CEU eTD Collection Submitted to Submitted In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts ENERGY AS AFOREIGNPOLICY TOOL: STRATEGY TOWARDSTHEEUROPEAN ASSESSING RUSSIAN ENERGY Supervisor: Department of Political Science Central European University COUNTRIES Olga Repyeuskaya Budapest, Hungary Professor Tamas Meszerics (2010) By CEU eTD Collection as a threat is groundless and speculatively as athreatis andspeculatively polemical. groundless use gas Russia for sighted to as amechanism influence EU’s the itof and of perception political hugeit of Recognizing mutual economic dependency is itthese appears that tooshort- parties, economic manipulation, dependingon Europeanthe Russian of or perspective examination. own virtue. Russia change interdependenceStreamsitsuses dominance to projects, to gas equilibrium the of Its actions andSouth Nord the Pursuingthrough diplomacy EU member pipeline different states. towards towards the manipulation asmean of strategic apply natural a gas seemsto Russia international arena, EU in the on the energy superpower as an Evolving partnership. strategic stageof the of to confrontation gas sphere are perceived as political and/or The EU-Russian energy relations are rather ambivalent and constantly shiftfrom the stage ABSTRACT ii CEU eTD Collection PhD student supervisor my express my to CEUthesis and organizations. people gratitude of I would liketo a number of support, through wholethe duration myof studies. myto express mylovebeloved to and family gratitude for theirunderstanding andendless who through their comments and have questions and encouraged enlightened me.Finally, Iwish financial means for completing this Masters Degree. I also want to thank co-students andfriends owe a I great interview. email in the questions dealimportant some answer to time valuable to finding for theLondon OSI - Soros Foundationof the that wholly-owned provided representatives tothe especially interviewees, academic tothe andprofessional goes appreciation me with the scholarship subsidiary and the of Gazprom - This research project would not have been possible without the direct and indirecthave withoutsupport and thedirect This not wouldpossible been project research Dr. Tamas Meszerics Tamas Dr. Andrej Nosko Andrej for his valuable comments and guidance about the energy topic. My topic. energy the about guidance and comments valuable his for ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS for his assistance and suggestions. Special thanks for the CEU the for thanks Special andsuggestions. assistance his for iii Gazprom& Marketing Trading RetailLtd . in CEU eTD Collection ILORPY...... 53 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... APPENDIX 3: CHANGES IN THE 52 ENERGY STRATEGY ...... OF RUSSIA APPENDIX 2: MAJOR RUSSIAN GAS PIPELINES 51 TO EUROPE...... APPENDIX 1: DEPENDENCY ON RUSSIAN 50 NATURAL GAS SUPPLIES ...... IN 2008 50 APPENDICES...... 46 CONCLUSION...... FRSI...... 37 OF RUSSIA...... CAPABILITY POWER-PROJECTION VS. ECONOMICOF IMPLICATIONS POLITICAL 4. CHAPTER RELATIONSHIPS 29 WITH RUSSIA...... ACCORDING TOTHEIR OFTHEEUMEMBER STATES CLASSIFICATION 3. CHAPTER CHAPTER 2. RUSSIAN GAS STRATEGY: DIFFERENT APPROACH 18 - SAME OUTCOME?...... EAINT USA...... 7 RELATION ...... TO RUSSIA IN AND‘STRATEGICMANIPULATION’ THE CONCEPTSOF‘ENERGY 1. SUPERPOWER’ CHAPTER 1 ...... INTRODUCTION 4.2 4.1 2.2 2.1 1.2 1.1 T R R P T G HE USSIA AS AN AS USSIA IPELINE HE USSIAN ENERAL P ‘D HENOMENON OF IVIDE AND IVIDE P A R OLITICAL OR OLITICAL LTERNATIVES USSIA E NERGY ’ R S ULE M S ANIPULATIVE S / TRATEGIC ’ AND UPERPOWER : G N AS ORTH E S CONOMIC TRATEGY TABLE OFCONTENTS S M TREAM VS TREAM A ANIPULATION ...... 7 ...... PPROACH TOWARDS THE TOWARDS PPROACH P ...... 21 ...... OSITION ON THE OSITION ON . Y AMAL ...... 11 ...... iv –2 AND THE P IPELINES U...... 18 EU...... A MBER C ONSTRUCTION P IPELINES ...... 41 ...... 37 ...... CEU eTD Collection problematic transiting countries such as Ukraine and Belarus. One alternative route is the route and Belarus.Onealternative problematic such asUkraine transiting countries alternative routes for supplying natural gas directly to Europe. They will bypass the solvent consumingmarket customers. for 6 years) thelast Ukraine (lasting reaction disruption European and negative of caused in withgas transiting gasdisputes The countries. Belarus 2006 and Russia between conflicts continuous to due nowadays, concern andeconomic political EU’s the oil), as (such countries from other beimported can that sources energy other Unlike market. which gas consumptions, Russia has gradually been transformed into aso-called ‘energy insuperpower’, policymaking. With increasethe of prices energy the and the growing demandofits role ininternational asignificant toplay arenaandstarted onthe reappeared global competitors, Iran and Azerbaijan, within the Nubucco project through Turkey to Central European countries. European Central to Turkey through project Nubucco the within Azerbaijan, and Iran competitors, supply. gas in restriction 4 no EU experienced the occasion onthat and reached was agreement an Fortunately increase the transitprice it charged forgas in to territory Europe its throughor even to cutsupply totally the off. agreement was reached, Gazprom threatened tocut off gas supplies to Belarus. Belarus, inturn, threatened to 3 different number of states in various historical periods. 2 cooperation with the EuropeanUnion. supply of gas (pipeline and not liquefied naturalgas), mostthe prominent and challenging component of Russian 1 Hypothetically European costumers could potentially turn for supplies to Russia’s main gasexporting no When Belarus. by paid price gas the in an increase demanded Gazprom dispute energy Russia-Belarus the In including Community European the in countries of conglomerate the - Europe as referred be also will EU The the with connected issue the on focus will research the gas, to of energy notion the down narrowing However, I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an To strengthen its position in the energy market and not to lose Europe as its main asits tolose not andEurope market inthestrengthen energy its To position Following the break up of Followingin endhas thebreak the 1991and of USSR the War, upof Cold the Russia INTRODUCTION 2 growing dependence on exclusive Russian natural be amajor seems natural gas pipeline growingto Russian dependence onexclusive 1 becomes extremely important for country’s position on the global arena and arena global the on position country’s for important extremely becomes 4 because of the conflicts, the Russian Federation introduced two introduced Federation Russian the theconflicts, because of 1 Sir Winston Churchill (October 1, 1939) 3 and gas confrontations with confrontations gas and enigma. . CEU eTD Collection energy assets. energy as Gazprom obtains control by purchasing acontrolling stake in pipelines, ports, storage facilities, and other key 5 (Hughes are balancingbetween‘energy 2006). and‘strategic partnership’ confrontations’ European has Union and Russia since the 1990’sundergone hugechanges.Currentrelations of every country. andsingle self-interests liberal etc.) free market,democracy liberalization, competition, (open andprinciples values the between exists widely which tension, the illustrate and problematic become have relations gas EU-Russiann an economic tool. Contemporary as and/or countries other a political Russia has alllevel political highest the the on diplomacy energy of mean a as incentivesused to use it is observe (including Nowadays inholisticgas dimension). them scope more (geo)political as a mean of ‘strategic as financialtrade, investments, and demand-supply Suchlimitedrelations. approachfails to manipulation’ in relations countries). ‘new’ andtransiting members tomember-states, analysing Russian foreign itspolicy and actions towardsvarious countries (‘old’ European complexity misunderstandingsand in EU-Russian the gas cooperation and gives value to by general undertaken approach, All manipulation since strategic Russia adds that 2000’s by some of the EU members areperceived Streams andSouth Nord the of construction the Moreover, future. asnearest in the a ‘divide and rule’ energy as itsEurope of strengthen Russia asole gassuppliesto the position will only gassupplieras strategy that is a part of a more Balkans and Central AustriaEurope, to and Italy mainas countries of destination. the trough Russian BlackSeafrom the under run Stream pipeline,whichwill South gas Stream Nord linkingpipeline, Russiadirectly Germany viaisto the Baltic Sea.Another the Russia’s energy diplomacy is present in the relations with Central Asiancountries, formerUSSR the and EU, Frequently energy relations between states are observed only in economic terms such terms ineconomic are only observed states between energy relations Frequently From the EU’s perspectivesuggested the routes docontribute not tothe diversification The history of the development of political and economic relations between the between relations economic and political of development the of The history 2 5 . Being asuperpower, CEU eTD Collection Europe. Orban, through the variations of the realist theory, tries to elucidate Russian Russian power- elucidate to theory, tries realist variations of the the Orban, through Europe. in presence energy dominant Russian about opinions contrasting have they states, European respectively. relations energy Ukrainian in Russian- and states (CEE) European Eastern and Central and Russia between relations focuses of havedifferent the analyses two of andMargaritaBalmaceda (2008),that (2008) Orbán Anita experts the between observed be can debates (energy) policy foreign specific Russian more the But region. Asian Central the and Union Soviet former with relations foreign political in participation international the affairs,more but preciselyfocusing on the and development energy economic its on concentrating empire, energy an being Russia of evolvement the explores thoroughly also (2004) Hill Fiona countries. European different and betweenRussia contemporary the relations energy andshiftingthem to historical connections illustrating EU-Russian the thegeneral relations, towards energy approaches highlights (2008) Aalto Palmi instance, For scientists. political and analysts political both by strategies gas Russian on and relations energy EU-Russian on written been has much Consequently, foreign agenda. policy a central on European the decade, Russiahasplayed role reasons of misunderstandings and confrontations. main the of one become has energy), (including approach policy foreign coherent no has but relations law trade and of rule development, democratic promoting is on keen EU that of the itselfas asoft- anda‘hard both capabilitiesestablishon power’ power’ onesideand‘softthe tries that to Russian state ofnewly ambitions consolidated growing Clashes of differences. enormous the to inevitable partiesdue are two those between conflicts innovations –the from Russia and isRussia, in turn, inforeign needof investments in and gas sector Even in spite of egregious mutual dependency – the EUdramatically depends on gas supplies The importance of the chosen topic is difficult to underestimate as throughout the last the asthroughout to underestimate is difficult topic of chosen the importance The However, while both tackling the question of Russian attitude towards various Russian whiletowards attitude tacklingof question both However, the 3 CEU eTD Collection common interests in the gas sphere. I will argue that Russia uses its energy dominance and the and have parties the mutually Ihypothesisethat are implications, speculative dependent states. theEU for applicable research, my for basis the be will - defiance or compliance the - party manipulated the and manipulator behaviour Asia. strategic the countries of Hisof state- Central the approach to manipulation on basisthe of Stulberg’s definition of manipulation itsstrategic and application towards the Gazprom main state-owned company will be equalized to the state-level. instance, are active actors inRussian foreign policy, the companies micro-level isnot inthe focus of that thesis. 