democracy a religion, it would be the statement: ‘the rule of the people’ we worship. And I argue that we do worship the idea of rule of the people, at least in contemporary modern democracies, we are even infatuated by it and loyal to it. I think that one of the greatest challenges in contemporary modern democracies will not be to question our own ‘religion’, but to come to the idea to question democracy, precisely because of our infatuation and loyalty with democracy. Besides our infatuation and loyalty, democracy is also our perspective or ideology from which we interpret the rest of the world, “we in a way enjoy our ideology” (Žižek, 2014, 00:58-01:05). For if democracy is rule of the people, the people must also be able to put an end to it, although I argue that this is hardly the case in modern democracies today, because “to step out of ideology, it hurts, it’s a painful experience” (Žižek, 2014, 01:05-01:12). This is exactly what makes democracy an oppressive ideology: “the promise to be able to escape it” (Welten, personal communication, February 19, 2020). In this chapter I will examine this promise in more detail. I will first go into more depth on the concept of ideology followed by a twofold description of the ideological role of democracy. I will end this chapter by explaining the concept of ‘dual ideology’ which shows the interwovenness of neoliberal and democratic ideology.

4.2 Ideology When it comes to the further analysis of ideology, one might ask: what is ideology? To answer this question, I want to start by looking at how people think or act. People do not just do or think things, it depends on their state of mind (Allport, 1935). I suppose we can agree that a happy person thinks and acts differently than, for example, a sad person. Sometimes people find themselves in a predisposed state of mind that empowers others to influence their thoughts and actions (Allport, 1935). It seems logical that if you want to influence people as long as possible you will have to keep them in their predisposed state of mind for as long as possible by continuing to respond to their emotions. The way to influence people’s thoughts and actions is by making people believe in something (Elster, 1986). That ‘something’ you want people to believe in may not necessarily be true or false or be for or against them. This is what ideology is: “a collection of beliefs and values held by an individual or group for other than purely epistemic reasons” (Honderich, 2005, pp. 419). To understand what the reason could be for having an individual or group keep a collection of beliefs and values, I will look at the purpose of political ideology. A purpose of political ideology is to influence people and steer them in a certain direction with their thoughts and actions in order to create the society that one has in mind. So, a political ideology can be very useful to control a crowd of people and to keep the spirits up. I assume that without a political ideology a society will fall apart because there is no ‘glue’ to keep people together. For example, to win a war, you need a strong ideology to keep your troops together, even if there are setbacks, otherwise your troops will run straight back home.

23 This purpose of political ideology, of keeping people together can be interpreted in two ways. First, “in positive terms as the expression of the world view of a class” or second, in negative terms as a “false consciousness or necessary deception which somehow distorts men’s understanding of social reality” (Larraín, 1979, pp. 13–14). The way I interpret ideology is in line with Marx and Engels interpretation, which is that ideology is a false consciousness. From this perspective, ideology is not only an "expression of the worldview of a class" (Larraín, 1979, pp. 13-14), but an oppressive expression of a ‘dominant’ class in favor of that dominant class (Honderich, 2005). A dominant and ruling class can use ideology to its advantage, by making a distorted social reality, with for example ‘class differences’ and economic and social inequality, appear "natural, inevitable, or just". (Honderich, 2005, pp. 419). One might ask then, does this dominant and ruling class believe in what it is preaching? As Elster (1986) explains: “successful indoctrination requires that the rulers believe in what they are preaching” (pp. 169) or at least one should pretend to believe in what he or she is preaching. And the latter is important, because the more the dominant class believes that: 'what is good for us is also good for the rest', the more credible it comes across, and the longer an ideology can continue. In the following two sections I will address democratic ideology. I will show that the role that democratic ideology is playing is twofold. 1) I will show that people are not seen as citizens, but are always addressed as consumers, which makes ruling a democracy for ‘the people’ very hard. 2) I will show how ruling in democracy is being made very difficult for people by showing how people are being tricked into the idea that they can participate. I argue that both points, addressing people as consumers and tricking people into the idea that they can participate, create a distorted reality and are in favor of the dominant and ruling class allowing the dominant and ruling class to decide politically whatever is in their best interest.

