The ANSO Report (16-28 February 2011) (Read-Only)
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The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 68 16-28 February 2011 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 The AOG focus on popula- The issue of civilian casual- labad, though collateral, 8 Northern Region tion centres noted in the pre- ties also came to the fore as provides a sobering exam- Western Region 15 vious period continued on a result of IMF operations, ple of the pervasiveness of into this one, providing for primarily from the Eastern the conflict and the impact Eastern Region 18 the defining dynamic of the Region. The great majority it can have on the most Southern Region 23 month. While this activity of these were the result of routine of activities. The has primarily involved suicide air strikes, and appear to be theft of communication 27 ANSO Info Page attacks, the complex attack associated with the ongoing equipment in Faryab, along within Jalalabad City (similar regional ‘reorientation’ of with the periods only Cen- to Kandahar in the PRP) was forces from such areas as tral incident in Kabul, YOU NEED TO KNOW the stand out event, due to the Pech Valley in Kunar served as reminders that both the number of casual- towards the population cen- criminality remains a uni- • Complex attacks within ties that resulted and level of tres, where it is felt a greater versal concern for the com- population centres sophistication. In addition, strategic impact can be munity, no matter the con- the suicide attacks in Khost achieved. These actions text. • Reduction/reorientation of ISAF within East (an apparent premature deto- can be seen as part of the Helmand in the South has nation), Kunduz, Faryab and overall ISAF ‘population consistently recorded the • Civilian casualties Kandahar also incurred con- centric’ strategy, as seen in highest comparative pro- siderable casualty figures; the South during Operation vincial incident volumes • Numerous & diverse with all these events denoting Mushtarak late last year; NGO incidents this year (Ghazni held this a greater ‘flexibility’ in AOG steps that also represent the distinction in 2010), both targeting definitions while early stages of the eventual from a regional and coun- resulting in high civilian casu- transition to ANSF in the try perspective, with over alty volumes. In the cases of long term. 200 AOG incidents in Feb- ANSO is supported by Jalalabad, Faryab and Kun- Thus far, the NGO pres- ruary alone. Kunar, in the duz the locations targeted ence in the West and South East, typically records the were civil structures, though has remained unaffected second highest, though the individuals within (the with no incidents reported Khost is closing in on this predetermined targets) could this year. In contrast, the range. Wardak remains the be loosely defined as ‘security East and North continue to most volatile province forces’ or legitimate targets. report the vast majority of within Central, though However, these attacks have NGO incidents, accounting Badghis surpasses it, also resulted in universal condem- for 6 of the seven total reporting the highest vol- nation (including the IEA events this period, bringing umes in the West. Lastly, itself) and the negative impli- the months total to 11. Faryab presents the highest cations on AOG acceptance The death of an NGO na- volumes from a Northern may force greater restrictions tional staff member (the 3rd perspective, surpassing on such efforts, though it this year overall and the 2nd such historically volatile nonetheless sets a troubling in the East) during the at- areas as Kunduz. precedent early on in the tack on the bank in Jala- year. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 1 The early morning hours of Fri- 40 day 18 February saw two INGO 16 February was followed ten days 30 employees report in the Kabul later by an early-morning multiple 20 City office pretending to be on rocket attack against high-profile 10 locations in the capital city. The duty, and successfully drive away 0 in the agency’s two high-profile said morning, three BM-1 vehicles. Both staff members had (107mm) rockets impacted in the vicinity of the Ministry of De- joined the organization shortly KABUL AOG KABUL Crime before the theft, with the senior fence and the Presidential Police between them having concluded a in PD 9 & 2 without causing casu- alties. The strike denotes a return (with a disciplined rank-and-file and an ability couple of months at a managerial to implement the internal code of conduct) - position. Capitalizing on his influ- to another tactic of choice fa- voured by AOG planners in the this is applicable in minimum to the IEA and ence, the individual also recom- its leadership’s approving