6 relations) international of theory realist on keen precisely are who be only (might those asaunitary actor state level of onthe manipulation’ ‘strategic voting behaviour. Itmeans almostthat nopolitical scientists have beeninterestedin observing of manipulation the through or diplomacy of levels political domestic of relations vertical individual’s level psychologicalthrough variables whetherin group-think decision-making, is manipulation doneonthe about thatiswritten is problem the However, thateverything 2000 untilfrom present andpoliticalthe strategic economic the perspectivesmanipulation. of andincentives international strategies towards ER-Russian energy relations’ relations. manipulation, their might studies be valuablein termsof understanding Russian general gas though, bothauthors donot deal specifically Russian gaspipelinewith ‘superpowerness’ and dealing various with European countries (including UkraineandBelarus) differently. Even forces oneto Russia difference in might useselectivethink that of strategy policy-making This in asamain actor relations. the for astate standing approach realist the evaluates Ukraine andcritically towards approach apolitical While, Balmacedaarguesfor andmeans. interests economic the through region in that outcomes policy foreign for settings and gaining Acknowledging that such state-owned companies as Gazprom, Rosneft, Transneft and private Lukoil, for Lukoil, private and Transneft Rosneft, Gazprom, as companies state-owned such that Acknowledging Recognizing that EU-RussianRecognizing that ambivalentenergy arerather relations and have This thesis analyses and evaluates Russia’s gas relations with European countries from countries European with gasrelations Russia’s evaluates and analyses thesis This 4 6 . The research tackles that omission that tackles The research . CEU eTD Collection in Relation to Russia’ deals with the examination formation of Russiainto energy superpower thesis. this of findings tothe contribute will Gazprom of websites official the reports, analyst reviews,online journals,visual andpresentations interviews from and records papers, conference articles, journals, newspaper books, as and materials such printed on-line Internationalfor Centre European the Political of director the and Romanova Tatiana Consultant Policy Economy (ECIPE) in Brusselsof Petersburg Professor with interviewSt. State academic Universityan London; Public and Fredrikin Erixon). representative M&T Gazprom Russian with interview (anonymous The interviews several use of secondary the EU. Russian gas strategies‘strategicincorporated into being the manipulation’, of politics example Russian gas towards and motivations and of ‘superpower’ main will concepts two of the analysis adescriptive dealswith The research be analytically tackled with the help of per se. strategic manipulation a be perceived actions Russia’s can and Streams South and Nord the build to intentions Russia’s in prevail rationales economic or/and political whether distinguish to important be also might It relations. energy EU-Russian the on had it has implications what and strategy polemical. speculatively and is groundless a threat as it of perception EU’s the economic), (mainly aims foreven leveragestrategy reachingits I will that Russia uses gas though conclude find itself. gas forfailure the and commodity to suppliers the incoherence and alternatives the interdependence of change equilibrium the to relations in those strategic manipulation mechanisms of to its own virtue. The success of its actions reinforce by the EU’s Different quantitative techniques can be applied to address the research objectives. research address the to beapplied can techniques quantitative Different The first chapter ‘The Concepts of ‘Energy Superpower’ and Manipulation’ ‘Strategic of‘Energy Superpower’ ‘The Concepts chapter The first in four willbe chapters. explored objectives The research The main The research questions remain to identify remain to logic the behind Russia’s energy 5 CEU eTD Collection Russian gas relations will conclude the research. the will conclude Russian gas relations political aims are analysed through prismthe mutual of dependency. pipelines. Russianposition its on economic intentions and European Russia’sposition on Amber and Yamal-2 of promotion inthe States Baltic the and Poland of motivations of Russia of EU as a state-like entity. incoherencethe of the analysisillustrates the Russia, towards level attitudes and dependency theiritsinmembersand gas according maincategories to theEU gas policy. Grouping Relationships with Russia’ presentsvariousof attitudes EUmemberthe Russiatowards states The examples of the Nord and South stream will serve as the basis for observation. differentEUmembers. towards strategy ‘divideandrule’ -the one last onthe mainly focus will disaggregation, and pre-emption co-optation, of strategy based onthe approach,pipeline provides EU’sthe view onRussia’s methods of gas strategic manipulation. Themain gas gas policy. conditions for strategicis Adam with providedtogether of (2007) Stulberg maincrucial the characteristics the manipulation to occur of based a study on manipulation, into idea the strategic of insight isA observed. theoretical to be examined on theis states other manipulate strategically to example aresource uses asuperpower when scenario, of Russian negative The countries. other comparing to its features with connected controversies and the Finally, improvement and aboutthe mainobservations the suggestions the of EU- the The last chapter The third chapter The secondchapter ’ observes the pipeline alternatives to the Nord Stream and to evaluate the ‘ Political vs. Economic Implications of Power-Projecting Capability Power-Projecting of Implications Economic vs. Political ‘ ‘Russian Gas Strategy: Different Approach –SameOutcome?’ Approach ‘RussianDifferent GasStrategy: Classification of the EU Member States According to their 6 CEU eTD Collection EU – 44.5% of total gas import came from Energy from came in (EU Policy 2010). For import 2009 EU –44.5%of Russia total gas the For EU. the to in relation especially politics, foreign and domestic Russian of locomotive is the energy times. Nowadays Soviet the from exploited network pipeline vast the through different natural Gazprom, quantities deliverssignificantparts of Russia of gas to worldthe in history. of gas use effectiveness After ashrink inproduction of gas in the 1990’s,today’s gasindustry has highest the 25% international aboutnatural 66-82). gas reservesand (Stulbergof 2007, produces gas be perceived as an energy conceptRussiaAccording can (Grigoriev that to in2010). policy too terms general outcome superpower as it accounts numberinfluence being of and,therefore, countries to able worldand markets getpreferred for almost 32% of the world’sa considerable to compared supplies scaleenergy of vast its territory, sizeof the of because proven ɟQɟ WɨZɚ being asuperpow Uɟ more subtle and economically-driven meaning.more and subtle economically-driven to closer it shifts and nature a ‘soft-power’ concept that to adds ‘energy’ word The relations. the C the use. If one observes these two words separately, the meaning of ‘superpower’ has anech separately,meaningwords of ‘superpower’ the thesetwo use. If observes one INRELATION‘STRATEGIC MANIPULATION’ TORUSSIA OF ‘ENERGYSUPERPOWER’ AND CHAPTER 1.THECONCEPTS pres rgy and r rgy rds the Sovi ɨ ɟ ldW nted different typ 1.1 Russia asan Energy Superpower Being the world’s biggestgas supplier, bymeans of its major company state-owned Russi The term ‘energy superpower’ relatively relatively came press The term the superpower’ and into recently ‘energy widepublic ɚ r and is associated with military superpowers and the arms race of and raceof Soviet-US arms the the superpowers military is with associated r and ɚ ɟ thr sour ɟ ɨ t Empir ɟ ɫɟ ugh r during the Tsarist period (when r duringperiod t Tsarist the s). Nowadays, Russia is associated with being Russias). Nowadays, isassociated an‘energy superpower’ ɚ ɟ lm ɟ s of ‘sup (when milit ɨ st th ɟ ɟ wh rpowers’. The country w ɨOɟ ɚ ry and id hist ɨ 7 ri ɫɚ ɟɨOɨ l p gy w ɟ ri ɟ ɨ rritories andpr d of its d of ɟUɟ ɟ mor nt through a transformation from ɟ ɟ p xist ɨ pul ɟ nc ɟ ɚ stig r th ɟ and stat and ɟ ɚ wereth n th ɟ se ɟ craft hascraft ɚ ɟ rch f goal) ɨ of ɨ r CEU eTD Collection 7 democracy the as given country World asa remains Third in state.However, raw-endowed budget the income to export 30% of least the ‘resource curse’, when an extensive reliance onenergy exports, while energy comprises at energy-development instance, For strategy. dangersof the Michael about Ross (1999)speaks virtues of an energy superpower, referring . energy superpower to the existence important an as Russia ascertain and policy energy complex Russia’s of strengthening politicalfavour risks of leading from Sea (Minsaas 2008)willfields inthe and in andStrowger UK Netherlands North the the gas long-term the the increasein demandperspective and adeclinein European output current being from dependenton imports their countries (whichthirds is tothe EU).So applicable in than energy tohaveresources is andother it gasreserves in such better a situation all equals, therefore, Russia is in relatively equal conditions in these terms. No one will deny that, among a differentdegree; to EU memberstates all inthe almost be observed economy the can sameof the recession Nevertheless, saving. in future and energy nearestthe investments fewer and in resulted budgethas inthat adeficit shortages caused therevenue federal temporarily 2009).The(Mitrova immense gas fallinexport pricesarebound (that to oil has prices) –therehasimportant been decliningin 2008 inexports, aslump by12% 2009comparing to is What level decreased tothe more in2000. of andthat demand, recession price, production energy superpowerness. After gradual Russia’s hasgrowth, sector experiencedgas rapid Russia’s budget. comprises it Energy the EU(EU the gasgoesto2010)and exported Policy Russia 70%of –around major source of influx of petrodollars and embraces a substantial part of In Russian case energy export comprises 60% of budget income. ofbudget 60% comprises export energy case Russian In However, some political scientists and analysts are sceptical about there being only on Russian influence negative has ashort-run crisis economic thecurrent However, 7 , leads to problems with economic growth and 8 CEU eTD Collection which can satisfy their ambitious desires for hegemony. typeresources, of that individually uses itcountry seems thateach Therefore, superpower). (than undeniable contributed toconvertinginto it aprofound economic,financial and military export and possession resource than rather industries manufacturing and technological the on in applying incentives military to notionthe of Russian energy nowadays.‘superpowerness’ energy sources to promote its economiccenturies two togain in moreorder in weight world,and the butratheruses already discovered political development. Thereforefor least last the at invasions overseas military in leading any minorinterest Russia hashad there is no use the Euro-Asian continent, possessing huge stocks of all kinds of natural resources. That means over vastly spreads territory Russian current The earlier). acentury andFrance, war in 1930’s and n and str and cr the As hist conc of of superp is that Kuw the notion of ‘energy superpower’ evolves. superpower’ notion of‘energy the 2008, 30). are eventually statehood (Baev thattraditions itsstrong with resources combined natural society highly-educated agenerally and sectors, manufacturing andconstruction diversified and has adeveloped country as the irrelevant are apprehensions these caseof the Russia ɨ ng st ɟ ɟ pt has milithaspt w territ ɨ Rutland (2008) provides another example of example another Rutlandbased its of USA the ‘superpowerness’ that (2008)provides As it is not enough only to be energy-endowed country, the question of applicability of applicability of question the country, energy-endowed be to only enough is not it As ry shows, resource-end ɚ te-empir ɨZɟ ɟɚ ɚ tion of tion st powerful of it Ir or ɨ r asRussia d ries with riesnatur with ɚ ry, historicry, ɟ ɚ and, therefore, th and, therefore, n or other w ɨ ɚ es. That meansap that es. That ɚ l or other subtextl other that or l resources ɚ ɨ ɨ tes unliktes wed countries do n rld larg ɟ y vari pursue ɟ ɟ (as one of the reasons why Germany initiated World st energy-rich exporters d resource-p Lab 9 ɟ lling Russi ɨ ɚ us inv ɚ ɨ dds weight st to the ɨɨ rt from alre rt t use milit r countries thatar ɚ ɚ si with this term, remark with ɨ ns in to order ɚUɭ ɚ dy mentioned f mentioned dy ɨ power for th noth ɚ tus of tus ‘superp ɟ ɚ in need form to a ve the same st ɚ cquire colonies ɟ exp ɚ ɚ ctors this ctors ble thing ɚ ɨ nsi wer’. ɚ tus ɨ n CEU eTD Collection using amanipulative gas as tool of ofthepolicy. One main label critics puttingany of of the about speculativethe only that debates provokes flawed 2008, 109), based logic’ (Rutland on are hesitant to apply that Club 2006). USSR’ Discussion ‘evil War and the (Valdai of Coldrevive echoes the definition to any of thebeingits usedto uselater was arguingthat on, avoid that to early at tried 2000’s, superpower countries including Russia (Daly 2010). In addition former President as the term ‘is on by that hiring apublic relation inGazprom consultant improve itsto image in Westthe be frequentlyto Russian massused intheWestern media. That provoked toreact authorities began superpower energy of sense negative the Treaty, Charter Energy ratify to disagreement pricein EU, the hikes, gasdisruption the resulted to that withstates neighbouring conflicts intofrom lately. in wide practice Russia involved Startingearly gas 2000’s, when was mechanisms in centuries 20th-21stthe and doubtfully so. do will dimension.a ‘hard-power’ yet Russiahasnever combined military gascapabilities its with milit Iɨ sight char th thing is th thing benefiting at the expense of expensebenefitingdependency atthe state’s sensitivity.other of and energy T might have situation the it. Nevertheless, of isdiscussing point no –there another state risk to anotheror threat scenario, any expose functions Russia. peacefully anddoesnot application If to superpower energy when the superpower has a potential to ‘abuse’ its power ɟ r another st r another spher ɚ ɚ ɟ ct ry cap ry d to‘chop ɟ The tendency of substituting a military tool of influence into an economic one came The notion of ‘energy superpower’ has both negative and positive in connotations rized by mutu by rized ɟ ɚ of of tr t ɚ ɚ city r city s ɚ te andte wh the ɚ ‘s ɨ ɚGɟ ff branchyouthe ɚ ɨ ther th ther ft-p and pr the ɚ l dep ɨ wer’, wer’, ɚ n commerci ɟ nd ɨ le int ɟQɟ ɟ ncy ncy rgy endowm rgy ɨ ɚ ducer-c ɟ ɚ re sittingIt would on’. b rnational rnational communit nd a mutu a nd ɚ l. In this case a ‘soft-power’ dimension transfers into transfers dimension a‘soft-power’ case Inthis ɨ Putin, who was promoting the image of energy of image the promoting was who Putin, nsum 10 ɟ ɚ nt can h can nt l ben ɟ r lev r ɟ fici ɚYɟ ɟ ɭ l. Hence, if l. every Hence, trad if en if ɚ lly r lly the the ɟ more n more ɟ ɨ ɟ sult, it w it sult, nl rgy combin became rgy ɭ thr ɟJɚ ɟɚ ɨ tively tively c t to anoth to t uld be r uld ɨ ɚ nsequenti Kɟ ther sh ther ɟ ɟ d d r stat r Skeptics ɟ d with ɟ ɟ li al al is ɫɚWɟ ɟ ɨ in rt- ɚ l CEU eTD Collection advantages in Eurasia in the 10-year period of Throughadvantages the in in of 1992-2002. period 10-year usability ‘soft- the Eurasia of influencing at He examinedenergy Russia’ssuccess nuclear (2007). Stulberg energy was explored the issue ‘soft’of dimensions of international security on the example of oil, gas and Russian gasas for maintool suchmanipulations.the appears It thethat only that author level and state tothe manipulation’ ‘strategicapplying to of energy the sphere, especially decision-making. politics (1990)whoZeev Maoz and observed thephenomenamanipulation of within group Robert Putnam observed(1988) that influence occurringin two-level in games domestic markets, within types various of levelofmicro-agents