4.3 Addressed as consumer In this section I will show one way in which it is difficult for 'the people' to govern in a contemporary Western democracy. I argue what makes ruling difficult is the way people are addressed. In the following I will describe three perspectives in which each perspective addresses people in a different way. These perspectives are: 1) people as citizens, 2) people as citizens and consumers, and 3) people as consumers. I argue that the third perspective shows the reality we live in and shows the ideological role of democracy.

People as citizens I assume that we can agree that people who live in contemporary Western democracies can be defined as citizens. I argue that the first three starting points in chapter one (departing from democratic statistics, departing from democratic theory and departing from democratic functioning) lean on this first perspective of people as citizens. In these three starting points to analyze the current state of democracy, citizenship is presumed to be the primary way in which people are addressed by the government and I think we can agree that it is very common to think this way. I assume that this presumption is based on how national law works. For example, under Dutch national law a child born of Dutch parents “automatically acquires Dutch nationality” (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2019). Because a child automatically becomes a national it also means that child automatically becomes a citizen of the state, whether that child identifies with citizenship or not.

People as citizens and consumers A second perspective is that people are addressed by government as citizens and addressed by the free market as consumers. Being addressed in different ways confuses people because even if people are citizens of the state they do not always act as citizens with political ideals. This perspective is also described as the ‘consumer citizen paradox’. As Dubbeldam (2020) mentions: “a large proportion of people regularly make choices that are at odds with his ideals”. As a good citizen, for example, one would never want others to be exploited or pollute the environment, but the choices we make as consumers often result in other people being exploited or the environment being polluted (Dubbeldam, 2020).

People as consumers I argue this third perspective does not question how people act, but more importantly this third perspective questions how people are addressed primarily, because I argue that the way one is being addressed primarily ultimately influences one’s behavior. I argue that people are being addressed as a consumer all the time by the free market and the government, even during the elections, which leads me to the fourth starting point in the first chapter: to perceive democracy in terms of an oppressive ideology. Democratic ideology says one thing and does another thing. Democratic ideology gives us the idea that people are born citizens of the state and thus that people are citizens, but I argue democratic ideology addresses people as consumers. For example, Dutch Prime Minister Rutte argued that people should consume more, because it is their “civic duty to spend more money” (Jansen, 2013). I argue that this is one of the odd things that democratic ideology does, it distorts reality by turning consumption into a civic duty. I argue that consuming as civic duty creates a false consciousness which makes people believe that consuming is what practicing democracy is about. Moreover, people should fulfill this so called ‘civic duty’ of consuming also during election time. A month or so before governmental representative elections, suddenly out of nowhere, party members in white, blue, green or red jackets with party logos on them start invading the “locus of consumption” (Baudrillard, 1998, pp. 34); the inner cities. These party members show their freshly printed pamphlets with hopeful promises and ask consumers to vote for their representatives. I argue that voting today is an economic transaction in which a consumer pays with his or her vote to get wat he or she has been promised. To further support my argument, we can have a look at Baudrillard’s (1998) standpoint. From Baudrillard’s (1998) standpoint we are all consumers and as he explains “the consumer's relation to the real world, to politics, to history, to culture is not a relation of interest, investment or committed responsibility - nor is it one of total indifference: it is a relation of curiosity” (pp. 34). It is the same curiosity as watching an entertainment show on TV, and I argue that this curiosity reflects our distance from democracy, just enough to not invest time in democracy or feel responsible. This curiosity is fed through the news item that dramatizes and distances all politics, history and culture into reduced signs that we consume (Baudrillard, 1998). By watching the news out of curiosity, as a spectator, we can have a look in the democratic arena and make an interpretation of it without really having to be there (Baudrillard, 1998). I argue that even if Dutch nationality law says that citizenship is automatically determined, in the reality people live in, a consumer reality; citizenship is an externality, or in other

25 words: “existing outside the perceiving object” (OUP, n.d.-b). If we take this idea one step further, I would argue that people are neither citizens nor exercise citizenship, but that citizenship today is replaced by being a consumer.

