Nazi Collaborators and Cold Warriors: America’S Belarusian Quislings

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Nazi Collaborators and Cold Warriors: America’s Belarusian Quislings

by Mark P. Alexander

B.A. in History, January 2013, University of Vermont M.A. in History, October 2015, University of Vermont

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 19, 2019

Dissertation directed by

Hope M. Harrison Associate Professor of History and International Affairs

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Mark P. Alexander has passed the Final Examination for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy as of April 15, 2019. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

Nazi Collaborators and Cold Warriors: America’s Belarusian Quislings

Mark P. Alexander

Dissertation Research Committee

Hope M. Harrison, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs, Dissertation Director

Hugh L. Agnew, Professor of History and International Affairs, Committee Member

James G. Hershberg, Professor of History and International Affairs, Committee Member

iii

Abstract of Dissertation

Nazi Collaborators and Cold Warriors: America’s Belarusian Quislings

During World War II, opportunistic Belarusian nationalist leaders compromised the independence and integrity of their young movement by tying it to Nazi Germany and becoming culpable in the crimes of the Holocaust. Fighting among themselves for control of the anticommunist Belarusian diaspora after World War II, many Belarusian nationalist collaborators became involved in the early Cold War anti-Soviet campaigns of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Virtually all of the leaders of the Belarusian

Nazi puppet regime immigrated to the US in the early Cold War and continued their hardline anti-Soviet political activism in their new homes. After decades living confidently in the US under their own names, these Belarusian collaborators became the focus of renewed government investigations into Nazi war criminals in the US and the center of a public scandal. This dissertation examines these understudied figures and their influence on world events from their place on the peripheries of power. It investigates leading Belarusian nationalists’ ties to Nazi Germany during World War II, their anti-

Soviet covert operations with the CIA in the early Cold War, and their participation in

American anticommunist politics. Finally, this dissertation explores how these figures affected the development of US government investigations into Nazi war criminals living in the US in the 1970s and 1980s.

Table of Contents

Abstract of Dissertation………………………………………………………………....iv

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..1

Chapter One: Belarusian Nationalism, 1900-1943……………………………………………………...23

Chapter Two: The Belarusian SS State and the Fall of the Third Reich, 1943-1945…………………...70

Chapter Three: The Belarusian Anticommunist Diaspora, 1945-1950………………………………….107

Chapter Four: Belarusian Nazi Collaborators and United States Intelligence, 1950-1961…………….139

Chapter Five: Belarusian Collaborators in Cold War American Life, 1948-1991…………………….203

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...269

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………280

Introduction

As the Second World War ended, tensions between the Soviet Union (USSR) and its allies in the wartime coalition arrayed against the Axis Powers rapidly escalated.

Soviet hegemony over the nations of Eastern Europe and the spread of communist movements in Asia caused the specter of imminent global communist encroachment to loom large in the imaginations of many Western policymakers in the late 1940s. In order to meet this perceived threat, the Western Allies would ultimately seek to strengthen

West Germany and Japan against communist influence by restoring full rights and privileges to their defeated and disenfranchised former enemies. One important effect of this was to enable individuals guilty of wartime crimes to assume positions of authority and influence once again. This meant softening and reversing initial postwar policies that pursued high standards of justice for former members of the Nazi Party and of Imperial

Japan’s government and business conglomerates (zaibatsu) accused of war crimes. By the early 1950s, the members of the previous war’s defeated rightwing regimes had become allies in the Cold War battle against the threat of worldwide communist expansion.

In addition to reversing denazification policies and releasing accused war criminals, United States (US) officials also used former Nazis and Nazi collaborators as assets in the Cold War, fostering fifth column forces and anticommunist émigré groups that would work to undermine the Kremlin through paramilitary and propaganda operations. Operation Paperclip, the covert American project to bring Nazi rocket scientists to work for the United States after the war, has become a widely known example of the relationships between US intelligence and Nazi war criminals in recent

decades.1 Similar projects focused on Nazi officials with intelligence expertise on the

Soviet Union. For example, Reinhard Gehlen had been the chief of Fremde Heere Ost

(FHO, or Foreign Armies East), the military intelligence office of the German

Wehrmacht concerned with the Soviet Union. After World War II, he worked closely with American intelligence agencies and became the first chief of West Germany’s foreign intelligence service. Gehlen and his colleagues shared their intelligence on the populations and territories of the Soviet Union with their new American partners. They also shared intelligence assets, including former collaborators of the Third Reich from the parts of Europe that had fallen under Soviet domination after the war.

Political and military collaborators from the western territories of the Soviet

Union under German occupation during the war were prized by Western intelligence officials for their knowledge of the region, their anticommunist convictions, and their ability to establish military and paramilitary forces among émigré communities abroad.

Individuals from territories stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea became intelligence assets of various Western powers, and in many cases the United States became their ultimate sponsor and home. Belarusian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian,

Russian, and Ukrainian Nazi collaborators all became involved in these covert anticommunist intelligence operations.

This dissertation focuses on the Cold War relationship that developed between the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and influential Belarusian Nazi collaborators, many of whom became citizens of the United States after the war despite their notoriety and

1 Tom Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists (Boston: Little Brown, 1987); Clarence G. Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War (New York: Atheneum, 1971); Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).

public calls for their prosecution. These Belarusian collaborators had been the figures most responsible for associating the Belarusian nationalist movement closely with Nazi

Germany. Although they were neither the architects nor the executioners of the so-called

“Final Solution,” these quislings facilitated the German invasion and occupation of their homeland and oversaw the persecution and mass murder of many of their former neighbors.2

The Cold War covert paramilitary operations conducted with these unsavory assets ended in disaster. The intelligence they produced for the CIA often proved outdated or fabricated, and their presence in the United States imported an organized and active extreme rightwing element into the American body politic and exacerbated the international tensions of the Cold War. In spite of the dismal results of these endeavors, the CIA helped protect these figures from prosecution for decades by providing whitewashed accounts of their Belarusian assets’ lives to other American agencies investigating their pasts. This history of Belarusian Nazi collaborators and their postwar sponsors in American intelligence engages with several different relevant areas of history and contributes to deepening understandings of both the Holocaust and the Cold War.

Although several authors have engaged with the history of Belarusian nationalism, the impact that collaboration with Nazi Germany had upon the development of the Belarusian nationalist movement following World War II remains understudied.

Scholars agree that Belarusian nationalism did not begin to blossom until the late

2 Since the end of World War II, the name of Norwegian fascist and Nazi collaborator Vidkun Quisling has become synonymous with traitorous collaboration with a foreign invader. Because the term “quisling” implies influential political collaboration rather than direct participation in the crimes of the Holocaust, it is a particularly appropriate label for the Belarusian politicians and officers who facilitated the invasion and occupation of their homeland during World War II.

nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, which meant that it developed later than comparable nationalist movements throughout Europe. Because the Belarusian people were dominated by their more powerful neighbors and had no state of their own until the late twentieth century, Belarusian language and culture developed long before political expressions of Belarusian nationalism. As such, historian Nelly Bekus describes early

Belarusian nationalism as “an almost classical example of small nation nationalism.”3

Her work on the subject examines early twentieth century Belarusian nationalism and issues of Belarusian identity in recent decades, but it does not engage with the impact and legacy of World War II. Swedish historian Per Anders Rudling’s recent monograph, The

Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 1906-1931, also explores early Belarusian nationalism and its connections to the impact of World War I.4 Rudling’s important work makes crucial contributions to the field, but the chronological scope of this study ends before the rise of Nazi Germany. This dissertation complements such scholarship by examining the impact that World War II and the German occupation had upon the development of Belarusian nationalism over the subsequent half century.

The body of historiography concerning German occupation policies is therefore necessary to frame this study. Although the initial scholarship on Nazi Germany and the

Holocaust focused on Central and Western Europe, historians have increasingly focused on events in Eastern Europe. The few early works on German occupation practices in

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union still provide relevant and useful information for this study. Two of these valuable early monographs on German occupation policies in the

3 Nelly Bekus, Struggle over Identity: The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness” (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 53. 4 Per Anders Rudling, The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 1906-1931 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015).

Soviet Union are Alexander Dallin’s 1957 book, German Rule in Russia, and Gerald

Reitlinger’s 1960 work, The House Built on Sand.5 Both of these monographs provide insight into the formulation, application, and development of German occupation policies. More recent scholarship, such as Wendy Lower’s 2005 work, Nazi Empire-

Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine, expands the study of the goals and conflicts of the German occupation of Soviet territories in the context of the war.6 This dissertation adds to this historiography by revealing how the inherent conflicts between Nazi racial ideology, German occupation practices, and Belarusian nationalist aspirations developed within the context of the war.

For years the historiography of the Holocaust focused on ghettos, concentration camps, and killing centers in Western and Central Europe while the waves of mass murder committed during the invasion and occupation of the Soviet Union went relatively understudied. Recent contributions to the field, however, have begun examining this previously understudied area. For example, in 2008 Father Patrick

Desbois published The Holocaust by Bullets, which identified several sites of mass execution in Ukraine.7 Timothy Snyder’s 2010 monograph, Bloodlands: Europe between

Hitler and Stalin, focused on Eastern Europe and the escalation of genocidal practices within the context of war.8 There is still relatively little scholarship focused specifically

5 Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies (London: MacMillan and Company Limited, 1957); Gerald Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia, 1939-1945 (New York: Viking Press, 1960). 6 Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005). 7 Patrick Desbois, The Holocaust by Bullets: A Priest’s Journey to Uncover the Truth behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2008). 8 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

on the Holocaust in Belarus itself, but this territory lies directly between Berlin and

Moscow and was central to Nazi invasion and colonization plans in Eastern Europe.

The paucity of scholarship on the history of Belarusian territories may be at least partially explained by the fact that for many generations these lands have been split among their more powerful neighbors. Modern Belarus has only been an independent country since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Many Western depictions of the Belarusian people and their culture have subsumed them within the much larger and more recognizable Russian nationality despite concerted efforts among the Belarusian diaspora to distinguish themselves. Consequently, relatively little historical scholarship on the Holocaust in Belarus appeared until the twenty-first century.9 Waitman Wade

Beorn published Marching into Darkness in 2014, detailing the German Wehrmacht’s role in the Holocaust in Belarus.10 The following year, Anika Walke published an oral history of the Holocaust in Belarus called Pioneers and Partisans.11 This dissertation contributes to the historiography of the Holocaust in Belarus by focusing on the high- ranking collaborators who facilitated the persecution and destruction of those targeted by

Nazi Germany. These figures were not executioners, but rather they served as willing administrators, mayors, guides, and informers for a regime whose ideology considered

9 German language monographs on the subject began appearing at the end of the twentieth century (Bernhard Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front: Besatzung, Kollaboration und Widerstand in Weissrussland, 1941-1944 [Düsseldorf : Droste Verlag, 1998]; Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde: Die Deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weissrussland 1941 bis 1944 [Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2000]). 10 Waitman Wade Beorn, Marching into Darkness: The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belarus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). 11 Anika Walke, Pioneers and Partisans: An Oral History of Nazi Genocide in Belorussia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

them to be undesirable racial stock. They organized police and military forces and oversaw the construction, administration, and destruction of Jewish ghettos.

The body of historiography on Belarus during World War II helps to contextualize this study, but much of the work on Belarusian collaboration with Nazi

Germany is problematic and must be used cautiously. As with studies of the Holocaust more generally, less scholarship has examined collaboration in Eastern Europe while a greater amount has been focused on regimes and figures in Western and Central Europe, such as Pierre Laval and Vichy France or Vidkun Quisling and the Nasjonal Samling in

Norway.12 Several works on the subject of Belarusian collaboration attempt to advance a particular historical narrative. Soviet histories of the German invasion and occupation of

Belarusian lands, for example, reinforce official narratives of the Great Patriotic War.

According to the Soviet version of history, the fascist German invaders encountered such unified resistance that “the very earth burned beneath their feet” as “all the people of

Byelorussia” supposedly “rose to a man” in order to defend “their native land, their

Soviet system, and the great conquests of the October Revolution.”13 Accounts of

Belarusian historians similarly minimize the role played by local collaborators, insisting

12 Hubert Cole, Laval: A Biography (New York: Putnam, 1965); René de Chambrun, Pierre Laval: Traitor or Patriot? (New York: Scribner, 1984); Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981); Alice Kaplan, The Collaborator: The Trial & Execution of Robert Brasillach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); J. Kenneth Brody, The Trial of Pierre Laval: Defining Treason, Collaboration and Patriotism in World War II France (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017); Paul M. Hayes, Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling, 1887-1945 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1972); Oddvar Karsten Hoidal, Quisling: A Study in Treason (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1989); E.M. Barth, A Nazi Interior: Quisling’s Hidden Philosophy (Frankfurt am Main and New York: P. Lang, 2003). 13 Ivan Sergeevich Kravchenko and Ivan Egorovich Marchenko, The Soviet Republic of Byelorussia: A Brief Historico-Economic Sketch (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 65, 74.

that “the mass extermination of the Jews came as a terrible blow” or that “the local inhabitants were horrified by the brutality of the Germans.”14 Such statements paint local reactions with too broad a brush and ignore the active collaboration that facilitated the occupation and the crimes of the Holocaust.

Recent scholarly works, however, are making less political and more nuanced contributions to the field. In 2000, Martin Dean published Collaboration in the

Holocaust, a study focused on the crimes of local Belarusian and Ukrainian collaborators in the auxiliary police forces of the Third Reich.15 Antonio J. Munoz and Oleg V.

Romanko published another important work on the Third Reich’s auxiliary police and military collaborators in 2003, titled Hitler’s White Russians.16 In 2011, Leonid Rein published The Kings and the Pawns, which is arguably the most significant scholarly historical study on Belarusian collaboration released to date.17 Rein’s work explores several different aspects of local collaboration with the German occupation, including ways in which clergy, police, politicians, military leaders, and other Belarusians worked with Nazi Germany. None of these monographs, however, examines the postwar activities of the influential collaborators who eagerly worked to bind the Belarusian nationalist cause to the Third Reich before seeking the sponsorship of the United States during the Cold War. This study complements the historiography of Belarusian

14 Nicholas P. Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), 186; Jan Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 97. 15 Martin Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-44 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 16 Antonio J. Munoz and Oleg V. Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians: Collaboration, Extermination, and Anti-Partisan Warfare in Byelorussia, 1941-1944 (Bayside, NY: Europa Books, 2003). 17 Leonid Rein, The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia During World War II (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011).

collaboration and the Holocaust by following these collaborators in their emigration and subsequent relationships with US intelligence.

Scholarship concerning the postwar relationships between Belarusian collaborators and Western intelligence agencies remains undeveloped. The only book to focus on the relationship between the US government and Belarusian Nazi collaborators was authored by John Loftus in the early 1980s. Loftus had investigated Belarusian Nazi collaborators living in the US as an attorney with the United States Department of

Justice’s Office of Special Investigation (OSI) before he resigned to publish his book,

The Belarus Secret.18 The release of Loftus’ sensationalistic but unsubstantiated theories caused a public scandal and introduced Nazi collaborators into American popular culture, but the subject remains unexamined by historians.19 This study explores these events, providing a more cautious and substantiated narrative than that advanced by Loftus.

A disparate body of work on the Cold War relationships between Western intelligence agencies and former Nazis and Nazi collaborators provides useful contextual information that helps to situate the Belarusian collaborators within Western anticommunist designs more broadly. Some, like The Belarus Secret, are rather sensationalistic. Examples include Howard Blum’s Wanted! The Search for Nazis in

America and Eric Lichtblau’s Nazis Next Door.20 Other monographs are much more

18 John Loftus, The Belarus Secret (New York: Knopf, 1982). 19 After he resigned, Loftus appeared on 60 Minutes and gave many newspaper interviews. The story remained in the headlines for some time and even inspired the plot of a detective film made for television in which Telly Savalas reprised his popular detective character from the popular 1970s series, “Kojak.” 20 Howard Blum, Wanted! The Search for Nazis in America (New York: Quadrangle, 1977); Eric Lichtblau, The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler’s Men (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014); Efraim Zuroff, Occupation: Nazi-Hunter: The Continuing Search for Perpetrators of the Holocaust (Hoboken, NJ: KTAV Publishing House, Inc., 1994).

reserved in their conclusions, such as Allan A. Ryan, Jr.’s Quiet Neighbors or Christoph

Schiessl’s Alleged Nazi Collaborators in the United States after World War II.21

Christopher Simpson’s Blowback is more critical of the US government’s relationship with Nazi war criminals, but he published this work a decade before the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group began its declassification project in 1998.22 Millions of pages of documents have been declassified as a result of this legislation, providing exciting new opportunities for research. Important studies of these files have already been produced, but none of these works uses the newly declassified files to examine the relationships between US intelligence and Belarusian

Nazi collaborators.23 This dissertation relies heavily on these previously unavailable documents to establish that the CIA intentionally sought to recruit Nazi collaborators in its campaigns to undermine the Soviet Union.

Scholarship focusing on postwar issues such as Displaced Persons (DP) camps, the reversals of denazification policies, and the release of accused war criminals has established the early Cold War turn away from earlier commitments to pursue justice for the perpetrators. Historian Atina Grossmann’s 2007 study on postwar interactions and relationships between DPs, German citizens, and Allied personnel provides significant

21 Allan A. Ryan, Jr., Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982); Christoph Schiessl, Alleged Nazi Collaborators in the United States after World War II (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016). 22 Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988). 23 Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Richard Breitman and Norman J. W. Goda, Hitler’s Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 2011).

contextual information on conditions in Europe’s postwar DP camp network.24 Other scholarship explaining how initial postwar commitments to justice became attenuated by growing tensions among the former Allies also helps to provide contextual information for this study.25 This dissertation adds to these developing historiographical fields by investigating the Belarusian collaborators’ efforts to reorganize themselves within the postwar DP camp system and following their escape from justice as the Allied governments turned away from their earlier commitment to justice.

This study also contributes to the large body of scholarship exploring Cold War covert operations, the intelligence officials involved, and the role played by the CIA in

US Cold War foreign policy. Some important examples of these works include Peter

Grose’s Operation Rollback, Gregg Herken’s The Georgetown Set, Burton Hersh’s The

Old Boys, and Evan Thomas’ The Very Best Men.26 Although they do not focus on the use of Nazi collaborators, these studies provide insights into several contemporaneous covert intelligence operations and the intelligence officials who created and supervised them. Many of the CIA’s Cold War propaganda, espionage, infiltration, and invasion operations were poorly planned and ended disastrously. For example, Charles Gati’s

24 Atina Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 25 Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration (New York: Columbia University, 2002). Alan S. Rosenbaum, Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Asian Center, 2008). 26 Peter Grose, Operation Rollback: America’s Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000); Gregg Herken, The Georgetown Set: Friends and Rivals in Cold War Washington (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014); Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992); Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).

monograph on anticommunist propaganda and psychological warfare in Hungary reveals how poorly planned some of the agency’s efforts to incite rebellion and unrest actually were.27 This dissertation demonstrates that the agency’s operations with Belarusian collaborators should be understood as another failed episode in the CIA’s history of covert operations that exacerbated the tensions of the Cold War.

Scholarship focused on Cold War US foreign policy and the development of

American anticommunist intelligence campaigns is also essential to framing this study.

For many decades, American intelligence officials sponsored groups of anticommunist

émigrés to form rightwing paramilitary units to help undermine their homeland’s communist regimes. This was not an isolated phenomenon conceived by rogue intelligence agents, but rather it was a widespread practice that grew out of the aggressively anticommunist foreign policy of high-ranking American government officials in the late 1940s and 1950s. In 2000, Gregory Mitrovich published Undermining the Kremlin, which explores the connections between these intelligence operations and

American foreign policy.28 Mitrovich’s work provides important insights into the policy planning level of postwar covert intelligence activities. Other works on the development of the postwar intelligence apparatus also helped to contextualize this study, which reveals the Nazi connections of the Belarusian anticommunist émigrés working with US intelligence.29

27 Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). 28 Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). 29 David F. Rudgers, Kate James, Andy Smith, and Stephen R. Bird, Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943-1947 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of

This dissertation also contributes to the broader issue of responsibility for Cold

War tensions. The causes and conduct of the Cold War remain controversial historical subjects, with several different schools of thought concerning the culpability and motivations for the conflict. This examination of US officials’ decision to conduct anti-

Soviet intelligence operations with Belarusian Nazi collaborators reveals that these relationships ultimately damaged American interests and exacerbated Soviet suspicions and Cold War tensions. This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union deserves no responsibility for the escalation of international tensions following the Second World

War, but the willful use of Nazi collaborators as intelligence assets suggests a less generous view of American anticommunist policymakers and intelligence officials than the work of scholars like John Lewis Gaddis.30 Instead, the details of Belarusian Nazi collaborators’ relationships with the US government lend additional credence to the conclusions of historians such as Melvyn P. Leffler, who argue that the actions and suspicions of United States policymakers exacerbated the growing tensions of the Cold

War.31

Kansas, 2000); Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed the America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 30 John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York: Penguin Press, 2011); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); John Lewis Gaddis, “Response to Painter and Lundestad,” Cold War History 7, No. 1 (March 2007): 117-120; Geir Lundestad, “The Cold War According to John Gaddis,” Cold War History 6, No. 4 (November 2006): 535-542. 31 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill & Wang, 2008); Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, Origins of the Cold War: An International History (New York: Routledge, 2005); Melvyn P. Leffler, “Cold War and Global Hegemony, 1945-1991,” Magazine of History 19, Issue 2 (March 2005): 65-72.

This work also adds to the body of Cold War historiography that looks beyond

Moscow and Washington and explores the agendas of peripheral actors and their impact on the centers of power. Like the work of scholars such as Hope M. Harrison or Odd

Arne Westad, this study explores elements of the complex transnational nature of the

Cold War and reveals how relatively minor players in the Cold War were still able to exert an influence on their more powerful counterparts.32 This dissertation demonstrates how high-ranking Belarusian Nazi collaborators continually sought to maximize their influence from their position on the peripheries of power.

Because the relationship between the CIA and Belarusian Nazi collaborators remains undeveloped in historical scholarship, this work must rely largely on untapped archival sources that reveal a new historical story. The research for this dissertation is based primarily on the archival holdings of the National Archives and Records

Administration at College Park, Maryland (NARA II) and the United States Holocaust

Memorial Museum (USHMM). Millions of pages of government documents relevant to this topic are now declassified and available for public research at NARA II. The collections with the most information related to this subject include record groups of files from the CIA, FBI, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Although many of these files are full of intriguing information, they remain virtually untouched by scholars to date. Other files from these collections provide the evidence for related work

32 Hope M. Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (New York: Basic Books, 2017); Odd Arne Westad, “The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms,” Diplomatic History 24, Issue 4 (October 2000): 551- 565.

on American intelligence and the use of Nazis and Nazi collaborators in the Cold War, but very little academic work exists on these subjects using these sources.

The declassified name and subject files of the CIA comprise the core of the primary source research for this dissertation. These collections include rich folders full of background information, personal depositions, and surveillance records on collaborationist figures such as Radoslaw Ostrowski, the president of the Belarusian puppet regime created by the SS (Schutzstaffel) in Minsk in December 1943; Stanislaw

Stankievich, the burgomaster of the town of Barysau, Belarus who was responsible for the management of the town’s newly constructed ghetto and the liquidation of its Jewish residents; and Boris Ragula, the leader of a mounted Belarusian anti-partisan brigade created by the German occupying forces who became the chief liaison officer for the CIA when the agency began recruiting Belarusian Nazi collaborators in the early 1950s. There are many other such names files as well as subject files pertaining to related topics.

Although these files contain a great deal of information, much of it was obtained directly from the Belarusian collaborators themselves and must be evaluated extremely carefully.

The collections of the CIA provide invaluable personal testimonies, including the biographies and wartime experiences of these individuals. Many of these depositions are predictably self-exculpatory, however, as they attempt to paint a disingenuously independent picture of Belarusian actions under Nazi sponsorship.

The FBI files include similar folders on specific collaborators as well as records that followed the political organizations of the Belarusian émigré circles in the United

States. The FBI files provide extra pieces of personal information about the whereabouts and activities of these figures after their immigration to the United States. Bureau agents

who were alerted to the presence of alleged war criminals investigated these men and occasionally utilized them as informants to expose suspected communist activities within their émigré communities in the United States. Norman J.W. Goda’s scholarship has exposed this phenomenon, and he used the declassified FBI files on one Belarusian Nazi collaborator as a part of his evidence.33

These declassified intelligence files are further supplemented by the extensive records within the folders of the INS, whose agents compiled background dossiers of all of these figures, explored their previous political affiliations and family connections, and kept copies of their visa and naturalization paperwork. The INS holdings are especially fascinating and useful for the numerous naturalization certificates of high-ranking Nazi collaborators they contain. Because scholars have not explored the phenomenon of

Belarusian collaborators immigrating to the United States, the INS files of these figures remain unexplored.

The resources available to researchers at USHMM also contain many opportunities to supplement and substantiate the collections at NARA II. The museum is one of eight locations worldwide in which researchers can use the digital archival holdings of the International Tracing Service (ITS). The museum also holds materials from the Belarusian National Archives that are no longer available to public researchers in Minsk. Scholarship focusing on Belarusian collaboration during the Second World

33 Norman J.W. Goda, “Nazi Collaborators in the United States: What the FBI Knew,” U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 227-264.

War has relied on these Belarusian archival sources and German documents to form the basis of their primary source evidence.34

The ITS archives contain invaluable information concerning these figures’ whereabouts after the war in the form of resident records of postwar DP camps as well as ship and airplane passenger manifests. These records make it possible to place these individuals in a particular time and place and to cross-reference their own depositions.

Because so many Nazi collaborators had things to hide after the war, their own testimonies and accounts of their wartime lives and deeds must be used extremely carefully and substantiated with documentation such as that held by ITS. These archives have only been available for public research for the last several years, and scholars have not yet had the chance to develop their potential for historical study.

The museum’s archives also hold microfilm and microfiche copies of many

Belarusian archival materials that have since become unavailable for public research in

Minsk. These collections include records of Soviet trials of collaborationist figures after the war and newspapers published in German, Belarusian, Polish, and Russian during the

German occupation of Belarusian territory. These records provide useful supplementary material to the archival collections and declassified files of the CIA, FBI, INS, and ITS that form the core of this project’s source materials. These largely unused primary sources provide the evidence to construct a new historical narrative about the Belarusian

Nazi collaborators who worked with American intelligence to undermine the Soviet

Union.

34 Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns.

In order to tell this story effectively, the chapters of this dissertation must range across multiple continents and encompass events that transpired over several decades.

Although the scope of this project spans most of the twentieth century, the events of the

1940s and 1950s take precedence and comprise the bulk of the study. The first chapter provides background on the development of Belarusian nationalism in the first years of the twentieth century and follows this movement into the first years of the Second World

War. Belarusian nationalism first culminated in the brief existence of a Belarusian state sponsored by German forces in the final years of the First World War, which set a precedent for seeking a powerful state sponsor for Belarusian nationalist aspirations that would continue for decades. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, different groups of

Belarusian nationalists sought to bring their movement closer to Nazi Germany, and this chapter explores how they continued pressing for closer collaboration with the Third

Reich as Germany invaded the Soviet Union and occupied Belarusian territories.