on the by Akerlof (1970) George mentioned weresuperficially mechanisms Those theories). prospect theory or choice, game theory as a complementary explanatory tool of particular postulates (for instance, rational Instead of various adjoining that, superficially upon thiswithintouch theories concept another isnothere individual in theory would political sciencethat precisely dealwith thatnotion. manipulation towards countriesother ornot. asa tool of itsstrategic resource uses energy is superpower that whether important is more What change –itpolicy-making. Russia’s not will energy state simply or great a superpower notion rath basis in reality’(Milov 2006a). Therefore, it is b Energy Policy and a former Russian Deputy Energy Minister Energy Deputy Russian former a and Policy Energy Milov, Russia isVladimir on ‘energy superpower’ of concept 1.2 ThePhenomenon ofStrategic Manipulation The issue becomes even more complicated from the theoretical perspective when perspective from theoretical the evenmore complicated becomes The issue The manipulation’ difficulty liesin conceptof of defining the ‘strategic factthat the ɟ r than using it for the ɚQɚ lytical purp 11 ɟ tter to stick to the pol ɨ ses. Even if to call Russia as an energy , who calls it an the head of the Institute of ɟ mical essenc ‘illusion with no with ‘illusion ɟ of that CEU eTD Collection diplomacy), and ‘soft-power’ notably asamechanismspersuasions (coerciveused during of times pressure crises the and violence direct the – through outcome necessary the reach to how ways evident two are with comply, mutually options Russia(Stulberg cooperate or oppose to whether 2007).There manipulatedgains wereskilfully for were that Thecountries manipulatedcountry. the given and loses for probability the influence and it) eliminating (by compliance of risk of amount is commonly used in today’s global political non-crisis environment. non-crisis political global in today’s used is commonly states the of decision-making the of ‘directing’ method indirect Such an unfavourable results. maximizealternatives, compliancediminish anddecreasingrisksof to ends to profitable or of alignment by the decision the of and reorganization state of another choices strategic instrumentsinfluencing strategic theStulberg manipulation policy of (2007,1), entails outcomes with known probabilities). Thus a st a Thus probabilities). known with outcomes by setting the political agenda and framing the terms of the debate. 9 8 beginning from ideasthe of countries. CEEand applicant states, European Western leverage on pipeline gas Russia’s analyse to possible be might it reality, gas Russian in today’s states (Stulberg 2007,17).Modifyingand extrapolating his casestudy examples Asian Central of differently’ behave would otherwise that another of affect decisions the to government by a attempt ‘unilateral itas a characterizes Stulberg statecraft, of practice Observing the actors. political of other decisions influence the try to often states policy-making international sub-national accordingand foreign actors its to individual needs in lastdecade. the mechanisms, indirectmarketand Russiamanagedtoalter power’, behaviour regulatory the of The notion of ‘soft-power’ was introduced by Joseph Tversky. Nye, Amos and Daniel who claimed by Kahneman, that developed statestheory The can control policy outcomes The theory of strategic manipulation developed by Stulberg (2007, 37), derives itsderives 37), by (2007, manipulation Stulberg developedstrategic The of theory of in process that the acknowledged is itwidely insight, from theoretical the Starting Prospect Theory 9 sophisticated technique – strategic manipulation.According to 12 8 (that the decisions involve risk and uncertain and risk involve decisions the (that ɚ te can affect an affect can te ɨ ther one by by ch one ther ɚ nging the nging CEU eTD Collection the net value that the manipulated state is ready to pay for the commodity. So if commodity.pay forthe So is the ready to state manipulated the value that netthe itsas be For vulnerability calculated manipulatedwill the state 2007). transaction (Stulberg and thevaluegoods the estimates of important for swapof strategically the accounts in is thesituation which manipulation state affecting the The of successful consequence contradictions. to birth gives that enforcement an than rather alternatives other than beneficial the manipulated state perceives the compliance to the policy of the other state as more awareness exists within both both awareness exists sideswithin such from assumption that that proceeds manipulating policies gas analysis of Russian doing, even they're if what know parties oneboth relationship, ofany In else. them anyone manipulate can one ‘No complains later on that they manipulationaware thatthe afamous writer(2007, 7): Paulo Quoting place. takes Coelho were used’. Thus, the are theretrospective following. Firstly, manipulation and its results can be estimated only if both parties are determinants. interpret information andother the ability the research, to aim the case,the the on of depending essential, he/she considers decide what to researcher importantisarena blurred Itis frequently todistinguishisthe and not it often up to these two. coerce a target. (Stulberg 2007, 17) 10 manipulator energy through means evolvementmanipulation.line of Theborder framing between as states a strategic mightfactors bebutnotfundamentally important of determiningfor likelihood the the However, andabovementioned energy hasits the factors). sphere peculiarities exogenous information; opportunity entailto rulethe by having more relative powerin globalthe market; information asymmetry meaning the advantage of the manipulator of having more complete important conditions for the manipulation to occur shouldbe considered (among which are Such as increasing or decreasing access to a resource, prices and tariffs that are extended to deter, contain or contain deter, to extended are that tariffs and prices resource, a to access or decreasing increasing as Such Some of importantSome of conditions most the identified intheRussian policy-makingenergy Several aspects of ‘strategic manipulation’, which are based on the existence of based existence the on whichare manipulation’, of ‘strategic Several aspects . But strategic manipulation Butstrategicmanipulation be as if can perceived a success 10 and just a rational actor performing on the international the on performing actor a rational just and 13 CEU eTD Collection of such political non-compliance. Starting anti-Russian rhetoric about joining NATO and the and NATO joining about rhetoric anti-Russian Starting non-compliance. political such of or gains the are higherin a higherrisk position Ukraine(Iliev 2008, 12). is a vividillustration manoeuvre its own itsrisk domaindomain: raise lossesrisk-taking ifthe prospected are lower policy or manipulator’s of the costs the canincrease state manipulated the as compliance inevitably lead not to vulnerability Thus,the does of potential coerciveoutcomes threats. the eliminate or redirect to action takes often state manipulated the static as arenot state home production is that cover able to internal the demand. of and gas inflow its mainsource hasSea as theNorth Britain, that instance, Great for than, risk manipulated more supportbeing of exposed to themselves are domestic production to gas pipelines.constructed donot Usually have countries that anyamountthose sufficient of or andalready location its geopolitical dueto alternatives havenoother Russian gasand Slovakia, on ‘impose’ or asBelarus suchcountries its which will are 100%dependent on to more chances itprovides Naturally, inmany countries. assets energy andother network global energy(Stulberg This 2007,7). isimplicitly applicable totheRussian position dominant on the market as the largest natural a-priori endowments. advantage due to gas world’s oil the bounded nowadays manipulative has formula. to prices a special through The state an gas exporter,is in priceof gas that of the gas andthevariation amount necessary of the accessibility the owner thevulnerability greatly on Russian energy, the depends In of (Stulberg case the 2007, 46). of a wide low estimations – with direction opposite inthe sameway the pipelinerelation works Such adirect is high,incredibly vulnerability the state that of proportionally high well 2007). as (Stulberg as loses possible the ashigh or exchange of estimatesthe the value state manipulated But asStulberg (2007)points out, relationsthe and between manipulator the another sector in thegas market global on the should have aweight state Secondly, the 14 CEU eTD Collection Russian pipelines that connect Russiawith other countries. 12 11 one of mainthe of flowsRussianroutes gas today; 50% of Wintershall Erdgas,49%of countries and (50%of infrastructure transportation gas company – Belarus ‘Beltransgaz’ of by buyingin foreigngas- shares and andenergy intransportation assets Europe former-USSR Romanstatecraft. According Gazprom Kupchinsky to (2006), expansionistpursues an policy state’s the minimize and gas policy-decisions problems important in strategically create company main state-own the Gazprom as (Stulberg Citing 2007,32). Shambaugh, George them through state manipulated influencing the therefore, abroad, actors itsof sub-state actions anddirect of choices set a cancontrol state-manipulator the when areapplied tactics with becomescomply policy beneficially moreSimilar notstate’s to than 2007,37). (Stulberg comply to strategically that so context, decision-making commercial and political shape can it maximize the statecraft. It should ‘function within clear regulatory framework at home’, when to policies state’s main the with in line act markets) energy external over control of kind bypassing country. the inproposed Russia evengreatereconomic to andvulnerability risk gasdue pipelineprojects ultimately resulted that of non-compliance example wasanegative that However, dominance. the EU, Ukraine expressedpay and by price consuminggasandsiphoningto assigned for the gas to market refusing the its disagreementEU and unwillingness to comply with Russian gas Gazprom is monopolistically responsible forgas export to other countries and holds ownership in almost all That happened during the Presidency of Viktor Yushenko in 2004. 11 and being unwilling to sell some of its energy assets to Russia to cover the gas debts, activities its within territory (2000, 405). undermines its integrity political by challenging its ability control to andactors also but disposal, atstate’s resources physical the decreases only not when one state controls the activities of firms within another state’s territory,it Russia possesses a favourable position internal in both and Having externalmarkets. some have (that companies energy domestic that confident be should state a Thirdly, 12 , there are no apprehensions that this actor can this actor that apprehensions are no , there 15 CEU eTD Collection promote and the level of dependency can be and Beingpromote estimated. evenroughly of the leveldependencycan the aware of to tries state the pipelines has, the country every gas reserves discovered known, which external forces and other principles system, international bythe isconstrained also is forthat statecraft reason The states. the between for therelations statements make same the to improvident rather might for begrounds behaviour thistype projecting it of individuals,is thelevelbut on of This between people. in general relations the micro-level) and onthe politicians the between in internal political have ‘whowill (so-called relations the waybehaviourupper hand’ of someone might thatRussia argue hassuch a long manipulating history culture of strategically influence of strategicthe on strategicthe Consequently, culture behaviour1999, 25). (Gray external, and internal both sense, broadest its in security thatnational about reflexes and dispositions, shape behaviour perceptions, attitudes, enduring especially influential, and powerfully broadly shared, and policy’ as identifies a‘strategic‘abody 35) of culture’ country (2006, as avital Ermarth prerequisite. in the same way with Gray’s earlier portrayed 14 proffered methods of operation that commonare aspecific historically experienced community (1999: 51). 13 Gray (1999) andFritz Ermarth whodistinguishes(2006), anotion ‘strategic culture’ matter of necessity to act in such way, I want to dedicate more attention to the views of Colinstrategic manipulation, such as ambitions of a countryfor Russiause gas (Gazprom) as to manipulating tool. or the existence monopolizing growingworld of This position incentivesprovides Greece, and Bulgaria (2006). war where it is a ownership of 50%up to of the shares of gas companies in Poland, France, Hungary, Slovakia, mentions Healso Gazprom’s inetc.). Germany, Erdgashandel 100%of Zarubezgas Ditgaz, That is a typically common problem for the ‘agency-structure debate’. ‘agency-structure the for problem common atypically is That According to ColinGray ‘strategic culture’ includes traditions, socially transmitted ideas, attitudes and I did not put in this list the factor of information asymmetry, as it is usually publicly usually is it as asymmetry, information of factor the list in this put not did I While there are many additional preconditions that contribute to the evolvement of evolvement tothe contribute that preconditions additional many are While there 14 . 