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The ANSO Report (16-28 February 2011) (Read-Only)

The ANSO Report (16-28 February 2011) (Read-Only)

The NGO Safety Office Issue: 68 16-28 February 2011

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 The AOG focus on popula- The issue of civilian casual- labad, though collateral, 8 Northern Region tion centres noted in the pre- ties also came to the fore as provides a sobering exam- Western Region 15 vious period continued on a result of IMF operations, ple of the pervasiveness of into this one, providing for primarily from the Eastern the conflict and the impact Eastern Region 18 the defining dynamic of the Region. The great majority it can have on the most Southern Region 23 month. While this activity of these were the result of routine of activities. The has primarily involved suicide air strikes, and appear to be theft of communication 27 ANSO Info Page attacks, the complex attack associated with the ongoing equipment in Faryab, along within City (similar regional ‘reorientation’ of with the periods only Cen- to Kandahar in the PRP) was forces from such areas as tral incident in Kabul, YOU NEED TO KNOW the stand out event, due to the Pech Valley in Kunar served as reminders that both the number of casual- towards the population cen- criminality remains a uni- • Complex attacks within ties that resulted and level of tres, where it is felt a greater versal concern for the com- population centres sophistication. In addition, strategic impact can be munity, no matter the con- the suicide attacks in Khost achieved. These actions text. • Reduction/reorientation of ISAF within East (an apparent premature deto- can be seen as part of the Helmand in the South has nation), , Faryab and overall ISAF ‘population consistently recorded the • Civilian casualties Kandahar also incurred con- centric’ strategy, as seen in highest comparative pro- siderable casualty figures; the South during Operation vincial incident volumes • Numerous & diverse with all these events denoting Mushtarak late last year; NGO incidents this year (Ghazni held this a greater ‘flexibility’ in AOG steps that also represent the distinction in 2010), both targeting definitions while early stages of the eventual from a regional and coun- resulting in high civilian casu- transition to ANSF in the try perspective, with over alty volumes. In the cases of long term. 200 AOG incidents in Feb- ANSO is supported by Jalalabad, Faryab and Kun- Thus far, the NGO pres- ruary alone. Kunar, in the duz the locations targeted ence in the West and South East, typically records the were civil structures, though has remained unaffected second highest, though the individuals within (the with no incidents reported Khost is closing in on this predetermined targets) could this year. In contrast, the range. Wardak remains the be loosely defined as ‘security East and North continue to most volatile province forces’ or legitimate targets. report the vast majority of within Central, though However, these attacks have NGO incidents, accounting Badghis surpasses it, also resulted in universal condem- for 6 of the seven total reporting the highest vol- nation (including the IEA events this period, bringing umes in the West. Lastly, itself) and the negative impli- the months total to 11. Faryab presents the highest cations on AOG acceptance The death of an NGO na- volumes from a Northern may force greater restrictions tional staff member (the 3rd perspective, surpassing on such efforts, though it this year overall and the 2nd such historically volatile nonetheless sets a troubling in the East) during the at- areas as Kunduz. precedent early on in the tack on the bank in Jala- year. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 1 The early morning hours of Fri- 40 day 18 February saw two INGO 16 February was followed ten days 30 employees report in the Kabul later by an early-morning multiple 20 City office pretending to be on rocket attack against high-profile 10 locations in the capital city. The duty, and successfully drive away 0 in the agency’s two high-profile said morning, three BM-1 vehicles. Both staff members had (107mm) rockets impacted in the vicinity of the Ministry of De- joined the organization shortly KABUL AOG KABUL Crime before the theft, with the senior fence and the Presidential Police between them having concluded a in PD 9 & 2 without causing casu- alties. The strike denotes a return (with a disciplined rank-and-file and an ability couple of months at a managerial to implement the internal code of conduct) - position. Capitalizing on his influ- to another tactic of choice fa- voured by AOG planners in the this is applicable in minimum to the IEA and ence, the individual also recom- its leadership’s approving such attacks. The mended his accomplice to join the past years and often put in motion when AOG decided to discredit future will actually show whether the IEA lead- INGO as a driver. The incident ership (as opposed to the HQN splinter group serves as a reminder that NGOs GOA discourse on security gains. Due to the type of weaponry used and foreign AOG elements for which such (as any other type of organiza- considerations do not apply), will be willing tions) are not immune to this type in combination with TTPs used, indirect fire attacks remain inher- and able to align the tactical & strategic consid- of criminality. The ‘inside’ jobs erations in the field back with its own ideologi- and deflection, especially by ently inaccurate, and pose mainly the risk of collateral damage for cal standpoints and code of conduct, including freshly-recruited staff, are rather a reigning in the HQN element. common feature. Holidays, week- civilian residences located along ends and after COB hours repre- its trajectories. Undoubtedly, the From another perspective, this cycle was char- sent a typical timing for such actual accuracy of IDF attacks as acterized by a higher than usual occurrence of schemes, as the office and project much as any other considerations false security alarms, with two notable cases of premises are manned by less per- matter less than their occurrence a detonation (inside a military training ground sonnel and the discipline is more and timing. This cycle’s IDF actu- in PD 9) and an accidental ‘friendly- relaxed. Regulated access to assets ally connects with the recent sui- fire’ (among the private security detail of a res- and implementation of strict re- cide missions in the capital as taurant in PD 10) prompting several Afghan porting procedures shall prevent both types of attack stand out for and international agencies to circulate unsub- most of similar schemes. It also being a minimal tactical invest- stantiated reports of AOG attacks. In the cur- appears that this category of ment in return for maximum stra- rent context, when further AOG attacks in the criminal cases is often preceded tegic impact, that is, on percep- City represent a statistical certitude, one will by symptomatic irregularities such tions of insecurity. Concomitantly benefit from a simple ‘common sense’ analysis as dissension among the team though, both types of attacks lead which fast reveals that the AOG threats re- members, individual discipline to an absurd situation in which volve around a predictable set of targets and issues or, as simple as it is, unex- civilians are caught (or worse, tar- situations. As opposed to ‘chasing’ generic pected transgression of SOPs or geted on purpose) in the fighting, threat reports issued by external agencies, breaking of routines. the AOG, successfully or not, NGOs will benefit from keeping focused on damage the reputation of GOA the analysis of their staff vulnerabilities along For the rest, wit- structures and their international the standard vectors: 1. proximity to security nessed only two non-lethal AOG sponsors, but by doing so also targets, 2. travel situations, 3. exposure in escalations. A text-book targeting detrimentally erode their own self- ‘target-rich’ public venues. of two fuel tankers in Surobi on image as legitimate opposition THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 1 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 So far, a modest 18 incidents (incl. 40 counted for one AOG attack 7 AOG) have been recorded for 30 February. Whereas the final ac- against a supply truck and its oc- 20 count may be subject to change, cupant, and the only IED blast the overall levels indicate that also recorded against security forces, 10 Logar renounced to the usual inci- which then sparked an IMF op- 0 dent volumes, with IMF & ANSF eration resulting in the arrest of operations outnumbering AOG two locals. Further up the road direct attacks by roughly 50%. towards Kabul, in Puli Kandahari, LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime Whereas the first two weeks saw a presumed couple of teenagers stuck a magnetic IED on a slow- kinetic activity has been claimed by IEA units the action mainly boil in Muham- in the peripheral districts as well as in Baraki mad Agha and Baraki Barak, with moving fuel tanker. The device reportedly detonated shortly after Barak, but could not be independently cor- larger scale operations sporadically roborated so far. reported from the peripheral the alarmed driver and his assis- Kharwar and Charkh Districts, tant, noticing the hasty retreat of An IMF/ANSF night raid, this time in Babus came back to the fore the youngsters from the vicinity Area (Puli Alam) on the night of 27 February, during this reporting cycle. Three of the truck, vacated the vehicle. resulted in the arrest of 5 local residents, and close-range ambushes of military In the Mohmand Area of Baraki channeled a wave of local resentment against convoys & patrols in addition to Barak, two RPGs were fired to- such operations which led the community to an IED blast (triggered by an IMF wards the IMF FOB. 2 road-side stage a protest in Puli Alam center a couple of patrol) and the burning of two IEDs were recovered by IMF hours after the arrest. fuel tankers were reported from from Ebrahim Khel in Baraki Ba- From March onwards, NGOs may anticipate a the central district. Qalai Ali Khan rak, while another emplaced de- steady increase in kinetic operations, which to the North of Puli Alam also vice was discovered by ANP in shall likely resume along the road networks. It rose to prominence, having ac- the Qala Shahi Area of Muham- is yet to be seen whether the current momen- mad Aghan. Additional AOG tum will remain with the pro-GOA forces.

NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 BAMYAN 50 This Report Period 0 Communities in Bamyan continue 40 to face harsh weather conditions, movement tracking of NGO road 30 with access being of particular missions. Of note, particularly low 20 concern. The province is currently temperatures are anticipated for 10 the first week of March. off reach through the majority of 0 communications, the exception Otherwise, ten years since the being the Ghorband Road. In- destruction of Bamyan Buddhas deed, Shibar remains the only by IEA troops, the course of se- BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN Crime open pass among those which curity developments in the prov- ince largely revolved around dis- stretch along the main access the local parties upon the announcement of coveries of weapons caches as roads. Passage through the iso- the Meshrano Jirga members by the President well as voluntary handovers of lated areas of the province also (one third of the chamber). According to local constitutes the most important military material by the communi- views, the final assortment of presidential ap- ties to the IMF. risk factor for NGOs, and shall be pointees under-represents Bamyan’s domestic mitigated by adequate awareness February concluded with a peace- elites and interests, with the only Bamyan dele- of the local road situation, ade- ful demonstration in front of the gate in the previous session having been re- quate equipment of vehicles and Governor’s office in Sarasyab placed by a Hazara candidate from Parwan. passengers with winter gear, rea- (Bamyan Markaz), called for by sonable timing and effective THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 Tagab remained in the spotlight 30 of ANSF & IMF efforts as well as aimed at disruption of supply net- of AOG counter-offensive opera- works, and ‘clear & hold’ phase 20 tions, although the intensity and operations along the main road 10 network including active involve- volumes of combat action signifi- 0 cantly decreased after the initial, ment of ANSF and local ‘public extremely kinetic, phase of the protection force’ in policing the ‘cleared’ areas have dominated the IMF operations in the district. KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime Still, Tagab hosted every second period, and will most likely con- tinue on irregular basis through- out of the total 31 incidents re- are to be found in the history (and success) of corded in February in the prov- out the spring season. During this cycle, the IMF paid a heavy toll of the recent IEA expansion in the province ince, including 5 out of 7 AOG- (targeting local HIG and other jihadi elements authored attacks. The adjacent several casualties in AOG counter -strikes along the typical TTPs on as much as local sympathizers/members of districts of Alasay and Nijrab ANSF), and more pragmatically in the well (Afghaniya Valley) received a sec- the main district roads: IED de- ployment (in Qurghar), close- established patterns of ‘prize money’ paid for ondary portion of incidents, each ‘successfully’ conducted operation. This largely echoing the operations in range SAF and ambushes (in Landa Khel, another ambush in strand of conflict also brings imminent risks Tagab. Alasay, however, may well for those community members rightly or have marked another milestone in Shah Khel did not result in casual- ties). Both types of attacks were falsely accused of sympathizing with the cur- the operation with a publicly de- rent IMF efforts. It is of crucial importance for cried airstrike, which allegedly also replicated in Nijrab (Chahar Qala and Afghanya), but did not NGOs active in the eastern districts to ensure killed a party of five bird-hunters that their staff are aware about such risks, and mistakenly taken for AOG fight- cause casualties on the IMF side. The afore-mentioned also indi- do not undertake actions which may be inter- ers. Meanwhile in the West, Ko- preted otherwise. histan I made for all three security cates the red lines of AOG riposte incidents including a hand- to the offensive. Besides increased In the context of resumed debate on civilian grenade attack and two cases of IED activity and tactical complex casualties due to IMF airstrikes in the Eastern IED and explosive material dis- ambushes along the roads, a third Region, an unfortunate incident occurred in coveries by ANP. addition previously identified as a the early morning of 24 February in Wahshi likely option, materialized during Area of Alasay. In a case of presumed mis- The developments in Tagab pur- this cycle. Two targeted killings of taken identity, IMF air assets identified a party sue an undeniable momentum on the militia members (‘public pro- of armed men as AOG fighters, and con- the side of the IMF&ANSF tection force’ in Kapisa’s security ducted an aerial strike. Although the identity of forces, heading towards security jargon), including an exemplary the five fatalities and two casualties has not transition announced for this year. hanging from a tree, were perpe- been verified in situ thru independent sources Surgical strikes against IEA lead- trated in AOG hotspots of yet, local witnesses as well as GOA authorities ership (led by special forces, and Bodrab and Morad Khel Area. claimed that the victims were actually local often accompanied by the air sup- Indicators that the course of ac- hunters. port), cordon search operations tion will follow ‘targeted killings’

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 23rd of February 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 1 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 0 Although the conclusive figures 80 may still change, the month of (7 AOG incidents) and February 60 2010 (3 AOG incidents). The pic- February stands out due to a dra- 40 matic lull in AOG kinetic activity, ture of AOG activity was comple- 20 with just 6 corroborated AOG mented by a single criminal inci- incidents so far (Nirkh, Saydabad, dence related to the setting up of 0 Jalrez). Besides one exception (an an illegal checkpoint along Jalrez Main Road on 18 February. arson attack against a private truck WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime on the Highway in Saydabad), all A case apart, IEA briefly re- engaged the HIG positions in of these being close-range SAF for the IEA especially if local HIG elements Nirkh (Sadonak) during this cycle, engagements ranging from IEA- infiltrate or overtly opt for joining the program withdrawing before any casualties HIG infighting in Nirkh to the (the latter option remains unlikely at this stage, more traditional attacks against occurred. Both groups continue but may become more feasible if HIG suc- to sport a hostile stance towards ANSF/IMF patrols and controls. cumb to the IEA pressure, as witnessed in the each other, although the opened The geographic distribution of northern provinces throughout 2010). operations (valid both for AOG infightings of scale lost momen- & ACG and the security forces) tum following the IMF’s elimina- Changing the perspective, it appears clearly largely following main road net- tion of major commanders on that AOG faced continued pressure from the works in Nirk & Saydabad both sides recently. Whereas side of IMF & ANSF throughout February (a (Highway) and Jalrez (Maidan to HIG’s dominant position has combined 15 operations were reported). The Jalrez Road). The volumes so far, been maintained so far, and de- security forces have been building up on the and in particular the absence of spite local leaders’ efforts at rec- current decrease of conflict intensity, focusing any IED strike (or even recovery onciling the two groups, re- mainly on special forces capture/kill opera- by IMF/ANSF), stand in contrast escalation of open hostilities tions, and disruption of AOG supply net- to the previous month, which had should be anticipated during the works. Two thirds of operations concentrated seen a triple number of AOG in- spring & summer fighting season. in the vicinity of major AOG hotspots in cidents including 7 IED detona- In addition, the introduction of Saydabad. The only lethal combat, however, tions. It however remains largely the Afghan Local Police program was reported from Chaki Wardak, where an consistent with low incidents vol- in the very short term in Nirkh, IMF element clashed with AOG, killing one umes recorded in February 2009 will likely complicate the matter opposition fighter.

NGO Incidents The comfortable level of security has also been PANJSHIR Year to Date 0 illustrated by refreshing announcements made This Report Period 0 To the contentment of local com- at the 2011 Panjshir Agricultural Conference in munities and NGOs, Panjshir local disputes and factional rival- Astana. Among the 2011 agricultural highlights fared throughout February with- ries which have become as con- is the inauguration of the weekly farmers’ mar- out any significant incident. The stant a feature there as the person- kets in Bazarak, opening of livestock markets province offers a stable opera- ality cult of the valley’s most fa- in Shutul and Paryan, and the Panjshir Mul- tional environment for NGOs, mous Jihadi commander. berry Festival, a major agro-tourism event provided distance is taken from scheduled for the summer. THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50

This Report Period 0 40 Typical for the winter season, heavy precipitation and climatic per annum, while 2010 marked a 30 conditions outweighed political spike with 11 cases documented 20 and criminal violence in Daykundi and an additional three recorded 10 throughout this cycle. A sole ex- this year. The overall tempo of ception, remained AOG activity outnumbers ANSF- 0 in the spotlight due to AOG ki- IMF operations by a ratio of two netic activity. This strand never- to one, although the latter are of- theless continues to be sporadic ten more busy with combating DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI Crime and usually non-lethal, largely re- crime rather than political vio- sulting from AOG efforts to en- lence. ANSF, (b) waged in retribution against the sure smooth transit of fighters Among the latest security addi- active stance of the community, or even more and equipment. On 21 February tions, ALP units in Kajran occa- pragmatically, (c) for fear of AOG that the in the Sulimunji Area of Zarda sionally take over manning of the local recruits provide accurate and up-to-date Gulan Valley, South from the road-side checkpoints from ANP intelligence to IMF & ANSF. In the short term DAC, an AOG element engaged a and actively participate in combat. at least, the incident levels in Kajran will likely detachment of Afghan Local Po- To the extent that the law- maintain the upward trajectory with the antici- lice manning a checkpoint on the enforcement authority of the ALP pated influx of AOG fighters moving back to road with SAF. The clash did not units is strictly confined inside the the southern fronts. result in casualties. Seen through boundaries of their home commu- Looking North, Shahristan, in particular Dasht the lens of the overall conflict nities (the ALP are basically meant Valley, witnessed a marred attempt by a law- dynamics, the passage through to improve the communities’ ca- enforcement officer to kidnap a young girl Kajran gained importance as an pability to police their constituen- from a private residence. The intruder was ap- AOG link road between the major cies) non-lethal AOG strikes may prehended by the owner of the compound, fronts in Helmand and Kandahar, be plausibly interpreted as warn- and ended up in Hospital as as well as for in- and out-bound ings destined to the communities a result of the physical altercation which en- transit between the aforemen- against interfering with the AOG sued. Local reaction to the incident encom- tioned operational areas and Paki- in transit. Nevertheless, in con- passed a demonstration attended by well a stan. Hardly surprising, amplified tested districts with higher kinetic hundred community members two days later, AOG movements across the dis- activity, which Kajran may even- on 18 February, requesting the authorities to trict found an echo in higher lev- tually become throughout the dismiss the perpetrator. Needless to say, simi- els of incidents, which remain spring season, local defence initia- lar excesses, especially if not prosecuted, in as geographically distributed along tives (LDI) often become a seri- much as privatization of public functions for the major roads and itineraries. ous target of choice for AOGs private or factional interests by local poten- According to ANSO data, the due to more concrete considera- tates, undermine the communities’ acceptance years of 2006-2009 saw in average tions such as (a) being seen as a of the central government. just 3 to 5 AOG attacks in Kajran ‘softer’ target compared to IMF & THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 1 PARWAN This Report Period 0 50 The high-profile targeted killing of 40 dain for women’s programming a local religious leader, reported in 30 the previous period, continued to and micro-finance schemes has haunt the security environment in become a constant and quite rigid 20 Chaharikar during this cycle. The mental picture in the community, 10 authorities, occasionally assisted too often mentioned in local ac- 0 by IMF, engaged in arrest opera- counts to be disregarded, but too tions, which were not always ap- poorly supported by coherent preciated by the communities un- evidence to be emphasized as a PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime der focus. At one occasion, IMF distinctive feature of the NGO claimed having detained ‘a HIG security threat picture in the prov- tions in the Siyagerd and Namak Ab Valleys, media magnate’, resident in Cha- ince. This said, the investigation and an IED detonation on the main Chahari- harikar and involved in HIG op- of the latest killing of the NGO kar – Bamyan Road (again in Siyagerd) made erations in the Kabul Province. A female staff member in Deh Qazi the news. more tangible outcome, though, Area has not revealed any conclu- sive leads as to the motivation of Mandiqol in Kohi Safi continued to feature in were several weapons cache sei- security reporting, in particular in relation to zures, and, at one occasion, the the attack, or identity of the at- tackers, so far. the local safe havens of endogenous AOG discovery of an RCIED mounted elements, specializing in the ‘Surobi fuel tanker on a bicycle in Chaharikar. While While Bagram district remained attacks’, most probably finding the district the tracking of hostile AOG net- calm with a single incidence of definitely more user friendly than the highly works has been recently empha- weapons cache seizure, another risky Tagab District across the provincial bor- sized in Chaharikar , the most AOG/ACG hub, the Ghorband der, and in a comfortable distance to the Kabul imminent concerns to NGO Valley, saw more sustained activ- City IDF launching sites in Kohi Safi and Deh safety still pertain to the local fac- ity. In particular, migration and Sabz mountain ranges, which beyond prestige tional issues, often echoed in tar- arrests of criminal elements in and fame, also bring more material compensa- geted killings, and rarely investi- Ghorband (Siyagerd), reports of tion by AOG leadership, that is prize money gated. The undercurrent of dis- AOG fighters taking back posi- and more supplies.