4.4 The illusion of participation In this section I will show a second way in which it is difficult for 'the people' to rule in a contemporary Western democracy. I argue it is not only the way people are frequently addressed, it is also being made more difficult for people to participate in contemporary democracies. I will take four steps to show this. First, I will look at how Shumpeter (in Pateman, 1970) describes the core of modern democracy: as a competition for voters. Second, I will look at what Pateman (1970) describes as an ideal democracy: a participatory democracy with maximum input of citizens. This brings me to the third step which is to elaborate on the announcement of a participatory society in the Netherlands in 2013 which concerned civic participation. One might think that this announcement embraces Pateman's view of an active citizen, but in the fourth step I will argue that in reality civic participation is nothing more than an illusion.

Democracy: a competition for voters In the previous section I argued that people are neither citizens nor exercise citizenship, but that citizenship today is replaced by being a consumer. This makes sense when we have a look at how Pateman (1970) describes Shumpeters definition of a modern democratic method. Shumpeter defines the core of modern democracy as a “competition for leadership” (Pateman, 1970, pp. 04). Shumpeter even goes as far as comparing voters with consumers, in which voters “choose between the policies (products) offered by competing political entrepreneurs and the parties regulate the competition like trade associations in the economic sphere” (Pateman, 1970, pp. 04). I argue Shumpeter did not realize how close he was to describing the democratic ideology. While Shumpeter compares voters with consumers, I argue the voters are consumers by expressing their preferences for the options that are on the (political) market. In line with what Shumpeter calls distinctive about modern democracy, namely that modern democracy evolves around the competition for voters, I argue that voting or in other words: ‘doing one’s duty’ is structurally similar to going out and buying something and has nothing to do with political participation.

The ideal participatory democracy In the ideal democracy described by Pateman (1970), we should strive for "maximum participation of all people" (pp. 02). Maximum participation means that people should have an active role in political decision- making. This is in contrast to a representative democracy, in which the emphasis is on representation rather than participation (Pateman, 1970). In representative democracy, the representative takes an active role, in which the person who voted for the representative gives away his or her political power and will have to accept that the representative rules over him or her (Cole, in Pateman, 1970). That person who gave away his or her political power will just have to trust that the representative does not have a double agenda. What I mean with a double agenda is that representatives can pretend to act in the interest of everyone, although when it comes to creating new laws, these laws apply “to certain persons or class of persons” … “which violates equal protection for all” (USlegal, n.d.). One of the great dangers for democracy is for representatives to have a double agenda, which

26 according to Mill (as cited in Pateman, 1970) is a consequence of the “the sinister interest of the holders of power” (pp. 28). This is why it so important to aim for participatory democracy according to Pateman (1970) for a number of reasons. I will highlight three of these reasons. First, the way politics is set up has an influence on a person's personality (Pateman, 1970). If a person has an active role in politics then that person will also feel appreciated for that, which has a positive influence on a person's attitude to life. Second, through participation: people educate themselves, and “the more individuals participate the better able they become to do so” (Pateman, 1970, pp. 43). Third, participation has an integrative effect that contributes to the acceptance of collective decisions. Moreover, Pateman (1970) argues that “if individuals are to exercise the maximum amount of control over their own lives and environment, then authority structures in these areas must be so organized that they can participate in decision making” (pp. 43). One would then think that the announcement of a participatory society in for example the Netherlands in 2013 would have been an embrace of Pateman’s ideal. I argue that the announcement of the participatory society in the Netherlands in 2013 did not embrace Pateman’s ideal and only created a false consciousness that is rooted in democratic ideology. I will show the ideological role of democracy in this example by first elaborating on the announcement of the participatory society in the Netherlands, followed by four arguments that show how this participatory society in the Netherlands is a false consciousness.

The announcement of a participatory society in the Netherlands During his first official speech, King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands said the following:

It is undeniable that people in our current network and information society are more articulate and independent than before. Combined with the need for government deficit reduction, this leads to the classical welfare state slowly but surely changing into a participatory society. From everyone who can is asked to take responsibility for their or her own life and environment (2013).

The participatory society announced in the Netherlands in 2013 concerns civic participation. The goal of civic participation is: “narrowing the gap between citizens and politics”, increasing “the capacity for policy”, “citizens can have a say”, “promoting self-reliance” and “strengthening social cohesion” (Infonu, 2016). What is positive about this civic participation is that citizens become more involved and “are asked for their opinion”, and “can exert real influence” (Infonu, 2016). I argue that this comes close to Pateman's (1970) conception of an active role of the citizen in political decision-making. The idea behind this civic participation in the Netherlands is that the government is going to teach people how to fulfil their role as citizens and that starts with getting into local politics at municipal level where the gap between politics and the people is the smallest (Infonu, 2016). Moreover, people who think that civic participation is important can invest time in it (Infonu, 2016).