16 13 of a CEU eTD Collection strategic manipulation. strategic its ‘soft-power’ from Russia proceed assumption the that manipulation strategy uses the as themainof of tool will analysis further Thus states. foreign other manipulate strategically to incentives of evolvement policy Russia’sand actions in gas relations can willbe adjusted to almost all those conditionsexplore that justifyappear. manipulation to for are vital the that conditions andthe market energy international the main Russia’s approachesawareness canbe neglected. impossibility anything, possess informationlacks about toinsignificant100% of to complete of the use of In short, the first chapter explored the position of Russia as a superpower in the of Russia asasuperpower firstchapter exploredIn the theposition short, 17 CEU eTD Collection increasingby firstly, gaspartners: toits interests its with of compliance attractiveness the highlight the opportunitymean that Russia should whether touse direct tools of manipulation or tobe able persuasively costs of complianceto explore. interesting is states EU the towards applies Russia that aims versusits reaching and manipulation of the risksleveragein future in than production’ future (Solana 2008,2).In this respect mechanism the of non-compliance;in investing interested be‘more seemsRussia’s asasupplier,stating theRussia reliability to his alarm about expressed EU JavierSolana Policy the of Foreign Common and Security and several Former 4). analysts European reliable (Smith 2008, Representative High of the using energy as more referringthedocuments disruptions of tool a political than 20 times, to Keith holds Russia hasbeen stating the (2009). thesameview that since 1990’s Smith point, environment theEuropean destabilizing countries and gasdependent other presence inthe whopointed Russia that out by its its owngeopolitical drives physical interests increasing idea Fredrik was bottomline Erixon, with That supplier. interview an the of the gas unreliable and a Russiahastheimage of manipulativeperspective threat general a aggressor, European the from states, transiting its with confrontation and members EU with dependency mutual Vladimir and his Putin current President successor Dmitry HavingMedvedev). anunequal state the of head former - the most significant the of (one country the of leaders political bythe was affected and conditions andeconomic political certain decades under two last the SAME OUTCOME? APPROACH- DIFFERENT CHAPTER 2.RUSSIANGASSTRATEGY: The image of Russia as a superpower has been evolving in the international hasforbeeninternational arena in the evolving asasuperpower The imageof Russia 2.1 Implying the concept of strategic manipulation into the Russian energy strategy Russian the manipulation into wouldstrategy Implying theconceptof energy strategic General Russia’s ManipulativeApproach towards theEU 18 CEU eTD Collection Germany. It proves that Russian state skilfully presented lesser costs and risks of compliance andrisksof costs lesser presented skilfully state Russian that proves It Germany. and Italy case of in the equality unity and ideas of mutual European seem tooverweigh supply from directly Russia, shortening chain linkbetween the supplierthe and consumer the gas of continuity security, energy individual of benefits Demonstrating terms. geopolitical and economic in option second-best is the if that even level state the on project the of variant (Bismark 1863).Therefore, this‘persuade’ makes it participate easier to in to partners the with Russia’ treaty agood of politics? Make ‘A secret wisdom: inBismarck’s confirmation creation of economic ties as well. The fundamental fundamental political ties The as well. economic of creation and the thestates between connections political tothe leaders contribute country’s the friendship tothe correlated of andSchroder with Putin of relations Berlusconi. Interpersonal directly be can Italy, or Germany with relations close country’s The Russia. by manipulation (2007) characterised (2007) thebehaviour of Russia in gasmarket, European the in Malhorta presented Amsterdam of Robert a quote Explicitly, market. Russian the access to and prices transit of mechanisms economic purely with ending leaders states’ European South Stream, Russia order toapplied ‘convince’ Europe to opt for the particular option of theall Nord Stream project andpossible the complexity and the variety of applied the tools of strategic manipulation simultaneously.tools In starting from political connections non-compliers. of punishment and dimensions threat’s explicit with overlap not with the bring in comparison with the other option (Stulberg 2007, 7). However, all these levers should action the will that consequence positive and thegain (‘selling’) by demonstrating secondly, The aggregation of those three strategies results in the whole concept of of strategic in concept whole the results strategies three of those The aggregation splittingbilateral EUthrough the deals (15). processmanipulateand Russian situations diplomacy to downstream that [corporations thepre-emption raw its interests: aslevels of leadersandcorporations political certain countries, material] and to scoop up assets and Gazprom deploys three strategies: three Gazprom deploys The observed case of Russian gas pipeline approach is worth isexploring duetothe worth approach Russian gas pipeline The observed case of - using upstream [involved in exploration and extraction] power extraction] and exploration in [involved upstream using - co-optation 19 -cultivating with partnerships co-optation disaggregation approach approach found its – CEU eTD Collection beginning of the century when gas was relatively cheap, Russia was eager to exchange its sectors down-stream up- or to access tohavelimited or market Russian energy inparticipate them to gas toSpain 2007,15-21). and Italy (Malhotra its Algeria inbringing region with cooperate and Caucasus not to the influence Iran tries to futurethe gas produc its influ its and and distribution of natural gas. 16 15 its neighbours (Romanova 2010). of sellgas to gluts to the EU member states forbids the Union and the and Gazprom between contracts long-term in the is consolidated that clause’ restriction ‘territorial the employed in market, CEE.Securing position the growing monopolization Russiaon European the in consumers supplying capacities tothe expand distribution theas well highly and profitable its involvement toguarantee Gazprom European the territories inupstream tries activities, By participation on leveragesresources. active natural the geopolitical through intocapacities markets. its Gradually on economic regain itsconverts global the country the power energy powers of the purchased energy assets ( the mutually beneficial outcomes for both parties. of cultivation the and trust partnership on high-politicalthe level additional provides security forand guarantees Besides prosperity. and values mutual long-term the than rather election of re- purpose the for decisions short-term the on leaders arekeen as the be difficult might The upstream gas sector refers to the exploration and production of natural gas, and downstream – to selling –to downstream and gas, of natural production and exploration tothe refers sector gas upstream The France. Italy, Germany, instance, For Russia created unequal reciprocal relations with different EU membersEU different with relations unequal Russia created reciprocal 16 The supplementary The firststep tothe strategy issupplementary use the of upstream and downstream Apart from Apart dir the ɟ . According to Gallis. According lacking to financial and (2007), new resources atthe technologies nce indir nce . ɟ Lobbying its monopolistic position helpthe with Gazprom of Russian the state, rs, diminishing the ch rs, diminishing the ɟ ctly through the for the through ctly ɟ ct presence inthesuppli ct presence ɨ ice of ice of Eur the ɟ ign mark ign pre-emption 20 ɟ ɨ ts and to consolidat to and ts pean Union pean Union t ɟ s to Europe, Russia att s to ). Through political ties Russia tries to ɨ diversif ɟ its int its ɭ itssuppli gas ɟ mpts tomaximis ɟ 15 rests with oth with rests by allowing ɟ rs inrs ɟ ɟ r CEU eTD Collection combination of incompatible parts consolidated in the so-called in the consolidated parts incompatible of combination difference inferiority power and with conferleverage (Stulbergtogether 2007).Such consists material of influencethat tool leverageof the strategic theaggregated of chosen reserves in Russia (Gallis 2007). have inthedevelopment of andparticipation pipelines of companies to energy the ownership for opportunity European the rejected assets monopolization energy of Thestate market). energy Russian inthe pioneers the whoare Shell or Petroleum asBritish (such companies but necessarily not approved of easily by countries anditsunderstood, European the become The position of apparent. Federation Russian for the suchenergy be security can increased theprotectionistin market policy energy of Russia andits selective approach for energy after But theprice resources West. from the new for these technologies energy rhetoric. rule’ and ‘divide - strategy and Lithuania (EUBusiness 2007). France and Germany and newcomers members: among membersUnion's 27betweenthe EUsuch the olderas the European of from the former for usingcondemnedapproach Eastern that Russia JoseManuel European Commission Barroso bloc such as Poland, political instance,foreign perception Russian former For of policy Presidentof outcomes. the Estonia manipulativeis articulated strategy byWestern widely politicians, European revealingthe (Brangioli 2009 Erixon Carta or and view2009). The thatRussia employs such a underminesEU unity the of bilateral contracts, by concluding member states European 2.2 In of spite existingthe main Russia several leverages of hegemonic has the states, The ‘divide and strategy rule’ pursuing various approach adiversified towards The ‘Divide and Rule’ GasStrategy , which should be given more attention due to the broadthe more current be attention which given shoulddueto 21 disaggregated pipeline CEU eTD Collection attempted to secure a pipeline from Finland for having additional amount of Latvia of forgas, Finland havingadditional amount from to secureapipeline attempted with by Germany organizingindividual deals, proposals pipeline oreven Estonia concessions: catch up to have tried countries Some EU community. whole the among dissonance created their territories). lackfees through duetothe inflow of transiting (notsaying money region lossnew-member the and security states among about of anything in the leverage energy having from countries those prevents project that as level official the on dissatisfaction their expressed have Lithuania or Poland like countries circumvented Netherlands, Great Britain, France and one of Russia’s priorities - the Kaliningrad region. The Northern part ofhostility Union. the within the Uniontension asbetween thecreates That project. beingthe of a of part havevirtue nota do that interests States’ Baltic the mainnew and old re-distributormain with Poland’s andthree destination country of favouring the confronts Germany as EU member states and gives instability. regional birth of to Russianapprehension creates unity EUand to the threats mainof its that gassupplier position unequal towards andgasin the countries a-priori puts attitude Russian instance). uneven for Therefore, (Germany, further countries with those contracts and bilateral signs interest its political andeconomic to to the according countries selects line’,asRussia vertical on ‘EU-Russian the occurs That division and the Baltic States,Belarus, Poland bypassing Baltic Sea, the directly through Russia and Germany connecting is a more vivid exampleinitiated by thattheNordStream hypothesise energy Onemightstrategy. project Russia, of ‘cross-cut division’ of the EU members. Naturally, by Russian manipulations andvulnerability gas dependency of some states As a result of those ‘divisions’, Germany is likely to increase its influence in the influence its increase to likely is Germany ‘divisions’, those of aresult As Another dividing dimension is observed on the ‘EU-EU horizontal line’. Nord Stream, Russian of in theframe canbegeneralized Streams andSouth Nord of cases Both 22 CEU eTD Collection from (Aaltofrom 94). That Western 2008, wasthefirstEurope stone laidin establishing economic Germany built gas first the pipeline from in USSR the 1970’swith the help the funding of West Germany, East with relations andimproving conflicts in east-west the tension easing the Russia and the country of priority throughout history. Tryinghighest price for Russia’ (2009). to play the role of mediatoris – the CEE) (especially of EU rest from the the ‘divide Germany convincingly argues, in Unionthe As Emeritus theProfessor (2008). of Russian History HoskingGeoffrey government skilfully plays off the ‘old’ thatthe Russian Keith suggests Smith 2004). in 2000’s(Grabbe early EU the accession to European states against the smaller of Poland’s andsupporter main promoter the one of Germany was that especially considering ‘new’ arrivals to devel and rivalri situ though t though energy might and s might energy cr Jɟɨ involved is countries understandable. non-directly andof reaction sometimes desperate aggressive the Therefore, Lissek 2009). to grant permission for Stream Finlandandterritories,project Sweden 2009duetoareluctance blocked till Nord the the pipeline to utilizesuggested using if underground their gasstorages pipelinethe would gothrough Balticthe their Exclusive Economic Zones (Muller and ɟ ated one d ɚ political ar tion on the politi the on tion ɨ pment of gas relations. gas of pment Hosking’s assumption is reasonable, as Germany has been a strategic partner for partner a strategic been has Germany as is reasonable, assumption Hosking’s The Russian approach creates misunderstandings between members,new and old misunderstandings between EU The Russian approach creates In general, the pr the general, In ɨ day’sdem donot preconditions ɟ s between Russian l ɚ y. The discrepancy in the shift of th ɟ na and be d na and ɟ ɫ cure European stat European cure al arena might might arena al ɨ ɟ blem is th is blem prive of str the of prive ɟɚ ders and the leaders of th ɫ ɚ hange in hange t ‘states-l t ɟ s might occur in the l in s mightthe occur ɨ ɨ nstrate the innstrate the ng sayin the 23 ɚ ɨ ny moment and and moment ny ɟ sers’ will w will sers’ spheres of influ ɟ ɟ ɫɨ EU states might stipulate obscure vitabilit mmon gas m mmon gas ɨ rsen their influ their rsen ɨɫ ɨ ɟ ɭ ng-run ng-run perspectiv nce in favour of the more of However,that. the of curred misund curred ɚ rket that mightb that rket ɟ nc ɟ rstanding ɨ ɟ ɟ , ev n the ɟ n ɟ CEU eTD Collection the cooperative point of view as well as from the prioritizing perspective. For instance,For