The second chapter of this study focuses on the last phase of the German occupation of the western Soviet Union and the culmination of Belarusian attempts to use the Third Reich to further their own cause. In late 1943, the SS assumed administrative responsibilities from the German civil administration that had previously governed the occupied territories, and the nature of Belarusian collaboration with the Nazis fundamentally changed. As the war turned against Germany and growing manpower demands caused reconsideration of several occupation policies, the SS created a

Belarusian puppet government to mobilize an auxiliary Belarusian military force. The

Belarusian Central Council was only in existence on Belarusian land for approximately six months, but the collaborators involved took advantage of the situation to present

themselves afterwards as a legitimate Belarusian government-in-exile. This chapter concludes with the end of the Second World War and the fall of the Third Reich.

Many Belarusian Nazi collaborators escaped prosecution in the first several years after the war by melting into the chaos of postwar Europe’s DP camp network, and the third chapter of this dissertation examines how collaborators hid their pasts and attempted to blend into their new communities. With their last powerful sponsor defeated and dissolved, groups of Belarusian collaborators dissolved and reconstituted their wartime organizations, portraying themselves as victims of both the Nazi and Soviet regimes.

Opposing groups competed for influence among the anticommunist Belarusian diaspora in Europe, and collaborators began to seek out different sponsors among the countries of the West. This chapter explores the early tensions of the developing Cold War, as well as early postwar American foreign policy and the first uses of former Nazi intelligence and foreign ministry officials whose supposed expertise concerned the territories and populations of the Soviet Union. American authorities’ first contacts with Belarusian nationalist figures began in this period, and many collaborators began emigrating to countries in Western Europe and the Americas. This chapter ends in the late 1940s as earlier Allied commitments to postwar justice faded into the background and concerns and suspicions among the wartime coalition grew.

The fourth chapter of this study explores the relationship between the CIA and

Belarusian Nazi collaborators in the early 1950s. Factions within the Belarusian anticommunist diaspora battled for American support, and this chapter examines the relationships forged between them and the CIA. American agents held these first discussions because they hoped that contact could be made with anti-Soviet Belarusian

partisan units left behind by the Nazi forces as the Red Army drove them from Belarusian territory. As it became clear that rumors of these partisans’ activities had been greatly exaggerated, the purpose of these relationships between the CIA and Belarusian Nazi collaborators changed to intelligence gathering, anticommunist propaganda work, and the formation of paramilitary reserves to draw upon for infiltration missions into the Soviet

Union. This chapter describes these missions and the development of other plans for the

Belarusian émigré networks fostered by the CIA.

The fifth chapter focuses on these Belarusian Nazi collaborators’ immigration to the United States in the postwar period. Some emigrated to other locations throughout

Europe or South America first, while others moved directly to the United States in the years after the war. Intercontinental émigré networks aimed to whitewash the collaborators’ pasts and keep them organized should Belarusian forces need to be mustered for another invasion of the Soviet Union. This chapter investigates the high- ranking Belarusian collaborators who immigrated to the US and their involvement in

American anticommunist politics in the Cold War. It also examines the efforts to expose and prosecute Nazis and Nazi collaborators living in the United States. This chapter studies the creation of OSI in the 1970s, the campaigns to expose and denaturalize these figures, the brief appearance of America’s Belarusian Nazi collaborators in American media, and the revocation of only two Belarusian collaborators’ US citizenship.

The conclusion of this dissertation highlights its major arguments, outlines its contributions to the relevant historiography, and summarizes the historical events under examination. Because this study engages with scholarship on diverse topics ranging from early twentieth century Belarusian nationalism and the Holocaust in Eastern Europe to

US foreign policy and covert operations in the Cold War, it is important to identify both how this dissertation supplements these different historiographical areas and how it points to new areas for future research. This project would not have been possible without many previously unavailable primary sources that contain rich resources for historians of the twentieth century. For example, the archives of the ITS and NARA II hold vast potential for scholars to develop several topics examined in this dissertation in greater detail.

This dissertation reveals that American intelligence officials recruited anticommunist paramilitary forces from within international networks of Belarusian veterans of the Third Reich’s auxiliary forces and promised these figures protection from prosecution in violation of international agreements to extradite and prosecute suspected war criminals. The use of these dubious assets provided intelligence of questionable value and veracity, gave Soviet intelligence agents easy targets for blackmail, created large amounts of intelligence blowback, and ultimately exacerbated the tensions of the early Cold War without producing any appreciable benefits. In the case of these

Belarusian quislings, the anti-Soviet intelligence practices adopted by the CIA in the early Cold War reflect similar anti-Soviet intelligence policies used a decade earlier by

Nazi Germany. The United States thus adopted some of the same methods to undermine the Soviet Union, and the CIA based these policies on the intelligence of the same collaborators who had engaged in these practices for Nazi Germany. The CIA applied similar strategies widely, using anticommunist émigré networks to help undermine communist governments around the world.

The Belarusian quislings and the American intelligence officials each attempted to influence the other for their own purposes in the Cold War. The CIA tried to use the

Belarusians to gather intelligence and to create anti-Soviet paramilitary forces should the

Cold War break out into open warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union.

This did not ultimately happen, of course, and the CIA failed to gather useful intelligence or appreciably undermine the Soviet Union through the sponsorship of these dubious assets. The Belarusian collaborators, on the other hand, hoped to use their relationships to powerful countries opposed to the Soviet Union in order to increase their own prestige and ultimately to form an autonomous, anticommunist Belarusian government. Although they failed to realize this dream, the Belarusians did succeed in escaping prosecution for their wartime collaboration and exerted a subtle rightwing anticommunist influence on the policies of larger powers for decades.

Chapter One: Belarusian Nationalism, 1900-1943

Generations of political and cultural domination by powerful neighbors caused

Belarusian nationalists in the twentieth century to seek the creation of an autonomous

Belarusian state. The seeds of a distinctly Belarusian cultural identity and the aspiration for an independent Belarusian nation-state were first formed as a wave of nationalism swept Europe in the nineteenth century, but few tangible gains were made at this time.

Lying in the western reaches of the czarist Russian Empire, Belarusian lands were home to many different ethnic groups, including Jews, Lithuanians, Poles, Russians, and

Ukrainians.35 In fact, ethnic Belarusians barely comprised a majority in many territories considered Belarusian.36 Because most ethnic Belarusians lived in rural areas and the

Belarusian elite had become highly assimilated into Russian society, nineteenth century

Belarusian nationalism lacked the demographic preponderance and the urban leadership that helped propel other nationalist movements to political success and national independence. The development of Belarusian nationalism was further hampered by official policies of Russification, which included banning Belarusian language publications and referring to the area not as Belarus or Byelorussia, but rather as the

“Northwestern Region” (Severozapadnyj Kraj) of the Russian Empire.37

35 “Belarusian lands” or “Belarusian territories” are abstract terms used herein to describe all of the regions claimed by Belarusian nationalists as rightfully Belarusian, which includes modern day Belarus as well as some areas belonging today to Poland, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. 36 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 59. 37 Ibid., 57-59; David R. Marples, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), 2.

By the early twentieth century a sense of Belarusian cultural nationalism had begun to grow around the increased use of the Belarusian language. Although millions of people spoke different Belarusian dialects in the nineteenth century, few people could read the Belarusian language, and virtually no one did so exclusively. Most ethnic

Belarusian peasants were illiterate, and the elites had become thoroughly Russified or

Polonized. Belarusian is a Slavic language with similarities to both Russian and Polish, so literate Belarusian speakers initially expressed the language in written form either through Cyrillic characters with Russian spellings or by using the Roman alphabet with

Polish spelling conventions.38 The largely illiterate Belarusian peasantry and the lack of accepted conventions for the written Belarusian language caused Belarusian cultural nationalism to develop slowly in the nineteenth century. For example, although

Frantsishak Bahushevich (widely considered to be the father of modern Belarusian literature) published a collection of Belarusian poems in Austro-Hungarian Galicia in

1890, his work was not widely read by Belarusians at the time. Bahushevich’s poems were published using Polish characters to express the Belarusian words, so the publication would have been incomprehensible to the Belarusian people in the Russian

Empire who could not read Polish.39 Nevertheless, the work of intellectuals like

Bahushevich helped to create a distinct sense of Belarusian culture and identity in the late nineteenth century. The foundational cultural work of the Belarusian intelligentsia in

38 Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569- 1999 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 43-44; 46-47. 39 Ibid., 46.

these early years was crucially important to later developments, and later generations of

Belarusian nationalists venerated these “first Byelorussian regenerators.”40

Political developments in Russia in the first years of the twentieth century caused the initially slow development of Belarusian cultural nationalism to accelerate in several important ways. The formation of the first Belarusian political organizations and the repercussions of the unsuccessful Russian Revolution in 1905 created new opportunities for Belarusian nationalists to advance their agenda. The most influential Belarusian nationalist political party of the first half of the twentieth century was founded in 1902 with branches in Minsk, Vilna, and St. Petersburg. The organization was briefly known as the Belarusian Revolutionary Party before the name was changed to the Belarusian

Socialist Hramada.41 Known colloquially as the Hramada (Belarusian for “the Party” or

“the Assembly”), the organization would play an important role in the interwar years.

Although the Hramada would eventually splinter and form different political organizations, the party and its legacy would continue influencing Belarusian political discourse throughout the twentieth century.42

The nationalist and socialist Hramada of the early twentieth century was primarily concerned with ameliorating the exploitation of the Belarusian peasantry by their

40 “Program of the Farmers-Workers Party of Liberation of Byelorussia, 1948,” FBI Subject Files, RG 65, Box 71, NARA II. 41 Marples, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation, 3; Dorota Michaluk and Per Anders Rudling, “From the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Belarusian Democratic Republic: The Idea of Belarusian Statehood during the German Occupation of Belarusian Lands, 1915-1919,” The Journal of Belarusian Studies, 7, No. 2 (2014), 4-5. 42 Different incarnations of the Hramada were especially active in the first half of the century, and a new Hramada party formed in Minsk in March 1991, participating in the struggle for an independent Belarusian state during the dissolution of the Soviet Union (“Program of the Farmers-Workers Party of Liberation of Byelorussia, 1948,” FBI Subject Files, RG 65, Box 71, NARA II; Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History, 157).

aristocratic Polish and Russian landowners and fostering a sense of Belarusian cultural identity among the peasantry. The Hramada’s original conception of Belarusian autonomy was outlined after the uprisings of 1905, when members of the Hramada drafted a plan for the creation of a combined Belarusian-Lithuanian region that would exercise a degree of self-governance within the Russian Empire.43 Though calls for greater degrees of independence would gain supporters within the Belarusian nationalist movement over time, initial conceptions of Belarusian statehood reflected a pragmatic appreciation of the constraints under which Belarusian nationalism operated. In the early twentieth century the movement was confined mostly to a few urban centers, popular support was still growing, and full independence seemed unimaginable.

Although the Russian Revolution of 1905 did not succeed in deposing Czar

Nicholas II, the uprisings surrounding the revolution and their repercussions were watershed events in the development of Belarusian nationalism. There were no major uprisings in Belarusian territories, but a successful railroad strike in Minsk in October

1905 and the formation of revolutionary clubs in several Belarusian cities contributed to the growing political consciousness of the region. The Revolution of 1905 also inspired revolutionary acts by Belarusian nationalist activists. For example, Radoslaw Ostrowski, a young member of the Hramada who would go on to become the president of the Nazis’

Belarusian puppet regime, was first motivated to begin his political career in this

43 Competing conceptions of Belarusian autonomy in the early years of the nationalist movement included multiethnic unions with Baltic and Ukrainian states as well as an ethnographically determined Belarusian nation-state. As the biological and racial (as opposed to linguistic and cultural) understandings of nationality became ascendant in the twentieth century, the vision of an ethnic Belarusian nation-state became dominant (Michaluk and Rudling, “From the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Belarusian Democratic Republic”).

revolutionary climate. Nearly fifty years later Ostrowski would still proudly recall how

“the struggle against autocracy….engulfed me completely.”44 He began participating in student strikes, for which he created “some chemical means of persuasion (stink bombs).”45 Ostrowski was eventually arrested by czarist police and banned from university towns for his “underground work.”46

The uprisings of 1905 elicited concessions from the czarist regime that directly affected the growth of the Belarusian nationalist movement. Among other rights and privileges granted to the czar’s subjects as a result of the unrest was the repeal of the ban on Belarusian language publications. With this, the slow growth that Belarusian cultural nationalism underwent in the nineteenth century rapidly accelerated, and several books and newspapers printed in Belarusian became publicly available for the first time.47 The most important early Belarusian periodical, Nasha Niva (“Our Fields” or “Our Soil”), was printed in both Roman and Cyrillic text without establishing spelling or grammar conventions.48 Published primarily in order to promote the Belarusian language among the peasantry, Nasha Niva ran from 1906 to 1915 and served as an important tentpole of

Belarusian nationalism during the formative years of the movement in the early twentieth century.49 Another notable publication that helped to popularize the Belarusian language was a guide to grammar authored by the Belarusian linguist and nationalist activist

44 “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II. 45 V. Kalush, In the Service of the People: Biographical Notes on Professor Radoslav Ostrowski (London: Abjednańnie, 1964), 16. 46 Ibid.; “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 1. 47 Marples, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation, 2; Per Anders Rudling, “The Beginnings of Modern Belarus,” Journal of Belarusian Studies, 7, No. 3 (2015), 120. 48 Marples, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation, 2; Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, 46, 54. 49 Marples, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation, 2.

Bronislau Tarashkievich.50 This book helped to codify the language and facilitated its increased use by providing a set of guidelines that removed significant obstacles from the development of the Belarusian language in its written form.51

Although the Belarusian nationalist movement had made important steps in the decade leading up to the First World War, a sense of Belarusian identity among the peasantry of the region was not yet apparent to outside observers when German forces overran the western territories of the Belarusian region in 1915. Belarusian territories formed the Russian empire’s border with Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian

Empire, and so Belarusian lands became a warzone split by the frontlines. German authorities struggled to decide whether the Belarusian people comprised a distinct nation or were a subsection of the Lithuanian, Polish, or Russian peoples. Nevertheless, although they officially banned all political activism, the German authorities adopted a benevolent occupation policy that indulged and encouraged Belarusian cultural nationalism in the western Belarusian territories they occupied.52 The German authorities permitted Belarusian activists to establish Belarusian language schools, and they sponsored Belarusian theater productions and a Belarusian language newspaper.53

These policies must have been a welcome surprise to a population that had recently been bombarded with unfounded Russian propaganda portraying German forces as savage beasts indiscriminately raping, maiming, and murdering anyone in their path.

Although German troops in the rear areas of occupied Belarusian territories reportedly

50 Rudling, The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 222. 51 Rudling, “The Beginnings of Modern Belarus,” 120. 52 Michaluk and Rudling, “From the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Belarusian Democratic Republic,” 10. 53 Ibid.

engaged in prostitution, public drunkenness, and physical abuse of local residents, these incidents were exceptions to official German occupation policies.54 German authorities promoted an image of the German soldier bringing higher culture and civilization to the peoples under their control. In at least one Belarusian city, for example, the German forces introduced electric lighting for the first time.55 They encouraged the development of Belarusian cultural nationalism, repealed antisemitic Russian laws, and supported

Jewish schools and Yiddish language newspapers.56 Historian Waitman Wade Beorn observes that the positive impressions of this lenient occupation caused many local residents to expect a similar experience when the forces of the Third Reich invaded decades later.57

Nationalism in the western Belarusian territories under German occupation continued growing during the first few years of the war, but residents of the eastern

Belarusian territories still behind the Russian lines experienced a series of repressive official policies. At the beginning of the war, Russian authorities hoping to prevent potential sedition in the region banned any nationalist activities there and relocated nearly

1.5 million people from Belarusian territories near the front to regions further eastward.58

The fear instilled by the horrific stories of the anti-German propaganda campaign and the

54 Vejas G. Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 133. 55 Daniel Romanovsky, “Nazi Occupation in Northeastern Belarus and Western Russia,” in Bitter Legacy: Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR, ed. Zvi Y. Gitelman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 235. 56 Michaluk and Rudling, “From the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Belarusian Democratic Republic,” 10. 57 Waitman Wade Beorn, Marching into Darkness: The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belarus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 32. 58 Michaluk and Rudling, “From the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Belarusian Democratic Republic,” 7, 13.

sudden and sometimes violent fashion in which the relocation policy was applied meant that families underwent forced evacuations under chaotic and panicked conditions with little preparation. An estimated quarter of a million refugees flooded the roads connecting the western reaches of Belarusian lands to cities in the heart of the Belarusian region such as Minsk and Slutsk.59 The populations of the Belarusian borderlands who remained in the territories near the frontlines faced official cultural repression as well as hardships brought about by the war.

The Russian Revolutions of 1917 greatly changed the calculations of Belarusian nationalists in the central and eastern portions of Belarusian territories not under the control of German forces. After the February 1917 Revolution overthrew the government of Czar Nicholas II, local councils sprang up all over the eastern Belarusian territories still behind the Russian lines, and nationalist work there resumed.60 In August 1917, members of the Belarusian Hramada (some of whom would become key figures in the

Nazi puppet regime) attended an official conference of the provisional government in

Moscow hoping ultimately to forge an autonomous Belarusian republic within a post-

Imperial Russian confederation of states.61 Any potential arrangement for Belarusian autonomy within the framework of the provisional Russian government became moot several months later when the Bolshevik Revolution overthrew the government headed by Alexander Kerensky. Many prominent Belarusian nationalist activists came from

59 Rudling, The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 70. 60 Michaluk and Rudling, “From the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Belarusian Democratic Republic,” 13. 61 “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 1; Michaluk and Rudling, “From the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Belarusian Democratic Republic,” 13-5.

wealthy backgrounds that made them potential class enemies of the new Communist regime. Fearing persecution, many Belarusian nationalists living in Russia fled the country. They became the first of many Belarusian anticommunist émigrés to live in exile abroad.

Opportunistic Belarusian nationalist activists who chose not to emigrate took full advantage of the chaotic conditions following the Bolshevik Revolution to declare

Belarusian statehood. At the First All Belarusian Congress, a group of several hundred

Belarusian men purporting to represent all of the regions and political affiliations of the

Belarusian people first assembled in the Minsk City Theatre on December 5, 1917. The declarations of this congress were later mythologized in multiple versions of the

Belarusian nationalist canon as the foundational event of Belarusian statehood. Although up to 1,900 delegates supposedly attended the gathering, Rudling observes that “any visitor to that building can easily testify” that the building “simply cannot accommodate that many people.”62 Sources indicate that the number of attendees was likely much closer to three hundred delegates. In addition, the political spectrum represented by the participants was rather narrow and was dominated by the nationalist and socialist

Hramada. This convention marked the first attempt at Belarusian self-governance, although the progress made was almost purely symbolic. The delegates formed a rada, or council, to serve as an executive committee for the new government, but the group possessed none of the powers of a government and exercised none of a state’s functions.

Bolshevik authorities dissolved this ill-fated body before the end of the month.63

62 Rudling, “The Beginnings of Modern Belarus,” 122. 63 Ibid., 122-3; Michaluk and Rudling, “From the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Belarusian Democratic Republic,” 15.

The rada reassembled when German forces drove the Bolsheviks from the Minsk region and the rest of the Belarusian territories just two months later, but the nationalist victories of this council were short-lived. Within weeks of the signing of the Treaty of

Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, the First All Belarusian Congress convened to draft declarations of the establishment of the Belarusian National Republic (BNR). The congress approved a resolution proclaiming independence on March 25, 1918, which has since become an important date in Belarusian nationalist traditions.64 The establishment of the BNR was instantly nullified by German forces, however, because a provision of the treaty signed three weeks earlier prevented the Germans from establishing or recognizing any new states on the territories under their control. However indulgent they may have been toward Belarusian cultural nationalism, German authorities could not permit the announcement of an independent Belarusian government. Eventually the rada of the BNR was allowed to reconvene, but simply as a representative body through which the German occupation authorities dealt with the Belarusian people. The BNR rada tried unsuccessfully to convince German authorities to support the establishment of a

Belarusian state, but they barely succeeded in becoming a governing body on paper.

Nevertheless, Belarusian nationalists would use the titles and declarations of this period to legitimize their claims to autonomy and authority for decades.65 The only areas of

64 March 25, 1918 has been celebrated by anticommunist nationalists in the Belarusian diaspora for generations. Since the early 1990s, some Belarusians have also celebrated March 25 as an act of nationalist defiance directed at the pro-Russian policies of President Alexander Lukashenko. Suprisingly, this year the occasion of the centennial of the First All Belarusian Congress has received some official sanction from the Lukashenko government. At the time of this writing, the plans for the centennial celebration of the declaration of independence in Belarus include exhibitions, concerts, and rallies (Grigory Ioffe, “Belarus: Paradoxes of National Memory and Freedom of Speech,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 15, No. 12 [January 2018]). 65 Michaluk and Rudling, “From the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Belarusian Democratic Republic,” 16-20, 22-3.

public life over which the Germans granted the Belarusian council any authority were the administration of education, culture, and welfare. During this brief period of German occupation, the practice of restricting Belarusian nationalist activities to cultural spheres and relief efforts while denying Belarusian autonomy or independence set a pattern that would be followed a quarter century later when Nazi Germany occupied Belarusian territories for years.

When the Central Powers collapsed and German forces left Belarusian territories in late 1918, these lands became battlegrounds in both the Russian Civil War and the

Polish-Soviet War.66 As control of the region rapidly passed from one army to another,

Belarusian nationalists tried to assert their claims to national sovereignty in a flurry of kaleidoscopic declarations of statehood.67 The BNR council’s ineffectual declaration of

Belarusian independence in March 1918 was followed by several months in which the council functioned only as a local advisory body to the German occupation authorities.

Many members of the rada went into exile, and the group splintered into several factions.

Belarusian nationalists fought the Bolsheviks with Polish forces as well as with the anticommunist Russian White Army, but the Red Army reoccupied Minsk in December

1918 and ordered the dissolution of the remnants of the BNR rada.68 Polish advances in

1919 allowed exiled Belarusian nationalists to return briefly to their homeland, but the

Red Army’s westward counteroffensive placed all Belarusian territories under Soviet control in 1920.69 On July 31, 1920, a Belarusian Soviet republic was proclaimed at the

66 Rudling, The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 84. 67 Ibid., 66-122. 68 Ibid., 94. 69 Ibid., 101-5, 109-10.

Minsk City Theatre, the same location of the declaration of Belarusian statehood of

March 25, 1918.70 Peace negotiations between Polish and Soviet representatives began in

Minsk the next month, but no Belarusian representatives attended. The following spring, these negotiations resulted in the Peace Treaty of Riga, which ended the Polish-Soviet

War and officially divided Belarusian territories between Poland and the Soviet Union.71

Belarusian nationalists unsuccessfully attempted to fight off the imminent occupation and division of their homeland as the Polish-Soviet War entered its final stages. In early 1920, one faction of the splintered BNR declared the formation of another

Belarusian state and a Belarusian national army under General Stanisław Bułak-

Bałachowicz, a passionately anticommunist nobleman of mixed ancestry whose units had been fighting with the White Army in the Baltic states.72 Per Anders Rudling observes that although this force represented itself as a Belarusian “national army,” only one-sixth of these soldiers actually identified as Belarusian.73 One element of Bułak-Bałachowicz’s zealous anticommunism was a virulent form of antisemitism that conflated Bolsheviks and Jews. Bułak-Bałachowicz’s soldiers sustained themselves through the extortion of the local Jewish populations they encountered, and his forces conducted a series of pogroms throughout 1920 and 1921 that killed nearly 2,000 people.74 They stole food and valuables and engaged in sadistic crimes of public humiliation, organized and systematic rape, and murderous violence. In the predominantly Jewish city of Mozyr, for example,

70 Ibid., 113. 71 Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History, 70-1. 72 Rudling, The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 114-8. 73 Ibid., 114-5. 74 Ibid., 116-7; Claire Le Foll, “The ‘Belorussianisation’ of the Jewish Population during the Interwar Period: Discourses and Achievements in Political and Cultural Spheres,” East European Jewish Affairs 38, No. 1 (April 2008), 69.

Bułak-Bałachowicz’s forces murdered dozens of local Jews and raped over one thousand

Jewish girls and women.75

Other than Bułak-Bałachowicz himself, the most prominent member of his regime was Radoslaw Ostrowski.76 Ostrowski had fled Belarusian territories in December 1918 when German forces retreated, joining White Army forces in Crimea as an intelligence officer. When his division crumbled in December 1919, Ostrowski returned to his family in his hometown of Slutsk, where he took a job teaching at the local gymnasium. In 1920

Ostrowski joined the regime of Bułak-Bałachowicz as its minister of education, and he was with its army during the pogroms in Mozyr in October and November 1920.77 As the pogroms devastated the Jewish residents of Mozyr, Ostrowski maintained contacts with

Belarusian nationalists mounting the period’s final bid for Belarusian independence in his hometown of Slutsk.

The Slutsk Uprising of November 1920 occurred as Polish forces retreated westward and Bolshevik forces advanced to occupy Belarusian territories. For approximately five weeks, thousands of Belarusians fought an irregular partisan-style war against the Red Army for control of the Slutsk region.78 Bułak-Bałachowicz’s army joined the Slutsk insurgents, but the combined Belarusian forces remained outnumbered.79 Badly outmatched and undersupplied, the Belarusian forces retreated to the Polish side of the demarcation line west of Minsk in late December 1920. Although

75 Rudling, The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 117. 76 Ibid., 115. 77 “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 2-3. 78 Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History, 70. 79 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 115-6.

Polish authorities had initially supported the anticommunist Belarusian insurgents, they now disarmed and interned them near Łódź.80 Some of these forces reportedly went underground and continued to fight a guerrilla war against Soviet forces for the next decade.81 The nationalist aspirations for an independent Belarusian state created as a result of the turbulent conditions of the First World War, the Russian Revolution, and the

Polish-Soviet War ended with the remnants of the BNR and its armed forces in detention and exile.

The revolutionary events of the first two decades of the twentieth century powerfully influenced Belarusian nationalist thought for generations to come. Cultural activities had been crucial in the cultivation and mobilization of Belarusian nationalist sentiments. Symbolic assertions of autonomy and independence had proven unsuccessful without the backing of a powerful ally. The relatively benevolent occupation of

Belarusian lands by German forces in the First World War had caused many Belarusians to remember Germans as bearers of civilization and sponsors of Belarusian nationalism.