February AOG Initiated Incident Volumes: Yearly Comparison 2006-2011 (as of 23 Feb 2011) 700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents Year to Date 3 BALKH 50 This Report Period 2 Kishindih District—the site of 40 this year’s only previous NGO Naqelin Area. The INGO had 30 not had any known prior issues in related incident in the province— 20 the area, and claimed strong ties resurfaced as the unlikely focal 10 point of insecurity for INGOs in with the community. Later that 0 Balkh this reporting period. In day, at approximately 1230 hours, less than 24 hours, Kishindih wit- an INGO convoy consisting of 4 nessed 2 direct attacks on IN- low profile, unmarked vehicles BALKH AOG BALKH Crime GOs; 1 RPG strike against an was hit by an IED along a small INGO compound and 1 IED road close to the site of the first tablished AOG operating in the region. If a detonation against an INGO con- incident. Although the IED new AOG is operating in the area—and it cer- voy. While these 2 incidents hap- caused only minor damages to the tainly seems that one is intentionally drawing pened to 2 different INGOs, they vehicle, it was later determined attention to itself—it stands to put itself at took place in very close proximity that the detonation was likely the odds with the many “retired” Jihadi command- in terms of both time and loca- result of a large RCIED that, had ers who reside in the otherwise quiet district, tion. it detonated closer to the vehicle, though the involvement of any of these actors could have caused significantly should also not be ruled out. was the source of more damage. There is at least 13 total security incidents this re- In Chimtal, which is (along with Chahar Bolak) one theory that the second IED porting period. Aside from the 2 widely considered one of the most insecure was not meant for the INGO but above, there were 3 incidents in districts in the province, the first AOG initi- for the district police and govern- Mazar-e Sharif City, road insecu- ated physical confrontation occurred since the ment officials who were expected th rity in Balkh and Zari districts, an onset of Operation Ebtikar. On the 26 , an to use the road while investigating IED detonation on an IMF con- AOG stopped and abducted a government bus the first attack. voy in Shortepa (24th), an IED along with its driver in Taraki village. After discovery in Chahar Bolak There are numerous theories the bus became stuck in the mud, the AOG (Salartepa Village) on the 17th, and about what caused these 2 inci- departed taking the driver hostage. ANP de- an AOG attack on the 26th in dents, but almost all of them pre- ployed to the area and recovered the vehicle Chimtal. suppose that the 2 attacks were after driving away a subsequent ANP attack, carried out by the same individu- but the hostage remains at large. Prior to this, Kishindih District, which borders als. Right now, with no follow up Chimtal has only seen IED incidents and ACG Sholgarah District to the north robberies or monetary demands crime in the wake of Ebtikar. and Dara-i Sufi Payin District in being made after the attacks, the to the East, Elsewhere in the province, the civilian popula- likelihood that this is the work of has historically been considered a tion of Dawlatabad voiced their displeasure an ACG appears somewhat di- relatively secure district. A pocket over the recent night raid that took in 3 alleged minished. This could be the work of insecurity that existed up until AOG members (PRP), anecdotal evidence of a new AOG trying to establish last summer mostly disappeared suggests that the government has called on itself by pulling off highly visible following the arrest of 2 of the behalf of the prisoners, and that the commu- attacks in the area to gain the at- AOG members responsible, and nity is unhappy about the allegedly tention and recognition of more the departure of a third to Paki- “disrespectful” way in which the raid was car- established AOG groups in the stan. Nevertheless, Kishindih has ried out. The only further insecurity in the province. Whether this is a new now had 3 incidents directly tar- district came from the discovery of 8 mortar AOG in the region, the previous geting INGOs over the first 2 rounds in a ditch. AOG re-establishing itself, or the months of this year, 2 of them Finally, in , just to the West of work of an AOG from one of the this reporting period. Kishindih, on the 22nd an ACG stopped vehi- nearby districts (perhaps Dar-I At 0200 in the early morning cles and robbed them in the Amrakh area until Sufi Payin or Sholgara) is currently the ANP responded and drove them out. hours of the 21st, an INGO com- unclear. What appears certain is pound was hit by an RPG in that there was no previously es- THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ Year to Date 1 KUNDUZ 100 This Report Period 0 14 security incidents took place in 80 this reporting strike was likely an attempt to dis- 60 period—5 in Chahar Dara, 3 in credit IMF reports that all AOGs 40 , and 2 in Kunduz— had been removed from the area, 20 while simultaneously seeking to the largest of which was a BBIED 0 detonation inside the civilian sta- send a warning to civilians and tistics office in Imam Sahib which combatants alike about what created waves throughout the could happen to those who en- KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime gaged with the GOA in the militia country. 20th in the Sedarak area when a magnetic IED programs. This was the second suicide (the first to be used in the North) which had bombing this year in Kunduz This continues a countrywide been attached to the back of a fuel tanker Province, both of them taking trend of AOG targeting pro- detonated. The fuel tanker did not ignite, so place shortly after the recent cir- government militia members and only minor damages were caused to the vehicle culation of IMF reports that their families. and no injuries were reported. Another oc- AOG presence throughout the This attack took place in Imam curred on the 21st in the Qabri Bangi area, province had been significantly Sahib—a known AOG strong- when a group of armed robbers set up an ille- diminished. The previous bomb- hold in Kunduz—in conjunction gal checkpoint to rob vehicles. ing took place on February 10th in with a visit by the High Peace Insecurity in other districts included 5 note- the District Center of Chahar Council, which had come to the worthy security incidents in Chahar Dara Dis- Dara, and killed the District Gov- province to inaugurate the Kun- trict (the site of the previous BBIED) that in- ernor, while this most recent duz Provincial Peace Committee, cluded an IED detonation in the Ghundi BBIED detonated in a census adding further to the potential Kalay area which killed 1 ANP and injured office just adjacent to the Imam impact. Activity in the district another, a RCIED detonation on an ANSF Sahib District Governor’s office, had slowly tapered off since last convoy, an AOG attack on an IMF convoy in and was responsible for the deaths year, with 7 incidents occurring in the Dobandi area which resulted in the deaths of 34 and injures to an additional December and 5 in January, but of 3 IMF soldiers, an AOG attack on an IMF 53. While only 2 of the individu- this marks the second high profile convoy between Gul Bagh and Qara Khani, als killed in this BBIED were uni- attack in the province over the last and the discovery in Ainal Majar of a signifi- formed ANP members, the vast two weeks as AOGs continue to cant cache of mortar rounds and IEDs in an majority of them consisted of in- ensure that their presence is felt. abandoned residence. Also on the 20th in the dividuals from 3 separate local Elsewhere in , Asqalan area, ACG released 2 local doctors militias who were in the course of there were 2 attacks along the Ali- who had been abducted from the Dasht Ab- joining the pro-government militia abad-Kunduz road, one on the dan Area of on the 15th. as part of the peace process. The THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 1 FARYAB This Report Period 1 50 Faryab recorded 15 security inci- 40 dents this reporting period, with 4 robbed by 3 armed men. The 30 in Qaysar, 3 in Pashtun Kot, and bandits broke into the compound 20 3 in . The most signifi- and severely assaulted the guards, 10 cant of these included an ANP before damaging and stealing 0 assault on an IO staff member in communications equipment and Qaysar, an armed assault of an fleeing. The guards were left in FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime INGO communications center critical condition in a ditch, and (also Qaysar), a BBIED detona- discovered only when members of wan—and Rasul’s 2 sons, were in attendance. tion on the Buzkashi field in the Community Development Further potential targets present included at , and a SAF/ Council (CDC) —who had been least one other Jumbesh commander and the RPG attack on the Ring Road alerted by the INGO when the District Chief of Police. This was the first against the convoy of the Provin- guards missed their radio check— BBIED detonation in this district, and 1 of cial Chief of Police (PCOP). located them and got them to only 3 that have occurred in Faryab prov- In Qaysar on the 17th, an IO staff medical treatment. Although ince—the most recent taking place on Novem- member was assaulted by the Qaysar has a strong, established ber 5th, 2010 in Khwaja Sabz Posh District, ANP during a food distribution to AOG infrastructure, the location when a BBIED detonated on the vehicle of IDPs. The altercation started due of this 2nd attack was not an espe- the Provincial Council Chairman. to alleged grievances on behalf of cially insecure/contested area, and Rounding up the profile of insecurity in the the population concerning the the possibility that this was retalia- region, the widely used Ring Road that con- individuals being served, and as a tion by individuals who were up- nects Maymana to Shibirghan was the site of result of the confrontation, the set over the incident with the IO an attack on the 24th, when a convoy which distribution program has been cannot be ruled out. Qaysar, aside included the Provincial Chief of Police for suspended until further notice. from being an AOG stronghold, was attacked with SAF and Relationships between the IO and has been the site of recent ten- RPGs along the Jungal section in Dawlatabad ANP became temporarily strained sions due to military operations District. In Pashtun Kot, another district during the operation when the against questionable targets, mak- which has been the recipient of significant in- ANP—reportedly on behalf of ing relations in the district ex- security, 11 AOG members surrendered to the members of their local popu- tremely combustible. GOA, 2 ANP officers were abducted in Jar lace—challenged the IO’s choice Further insecurity manifested it- Qala Village, and on the 23rd, 2 AOGs fought in determining whom to distribute self in an incident denounced over the right to tax local citizens near Khwaja food to. Following the incident, publically by President Karzai and Namosa village. Gurziwan District also had a the IO met with the provincial IMF, when a BBIED detonated number of AOG members (12) join the peace government, who reassured them during a Buzkashi match in Shirin process, and lastly, a military operation was that the ANP have no mandate to Tagab on the 26th. 4 civilians were launched to clear out areas in and around Say- decide where—and to whom—aid killed and a further 22 injured. yad District in Sar-E Pul, Bilchiragh District is delivered. The match was being held to was the only district from Faryab involved in The following evening (18 Feb), honor the coming of age of young the operations. also in Qaysar Province, but in the members of the Pahlawan family, Nahrin Mountain area, an INGO and the likely targets; Guli Pahla- communications center was wan—the brother of Rasul Pahla- THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 1 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 0 Despite significant AOG pres- 40 ence, and a strong possibility that business, and one that is ingrained 30 AOG who are pushed out of deeply in the infrastructure of 20 northern Kunduz flee to Takhar, both criminal and government 10 saw few signifi- parties. Much of the insecurity 0 cant AOG attacks amongst the 13 recently in both provinces has come about as a result of changes incidents this reporting period. TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime The physical breakdown includes amongst the District Chiefs of 3 incidents in Khwaja Ghar, 3 in Police (perhaps shifting precarious known men attacked an ANP checkpoint with Taluqan, and 2 in Baharak. power dynamics), and unhappi- SAF before escaping from the area. In Ba- ness amongst drug traffickers in Perhaps the most notable incident harak District on the 19th in Jilo Village (very the region. Khwaja Ghar, a likely occurred on the 25th in Tangi Qala close to Khwaja Ghar), a RCIED detonated AOG destination as the district District - Safi Ha area, when ANP against a pro-government militia vehicle, dam- closest to Archi in Kunduz, also arrested a high ranking ANP aging the vehicle, and in Haji Ismael village on saw drug related activity when an member from Dasht Qala District the 21st IMF arrested 3 AOG members during arrest was made of 2 drug traffick- with 2 of his soldiers. They were a night operation. ers. caught transporting a large quan- Taluqan District, where most of the NGOs tity of opium in an ANP vehicle. Other notable events included working in the area are based, saw 3 personal th Drug trafficking throughout Tak- one in Chah Ab, on the 18 (Dara disputes deteriorate to violence, two of them har and Badakhshan is a lucrative -E-Nooraba village), when un- assaults on personal residences.