prioritizingthe view perspective. of aswellfrom cooperative the point from both beobserved can hubs main placing for countries choosing of tactics the Moreover, Kɨ inv still Italy Austriaand (besides has Italy a partial ownership in South Stream Thethe project). control over region,the butalso makes amutually networkdependent (includingitself). inandequallybut not gas Italy the mutual supply onlyspreadsitsnot chaindependent it Austria Croatia, Greece, Slovenia, tactics.Serbia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Bylinking cooperate’ and ‘unite more of line the in region South-Eastern the of states majority the with contracts of Stream.features realpolitik realist bilateral the Nord more signs the sophisticated Applying from countries than gas Russian on more which dependent are states European South-Eastern countries. ‘strategic partnership’ Westernwith that country validand of apprehensions CEE other importancethe forof Germany indisputable Russiais their justifies and havinggoal of a (asBoykewich supposes 2006).Therefore Stream Putin Nord the of on recommendation the of committee’ ‘shareholder headwho waschosento be of the Schroder, and Putin between gas to Germany up to 2020. salesAll second half of 1990’sGermany’sthe agreed with Ruhrgasof on guaranteed Gazprom that was cemented by thegive Germany interestan in Yuzhno-Russkoyethe gas (Malhotradeposits 2007,15-21). In the political will and close to Gazprom promised Europeangasdistribution, the Toobtainaccess to gasmarket. German relations agreements on swapping energy assets with the USSR that time, allowing it topenetrate the andgoods Individual investments). German werecompanies the first tostart signing technologies, RussiareceivedGerman later and USSR the (as interdependency relations and stile towards Russia) is curr Russia) towards stile ɨ lvement of Slovaki of lvement Nevertheless, such unification of the states is only partly true as the main priorities are The Stream is butSouth with biggerapproximately samethe of involved case amount ɚ and Cz and ɟ ɟ ntly unc ntly ch Republic into the S the into Republic ch ɟ rtain and might cr might and rtain 24 ɨ uth Stream pr Stream uth ɟɚ te aris te ɨ ɤ ject (both are rather are (both ject of being l being of ɟ ft-out. CEU eTD Collection economic sanctions and military pressure. Learning from economic and military Learningfrom USexamples sanctions the offinancingpressure. non- covertoperations, States: Baltic on of example the the (2009) Friedman by observedGeorge which were leverages, main it has interconnected 3 policies, its comply still energy with leverage’. dosoincreasesit merecould thatitsand economic political knowledge the practical: anything (2008, 218),‘the advantage of gas-based isdiplomacy that Russia doesnot actually need todo Adward According Lucas (Lucas to asthestrategy presumes set of policy 2008). choices higher propensity to commanding compliance (with no necessity have in itconflicts of will occurrence future andthat the strength authority, and decisiveness to act), but no changing the int eff former. As pip former. for the vulnerability the creating providers, than fewer alternatives have naturally importers itis amarket thatpipelines,theory Russia through where thatcreates obvious gas structure Russia. and members EU different Julycommentillustrates posted situation21, 2007).This also unequal between relations dream and plan...We old don’t needKarbuz, dreams,weneed gas’ Karbuz(Sohbet Blog, long is a project Nabucco ‘the – Stream Blue Russian for Gyurcsany Ferenc Minister Prime can desiredthe be channel. supportive speechof by confirmed That Hungarian then the the to isdirected choice and shaped policy the or by manipulator the isconstructed set of options inentrenchment Asthe region’ the (Larsson strategic2007, 52). manipulation presumes a that to allow aRussian reluctant been ‘have rather recently that GreeceandBulgaria to compared suggesting main hubs in Hungary and Serbia gives those states some kind of priority ɟ ɨ rests in any asp in any rests rt, astate-manipul rt, In case Russia decides to have the implicit obedience of the Eastern European states to states European Eastern the of obedience haveimplicit the to decides In caseRussia Analyzing behaviour thatRussian energy from lens the of strategicthe manipulation ɟ lines arep lines ɟɫ ts. The crucial circumventing policies towards CEE signifies Russia’s signifies CEE towards policies circumventing crucial The ts. ɚ tor has ap tor ɟ rman ɟ ɟ rfect situ rfect nt ass nt ɟ ts andrel ts ɚ tion tion to 25 ɚ ɚ pply c ted f ted ɟɟ ɨɟ can be c can rcion ‘imp and rcion ɨ llected with ɨVɟ ’ its rights rights ’ its ɨ ut much ut ɚ nd CEU eTD Collection gas demand is far moreintensively growing it isthan market in European the (Gazprom M&T domestic Russian in the Russia, development economic of current thehighrates to because Directors: of Board the with Press Conference the on point important very made a Gazprom of CEO the Russia. in Miller, consumption energy indigenous of increase the be might here Union European the to threat A real significantly. changes proportion the before Russia have theinfluential impact onBrussels. but not can well’, as interests our consider to have will it then gas, our wants Union European alternatives in of terms gas sales. We have a fast-growing Chinesemarket[…] If the ‘We understandOstrovsky 2006)thatwe have wantEuropean to countries that just other in interests Kupriyanov energy Suchmade the bySergey world. claims inBuckley & (Cited in itsmanoeuvrefor claiming market and room will provide dependence on European the Russia’s financial technological and reduce will asit2010). Such EU, the alarm trends M&T representative (Gazprom several times byits2010 was announced representatives (China, Asian and theKorea) the USA by Japan gas supplies and India, markets to South diversify to determination Gazprom’s pursuemanipulative way diplomacy. another energy to well as the Black sea fleet might play the same role in the case of the South Stream). itself as Stream protect seabed (Russian the fleet Nord andin the Baltic states also but other privilege touseits military forcefor protection the itsof pipelinesnot only within acountry Russia a that wasprovided with Mortished2007), Carl ideaof Friedman with agrees the Finally, pipeline). Stream Nord the of appearance the with becomes possible (that cut off minoritiesform in economic the nexttool will the trigger of sanctions gassupply through the pro-Russianother in The elements Balticstates. those responsive by reaction on suppressing governmental in countries, minorities Russia other organizations energize Russian can and China is, growing of course, fast and the EUshould really itsstrengthen relations with Russian high-political official rhetoric about the redirection of the gas routes is routes gas the of redirection the about rhetoric official high-political Russian 26 CEU eTD Collection necessary Russia advertises to Brussels directly, but in case of disagreement there –Russia there in disagreement of butcase Brussels directly, to advertises Russia necessary dependency of the states, the price levels and various levels of benefits of the gas deals. If conditionsfor strategically Russia manoeuvring actasaprominentto gassupplier, the arethe good Those by and challenge themselves). the tackling unprotected energetically being Slovakia or Latvia as state small such (leaving equally members all for supply secure efficientgas fails to EU the and regulations, market energy of European common creation the to approach nocoherent Having in arena). European makingthe power decision interests to its dictate Moscow to for iteasier makes EUwhich the theunity of undermines construction the European Community 2010). (GazpromM&T perceived asapragmatic representative rational actor (as small states be butrather longer beasa viewed threat, no Russia should that claims Gazprom official separatelylevel, company’s Novosti the On (RIA coerce its2007). neighbours’ to gas resources do not remains former very Putinsceptical. President not that‘Russia have clarified Even use does oil or that muchgain foreign benefits Nordpolicy Stream and towards a politicised approach construction manipulation Russia to ofstrategic accusations tactics refutes the of export of using gas the position in is ‘dividing’ Europe andin debatable, rather it ‘ruling’ is more even arguable. of Russia’s rectitude the However, states. member EU of some interests tothe contradicts be can not perceived mutual asit as and a common priority energy European projects diversification of the suppliers, but only a diversification market might damagesupplies the European (Stern 2008). of the gas routs for the EU. prices internal Theygas increase of the with the together development by economic caused the Gazprom bigger fewer profit risks.with energy the Consequently, consumption growth willbring gasconsumption prices Increasing domestic and rising representative 2010). Russia’s strategy for gassupply Russia’sbilateral ‘circumventing’ strategy pipeline andof contracts Concluding the above said, the Nord Stream and South Stream are not a 27 CEU eTD Collection individual insideandindividual of interests incompetence EUas the a structure. coherent with separate states than field.energy For such immense an country is– it much toleadeasier negotiations energy with the European Union usingas a whole, EU’s due to fragmentationdisability signs bilateral members (Larssonagreements with European is2007, 14).Russia naturally of theas the advantage in negotiating and cooperating with the EU in the 28 CEU eTD Collection almost a quarter almostitsof aquarter gasby demand imports the EU-from Russia. Russianrelation towards gradually continue 2030.growing are expectedtoThe EUcurrently tendency upto satisfies Agency for Those 10% (International around production increase2008, 39). Energy will of 2005, comprising In 1.50%of period rate Russiangas growth. same the annual average natural primary Europe’s estimations gas demandwill increase in2015comparing16% to Agency Energy International to According gas. and energy on dependency Europe’s Russia that pursuesgas tosatisfypolitics its ownrational interests, noonewill deny growing fact of spite In the in politics. issue everyday became widespread gas dependency Russian on pip Jɚ nucl imp EU’s ‘compliance’ with its gas policy (to a different extent for various EU states). create 8), managed situation the to variables by of (2007, articulated both possessing Stulberg Russia, ‘mutual accommodation’. scenarioin of a will both between result parties relations lead to stateof the ‘defiance’. If possesses Russianstate the only variablesone of those –the will elements both consolidate to inability and ‘compliance’ of result the to lead only might ‘defiance’ both variables or –‘compliance’ situations of main consolidation – the alternative andmarketpower (2)domestic institutional conditions and authority.regulatory two Having of utilization (1)the necessary elements: is on two state based other for frames the decision WITHRUSSIA THEIRRELATIONSHIPS ACCORDING TO STATES CHAPTER 3.CLASSIFICATION THEEUMEMBER OF s. Analysing the evid s. Analysingthe ɟ ɨ ɟɚ line gas stratline gas rts, appli r p All the EU m set state’s 7) capacity to (2007, explanation Stulberg’s theoretical According to ɨ wer as a substituti ɫɚ tion of of tion ren the ɟ gy gy – gasdep ɟ mb ɟ nt reasons f reasons nt ɟ r st ɨ n for gas ɚ ɟ tes wabl ɟ ndenc ɨ ɚ r the majr the re diff ɟ ɚ for gen nd the exp ɭ s ɟɟ ɟ rent in th 29 ms to be the k ms to ɨ ɟ rity of of Europ the rity rating el ɨ sure to the ris ɟ ir energy int ɟɫ tricity, politic tricity, ɟ y. The topic about Europe’s y. topic about The ɟɚ ɤ of dep n states acc n states to ɟ nsity, use ɟ ɚ ndenc l attitude tow l attitude ɭ onRussian ɟ ɨ pt Russianpt f the gas ɚ rds CEU eTD Collection nor vulnerability ispose a likely to orriskthreat unless crisisthe happens Such mutually dependent balance mightbe preserved for along time and neither sensitivity isneed). supplier the in that others, technological or resources, hasanimportant consumer country- orthe hikes in price the caseof becan raised fees that transiting a mechanism of have states instance, transiting (for counter-leverage of kind hassome stable or commercially possibilitieslimited are in scope ornot feasible within timethe available’(2007, 68). ‘recycling the and country-consumer in a alternatives substitutive other no has commodity occurs due to embargoes, political decisions, wars, terrorism or other unforeseen events; if the politically and economically,if gasthe supplyis subjectof manipulation and disruption in the dimension usually dependent thatthe highlights manipulationstate byRussia).appears strategic Larsson apossible from follows (that vulnerability of level the to sensitivity just from shifted situation of energy vulnerabilitythe Streams South and Nord the of introduction the with countries European some foris face’.why That actors various that of alternatives the costliness and availability relative if theKeohaneto and‘the vulnerability dimension Nye(2001,11), interdependence on rests the of supplierAccording vulnerable. not but issues, energy the to sensitive remain can state the dependent, and consumer are radically different dependence comprises only 15% (Leonard and Popescu 2007). Apart from energy 2007).Apart the andPopescu 15% (Leonard only dependence comprises more than 80% of the commodity nowadays, whereas the average intensity of energy into several blocks in relations to Russia. Six countries of the EU are dependent on Russia Uni that allowsthat Russia toexercise various energy of tools promoting its ‘superpowerness’. 27 canbe explainedby of weaknessinterms the many dependency gas of countries European ɨ n as it But the vulnerability of being manipulatedcanbe eliminated if countryisthe more However, discrepancy in gas dependency among European inEuropean dividesHowever, the discrepancy amongstates gasdependency Union The enl ɚ dded n ɚ rgem ɟ ɟ nt of th w memb ɟ EU in 2004 incr ɟ rs arehighlthat rs 30 ɟɚ ɭ sed the ov gas dep ɟ ɟ ndent. Although being highly rall ɟQɟ rgy dep ( Mascotto 2010 Mascotto ɟ ndency of the ). CEU eTD Collection memberStates would not matter much in this respect dueto almost no relations with Russia. 