On the other hand, Bolshevik authorities had dissolved the BNR when they took control of Minsk, and Polish authorities had seemingly betrayed the forces of the Slutsk

Uprising. The regime of Bułak-Bałachowicz had conflated Jews and Bolsheviks, and the pogroms his forces committed had joined acts of murderous antisemitism to aspirations of Belarusian nationalism. As a result of these chaotic years, the shape of the Belarusian

80 Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History, 70, “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 3; Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 115. 81 “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 3.

nationalist movement had grown increasingly anti-Polish, anti-Russian, anticommunist, antisemitic, and pro-German.

On March 18, 1921, the Treaty of Riga officially went into effect, dividing

Belarusian territories between Poland and the Soviet Union and frustrating dreams of independent Belarusian statehood for decades.82 Although at first both powers permitted a limited degree of Belarusian nationalist activity, the Polish and Soviet authorities each would quickly become more repressive. The western Belarusian territories incorporated into Poland initially saw some signs that the recent progress of the Belarusian nationalist movement might continue in limited form within its new constraints. Although any degree of autonomy was denied to the Belarusian territories now forming the easternmost regions of Poland, the government granted Belarusians the right of political representation within the Sejm (the Polish parliamentary body) and pledged to honor the rights of the state’s national minorities. On the Soviet side of the new border, Belarusian residents also had cause to be optimistic that their culture and their national aspirations would be honored. Although the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) had little autonomy from Moscow, its existence made the idea of a Belarusian state a political reality.83 Belarusian was made the official language of the BSSR, and Belarusian schools and publications proliferated.84 In the years following the incorporation of Belarusian lands into Poland and the Soviet Union, Belarusians on both sides of the border had reason to believe that the struggle to promote Belarusian nationalist interests within these states would be reasonably tolerated. Almost immediately, however, these hopes would

82 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 116. 83 Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History, 76. 84 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 139-40.

give way to growing persecution and repression in both Poland and the Soviet Union. As legal opportunities for nationalist activism within Poland and the USSR disappeared,

Belarusian nationalists increasingly turned to foreign sponsors and underground activities to further their cause.

Although independent statehood and political autonomy had been denied them by the Treaty of Riga, Belarusian nationalists living in Poland in 1921 could find encouragement in authorities’ permissive stance toward the development of Belarusian cultural nationalism. Belarusian schools began opening after the Treaty of Riga was signed, and soon a handful of teachers’ colleges, several gymnasia, and over 400 primary schools were instructing Belarusian students in the Belarusian language.85 In addition, the

Polish government subsidized the Belarusian language press and supported several

Belarusian cultural and professional societies.86 This official support for the spread of

Belarusian culture and the use of the Belarusian language was a perfect reflection of the policies of Polish leader Józef Piłsudski, who had declared in 1920 that he was personally

“in favor of some significant concessions to the Belarusans in the field of their cultural development” but remained opposed to any “political concessions favoring a Belarusan fiction.”87 The Piłsudski government’s support for the Belarusian language was part of an attempt to supplant Russian culture and identity in Poland’s newly acquired eastern borderlands by promoting Belarusian culture, which was viewed as having benefitted from significant Polish influences.

85 Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History, 83. 86 Ibid., 83; Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 121. 87 Józef Piłsudski, in Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History, 82.

Official tolerance for Belarusian cultural nationalism waned, however, as

Piłsudski retired from politics after the Polish-Soviet War. The Polish government, increasingly dominated by the rightwing National Democrats (Naradowa Demokracja, popularly known by the Polish diminutive form of its initials as the Endecja), began to embrace twentieth century notions of a racial nation-state and initiated efforts to assimilate Slavic national minorities like the Belarusians.88 Polish support for Belarusian cultural nationalism in the early 1920s, therefore, was part of an effort to reduce Russian influence in the newly created state that conflicted with a simultaneous effort to Polonize and assimilate the Belarusian people. Belarusians who had been accustomed to using

Russian soon found themselves using Belarusian or Polish instead. Schools were no longer permitted to operate with Russian as the language of instruction, and the government officially recommended that Belarusian be written using Roman characters instead of the Cyrillic alphabet. One estimate in 1921 claimed that Catholic Belarusians in Poland who did not speak the Polish language could still become “completely assimilated” within a decade.89

The Belarusian national minority used their limited political rights to protest as the development of Belarusian cultural initiatives began to give way to increased

Polonization campaigns. Belarusians in Poland had been denied political autonomy, but they did have the right of representation in the Polish Sejm. In 1922, Belarusians in

Poland sent three senators and eleven deputies to the national assembly.90 The Belarusian

88 Rudling, The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 167. 89 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 121. 90 Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History, 83; Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 121-2.

representatives used their positions in the Sejm to agitate for further rights and privileges and to condemn Polish authorities for redistributing Belarusian lands to Polish colonizers rather than Belarusian peasants.91 The Belarusian political landscape in Poland was dominated by left-leaning groups, and the most influential organizations had ties to

Soviet authorities in Minsk and Moscow. Belarusian politics in Poland in the 1920s always were closely intertwined with underground activities sponsored by foreign powers.

Poland’s neighbors fostered Belarusian resentments to these policies and sponsored insurgent groups of Belarusian nationalists that conducted more than a thousand armed attacks.92 In early 1922, the Lithuanian army fostered a small group of

Belarusian guerrilla fighters who planned to incite a Belarusian uprising against Polish rule. The planned insurrection, however, resulted only in a few ineffectual attacks and the murder of two Polish policemen in April 1922.93 Several months after this unsuccessful project of the Lithuanian army, the underground Communist Party of West Belarus began conducting hundreds of armed operations with Soviet support. Rudling observes that these forces’ tactics (provoking harsh retaliatory actions from authorities that would make the population sympathetic to the cause of the insurgency) foreshadowed the tactics of Soviet partisans in the region during the Second World War. In retaliation for the series of guerrilla attacks, Polish authorities declared martial law, deployed thousands of

91 As part of the effort to Polonize the Belarusian regions of eastern Poland in the early 1920s, Polish authorities assigned much of the most valuable land there to thousands of Polish veterans known as Osadnicy, or military colonizers (Rudling, The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism,170; Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History, 83; Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 122). 92 Rudling, The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 181. 93 Ibid., 177-8.

police and soldiers to the Belarusian regions of eastern Poland, and incarcerated well over a thousand people accused of participation in the insurgency. By 1925 many members of the underground bands had been arrested and the attacks grew less frequent.94

Consequently, Belarusian nationalists began camouflaging their revolutionary activism behind a veneer of legal political activity designed to avoid Polish retaliation. In

January 1925, the Belarusian linguist and nationalist activist Bronislau Tarashkievich joined the Communist Party of West Belarus; months later he helped to reconstitute the

Belarusian Hramada as a legitimate front organization for the underground activities of the illicit party.95 The new party’s platform did not call for violent insurrection, but its revolutionary agenda was readily apparent. In a newsletter published three weeks after the party first formed, the new Belarusian Peasants’ and Workers’ Hramada released its program to the Belarusian people of Poland. Tarashkievich wrote:

We regard ourselves as being revolutionary socialists and internationalists while our comrades…deceive themselves by believing that they seize concessions for our people from the Polish government. We do not have these illusions. We are once and for all cured of all illusions and also do not believe in the justice of such democratic regimes…We are convinced that the Union of Workers and Peasants will create that force which will lead to the victory of our social and national slogans. And these slogans are: revolutionary workers’ and peasant government, independence of Byelo-Russia, and close union with the nations who have already created a new social structure.96 Membership in the new Hramada soared, and it quickly became the most influential

Belarusian political party in Poland. Several members of the Hramada would become influential figures in the Nazi puppet regime. Radoslaw Ostrowski and Juri Sobolewski,

94 Ibid., 181, 190-1. 95 Ibid., 190-1. 96 “Translation from July 11, 1925 issue of Valka (Battle): Memorandum for Director FBI from CIA,” 19 January 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 1.

who served in the Polish Sejm as Hramada party members in the 1920s, would become the president and vice-president of the Belarusian auxiliary government created by the

Schutzstaffel (SS) in 1943, respectively.

The Polish government did not tolerate the revolutionary rhetoric of the Hramada for very long. The outspoken political agitation of the Hramada deputies in the Sejm directly questioned the validity of the Polish state and its authority over its Belarusian subjects, and the new party was closely linked to the Communist Party of West Belarus.

In the late 1920s, Polish authorities arrested hundreds of members of the Hramada, including its deputies in the Sejm. Ostrowski and Sobolewski were both swept up in this crackdown, but neither was incarcerated long. Rumors that they secured their releases by cooperating with Polish authorities and informing on their compatriots sullied the men’s reputations for decades.

Official policies concerning Belarusian nationalism followed a similar course in the BSSR. Early signs of encouragement soon gave way to increasingly repressive policies. In the first years of Soviet rule, Belarusian culture flourished as new schools opened and Belarusian language publications proliferated. Soviet nationalities policy initially encouraged cultural recognition and development while discouraging political autonomy. Soviet authorities permitted and even encouraged the spread of Belarusian culture, and the BSSR became home to a number of Belarusians who had been targeted by Polish authorities in their crackdown on the Hramada. Leaders like Tarsahkievich, who had founded the party, moved to the BSSR upon their release. Most of the members of the BNR rada returned to Minsk from exile in Poland and Germany in the mid-1920s, and the city became home to many prominent nationalist activists who worked to

promote Belarusian culture and language in the new Soviet state through Belarusian dictionaries, libraries, and universities.97 In 1929, however, Belarusian nationalists who had returned to the BSSR from abroad were arrested in large numbers. Nationalist activists were executed or relocated to Siberia, and Belarusian literature, scholarship, and religious icons were confiscated by state authorities. The nationalist cause in the BSSR continued to suffer as it lost influential leaders to the continued Stalinist purges and

Russification campaigns of the 1930s.98

Belarusian Nationalists and Nazi Germany

When the Nazi Party assumed control of Germany in 1933, the Third Reich began to exert particular appeal as a potential sponsor of the Belarusian nationalist movement.

Germany’s growing military strength, the Nazis’ antisemitic and anti-Polish racial ideologies, and the regime’s fundamental hostility to communism and the Soviet Union made the Third Reich appeal to the Belarusian nationalists as a powerful potential ally.

Because Belarusian lands lay directly between Berlin and Moscow, Nazi leaders viewed anti-Polish and anti-Soviet Belarusian nationalists as useful but disposable assets in their expansionist schemes. Anticommunist Belarusian émigré leaders hoped that the German invasion and occupation of Poland and the Soviet Union would destroy both of the states that governed Belarusian territories. Ultimately, their goal was to lead a new, autonomous

97 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 144-5. 98 Ibid., 145-8; Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 30-1.

Belarusian state within the so-called New Order envisioned by the Nazis, but Belarusian autonomy did not fit in with these plans.

Some Belarusian nationalist émigrés living in Germany identified closely with the

Nazi regime. In the 1930s, a small Nazi-sponsored Belarusian organization operated in

Berlin, and the German capital became an important center of Belarusian émigré activities until the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. A young Gestapo informant named Fabian Akinchyts even attempted unsuccessfully to create a Belarusian National

Socialist Party as early as 1933.99 Akinchyts sought to raise awareness of the Belarusian nationalist cause among Germans while promoting Nazism to anticommunist

Belarusians. Other Belarusian organizations in Germany in the 1930s worked with Nazi authorities, including student groups and poverty relief charities. These groups were all used by Belarusian nationalists and German authorities to mobilize Belarusian anticommunist émigrés in Germany in order to facilitate the planned invasion and occupation of the lands marked by the Nazis for Germany’s eastward expansion.

The Belarusian nationalists received more official attention as preparations for the

German invasion of Poland proceeded in 1939. A German official named Gerhard von

Mende began promoting official projects with Belarusian émigrés in July 1939 in order to foster potential fifth column forces within the territories marked for invasion.100 After the war, Mende would promote similar projects involving some of the same individuals to

American intelligence officials.101 When the German invasion of Poland began on

99 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 94; Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 261 f39. 100 Ivan Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, trans. Clarence Augustus Manning (London: Byelorussian Central Council, 1989), 204. 101 “CAPRIFORM: Contact with Russian National Minorities,” 18 May 1949, CIA Name File of Gerhard von Mende, RG 263, ZZ-18, Box 88, NARA II, 2; Ian Johnson, A Mosque in Munich:

September 1, 1939, Belarusian nationalists who had been living there began working immediately with the German authorities. Local Belarusians organized themselves into groups and provided the Germans with information concerning local geography and local populations. Ostrowski headed the Belarusian organization in Warsaw, and other collaborators served as auxiliary civilian government officials to facilitate the occupation by the German forces. Juri Sobolewski, for example, became the Bürgermeister (mayor) of his hometown of Stoubcy, where he was alleged to have submitted lists of individuals to the German authorities for incarceration and execution. When the Red Army invaded eastern Poland on September 17, Sobolewski was imprisoned for his crimes during his brief time as the German occupation’s mayor. He would remain in jail until the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

Throughout 1939, Belarusian nationalist activities and organizations in Germany and occupied Poland proliferated. Among the officially sponsored projects were the

Belarusian newspapers Belaruski Rabotnik (The Belarusian Worker) and Ranitsa (The

Dawn), the Samapomac (Belarusian Self-Help Organization), and the Belarusian

Vertrauensstelle in Berlin (literally “Trust Office,” the Vertrauensstelle was a committee of émigrés advising German authorities on Belarusian issues). Belaruski Rabotnik and

Ranitsa were originally published in Berlin for Belarusian anticommunist émigrés living in Germany. These publications continued to propagandize for the Reich during the war when their intended readers became Belarusian laborers euphemistically called

Ostarbeiter (literally “eastern workers,” these laborers lived and worked in difficult

Nazis, the CIA, and the Muslim Brotherhood in the West (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2010).

conditions segregated from German society and marked by mandatory white and blue cloth patches with the abbreviation “OST.” Usually teenagers and young adults, these individuals were drafted to work within the Reich under coercive and misleading conditions by German authorities in order to alleviate the growing labor shortages caused by the war’s increasing German reversals).102

Belaruski Rabotnik and Ranitsa were “semi-official” publications of the Reich that closely reflected Nazi ideology.103 The Belarusian Nazi Party did not have a large base of support, however, so using Belarusian nationalist parties became necessary to advance Nazi propaganda among the Belarusian people. Belaruski Rabotnik had limited appeal, as it demonstrated “a noticeable leaning toward Nazi ideology.”104 German authorities also supported the publication of Ranitsa, but this newspaper presented itself as the legitimate organ of a Belarusian Catholic nationalist party led by priest Vincent

Hadleuski rather than a mouthpiece for the Nazis and their Belarusian imitators.105

Hadleuski collaborated with the Nazis, but he was more reluctant than other Belarusian nationalists. In 1942, an underground Belarusian independence party for “neither the

Russians nor the Germans” would be formed in Minsk under Hadleuski’s leadership even as he continued working for the German occupation.106 The first issue of Ranitsa was published in Berlin on December 3, 1939, and the newspaper would continue publishing

102 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 266 f81. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid., 165. 105 Ibid. 106 Hadleuski would be arrested in summer 1942 with other unreliable Belarusian collaborators, and he was either shot or tortured to death on December 24, 1942 (Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 94, 136; Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 189-90, 266-7 f83).

Belarusian nationalist propaganda throughout the war in order to mobilize Belarusian support for the Third Reich.107

The contributors and editors of Ranitsa included several more eager Belarusian

Nazi collaborators who would emigrate to the United States after the war or become assets of the CIA. For example, Vitaut Tumash, a leading member of a pro-German

Belarusian student organization in Berlin before the war, would become editor of Ranitsa after the Germans and their collaborators retreated from Belarusian territory in June

1944. Tumash would ultimately emigrate to the United States, where he produced intelligence reports for CIA analysts and remained active in cultural and political circles within the Belarusian community for decades. Another editor of Ranitsa, Stanislaw

Stankievich, would serve as the German occupation’s Belarusian mayor of the city of

Barysau, where he would become complicit in the administration and destruction of the

Jewish ghetto constructed there. As Chairman of the Learned Council of the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich after WWII, Stankievich led an office of academics that was a part of a larger CIA anticommunist propaganda campaign.108 Anton

Adamovich, another Belarusian author who cooperated with the editorial board of

Ranitsa, would join the Belarusian puppet regime created by the SS in December 1943.

In the 1950s, Adamovich would edit a CIA sponsored Belarusian language newspaper

107 The last issue was published from the Sudetenland in German-occupied Czechoslovakia in April 1945 (Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 261 f23). 108 Codenamed BGCALLUS, the Institute for the Study of the USSR was a part of CIA project QKACTIVE, which included the production of written propaganda as well as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe (“Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files, Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Disclosure Acts,” National Archives and Records Administration, accessed 29 March 2018, https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/second-release- lexicon.pdf).

called Bazkaushtshyna (The Fatherland) and run the Belarusian desk for Radio Liberty, an anticommunist propaganda broadcasting operation covertly run by the CIA.109 He would also contribute to the work of the CIA’s Institute for the Study of the USSR.110

The Samapomac also labored to mobilize Belarusian support for Nazi Germany’s war effort. The organization started additional branches in several major cities throughout

Germany and occupied Poland. Its members conducted charitable relief work within their communities, but they also organized these communities into pools of potential recruits for use as local guides, paramilitary saboteurs, and auxiliary occupation forces. The organizing work of the Samapomac provided a legitimate cover as these individuals created a network of Belarusian reserve administrators who would soon serve the German occupation of the Soviet Union. This included individuals like Ostrowski and Tumash, who ran the Samapomac chapter in Łódź in occupied Poland.111 Ostrowski began organizing a Belarusian aid committee in Łódź in January 1940, and he soon began registering Belarusian émigrés working in textile factories there and networking with groups of Belarusians living elsewhere in Germany and occupied Poland. He also lobbied

German authorities “to obtain the release of Byelorussians [sic], who had been arrested as

Poles, from German concentration camps at Dachau and other places.”112 Tumash moved to Łódź from Berlin later that year, and Ostrowski gave over leadership of the

Samapomac network he had established to his former pupil “while he himself remained

109 “Adamovich, Anton,” in Biographical Dictionary of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, eds. Wojciech Roszkowski and Jan Kofman (M. E. Sharpe, 2008). 110 Anton A. Adamovic, “Soviet Literature and Art,” in Forty Years of the Soviet Regime: A Symposium of the Institute for the Study of the USSR (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1957): 77-114. 111 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 34-5; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 206. 112 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 34-5.

responsible for the Lodz [sic] branch of the Byelorussian [sic] representation in Berlin”: the Vertrauensstelle.113

In 1941, the members of the Berlin Vertrauensstelle helped the office of Nazi foreign policy minister Alfred Rosenberg form a Belarusian “National Center” to “plan, guide and coordinate all activities of the Byelorussian [sic] national affairs in Germany and General Government.”114 This committee would organize and register “all known

Byelorussian political and cultural activists” willing to work with the Third Reich in its campaign against the Soviet Union, and it was designed to become the foundation for the

German occupation’s Belarusian auxiliary administration.115 The Vertrauensstelle had assistance establishing this committee from the leaders of Samapomac and from representatives of the few members of the BNR rada who had not returned to the BSSR in the mid-1920s with many other nationalist leaders.116 Rosenberg’s staff “summoned to

Berlin” BNR representatives Vasil Zacharka and Ivan Ermachenko shortly before the

German invasion of the Soviet Union.117 Zacharka and Ermachenko had sent a seventeen- page memorandum to Hitler asking him to personally consider the Belarusians in any

“future developments” shortly after German forces occupied Prague in 1939, and they had first been summoned to Berlin to discuss the Belarusian situation even before the

German invasion of Poland.118 In June 1941, the men reportedly met with senior Nazi officials for three hours talking over the possibilities of Belarusian autonomy within the

113 Ibid. 114 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 206. 115 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 96; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 205. 116 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 205-7. 117 Ibid., 205. 118 “Memorandum from Zacharka and Ermachenko to Hitler,” 1939, in Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 96.

Nazis’ so-called New Order and the potential terms for collaboration between the BNR and the Third Reich.119 Negotiations continued for months while Zacharka and

Ermachenko helped the members of the Berlin Vertrauensstelle to create a committee to coordinate Belarusian collaboration with Belarusian Nazi leader Fabian Akinchyts. They traveled throughout German-occupied Poland, meeting with Ostrowski, Tumash, and other Samapomac leaders to discuss the Germans’ campaign to mobilize their Belarusian collaborators. Representatives from these groups met on June 19, 1941 to establish a central coordinating committee, and Tumash helped to prepare “a long memorandum addressed to Hitler” asking for clarification of the Reich’s intended policies for

Belarusian lands and some assurance of Belarusian “national independence…through political and economic cooperation with the Third Reich.”120

Negotiations between the BNR and the Third Reich ultimately dissolved because

German officials would not give the Belarusian collaborators any such assurance.

Zacharka, who had assumed leadership of the BNR in exile, insisted that the Germans must recognize full Belarusian independence after the successful conclusion of the Third

Reich’s war of annihilation against the Soviet Union as a precondition for an alliance with the BNR. Negotiations between Rosenberg’s staff and the BNR continued until

September, but Zacharka ultimately refused to accept the terms offered because they did not meet his demands.121 Although no official relationship between the BNR and the

119 Rosenberg’s emissaries for this meeting were reportedly Georg Liebbrandt, the head of the eastern policy division of Rosenberg’s office, and Andor von Henke, the former German Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 177, 263 f25-6; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 205-7; Douglas Tottle, Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard [Toronto: Progress Books, 1987], 76). 120 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 206. 121 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 177, 263 f26.

Third Reich resulted from the discussions with Rosenberg’s staff, individual members of the BNR worked closely with the German occupation of their homeland. Ermachenko, for example, developed a reputation for being so eager and sycophantic that he would become known by the nickname “Herr Jawohl” during the German occupation for his enthusiastic collaboration.122

As Belarusian political leaders organized themselves and negotiated with Nazi officials, the Abwehr (German military intelligence) began readying Belarusian paramilitary forces for operations within Soviet territory. In late 1940, the Warsaw

Samapomac chapter began working with the Abwehr to recruit young Belarusian men to train for sabotage missions behind Soviet lines.123 German military officials also recruited paramilitary volunteers from other Samapomac chapters in German-occupied Poland in early 1941.124 Ostrowski would later recall that the initiative for the formation of these auxiliary Belarusian paramilitary forces came from their German sponsors. In a deposition given to the CIA in 1952, he recalled that German officials approached him at the Samapomac chapter he led in Warsaw and “suggested that we organize a parachute detachment to be dropped on the other side of the demarcation line. A school was organized in Ostrolenka (not far from Lomzhi [sic] in Poland).”125 Dozens of trainees took courses in parachuting, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare at this school, and at the end of May 1941 the Abwehr issued orders for these forces to be deployed just before the

122 Literally “Mr. Yes, Definitely” (Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 144; Tom Lampert, One Life [Orlando, FL: Harcourt, Inc., 2004], 54). 123 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 97. 124 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 205. 125 “The Belorussian Central Rada (Council): Past and Present,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 2.

launch of Operation Barbarossa in order to secure strategically valuable bridges and sabotage railways behind Soviet lines.126

Days before the German invasion of the USSR, dozens of Belarusian saboteurs parachuted into the Soviet Union.127 Charged by the Abwehr with blowing up a major railroad line needed to resupply Soviet forces in the western provinces of the BSSR, one unit of Belarusian guerrillas parachuted into a region southwest of Minsk on June 18, but they were ultimately apprehended by Soviet forces and did not accomplish their mission.128 Other units parachuted into the Bialystok region in the northwest BSSR on

June 20, but one collaborator would later recall that the units “were soon captured and everybody was immedietely [sic] executed by the Soviet military authority.”129 The day before the launch of Operation Barbarossa, a unit of Belarusian saboteurs parachuted into the southwest BSSR near Brest and engaged in a short fight before being arrested and imprisoned in Łomża until German military forces arrived and released their Belarusian collaborators. Another unit of ten men landed near Minsk on the day of the German invasion, and this group supposedly accomplished their mission and evaded capture until

German forces arrived.130 Nearly all of these operations ended disastrously for the

Belarusian soldiers involved, as all but one of these units were quickly captured or killed.

126 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 204-5; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 97. 127 Sources disagree on the exact number of Belarusian guerrillas parachuted behind Soviet lines in June 1941 as well as the exact dates of the missions, but at least fifty men were dropped into the BSSR between June 18 and June 22, 1941 (Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 205; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 97). 128 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 97. 129 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 205. 130 Ibid.

The Belarusian paratrooper units dropped into the BSSR by the CIA the following decade would meet similarly disastrous ends.

Belarusian collaborators were also involved in the German attack on the Soviet

Union through the dissemination of Nazi propaganda over the radio. On June 22, 1941, the day Operation Barbarossa launched, the Belarusian Catholic priest Hadleuski made a radio broadcast into the BSSR urging his countrymen to begin an uprising in support of the German invasion. Belarusian collaborators continued to use German radio to broadcast such appeals to rise up against Soviet authorities.131 There is little evidence to suggest that Hadleuski’s appeals were successful, but many Belarusian civilians did welcome the invading German military as liberators. One collaborator, Boris Ragula, would later recall how he watched Belarusian villagers greeting the German soldiers with bread and salt presented on white cloths, lighting devotional candles before their religious icons and “offering prayers of thanks to God for bringing Stalin’s cruel reign to an end.”132 Using rightwing Belarusian nationalists to broadcast anticommunist propaganda into the Soviet Union was another tactic that the CIA would repeat when it created Radio

Liberty in 1950.

As German forces swept into Belarusian territories in summer 1941, they brought several collaborators who would become instrumental in the Belarusian auxiliary administration of the conquered territories under the German military and civilian occupation authorities. The territories near the frontlines with the Red Army initially fell under the jurisdiction of the German military administration; as the front moved further

131 Ibid., 207. 132 Boris Ragula, Against the Current: The Memoirs of Boris Ragula (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014), 57-8.

east and these became the military’s rear areas, a civilian administration would assume control of the occupation under the authority of the Ostministerium (Eastern Ministry) headed by Alfred Rosenberg. In the first days of July, several Belarusian collaborators returned to their homeland to assist the German occupation. Approximately 40 members of the Belarusian organizations in Germany and occupied Poland left Warsaw at that time for the territories of the BSSR occupied by the Wehrmacht.133 Tumash traveled to

Warsaw on June 29 in order to meet with Dr. Mykola Shchors, the head of the central committee organizing Belarusian emigrants for Nazi Germany. Shchors had close ties to the Gestapo, and he helped to arrange the collaborators’ travel from Warsaw.134 Tumash traveled to Minsk via Bialystok, and German military occupation authorities appointed him acting mayor of Minsk on July 5. He immediately began organizing the city’s

Belarusian administration and police forces.135

Ostrowski and four other collaborators traveled to Minsk via Pinsk and Brest, creating networks of Belarusian collaborators as they went.136 Upon arriving in Minsk on

July 13, Ostrowski received orders from the German military administration to appoint collaborationist administrators and police chiefs in the districts surrounding Minsk.137 He would later brag that he had organized the entire district in “less than a fortnight.”138

Granted the use of a car by the German military authorities, Ostrowski traveled extensively behind the German lines in the weeks and months after the invasion, and for

133 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 36. 134 “The Belorussian Central Rada (Council): Past and Present,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 3. 135 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 210. 136 “The Belorussian Central Rada (Council): Past and Present,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 3. 137 Ibid.; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 210. 138 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 35.

years he would remain boastful of the large number of regional auxiliary administrations he had created in such a short period of time. In a 1952 deposition given to the CIA, he proudly recalled his work for Nazi Germany in the summer of 1941:

Having been supplied with military transport, I had been able to organize 21 raions [districts] in the Minsk oblast [region]. This astonished and impressed the Germans, who then asked me to include the city Minsk in the general administration…I refused, not wanting to spoil my relations with Tumash, who was young and ambitious.139 Groups of Belarusians kept returning from Germany throughout the summer.