Democratic ideology in practice I argue that there are three main things that draw attention in the official speech of King Willem- alexander in 2013 and the description of civic participation that show how democracy is playing its ideological

27 role. The first thing that draws attention in the official speech is that a participatory democracy is said to be a consequence of people becoming more articulate and independent in the current network and information society. What is left out by the King, is that the current network and information society is a commercial institute that Zuboff (2019) calls ‘surveillance capitalism’, which is run by big tech companies who earn money by showing people the information that they think they want based on algorithms. “Instead of only tracking our data, surveillance capitalism has now evolved into intervening and controlling our behavior to raise the profits” (Zuboff in van Raay, 2020). According to Zuboff (2019) this means “it is no longer enough to automate information flows about us, the goal now is to automate us” (pp. 8). I argue that people have not become more articulate and independent in today's network and information society, but instead think that they have become more articulate and independent, yet they are being manipulated for profit. I think this means that there is nothing democratic about the current network and information society. Using the current network and the information society as a citizen is not a way to participate, but a way to be manipulated. One can then ask what the influence is on a person's attitude to life if that person is constantly being manipulated? The second thing that draws attention is that people are being helped in learning how to participate. I assume this also means people should have political tools to participate, like a referendum for example. What is left out in the description above is that in 2018 the referendum in the Netherlands was abolished (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2018), signed by the same King. One might ask how this abolition of the referendum, helps people to educate themselves and how this narrows the gap between citizens and politics? How does this increase the possibility for people to have a say or help encourage citizens to give their opinions? And how does this help citizens to have a more active role in political decision-making? I argue it does not and it takes away the opportunity to make collective decisions, which according to Pateman (1970) is so important for a participatory society. I argue the abolition of the referendum in 2018 in the Netherlands demonstrates the ideological role democracy is playing, because it promises one thing and does another. The third thing that draws attention is that people who think participation is important can invest time in politics (Infonu, 2016). In 2017 the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) concludes that people do not have time to invest and that “the so-called 'participatory society' demands too much of the ability to participate of citizens” (den Hartog, 2017). “There is quite a difference between what is expected of citizens and what they can actually cope with” (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2017). What this means is that people have enough to deal with in their lives, like long working days, and that most people don’t have time to invest in politics (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2017). This would not be a problem if, for example, participation could also take place at work (Pateman, 1970), through workplace democracy. But “work is not political, instead it is insulated from political action” (Cawston, personal communication, May 30, 2020). In addition, people are trained to serve rather than participate, and “this training largely takes place during the course of people’s daily occupation” (Pateman, 1970, pp. 38). I argue that this shows how democratic ideology throws out some bait by mentioning that people can participate, but in reality no one will bite because on the one hand, people are merely curious spectators who take a look at the democratic arena for entertainment, and on the other hand, not much more than a glance, because they have to work and serve rather than participate.

28 4.5 A dual ideology I argue that neoliberal ideology depends on democratic ideology for survival, because I assume that people would never accept a straightforward corpocracy (a culture dominated by “large commercial organizations” (OUP, n.d.-a)) as a society in which the free market would lead and people would serve, but as long as people call their society a democracy, even if it is an oppressive ideology, it seems that people do not care. I argue that this interwovenness of these two ideologies results in a dualism. This interwovenness of two ideologies is logical because, as mentioned before, “ideology is never created in a vacuum; every ideology is a reaction to another ideology” (Kuo, 2018). For Plumwood (in Tronto, 2013) dualisms “express two sides of the same coin, in which the second quality is repressed or back grounded” and “the results of such dualisms are always to denigrate the second term” (pp. 71). Looking at the previous section, I think it's convenient that neoliberal ideology insulates the workplace from political action because people are encouraged to take personal responsibility and work hard to realize their 'American dream', but as long as this hard work trains people to serve, it keeps people away from political participation and allows the neoliberal ideology to continue with its daily routine. In line with Plumwood’s explanation of dualisms I call the two-man show in which people in modern democratic societies live in: a ‘dual ideology’ in which the second ideology, namely democratic ideology is repressed by neoliberal ideology, resulting in a toxic relation between these two ideologies.