18 relations. gas contemporary the in changes recent by the be supplemented will analysis Carta’s and Braghiroli supplies. gas of security and dependence ofenergy terms in countries different of that classificationwill be narrowed only to the EU gas relations withRussia, as it is crucial to analyse attitudes of Russia’s reaction, it is also17 essential to bear those factors in mind. In the structural frameall by ofcommunism period the USSR andinsomedominated caseshistory of occupation. of the thesis topic, Czechoslovakia. Such a position can be easily explained through the historical legacies, above levelsdependence of and (respectively, 45% 43%, 31%) relatively 63%and51%.Germany, high andItaly respectively,score 67%, Poland 72%, 84%, are scores their and Slovenia, Austria Hungary, Greece, Republic, Czech Concerning the Francehave lowas andRomania and comparatively rates 15%). well (respectively, 18% Luxembourg and the UK). and Portugal, Spain,Sweden, Ireland, Russian as, Denmark, gas (such independence towards Belgium and the NetherlandsLatvia, score Lithuania,3% andwhich shows almost absolutedependence Russian from gas (Bulgaria, Finland, Estonia, 6% of the reliance; Slovakia)from the supplier on the overall country consumption. There are two extreme groups one of and in ismeasured aggression DependenceonRussian gas as response. shareof the gas imported the another only Aggression canprovoke toward Russia. attitude of growth causes the aggressive until recently were projects such as the Southdemonstrating and Nord Streams pipelines. directother Appendixdisputes (see 1) and completecommercial diplomatic, territorial, significant of presence the and differences religious NATO, Ukraine to and of Georgia accession Russiangas,the withtrade Russia,reliance on and relations economic to according four blocks into EUstates whocategorised scale, global dependency interesting an distinction was madebyBraghiroli (2009)inand Carta amore ‘ Eastern divorced Braghiroli and Carta’s research strangely excludes Cyprus and Malta. However, the analysis of those EU those of analysis the However, Malta. and Cyprus excludes strangely research Carta’s and Braghiroli Albeit, itmay seem short-sighted not to use a methodical explorationof all the factors that stipulates the cause Notably, that increase of gas vulnerabilityincrease high dependency proportionally tothe Notably,gas due of that Unsurprisingly, most unfriendly Russia those European countries towards called ’ were from the former Soviet bloc – the Baltic States, Poland and former 17 . This exploration is vital in terms of the proposed 31 18 . CEU eTD Collection solution in solution place. concrete no with ischanging currently situation the However, level. official the on started supplies, the talks on Russiandependentparticipate Being projects. almost 100% invited inanyof those to about Czechinitially not were Slovakia and Republic Czech joining recently, Until taken. been have actions the Nord Stream provide a Polandpipeline network to from German territory.nosubstantial Conversely, and Slovakia – the NordStream the if scepticismbe suggests, Poland’s about Germany reduced to could was South Stream the EU’s sharing of the risk and solidarity will be damaged completely.As Larsson (2007, 53) happen), it case(should this In Germany. lucrative more pivotal affecting itwithout gasto the cut off beRussia ableto an would that apprehension anddueto increase States Poland will confrontations with Russia. of consequence adirect and logical a became territories), ontheir missiles defence place political and pressure, incentivethe for seeking security within NATO(allowing the USA to for energy the assets fears with losingover of control left together this prejudices Naturally, with additional business contracts for the Nord Stream (Socor 2009b). Austriahas been country will the That reward for this project. buildsacompressor plus Sea intheBaltic pipes ties with Russia. It provides a credit tothe Nord Stream manufacturesand and layssome steel a significant role) (Di Italy Nucci 2006,341-357).also hasbeen strong economicdeveloping a dependentimporter of fossil fuels from Russia and the Middle East (where Russia also plays nuclear since energy negative in results inthe is of referendum the the 1987, beingposition of supports South the Stream Italy,lackingproject. natural andresources being explore unable to issue)andwith theNabucco Cyprus political for (probably about disagreementTurkey itopposes itssupplier; energy to lacks alternatives Greece Austria. Greece and embrace Italy, With the construction of the Nord Stream the expected vulnerability of the Baltic More favourable states disposed to good relations disposed are‘ togood with Russia favourable states More 32 Loyal wives ’ that CEU eTD Collection is Braghiroli’s confusing. (2009)placement andCarta’s of in of countries those the group inStream participate gas pipeline. South in desireto France’s consolidated were The15-21). ideas cooperative 2007, (Malhotra company itsand domestic customers with an additional 2.5 billion cubic meters of natural fuel Stream GdF French will the provide Nord the of construction Besides, the Carta’s 2009). and asAlgeria (Braghiroli’s aswell Netherlands by the and Norway aresatisfied needs its from Russia as95%of imports only gas 18% of present France at coal, andcostly gas, oil itsto strengthen leveragein Being in international the naturalstage. poor of energy resources it help might that ones economic the than rather motives political the of because more Russia France supports ison Russian economically), moreUnlike dependent gas Germany (who (Butcher Georgia 2008). themembership Ukraine policy and to NATO the guaranteeing of USA’s the oppose to dared even Netherlands) the and Belgium Spain, France, with (together Germany energy), in of of sphere the them Russia (many with partnership strategic long-term (Helm have 2006). Today, to continuing a far-seeing interest looking and economic fora ‘special Russia,cementing relations’ with in mutual them the construction NordStream of the Germany discussed.was already Theonly addisit to isthing that successfully maintaining its Luxembourg, theNetherlands, Portugal and Spain)group. Thecase thelargest compose of in gas centre whole Europe. the biggest the and Moreover, with Italy launching(Smith 2008, 15). South the Stream Austria willbecome Austria the prospects of pipelinepreservingalmost obliterated to Nabucco the Russiangas sell 50% of Austrian Baumgarten trading floor and to construct storage facilities there for Russia supplier. reliableRussian-Austrian asacontinuous, Inaddition, agreementsto energy benefitingfrom Russian energy supplies 1980’s.since the Todate, Austrian officials view To some extent the situation with Spain, Luxembourg, Denmark,someand To Luxembourg, Portugal situation Spain,the Ireland with extent The ‘ Acquiescent partners’ Acquiescent (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Germany, France, Finland, Denmark, (Belgium, 33 CEU eTD Collection all the necessary documentation. Bulgarian case is different, as current government refused to refused government ascurrent isdifferent, case Bulgarian documentation. necessary all the signed and Stream South in the involved already being either, Russia towards attitude critical Considering the present-day Hungarian and Slovenian situation, doubtfully it will its keep for Romanian Stream the main today will eliminate dependence on Ukraine. through route South the from branch the Besides, Stream. South in the a partner become and position leftfrom out any projectsof proposed from yet,Russia still has a chance tochange its critical abstainingfrom lead increase hydropower, expanding in Romania, the to export. energy being as and demandincreasesfuture, nonuclearthe for country, gas having reactor and the currently inchange 2008,67).Nevertheless, islikely inthe situation to Sweden the (Larsson Stream Nord anditsproject from independenceasallgascomes onRussian gas Denmark increasing. Sweden is2003). However, with construction the of Stream Nord the iscountry’s involvement one of the main criticssatisfyto home demand,eventhoughtheisof amount that gradually (Helm decreasing) of Russia due to the energy positionecological in the EU (as it is importing gas from natural gas in the fields in the North Sea issues of United has criticize Kingdom every to theRussianright security policy due tothe its of the Bulgaria, Hungary and United the Kingdom at the head Understandably, of group). the the close relations with Russia on governmental the level (see Appendix 1). and have Italy index ahigher towardsRussiafriendliness of than Germany,enjoys which itarises on Russian is gas. Thequestion is Besides, completely that why Greece dependant beneighbour agood its in 2009). security ‘soft and Carta preserving agenda’ (Braghiroli mutual withborder Russia and keeping aneutral inmanystance questions, tries conflicting to mainthe elementof a more orless towardsRussia.positive attitude Finlandin sharingturn, a benefitfrom greater supply diversity might explain such tolerance. So gas consumption is not states those factthat import The not anyRussian gas. because enough they is do partners odd And the last group describedAndlast group the was‘ Vigilant critics 34 ’ (Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, CEU eTD Collection 19 members,leads EU other dangeroussituation energy tothe crises during of in toavoid competition the order EU trading of and within cross-border market shortage gas Havingasegmented gas market. European a single of andcreation the energetic complex European the of reforming in the but terms, these in policy foreign Russian and commodity states. European particular to capacities by transportation the limited stable and politically not are Algeria that and Iran from as aslack factories, costly gas suppliers apart natural liquefied of gas well efficient really for such gasincluding asincreasingadjustments using resources energy efficiency, alternative manipulative influence of gas as a tool). EUfailed The find to domestic options for indirectmain economicexperiencing with supplier or difference political direct and the and described byLarssonaslack of huge (2007)such possibilities forsubstitutive gasresource, vulnerability of the necessary conditions all almost of influence underthe appear countries into the vulnerability of dependence the of issue of transformation the legacies.Generalizing historical by of a variety the EU memberalso but gas Russian on states, dependency energy of level the by only not influenced it and canreciprocal be states that the majority of the EU they are the players in this Russian ‘energy game’. countriesboth understandBulgariaon that had and 2010).That effect adesirable link (Socor Romania about routing the pipeline through their territory maketo this country firstthe in this Bulgaria and its manipulative using skills, started negotiatingthe Russia with process impress to trying in such way. However, conditions favourable more for receiving importance continue in its participation the South Stream endat the increase of 2009, deciding its to gas in disruptions Hungary have2009, Slovakia or for not did relocation achance supplies of As happened in2006 and 2009 betweenRussia and Ukraine. However, it seems that the problem is not the European overdependence on that on overdependence European the is not problem the that seems it However, relationsConcluding above, the the Russia members between are and European 35 19 . Sufferingfrom the CEU eTD Collection ultimately national state’s security in security national general. state’s ultimately its huge energy situation disaggregation, creates security problems with Union’s and integration. market Such European might preventthe storageassets or European transmission from the other national markets. Additionally, providing the access for Gazprom to obtain 36 CEU eTD Collection issues from ecological the apart countries, those of The main apprehensions with sameshot. the politicise Russian intentions tobypass not only butUkraine, also Poland andtheBaltic States backgr the tr the with third p missile munitions were buried in the Baltic Sea. 20 exclud that Sea, Baltic the via Germany and Russia connecting Austria). andsupplying preservedominant geopolitical in position CEE together with Italy and interestremovemakesmarket competitor to the evidentRussian commercial supplier (that Middle East a different had from Stream, arival Nabuccopipeline Unlike theSouth that -the beexplore pipelinein case. can indicatingpolicy energy challenging and tothis and choice or Polandthrough andBelarus). motivations Russia’s Therefore for choosing aparticular gas Baltic States the through Baltic the Sea, Germany (through to delivery for gas routes different plays important an ground for analysis isbecauseit has mainsupplierthe (Russia)butonly Appendixalternatives whyonlyNordStream Amber(see –Yamal-2andthe 2).The reason explore NordStream valuable the with issuebycomparingpredominantly the their to be might it Streams, South the and Nord the of construction the for intentions economic POWER-PROJECTION CAPABILITYOFRUSSIA OF IMPLICATIONS VS.ECONOMIC CHAPTER 4.POLITICAL As the Baltic States, for instance, ground their ecological fears on the post-world war two incidents, when 20 ɚ ɨ nsitingf In order tounderstandIn order why Russia in behaves aparticular wayandits political and 4.1 Driving from above, the bottom line of the suggestion to launch the Nord Stream , are that Russia will affect them Russia , arethat by interrupting them will affect theindividually, gassupply without und vs.ec Pipeline Alternatives: NorthStream vs. Yamal–2andthe Amber Pipelines ɚ rties aft ɟ es. It ar It es. ɨ nomi ɟ r the ɫ motiv ɨ ɫ used many c risis (such as Ukraine and Belarus) as w ɚ tions of tions Russi ɨ nfrontati 37 ɚ . CEE countries are the most active critics that ɨ ns sp and ɟɫ ulations ab ulations ɟ s politi ɟ ll as av ɫɚ l ris ɨ ɨ ut its p ut idance p ɤ s of de s of ɨ litical ɚ ɚ ying ling CEU eTD Collection project that financially dependent Russia, might arise. Was it unforeseen miscalculation under miscalculation Wasunforeseen itarise. Russia, might financially dependent project that Stream share intheNord lesserhave a agreedto Germany of why question The rhetoric parties. between two disputes ininfluencingpossible energy shares different and therefore Stream ownership (asRussiapossesses 51%of NordStreamthe and Germany 40%), – around have in not Germany does equality arouses controversies. Nord of projectownership the politicalfuture conflicts withgas countriesother thatcould have been potentially involved. set’ in the form of the Nord‘win by Russiasuggested is easilyagreedfor why That economicGermany machine. German Stream option, which in from choose, as Russia to longits asRussiacould securesteady maintaininggas for supplies addition reduces the supplyfor Germany as an ultimate customer there was notbig difference chainof which way of gas supply and and its people in terms of gas prices and lower costs forYamal-2 through Belarus andPoland would be beneficiala more for option Germany construction.