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 0 SAMANGAN This Report Period 0 50 Although there were extremely 40 few security incidents in Saman- day along an extremely narrow 30 gan this reporting period, there stretch of the road. This has led 20 were 2 notable developments. In to the conclusion that it must 10 Aybak—a historically secure dis- have been planted recently, and 0 trict—anecdotal reports surfaced specifically to target the military forces that regularly used that that AOGs were pressuring local SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime nationals to rebel against the road. GOA presence in the district and Secondly, anecdotal reports have some of the individuals responsible are the halt any cooperation with foreign- surfaced referencing 2 new AOGs same ones who have recently begun to join the ers. This initiative may prove re- operating in and around Dara-i peace process, with 4 new AOG members sur- sponsible for the IED that deto- Suf District. Dara-i Sufi has long rendering to the GOA as recently as February nated on an IMF vehicle near Ay- been considered an insecure dis- 16th. There is at least some possibility that one bak city in the Akhakam area on trict with 2-3 identified AOGs of these groups may be the same individuals the 15th. The IMF vehicle was en already operating in the area. In that are responsible for the attacks in Kishin- route to an often used shooting the past this group has been able dih (Balkh) profiled elsewhere in this report. range when they were hit. The to pull off high profile incidents What these potential new actors mean for se- detonation killed 1 IMF soldier such as the kidnapping of 7 inter- curity in this province—as well as that of and injured another. The detona- national construction workers late neighbouring Kishindih—are yet to be deter- tion occurred in the middle of the last year. It has been alleged that mined. THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 0 BAGHLAN 50 This Report Period 0 Baghlan, with 14 security inci- 40 dents total, was the focus of inter- Although anecdotal reports claim 30 national attention this reporting that the operation—which re- 20 period when an ANA soldier shot sulted in the deaths of 2 major 10 AOG commanders—has resulted IMF troops on a military installa- 0 tion, killing 3 and injuring 6, be- in a temporary lull in violence and a corresponding increase in access fore being shot and killed. This BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime occurred in Baghlani Jadid on the within the district, the notion that 18th, and took much of the atten- it is free of AOG presence re- make up for in casualties and shock value, cre- tion away from circulated IMF mains questionable. In contrast ating a perceived atmosphere of insecurity. reports stating that “Operation to these reports, increased chatter surfaced regarding potential Nowruz operations that took place during this Nowruz” had cleared Northern reporting period in Baghlani Jadid included an Baghlan of AOG presence. There BBIED attacks in the province (specifically in Baghlani Jadid) IMF night raid in the Larkhabi Ha area of the is substantial evidence that the th which—should they come to frui- Old City on the 17 , and operations in IMF shooting was the result of an Alawdin Village on the 20th. Following these, interpersonal conflict rather than tion—would mirror what took place in Kunduz; where substan- 7 AOG members from the district joined the an AOG attack. th tial military operations led to peace process on the 24 and a GOA em- Baghlani Jadid has long occupied widely circulated reports that ployee who had been abducted from Chahar the focal point of insecurity in the th Kunduz AOG strongholds were Shanbi Tepa area on the 17 of December . This period, “AOG free,” only to see 2 2010 was freed. Operation Nowruz resulted in the BBIED attacks. BBIED attacks Also in Baghlani Jadid, AOG attacked an IMF surrendering of 20 AOG mem- after sustained military operations convoy in the Old City, and there were 2 ACG bers in Shahi Khil before it make tactical sense, as recovering incidents in the Fabrika area of the district on paused due to increment weather. AOGs often have their infrastruc- the 23rd— an RPG attack on a local residence IMF has claimed that in total, 80 ture and man power depleted, and SAF on a private vehicle. It is unclear villages have been cleared and lessening their ability (and desire) what the motives for these last 2 attacks were, over 20 AOG members killed as a to engage in open attacks. What as neither of them resulted in robberies. direct result of the operation. BBIEDs lack in manpower they THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 0 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 Jawzjan saw the most conflict out 40 of the 3 provinces involved in a in Chaqma Choqor area, an IED 30 new military operation to clear detonated on an ANBP vehicle 20 districts around Sayyad, Qush killing 2 and injuring 5, and on the 10 23rd in Gardan area, AOG am- Tepa, and Darzab (Jawzjan, 0 Faryab, and Sar-e Pul were all in- bushed an IMF/ANSF convoy volved), a focus that is not sur- (the convoy called in air support JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime prising as security forces have which left 4 AOG members framed this area as a ‘triangle of dead). The operation further re- into a clash with AOG. The 3rd incident in- insecurity’ in the past. In all, Jaw- sulted in the discovery of 3 IEDs volved an AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint zjan witnessed 11 security inci- on the 16th in Taraghli Village, in the District Administrative Center (DAC). dents, 9 of which were attributed followed the next evening (the In Shibirghan District, at 2300 hours on the th to this operation (6 in Qush Tepa 17 ) by a large armed clash in the 15th, AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint along and 3 in Darzab), as well as 1 inci- village between ANSF/IMF and the Shibirghan – Sar-e Pul Road in the Tasfiya dent in Shibirghan along the AOG (4 AOG killed). Counter Khana area. This stretch of road is vital to widely travelled Shibirghan - Sar-e attacking, AOG attacked tempo- INGO access in and out of Sar-e Pul. In this Pul Road. rary ANP checkpoints on subse- incident, the ANP drove the AOG to retreat quent evenings in Jarqodoq area A joint IMF/ANSF operation after a 30 minute long fire fight that left 1 (18th), and in Khanaqa Village that was taking place in the above GOA employee injured. There were anecdotal (19th). Both attacks were repelled. mentioned provinces took IMF/ reports that this attack (and another on this ANSF into—and out of—Qush As the operation pushed on road in Sar-e Pul Province) may have been led Tepa and Darzab (with no military through Darzab, 3 incidents took by the brother of an AOG leader arrested in elements left in these districts to place on the 20th, 2 of these in Balkh during the PRP, and that the group was establish any “hold” phase). Inci- Khwaja Ashkara. In these 2, intent on capturing a hostage they hoped to dents related to this operation in ANSF/IMF first discovered and exchange for his release. Qush Tepa included; on the 21st, removed 3 IEDs, and then got