29 Chapter 5 | Paddling pools for democracy

5.1 Roadmap chapter five After having taken a step back in the second chapter, a step forward in the third chapter and having argued for the oppressive ideological role that democracy is playing in the fourth chapter, it is now time to answer what we should do with Tronto’s (2013) suggestion of a caring democracy. Now that we have reconsidered our loyalty to democracy, including Tronto's loyalty, I suggest we take a different route. I argue that in the pursuit of a caring democracy, we must not leave democracy untouched; we must rethink how we can act democratically. Moreover, we not only need to rethink how we can act democratically, but we also need to leave room to learn, to experience and to put democratic behavior into practice. This room for practice is what I call ‘paddling pools for democracy’. And as the title of this thesis suggests, these paddling pools for democracy are a prefigurative approach to Tronto's (2013) caring democracy. I will take six steps to argue for this prefigurative approach. 1) first, I will elaborate on prefigurative politics. 2) second, I will look into what a paddling pool is, in order to use it as a metaphor for the route I’m taking. 3) third I will argue what needs to be prepared to create an environment that could host a paddling pool for democracy. 4) fourth, I will have a closer look at the tenets of a paddling pool for democracy. 5) fifth, I will argue for the surprise factor and 6) sixth, I will argue how this approach could lead to a caring democracy.

5.2 Prefigurative politics For example, if I were to ‘figure out’ how democracy works, I would be unravelling or deciphering a political system. ‘Prefiguration’ aims at unravelling or deciphering as well, but with the intention to try something out on a small scale first before one deploys its learnings on a bigger scale. In the context of a society, van Dijk (2020) mentions "a future society must not only be realised in the future, but also in the present” (pp. 31). In this way people can try to work now on something that can be worked out later in a larger context. This means that the 'present future society' that people could work on now is a prototype for the future. Graham (2005) argues that in prefigurative politics, this ‘prototype’ is “the embryo of the human society of the future” (pp. 98). The future society that is referred to here is the post-capitalist society that Gould (1978) refers to when she describes a “communal society” (Gould, 1978, pp. 04) in which people become “universal social individuals” (Gould, 1978, pp. 01). This means prefigurative politics can be defined “as the strategic commitment to developing revolutionary organizations that embody the structures of deliberation and decision-making that a post-capitalist society should contain” (Raekstad, 2017, pp. 363). Moreover, in the process of prefiguration, experiments through “trial and error” (van de Sande, 2015, pp. 189) and the experience one gains through prefiguration are of great importance. Prefigurative politics is thus about people coming together in small groups to experiment with "other forms of representation" (van Dijk, 2020, pp .31), in order to reflect a future society. These experiments will only work if the organisation of these small groups is based on “mutual aid, voluntary cooperation, direct democracy, and is opposed to domination and exploitation in all forms” (Solidarity Foundation, 2015).

30 5.3 What are paddling pools? ‘Paddling pools for democracy' is my interpretation of prefigurative politics and that is why I will first elaborate on the metaphor of paddling pools. A paddling pool is defined as “a shallow artificial pool for children to paddle in” (OUP, n.d.-c). Usually made of plastic, inflatable and often in blue with a white rim. When you try to find photos online of a paddling pool you will often see the paddling pool placed in the context of a backyard, where it is placed in full sun on a perfectly green mowed lawn with a couple of children in it. The children in the pool are smiling and it seems that there is no danger of drowning because the paddling pool is forgiving. Something is going on in the pool, the children seem to have fun playing with water, but it also seems that they are learning to play with each other. It seems to be a safe place, isolated from the rest of the world. Within the paddling pool it is up to the children to determine the rules of the game, of course this is not easy for social beginners, but a paddling pool seems ideal for this kind of social learning.