(2005) However, that states claims itGotz seemsRonald as such that analysts energy independent However, supplies. gas increase strategyRussian national2006), being security theirdependence on (Beniotready to the state’s level on Stream hasproject Germany North the anyprioritized intermediaries. without troublesome and German Chancellor Angela by ). Lithuania Baltic the and Latvia (promoted States Merkel hasfollowingproject by viaBelarus andPoland Amber (suggested going through Poland) and made Nord Streamcomparison a part of ofthe Nord the toobserve incentives the triggers That launch newones. than to projects inland pipeline Stream with its alternativeexpand theexisting to logical cheaper and more itbe could Stream, Nord of offshore costs the routes to Germany,causing troubles for Germany (Larsson 2007). Pointing outcommercial inefficiency and huge which are Yamal-2 If economic incentives drew Germany’s compliance, then the participation in the participation the then compliance, Germany’s drew incentives If economic have Germany interested of pipelineas amainstrategicto partner Russia is direct 38 CEU eTD Collection the capacities. It could also gain substantial transiting fees, because the average transit feefees, capacities. Itcouldthe averagetransit becausethe alsogain substantial transiting could bebeneficial Poland,itreceiveto would as not additional by gas amount increaseof the launching the additional branch of pipeline Yamal-Europe the Yamal-2. -the This pipeline suggesting by construction Stream Nord hinder to intention its expressed Poland interest, representative 2010). M&T(Gazprom in on further in nextdecadewill increase the estimates increase the into high-costthe Yambur the Shtokman,probability fields Urengoy, Yamal, the gas of inclinations of Russia to1576 till 1680 trillion cubic meters(Energy With Administration Information 2009). the actively develop and attractfrom increased reserves inRussia gasproved natural of Theestimates the Administration. investments from Statoil, inenergy reserved from by Russia 2007 until 2009 weregrouped USEnergy the Information Total, Hidro British by made estimates recent The Petroleum reserves. gas Russian of real estimations the about research Statistics,Hanson (2009). PennWellexpressedby Robert Price (2008),Andreas (2008),Jonathan Goldthau (2008) and Stern Philip Corporationabout Russian scarcity of the gas resources and inability fulfilto its energy commitments were andbusiness the with declaration 2009a). of confidence inRussia (Socor Apartfrom him, concern CEDIGAZ apprehensions were expressed privately,butwere highlighted publicly by andgovernment of the worldThose future. in the theEU-27 of demand growing whole the cover to gas reserves proved Germany’sfor theadditional rush from gassuppliesby Russia fearof the deficitRussian of of process construction? to speedupthe order in made Germany that concession political simply or manipulation Russian of influence the Resigned to the fact that Germany was and will remain the main country Russian Germanymainof fact andwill country the that the was remain Resigned to independent of availability the to due groundless seems argument their However, (2009a),whoexplained byVladimirSocor A waspresented answer possible 39 CEU eTD Collection out engin out Uɟ have additi this pip this (Gazprom convincing notGazprom.(Gazprom to M&T 2010)were representative length Stream atleastof four times1220 km and thecosts lessthanexpectedbln. 7.4 Euros inv in the Fɨ appr impact (Nicola andlesserfacilities P environmentthe than route 2009). offshore constructionis expenses, Russia that gainfrom could have saving maintenanceon the directi the pipelinthe with anti-Russi internati deal with Russia c wh fees, Poland started beingfees,instarted interested Poland 2007).In LNG (Larsson existing pipeline in experienceYamal-Europe with disadvantageous Having negotiation process. during the terms of lack of the access to the ownership,2.7 USD(Malyhina 2009). control and the transiting memberthrough EU the per1000cm isper 100km around4USD,comparingUkrainian to gion. Lithuania was extr was Lithuania gion. nvincing as at leastnvincing at Eur as ɟ n pipelin the ɟ hensi ɨ ɟ Regarding Amber, conn Amber,Regarding The clench for Russia in the Yamal-2 project, apart from the shorter length and fewer Strangely enough,play Poland didnota decisive enough in role pipeline’s promotion n is d ɨ line was ben was line nal conditi nal ɟɟ ɨ ɨ ɟ ɨ lvement. Even the fact that its length will be shorter than its competitor’s Nord competitor’s its than shorter be will length its that fact the Even lvement. ring, environm ring, constru ns of ns n of nal amount of gas and c ɨ ubtfully a g ɚ n gov Polish ɟ waspr ɨ ɨ ɫ ɨ uld undermin ɟ t finding inv ti ns were not the b the not ns were ficial f ficial ɨ n again, butth ɨ ɨɨ ɨSɟ moting P ɟ ɟ mely dissatisfi mely nt and economical in economical and nt d ide ɨ ɟ an comp r all the Baltic Stat Baltic the all r rnment in p rnment ɟ cting Russia and the EUwith and the Russia cting ɚ . ɟ ɟ stors for the pr stors its Europe ɨ ɨ land w uld counterbalanc ɚ ɟ nies of niesint of ɟ feasibilit st to est to st ɨ ɟ wer at that m wer atthat d that the Nord Str Nord the that d ɚ s engaged ints engaged 40 ɚ n integr ɟ ɟ ɚ ɟ ɭ s in many asp many in s rest blish political ti political blish fficiency issu fficiency of incr of ɨ jectin d ɟ ɟ d statesc Russia in t ɨ ɚ ment). it In 2009 rais tion tion reput ɨ ɟ EUj asing the g asing ɟ aling with B aling with ɟ ɨ ɟ am will lie am will ɟ ut third stat cts, not not cts, ɨ ɨ s. The Lithuanian president Lithuanian The s. uld have iningissues. The additi ɚ ɟ ɟ ddition, duringddition, th ɚ s with Russia (esp Russia s with rms of its influ tion intion respthis ɚ s supply ins supply the s ɨ nly if they d they if nly ɟ ɨ xpress its int its xpress ɟ ɟ larus s s (like Belarus), ffshore p ffshore ɟ d the issu the d ɟ nc ɟɟ ɟɫ ɟ ɟ ɟ p ms not ms ɨ ɨ cide to cide ɟ in the t. The t. inting ssibl ciall ɟ ɟ ɨ ɚ riod ɟ rest me nal of ɭ ɟ CEU eTD Collection chapter. sub- next the in examined be will intentions actual Russian non-cooperation. or compliance for ‘punish’ political Balticnon- the intentions states to or has today itthat Poland the doubtfully and independence sincetheir cases) oil it(unlike gas casewith the was never But through existingthe pipelines of branch Belarusian the affectnot wouldthat supplies. German CEEstates seemsto the unjustified. If Russia wantedtocutoff it gas,the couldit earlier do partners. as mature for this project commitment the Balticended in 2008). autumn the 2005’ (NewEurope of Statesconducting negotiations insecrecy with Russian the side his during chancellorship, which failed him ‘accusing of Schroeder, Chancellor offormer German critical was particularly to demonstrate their joint efforts in pipeline’s promotion and Energy Minister,towards the VladimirEU. The head of on. therely to Milovanalysis for basis main the Institute are interviews experts' and authorities the of statements claims of Energy official the Thus, transfer. and conditions thatPolicymarine issues, environmental relations, the and‘energy a former Russian is legacies shaping historical fees, transiting capacities, transporting costs, such asconstruction not Deputy politics’ planning pipeline the during shouldbe considered factors andunpredictable compute hard to (Milovmany is that Theexplanations analysts. of independent data statistical various contradicting 2006). T of variety the and by Gazprom made calculations cost-benefit secrecy the the of due to is complicated various pipeline projects towards attitude Russian estimation of position. The 4.2 Taking into accountintoTaking above the fears in described of probable gas disruption future the Russian state constantly underlines economic incentives for pursuing gas strategies gas for pursuing incentives economic constantly underlines state Russian The apprehensions of member newthe The apprehensions of are clear,unlikeRussianambiguous EU states Russian Political or/and Economic Positiononthe Pipelines Construction 41 However, accordingHowever, (Larsson 2007, 59) to he CEU eTD Collection 2009 a foremost political project, but it does not diminish its financial and long-term economic long-term and financial its diminish not does it but project, political foremost a costs are not defined yet) at the first stage of the construction it seems that the Nord Stream is market. its presence in toincrease goals economic international the Federation This2009). confirms Russia’s status of energy andsuperpower country’s Russian the of of Energy system in (Ministry energy global integrated the further economy’ ‘innovative an to economy export-oriented’ and ‘resource-based a from Russia transfer to growth, energy security and geo-economic increase economic andpost-crisis of export competition, market international promote 2030, new the to a start gave energy strategy This seas. Mediterranean in Blackandthe the Baltic, the fuel projects prospective implementing base for necessary establish seeksthe to Thesecond stage in2009-2010). completed be (to resources energy of supplier stable and asuccessful make Russia to designed markets, energy external and internal competitive transparent to path onthe barriers the all remove marketSpace and twoinitial realization Western the suggests The aimsto phases. phase Strategy aims determineto the general aspects offuture Russian gas policy on the Post-Soviet ( the development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure, etc. infrastructure, (LNG) gas natural of liquefied development the stability and the maximization of national and foreign investments; energy saving and environment protection; 21 profitmaximization’ (Gazprom M&T representative 2010). the bigEuropean Union.As every oil-gas company, has its mainGazprom aim commercial – cleave is nostrategy to ‘There line: argumentative thesame has of perception on the Gazprom departments in organization and Trading Marketing opinion of Gazprom of one manager the Ministry Federation Ministry Energy of Russian 2003) the of The strategy includes main objectives such as securing domestic energy supplies at stable prices; financial prices; stable at supplies energy domestic securing as such objectives main includes strategy The ) . The dynamics of the prospected energy goals (see Appendix 3) reveals the main idea main 3)revealsthe energy (seeAppendix . The dynamics prospected goals of the that in its 3 phases is more focused on research and development issues that will issues that development and research on focused more is in its 3phases that But giving apreciselookat constructionthe thatpipelineof (eventhoughthefinal Russia’s economic intentions were revealed in the revealed were intentions economic Russia’s ( 42 Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation Russian EnergyStrategy the for period upto . Covering the main objectives main the Covering Russia’s Energy Strategy until 2020 21 , the , CEU eTD Collection Streams weresuggested by Russian side andlobbiedthe for market, the European ambitious Thefact strengthen plansthatwould South holdthe and over that Europe. Nord by joining NATO. problemthe mightbe deeply in rooted politics, starting with Russian minorities finishingand The environmental issue can be only the stationcompressor in regionthe is that severely coverenvironmentally unfriendly (Larsson 2007). for Russia to circumvent those additional require is likely to this alternative show, calculations CEE As Gazprom’s one. ecological states as which is a part Belarus through 20%of gas follows around as already Russian creating diversification the of Yamal-Europewould be only 23 bcm (Nicola 2009)comparing toNord Stream’s 55 bcm and isfarfrom transmissiontransport routes.strategies of increasingconsiderably the transmitting and capacities diversificationthe the of system.Neither of thoseThe twoissue factors about are inSea (Wright2009). North the satisfied Amber as– theis inonly liquefiedin gasindustry (includingbut the underwaterpipeline gas) also construction capacitythe of theVladimir Yamal-2 Milov, Russia isis new aspectimportant theopportunities ofapplication According technologies. of to striving to reach the BritishGazprom islikely supplyto considerable amount of gas lucrativeto Western Europe.gas Another market as Britain dueto hugethe fees Besides of capacity transit (Gazprom 55bcm 2010). M&T representative is a leader not onshore pipeline the than lower 15% be will costs overall the that claim Proponents through supporters. many has still the it Baltic alternatives, inland the of any than 59), 2007, States(Larsson challenging more technologically or Poland in 25 years and water) under the their placement itself of and costs pipes the expensive (dueto due to the absence of sustainability. Stream Acknowledgingthe thattoday’s agreed route is Nord moreoffshore longer, Gazprom’s energy game with EUstatesisthe manoeuvring andpushingforward its Such alternatives as Yamal-2, according did not meet Russia’s goals from