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 1 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 0 50 Military operations in Sayyad were 40 the cause of much of the insecu- in a fight that left 1 AOG member 30 rity in the province this reporting killed and 2 others injured, and on 20 th period. There was also road inse- the 17 , 42 AOG members sur- 10 rendered from Ahao, Qaraghaj, curity—possibly spurred on by 0 the previous arrest in Balkh prov- and Aqso Sharqui. While none of the three operations (Sar-e Pul, ince (see Jawzjan)—along the SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime Shibirghan-Sar-e Pul Road. In Jawzjan, Faryab) left behind ele- total there were only 6 security ments to initiate a “hold phase,” ties—and passively—villages of recent Arbaki incidents this period, with 4 of there is the belief that the large recruits are often targeted by AOGs who want those in Sayyad as a direct result number of surrendered AOG to penalize the communities for working with of the IMF/ANSF operations from Sayyad which have been the government. incorporated into the growing taking place there. The Sar-e Pul—Jawzjan road had an incident Arbakis in the district may have a As part of the operations being take place on the evening of the 17th, when, in tangible effect on the security conducted in Sayyad, there were Sar-e Pul District (Adbakhshi village), a group paradigm there. Whether or not ANSF clashes with AOGs in the of armed men believed to be AOGs were that effect will be positive is yet to village of Beland Ghor on both sighted. ANSF/IMF deployed to the area and be determined, as Arbakis have the 14th and 15th. On the 16th, chased off the group after an hour and a half often created more insecurity both ANSF moved into Qaflatoon and fire fight. In Sar-e Pul City, a further 16 AOG actively—by causing problems Alqani villages, where they seized members joined the peace process. and engaging in criminal activi- weapons and engaged with AOG THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 1 BADAKHSHAN 50 This Report Period 0 remained 40 relatively stable this reporting pe- 36% of the total for the province). 30 riod with 9 total security inci- Many of these (3 this period) have 20 dents.4 of these took place in Ba- taken place in the District Admin- 10 harak, which has become a fairly istrative Center (DAC), which is 0 active district in 2011, while else- always a sign of a significant dete- rioration in district security. The where, a RCIED was discovered BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime in Fayzabad, and an armed rob- district has demonstrated a sub- stantial increase from the 14 inci- bery took place along the Jurm- AOG tactics, anecdotal evidence suggests that dents which took place over the Baharak District Main Road. this rash of incidents is the result of local ac- entire previous year, and Baharak As the headquarters district for tors who are unhappy with the newly ap- District accounted for almost half much of the humanitarian com- pointed District Chief of Police (DCOP). It is of Badakhshan’s total security munity in the province, insecurity not uncommon throughout the North for indi- incidents this period. in Fayzabad is always of particular viduals who have been removed from their concern. After the PRP’s report- In Baharak DAC, 2 of the 3 oc- official positions to demonstrate their dissatis- ing of minor civil unrest over elec- curred within hours of each other faction (and create an argument for why they tion politics and new leadership in on the 19th, and the 3rd on the should be reinstated) by participating in—and the district, a RCIED was found evening of the 26th. These con- increasing—insecurity. The 4th event in Ba- in the city on the 16th in PD #3, sisted of a grenade hurled into a harak was a civilian death attributed to an in- Mandawi Kohna area. While this girl’s school on the 19th, and 2 terpersonal dispute on the 21st. RPG attacks. None of the attacks alone does not represent a shift in Lastly, in in Posh Ha Area along resulted in any casualties. Al- the security paradigm for Fayza- the Jurm – Baharak road, it was reported that though attacks against girl’s bad — and it is far from the first criminals were stopping vehicles and robbing schools have slowly begun to re- IED discovery in the district — it the passengers on February 17th. Although surface throughout the North, was the first IED discovery in Jurm has not been an especially insecure dis- th with 2 taking place over the first 2 Fayzabad since October 25 . No trict, with only 2 incidents this year and 7 in all weeks of February, whether or other security incidents took place of 2010, the ACG working in the area has not this will become a problem in the district prior to — or fol- demonstrated the ability to create some insecu- for Badakshan (and Baharak Dis- lowing — its discovery and subse- rity along the roadways, with many of the inci- trict in particular) remains to be quent removal. dents consisting of illegal road robberies or seen. Baharak District, which was the abductions. The possibility that this is the site of the only NGO incident in As mentioned in the PRP, Ba- same ACG that is acting out in neighboring Badakhshan this year, has now harak District is not a known hub Baharak cannot be ruled out, but the likelihood seen 9 security incidents over the for AOG activity, and although appears slim, as the method and motives ap- first 2 months (accounting for these attacks are consistent with pear substantially different. THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

W ESTERN REGION

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 0 80 This Report Period 0 70 During this reporting period the 60 security environment in Herat was more AOG activity than usual. 50 40 characterised by several notable Whereas the IED detonation on 30 incidents related to the use of 21st of February marked the sec- 20 IEDs throughout the province. ond IED related incident in the 10 0 On 27th of February, an explosive area this year, after an IED dis- device detonated on the Herat covery reported in January, the HERAT AOG HERAT Crime City-Airport Main Road in Ghizan RPGs attack that took place on Area of targeting an the 18th marks a new development security along district roads was underlined on ANP parked vehicle. The inci- as AOG activity (although spo- the 22nd, with a marred abduction attempt that dent resulted in one teenage boy radic) has been generally concen- took place on Herat-Obe Main Road in Turka- reported to have been killed and trated on nearby Seyawshan Area. bad Area. Four armed men - purported AOG - one ANP wounded. The explo- Nonetheless, further incidents in stopped a local transport vehicle and at- sion marks the first IED strike to the area targeting ANSF person- tempted to kidnap a wealthy local civilian. occur on the main road since the nel or facilities (particularly ANP ANP arrived at the scene and a brief fire fight 3rd of January, when an IED deto- checkpoints) are not unlikely, ensued, allowing the victim to escape. The nated against an IMF vehicle. mainly due to the anticipated exact motivation of the group is unclear as the The recent incident highlights handover of security responsibili- gunmen singled out this particular individual, once again the potential threat of ties from ISAF to ANSF. With hence a purely financial motivation cannot be collateral involvement for the lo- this objective, the area of the Re- ruled out. Nonetheless, NGOs should be cal population, as well as for gional ANP HQ/Training Centre aware of the possibility of illegal check points NGOs, while transiting along this may become attractive targets for during daylight hours (as the incident occurred road due to the proximity with AOGs willing to demonstrate at 1000 hrs). AOG/ACG potential targets. In their strength and presence. An- addition, on another important other notable incident took place In Shindand, tensions in regard to the Afghan road, this time within Herat City, on 28th of February, with an IED Local Police (ALP) have continued after a qui- security forces located two IEDs strike targeting an IMF vehicle on eter period observed in the previous cycle. On which were emplaced in District Herat-Kandahar Main Road in the 18th, two AOG members riding on a mo- 2, between Spin Ade and Darbe Adraskan District. The incident torcycle shot and injured three ALP members Kandahar Areas. resulted in one IMF soldier killed in the northern part of Zirko Valley. Since the In the past two weeks the road and four wounded and marks also disagreement surrounding the recruitment of from Herat to Pashtun Zarghun the first IED detonation on this ALP in the district has become noticeable, in the area of the Regional ANP road this year. along with tribal tensions in the area, further violence related to the ALP process cannot be HQ/Training Centre witnessed Apart from IED deployment, in- excluded. THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents FARAH FARAH Year to Date 0 50

This Report Period 0 40

This reporting period in Farah, 30 AOG were quite active, initiating short term is grim as AOG will 20 nine of the overall nineteen inci- most likely intensify their efforts dents documented so far. In the to disrupt vehicular movement on 10 last two weeks, roadside IED de- this road in the coming weeks. 0 ployment, and to a lesser extent , in Delaram Area, direct attacks and intimidations witnessed another important FARAH AOG FARAH Crime continued to pose the main threat strand of IED activity, this time throughout the province. Bala along the Herat-Kandahar High- the intimidation campaign against the local Buluk District was again in the way, with three discoveries. population in Pusht Rod as on the 20th an ALP fore of AOG attention. Of note, AOG also showed their presence recruit along with three local civilians was ab- the main road between Pusht Rod in Khaki Safed, with a direct at- ducted in Massaw Area. The civilians were and Farah City witnessed two tack on an ANSF/IMF on 18th of released two days later due to negotiation of IED detonations. One IED deto- February in Karize-Mohabbat local elders but the ALP remains in custody. nated against an ANP vehicle on Area. This time, the action In addition, a local elder was abducted on 21st 19th of February and another ex- claimed the lives of one ANA and in Nawbahar Village. plosive device detonated prema- one ANP servicemen. The said ANSF/IMF operations were rather limited turely. In addition, two IED re- district saw also an attack on during the present cycle. The most notable lated incidents were reported in ANSF/IMF convoy in Islamabad occurred on 25th of February in Khaki Safed Shiwan Area, which is halfway Village, resulting in two AOG where IMF conducted an operation supported along the road from Pusht Rod to members and one ANA soldier by air assets, killing six AOG members, includ- Farah City. The outlook for the wounded. AOG also continued ing a commander and arresting another six.

TRAINING NOTICE: ANSO will be conducting free Basic Guard training and Radio Communications training for NGOs in Mazar-e-Sharif City beginning on the 20th of March 2011. Please note that the two training courses are separate, take one whole day each, and will only be available in Kabul City during this period; however, organisations with staff in the surrounding provinces are more than welcome to bring them in for training if feasible. Additionally, note that registration for the training will be closed as of 1630 hrs on the 16th of March – NO EXCEPTIONS. And as usual, the ANSO trainer will be rotating through the ANSO field offices in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat City, Jalalabad City, and Kandahar City at later dates to also provide this training. (ANSO will notify you of these dates at a later time). If you would like the ANSO Trainer to conduct either of these courses at your office for your staff, please refer to the registration forms emailed previously or contact the Operations Coordinator National Counterpart, Masoud Habibi, at [email protected].

THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 70 Badghis continues to be the most 60 unstable. 50 ‘active’ province in the WR. Dur- 40 ing this period AOG activity con- This cycle AOG and IMF contin- 30 20 centrated in Murghab and Qadis ued to wrestle over the influence 10 districts. Whereas Murghab is in Qadis District, with the latter 0 historically an AOG spot, the raising the stakes with two air- changing security environment in strikes being called in during this BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime Qadis should be underlined. period. On 18th of February, in In Murghab, there were four IED Dara-e-Boom Area IMF air assets ronment seems to revolve around Dara-e- discoveries (two in Akazai, one killed three AOG members, in- Boom, as the area accounted for 50% of all respectively in Mangan and Yoye cluding one AOG commander. incidents reported in the district. Khaja Area) in the past two Three days later in Khmak Kabu- cha Village, reportedly three local Inter-AOG clashes have continued as well weeks. The district also experi- st civilians died as a result of another with one incident reported on 21 of February enced three direct attacks against in Qadis Khordak area. Also on the 21st in this ANSF checkpoints in Khami air strike. The use of air strikes in a very short interval indicates that same area, 21 AOG members, including two Malik, Sarkhaland and Mulla local AOG commanders, surrendered and Baran Area and an additional two the situation in Qadis is deterio- rating. It is worth noting that so handed over their weapons to NDS. Participa- attacks on ANSF/IMF bases. tion of local elements in the Afghan Peace and Despite numerous past ANSF/ far, Qadis recorded air strikes in areas of Dara-I-Boom, Khirkhana, Reconciliation Process (APRP) will likely fur- IMF operations the security situa- ther exacerbate tensions between opposition tion in the district remains highly Chah Talkh and Qarachaghi. This deterioration in the security envi- groups.