The conditions for preparing an environment As the Solidarity Federation (2015) mentions: “we are committed to building a new society within the shell of the old”. The concept of ‘paddling pools for democracy’ is also committed to do the same but assumes that the old shell of society is a ‘dual ideology’. This is the main difference between prefigurative politics as described above, and the concept of paddling pools for democracy. I argue that if one wants to deploy prefigurative politics in a contemporary Western democracy, one will first have to deal with a ‘dual ideology’ consisting of neoliberal and democratic ideology, before one can prepare an environment in which one can prefigurate a future society. But as mentioned before in the third chapter: “ideologies are averse to change” (Kuo, 2018). That is why I have argued that controlling and limiting the market as Tronto (2013) proposes will not be enough to bring about change. Therefore, to aim for a democracy driven by care values as Tronto (2013) proposes, which I think comes close to Gould’s (1978) description of a “communal society” (pp. 04) with “universal social individuals” (pp. 01), I argue people will need to create prefigurative environments where oppressive ideologies do not make sense. These environments, where oppressive ideologies do not make sense, can be fun like paddling pools and there must also be room for dialogue and conflict. An important condition for these environments is that they are safe havens, like paddling pools for children, isolated from oppressive ideological thinking. A 'paddling pool for democracy' must therefore, as a prefigurative approach, detach itself from the dual ideology as I described earlier, in order to be able to do the work needed to realize the ideal of a caring democracy or in other words: a future post-capitalist society. By 'detachment' I mean that in the case of the neoliberal ideology a paddling pool must under no circumstances behave as a free market or be influenced by the free market and must therefore be a closed market. In the case of the democratic ideology, by 'detachment' I mean that people within a paddling pool for democracy must under no circumstances be addressed as consumers, nor as citizens of the state, but only as 'people'. Moreover, participating in a paddling pool for democracy is very different from the ideological participation that people experience today in the Netherlands, for example. The difference is that participation in a paddling pool for democracy is a real direct democratic practice, while participation in the participatory society in the Netherlands is a false consciousness.

31 The tenets of a paddling pool for democracy If we have a look at Marx’s theory of practice, prefigurative politics requires people who have “the right powers, needs, and consciousness” (Raekstad, 2017, pp. 360) to organize revolutions. But is that not too much to ask of people and do people really have the ability to act effectively these days? Zygmunt Bauman asks himself what happened after the Arabian Spring or after the Moviemento de los indignados in Madrid (van Rootselaar, 2018)? Bauman answers with a short: “nothing” and explains that there is “a discrepancy between the explosion of emotions and the ability to act effectively” (van Rootselaar, 2018, pp. 20). I argue that people who are used to living in a dual ideology cannot be expected to have the right powers, needs or consciousness to be able to exercise prefigurative politics because these two ideologies influence the way people think and act politically. Prefigurative politics is something that people have to learn through practice, and one needs a dialogue with another person to rethink one’s opinion (like in coaching), mistakes can therefore be made. This leads me to argue that, if we look at the three themes of exclusion, blame and competition, in a paddling pool for democracy nobody can be excluded from prefiguring a future society, and no one can be blamed for being incapable of practicing real direct democracy nor is learning to practice democracy a competition. A paddling pool for democracy is a learning zone in which people have the opportunity to get out of their political survival mode. Key to this learning zone is restoring the care process as described by Tronto (2013). ‘Personal responsibility’ has to become ‘responsibility’, which means people take up their responsibility to act and respond to others. And finally, people should be able to step out of a paddling pool for democracy anytime and anywhere without conditions.

The surprise factor All the tenets and conditions for paddling pools of democracy as described above are abstract and don’t reveal much details about a paddling pool for democracy. I am aware of this. I am also aware that people are creative beings, and assuming that I have to describe more details will make the paddling pool for democracy oppressive and would make people less creative. The idea of giving a simple description is that people have to fill in the rest themselves. This is in line with Marx approach of not giving a blueprint for a future society but only the preconditions. I think of paddling pools for democracy as a challenge, in which people can surprise others with their interpretation of it. I argue that the surprise factor is one of the most important factors, because I do not think we are aware of what people are capable of. Besides, who does not like surprises? The answer would be: ‘ideologies that are averse to change’. By going more into detail, I would take out the surprise factor. This means that people have to stop thinking of democracy and start doing democracy. I do not know what this leads to, and I think that's the beauty of it because I think the surprise factor is the only certainty that can subdue oppression.