Many influential collaborators returned to Minsk in the months after the initial invasion, such as Francishak Kushel (an officer from the Polish Army who would become the leader of the Third Reich’s Belarusian military forces in 1944) and

Ivan Kosiak (an architect who would become the leader of the US incarnation of the SS puppet regime).140

As the rapid advances of the Wehrmacht pushed the Red Army further to the east, units of the Einsatzgruppen (these mobile killing units’ euphemistic name translates roughly to “Special Action Groups”) followed closely behind the

German military, conducting mass murders of Jews, Roma, Communist Party leaders, and others deemed potential security threats. Einsatzgruppe B first began conducting massacres of adult male civilians on Belarusian territory shortly after the German invasion of the USSR began. Before the end of the summer of 1941, these practices expanded to target women and children as well. This first wave of mass murders in summer 1941 was followed in the spring and summer of 1942 by

139 “The Belorussian Central Rada (Council): Past and Present,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 3. 140 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 212.

further genocidal campaigns, in which local Belarusian police forces became more heavily involved.141 During World War II, Nazi Germany and its collaborators murdered approximately eighty percent of the prewar Belarusian

Jewish population, which has been estimated at one million individuals.142

In recent years, scholars have increasingly turned their attention to these mass shootings on the Eastern Front, which often occurred in forested areas just outside victims’ hometowns.143 The Wehrmacht, German police units, and auxiliary forces of collaborators also became involved, and violence sometimes occurred in towns in full sight of residents.144 Little effort was made to prevent civilians from witnessing these executions, and in fact Belarusian émigrés and local residents often became involved in these mass murders as guides, informants, and auxiliary security forces. Stankievich, for example, served among the 30 to 40 Belarusian guides attached to Einsatzgruppe B, which followed the

Wehrmacht’s Army Group Center through the BSSR toward Moscow.145

German forces created Jewish ghettos in towns and cities throughout Belarusian territories during the late summer and autumn of 1941, delegating oversight to Belarusian collaborators in order to reduce their administrative burdens. Local auxiliary police often guarded ghettos and enforced order, and the collaborationist administrations frequently

141 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 256, 268. 142 Walke, Pioneers and Partisans, 3-4; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 256. 143 Desbois, Holocaust by Bullets; Snyder, Bloodlands; Walke, Pioneers and Partisans. 144 Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust; Beorn, Marching into Darkness. 145 Juri Sobolewski may also have acted as a guide for Einsatzgruppe B, but his precise activities during the summer of 1941 are difficult to substantiate (Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 97, 122 f59).

enriched themselves with the stolen property of the persecuted Jews.146 In several cities, the Germans made Belarusian mayors directly responsible for the creation and administration of ghettos in which to confine the region’s Jews. Tumash signed orders establishing the ghetto in Minsk and issued work assignments to the ghetto inmates.

Approximately 75 kilometers to the northeast in Barysau, the orders for the creation of a

Jewish ghetto were issued by Stankievich, the Belarusian mayor appointed by the

Germans. Stankievich extorted money and valuables from the ghetto’s inmates and took action against any Jews defying his orders. In Stoubcy, the Germans appointed Ivan

Awdziej to serve as Bürgermeister (mayor) in summer 1941. Awdziej strictly controlled the ghetto in Stoubcy, issuing orders making it a crime for local non-Jewish residents to barter with or smuggle food to ghetto inmates.147 Officials like Tumash, Stankievich, and

Awdziej were also responsible for producing lists of individuals deemed dangerous by the Nazis, including Jews, Roma, Polish intelligentsia, clergy, and communists.

Belarusian collaborators submitted these lists to German authorities, and these individuals were almost invariably executed. Several collaborators who would later immigrate to the United States or work for the CIA served the Germans in this capacity during the war.

As the German front lines pushed further east and the German civilian administration replaced the military administration in Minsk, a power struggle ensued among the Belarusian collaborators. On September 1, 1941, Wilhelm Kube became

Generalkommissar für Weissrussland (General Commissioner for White Russia

146 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 147. 147 Ibid., 266-7.

[Belarus]) and established his headquarters in Minsk. Generalbezirk Weissrussland was a part of the larger Reichskommissariat Ostland under the overall command of his old friend Hinrich Lohse, to whom the disgraced Kube likely owed his appointment.148 Kube was an “old Nazi” fighter who had briefly been interned in a concentration camp for attempting to blackmail Martin Bormann by writing an anonymous letter alleging that

Bormann’s wife had Jewish heritage; he had volunteered for service in the SS in order to redeem his reputation.149 When the German military administration handed authority of the region to Kube, he asked Ostrowski to remain in Minsk as the head of a Belarusian

Nebenbüro, or administrative satellite office. This new arrangement meant that the

Belarusian administrative offices had to report to their German counterparts and supervisors more closely than before, and any semblance of administrative authority that they had begun to enjoy vanished.150

Quarrels frequently erupted among the Belarusian administrators in Minsk as they competed for influence under the new civil administration, which favored its own collaborators. In mid-September, Ermachenko drove from Prague to Minsk in order to exploit his connections to Rosenberg’s ministry to secure a position of influence under the German civil administration.151 Jealousies and infighting grew, and several leading

Belarusian collaborators allegedly informed on one another in attempts to eliminate their competition.152 In spring 1942, somebody would even poison Ermachenko’s coffee with

148 Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand, 156-7. 149 Ibid., 156. 150 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 37-8. 151 Lampert, One Life, 214. 152 “The Belorussian Central Rada (Council): Past and Present,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 3-4.

arsenic in an assassination attempt that very nearly succeeded.153 Belarusian leaders began to demonstrate signs of disillusionment with Nazi Germany’s plans for the

Belarusian territories under Kube’s jurisdiction. For example, Ostrowski acted spurned by the new arrangements with the German civil administration and the new restrictions placed upon his personal privileges: on the evening of October 30, 1941, the attempted confiscation of his wireless radio by German police “so annoyed Ostrowski” that he resigned from the Nebenbüro in an angry letter to Kube and followed his “former colleagues in the Military Administration Headquarters” east in order to organize networks of Belarusian collaborators in the Bryansk region.154

The same week that Ostrowski resigned from the German civil administration’s

Belarusian Nebenbüro over his radio, a brutal pogrom occurred in his hometown of

Slutsk.155 Operating under Einsatzgruppe A, the German 11th Reserve Order Police

Battalion left Minsk with auxiliary Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft (literally “Security

Squad”) units in late October 1941 and proceeded immediately to Slutsk, which lies approximately one hundred kilometers south of the Belarusian capital. This force had been ordered “to effect the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Slutsk, within two days.”156 The German civil administration in Slutsk objected, however, demanding that the massacre be postponed in order to spare the lives of the Jewish forced laborers being exploited by the German occupation in local workshops and factories. On October 30,

153 Lampert, One Life, 217. 154 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 38; “The Belorussian Central Rada (Council): Past and Present,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 3. 4-5. 155 Ostrowski’s memoirs as told to V. Kalush and his 1952 depositions to the CIA both recount the radio incident in great detail, but neither makes a single reference to the brutal massacre in Slutsk that occurred at approximately the same time. 156 Heinrich Carl, in Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 148-9.

Gebietskommissar (Area Commissioner) Heinrich Carl reported to Kube that despite his objections to the first lieutenant of the 11th Reserve Order Police, the combined German and Lithuanian force soon encircled the Jewish quarter of Slutsk. They dragged Jewish men, women, and children out of their homes and workshops and transported them in trucks to execution sites outside of town. In two days, these forces murdered approximately 5,000 Jews in the Slutsk area.157 The combined German and Lithuanian force also shot Jews in the town of Slutsk itself, and non-Jewish residents of the town suffered indiscriminate beatings as well.158 Carl complained to Kube:

The Jewish people, but also among them White Ruthenians [Belarusians], were taken out of their dwellings and herded together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The [Belarusians] were in greatest distress to free [themselves] from the encirclement…the Jewish people…were mistreated in a terribly barbarous way in the face of the [Belarusian] people…the [Belarusians] themselves were also worked over with rubber clubs and rifle butts.159 Kube forwarded Carl’s report of the Slutsk massacre to Lohse and Rosenberg, suggesting that the public atrocities should be brought to the attention of the Reich’s top authorities.160 Carl and Kube expressed their displeasure with the events because the civil

157 “United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kazys CIurinskas, Defendant-Appellant,” 19 June 1998, Findlaw.com, accessed 23 April 2018, https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th- circuit/1392347.html; “United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kazys Clurinskas, Defendant-Appellant,” 19 June 1998, Justia.com, accessed 23 April 2018, https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/148/729/510457/; “Lithuania: War Crime Suspect, Deported from USA, Rejects Charges,” BBC Monitoring Service, 3 June 1999, 1. 158 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews: Student Edition (New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1985), 142-3. 159 This passage describing the suffering of the Belarusian people is emphasized in Ostrowski’s memoirs, which was published from his former address in London in 1964 (Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 40-3; Heinrich Carl, in Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 149). 160 Ostrowski would later cite Kube’s objections as proof of his own impotence and innocence in the persecution of the Jews in a rhetorical plea for his readers to exonerate him and his compatriots from culpability for their complicity:

administration hoped to cultivate Belarusian support for the German occupation while exploiting Jewish forced labor. Indiscriminate violence and the murder of Jewish skilled laborers undermined these goals.

In other cities and towns throughout Belarusian territories, German authorities delegated mass killing operations entirely to the local Belarusian auxiliary administrations and their police forces. In the town of Barysau, for example, approximately 7,000 Jews were murdered by the local Belarusian auxiliary police under the direction of the local Belarusian Bürgermeister, Stanislaw Stankievich.161 The same month as the massacre in Slutsk, Stankievich issued orders to the auxiliary Belarusian police of Barysau to remove all of the Jews from the city’s ghetto, transport them to sites outside the city, and execute them.162 Wearing armbands adorned with the white-red- white stripes of the Belarusian nationalist flag, the Belarusian police carried out the massacre on their own without assistance from German units.163 These forces then looted

If, then, the General Commissar [sic] for Byelorussia [sic] and other high officials could not stop the atrocities perpetrated by their own countrymen and hired henchmen, how can the slightest blame be put on Belorussian [sic] nationalist leaders and on R. Ostrowski personally? (Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 43; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 143) 161 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 128; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 267-8; Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand, 251-3. 162 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 268; Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 40. 163 Ironically, in order to disprove such instances of Belarusian antisemitism, Ostrowski relies on antisemitic stereotypes. In a biography of Ostrowski that shares so many stylistic and personal details that Ostrowski himself almost certainly was the ghostwriter, he would insist that Belarusian Jews must have destroyed or misused documentation after the war that would otherwise have proven local Belarusian residents’ sympathy for and aid to their Jewish neighbors: Although documents…were in existence after the war, they were mainly in the possession of Jews, who allowed their material to be used by writers not always anxious to give an objective account of events, and did not hesitate to ‘lose’ documents which did not fit their theories… Ostrowski concluded:

their murdered victims’ belongings.164 Much of the violence in Barysau occurred in view of the city’s Belarusian residents, whom German observers noticed were reacting at first with satisfaction at the murder of the Jews, then with growing disbelief and anxiety, and finally with religious mysticism and fatalism. Knowledge of these executions caused rumors to spread that the Nazis intended to annihilate the Slavic peoples while the threat from underground resistance fighters began to grow.165

The brutal nature of the Third Reich’s rule disillusioned many of those who had initially welcomed the Germans as liberators from Stalin, and the Soviet partisan movement began to attract some local support. After the rapid initial advances of the invasion slowed in late 1941, guerrilla warfare began to become a significant threat to the

German military’s rear areas.166 Historian Timothy Snyder observes that while partisans had barely been able to keep themselves alive in the chaotic conditions following the invasion in 1941, Soviet guerrilla forces began taking the offensive in 1942.167 The Nazis often conflated their campaigns to annihilate Jews with antipartisan warfare, although

Jews who managed to escape to partisan units were often met with hostility, or were even

The Germans’ henchmen were usually Communists and Moscovites [sic] whose intention was to compromise the Byelorussian [sic] nationalist movement by exhibiting on their sleeves the Byelorussian [sic] colours when engaged on their murderous missions (Kalush, In Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 40, 42). 164 Kalush, In Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 40-2; Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand, 251-2. 165 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 128. 166 “Report by Kube on the Extermination of Jews and the Fight against the Partisans in Byelorussia,” 31 July 1942, in Documents on the Holocaust: Selected Sources on the Destruction of the Jews of Germany and Austria, Poland, and the Soviet Union, eds. Yitzhak Arad, Yisrael Gutman, and Abraham Margaliot (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1981), 411-413; Snyder, Bloodlands, 237-49; Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 267 f8. 167 Snyder also points out that Jews were often met with hostility even if they somehow managed to get themselves to a Soviet partisan unit (Snyder, Bloodlands, 237-41).

murdered for their weapons.168 Some Jewish partisans, such as Tuvia Bielski’s forces in the Navahrudak region, began devoting their underground activities to rescuing Jews rather than killing and sabotaging Germans.169 In 1942, the number of active partisans in the Belarusian regions under German occupation quadrupled, making the area one of the largest insurgent challenges to Nazi domination in Europe.170

As the war continued, the increasing troubles faced by the German occupation created further opportunities for the Belarusian nationalists willing to collaborate with the

Third Reich. Although the Belarusians would win some concessions from the German authorities, the Belarusian collaborators would never be more than an expedient to the

Germans. Nazi racial hierarchies classified Slavic peoples such as the Belarusians as inferior Untermenschen (“subhumans”) worthy only of being exploited by the German people. The German authorities would prove willing to make significant concessions to their Belarusian collaborators’ nationalist aspirations as the needs of the war and the occupation grew, but these changes reflected a pragmatic approach to exploiting the local population rather than any genuine appreciation or support for Belarusian nationalism or statehood.

Facing increasingly successful partisan attacks and flagging local support for the

German occupation in 1942, Kube called together a committee of Belarusian collaborators to advise him on matters of local policy and serve as a liaison representing the Belarusian civilian population to the German authorities. In June 1942, Kube

168 Snyder, Bloodlands, 237-8. 169 Nechama Tec, Defiance: The Bielski Partisans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Snyder, Bloodlands, 237-8. 170 The Soviet estimate of partisans in the region grew from approximately 23,000 to just under 100,000 (Snyder, Bloodlands, 238).

appointed Ermachenko as “a sort of native spokesman and adviser” and gave him control of an advisory committee with an office at the civil administration’s Minsk headquarters.171 These collaborators hoped to expand their position and become an autonomous governing body under the German occupation.172 Ermachenko even aspired to become the president of a future independent Belarusian state within the Nazis’ so- called New Order after the war ended.173

Mistrusted by his fellow collaborators, the local population, and the SS,

Ermachenko nevertheless grew close to Kube. For example, on Kube’s 55th birthday,

Ermachenko sent the Generalkommissar greetings and well wishes on behalf of himself and his committee, and Kube responded with warm and familiar language: “My dear, dear Dr. E.! I thank you…for the very friendly birthday wishes. You have all made me very happy…With the best wishes for you and your work, your Wilhelm Kube.”174 Doing everything he could to personally ingratiate himself to the Generalkommissar,

Ermachenko even coerced a female Belarusian doctor whom Kube fancied into working as the Generalkommissar’s housekeeper by threatening her with harassment by the police if she refused.175 Ermachenko, “not a novice in politics,” successfully cultivated his relationship with Kube while building up the strength of his advisory committee and the

Samapomac he led in Minsk.176

171 Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand, 157. 172 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 149. 173 Lampert, One Life, 217. 174 “Letter from Wilhelm Kube to Ivan Ermachenko,” in Lampert, One Life, 216-7. 175 Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand, 158; Lampert, One Life, 67. 176 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 144

In June 1942 Kube appointed him “supreme commandant” of a new Belarusian antipartisan defense force.177 Kushel, who had arrived in Minsk in summer 1941, led the recruiting drive for this force, which the German administration intended to be merely irregular bands of anticommunist volunteers modeled loosely on the Freikorps of post-

WWI Germany.178 The Belarusian leaders involved hoped that this might provide the basis for a Belarusian national army, but the German authorities did not even supply the units with uniforms, weapons, or food. Instead, the burden for supplying this antipartisan force fell on local Belarusian administrators and peasants, and many soldiers defected from these poorly organized units and joined the partisans themselves.179

The poor performance of Ermachenko’s Belarusian antipartisan forces, rumors of his personal corruption, and suspicions of his own ambitions contributed to his downfall in spring 1943.180 Kube’s experiment forming irregular Belarusian defense forces had failed to meet the partisan threat, and in fact the units’ desertions had swollen their ranks as the partisans challenged German forces for control of the Belarusian countryside with growing success. This unfolded as rumors of Ermachenko’s handling of the Samapomac charity’s funds abounded and SS-Obersturmbannführer Eduard Strauch ordered an investigation into the organization.181 In mid-April 1943, Ermachenko was summoned to the offices of the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service, or SD) for interrogations lasting for an entire week. Ermachenko was accused of smuggling gold to Prague, helping his sisters-in-law furnish their apartment with items they took from the Samapomac

177 Ibid., 295. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid., 296-7. 180 Ibid., 296; Lampert, One Life, 217-8. 181 Lampert, One Life, 217.

storeroom, trading 45 pounds of embezzled flour for a fur coat for his secretary, and stealing 9,000 pounds of salt.182 After a week of interrogation and abuse, Ermachenko was released from prison and sent back to Prague, where he was forbidden from engaging in political activity. The SS in Minsk reported rumors among the Belarusian people that

Ermachenko had grown a beard in Prague in order to cover the facial scars caused by his interrogation.183 Sobolewski took over administration of Kube’s Belarusian advisory council, and the antipartisan defense force Ermachenko led was officially disbanded in

May 1943.184 He tried unsuccessfully to restore his position with the Germans, but he continued drawing a salary from the Ostministerium until January 1944. In 1948, “Herr

Jawohl” would emigrate to the United States and continue practicing medicine in upstate

New York.185

As the underground resistance to the German occupation grew more aggressive over 1943, German efforts to suppress the partisans amounted to little more than campaigns of mass murder directed not at partisan combatants, but at civilians.186 In May

1943, German antipartisan forces destroyed several villages north of Minsk, killing the inhabitants by locking them in barns and burning them to the ground.187 In 1943, many of these operations targeted the remaining Jewish and Roma and Sinti populations who had survived the waves of mass murder in 1941 and 1942.188 Over the three years of the

German occupation, these so-called antipartisan campaigns on Belarusian territories

182 Ibid., 217-8. 183 Ibid. 184 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 152, 296. 185 “Woman Physician Dies in Car Crash,” The Canandaigua Daily Messenger, 22 October 1949, 1; Lampert, One Life, 219-21. 186 Snyder, Bloodlands, 250; Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 193. 187 Snyder, Bloodlands, 246. 188 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 166; Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 348.

killed approximately 350,000 people, at least ninety percent of whom had not been armed.189 The population of Belarusian territories was decimated by the war and the genocidal campaigns conducted during it. Approximately two million inhabitants of the region died during the war, including roughly eight hundred thousand of the prewar

Belarusian Jewish population.190

Generalkommissar Kube ultimately lost his campaign against the partisan underground, which succeeded in assassinating him in September 1943. A young woman named Halina Mazanik, known to the partisans by her Komsomol nickname, “Black

Maria,” infiltrated Kube’s home as a housekeeper and allegedly became his mistress. On

September 22, 1943, she assassinated Kube by placing a timebomb in his bed.191 Soviet partisans and Belarusian nationalists each claimed that the woman worked for them, and rumors at the time identified her alternately as Belarusian, Jewish, or Russian. A Soviet intelligence officer who defected to the US in 1954, however, confirmed that he had personally directed Mazanik to assassinate Kube.192

Kube’s assassination marked an important turning point in the German occupation of Belarusian lands. A struggle to fill the power vacuum left by his death would soon begin between the SS and the Ostministerium headed by Alfred Rosenberg. The increasingly aggressive partisan threat in Belarusian territories and the deteriorating

189 Snyder, Bloodlands, 250. 190 Leonid Rein, “Untermenschen in SS Uniforms: 30th Waffen-Grenadier Division of Waffen SS,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, no. 2 (2007), 330; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 256; Walke, Pioneers and Partisans, 3-4. 191 Snyder, Bloodlands, 249; Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 193, 267 f6; Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History, 97. 192 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 267 f6; M. S. Handler, “Another Russian Defects to West; Bars Slayer Role: Secret Police Agent Quits Rather Than Kill an Official of Refugee Organization,” The New York Times, 23 April 1954, 1, 5.

military situation faced by Nazi Germany created demands for labor and auxiliary military forces in 1943 that Kube’s policies had not met. This situation would soon provide the Belarusian collaborators with the opportunity to form a puppet regime under the Nazis, which would become a central part of rightwing Belarusian nationalist mythology for decades in spite of the regime’s extremely brief existence and its utter dependence on the authority of the Third Reich.

Belarusian nationalism was still a young movement caught between the constraints of Polish and Soviet authority when Nazi Germany began to exert special appeal as a potential sponsor and ally. Russian, Polish, and Soviet domination of

Belarusian lands had impeded the development of Belarusian culture, language, and identity. Despite significant progress in the early twentieth century, Belarusian nationalism was still a relatively small and weak cultural movement when the Nazi Party assumed control of Germany. Seeking a strong ally in their struggle for autonomy, many leading Belarusian nationalists enthusiastically tied their movement to the Nazis. These collaborators eagerly facilitated the invasion of their homeland by helping to organize local auxiliary forces and propagandize on behalf of the German occupation, and they became complicit in the crimes of the Holocaust as guides to Einsatzgruppe B and as

German-appointed mayors. Ambitious Belarusian nationalists sought simultaneously to advance their cause and their own careers, continuously competing for influence among themselves while trying to associate their movement more closely with Nazi Germany.

Although scholars have studied the development of Belarusian nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the historiography exploring the impact of collaboration on this movement remains undeveloped. Focusing on the impact that World

War I and its aftermath had upon Belarusian nationalism, Rudling asserts that the movement rose and fell in the quarter century following the failed Russian Revolution of

1905.193 Some works on Belarusian nationalism examine the early years of the twentieth century but then skip over the events of World War II and the Cold War entirely to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the establishment of modern Belarus.194 Others summarize the events of the German occupation in a few pages of broader historical context, but virtually no scholarship examines the activities of the Belarusian diaspora after World War II.195 Some Belarusian nationalists have written accounts that provide much useful information on this overlooked period, but these accounts often obscure the extent of local collaboration with the German occupation or the role of leading collaborators in the postwar Belarusian émigré community in the US.196 Examining the opportunistic collaboration of leading members of the Belarusian nationalist movement builds on the current scholarship on Belarusian nationalism and collaboration to reveal how these anticommunist Belarusian émigrés compromised their fragile young nationalist movement by aligning it with Nazi Germany and involving themselves in the crimes of the Holocaust.

193 Rudling, The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism. 194 Nelly Bekus, Struggle over Identity: The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness.” 195 Marples, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation. 196 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation; Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History; Vitaut Kipel, Belarusans in the United States (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999).

Chapter Two: The Belarusian SS State and the Fall of the Third Reich, 1943-1945

The assassination of Generalkommissar Wilhelm Kube in late September 1943 initiated pivotal changes in the German occupation’s leadership and its approach to

Belarusian nationalism and the use of local collaborators. Alfred Rosenberg’s

Ostministerium and Heinrich Himmler’s SS both advanced candidates to replace Kube and secure administrative control of German-occupied Belarusian lands for themselves.197 A brief political struggle to determine Kube’s successor resulted in the appointment of SS leader Curt von Gottberg to the post of acting commissar for

Belarusian territories (Reichskommissar für Weissrussland). With Gottberg installed as acting commissar, the SS had gathered together the power and authority of the German occupation’s civil administration, police, and security forces. This made Kommissariat

Weissrussland the only state in Nazi-dominated Europe that operated completely under the control of the SS.198

Historian Timothy Snyder has observed that between 1941 and 1944, the brutal occupation policies and genocidal campaigns of the German occupation made Belarusian territories into the “deadliest place on Earth.”199 During these three years, German and collaborationist forces murdered approximately eighty percent of the prewar Belarusian

Jewish population, estimated at one million people. These campaigns also targeted Roma and Sinti, Communist Party officials, and other groups that Nazi ideology deemed racial

197 Snyder, Bloodlands, 249; Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 193, 267 f6; Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History, 97. 198 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 166-7. 199 Timothy Snyder, “Holocaust: The Ignored Reality,”New York Review of Books 56, no. 12 (2009).

or political threats to the regime. Most of these mass murders occurred during two separate campaigns. The first wave of targeted murders occurred in the wake of the

German invasion in summer and fall of 1941, and the second followed in spring and summer of 1942.200 Historian Anika Walke explains that “the speed and brutality” with which German authorities implemented their genocidal designs in Belarusian territories was “remarkable when compared to these campaigns elsewhere in Europe.”201 By the time that the SS came to dominate the administration of Belarusian territories in 1943, most of the Jews murdered during the German occupation were already dead. The members of the devastated Jewish and Roma and Sinti communities who had survived the initial waves of mass murder in 1941 and 1942 were targeted for annihilation as the

German administration developed a policy of brutal antipartisan reprisals in 1943.202

Gottberg’s promotion to acting commissar was intended to be a temporary solution to the escalating partisan attacks, but he remained in his post until the end of the occupation in 1944.203 As the higher SS and police leader for these territories, Gottberg had already developed a reputation for responding aggressively to the partisan threat to the security of German rear areas of occupied Belarusian lands. The SS administration quickly created auxiliary Belarusian antipartisan military forces and a Belarusian puppet government, whose nominal authority relied completely on the power of the Third Reich.

The Belarusian SS state would not last long, however, as the Red Army’s counteroffensives drove German forces completely from Belarusian territories in summer

200 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 256. 201 Walke, Pioneers and Partisans, 4. 202 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 166; Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 348. 203 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 167.

1944. Within months of its creation, the Germans’ Belarusian puppet regime would be forced to flee west with their sponsors to Berlin to represent themselves as a legitimate government-in-exile until the fall of the Third Reich.