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 0 GHOR 50 This Report Period 0 Ghor remains relatively quiet with 40 very few reported incidents negotiations were undertaken. 30 (literally two) across the province, Though it seems that the perpe- 20 the defining factor being difficult trators gave back a portion of the 10 winter conditions and limited mo- loot; however, reports differ and 0 bility in the area. Beside an am- some continue to claim that the munition discovery reported in issue has not been settled down City, an incident of yet. Till a solution is found, ten- GHOR AOG GHOR Crime note occurred on 22nd of February sions will be likely to reoccur. It longed to Barakhana, but had also links to the in Gorge Village of Barakhana should be noted that the situation abovementioned local commander from Du Area (north-west of Chaghcharan) in Barakhana Area was assessed as Layna. In addition, unconfirmed reports also with supporters of a local com- potentially unstable since the as- indicated that the supporters of the com- mander from Du Layna snatching sassination of its most influential mander from Du Layna approached local au- a significant amount of sheep local commander on 6 December thorities to take action against the suspected from a rival camp, constituted by 2010 in Allayer/Barakhana Area. perpetrators. Therefore, the recent incident is the supporters of an influential Unconfirmed reports suggested very likely connected to these longer-term ten- local commander assassinated in that the supporters of the assassi- sions. If the skirmishes continue, the issue December 2010. ANP was de- nated local commander singled may affect the security situation in the north of ployed to the area to prevent an out and took action against sus- Chaghcharan. escalation of the situation and pected perpetrators, who be- THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 4 NANGARHAR This Report Period 2 100 In Nangarhar this period, the 80 stand-out security incident was environs of the city, and on the 60 the suicide-based complex attack 23th ANSF arrested a local re- on the Kabul Bank branch in Jala- sponsible for overall coordination 40 labad City, just 20 metres away of the attack, a carpenter from 20 from the Governor’s Palace, in Kunar. Events of this severity, 0 which a total of 40 people were with such a high casualty figure, killed (including one INGO na- are rare, and as such it is unlikely NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime tional staff member) along with 5 to be repeated frequently, even if of the 7 suicide attackers and the suicide campaign is likely to the form of a hit-and-run SAF and rocket at- wounding a further 92 others, continue through the year; more- tack on the Nangarhar PRT late on February approximately 80 of which suf- over, the distaste felt among the 24th, marking the first of such attacks in 2011 fered significant injuries. While we local population for such tactics and the resumption of this pattern of strikes have seen an acceleration in the may cause them to be discontin- on the main regional IMF facilities that was campaign of suicide attacks – ued, because of the danger of for particularly visible in October and November both in planning and in actual AOGs of such methods alienating 2010, but which was quiet in December and operations – across the east re- Afghans. January. Moreover, connected to this targeting, cently, this incident stood out for While this event overshadowed a roadside IED was discovered and defused its sophistication, its deadliness, the rest of the security picture in outside of JAF on the Jalalabad-Torkham and its targeting of unarmed indi- Nangarhar, a few other incidents Highway two days prior to the attack. viduals – even if many of them are worthy of note. Firstly, the On the IED front, volumes were slightly lower were off-duty ANSF collecting other NGO incident of the period than in recent periods, although this is primar- their salaries, the stated target of in Nangarhar occurred in Bihsud ily a function of the shorter timeframe in the the attack. district, where a recently opened second half of February. There were 25% As such, it has generated consid- NGO education centre received more discoveries than detonations, signaling erable concern in Jalalabad, as the night letters purported to be from the ANP’s ongoing effectiveness in this par- first such large-scale attack of its the IEA stating general opposition ticular area of their work, and of note, there kind, with much dissatisfaction at to un-Islamic influences on Af- was one IED detonation and one discovery ANSF and GOA officials’ capaci- ghanistan, followed the next day within Jalalabad City, the former at Angur ties to keep their people safe, and by a visit from armed men telling Bagh Chowk and the latter at the city’s Kabul was a key factor in the political the guards they should close down bus station. In Achin, an IED struck an ANP stand-off that occurred days later, their centre. Upon being informed vehicle, killing 5 ANP and injuring another, where key political leaders op- that the syllabus was compatible while in another incident in that district, one posed to the Nangarhar Governor with Islam and Islamic values, the AOG operative was killed after an IMF vehicle attempted to push him out, ulti- armed men departed, in what struck an IED and opened fire in response. mately proving unsuccessful after seems to have been a case of a Finally, in Bati Kot, where AOG gains have the Governor received support combination of lack of informa- been distinctly visible in the first months of the from Kabul. A day after the at- tion and a predisposition to be year, an IED struck an ANA vehicle after dark tack, a facilitator who provided suspicious about the work of a on the main Jalalabad-Torkham Highway, al- shelter and procured weapons for foreign organisation. though it was reported that no casualties were the attackers was arrested in the The second major incident took sustained. THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 2 KUNAR 200 This Report Period 1 Kunar’s general security environ- 150 ment remained much as it has incidents focused on the central 100 been, with large numbers of direct belt of districts – Sirkanay, Khas attacks aimed at IMF and ANSF. Kunar, Chawkay, Manogai and 50 Wata Pur. Outside of the pattern As such, the most notable single 0 incident was also the sole NGO of direct attacks, there was an at- incident recorded in the province. tempted kidnapping of two Ira- An NGO ambulance and its 4 nian road construction engineers KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime occupants were abducted in the in Chawkay’s Ghafoor Khawar Matin area of Manogai district, as area, which was disrupted by the ning by IMF of withdrawal from parts of the it transited the area coming to quick response of a nearby ANP province, which will last a number of months, Asadabad from Nuristan’s Wanat CP, who managed to capture one and has begun with the highly insecure Pech village with a patient. This abduc- AOG after a 30 minute exchange Valley; the stated intent is to focus on areas tion occurred exactly two weeks of fire. Chawkay, as well as Khas where IMF can have a more tangible impact, after another NGO ambulance Kunar and Sirkanay, are influ- such as population centres – implicitly admit- and its occupants were abducted enced by a cross-border AOG ting that attempts at denying AOGs presence in the same area during the previ- that emphasises kidnapping for in the area there have not succeeded. Indeed, ous reporting period. In both ransom, particularly against pri- what is perhaps of most concern is that this cases, all occupants were released vate construction company tar- comes in the run-up to the deployment from by their kidnappers within 24 gets, and this particular incident is Kabul of an additional ANA corps into the hours. As such, NGOs should be likely to be the latest example of region to be completed over the coming 2-3 particularly careful about transit- that AOG’s activities in this direc- months, which will result in a quadrupling of ing the Pech Valley-Asadabad tion. Furthermore, in Manogai a the number of ANA stationed in Kunar. This road in the future, due to what local contractor for a local ANA raises serious concerns about medium-term appears to be an AOG willing to base was stopped and kidnapped GOA and ANSF authority in Kunar, as this target medical actors. Further- at an illegal AOG CP, and later partial withdrawal and transition will be taking more, having strong relations with killed. place at a time when the 2011 fighting season local communities is vital, in al- From the IMF side, a high num- will be well underway, and where there are lowing for a quick reaction to ber – approximately 60 – of civil- strong doubts as to whether the ANA will be such incidents in an attempt to ian casualties were claimed to able to hold the land they are ceded by IMF, secure the release of abductees. have arisen from a series of air given their training, motivation and resources, strikes and artillery-based opera- In the wider security picture of let alone actively take ground from the local tions across the province and in the period, direct attacks again AOGs. constituted the primary type of Ghaziabad in particular. This oc- AOG incident, with 24 recorded curred simultaneous to the begin- THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents NURISTAN NURISTAN Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 Only three incidents were re- 40 corded in Nuristan during this another group engaged in armed 30 reporting period, the first being an clashes in the Amesoza village 20 inter-village dispute over rights of area, leading to at least 2 killed. 10 cultivation and grazing on the This is further evidence of the fact 0 Pashaghar mountain, which de- that AOGs present in this AOG scended into a fire fight killing stronghold are primarily con- two and wounding 5 more. The cerned about inter-AOG power NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime second incident occurred in relations, broadly unchallenged by Wama district, where AOG en- IMF or GOA actors as they are. ANSF, particularly ABP, that are stationed in tered an ANP CP by unknown More generally, it appears that the Bargi Matal and Kamdesh are significantly un- means and kidnapped the 5 ANP withdrawal of IMF from Nuristan der-resourced, including with some basic pro- policemen stationed there. Four is effectively complete, with just a visions. This should be seen in the light of the of the five were released, and a rump presence remaining at the beginning of the phased withdrawal of IMF fifth is apparently still in custody; Nurgaram PRT. It now seems from those Kunar districts that border Nuris- the intent appears to have been to unlikely that any further IMF op- tan (see Kunar in this section), which could loot the ANP of their weapons erations will take place in the east catalyse AOGs based out of Nuristan to sub- and supplies. Finally, further re- of the province, and as such, the stantially step up their campaign to roll back ports of AOG infighting have de facto ceding of the province ap- the ANSF and GOA presence in Kunar. This been received from Waygal, which pears to be underway, with just is not necessarily a bad thing for NGO opera- is now effectively under AOG the provincial capital re- tions, as much of the AOG presence is local control, where it appears that maining under partial GOA con- and broadly accepting of development actors, AOG fighters associated with the trol; there is already little to no but it remains too early to read the full implica- overall provincial AOG com- GOA presence in Mandol and tions. mander and those aligned with Doab, and the small number of