How does this lead to a caring democracy? I think that the concept of paddling pools for democracy can be applied to all sorts of local initiatives. These local initiatives may include, for example, retirement homes, local energy cooperation’s or local food collectives. I argue that the context is not that important, what is more important is the way people set up these paddling pools for democracy. These paddling pools for democracy should be set up as 1) closed markets, 2)

32 people should be addressed as ‘people’ instead of consumers, and 3) people should take into account the tenets I explained in the previous section. I believe that as long as people experience democracy on a local level, they will learn to deal with the setbacks, but the enthusiasm will also grow, regardless of the small context, and this will result in a growing network of small paddling pools for democracy. I argue that this is the route to cultivate “universal social individuals” (Gould, 1978, pp. 01) and this will eventually lead to care driven democracies.

33 Conclusion

This thesis is focused on answering the main research question, which is: ‘how to describe the ideological role of democracy, and how does understanding this description help us think about how to realize a democracy that is driven by care values as Tronto (2013) proposes?’ In order to answer the main research question, I applied an ideology critique as a method to dismantle the ideological role democracy plays in contemporary Western democracies. I have described democratic ideology as an ideology at the service of another ideology, namely at service of neoliberal ideology. I call this a ‘dual ideology’. I have argued that democratic ideology serves the interests of neoliberal ideology in order for neoliberal ideology to survive and remain as it is, because I assume that people would never accept a society that operates solely on neoliberal ideological beliefs, like a corpocracy. I have argued that as long as people believe that they live in a democracy, people are not going to ask questions. That in short is the ideological role of democracy, it is a repressed role, a role of serving another ideology. I have illustrated this repressed role by showing how market logic, which is based on neoliberal ideology, not only spreads to all “realms of life” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 121) including the political creating a democratic deficit, but also infuses democratic thinking creating an oppressive ideology, which is my main thesis statement. I have also shown how both ideologies are oppressive. Both ideologies create a society wherein people are excluded, blamed and have to compete with each other for economic and political survival. Moreover, both ideologies play with the idea of false responsibility. First, neoliberal ideology distorts human nature by portraying people as independent individuals who only have personal responsibilities, although they also have the responsibility to respond to others (Tronto, 2013). Second, democratic ideology makes spending money a civic duty, by letting people think that it is their responsibility to keep the economy running, and that this is what the practice of democracy is all about, which it is not. In addition to that, both ideologies also play with the idea that anyone can join the economic and political rat race with success. First, neoliberal ideology claims that the free market is neutral, which it is not because “it supports some at the expense of others” (Tronto, 2013, pp. 39). Second, participatory democracy, as, for example, applied today in the Netherlands, lets people believe that everybody can participate in society, while in reality people don’t have time to participate. This leads me to the conclusion that I don't know what democracy is because I have never experienced real democracy. Now that I know this, I can answer the second part of the main research question which is: how this helps us think about how to realize a democracy that is driven by care values, as Tronto proposes. I have answered this question in this thesis by arguing for a prefigurative approach to Tronto’s (2013) caring democracy. ‘Paddling pools for democracy’ is my interpretation of prefigurative politics. In order to achieve a democracy that is driven by caring values instead of economic values as democracy is driven today, I have argued that people need to prepare small environments, like safe havens, isolated from oppressive ideological thinking. These small environments are learning zones for people to learn to practice their democratic skills. These paddling pools have to be closed markets. Moreover, participation and leaving a paddling pool for democracy is unconditional. I am aware that in describing these ‘paddling pools for democracy’ I do not go into much detail, and this is deliberate. I am convinced that designing a detailed blueprint for future society is what leads to oppressive ideological thinking. I have argued that future care driven democracies have to be built on the unexpected capabilities of

34 people who join in building them. I believe that this is the route to cultivate “universal social individuals” (Gould, 1978, pp. 01). Although I think the impact of paddling pools for democracy will be small at first, I think the impact will grow from local to national in the long run. This leads me to make a suggestion for the direction of future research. I have given an ideology critique of democracy and in response I have proposed my interpretation of a prefigurative approach. But I think that the impact of paddling pools for democracy will have political consequences that will not go unnoticed, and this is something I have not yet addressed in this thesis. There will be obstacles and challenges that such prefigurative experiments will face, because ‘paddling pools for democracy’ are not in a vacuum. Instead, the " paddling pools for democracy " will be surrounded by a world infused with an oppressive neoliberal and democratic ideology, which is why I expect that the people taking advantage of the current state of democracy will try to undermine the success of these experiments at all costs. Future research can further explore these challenges, not by starting from theory, but again departing from the actual situation.

-END-

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