The SS regarded itself as the racial elite and the ideological vanguard of Nazi

Germany, but Gottberg’s administration quickly began making pragmatic concessions to

Belarusian nationalism. Neither the SS nor Gottberg himself supported the nationalist dreams of the Slavic Belarusians or the establishment of an independent Belarusian state, but his administration permitted the creation of a Belarusian puppet regime in order to mobilize local auxiliary forces deemed necessary to alleviate the Third Reich’s growing military and administrative burdens. German military reversals were mounting in 1943 and 1944 as partisan attacks in Belarusian territories grew bolder and more frequent, making it necessary for the new administration to rely on local collaborators more than ever. Although the SS made only limited concessions to the Belarusians, the increased recognition and indulgence that Gottberg’s administration gave to Belarusian nationalism represented an important victory for the collaborators and demonstrates how German occupation practices developed in reaction to the exigencies of the war in an improvised and polycratic fashion.

Gottberg and the SS may have been unlikely champions of Belarusian nationalism, but the new German administration would create a Belarusian puppet regime and a military force that provided far greater opportunities for their Belarusian collaborators’ nationalist aspirations than Kube and his administration ever had. Gottberg and the SS exploited the Belarusians for their own purposes, but their collaborators were not merely passive pawns in the war between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. The

leading Belarusian Nazi collaborators took advantage of the situation and used German power to advance their nationalist agendas and personal ambitions, continuing to organize themselves under the SS even as the Red Army drove German forces from

Belarusian territories. Many of the most prominent and influential collaborators would remain boastful of their work for the SS for decades after the war, using their wartime collaboration as anticommunist credentials and the foundations for their postwar claims of authority.

When Gottberg became acting commissar in autumn 1943, the Red Army had already liberated several Belarusian territories east of Minsk from German occupation.204

Partisan units controlled many rural areas throughout the region as the Red Army continued their westward drive. Kube’s assassination was emblematic of the increasingly bold and successful partisan attacks against German strongholds in 1943. Faced with this deteriorating situation, the new German administration instituted a different approach to recruit larger numbers of Belarusians to help support the German occupation and war effort. Gottberg had previously expressed contempt at the idea of a future Belarusian state dependent on Nazi Germany, but after becoming acting commissar he quickly began ordering the creation of Belarusian nationalist organizations that the SS could use to recruit auxiliary Belarusian military forces. Although the SS created and sponsored them, these organizations would utilize Belarusian nationalist emblems and symbols to increase their local appeal and obscure their reliance on the Third Reich.

204 Ibid., 166.

Gottberg sought to counter the growing partisan threat by forming auxiliary

Belarusian forces to hunt down and combat the Soviet guerrillas. In autumn 1943,

Wilhelm Traub, the SS district commissar for the Navahrudak region, created a local mounted antipartisan unit under the direction of the SS that was designed to remain completely Belarusian in appearance.205 One morning in early autumn 1943, Traub summoned Boris Ragula, his twenty-three-year-old personal translator and trusted liaison officer, to visit him at his private residence in Navahrudak. In his memoirs many years later, Ragula would still recall how he was received that morning: a German guard saluted him at the entrance to Traub’s home before the commissar’s “very attractive and pleasant” wife showed him into the living room, where Traub himself “graciously served me a glass of schnapps.” According to Ragula, the two men drank and “exchanged a few pleasantries” before Traub announced that he and the SS were considering greater concessions to their Belarusian collaborators’ nationalist aspirations in order to mobilize local support for the German occupation. Ragula would later boast that Traub credited him with persistently urging the SS to offer greater support for Belarusian nationalism in exchange for closer collaboration:

Now, [Traub] admitted, he had a better sense of what I had been attempting to communicate since the beginning of his administration…that under the prevailing conditions the aspirations and national goals of Belarusians were compatible with the goals of the German people. By collaborating, Belarus and Germany could work towards the creation of a new order in the Soviet Union.206 Although Ragula had pushed for closer collaboration and greater recognition of

Belarusian nationalist aspirations, it was Gottberg’s new approach to the German

205 Ragula, Against the Current, 74-7. 206 Ibid., 75.

occupation’s deteriorating situation that ultimately produced Ragula’s next opportunity.

According to Ragula’s account, Traub explained how Gottberg sought the “active participation of Belarusians in determining their own future, in defending against the Red

Guerrilla threat, and in confronting the approaching danger of the Red Army.”207 Traub then outlined “the basic plan” for a cavalry unit of 150 men under Ragula’s command that would answer directly to German authorities in Minsk.208

Ragula had ingratiated himself to the German authorities during the occupation, becoming a trusted translator and accompanying his German employer on an automobile trip through the Reich. He exhibited considerable personal ambition as he pursued new positions working for the German occupation, but he also continued underground nationalist activities that the German authorities soon would channel into the creation of an ostensibly Belarusian armed force working on the occupation’s behalf. The first of

Gottberg’s efforts to exploit the nationalist impulses of the Germans’ Belarusian collaborators found a willing and receptive young officer in Ragula, who was enthusiastic about the prospect of leading a Belarusian military unit under the SS. Ragula later remembered that he “tried to remain detached” as he sat and listened to Traub’s proposal:

“Although I tried to hide my enthusiasm,” Ragula would recall, “I could not quell my feelings of triumph.”209

The next morning, Ragula traveled to Minsk in order to receive instructions for the formation of the unit from Gottberg himself, whose physical stature and official status both seem to have inspired awe in the ambitious young Belarusian. Traub had arranged

207 Ibid., 74-5. 208 Ibid., 75. 209 Ibid.

for a German fighter pilot to fly Ragula and his personal secretary directly to the capital to meet the newly appointed acting commissar. Ragula noted that Gottberg’s “military bearing, fine features, and intelligent eyes, impressed me. I noted the SS insignia on his uniform.”210 Ragula boasted to Gottberg that he already had begun preparing many young men for military service and would have the unit operating within the month.211

The First Belarusian Cavalry Squadron, known simply as the Eskadron

(Belarusian for “squadron”), spent most of its short life organizing and training.212 Ragula would later boast that “we had 150 men ready to join” the mounted antipartisan force within a week of his meeting with Gottberg, but the Eskadron “remained cloistered” in

Navahrudak for several months conducting exercises and drills.213 The unit did not even receive weapons or ammunition from the Germans until spring 1944, although it was issued “grey German uniforms,” which were worn “with the Belarusian insignia…and the red-and-white flag emblazoned on the collars and sleeves.”214 Ragula’s troops operated under the direct orders of the German authorities, but after World War II, Ragula would represent his unit as an independent Belarusian militia that protected local villages from both Soviet partisans and German attacks. Although the Eskadron was the first ostensibly

Belarusian military force organized under the Third Reich, it was small and otherwise unremarkable. By the time the unit began engaging in limited skirmishes with “the Red

Guerrilla forces” in the vicinity of Navahrudak, Gottberg announced the creation of other

210 Ibid., 76. 211 Ibid., 77. 212 “Biographical Debriefing, Constantine Mierlak,” 9 July 1957, CIA Name Files, Entry ZZ-18, RG 263, Box 90, NARA II, 12. 213 Ragula, Against the Current, 89. 214 This insignia was a simple cross with two horizontal bars. This emblem was based on the cross of St. Euphrosyne, an ancient Belarusian religious symbol used on many nationalist and collaborationist designs (Ragula, Against the Current, 77, 89).

Belarusian nationalist organizations that would quickly eclipse both the practical and symbolic importance of the Eskadron.

As the Germans’ military situation deteriorated further in late 1943, Gottberg began hastily assembling a Belarusian puppet regime in Minsk. He designed this council to act as a local mouthpiece for the German administration in its efforts to mobilize the

Belarusian population into auxiliary military forces that could aid Nazi Germany’s failing campaigns against the Red Army and the Soviet partisans, who had recently assassinated

Gottberg’s predecessor. During the third week of December, Gottberg informed Juri

Sobolewski, the chairman of the Minsk Samapomac (Belarusian Self-Help Organization) and the former leader of Kube’s Belarusian advisory council, that prominent collaborators must assemble quickly in order to select candidates to lead a new regime that was to be called the Belarusian Central Council (BCC). Gottberg asked Sobolewski to begin organizing a meeting of prominent Belarusian Nazi collaborators, which

Sobolewski did “without delay.”215 He immediately sent for Radoslaw Ostrowski, who had been organizing local police forces and civilian collaborators for use by the German military administration in the regions east of Minsk since Ostrowski had angrily resigned his commission with Kube’s civil administration in October 1941 after it had not given him enough work or authority for his liking.216

The urgency of Sobolewski’s message and the involvement of the new commissar were both evident from the way Ostrowski was summoned to Minsk. Around midnight, a

215 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 262. 216 The final straw, however, was the confiscation of Ostrowski’s radio in October 1941 (“The Belorussian Central Rada [Council]: Past and Present,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 4).

German officer personally delivered a telegram to Ostrowski at the home of his daughter’s family in Baranovichi, approximately 150 kilometers southwest of Minsk. The officer delivering the note came directly from the office of the Baranovichi district commissar, and he explained that a car would be sent to bring Ostrowski to meet a

German military train passing through Baranovichi at 3 o’clock in the morning.

Ostrowski found a place reserved for him on the train, and he arrived in Minsk early the next morning in time to join a meeting already underway at Sobolewski’s apartment.217

Sobolewski had “gathered together some of his most trusted workers” from among the

German occupation’s Belarusian auxiliary administrators, and they were all excitedly discussing the possibilities of Gottberg’s proposal for a Belarusian council when

Ostrowski joined them.218 According to Ostrowski’s biography, “all the speakers were agreed” that they must follow Gottberg’s plan, and to his surprise they urged Ostrowski himself to “head the new body.”219 He initially refused on the grounds that he could not work with the German civil authorities who had provoked his resignation two years earlier when they had curtailed his authority and attempted to confiscate his radio.

Gottberg summoned a delegation from this group to his office to receive the charter of the new puppet regime. Sobolewski, Ostrowski, and a third Belarusian representative, Mykola Shkelonak, went to the commissar’s offices and met with several

German officers, including Gottberg himself. Ostrowski would later depict his conduct during this meeting as that of a reluctant hero who rose to meet the demands of the occasion and manipulated the German commissar into granting important concessions to

217 Ibid., 5. 218 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 262. 219 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 49.

the Belarusian nationalists. The delegation supposedly explained that they “had decided to accept the proposal and had voted for R. Ostrowski to head the new organisation…but that R. Ostrowski had declined.”220 According to Ostrowski’s account, the Germans pressed him to give his reasons for refusing, and so he “spoke for nearly an hour” while they “listened attentively” and “took notes in shorthand.”221 He would claim that lecturing the German officers on their lack of appreciation for Belarusians’ nationalist aspirations won Ostrowski their admiration, and that “when he had finished, the Germans came up to him, shook his hand and thanked him for his honest account.”222 One German officer supposedly turned to Ostrowski and announced:

Although this is the first time I’ve met you I am convinced that you are a great patriot and care for the fate of your people. I therefore think that you have no right to forsake your people in these difficult times and I promise you that we for our part will take your opinions into account.223 Collaborators’ postwar accounts describe how Ostrowski still refused to accept the presidency of the new regime unless Gottberg agreed to three conditions: “1)

Assistance in organizing the Byelorussian Country Guard (BKA – Belaruskaya

Krayovaya Abarona) including a supply of arms; 2) The BKA [was] not to be used on the western front; and 3) The convocation of the Second All-Byelorussian Congress.”224

Ostrowski then supposedly “repeated his conditions,” and “after a few more questions and answers…Gottberg consented to all Ostrowski’s proposals and promised him every assistance.”225 Gottberg and the SS, however, had only intended to indulge Belarusian

220 Ibid., 50. 221 Ibid., 51. 222 Ibid. 223 Ibid., 52. 224 Ibid.; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 262. 225 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 52-3.

nationalism insofar as it helped to mobilize local support for the German war effort and antipartisan campaigns. Ostrowski claimed that he predicated his acceptance of the presidency of the BCC on the condition that the SS would sponsor the creation of the

BKA, but this was actually the very reason Gottberg had created the council in the first place. Ostrowski supposedly claimed that only after his demands were satisfied would he reluctantly agree to shoulder the burden of leadership, “fulfilling his duty to the

Byelorussian people and his fatherland…despite the critical circumstances of that time.”226

Ostrowski’s account portrays himself not only as a noble patriot, but also as a shrewd negotiator who successfully manipulated Gottberg’s desire to form a Belarusian governing body. The concessions he supposedly won from Gottberg and the SS would rather conveniently lend the BCC a more democratic and legitimate appearance while declaring the enduring anticommunist orientation of the collaborators and their sympathy for the Western Allies. It seems as if the Belarusian collaborators were girding themselves against the possibility that the Allies would defeat Nazi Germany, bringing

Soviet authority back to Belarusian territories. Before the BCC had even been established, its leaders began cynically preparing their emerging regime for the fall of the

Third Reich by outlining conditions for cooperation that could be used after the war as a testament to the council’s unwavering opposition to communism, its unwillingness to wage war against the Western Allies, and its commitment to democratic principles. In

Ostrowski’s account, the Germans virtually begged him to become the president of the

BCC. The conditions he supposedly made, however, were little more than the precise

226 Ibid., 77.

goals Gottberg envisioned when he created the BCC: a puppet regime legitimized by the trappings of Belarusian nationalism that could be used to mobilize an auxiliary military force to help the Third Reich fight the Soviet Union.

Although Gottberg and the SS created the BCC for the purpose of exploiting its potential to recruit auxiliary military forces for the Third Reich, the collaborators who formed the leadership of the council viewed Gottberg’s initiative as an opportunity to create the basis of a Belarusian national army and an independent Belarusian state carved out within the “new order” of Nazi-dominated Europe. If Nazi Germany’s war against the

Soviet Union failed, Ostrowski and the others hoped that vesting the BCC with symbols of legitimacy could help it to become a Belarusian government-in-exile.

After the war, Sobolewski would claim that the founding of the BCC and the aspirations of statehood it represented were the sole reasons he and his compatriots collaborated with Nazi Germany. Summarizing a statement Sobolewski would make to

US intelligence agents in 1951, Sobolewski’s interviewer explained:

It was true that the organization and he himself had cooperated with the German forces in World War II, but that this cooperation was purely for the setting up of the Byelo-Russian Central Administration, which was done and which he and his colleagues intended should continue when and if Byelo-Russia is ever freed from Soviet domination.227 Sobolewski’s comment not only describes the nationalistic motivations for his own collaboration, but it also implies that he and his fellow collaborators cynically agreed to the foundation of the BCC because the regime could become useful to them even if

Soviet authority returned to Belarusian territories. Opportunistic calculations that the

227 “Internal Security Report on George Sabolewski,” 20 December 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 4-5.

BCC would either become the government of an autonomous state within Nazi- dominated Europe or the foundation of a government-in-exile may explain why the trio of collaborators meeting in Gottberg’s office agreed to his proposal “in spite of the

German’s [sic] precarious situation on the eastern front” and the numerous constraints

Gottberg placed on the proposed council.228

The Belarusians had taken no part in the creation of the council’s charter or the drafting of its statutes, but they represented the regime as their own independent creation.

Sobolewski would later exaggerate the initiative of the Belarusians and attempt to minimize Gottberg’s role as the creator of the BCC, claiming that the commissar merely

“allowed the Byelo-Russian Central Administration [another common translation for the

BCC] to set up its self-government.”229 Other collaborators, however, would admit that

Gottberg was the architect and creator of the BCC: it had been “his initiative” to create a local puppet regime, according to Ivan Kosiak, and Gottberg designed the BCC to reflect

“the character of a Byelorussian Government” rather than to be a truly autonomous governing structure.230

In fact, the BCC was such a dependent creation of Gottberg’s administration that it cannot be accurately referred to as a collaborationist government, but rather it should be understood as a Nazi puppet regime. The new council was designed to rely completely on the authority of the German administration and the power of the SS, and its charter specifically noted that Gottberg retained the authority to appoint or dismiss any member

228 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 262. 229 “Internal Security Report on George Sabolewski,” 20 December 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 4. 230 Italics added. Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 262.

of the council, including its president. Gottberg designed the BCC to act as a mouthpiece for his administration and to facilitate the mobilization of the population for the German occupation’s failing antipartisan campaigns, and he allowed the rada to exercise only nominal authority over the development of Belarusian cultural and educational programs.

In his study of Belarusian collaboration, historian Leonid Rein observes that the BCC had so little authority of its own that it actually acted as little more than “an advisory body” to

Gottberg.231

The German administration announced the creation of the BCC with official fanfare, and the council quickly began organizing its offices throughout German- occupied Belarusian territory. The BCC planned a formal ceremony to mark the occasion of its first official meeting in January. The invitations to the inaugural session of the

BCC, which were printed in both German and Belarusian, welcomed recipients to attend

“the first ceremonial assembly of the Belarusian Central Council…on 22 January 1944 at

10am in the banquet hall of the BCC” before adjourning to “the dining room of the BCC” for a celebratory luncheon.232 The inaugural session was followed by official pronouncements in Belarusian occupation newspapers while the council appointed regional representatives to organize collaborationist administrative, police, and military forces.233

231 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 168. 232 Radoslaw Ostrowski, “Invitation to Inaugural Session of Belarusian Central Council,” 19 January 1944, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 14, Immigration History Research Center Archives, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, ME (IHRCA). 233 “The Belarusian Central Council Headed by Mr. Radoslaw Ostrowski Comes to Life on the 21st December 1943 in Minsk,” Ranitsa, 9 January 1944, (Berlin), 3.

Several of the men appointed to serve as the BCC’s regional representatives had been eager Nazi collaborators already for years and would become important figures within the anticommunist Belarusian diaspora in the Cold War. Ragula was appointed as the BCC representative in Navahrudak and would later become the first liaison agent between the Belarusians and the CIA in the early 1950s. Stankievich, who had served as a guide for Einsatzgruppe B in 1941 before being appointed mayor of Barysau by the

German administration, became the BCC representative for Baranovichi. He would later write and broadcast propaganda for the CIA front organizations the Institute for the

Advanced Study of the U.S.S.R. and Radio Liberty. Ivan Kosiak became the representative for the district of Hlybokaye and would later serve as the president of the

BCC’s postwar incarnation in the United States. Emmanuel Jasiuk served as the BCC representative for the Stoubcy region. An Ostrowski loyalist, Jasiuk would later coordinate Belarusian nationalist activity in the US and promote Belarusian national interests to American politicians.234

A report filed by the German authorities three months after Gottberg created the

BCC suggests that while a small portion of the Belarusian populace viewed this as a positive development, most of the civilian population showed little regard for the BCC and some even considered the council to be nothing but a “puppet in German hands.” The report reads in part:

The formation of the Belarusian Central Council has so far generated no particular response among the population. A smaller section of the population welcomed this move by the German leadership and regretted

234 Ragula, Against the Current, 83; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 264, 276; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 97-8.

that it was so late. The mass of the Belarusians acts hesitant and reserved. The BCC is partly considered a puppet in German hands.235

The members of the council, however, insisted that “the Germans saw the [BCC] as a vital anti-Soviet propaganda tool” and the Belarusian people saw the BCC as a crucial development for the cause of Belarusian national independence.236

Although its members claimed that the BCC “united the nation” and constituted

“a great step in [the] struggle” for Belarusian independence, neither the formation of the council nor its activities actually seemed to matter significantly to either the

German administration or the war-weary Belarusian population at the time.237

The BCC would often cite the creation of a Belarusian national army in

1944 as another crucial step in the Belarusian nationalist struggle, but the

Belarusian Krayovaya Abarona (Belarusian Home Guard, hereafter referred to by its Belarusian initials BKA) was actually formed at the initiative of Gottberg and the SS to combat partisan attacks against German occupation forces. In late

February 1944, Gottberg issued orders for the formation of a large Belarusian military force that would subsume Ragula’s Eskadron and many existing

Belarusian auxiliary police units within it. The members of the BCC and their supporters would later depict the mobilization campaign for this collaborationist armed force as “a very important act,” because it represented “the first time in the modern history of Byelorussia, that the Byelorussian people were called to arms by the Byelorussian authorities.”238 What little authority the BCC possessed,

235 “Situation Report,” 25 March 1944, 82172876_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM. 236 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 275. 237 Ibid., 276. 238 Ibid., 264.

however, it borrowed from Gottberg, who had only created the council for its potential to facilitate such a mobilization. The Belarusian armed forces created in spring 1944 were intended by Gottberg only to supplement the German administration’s antipartisan forces and ease its military burdens, not to become the foundation of a Belarusian national army.

The BCC announced the mobilization drive in early March.239 One BCC representative would later recall that “most parts of Byelorussia were covered with posters announcing the mobilization” before its scheduled day on March 10, and news of the mobilization drive was portrayed in triumphant, nationalist tones in the German-sponsored Belarusian press.240 The front page of the pro-Nazi newspaper Ranitsa in Berlin proclaimed “Mobilization in Belarus!” and

Biełaruski Hołas (The Belarusian Voice) in Vilnia exhorted its readers “To Arms,

To Freedom!”241 Although Gottberg always planned to integrate these divisions into his antipartisan forces, the BCC publicly presented the mobilization as the foundation of a Belarusian national army. The BKA was portrayed as much as possible as an independent creation of the BCC in its fight against the “Bolshevik bandits” terrorizing “the Fatherland.”242 Signed by Ostrowski, the mobilization orders focused only on regions firmly under German control and conscripted all former Belarusian officers up to the age of 57, all non-commissioned officers up to the age of 55, and all able-bodied men born between 1908 and 1924. Conscripts were given only three hours after receiving their notice on March 10 to gather

239 Ibid., 267-8. 240 Ibid., 268. 241 Bielaruski Holas, 17 March 1944 (Vilnia); Ranitsa, 19 March 1944 (Berlin). 242 “Zahad Prezydenta Bielaruskaj Centralnaj Rady,” Bielaruski Holas, 17 March 1944 (Vilnia).

their personal equipment and appear for a medical examination before they were officially “viewed as deserters…and subject to the death penalty.”243 This intensive mobilization campaign was overseen “personally” by Ostrowski and

Kushel, the former colonel in the Polish Army who had led the Belarusian auxiliary police forces under Kube’s administration and now served the BCC and the SS as the head of the BKA.244

Although the Belarusian collaborators’ accounts all boast that the mobilization drive for the BKA quickly exceeded all expectations, the German authorities only judged the results “moderately favorably.”245 One collaborator claimed that only “three days of mobilization produced excellent results. About 28,000 people were processed by the mobilization commissions.”246 Although leading Belarusian collaborators placed the total figures much higher, the total number of soldiers conscripted into the BKA by the BCC and its German sponsors did not even reach 22,000 before they were driven from

Belarusian territory by the rapidly advancing Red Army.247 A German situation report filed at the end of March 1944 reveals that the initial results were disappointing expectations. By the end of the first month of mobilization, the entire Minsk region had not registered one tenth of this figure: “So far, about 2,500 men have been called up. The number of conscripts could be greater.”248 Even if all of the other regions subject to the conscription orders each registered similar numbers of recruits, however, the total

243 “BKA Mobilization Order,” in Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 267-8; “Zahad Prezydenta Bielaruskaj Centralnaj Rady,” Bielaruski Holas, 17 March 1944 (Vilnia). 244 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 268; “Zahad Prezydenta Bielaruskaj Centralnaj Rady,” Bielaruski Holas, 17 March 1944 (Vilnia). 245 “Situation Report,” 25 March 1944, 82172876_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM. 246 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 268. 247 Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 386. 248 “Situation Report,” 25 March 1944, 82172876_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM.

number of troops called up would not have reached 28,000 soldiers by the end of March

1944.249 The conscripted soldiers registered for the BKA were formally sworn in during a ceremony held in Minsk on March 25, which was the 26th anniversary of the symbolic declaration of Belarusian independence in 1918. Ostrowski and Gottberg presided over the ceremony, which Kosiak would recall being attended by several other representatives of the German administration as well as “a throng of people.”250 Ragula’s Eskadron was increased in size and reincorporated within the BKA with a German liaison officer attached to oversee and coordinate the battalion.

The newly formed BKA began organizing and training under inauspicious conditions. Problems of discipline and equipment plagued the BKA from the beginning, and many units suffered from mass desertions.251 Training was conducted without live ammunition, and the German military command threw “hastily trained BKA battalions” into combat against battle-hardened partisans who had overpowered German police forces or broken through German lines.252 Classes of young cadets entered the officer training school established in Minsk, becoming officers of the BKA and almost immediately leading their compatriots on antipartisan raids alongside German units.253

The BKA was still trying to secure uniforms and arms for its recruits as German military

249 Only seven regions of German-occupied Belarusian territory were subject to the mobilization orders (“Zahad Prezydenta Bielaruskaj Centralnaj Rady,” Bielaruski Holas, 17 March 1944, [Vilnia]). 250 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 270. 251 “Biographical Debriefing, Constantine Mierlak,” 9 July 1957, CIA Name Files, Entry ZZ-18, RG 263, Box 90, NARA II, 12. 252 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 269-70 253 Ibid., 269-73.

reversals in the region mounted, and by June the Red Army was threatening to liberate

Minsk.

The BCC continued asserting claims to its legitimacy and performing rituals of a functioning government even as the German occupation and its collaborators were being driven from Belarusian territories in summer 1944. In fact, the Belarusian puppet regime staged a final flurry of nationalist, pro-Nazi ceremonies in the very last days before the advances of the Red Army drove German forces from Minsk. Despite the precarious military situation, the German occupation authorities and the BCC staged a public celebration on the third anniversary of Operation Barbarossa. On the morning of June 22,

1944, a parade of German forces and Belarusian collaborators marched down the main thoroughfare of Minsk. Soviet forces launched an ambitious offensive that same day, which would soon drive the Germans and their Belarusian collaborators from the city.254

Kastus Akula, a young Belarusian cadet attending the officer training school of the BKA, would later describe the events of that day in a novel about the German occupation. He recalled that “the twenty-second of June came, sunny and warm, as if made to order…a barely noticeable breeze and a mild warmth without any discomforting humidity.”255

Akula wrote that people “from all corners of the ruined city” began to gather at the site of a newly-constructed platform on the parade route early that morning. A German military brass band stood at the ready nearby, and two flagpoles flanked the stage as “a gentle

254 Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 403. 255 Kastus Akula, Tomorrow is Yesterday (Toronto: Pahonia Byelorussian Publishers & Arts Club, 1968), 143.

breeze fluttered the Byelorussian Flag beside the German Swastika.”256 Akula described

Gottberg’s arrival at the viewing stand and the beginning of the parade in great detail:

The tall, lean, long-necked, stork-like SS/Polizei General von Gotberg [sic], General Commissar of Byelorussia, alighted from the rear seat…He scanned the assembly, received a report from the garrison commander, and then, supporting himself with a brown cane, carefully hobbled up the steps to the platform. After saluting and shaking hands with the dignitaries present, he placed himself in the center, leaders of the Byelorussian Administration on his left, and the Germans on the right. The almost imperceptible nod from the hook-nosed ruler spun the parade wheels in motion. As the military band struck up Edelweis, infantry units descended from the hill.257 Soldiers of the Wehrmacht led the procession, followed by troops of the recently formed

BKA and the cadets of the BKA officer training school operating in Minsk. Akula was one of these cadets, and he described how “this ‘cream’ of the newly created army” embarrassed themselves in front of the crowd, the members of the BCC, and the representatives of the SS gathered to review the parade from the dignitaries’ platform:

Clad in black uniforms (the green ones were not yet available), these sturdy, healthy, peasant boys – the average age was eighteen – pounded the cobblestones with well-mastered steps. The thunderous applause from the civilian crowd drowned the tunes of the military band and echoed among the hollow ruins of the prostrate city. Then something quite unexpected happened. The captain, leading the cadet column, ordered the school to halt in order to report to his commanding officer on the reviewing stand. In the continuous rain of applause, his order failed to reach the ears of those at the column’s rear. As the front halted abruptly, a hail of uneven footsteps rose from the cobblestones in the back. Accompanied by loud boos from the crowd, the blushing officer jerkily saluted, reported to the displeased colonel, and proceeded to the Svislach bridge.258

256 Ibid., 143-4. 257 Ibid., 144. 258 Ibid., 145.

The “displeased colonel” Akula refers to could only have been Franzishak Kushel, who would almost certainly have been on the stand reviewing his troops in his capacity as the leader of the BKA. Although he had only ever risen to the rank of colonel, Kushel was granted the commission of major by Ostrowski through his authority as the president of the BCC in early 1944.259 Later Ostrowski would promote him to general. Five days after the embarrassing incident at the parade, Kushel, Ostrowski, and the rest of the BCC attempted to solidify their authority by staging a supposedly democratic congressional convention.