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 0 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 1 A number of significant NGO 40 pants that have come from Nan- and other incidents occurred in 30 garhar. This seems to have started Laghman during this reporting 20 period, although the absolute only recently, and shortly after the number of incidents remained arrest of a foreign individual sus- 10 relatively low. Firstly, an INGO pected to be on his way to carry 0 vehicle was involved in a car acci- out a suicide attack. As the indi- dent with an ANP Ranger vehicle, vidual is currently in custody, few thankfully causing no fatalities, on details are known at present, but it LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime the Kabul-Jalalabad Highway, is likely that this arrest is con- now been relatively secure. which resulted in the impounding nected to the escalating suicide In Alingar, an IED detonated near Parwa’i of the NGO vehicle in question, campaign being implemented in village, killing a child, and two days later IMF and the detention of its driver, the eastern region, and the deci- and ANA conducted a joint search operation both of which were subsequently sion of Laghman ANSF officials in the same village, detaining 4 suspects. Only released. This event highlights the to try to counter such potential two AOG direct attacks were recorded, one fact that practicing good road suicide attacker infiltration. Also occurring in Alishing’s Kotalkay area, where safety, including wearing seatbelts, related to Mehtarlam, an IED was they briefly attacked an ANP CP with heavy is of crucial importance, particu- discovered on the main road to weapons and small arms, and the other occur- larly on such a dangerous road. the city from the Surkhakan junc- th ring in Alingar’s northern Nuralam Saheb val- In the provincial capital Mehtar- tion on the 19 , and later defused. ley, where AOG fighters ambushed an IMF lam, ANP are reported to be ask- This is the first such IED to be convoy and engaged them for a number of ing all inbound vehicles their found on this road, suggesting an hours. At the time of writing, no details are starting point, and thoroughly increased AOG presence on this known about casualties. searching all vehicles and occu- stretch of road, which has until THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 0 KHOST This Report Period 0 150 Khost alone constituted 40% of all security incidents in the eastern injured. There were also 24 IDF 100 region during this period. If in attacks spread across the prov- the rest of the region IMF have ince, particularly Bak, Khost City 50 been relatively quiet, in Khost and Tere Zayi, including 2 rocket 0 they have maintained, if not fur- attacks on the main IMF facility in ther upped, their intensity during Khost City, one of which injured this period, with at least 16 signifi- an IMF servicemember. However, KHOST AOG KHOST Crime cant operations, demonstrating none of the other IDF attacks that the international military fo- caused any significant casualties or open question if the target was in fact the cus at the present in the region is damage. Furthermore, there were Governor’s office. The casualties figures of the very much on the Waziristan- 10 IED detonations and 10 dis- attack were 41 wounded and 10 killed, includ- based AOG that has broad sway covery-disposals, a quarter of the ing 2 women and 2 ANP. The second event over the south-east. The opera- total occurring in Khost City, and occurred on February 21st, when a 14 year old tions focused again on the belt of the rest spread across Nadir Shah suicide bomber wearing a BBIED surrendered Sabari (6), Tere Zayi (5) and Bak Kot, Mando Zayi and Gurbuz in himself in Khost City to the ANP. (3), detaining a total of 47 AOG particular. Of note, in one prema- fighters and killing 4, with no re- ture IED detonation in a madrassa As such, Khost remains highly afflicted by in- ports that mid-level commanders in Khost, a local cleric thought to security, although the level of civilian casualties were a component of these num- be an AOG member was killed. have recently been much lower when com- bers. pared to the other provinces, Kunar and Nan- The period’s AOG incidents in- garhar, in the eastern region where significant However, in spite of these ongo- cluded two suicide bombing- fighting is also occurring; this is primarily a ing operations, the number of related incidents. The first con- function of the special forces-led form of the AOG attacks have not fallen, with sisted of a premature SVBIED conflict in Khost. But the high number of se- 15 direct attacks, focused on Bak detonation at an ANP CP in curity incidents from the AOG side, just as the (3), Khost City (4) and, unusually, Khost City, near to both offices IMF seeks to sustain the heavy pressure on the Tani (3). In one notable incident, of the Khost Governor and the main AOGs operating there, powerfully dem- a school-aged child threw a gre- UN and in a bazaar area; the onstrates that the AOG in question is willing nade at a passing IMF convoy, driver of the vehicle is thought to to offer substantial resistance to IMF pressure. injuring a foreign soldier, with the have triggered the explosives after As such, we can expect the conflict in the other attacks cumulatively causing realising that he was being fol- province to sustain itself and accelerate approximately 4 ANSF and 2 IMF lowed, and as such it remains an through the coming months. THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 0 PAKTYA 100 This Report Period 0 Paktya’s winter lull remained in 80 place, with a total of just 15 inci- and Chamkanay. IEDs are par- 60 dents recorded during the report- ticularly uncommon in winter, and 40

ing period. Among these, there this slight increase over last period 20 were 2 AOG direct attacks, one is indicative of the fact that as the 0 on an IMF patrol in Zurmat on weather warms and the ground the 16th, which led to the deten- defrosts, IED volumes are likely

tion of one of the AOG fighters to again increase in the province. PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime involved. The other occurred in From the IMF side, just two inci- Jaji, where an ABP patrol convoy dents were reported. The first was volatile district. Further north, reports were was temporarily attacked by a an operation in Zurmat’s Tatang received of multiple SBBIED infiltrations into group of AOG fighters. area, which led to an exchange of the province through Dand wa Patan from Beyond these, the only other inci- fire with AOG fighters and the Kurram Agency, where a new route appears to dent of violence occurred as a ultimate detention of one of the have opened up to the region’s dominant Wa- result of the kidnapping of a local fighters. The other took place on ziristan-based AOG after the peace agreement road construction engineer hos- the 24th in Nisti Kot, just north of in the agency between that AOG and the local tage by the villagers of Shaheed Gardez, where IMF arrested 6 Shia. Reports have also been received that this village, Wuza Zadran, on February suspects armed with AK47s, in- agreement is currently in a trial phase, and this 15th. In retaliation, the PSC work- cluding what the IMF stated as would be consistent with the relatively low ing with the company attacked the one IED maker. Locals disagreed, level of security incidents seen through this village with SAF and RPGs, kill- saying there were simply civilians, period; as such, there could be a substantial ing one villager and injuring two, who, as with many locals, hap- uptick in incidents in Paktya in coming months before the villagers took 18 of the pened to be armed, although it if the apparent trial goes off without difficulty PSC gunmen hostage, subse- remains unclear what they were for the parties involved. Connected to this quently killing one and finally re- doing armed together outside one cross-border dynamic, ANP conducted an op- leasing the others to the ANP. another’s homes. eration in Dand wa Patan, on the border, on The only IED incidents recorded In wider news, a new Civil Order February 26th and arrested 5 individuals, in- were discoveries, 6 in total, and Police HQ was opened in Zurmat, cluding 2 Pakistanis, in connection to the kid- spread across the districts of Zur- as part of efforts to strengthen napping of the Turkish engineers which oc- mat (3), Shwak, Dand wa Patan ANSF presence in this particularly curred in late January.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 23

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR Year to Date 0 KANDAHAR 200 This Report Period 0 witnessed a 150 effort to counter Colonel Razzik’s decrease in the overall rate of se- 100 curity incidents compared to the Border Police, which have been extremely active previous report- known as active willing ally in as- 50 ing period. Nonetheless, a series sisting IMF operations in the 0 of notable incidents involving province. Another incident of different tactics has been recorded note occurred on 27th of February across the province. On 24th of in Arghandab District (north of KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime February in , Kandahar City) as two successive an SVBIED detonated in Bazaar IEDs detonated while a large with the GOA. In the last two weeks an on- Area. The explosion resulted in crowd of spectators was watching duty ANP official was shot and killed in Dis- one civilian killed, and another 16 a dog fight in the area of Sarkari trict 2. On a different occasion, a tribal elder, civilians, six NDS, two ANBP Bagh. The incident resulted in who was also an unsuccessful candidate in the officials wounded. This attack nine civilians killed, five ANP and last parliamentary election, was gunned down marks the third significant inci- four civilians wounded. With re- by two individuals riding on a motorcycle in dent to occur in the district this gard to NGOs, this attack should District 4. Finally, an ANP trainer was the year. Prior to this, on 7th of Janu- serve as reminder that gatherings target of a deadly attack in District 9. A rather ary a suicide attack took place as should generally be avoided as unusual incident was reported also in District an individual equipped with a such events frequently involve the 4, Kabul Darwaza Area, when seven ANP BBIED entered a public bath- presence of officials or other were apparently poisoned by their cook at an house located also in Bazaar Area AOG/ACG potential targets. ANP check post. The victims were trans- and detonated his device. Three The AOG campaign of targeting ported to the hospital and their health condi- days later, on the 10th, a VBIED GOA officials also continued this tion is not life threatening. Whereas AOG detonated against an ANP vehicle period. On the 18th, in Nakodak direct attacks continued apace in Panjwayi, on the Kandahar-Spin Boldak Village an IED detonated against Zhari, Arghandab and Kandahar City, IED Main Road in Zarif Bawri Area. the convoy of the Dand District initiated incidents have dropped this reporting The pattern of the recent attacks Governor, causing no casualties. period. Of note, an IED attack against an IMF in this district seems to indicate In Kandahar City, mobile ‘hit convoy occurred in District 7 of Kandahar that AOGs continue to focus teams’ continue to target ANP City, wounding one child and one IMF soldier. their activities on Spin Boldak, in officials or civilians associated THE ANSO REPORT Page 24