meetnot Such did asYamal-2,according from two Russia’s the alternatives goals 43 CEU eTD Collection as offensive and aggressive, considering only its egoistic interests. EU’s constant reproaches EU’sconstantinterests. its egoistic only considering andaggressive, as offensive justifiable). economically is competition for also (that Gazprom create prospective EUmight tothe gassuppliers those gas Those fields are Russia(Gazprom for 2010). M&T representative vital of importance as Libya and Bolivia in Nigeria, fields gas new explore to in 2008 dollars billion 2.5 than behaviour. its of explanation economic an is already that dependence export own its avoid simply might Russia is how That projects urgently that willindependently (2010). Predicting unfavourable the situation Russia strives for pipeline consolidatefluctuating years, several itselflast the for decreasing been has price its and asgrowing is a sole unconditional gasbehindfar According Romanova, that. to popularity the liquefiedof the natural in gas Europe supplier to Europe. of renewables andother sources mightbeenergy, geopolitics in left thelong-term perspective tendency shifting to popularity inliquefied of favour gasfrom EgyptandQatar, Nigeria, inRussian gas.Present of necessity a aboutthe exaggeration the andthought to leads consumers. solvent and have stable to biginterest is itof iswhy that it), release wastefully simply to (not somewhere reservoirs the more. technological gas Asdueto inbe specificity needed extracted stored the supplied to or years or next20 the for customers European from the demandforRussian gas guarantee the will in being place and pipelines contracts long-term be that confident to wants seems Russia financialsupplies. Making investments in great and political efforts itpipelines promotions, risks, can reveal hidden indoubts Russian gas assurance in futurethe demand forthe political of elimination the and security energy of growth the benefits, the demonstrating All these steps of Russian gas strategy is RussianAll strategy EU the stepsof these gas towards often perceived bythe Union Moreover, asa resultinvestedof more strategy,its expanding marketing Gazprom dependency gas European of estimation real the a doubt into put motions active Those 44 CEU eTD Collection and the dependency on the third transiting states. threats by eliminating common security, energy preserving be butkeen rather on both relation politicizebounded and ties economic EUbeing by should stop anddramatizegas the theirthe actions to unilateral be Russian any for consideredexplanation is the That countries. gas-OPEC the with policies to bear negative its andhardly coordinates Organization a memberis Treaty,‘soft-power’ Trade World the not of Charter implications. Energy has ratified the not integration: itself global the fully committed not regional and to In has still Russia spite level, high-politics the on sphere energy inthe of cooperation this, bilateral promote Russia of the energy relations with the West. In spite of the fact that Russian authoritiesof such accusations was expressed by Tatiana Romanova, whoin the interview claimed, try to limitedRussia for its access energy to and Invalidity lackmarket the of liberalizedsector. gas Norway Norway do nothave fully liberalized gas (2010). sectors some energy sectors (such as nuclear and liberalization of gas), onlyRussiahasproblemsthe with EU.Not Russia the and but such major EU members as establishment of prevented the approximation equal between gas relations legal and market energy of the liberalization with problems recently. The ...Both Russia and the EU became rather protective in the energy sector It is true that Russian state is the keymodernizer and the promoter of the development 45 CEU eTD Collection culture’ of domination, good domestic in keyposition culture’ conditions, the institutional andthe good domination, of ‘strategic the of existence the arenaand world the on status its restore to ambitions are the which among aims, economic and political their reaching for resources gas use to incentives all the almost has Russia EU states. the topic among been adiscourse has often Russia canbe made. energy relations EU-Russian the to recommendations specific and observations of number a research, above international politics and power games of the entities involved. Drawing conclusionsfrom the by adjust made to theobstacles logic market hasto how of the Streams,the South Europe the Nordandthe through suppliesanalysis exampleof the gas to revealed, through The incentives. commercial and interests economic of in favour one Western the from differs official rhetoric Russian Russia. However, towards ‘friendly’ and aremore cooperative states isinto according dividedoldRussia, newattitudes and towards Europe to member old where means Union the That question. this on haveposition acommon not does and body coherent the EU member statesincentives that Russiato use gas asis a mechanismusing of andtheexistence the of superpower energy Russian status has confirmed research ofnatural influence. Ingas spite as of manipulation a used by Russia (suchas pre-emption, co-optation, andthe disaggregation),the political accusations fromtool, some of of strategic methods the analysis the on Focusing member states. EU the for theimplications EU is not a Russian pipeline geopolitics prismthe of through strategic manipulation itsand illustrate supplier and the customer. The contribution to that widely discussed topic was to observe belike based to ideaon ofenergy mutual the security and interdependency country-the of through prismthe of strategic manipulation. gasrelations Contemporary look EU-Russiann Constant scepticism about the use of the gas-tool and its expansionist strategy itsstrategy andof expansionist theConstant useof scepticism gas-tool the about The purpose of my thesis was to observe Russian pipeline gas strategy towards the EU CONCLUSION 46 CEU eTD Collection situation in the EU-Russiann gas relations is unlikely to change. European needschange. to insituation gasrelationsisunlikely Union European to the EU-Russiann the asathreat, Russia perceives long Union asthe As enemy. and political ideological politicization of thechanged political-economicits situation, goals and priorities.is TheWest still using the historical events (from the USSR era), exhibitingfor doing countries. sameasother the Russia reproach Russia as a is(Deliagin the 2006).Whatis Russianpipeline with difference to then? strategy unjust It potential USA the – army military,andis it hinting that use gas better as to an than advantage bombs countries which also have someinfluence tools of in world:the France –nuclear industries or other with itself compares Russia consumers. European harm lucrative the to done never is it but officials), the to according ones commercial (predominantly goals its of variety the direct violent tool of coercion). The Russian side does notdeny the use ofenergy for reaching implication,it stands within (asitline still behaviour a of actor not of usea rational any does policy. inforeign manipulation strategic as itsresources for energy using Moscow blame to tries Brussels negative. exceptionally countries, such as the USA, Germany, and the UK), the EU’s initial reaction to this trendinfluential other (as do economy political ininternational reclaim itswas interests to started and more stable became Russia when However, anymore. interests national any legitimate inworld 19 aswas case the the in fact the than a mission with a nation ageographical rather politics in international existed member EU the states. towards strategy communistthe largely viewedand isstill assuch, era ‘thedivide applying rule’ and pipeline Antidemocratic Russia andhazardous market. world a wasperceived energy during as threat The explanation of this perception is clear. For nearly 10 years after 1992, Russia 1992, years after nearly 10 is For clear. perception this The explanation of The EU’s main mistake is that its outdated perception of Russia is not based on its has anegative manipulation of concept strategic the in fact that of spite the However, th and 20 th centuries. It almost seemed as if Russia did nothave 47 CEU eTD Collection Even if to envisage the probability for Russia to use gas disruption in terms of of use extreme interms gas disruption envisage for Russia to the probability Even ifto policy-making. for alternatives the choosing with be careful should and partner actual main be the to remain will EU the that Russia sales strategy Therefore, and be shouldacknowledge import. avictim coercive gas of 2009,be China 20). trivialized’ firmsurrender(Mascotto hasits not to position hostile tothe mutual notand should values the of cooperation energy reciprocity geopolitics, commercial in and expertise power persuasive that‘Russia’s be Claiming considered. as Chinashould notices,from (2009), playersRussiarelations. apart AsMascotto andtheEUsuchimportant and buyer-seller within the dependence the competition of imperfect ispressure theexistence construction. pipeline inoff-shore new technologies fieldsas using the asfor hard-approachable well the from gas natural the extracting for innovations and investments foreign of importance the consider has to country recently,negative the environment crisis toeconomic being exposed developingits without of huge energy foreignsector help (especially in the downstream). But in the self-sufficient relatively was it years few last the for if even market; European of cooperation the and for ability quickeconomic the decision-making. efficiencyinincreasing the market seen not perspectives, butfrom marketstrength, terms of manipulation divideto the EU is notin its interest. This policy for dealing with the EU can be usingstrategic thus, and, reliable gainpartner and to imageof a consistent strives the which is Union the onlyatthe beginningfully way the of to understand.Russia Nowadays otherpartner, withany as with Russia cooperate is hereto approach it. best The to attached clarify its priorities and get rid of the legacies of the 20 All the apprehensions of the Baltic States and Poland seem to be groundless either. Another reason, clearly showing the uselessness of Russia at using gas as a tool of solvent main its from independence Russia’s overestimate not should we Besides 48 th century and the prejudices that are that prejudices the and century CEU eTD Collection and economic ‘blackmailing’ or manipulation of EU. manipulation of the or ‘blackmailing’ and economic be for from should there any not side dependency exists, Russian threats the apprehension itleast Aslong alsoEU shouldleverage. as,at recognize that has economic mutual contracts, this would likely to threaten Gazprom’s ability to borrow ( borrow to ability Gazprom’s threaten likely to this would contracts, long term take-or-pay abolishing someday require ifgas companies instance, European the worse economic sanctions consequentialthe long-run effect would beharsher in terms of political capital and even could be applied – is action greater that of scale If the supplier. being unreliable image of long-term negative by the EU (for instance,disrupts energy the flow –it could onlyhave temporarily loses for thebudget andhave a trade embargoes). example,ifRussiaFor (Rutland2008). action different,that dependingon scalethe of For be for outcomes the manipulation Russia would strategic EUmemberStates, towards action 49 Rutland2008, 109). The CEU eTD Collection Acquiescent the Group Divorced Partners Name of Vigilant Eastern Critics Wives Loyal June 2008in Braghirolithe (2009) and Carta Source: 2008; (*)otherwise datarefer refer denotescountries to whosedata to2005 Appendix 1: Dependency on Russian Natural Gas Supplies in 2008 in Natural GasSupplies onRussian 1: Appendix Dependency Note: The figures are expressed in billion cubic meters; if notexplicitly stated meters; inbillion cubic The figuresareexpressed Note: Luxembourg* Netherlands Countries British PetroleumBritish Company, BP Statistical WorldReview of Energy, London, Slovenia* Belgium* Lithuania Germany Denmark Romania Republic Slovakia Hungary Estonia* Bulgaria Portugal Sweden Finland Latvia* Austria Greece Ireland Poland France Czech Spain Italy The UK Friendliness An Index of Russia (0– the lowest the Towards highest) 1 –the rate, 0.90 0.43 0.47 0.38 0.21 0.09 0.74 0.76 0.69 0.62 0.14 0.78 0.62 0.38 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.62 0.62 0.55 0.45 0.40 0.17 0 0 APPENDICES Consumption Natural Gas 45.60 13.70 77.80 41.90 16.40 35.10 82.70 17.33 37.20 11.80 50 4.00 3.10 1.10 5.90 4.10 8.90 1.41 4.80 1.89 4.60 4.30 7.80 3.80 1.50 1 Movements by Pipeline Total Gas 70.45 33.76 10.95 83.72 19.34 18.86 10.48 Rate 2.89 3.10 1.10 5.80 4.30 7.48 1.50 4.15 1.60 9.30 1.39 7.63 3.40 1.11 4.80 1.50 28 0 Movements Gas Trade Russia by Pipeline 23.80 35.55 with 2.89 3.10 0.56 5.80 4.30 5.60 1.60 6.20 6.60 3.40 7.63 2.50 1.50 0.50 2.30 7.85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 dependency on Russian % of 100 105 100 gas 72 51 98 63 85 45 84 89 18 15 31 67 43 0 0 0 0 3 6 0 0 0 CEU eTD Collection Unported. Commons Creative Francisco: San Europe. to pipelines transportation Attribution 3.0 Source: Appendix 2: Major Russian Gas Pipelines to Europe Bailey, Samuel. 2009. Map of Bailey,Samuel. majorthe 2009.Mapof existingRussian natural andproposed gas 51 CEU eTD Collection http://www.iea.org/work/2008/neet_russia/Gromov.pdf. ‘21stcentury exhibition-congress Russia technologies’.perspective Moscow, 1). 30-October (September International II in the Workshop Development. Energy Innovative the to Source: Appendix 3: Changes in the Energy Strategy of Russia Gromov,Russian Alexey. Energy 2008. forStrategy theperiod2030: up to Way the 52 CEU eTD Collection Benoit, Bertrand. 2006. Berlin Clears Schröder over Guarantee to Gazprom. overGuaranteeto Berlin ClearsSchröder 2006. Bertrand. Benoit, Boykewich, Stephen. 2006. GermansBoykewich, Stephen. 2006. for Question Gazprom $1Bln Bismarck, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/the_secret_of_politics-make_a_good_ Otto. 1863. Erixon, Fridrek. 2009. 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