On June 27, 1944, as the sounds of Soviet artillery closing in on Minsk echoed in the distance, the German authorities permitted the BCC to convene the so-called Second

All-Belarusian Congress.260 This convention was intended to invoke the legacy of the

First All-Belarusian Congress of 1918 and to establish a semblance of continuity between the BNR of 1918 and the BCC created by Gottberg. Although the BCC attempted to portray these events as an independent and democratic Belarusian initiative, the delegates operated under the authority of the Nazis both figuratively and literally. Gottberg sanctioned the congress, and several representatives of the SS observed the proceedings from a balcony.261

Over one thousand Belarusian nationalists invited by the BCC assembled at the

Minsk opera house to reaffirm the declarations of Belarusian independence made a quarter century earlier and to declare that the BCC under Ostrowski was now the only recognized and legitimate Belarusian government in existence. Largely undamaged by

259 “Zahad Prezydenta Bielaruskaj Centralnaj Rady,” Bielaruski Holas, 17 March 1944 (Vilnia). 260 Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 399. 261 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 281.

the war, the opera house was a “round, wedding cake-shaped imposing gray structure” that “dominated” the ruins of Minsk like a “magnificent sepulchre.”262 With little debate, the convention unanimously voted to recognize itself as the “supreme representative body” of the Belarusian nation, confirmed the declarations of Belarusian statehood made on March 25, 1918, and affirmed Ostrowski as the president of the Belarusian puppet regime, which they asserted was “the only legitimate representative” of the Belarusian people.263

Convened as German power and authority visibly crumbled around it, the congress still made many declarations of loyalty to the Third Reich. Several Belarusian officials expressed their sympathies for Nazi Germany’s authoritarian and anti-Jewish policies, and greetings and pledges of loyalty were personally addressed to Adolf Hitler.

Joachim Kipel, who had been appointed by Ostrowski to serve as the director of the

“Sub-Department of Science” within the BCC’s Education Department in January, served as president of the convention.264 Kipel opened the proceedings by declaring that all of the Belarusian assemblies convened by Soviet authorities over the years must be considered invalid because they had been “40 per cent Jewish.”265 Ostrowski then delivered a speech in which he denounced the vast “Jewish conspiracy” threatening

Belarusian independence and praised Nazi Germany and the Führerprinzip (literally translated as “leadership principle,” this shorthand phrase was used to describe the Nazis’ veneration of authoritarianism).266 Belarusian-American scholar Nicholas P. Vakar

262 Akula, Tomorrow is Yesterday, 151-2. 263 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 205. 264 Ibid., 204; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 263. 265 Joachim Kipel, in Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 204. 266 Radoslaw Ostrowski, in Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 204, 271 f57.

observes that “the cursing of the Jews” by Kipel and Ostrowski essentially enshrined the addition of antisemitism to the tenets of Belarusian nationalism expounded here.267

The BCC president recounted the activities of the council and praised its work before other council members joined him in this ritual of self-congratulation. Kipel joined the praise and introduced a resolution that the Belarusian people, as represented by the congress convened by the BCC, confirmed the council and its president to be “the only authorized representative body of the Byelorussian people.”268 The congress, which had been convened by the invitation of the BCC, voted unanimously to approve the resolution. In addition, the congress also addressed greetings and assurances of solidarity personally to Adolf Hitler. Ostrowski drafted the following telegram:

To the leader of Great Germany Adolf Hitler, Headquarters. The Second All-Byelorussian Congress held in Mensk [sic] on June 27, 1944, with its 1,039 delegates has vested the authority in me to send you, Fuehrer, a greeting and to assure you that the Byelorussian people will incessantly fight alongside of the German soldiers against our common enemy Bolshevism. We hope and believe in a final victory which under your leadership will see a New Europe that will bring a happy future to the free Byelorussian people. Long live Victory!269 The congress approved the text of the telegram, and Ostrowski and Kipel both gave speeches tracing the origins of the BCC to the First All-Belarusian Congress of 1918 again before the convention ended. Despite the sympathetic and sycophantic attitudes the members of the congress displayed toward their Nazi sponsors, the trappings of nationalist legitimacy conferred by this rubber-stamp congress would be cited for years

267 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 206. 268 “Resolution of the Second All-Belarusian Congress,” in Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 277. 269 “Greetings from the Second All-Belarusian Congress to Adolf Hitler,” in Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 281.

after the Second World War by the leaders of the BCC in order to add a veneer of autonomy and popular support to the Nazi puppet regime they led.270

The very next day after the strident declarations of the Second All-Belarusian

Congress, the German occupation authorities and their Belarusian collaborators began to flee Minsk. Although Ostrowski had just assured Hitler that “the Byelorussian people will incessantly fight alongside of the German soldiers against our common enemy,” now he and his forces would flee alongside their German sponsors instead.271 The soldiers of the BKA received orders from the German authorities to start marching westward with the retreating German police and military forces, and the administration arranged a special train to carry prominent Belarusian collaborators and their families to the

Reich.272 Ostrowski would later recall that “bombs were falling and the Bolsheviks were advancing on Minsk” as the members of the BCC and their families boarded the train.

They made it safely to Berlin as the scattered battalions of the BKA began retreating to

Bavaria.273

On the morning of July 3, Ragula urged the remnant of the Eskadron (now a battalion within the BKA) to decide for themselves whether they would stay or retreat westward. Other commanders of the “poorly prepared battalions of the BKA” also released any soldiers who wished simply to return home.274 Ragula did not accompany his battalion on their retreat, abandoning his men to flee to Germany in the command

270 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 203-6. 271 “Greetings from the Second All-Belarusian Congress to Adolf Hitler,” in Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 281. 272 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 282-3. 273 “The Belorussian Central Rada (Council): Past and Present,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 9. 274 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 283.

car.275 Constantine Mierlak, a young lieutenant working as a supply officer with Ragula’s unit, would recall that “Ragula’s passenger car and [Mierlak’s] truck were the only motor vehicles of the batallion [sic] left. The batallion [sic] moved by horses on a different route…Ragula went by his command car” and Mierlak drove a supply truck filled with

Ragula’s family and other refugees from Navahrudak.276 Ivan Kosiak, a political rival of

Ragula in the postwar diaspora, would later write that the young commander “took his girlfriend into the military service automobile and hurriedly went westward, leaving the battalion behind. Seeing this the soldiers were confused. Some of them committed suicide while others tried to escape to the west through the forest trails, but most of them were cut off by the Soviet armies.”277

Ragula would later write his own account of the retreat, in which he admits that he “left [his] troops and went to find [his lover] Ludmila” instead of rallying his battalion or orchestrating its retreat.278 Although his forces had been ordered forward to engage with partisans north of Minsk, Ragula led his forces back to Navahrudak as the German front crumbled.279 Ragula left his men to find Ludmila Hutor and her sleeping family in their home, waking them and proposing marriage again to the teenaged girl who had rejected his earlier advances.280 Finding no priest willing to perform the ceremony during a time of fasting before a religious holiday, the two wed at City Hall as “reports came in that the Red Army was only twenty kilometres from Navahrudak.”281 Ragula left his

275 Ragula, Against the Current, 96-9. 276 “Biographical Debriefing, Constantine Mierlak,” 9 July 1957, CIA Name Files, Entry ZZ-18, RG 263, Box 90, NARA II, 14. 277 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 283. 278 Ragula, Against the Current, 97. 279 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 283. 280 Ragula, Against the Current, 95. 281 Ibid., 97.

young bride to pack a few possessions while he went to release any of his troops still at their posts, “so that those who chose to retreat could do so with a clear conscience.”282

Ragula himself chose to retreat with Ludmila, Mierlak, and a few others to

Dallwitz in East Prussia, where the German Luftwaffe was supposedly organizing “an operational base in the forrest [sic] for propaganda activities against the Soviet front.”283

Mierlak would recall that “soon it turned out that the actual task of the camp was to train members of a Byelorussian underground resistance movement to be parachuted behind the Soviet lines.”284 The school at Dallwitz was actually run by the Abwehr (German military intelligence), and Ragula soon became one of the Belarusian officers leading the paratrooper units.285 This was the first time that Ragula worked to prepare Belarusian paratroopers to commit sabotage behind Soviet lines, but it would not be the last: he would perform the same task for American intelligence in the early 1950s. Although he was heavily involved in the preparations for these missions, Ragula himself never participated in one of these infiltrations. In his description of the operations at Dallwitz,

Kosiak would seize this as another occasion to smear Ragula’s character:

Soon after the evacuation from Byelorussia, an infantry company…was sent to Dalvitz [sic] near Istenburg [modern day Chernyakhovsk]. At this camp Byelorussian paratroop units were being organized for guerrilla action in Byelorussia. There were around a hundred people, including former policemen and officers, being trained at this camp. Among the leaders of the units were M. Vitushka, B. Rahula, Dr. H. Bahdanovich, I. Hinko and others. This detachment was visited by President Astrouski [sic] before it was sent to the Soviet rear. When the time of departure of the paratroopers came, all of them fulfilled their duty, with exception of B.

282 Ragula, Against the Current, 98. 283 “Biographical Debriefing, Constantine Mierlak,” 9 July 1957, CIA Name Files, Entry ZZ-18, RG 263, Box 90, NARA II, 14. 284 Ibid. 285 Ibid.; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 178.

Rahula, who refused to fly at the last moment. Another officer volunteered and flew in his place.286 Mierlak was not interested in joining these missions either, as he recently “had decided that the war had been lost for Germany, and that he would by all means try to escape to the West, perhaps France, and join the Allies.”287 He and some others informed Ragula, who reportedly allowed them to leave the camp and “did not try to persuade anyone to the contrary.”288 According to Ostrowski, the 31 remaining men who volunteered to be smuggled behind Soviet lines trained for six months before parachuting back into

Belarusian territory in January 1945 to form “the foundation for an underground liberation movement.”289

For the last several months of the war, the BCC struggled to establish itself as a respected government-in-exile in the capital of the Reich. The German authorities provided the BCC with offices and living quarters in Weissensee, a suburb northeast of

Berlin.290 The council’s activities in the capital of the Reich, however, were mostly devoted to producing pro-Nazi Belarusian nationalist propaganda and preserving the

Reich’s newly formed Belarusian auxiliary military forces. Kosiak would describe how the BCC “organized the Byelorussian press – the newspapers ‘Ranitsa’ (The Morning) and ‘Belaruski Rabotnik’ (The Byelorussian Worker)” as the council settled into their new quarters in Weissensee.291 These Belarusian newspapers were both well-established

286 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 288. 287 “Biographical Debriefing, Constantine Mierlak,” 9 July 1957, CIA Name Files, Entry ZZ-18, RG 263, Box 90, NARA II, 14. 288 Ibid. 289 “The Belorussian Central Rada (Council): Past and Present,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 10. 290 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 286. 291 Ibid.

in Berlin by summer 1944; the leadership of the BCC merely took over operation of these from the Belarusian collaborators who had previously been working on them. Ranitsa, which had been published in Berlin since before the German invasion of the Soviet

Union, ran sycophantic pro-Nazi articles such as “Why the Germans Are Winning,” “Let

There Be Victory,” or a piece about Adolf Hitler titled “Defender of European

Culture.”292 Ranitsa also ran antisemitic cartoons, and it published the news and statutes of the BCC well before the council arrived in Berlin and assumed control of the paper.293

Stankievich became the chief editor of Belaruski Rabotnik, a newspaper which the

German authorities used to publish regulations for Belarusian Ostarbeiter (literally

“Eastern workers,” Ostarbeiter were forced laborers from the conquered territories of the

Soviet Union working in the Reich).294 Belaruski Rabotnik was a shorter newsletter than

Ranitsa, and it ran brief articles on such topics as Belarusian nationalist heroes, Nazi

Germany’s newest weapons, and the role played by Belarusian Ostarbeiter in the war.295

As they organized themselves in Weissensee and assumed control over Berlin’s

Belarusian newspapers, the members of the BCC also struggled against German plans to disperse the remnants of the BKA and to incorporate its soldiers into other amalgamated collaborationist military units. The BCC hoped that the Belarusian troops would remain concentrated together, eventually forming the nucleus of a national liberation army that would return to free Belarusian lands from occupation by Soviet forces. The Belarusians

292 Ranitsa, 9 June 1940, (Berlin); Ranitsa, 9 January 1944 (Berlin); Ranitsa, April 23, 1944 (Berlin). 293 Vitaut Tumash, the former pupil of Ostrowski who had been appointed mayor of Minsk three years earlier by the German military administration, had been involved with Ranitsa ever since Wilhelm Kube’s civil administration had limited his authority as Minsk’s mayor and he returned to Berlin to pursue his medical degree (Ranitsa, 9 January 1944 [Berlin]). 294 Belaruski Rabotnik 34, 20 August 1944 (Berlin). 295 Ibid.

had a German advocate in their struggle to preserve the national integrity of their movement in the person of Gerhard von Mende. A specialist on Soviet national minorities within the Ostministerium of Alfred Rosenberg, Mende had been a pioneering promoter of the use of Soviet minorities as fifth column assets since 1939. Ostrowski gave Mende “due credit” for being “a great friend to all the non-Russian peoples enslaved by the Bolsheviks.”296

Ultimately, however, the BCC proved powerless to prevent the German command from disposing of its Belarusian auxiliary soldiers as it saw fit. For example, German military authorities reorganized the engineering battalions of the BKA into construction battalions under the command of the Wehrmacht and added Belarusian auxiliary police forces and the cadets of the officers’ training school in Minsk to the multinational antipartisan unit led by Hans Siegling, which officially became designated as the 30th

Waffen-SS Division on July 31, 1944.297 Foreign soldiers of the division took an oath of

“unconditional obedience” to Adolf Hitler and swore to lay down their lives at any moment in the struggle against communism.298 Kushel was “the nominal commander” of the division, and Ragula served as “the liaison man” between the Belarusian military leader and his German command.299 Although the BCC continued paying “lip service” to its German sponsors in its propaganda publications, Rein asserts that Ostrowski and others in the council had become convinced of the inevitability of Nazi Germany’s

296 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 62. 297 This division was comprised mostly of Belarusian soldiers, but also included Germans, Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, and others (Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 370; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 282-4; Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 404-11; Rolf Michaelis, Russians in the Waffen-SS [Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2009], 61.). 298 Michaelis, Russians in the Waffen-SS, 64. 299 “Subject: Frantizek Kushal,” 14 October 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, ZZ-18, Box 76, NARA II, 3.

eventual defeat by this time and that the disillusioned Belarusians were now “eager to avoid” associating their fortunes further with the withering forces of the Third Reich.300

The principal effect of leading Belarusian collaborators’ awareness of Nazi Germany’s crumbling military fortunes, however, was their increased preoccupation with preserving the inchoate Belarusian military forces created by their German sponsors.

Belarusian soldiers and officers comprised the vast majority of the 30th Waffen-

SS division and strove to increase the sense of a distinct national identity in their new formations, but the Belarusian leaders would complain that the troops were fully under

German control. The council “was not allowed to have any contact with the division,”

Kosiak would later complain, “the German command did not allow this.”301 Ragula’s

Eskadron would become a cavalry unit of the Waffen-SS under the command of German officers.302 In his memoirs, Ragula would describe the frustration and impotence experienced by the Belarusian collaborators at this time, writing that “to the Germans we were mere pawns of their imperfectly constructed empire.”303 This became especially evident as the German military command transferred the remnants of the BKA to the western front to fight the maquisards of the French underground resistance in late summer 1944 instead of keeping them on the eastern front to fight against the “Bolshevik bandits” of the Soviet Union as BCC leaders wished.304 If the soldiers of the BKA were to become dispersed among the crumbling forces of the Third Reich and deployed far

300 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 177-8. 301 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 284. 302 Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 405. 303 Ragula, Against the Current, 98. 304 Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 407; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 285; “Zahad Prezydenta Bielaruskaj Centralnaj Rady,” Bielaruski Holas, 17 March 1944 (Vilnia).

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from Belarusian territories, they could not possibly become a Belarusian national army fighting for the liberation of their fatherland as the BCC leadership had envisioned.

Battalions of the newly created 30th Waffen-SS left by rail for antipartisan combat duty in France even before the division had finished forming or training.305 Just as with the formations of the BKA months earlier, the insufficient training and early deployment contributed to low morale and desertions among the troops as they were prematurely deployed.306 Belarusian soldiers of Siegling’s 30th Waffen-SS Division arrived behind the front lines south of Strasbourg only to be subjected to harassing attacks by the French

Maquis as they struggled to complete their training without adequate equipment.307

Morale was so low that some troops rebelled and deserted.308 Before the entire division had even arrived in France, two battalions killed their German officers and defected to the Maquis; soldiers from another regiment fled to Switzerland.309 Nevertheless, in late

October, the desperate situation at the front caused German authorities to order the hastily prepared and unreliable division to the front lines, where they suffered high casualties protecting the German 19th Army’s retreat across the Rhine River.310 The Belarusian troops of the 30th Waffen-SS Division guarded the crucial bridges across the Rhine against the attacks of the 1st French Army, which had quickly advanced through central

Alsace with the U.S. 6th Army Group and now threatened the encircled forces of Nazi

Germany trapped in the Colmar Pocket west of the Rhine.311 Although some of the

305 Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 413-5. 306 Ibid., 414; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 285. 307 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 371; Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 413; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 285. 308 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 372. 309 Michaelis, Russians in the Waffen-SS, 70. 310 Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 419-21; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 374. 311 Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 418-9.

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division fought stubbornly and prevented French and American forces from capturing any of the bridges near Marckolsheim intact, they ultimately failed to halt the advance of the superior Allied forces and were forced to retreat east across the Rhine before being transferred back to Germany and disbanded.312 Ostrowski used the disastrous performance of the 30th Division to continue lobbying for a cohesive Belarusian armed force, arguing that the Belarusian troops who had mutinied and deserted “had no hostility to French, English and Americans,” and he “warned the Germans” that these forces should only be used in the fight against “the Russian Bolsheviks.”313 In a succinct and adulatory biography of Ostrowski that he almost certainly wrote himself, he complains that “the Germans paid no heed to this warning, but soon found to their loss that

Ostrowski had been right, for a few Byelorussian battalions who had been sent to the western front simply eliminated their German officers and went over to the Allies.”314

The 30th Waffen-SS Division was disbanded on December 31, 1944 after being recalled to the German military training grounds outside the Bavarian town of

Grafenwöhr.315 After transferring 1,000 men to other units, the German military command reorganized the Belarusian remnants of Siegling’s division into a new, smaller unit of brigade strength of approximately 2,000 soldiers and officers.316 Although the brigade was still led by German officers, it was otherwise ethnically Belarusian in composition. The leaders of the BCC referred to this unit as “the First Storm Brigade

‘Belarus’” (or simply “brigade ‘Belarus,’” or ‘the Belarus brigade’) and entertained

312 Ibid., 419-22; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 375-6. 313 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 289. 314 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 62-3. 315 Michaelis, Russians in the Waffen-SS, 84. 316 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 376.

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grandiose designs to make this formation the prototype for many “future storm divisions of the Byelorussian Liberation Army.”317 The Belarusian leaders made much out of the formation of this small military unit, arranging a “ceremonial parade” of the troops to mark an official visit by President Ostrowski of the BCC.318 Kushel supposedly “received full freedom of command” of the troops, but German officers and core personnel actually retained control of the brigade.319 The newly formed brigade failed to live up to these ambitious plans, however, as the troops never saw any action before surrendering to

Allied forces.320

Kushel and his troops surrendered to the US Third Army near the

Czechoslovakian border in Bavaria while many of the soldiers were still at their regiment’s training camp at the town of Grafenwöhr.321 The Americans took the captured

Belarusians to a prisoner of war (POW) camp east of Regensburg near the town of Cham, which Kosiak would later describe as “nothing more than an open muddy field surrounded by [a] high barbed wire fence.”322 Kosiak’s account also claims that Kushel managed to escape from captivity but abandoned his troops to their fate:

After a few days, Byelorussian officers arranged the escape from the camp of Colonel Kushel. Colonel Kushel ordered all Byelorussian soldiers to remain in the camp and await new orders from him. He promised to get in touch with the American authorities and to achieve a resolution of their future. After weeks of waiting, there was no news from Colonel Kushel at all. He settled in an UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] camp with his family and did nothing concerning Byelorussian prisoners of war. Then Byelorussian officers dispatched an emissary from the camp to Colonel Kushel to receive the directives from

317 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 288-9; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 376. 318 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 289. 319 Ibid. 320 Michaelis, Russians in the Waffen-SS, 84. 321 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 290. 322 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 376; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 290.

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him. Kushel again ordered all prisoners of war to remain in the camp and await his directives.323 Other prominent collaborators also melted into the chaotic conditions plaguing Germany in the final days of the war. The BCC abandoned Berlin before the Allies surrounded it and managed to relocate to western Germany. Several of the members, including “the

President’s retinue” and Ostrowski himself, settled temporarily in the town of Höxter, where the BCC had deposited its remaining financial assets.324

The most well-known and influential Belarusian Nazi collaborators would virtually all escape capture and prosecution by the Allied forces. Having served the Third

Reich since the German military’s preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union, these collaborators then facilitated the occupation and exploitation of their homeland before seizing the opportunities provided by Nazi Germany’s military reversals and the creation of the SS-sponsored political and military organizations. Few of the leading

Belarusian collaborators had been avid Germanophiles or ideological supporters of

National Socialism, but rather they were ardent Belarusian nationalists who had worked enthusiastically to align their movement for national independence ever more closely with Nazi Germany’s war against Poland and the Soviet Union. They became culpable in the crimes of the Holocaust and continued to exploit their relationship with the Third

Reich by pushing for closer collaboration even as German forces suffered severe reversals.

323 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 290. 324 Ibid.; “The Belorussian Central Rada (Council): Past and Present,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 10.

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Historians have shown greater attention to events in Eastern Europe in recent decades, but the Holocaust and collaboration in Belarus remains relatively undeveloped.

Several monographs published since the disintegration of the USSR use previously unavailable archival sources from former Soviet bloc countries to help illuminate Nazi

Germany’s occupation practices and the actions of Belarusian police and military collaborators.325 Less scholarship is available on the high-ranking political collaborators or on the experiences of the targeted groups of the regime and its collaborators.326 This study adds to this body of historiography concerned with German occupation practices and collaboration in Eastern Europe by focusing on the leading Belarusian collaborators and their persistent efforts to bind the Belarusian nationalist movement to Nazi Germany.

Gottberg and the SS never supported the notion of an independent Belarusian state, but even the limited concessions that they did grant their collaborators represented victories for the Belarusian nationalists, suggesting that German occupation practices developed in response to the exigencies of war rather than with strict adherence to Nazi racial dogma.

Rein and other historians note that many initially enthusiastic Belarusian collaborators began to have “second thoughts” as the myth of German military invincibility evaporated and the tide of war turned against the Third Reich, but this was not the case with the leading collaborators.327 The figures in this study kept trying to use

German power and resources to advance the Belarusian nationalist cause and their own careers even as the artillery of the advancing Red Army could be heard approaching

325 Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front; Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust; Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde; Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians; Snyder, Bloodlands. 326 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns; Walke, Pioneers and Partisans. 327 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 400.

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Minsk. The BCC reaffirmed pledges of loyalty to Hitler and Nazi Germany during the

Second All-Belarusian Congress held in the final days of the occupation. This speciously democratic assembly convened in order to put a stamp of legitimacy on the Belarusian puppet regime just before the Red Army completely drove German forces from

Belarusian territories. Although they had not become the leaders of an autonomous

Belarusian state in Nazi-dominated Europe as they had initially hoped, leading Belarusian collaborators had successfully forged nationalist political and military structures that would survive the war and give them the means to portray themselves as a legitimate anti-Soviet Belarusian government-in-exile. They may have experienced World War II as relatively powerless actors in the titanic struggle between vastly more powerful neighboring states, but these leading Belarusian collaborators still found a way to advance themselves and their cause from their position on the peripheries of power.

After the fall of Nazi Germany, these individuals would camouflage themselves among the chaotic conditions of Europe’s emerging DP camp network, assuming positions of trust and authority within the camps in which they lived. Before long, fierce factionalism among the Belarusian émigré community would encourage Ostrowski and other prominent collaborators to resurrect the regime created by the SS in order to assert their claims to the leadership of the anticommunist Belarusian diaspora as they looked for new sponsors in their ongoing mission to free their homeland from Soviet control.

Because so many of these collaborators would remain politically active after World War

II, the Belarusian nationalist movement would remain compromised by its association with Nazi Germany for generations.

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Chapter Three: The Belarusian Anticommunist Diaspora, 1945-1950

In the years after World War II, many leading Belarusian Nazi collaborators concentrated in DP camps in occupied Germany before emigrating from the European continent to avoid facing justice for their actions during the war. Personal rivalries and factionalism quickly developed within the Belarusian anticommunist diaspora, with most émigrés’ loyalties split between Radoslaw Ostrowski’s Belarusian Central Council

(BCC) and the remnants of the Belarusian National Republic (BNR), which had been led since 1943 by Mykola Abramchik. Abramchik lived in Paris after World War II, but the other leading Belarusian nationalists and both organizations’ activities all were concentrated in the DP camps of occupied Germany, where thousands of anti-Soviet

Belarusian refugees and former Nazi collaborators settled. Although the factional rivalry between the BCC and the BNR became extremely contentious during these years, both organizations shared remarkably similar anti-Soviet Belarusian nationalist political platforms and aspirations. The competition and hostility between the two groups sprang instead from these leading Belarusian nationalists’ personal ambitions, political calculations, and cultural and religious differences.