such attacks. The mended his accomplice to join the past years and often put in motion when AOG decided to discredit future will actually show whether the IEA lead- INGO as a driver. The incident ership (as opposed to the HQN splinter group serves as a reminder that NGOs GOA discourse on security gains. Due to the type of weaponry used and foreign AOG elements for which such (as any other type of organiza- considerations do not apply), will be willing tions) are not immune to this type in combination with TTPs used, indirect fire attacks remain inher- and able to align the tactical & strategic consid- of criminality. The ‘inside’ jobs erations in the field back with its own ideologi- and deflection, especially by ently inaccurate, and pose mainly the risk of collateral damage for cal standpoints and code of conduct, including freshly-recruited staff, are rather a reigning in the HQN element. common feature. Holidays, week- civilian residences located along ends and after COB hours repre- its trajectories. Undoubtedly, the From another perspective, this cycle was char- sent a typical timing for such actual accuracy of IDF attacks as acterized by a higher than usual occurrence of schemes, as the office and project much as any other considerations false security alarms, with two notable cases of premises are manned by less per- matter less than their occurrence a detonation (inside a military training ground sonnel and the discipline is more and timing. This cycle’s IDF actu- in PD 9) and an accidental ‘friendly- relaxed. Regulated access to assets ally connects with the recent sui- fire’ (among the private security detail of a res- and implementation of strict re- cide missions in the capital as taurant in PD 10) prompting several Afghan porting procedures shall prevent both types of attack stand out for and international agencies to circulate unsub- most of similar schemes. It also being a minimal tactical invest- stantiated reports of AOG attacks. In the cur- appears that this category of ment in return for maximum stra- rent context, when further AOG attacks in the criminal cases is often preceded tegic impact, that is, on percep- City represent a statistical certitude, one will by symptomatic irregularities such tions of insecurity. Concomitantly benefit from a simple ‘common sense’ analysis as dissension among the team though, both types of attacks lead which fast reveals that the AOG threats re- members, individual discipline to an absurd situation in which volve around a predictable set of targets and issues or, as simple as it is, unex- civilians are caught (or worse, tar- situations. As opposed to ‘chasing’ generic pected transgression of SOPs or geted on purpose) in the fighting, threat reports issued by external agencies, breaking of routines. the AOG, successfully or not, NGOs will benefit from keeping focused on damage the reputation of GOA the analysis of their staff vulnerabilities along For the rest, Kabul Province wit- structures and their international the standard vectors: 1. proximity to security nessed only two non-lethal AOG sponsors, but by doing so also targets, 2. travel situations, 3. exposure in escalations. A text-book targeting detrimentally erode their own self- ‘target-rich’ public venues. of two fuel tankers in Surobi on image as legitimate opposition THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 1 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 So far, a modest 18 incidents (incl. 40 counted for one AOG attack 7 AOG) have been recorded for 30 February. Whereas the final ac- against a supply truck and its oc- 20 count may be subject to change, cupant, and the only IED blast the overall levels indicate that also recorded against security forces, 10 Logar renounced to the usual inci- which then sparked an IMF op- 0 dent volumes, with IMF & ANSF eration resulting in the arrest of operations outnumbering AOG two locals. Further up the road direct attacks by roughly 50%. towards Kabul, in Puli Kandahari, LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime Whereas the first two weeks saw a presumed couple of teenagers stuck a magnetic IED on a slow- kinetic activity has been claimed by IEA units the action mainly boil in Muham- in the peripheral districts as well as in Baraki mad Agha and Baraki Barak, with moving fuel tanker. The device reportedly detonated shortly after Barak, but could not be independently cor- larger scale operations sporadically roborated so far. reported from the peripheral the alarmed driver and his assis- Kharwar and Charkh Districts, tant, noticing the hasty retreat of An IMF/ANSF night raid, this time in Babus Puli Alam came back to the fore the youngsters from the vicinity Area (Puli Alam) on the night of 27 February, during this reporting cycle.