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA 150 This Report Period 0 Incident levels in Paktika re- 100 mained relatively low, given the of the 3 direct AOG attacks oc- intensely cold winter weather still curring there – one of which was 50 affecting it, and the AOG control a RPG and SAF attack on a patrol of much of the province’s rural in the Margha area, and the other 0 territory. This is likely the primary a similar attack on a convoy in the reason why just 3 IED incidents district centre. The other direct were recorded during the period, attack took place in Gomal, where PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime and why 2 of the 3 occurred to- AOG fighters attacked the DAC ward the end of the period; it is with SAF and RPGs. Two of the the Pir Koti area, led to the discovery and con- also likely that only as the ground five IDF attacks also occurred in fiscation of a suicide vest and a motorcycle defrosts will the province register Barmal, both targeting the IMF rigged with explosives, evidently waiting to be the return to normal levels of this base in the district, with the final deployed for a (potentially complex) suicide form of attack. The earliest such incident registered there an IMF operation. Other IMF operations took place in IED incident was the ANP dis- air strike on AOG locations in the the Yahya Khel DAC, with an air strike against covery of two in the same location district centre area. The other IDF AOG positions, and Mata Khan’s Marjani vil- in the Saigana area of Khair Kot. attacks occurred in Dila and lage, where three suspected AOG members Later in the period, on the 24th, an Gayan, where IMF bases were were arrested. Also of note, two separate IED struck an IMF vehicle in Ya- targeted, and Omna, where the UAVs crashed of technical faults during the hya Khel, injuring a soldier, and DAC was the target. period, marking a new record, one in Gomal the following day an IED was Urgun found itself home to four and one in Khair Kot. defused in Sar Hawza. Related to reported IMF/ANSF operations Finally, in an unusual incident, the Khushmand IED incidents, two AOG mem- during the period, the first three District Governor shot and wounded a local bers were arrested by ANP in together leading to the detention shopkeeper in the district bazaar over a per- Omna while carrying IED raw of 3 AOG members, including sonal dispute. It is unknown at the time of materials. one mid-level commander on writing if the DG will face any punishment for th Barmal remained a particular fo- February 20 believed responsible this incident. cus for AOG-IMF conflict, with 2 for IED attacks. The fourth, in

NOTICE: ANSO ORIENTATION SERVICE

All newly arrived NGO international staff (no contractors or consultants) from ANSO- registered NGOs are welcome to attend the next ANSO NGO International Staff Orientation that is scheduled for 0830 hrs at the ANSO Headquarters in Kabul on the 23rd of March 2011. (The briefing will last approximately 3.5 hrs). Please note, this service is designed for newly arrived international staff that would like to be sensitised to ANSO services, trends in the conflict, the conflict’s historical basis and regional-specific contexts, the NGO operational context, and an analytical overview of NGO recent incidents. Organisations interested in having staff attend should register by fully filling in the attached document and supplying it to the Operations Coordinator National Counterpart, Masoud Habibi, at [email protected] no later than 1300 hrs on the 22nd of March 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 25

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 0 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 The overall rate of security inci- 80 dents reported in Uruzgan Prov- place on the 16th, in Chalabi Vil- 60 ince has slightly risen as compared lage of , where to the previous reporting period. AOG abducted two relatives of 40 Furthermore, AOGs have con- ANP officials. 20 ducted more direct attacks, par- IED related incidents continued 0 ticularly in the second week of to be prevalent across the prov- this cycle. In the past two weeks, ince. This reporting period saw a URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime at least eight AOG direct attacks total of 13 IED incidents reported Uruzgan as a supply base for operations in were reported in Tirin Kot with in Tirin Kot and Chora districts, a four such occurrences, in addition other southern provinces, ANSF/IMF units significant decrease relative to 20 have continued to carry out numerous search to two occurrences in Dihrawud incidents reported in the PRP. As and one in Chora. It is worth operations. In the past two weeks these opera- is often the case in this province, tions were concentrated on main AOG area of noting that although still limited the large majority of these inci- in number, one of these attacks operations i.e. Tirin Kot, Chora and Dihrawud dents were ANSF/IMF recovery districts. In seven separate search operations involved casualties. On 20th of and disposal operations. Both February, in Tirin an throughout the aforementioned districts aforementioned districts wit- ANSF/IMF seized mainly ammunition and IMF soldier and a national inter- nessed IED that detonated against preter were killed as a result of the IED making materials. Similar to the last re- IMF patrols, however there were porting period these operations were accompa- fire fight with AOG elements. no reports of casualties associated Apart from direct attacks, AOG nied by AOG detentions, with 17 suspected with these incidents. In order to AOG members reported to have been arrested activity manifested itself with an- prevent AOGs from using other incident of note, which took in Tirin Kot and Chora districts.

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 The incident levels in Zabul 80 th slightly increased during this re- cial on 20 of February. The 60 same district experienced another porting period, nonetheless the 40 targeted attack against NDS per- volumes remained in line with 20 seasonal trends that had been ob- sonnel as an official was shot and 0 served during the same period last killed in Bakirzi Area also on the year. This reporting period, Qalat 20th. Finally, five days later two AOG members riding on a mo- and Shinkay districts have experi- ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime enced the large majority of AOG torcycle shot and killed a tribal initiated incidents. Apart from elder of Mizan District in the vi- tions conducted in Qalat, Shahjoy and Ar- two AOG direct attacks that were cinity of his house. ghandab districts resulted in various ammuni- reported in and an The pace of IED incidents has tions, weapons and IED making materials sei- IED strike in Shinkay (all of them remained robust with five re- zure. In addition, security forces discovered a targeting IMF patrols with no ported incidents, of which one suicide vest in Sinak Area of Qalat District. casualty reported), AOG activity device resulted in detonation. Of Several arrests of AOG members have been manifested itself in a series of at- note, in two separate discovery reported as well in these districts, including an tacks on officials and against a and disposal operations ANP lo- AOG weapon facilitator that has been de- tribal elder. In Kharwaryano Area cated two AT mines and two tained in the latter district along with his asso- of Qalat District, AOG elements IEDs in Qala Khel Area of Shah- ciate. shot and wounded an NDS offi- joy District. ANSF/IMF opera- THE ANSO REPORT Page 26

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 0 HELMAND This Report Period 0 250 Although the overall incident vol- 200 ume has decreased as compared two weeks targeting mainly 150 to the last period, Helmand Prov- ANSF/IMF patrols which re- ince continues to be very unsecure sulted in the reported deaths of 100 with an extremely high number of one ANA soldier and two ANP, 50 security incidents. ANSO data another ANA and five ANP were 0 shows an increase of around 89% wounded. In addition, one civil- ian was reportedly killed in an in the overall incident volume as HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime compared to the same period in IED strike in . 2010 (with an increase of 45 % in The most deadly IED related inci- Although a criminal motivation for the attack th AOG initiated incidents only) dent occurred on 25 of February cannot be excluded for this particular attack, it indicating the current intensity of in Garmser when a roadside IED should be noted that AOGs frequently target conflict in the province. So far hit an ANP vehicle, killing one for-profit development organizations which the majority of AOG initiated ANP and wounding four others. are perceived as being associated with IMF incidents have been recorded in Another notable AOG initiated efforts and objectives. Another feature that Nahri Sarraj, Nad Ali, Sangin and incident consisted of killing of may have additional impact on the already Musa Qala districts. Furthermore, two civilian workers employed by tense security environment in Helmand Prov- the aforementioned districts ac- the GOA for cleaning canals in ince is the beginning of the eradication cam- counted for 55 % of all IED Nawa-I-Barak Zayi District. In paign that started in five districts of Helmand rd strikes recorded throughout the Lashkar Gah City on the 23 , two Province- Nawa-i-Barak Zayi, Nad Ali, Marjah, province and more than 80% of unknown individuals also shot Garmser and Nahri Sarraj. AOG direct attacks. There were and wounded a local staff member at least 32 IED strikes in the past of a development organization.

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 0 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250 A sharp downturn in the volume 200 of reported security incidents has IMF logistical convoy) and were been recorded in Ghazni in the focalised on Andar, Waghaz and 150 past two weeks. This decrease is Qarabah districts. Similar to the 100 most likely related to difficult previous report, AOG ‘hit and 50 run’ tactics, in order to avoid the weather conditions and heavy 0 snowfalls reported across the prolonged engagements with se- province, particularly in Nawur, curity forces, concluded in no GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime Ajristan, Malistan and Jaghuri dis- casualty reported in the past two tricts. AOG indirect attacks have weeks. With regards to IED de- ary in the later district, an IMF vehicle was hit continued to decrease with no ployment, three explosive devices by an IED resulting in six IMF soldiers recorded incidence this reporting were reported to have detonated wounded. ANSF/IMF operations were limited period (as compared to only one across the province (an increase as this period with five search operations recorded in the last report), how- compared to one recorded in the launched in Ghazni, Dih Yak and Qarabagh ever direct attacks remain the PRP). The main target remains districts. Beside a quantity of weapons and AOG’s tactic of choice through- ANSF/IMF vehicle with two ammunitions, six AOG members were ar- out the province. These attacks separate strikes that damaged rested, including a mid-level AOG commander were led against various targets ANP and IMF vehicles in Ghazni who was detained in Nawi Area of Qara Bagh (IMF convoys, a road construc- and Andar but caused no casual- District. tion company or PSC escorting an ties. However, on 27th of Febru- THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: ANSO is hosted by Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 Nimroz

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) This is because we Brian Laguardia - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 do not know enough To Register with ANSO Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 about the area to contact: comment on the sig- [email protected] EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) nificance of the inci- Rory Brown - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 dents occurring Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 there. ANSO is managed by an NGO Board. If you have any SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) If you can help us feedback, good or bad, let Vacant - [email protected] 0796 688 416 understand the prov- them know on: Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 ince better, please [email protected] contact us. ANSO ACRONYMS WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) Rachel Adam - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 ACG-Armed Criminal Group / Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135 AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Police / ANP-Afghan National Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 Police / AOG-Armed Opposition Group / APPF-Afghan Public Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Protection Forces (local depu- Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 tised militias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Explosive Device / IMF- International Military Forces / NDS-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / PRP- Previous Reporting Period / FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES: Advisory Board email address PSC-Private Security Company / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- vised Explosive Device / PDO- ANSO Advisory Board at [email protected]. Private Development Organisa- tion / ALP-Afghan Local Police / LDI-Local Defence Initiative / IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani- stan () / PSG-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG- District Shadow Governor (IEA)