Ostrowski and his cadre had been in a far more influential and advantageous position than the BNR during the war, but Abramchik began to attract supporters after the war because his reputation had not been sullied by such close association with Nazi

Germany. Many of Ostrowski’s group soon began abandoning the BCC for the BNR. The competition for influence within the Belarusian anticommunist diaspora added to the growing rivalry between these organizations. This factionalism grew increasingly heated

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alongside the rapidly developing rivalries of the early Cold War, with the Belarusian

émigrés accusing one another of harboring Nazi collaborators and Soviet agents as they struggled to become the dominant faction within the Belarusian DP camps. As they emigrated from the continent, they took their feuds and divisions with them to their new homes abroad. As the rising tensions of the Cold War reached a boiling point over Korea in 1950, the Belarusian collaborators would seize the opportunity to undermine the Soviet

Union working with new sponsors in the West.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the influential Nazi collaborators who had fled Belarusian territory with their retreating German sponsors in summer 1944 primarily occupied themselves with escaping capture and prosecution by Soviet authorities. Those Belarusian collaborators and anticommunist émigrés living in

Germany at the end of the war fled westward, choosing to live in the American, British, or French zones of occupation rather than face Soviet authorities.328 The members of the

Belarusian Central Council fled from Berlin in spring 1945, and after the war ended

Ostrowski and several members of “the President’s retinue” settled in the Westphalian town of Höxter.329 “Fearing the American reaction” to the continued operation of “an out-

[and]-out collaborationist group” in the US zone of occupation, Ostrowski decided by

September 1945 that the BCC must dissolve itself and instead put its authority (and financial assets) behind a more legitimate-sounding Belarusian émigré organization operating out of Bavaria:330

328 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 290. 329 Ibid. 330 “Subject: Redsox/Aequor,” 7 November 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 76, NARA II, 5.

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I called a plenary meeting…and proposed that all overt activity of the [BCC] be suspended in view of the American policy of handing over collaborators to the Bolsheviks, and that a new organization be formed at the same time – the Belorussian National Center. The proposal was adopted and such a center was founded in Regensburg. I turned over to this organization all of the Rada funds with the exception of 43,000 DM, which were in a current account…in Hoxter (?) in Westphalian [sic]. I was not able to obtain this money and it was left there.331

Although Ostrowski had proposed the creation of the Belarusian National Center, the

BCC president’s political rivals soon came to dominate the new committee.

Belarusian émigrés had begun to gather at Bavarian DP camps near Regensburg in summer 1945, and emerging rifts among the diaspora soon became evident. Before long, the members of the Belarusian Waffen-SS formations captured and held by US forces in “that muddy field” near the small Bavarian town of Cham began escaping to the

DP camp in the neighboring town of Michelsdorf and the much larger DP camp outside the city of Regensburg, approximately 50 kilometers further to the southwest. The

Belarusian commandant of the camp at Regensburg, however, called the escapees

“fascists” and refused to admit them until he was “beat up” by a former collaborator who had already settled in the camp.332

Some of the developing factionalism reflected cultural divisions related to

Belarusian territories’ unique position straddling the borderlands between Poland and

Russia. An undated report in Ostrowski’s CIA file explains that the BCC president’s supporters were “mainly from Eastern Byelorussia or [were] refugees from the Soviet

331 “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 10. 332 The camp commandant, Jan Stankievich, was a Belarusian nationalist of the 1918 generation. Opposed to working with “fascists,” he allegedly would become one of “the most important members” of the new committee in Regensburg (Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 291; “Subject: About the Byelorussian Committee ‘Krivichi,’” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II).

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Union,” while “the ABRAMCHIK Group are mainly from Western Byelorussia and

Poland.”333 Exceptions certainly existed, but Ostrowski and his faction were predominantly members of different Orthodox churches while Abramchik’s principal supporters belonged to the Catholic Church and the Eastern-rite Catholic faith.334

Because of this rift, each faction accused the other of being manipulated by non-

Belarusian religious and cultural groups.335 The BCC, for example, frequently charged that Abramchik and the BNR were being manipulated by the Vatican or the Polish government. BCC propaganda smeared Abramchik’s faction as a “Polonophile-Vatican group” and alleged that Kushel was secretly Polish and not Belarusian at all.336 Shortly after Abramchik visited with Belarusian émigrés in London in 1947, Ostrowski supporters in the UK charged the priest who had hosted the BNR president with being sent by the pope to convert Orthodox Belarusians to Catholicism.337 Similar accusations from Abramchik’s supporters accused the BCC “of being pro-Russian in the cultural and political field.”338 Members of the BNR belonging to the Belarusian Autocephalous

Orthodox Church insulted BCC supporters whose parishes recognized the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church by calling them “Zarubezhnaia” (“foreigners,” “outsiders,” or “expatriates”).339

333 “Report on Belarusian Political Factions,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 5. 334 Alexander Nadson, Ceslaus Sipovich: The First Belarusian Catholic Bishop in the 20th Century, 1914-1981 (Minsk: Technalohija, 2007), 56, 58; Ragula, Against the Current, 107. 335 Nadson, Ceslau Sipovich, 58-9. 336 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 304-5; “Subject: General - Operational, Specific – Kuszel or (Kuszal),” 8 August 1950, CIA Name Files, Entry ZZ-18, Box 76, NARA II, 1. 337 Nadson, Ceslau Sipovich, 59-60. 338 “Title: Cossack,” 11 June 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 5. 339 Nadson, Ceslau Sipovich, 58.

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The BCC also adopted insulting terms for their rivals that questioned BNR supporters’ Belarusian identities. Ostrowski’s faction mockingly called Abramchik’s supporters the “Krivichi,” which was the name of an ancient Slavic group that loomed large in the national identity of many western Belarusians. A few members of the BNR had tried to popularize the term in place of the prevalent contemporaneous designation

“White Russian” in an attempt to distinguish Belarusians from Russians as a distinct national and ethnic group.340 They completely failed to make “Krivichi” the universally accepted name for the Belarusian people, but “the nickname stuck” to Abramchik’s group after Ostrowski and his supporters mocked them for their failed campaign.341

To keep their freedom and more easily fit into the DP camp system, Belarusian collaborators from both factions falsified their personal histories so as to appear as if they had been victims of Nazi persecution themselves. For example, Constant Mierlak simply claimed that he had stayed in his hometown of Navahrudak until the Germans invaded, at which point they had “deported him for compulsory labour…on a peasant farm until [the] end of the war.”342 Boris Ragula kept much of his own past intact with the key exception of potentially incriminating details of his whereabouts and actions during the war. He changed his invented narrative often enough, however, that sometimes his lies came into conflict with one another. In an interview with a lieutenant of the US Third Army in

February 1947, Ragula asserted that he had worked as a teacher in his hometown of

Navahrudak “until the German occupation,” implying that he had never worked under the

German administration, even as a schoolteacher.343 Elsewhere, however, he stated that he

340 Ibid., 59. 341 Ibid. 342 “Questionnaire of Constantin Mierlak,” 80433126_0_1, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM. 343 “Questionnaire of Boris Ragula,” 79637593_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM.

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had continued to teach in Navahrudak throughout 1942 and 1943 before being forcibly deported to Germany in February 1944. Ragula claimed he had been “put to work as forced labor in an ammunition factory” and had supposedly “worked there till [sic] liberation.”344 He would alternately claim to have been forced to work for the German railroad throughout 1944 until he was freed by US forces at the end of the war.345

Unsurprisingly, he made no mention to his American interviewers of the antipartisan military force he had led for the SS or his work for the Nazis’ Belarusian puppet regime.

Despite his attempts to obscure his past collaboration, Ragula was found ineligible for DP status and benefits because US Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) files revealed that he had worn a German military uniform during the war.346 Instead of settling in a DP camp, Ragula engaged in black market activities to support himself as he enrolled in medical courses and settled with Ludmila at a student hostel in Marburg.

There he became the leader of a central Belarusian student organization formed to create a network of Belarusian students throughout Western Europe.347

Although he had previously been found ineligible for assistance because of his service to the Reich, Ragula was given another opportunity in February 1947. This time, his interrogator decided that Ragula had not actually served in the auxiliary military

344 “Questionnaire of Boris Ragula,” 79637593_0_1-2, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM. 345 “Application for Assistance of Boris and Ludmila Ragula,” 79637595_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM. 346 “US Third Army Registration Card of Boris Ragula,” 100939633_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM; “Questionnaire of Boris Ragula,” 79637593_0_1-2, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM; “Application for Assistance of Boris and Ludmila Ragula,” 79637595_0_3, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM. 347 “US Third Army Registration Card of Boris Ragula,” 100939633_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM; “Questionnaire of Boris Ragula,” 79637593_0_1-2, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM; “Application for Assistance of Boris and Ludmila Ragula,” 79637595_0_3, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM; Ragula, Against the Current, 104-6; Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 232.

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forces of the Third Reich. Instead, he noted that the Belarusian émigré may have possessed insufficient language skills at the time of his capture to explain why he had worn a German military uniform: “He speaks English but not too well, possibly misunderstood question about German uniform. In my opinion there is no reason why this man should not be established [with official DP status].”348 The young Ragula family soon began receiving assistance and living in a series of DP camps near Kassel.349

Ragula received generous treatment from his interviewer in 1947, which was consistent with shifting views concerning former Nazis and Nazi collaborators at this time. In the immediate postwar period, the Allies had committed themselves to the denazification of occupied Germany and the prosecution of alleged war criminals. As early as 1948, however, “serious students of the problem” were already decrying the

“failure of denazification…which began with a bang [but] has since died with a whimper.”350 The goal of denazification was to rehabilitate and democratize German society by removing ardent and influential Nazis from public office or important positions in private businesses, but US occupation authorities turned responsibility for denazification over to German authorities in 1946.351 Amendments to the relevant

German legislation regarding denazification in 1947 and 1948 provided opportunities for many alleged war criminals to avoid prosecution and return to their places in German society.352 Historian Norbert Frei explains that “from its very inception” in May 1949, the government of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD, or Federal Republic of Germany)

348 “Questionnaire of Boris Ragula,” 79637593_0_1-2, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM. 349 “Letter from ITS to US Embassy in Bonn,” 122008199_0_1, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM. 350 John H. Herz, “The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany,” Political Science Quarterly, 63, No. 4 (December 1948), 569. 351 Ibid., 570-3. 352 Ibid., 6.

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considered ending denazification “an urgent political task.”353 Consequently, many former Nazi Party members and officials of the Third Reich would become integral parts of the new state. As historian Alexandra F. Levy observes, this ensured that West

German democracy would be built “with some Nazi bricks.”354

Although the denazification campaign and the prosecution of Nazi war criminals was slowing as Cold War tensions grew in the late 1940s, several of the leading

Belarusian collaborators lived under false identities until they grew more confident using their true names. One anonymous account from Jasiuk’s CIA files explained that after the war, “most of the White Russian leaders changed their names and entered French,

English, or American Zones…because they feared they would be returned to Russia or

Poland without their consent.”355 Ivan Ermachenko, for example (known as such a sycophantic Germanophile during his time as the head of Wilhelm Kube’s Belarusian advisory council that he had been dubbed “Herr Jawohl” by the local population), lived with his wife after the war in the small Swabian towns of Kaffeebergweg and

Königsturm, registering as a Czechoslovakian citizen named Jan Ermachenkova.356

Subsequently claiming statelessness rather than Czechoslovakian citizenship, he settled on “Jan Ermachenko” before registering for resettlement to the US.357

353 Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 27. 354 Alexandra F. Levy, “Promoting Democracy and Denazification: American Policymaking and German Public Opinion,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 26 (2015), 631. 355 “Title: George Sabolewski, was.,” 9 May 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 62, NARA II, 3. 356 “Registration Form of ‘Jan Ermacenkova,’” 76150605_0_1-2, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM. 357 “A.E.F. Assembly Center Registration Card of Jan Ermachenko,” 26113665_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM.

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The aliases chosen by the Belarusian collaborators contained different degrees of connection to their true identities. Juri Sobolewski, the BCC vice president, lived under the alias “Alexei Sokolowski” immediately after the war.358 Emmanuel Jasiuk, who had allegedly collaborated with the Gestapo while serving as a BCC official, used his own initials with his assumed name, “Edward Jasinski,” and pretended that he had spent the war years “as a gardener’s helper for a Benedictine Cloister” in Poland.359 At times,

Jasiuk also used his childhood nickname, “Maj,” instead of his full name.360 Other collaborators, such as Dmitri Kasmovich, selected names that were completely distinct from and unconnected to their true identities. Kasmovich claimed the name “Stanislaw

Kisielewski” for himself to avoid detection, claiming that “as a Pole” he had been

“harassed by Hitler.”361 Kasmovich portrayed himself as a victim not only of Hitler, but also of Stalin: “I am an outspoken enemy of Eastern totalitarianism, my brother died in

Soviet captivity, in-laws were taken to Siberia, and that is why I hate the communist regime in Poland!”362 In summer 1941, Kasmovich had been appointed by Vitaut Tumash to serve as the head of the Belarusian auxiliary police in Minsk.363 Replying to a US

Army questionnaire, however, Kasmovich claimed that after being taken prisoner as a

358 “George Sabolewski, w/as,” 27 February 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II. 359 “Title: Emanuel (Max) Jasiuk, was. Edward Jasinski, Maj, Mike,” 14 September 1951, Investigative Records Repository (IRR) Name Files, RG 319, Entry A1 134-B, Box 339, NARA II, 10. 360 Ibid.; “Subject: About Byelorussians and about Golobevs,” 21 April 1948, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II. 361 (“Als Pole…von Hitler drangsaliert”), “US Army Questionnaire of ‘Stanislaw Kisielewski,’” 79284774_0_3-4, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM. 362 (“Bin ausgesprochener Feind des ostlichen Totalismus, mein Bruder ist in der sowietischen Kriegsgefangenschaft gestorben, Schwiegerelter wurden nach Sibirien verschleppt, und deshalb hasse ich das kommunistische Regime in Polen!”), “IRO Application for Assistance of ‘Stanislaw Kisielewski,’” 79284779_0_1-3, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM. 363 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 210.

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soldier of the Polish Army and forcibly deported to Germany in 1939, he had been made to work in the Leipzig region as a manual laborer “to improve the railroad line” until

1945.364

With their false personal histories accepted and entered into the official record, several Belarusian Nazi collaborators began working for International Refugee

Organization (IRO) and UNRRA authorities in the DP camp system. As members of the

Belarusian intelligentsia, some of the leading collaborators used their background and education to become trusted authority figures within the DP camp system. Living under the false name “Stanislaw Kisielewski,” Kasmovich clerked for UNRRA and IRO from

April 1945 through 1950 throughout the Stuttgart area.365 Kasmovich also was appointed to the job of “Food Supervisor” by the IRO, a valuable position in postwar Europe, where food was scarce, necessities were closely rationed, and those with access could make a fortune on the black market.366 Sobolewski lived in the DP camps at Ellwangen,

Michelsdorf, and Backnang, working “as a teacher and a YMCA field worker.”367 Ivan

Kosiak, who had been the BCC’s representative for the Hlybokaye district, also assumed several positions of trust and authority in the DP camp network. He worked for years as a translator, a secretary, and an official witness in a DP camp in Bavaria near the town of

Thiersheim before transferring to the Michelsdorf DP camp outside Cham. 368

364 (“Arbeiten zur Ausbesserung der Bahngeleige”), “US Army Questionnaire of ‘Stanislaw Kisielewski,’” 79284774_0_3-4, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM. 365 “IRO Resettlement Registration Form of ‘Stanislaw Kisielewski,’” 79284777_0_1, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM. 366 “Transfer Slip of ‘Stanislaw Kisielewski,’” 100648233_0_1, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM. 367 “Title: George Sabolewski was.: Yury Sabolewski, George Sokolowski, Yury Sokolowski, Jury Sobolewski,” 14 February 1950, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 1. 368 “Information Summary on Ivan Kosiak,” 111080816_0_1, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM.

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Several high-ranking Belarusian collaborators also became leaders of the camps in which Belarusian DPs concentrated. The former editor of the pro-Nazi Belarusian newspaper Ranitsa, Stanislaw Stankievich, became the leader of the Belarusian DP camp at Osterhofen, southeast of Regensburg.369 Kushel, the former leader of Nazi Germany’s

Belarusian police and military forces, became the Belarusian camp leader of the

Michelsdorf DP camp at Cham.370 Kosiak worked as a teacher at Michelsdorf before transferring to the Backnang DP camp near Stuttgart, where he became the “Lagerführer”

(literally, “camp leader”) there.371 Jasiuk briefly became the commandant of a Polish DP camp in the French occupation zone under his alias, “Edward Jasinski.”372 A US Army

CIC report from 1950 reveals that Jasiuk “fled to the US Zone of Germany” in 1947 or

1948, at which point “he obtained documents under his real name.”373

Very few of these leading Belarusian collaborators remained loyal to Ostrowski after the BCC suspended its activities in autumn 1945 and created the Belarusian

National Center in the Regensburg DP camp to replace the overtly collaborationist council. By suspending the organization he headed, however, Ostrowski essentially abdicated his claims to the leadership of the Belarusian people, and many of his followers left him and joined his rival. The Belarusian National Center, like the BCC before it, attempted to legitimize its existence by claiming to be the inheritor of the legacy of the

1918 BNR. Abramchik had a stronger claim on this mantle, however, and his position

369 “Siem, Nina nee Litwintsonzk,” 16 May 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 125, NARA II. 370 “Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, Foreign Division M,” 8 August 1950, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 76, NARA II. 371 “Information Summary on Ivan Kosiak,” 111080816_0_1, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM. 372 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 303. 373 “Jasiuk, Emanuel, Re: War Criminals,” 19 September 1950, IRR Name Files, RG 319, Entry A1 134-B, Box 339, NARA II.

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was greatly enhanced when the BCC dissolved and its successor pledged its support to the legacy of the BNR. The newly created Belarusian National Center soon became so supportive of Abramchik that it grew hostile to Ostrowski and his faction. Abramchik’s incarnation of the BNR could trace its origins much more directly to the 1918 declaration of Belarusian sovereignty, and it had not derived its authority in any way from the Third

Reich.

Nevertheless, the organization would soon welcome many well-known collaborators into its ranks as Abramchik traveled from Paris to organize support for his reinvigorated regime. He visited Belarusian émigrés in London in July 1947 before meeting with influential former collaborators in the DP camps of occupied Germany.374

Kushel offered his service to the BNR promptly after the BCC “liquidated itself,” and

Ragula joined after personally meeting Abramchik in Marburg.375 During this period, many of the defunct BCC’s leading personalities joined Abramchik’s faction, including

Kushel, Stankievich, Ragula, and Tumash.376 Although Ostrowski would recall that he himself had proposed that the BCC suspend its operations, Kosiak believed that the dissolution of the council and the defection of so many of its members had actually been the result of a nefarious “plot” hatched by “secret supporters” of Abramchik within the ranks of the BCC.377

374 Nadson, Ceslau Sipovich, 56; “Subject: Redsox/Aequor,” 7 November 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 76, NARA II, 5. 375 Ragula, Against the Current, 106; “Subject: Frantizek Kushal,” 14 October 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, ZZ-18, Box 76, NARA II, 3. 376 “Subject: Redsox/Aequor,” 7 November 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 76, NARA II, 5. 377 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 304.

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With Abramchik successfully recruiting several influential former BCC members,

Ostrowski and his remaining followers soon became “convinced of the harm being caused” to their own influence and, supposedly, to the Belarusian “national unity” that had “existed from 1939.”378 Sobolewski had apparently joined Abramchik shortly after the dissolution of the BCC, but “he was finally won over” again to Ostrowski’s faction due to an unspecified “series of misunderstandings” with the BNR leadership.379 While some sources conclude that the BCC vice president had truly become a “personal enemy” of Ostrowski after the war, a Belarusian source sympathetic to Abramchik and the BNR would assert that the “badly educated, brutal, and aggressive” Sobolewski only tried joining the BNR with the goal of “causing dissention [sic]” and was “despised by his

Western-oriented countrymen.”380 It seems that only Jasiuk and Kosiak remained unwaveringly loyal to the BCC president throughout the immediate postwar years.381

According to Kosiak, “only two of the original members of the council chose to align themselves with Ostrowski.”382 Of the BCR members who had been present at the so- called Second All-Belarusian Congress in Minsk in June 1944, Ostrowski himself would concede that “there were only a few of them left now.”383

378 Ibid., 304-6. 379 “George Sabolewski, w/as,” 27 February 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II. 380 Ibid.; “Jury Sabolewski, George Sokolowski, Yury Sokolowski, Internal Security,” 27 September 1950, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 1-2. 381 “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 15. 382 “Subject: Redsox/Aequor,” 7 November 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 76, NARA II, 5. 383 “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 14.

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In May 1948, the BCC reactivated itself in an attempt to reassert Ostrowski’s leadership and challenge Abramchik’s BNR for the leadership of the Belarusian anticommunist diaspora. Kushel would suggest that Ostrowski, “who appears to be somewhat of an opportunist,” began taking steps to resuscitate the moribund BCC when he realized that “the Americans were not going to take any action against German collaborators.”384 Although Ostrowski’s long political career contains many examples of his ambition and opportunism, he and his supporters would portray his involvement in these events as that of a reluctant participant who only took advantage of the situation in order to align the Belarusian nationalist movement to the principles of democracy. In a deposition given to US intelligence a few years later, Ostrowski would recall self- servingly that “a delegation came to see me in the English zone with a request to resume the activities of the [BCC]. The request was made by…the uncle of Major [Boris]

Ragulya…and Sobolevski. I agreed but at the same time I suggested that the [BCC] be reorganized on strictly democratic foundations.”385 The biography of Ostrowski that the

BCC president himself almost certainly wrote portrays him as a reluctant hero forced by his supporters to stand up to the Abramchik faction, whose “first activity” had been “to shower abuse on R. Ostrowski.”386 His supporters were supposedly so “outraged by the behaviour [sic]” of the BNR faction that they “demanded that Ostrowski should revive the BCC and its functions. Ostrowski did not feel there was any need for hurry, but

384 “Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Byelorussia (Litsva),” 17 October 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 76, NARA II. 385 “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 14. 386 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 71.

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eventually he had to call a plenary session of the BCC, which took place at

Ellwangen.”387

Just as with the so-called Second All-Belarusian Congress of June 1944,

Ostrowski and his supporters once again orchestrated a façade of democratic legitimacy in order to argue that the BCC was “the only official Byelorussian national representation” in existence.388 To prepare for this “general Byelorussian conference,”

Ostrowski’s supporters devoted April 1948 to organizational work and “political activities within Byelorussian groups” in occupied Germany.389 The BCC held its

“plenary session” at the DP camp at Ellwangen in early May 1948, to which the council invited representatives selected from the Belarusian DP camp populations, delegates of the Second All-Belarusian Congress, and Ostrowski’s supporters.390 Although Ostrowski would boast that this meeting included “representatives of all Belorussian organizations and political parties, regardless of their political orientation,” he also would complain that

Abramchik’s supporters would not participate in the resurrection of the BCC in any way.391 Ostrowski would later assert that this occurred only because the BNR and its members “could see that they would not obtain a majority. They also refused to join the coordination committee for political parties, although we invited them twice.”392 With

387 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia, 71. 388 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 306. 389 “Subject: About Byelorussians and about Golobevs,” 21 April 1948, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II. 390 “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 14. 391 Ibid., 14-5. 392 Ibid., 15.

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Abramchik and his supporters refusing to participate, Ostrowski’s faction predictably won control of the reconstituted BCC for themselves during “the elections of 1948.”393

These elections, however, were no more democratic than the Second All-

Belarusian Congress four years earlier. The delegates had not been elected democratically, but rather they were selected by the leaders of the BCC. Although the supporters of Abramchik and the BNR were the larger faction within the Belarusian diaspora, none of them participated in Ostrowski’s farcical “elections.”394 A politically savvy chameleon, Ostrowski aligned himself at various times with socialism, Nazism, and democracy, deftly changing his political identity as circumstances demanded.395

Opportunistically trying to conform the goals and methods of Belarusian nationalism to the prevailing trends and powerful potential allies available at any given moment,

Ostrowski eschewed the authoritarian Führerprinzip he had so recently embraced and began to insist that his movement was committed instead to the principles of democracy.

With “two separate factions” and “two sets of Presidents and Vice-Presidents” openly competing against one another for influence within the Belarusian émigré community, the struggle for dominance and legitimacy became increasingly bitter.396 The reestablishment of the BCC caused the growing rifts between the factions of the

393 Ibid. 394 Ibid. 395 Ostrowski first began active participation in the revolutionary student movements of the Russian Empire while still a teenager. Over the decades, he participated in or collaborated with the Belarusian Socialist Hramada, the Russian Provisional Government of Alexander Kerensky, the short-lived Byelorussian National Republic of 1918, the White Army of the Russian Civil War, the Polish Government of Josef Pilsudski, the Belarusian Workers’ and Peasants’ Union, the Communist Party of West Byelorussia, Nazi Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 396 “George Sabolewski, w/as,” 27 February 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 2.

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Belarusian diaspora to widen into chasms. For example, the Association of Belarusians in the United Kingdom was convening its annual general meeting just as the so-called elections were being held in Ellwangen in early May 1948 when “a group of members, all supporters of the [BCC], walked out.”397 Ironically, this group had only just begun publishing a journal entitled Abyednanne (Union), in which “they attacked the management of the Association of Belarusians.”398 For his part, Ostrowski would characterize Abramchik as an illegitimate and opportunistic leader, claiming that his rival had only “declared himself president of the Belorussian National Republic…on the basis of a mythical ‘testament’” from his predecessor with the explicit purpose of taking advantage of “the temporary halt” in the work of the BCC in 1945.399 In response, members of the Abramchik faction “accused the Byelorussian Central Council of cooperating with the Germans.”400 They also denounced individual members of the BCC, whom they alleged had been “responsible for actions of brutality” against the Belarusian populace during their time as German collaborators.401

An unknown Ostrowski supporter accused Abramchik of collaboration with the

Germans as well. The BNR leader supposedly had been “summoned to Berlin (by some

German political circles)” from Paris to work on the pro-Nazi Belarusian newspaper

Ranitsa when German forces invaded Poland in September 1939. According to this BCC

397 Nadson, Ceslaus Sipovich, 59. 398 Ibid. 399 “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 14. 400 “Title: Cossack,” 11 June 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 5. 401 “George Sabolewski, w/as,” 27 February 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 2.

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member, Abramchik soon left the paper “because he was unqualified for such work” and then left his subsequent position with a Belarusian center in Berlin due to “some misunderstanding between him and the committee concerning the committee funds.”402

Abramchik told CIA agents a different story about this period, however, in which he took an “illegal trip to Byelorussia, contacted anti-German guerrillas, was arrested on return to

Berlin in November 1943, expelled to Paris and kept under Gestapo surveillance there.”403 Although Abramchik’s whereabouts during 1943 are difficult to substantiate, allegations of his collaboration are unsubstantiated while his own account is supported by the fact that he was residing in Paris at the end of World War II.

Both sides also accused their rivals of being agents of foreign powers intent on dividing and weakening the anticommunist Belarusian nationalist movement. Ostrowski alleged that the BNR leaders were secretly on the payroll of the London-based Polish government-in-exile. He would claim that Abramchik went to London in 1947 not to organize support from the Belarusian émigré community in the UK, but rather to contact the Polish government-in-exile, “with which he made some sort of agreement. As a result he received 300 pounds, which gave him the opportunity of expanding his activities.”404

An unnamed Ostrowski supporter expanded on these allegations in a report on a group of his rivals prepared in 1948, in which he claimed that Abramchik had spent an entire month in London in late summer 1947 arranging for “a secret agreement” with the Polish

402 “Subject: About the Byelorussian Committee ‘Krivichi,’” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ- 16, Box 39, NARA II. 403 “Memorandum on Mikola Abramtchik,” 7 March 1950, CIA Name File of Mikola Abramtchik, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 1, NARA II, 2. 404 “Brief Biography of Radoslav Ostrowski,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 14.

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government-in-exile in which he agreed to betray large amounts of Belarusian territories to an imagined future Polish state that was to be reclaimed by the government-in-exile.405

Meanwhile, adherents of the BNR accused BCC members of conspiring with the

Lithuanian underground. Sobolewski was allegedly “vouched for and protected by the

Lithuanian Government in exile,” having been “charged with the task of penetrating and causing dissention [sic] among the Byelo-Russian groups opposed to the present

Government of the Soviet Union.”406 The BCC vice president was also accused of becoming “an agent of international Communism” in 1948, but Sobolewski apparently responded in kind.407 He allegedly “occupied his time” in the DP camps “by writing anonymous and denunciatory letters to the American authorities concerning members of the opposition about to leave, or applying for entry into the U.S.”408 BCC member Ivan

Kasiak would later assert that Sobolewski and the other leading supporters of Abramchik had only designed these “mass denunciations” in order to “eliminate [their] opponents or interfere with their emigration.”409 One Belarusian-American informant warned US intelligence that the allegations made by “neither side should be believed,” because both

405 “Subject: About the Byelorussian Committee ‘Krivichi,’” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ- 16, Box 39, NARA II. 406 “George Sabolewski, w/as,” 27 February 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 1-2. 407 “Jury Sabolewski, George Sokolowski, Yury Sokolowski, Internal Security,” 27 September, 1950, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 2; “Title: George Sabolewski was.: Yury Sabolewski, George Sokolowski, Yury Sokolowski, Jury Sobolewski,” 14 February 1950, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 1. 408 “To: Director, FBI, From: SAC, New York, Subject: George Sabolewski, was. Internal Security,” 10 October 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 3. 409 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 304-6.

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of the groups “consider the opposition as mortal enemies…due to the violent disagreement between both factions, and the hatred between the opposing members.”410

As the rivalry between the two factions grew increasingly acrimonious, the DP camps in which the Belarusian émigrés lived became sites of competition for control and influence. The camps at Osterhofen and Windischbergerdorf were centers of BNR activity, but the Michelsdorf DP camp, located near Cham, became an important base of support for the BCC.411 Members of both factions lived in the same camps, sometimes winning influential positions away from one another. The leadership of the camp at

Michelsdorf, for example, had been in the hands of the BNR before representatives of the

BCC began to dominate the camp. Kushel had served as the leader of the Belarusians in the camp, but he became “very unpopular” with the subsequent “camp leader and the supervisory staff at Michelsdorf,” who accused him of being “a radical nationalist.”412 A complaint from the Belarusian leadership of the Osterhofen DP camp alleged that the

BCC had begun publishing an underground newspaper from Michelsdorf, “where the camp-administration is in hands of the group of Ostrowski.”413

Kushel’s activities as a nationalist organizer and promoter of the Abramchik faction made him an especially unpopular figure with his former colleagues in the BCC and increased the tensions and factionalism within the DP camps. He traveled throughout

Bavaria in the late 1940s in his capacity as “one of the leaders of a recruiting drive”

410 “To: Director, FBI, From: SAC, New York, Subject: George Sabolewski, was. Internal Security,” 10 October 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 3. 411 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 302. 412 “Subject: General - Operational, Specific – Kuszel or (Kuszal),” 8 August 1950, CIA Name Files, Entry ZZ-18, Box 76, NARA II, 1. 413 “Letter from the Whiteruthenian National Committee of the Central Representations of Whiteruthenians in Germany to the International Refugee Organization,” Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 13, IHRCA, 2.

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focused in the Belarusian DP camps at Michelsdorf and Windischbergerdorf.”414 Kushel and his fellow Belarusian officers and soldiers from the BKA and the Waffen-SS began to form a network linking together the dispersed veterans of the Third Reich’s auxiliary

Belarusian military forces. Promoted to the rank of general by Abramchik, Kushel became the leading figure in this Belarusian “Veterans’ League” as well as the chairman of the Belarusian Liberation Movement. These organizations sought to form Belarusian

“Guard companies” in order to preserve what BNR leaders considered to be the nucleus of a future Belarusian national army and to cement the authority of the BNR.415

The contest for the political leadership of the anticommunist Belarusian diaspora was also being conducted in the pages of propaganda newspapers issued by both factions.416 First published from within a center of BNR activity in the Osterhofen DP camp on October 31, 1947, the weekly newsletter Bazkaushtshyna (The Fatherland) became the major public platform of Abramchik and his supporters for decades.417

Stankievich, who had edited the “pro-Nazi, anti-allied” propaganda newspaper Ranitsa after the collaborators’ retreat to Berlin in summer 1944, subsequently served as the chief editor of Bazkaushtshyna for several years.418 The newspaper was undoubtedly an organ of Abramchik’s BNR, but its popularity extended beyond its political circle because it also promoted Belarusian cultural and literary development among the diaspora.

414 “Subject: General - Operational, Specific – Kuszel or (Kuszal),” 8 August 1950, CIA Name Files, Entry ZZ-18, Box 76, NARA II, 1. 415 Ibid. 416 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 306. 417 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 405-6. 418 Backauscyna, 25 August 1957; Backauscyna, February 24, 1957; “Letter from Stanislaw Stankievich to the Coordinating Committee of the Organization of Belarusians in Britain,” 20 August 1951, Series 3, Subseries 1, Box 10, Francis Skaryna Library, London (FSL); “Siem, Nina nee Litwintsonzk,” 16 May 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 125, NARA II.

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Stankievich devoted column space to Belarusian literary reviews, included monthly supplements for children, and published Belarusian books alongside the weekly newspaper.419 For nearly twenty years, Bazkaushtshyna served as “the unifying factor” for the Belarusian émigrés affiliated with the BNR.420 The paper moved to Munich when the camp at Osterhofen closed in 1949, and it continued publishing weekly issues until

1966.421

To compete with Bazkaushtshyna, Ostrowski’s supporters began publishing

Belaruskaye Slova (The Belarusian Word) in late 1948 in the Michelsdorf DP camp.422

Officially authorized by the American occupation authorities as a fortnightly appendix to the newsletter Ukrainian News, the newspaper of the BCC concentrated on assertions of the council’s legitimacy.423 Having just reactivated itself seven months earlier in

Ellwangen, the emboldened BCC openly used the council’s name and lauded its history in its attempts to legitimize itself in the pages of its new paper. On December 17, 1948, the first issue of Belaruskaye Slova appeared with a large, frontpage article by

Sobolewski, in which the BCC vice president outlined an extremely selective history of the puppet regime. Sobolewski attempted to prove that the council traced its roots to the

BNR declaration of independence in 1918, and its legitimacy had been confirmed by the

Second All-Belarusian Congress in 1944. Sobolewski argued, therefore, that the BCC under Ostrowski must be recognized as the “sole legitimate and democratic

419 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 412. 420 Ibid., 405. 421 Ibid., 405. 422 Belaruskaye Slova, 17 December 1948. 423 Ibid.

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representative of the sovereignty and rights of the Belarusian people.”424 The following year, Sobolewski actually printed the BCC statutes themselves in the pages of

Belaruskaye Slova, explaining how Gottberg had created the council in December 1943 and how he had read its charter aloud to the Belarusian nationalists he had assembled in his office.425 When the DP camp at Michelsdorf closed in May 1949, the operation of

Belaruskaye Slova moved to the DP camp at Backnang.426 As Belarusian DPs left

Germany to begin new lives abroad, Belaruskaye Slova transferred its editorial offices to the US, where the paper continued publishing until 1958.427

Nearly all of the leading Belarusian Nazi collaborators immigrated to the US through the Displaced Persons (DP) Acts of 1948 and 1950. Passed to respond to the refugee crisis caused by World War II, the DP Acts radically altered the immigration policies of the US and introduced organized mass immigration and resettlement to the country for the first time.428 Influential Belarusian collaborators began immigrating to the

US the year that the DP Act went into effect.429 Using his false name, Kasmovich tried to immigrate to the US in 1948, but his attempt to enter the country as “Stanislaw

424 Juri Sobolewski, “Memorial of the Secretariat of the BCC,” Belaruskaye Slova, 17 December 1948, 1. 425 “Belarusian Central Council,” Belaruskaye Slova, 25 March 1950, 5. 426 Belaruskaye Slova, April 1955; “Search Results for Michelsdorf, DP Camp Inventory,” The International Tracing Service, accessed 23 October 2018, https://dpcampinventory.its- arolsen.org/uebersicht-zonen/amerikanische-zone/dp- camps/?tx_itssearch_itssearch%5Baction%5D=search&tx_itssearch_itssearch%5Bcontroller%5D =Its&cHash=50d631fc03dd81b4d5b90bd34976f63d. 427 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 406. 428 Haim Genizi, America’s Fair Share: The Admission and Resettlement of Displaced Persons, 1945-1952 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993), 203. 429 The DP Act and its provisions are explored further in the fifth chapter of this dissertation, which examines Belarusian collaborators’ emigration and participation in US Cold War politics.

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Kisielewski” was unsuccessful.430 Ermachenko and his family settled in New York City that year before moving to upstate New York.431 Jasiuk moved to the US that year as well, taking a job making television parts for Thomas Electronics in Passaic, New

Jersey.432 He began the application process for American citizenship shortly after arriving in the US and began helping other collaborators immigrate.433 Sobolewski sailed to New

York in summer 1950 and quickly moved to New Jersey, where Jasiuk found him a job at

Thomas Electronics.434 Kushel also immigrated to the US in summer 1950, and Tumash departed for New York on November 25.435 Five days later, Ostrowski also left Europe.

The president of the BCC did not attempt to immigrate to the US immediately. Instead, he sailed for Argentina, which had far less restrictive immigration laws and became a haven for Nazis and Nazi collaborators after the war.436

Many leading Belarusian collaborators began organizing themselves almost immediately after immigrating to the US. For example, Ermachenko began fundraising efforts for Belarusian DPs soon after his arrival and formed an organization devoted to

430 “George Sabolewski, w/as,” 27 February 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 4; “IRO Application for Assistance of ‘Stanislaw Kisielewski,’” 79284779_0_1-3, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM. 431 “Alien Passenger Manifest Form of the SS Marine Flasher,” 81651671_0_1; 81651678_0_1/ITS Digital Archive, USHMM; Belaruskaye Slova, 17 December 1948. 432 “Nominal roll of passengers of USAT General McCrae,” 81659485_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM; “Nominal roll of passengers of USAT General McCrae,” 81659496_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM; “Declaration of Employment of Emmanuel Jasiuk,” INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 3, NARA II; “Letter to Director, FBI,” February 15, 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136 Z, Box 76, NARA II. 433 “Certificate of Lawful Admittance to the United States,” October 25, 1949, 2, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 3, NARA II. 434 “Central Names Index card for Jury Sobolewski,” 38051815_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM; “Nominal roll of passengers of USS General Taylor,” 81670221_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM. 435 “Central Names Index card for Franzishak Kushel,” 29655420_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM; “Tracing and Development card of Vitaut Tumas,” 103422127_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM. 436 “IRO card of Radoslaw Ostrowski,” 44882754_01, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM.

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helping other Belarusian immigrants acclimate to life in the US. Jasiuk became a chairman of the Passaic, New Jersey branch of this organization, where he helped

Sobolewski, Awdziej, and nine additional Belarusians find jobs working with him at

Thomas Electronics.437

Almost as soon as they settled in the US, these figures began participating in anticommunist political events. Four months after arriving in New York City,

Ermachenko served as the Belarusian delegate to a multinational rally for “freedom, unity, and federation” against “the Communist menace,” which was held at Carnegie Hall on May 5, 1949.438 Delegates of more than a dozen countries behind the Iron Curtain pledged to fight together against communism until the demise of the Soviet Union, and several prominent American politicians of both major political parties attended and endorsed the event. Republican congressional member John Davis Lodge of Connecticut and Democratic congressional member Brooks Hays of Arkansas both attended and spoke in support of the resolution.439 Although an illness kept Sumner Welles from attending, the former Under Secretary of State sent a message declaring that “the sympathy and support of American public opinion will ever be with the peoples of

Eastern Europe in their struggle to regain…their inalienable rights.”440

437 “Certificate of Lawful Admittance to the United States,” October 25, 1949, 2, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 3, NARA II; “Title: George Sabolewski, was.,” 9 May 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 62, NARA II, 3; “Changed: Jan Awdziej, was. Jonas Awdziej, John Awdziej, Jan Audzeej,” 6 May 1955, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 1, NARA II, 6; Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 213-4. 438 “End of Communism Sought by Exiles: From 13 Iron Curtain Nations, They Pledge at Rally Here Unity to Free Europe,” New York Times, May 6, 1949, 22. 439 Ibid. 440 Ibid.

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While many Belarusian collaborators would remain devoted to their anticommunist activism and nationalist organizational work in their new homes for decades, Ermachenko and others would begin focusing more attention on their careers and their new lives abroad. In addition to his initial fundraising and organizational work,

Ermachenko had also served as the US point of contact for Belaruskaye Slova in New

York City in 1949, but the man formerly known as “Herr Jawohl” began practicing psychiatric medicine at the Binghamton State Hospital in upstate New York later that year and became increasingly inactive in Belarusian nationalist politics.441 One

Belarusian-American historian with ties to the BCC claims that Ermachenko’s work during this period should be credited as “the first move toward organizational activities of the post-World War II Belarusian immigrants.”442

As the postwar wave of Belarusian immigrants began establishing themselves in the US, the factionalism that had existed in Europe followed the leading collaborators across the ocean. An undated report within Ostrowski’s CIA files explains that “just as in

Europe there existed two Byelorrussian [sic] organizations, there are two in the United

States, which follow similar lines of division.”443 In general, the Belarusian nationalist leaders supporting Abramchik and the BNR lived in New York City, and those backing

Ostrowski and the BCC mostly settled in New Jersey. Two new organizations formed in the US to represent the interests of the BNR and the BCC, respectively: “the

Byelorussian American Association (ABRAMCHIK Group) and the Byelorussian

441 Belaruskaye Slova, 17 December 1948; “Physician Dies; 3 Hurt In Accident,” Syracuse Herald-Journal, October 22, 1949, 3. 442 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 213. 443 “Report on Belarusian Political Factions,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 5.

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American Congress (ASTROUSKI [sic] Group).”444 Leading BNR supporters met in

Manhattan in July 1949 to create an umbrella group aligned with the BNR in order to organize Belarusians living throughout the US.445 Within years, the membership of the

BNR-aligned Belarusian American Association (BAA) grew from several hundred members to thousands, and it established several branches across the country.446

Ostrowski’s supporters in the US would soon respond to their rivals’ creation of an

American organization by announcing one of their own, just as they had responded to the publication of Bazkaushtshyna by printing Belaruskaye Slova.

The first meeting of the Belarusian American Congress Committee (BACC) would be held in South River, New Jersey in early 1951 with several striking parallels to the convention the BCC held years before under German sponsorship in Minsk.447 During the Second All-Belarusian Congress in June 1944, the delegates had passed resolutions supporting the declarations of the First All-Belarusian Congress and affirmed the authority of the BCC before sending greetings to Hitler pledging the regime’s dedication to the Third Reich’s fight against communism. In South River, the remnants of the Nazi puppet regime in the US passed a resolution affirming the legitimacy of the BCC and the declarations of the First and Second All-Belarusian Congresses, sent official greetings to

President Harry S. Truman and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and proclaimed that the mission of the BACC would be “to support the desires of the Byelorussian people for liberation from occupation by Soviet Russia” and “to be alert to and to unmask

444 Ibid. 445 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 215. 446 Ibid., 216. 447 Ibid., 220-2; “Report on Belarusian Political Factions,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ- 16, Box 39, NARA II, 5.

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Communist propaganda infiltrating the country.”448 Sobolewski became the nominal head of the organization in the US, but he himself would explain that in 1951 he was “no longer active” in the work of the BACC “due to his age.”449 Jasiuk actually would handle many of the “necessary formalities” of the organization’s activities until Sobolewski died in 1957 and was succeeded as president of the BACC by Kosiak, who would keep the position for more than four decades.450

The rivalry between the different factions of the Belarusian diaspora continued to grow ever more bitter as the escalating tensions of the Cold War erupted into open military conflict on the Korean peninsula in summer 1950. This indirectly created new opportunities that the Belarusian collaborators would soon begin to exploit. Both factions of the Belarusian anticommunist diaspora recognized that the outbreak of war in Korea fundamentally changed the international dynamics of the Cold War. Abramchik and

Ostrowski both attempted to rally Belarusian émigrés to their respective political organizations in a renewed scramble for supporters. Both factions anticipated an imminent war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and they worked to organize Belarusians abroad in preparation for such a conflict. Abramchik visited

Belarusian communities in Canada and the United States shortly after the outbreak of war in Korea, “touring North America on a mission of organization to keep the flame of resistance burning in the hearts of 10,000 Byelo-Russian exiles throughout the world.”451

448 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 220. 449 “FBI Report on George Sabolewski,” 20 December 1951, 5, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 5 450 Ibid.; Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 221. 451 “Folklore Relived In Brave Story,” Winnipeg Free Press, 8 August 1950, 10.

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Once again responding in kind to the BNR, Ostrowski would issue a similarly grandiose statement to inflame the anticommunist passions of his fellow Belarusian émigrés.

As he traveled, Abramchik promoted himself as the president of the only legitimate Belarusian government-in-exile, attacked his rivals, and glorified the

Belarusian anti-Soviet partisan forces supposedly undermining the USSR from within at the time. A Canadian newspaper article introduced Abramchik as the leader of “the only free government Byelo-Russia has had since 1795.”452 Another newspaper wrote that during Abramchik’s speech in Toronto, the “head of the banished regime…spoke with a patriot’s zeal of the fight his iron-curtain country is putting up against Russian oppression.”453 Abramchik spoke of the great numbers of his countrymen allegedly fighting Soviet authorities in partisan resistance cells living underground in the BSSR, but he could not do so without taking a subtle swipe at Ostrowski and the BCC: “Led by a guerrilla warfare veteran…some 50,000 partisans are living in the thick forests, harrying the Russians,” Abramchik claimed. “Before the Germans came,” he continued,

“we had 300,000—but, unlike some anti-Communist partisans, our brave fellows fought the Germans. They could not see the difference between Germans and Communists: both were foreign overlords. As a result, we lost many men.”454 Abramchik tried to remain positive in his public appearances, however, and he seemed optimistic about the implications of the recent developments in the Cold War. “Today, more than ever,” he said, “we feel there is hope for the future.”455

452 Ibid. 453 “Battling Red Yoke: White Russia Resisted For 11 Centuries,” The Lethbridge Herald, 31 July 1950, 2. 454 “Folklore Relived in Brave Story,” Winnipeg Free Press, 8 August 1950, 10. 455 “’White Russians’ Still Fight Reds,” The Medicine Hat News, 7 September 1950, 9.

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Ostrowski also saw reason to be hopeful about the prospects for Belarusian liberation from Soviet rule following the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula. He addressed himself to Belarusians around the world in a grand-sounding appeal to fight communism in Korea in the name of the BCC. “Now the moment has come,” he wrote,

“the first ray of hope flashed for the realization of the holy dream of the Byelorusian people, the first ray of the possibility of hoping for our return into our beloved home country of Byelorusia free from Bolshevik tyranny.”456 Because of the grave and far- reaching implications he imagined for the conflict, the BCC president implored

Belarusian veterans of the military forces he had raised for the Third Reich “but also every Byelorusian man and every Byelorusain woman able to fight, in whom a true

Byelorusian heart is still palpitating” to “take up arms…together with the other nations of the world that are possessed of the love of liberty.”457 Ostrowski’s appeal did not result in mass voluntarism, but rather it was “met with strong criticism” and provided a new target for his rivals’ ridicule.458 Although the wave of Belarusian military recruits which

Ostrowski had hoped to mobilize failed to materialize, US intelligence would soon give the Belarusian collaborators the opportunity to engage directly in efforts to undermine the

Soviet Union.

Leading Belarusian collaborators were able to focus less on escaping their pasts and more on marshaling their support and planning their futures because Western powers quickly became more concerned with the potential threat posed by the Soviet Union than

456 “Excerpts from the Manifesto of the President of the Byelo-Russian Central Council: FBI Report on George Sabolewski,” 20 December 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 10. 457 Ibid. 458 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 410.

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with prosecuting anticommunist collaborators. After years trying to obscure their pasts and pass as victims of Nazi persecution, the leading Belarusian collaborators had grown ever bolder. The BCC had reconstituted itself and begun operating publicly once again, and many influential collaborators had emigrated from the DP camps in Bavaria as the

1940s ended, concentrating especially in Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US. The

BNR and the BCC were present in all of the places anticommunist Belarusian émigrés settled, but these organizations became most active in the US. The specter of worldwide communist expansion fully eclipsed the threat posed by the defeated forces of the Axis

Powers, and US intelligence soon began to recruit known Belarusian Nazi collaborators in spite of their wartime relationships with the Third Reich.

The study of refugees within the postwar DP camp system is still an emerging subfield, and newly available archival resources are providing new possibilities for research. The archives of the International Tracing Service (ITS) in Bad Arolsen,

Germany have only been available to historians and public researchers since 2007.

Originally started as a central database to help locate missing persons during World War

II, the ITS and its vast archival holdings contain documents on millions of individuals displaced by the war or Nazi German persecution, promising to add new elements to the existing scholarship concerning DPs in the years following World War II. These archives have been crucial for this study, as very little has been written on Belarusians in the postwar DP camp system. Some general histories of DPs in Europe exist, but much of the

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historiography on the subject understandably focuses on Jewish refugees with relatively little on the experiences of other émigré groups.459

Academic studies of Belarusian émigrés within Europe’s DP camp network are virtually nonexistent, so examining these leading Belarusian nationalist collaborators’ struggles for control of their camps and for influence among the anticommunist

Belarusian diaspora contributes new elements to the relevant historiography. Several accounts by or sympathetic to collaborators provide useful information, but these are often extremely biased and reflective of the political agendas of their authors.460 This study of Belarusian collaborators fighting for authority and influence in the DP camps of

Bavaria after World War II reveals that within a very short time, they became less concerned with escaping justice and began to focus their energies on organizing the anticommunist Belarusian diaspora for the next chapter of their nationalist struggle against the Soviet Union.

459 Yehuda Bauer, Out of the Ashes (New York: Pergamon Press, 1989); Grossman, Jews, Germans, and Allies; Zeev W. Mankowitz, Life between Memory and Hope: The Survivors of the Holocaust in Occupied Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Michael Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Jaques Vernant, The Refugee in the Postwar World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953); Mark Wyman, DPs: Europe’s Displaced Persons, 1945-1951 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 460 Kalush, In the Service of the People for a Free Byelorussia; Kipel, Belarusans in the United States; Ragula, Against the Current; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline.

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Chapter Four: Belarusian Nazi Collaborators and United States Intelligence, 1950-1961

As the leading Belarusian Nazi collaborators were bringing their divisive rivalries and rightwing anticommunist activism to the US with them, the government of their adoptive country was undergoing monumental changes to its military and intelligence infrastructure in response to what many policymakers began to see as the imminent encroachment of communism worldwide. US intelligence possessed little information on the USSR, however, which created openings for dubious sources of intelligence to become American assets. Because the Soviet menace had eclipsed any apparent dangers posed by the defeated Axis Powers by the late 1940s, US intelligence officials began to rely on the expertise and intelligence work of former Nazi officials and their networks of collaborators from the occupied territories of the USSR to provide information. When war broke out in Korea in summer 1950, the US accelerated its preparations for the possibility of open war with the USSR in Europe by planning covert operations to sabotage Soviet forces in the border regions of the western USSR. Before long, the

Belarusian nationalists who had collaborated with Nazi Germany a few years earlier began working with US intelligence to provide information on the USSR, to create anticommunist propaganda, and to conduct paramilitary operations into the Soviet Union for the purpose of establishing underground guerrilla resistance cells. The Belarusian collaborators in the BNR and the BCC attempted to exploit the situation to their advantage and continually presented ambitious plans to US agents, but these schemes ended in disaster and were ultimately abandoned in favor of much more modest efforts.

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The US military and intelligence apparatus had undergone significant structural changes in the late 1940s and was beginning to expand its reliance on covert operations just as the Belarusians began proposing daring infiltration missions and grandiose schemes to overthrow the USSR. Congress passed the National Security Act in July

1947, which merged the separate branches of the military together into the National

Military Establishment (later the Department of Defense) and created the National

Security Council (NSC) and the CIA.461 This reorganization of US intelligence created new intelligence services and provided opportunities for ambitious new initiatives with relatively little oversight. Initially these plans focused on groups of nationalist émigrés from the Soviet bloc, including Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Baltic groups that had been tied to the Third Reich. After these early infiltration operations ended in disaster, the agency’s efforts to challenge Communist influence with clandestine paramilitary forces would begin to focus on countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.462

Clandestine and covert operations under the new system became the responsibility of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) under the leadership of Frank Wisner, who soon established a study group to explore possible uses of anticommunist refugees from the USSR.463 Indiscriminately seeking assets in the heightened Cold War tensions of the late 1940s and early 1950s, Wisner’s study group would soon evolve into a series of covert operations that included the Belarusian “refugees” who had recently collaborated with the Third Reich. The OPC’s mandate to conduct political and psychological warfare as an instrument of US foreign policy was loosely defined, making Wisner responsible

461 Stuart, Creating the National Security State, 132-143. 462 Thomas, The Very Best Men,107. 463 Grose, Operation Rollback, 109.

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for propaganda and covert operations with little oversight. Although the OPC had initially been placed under the authority of the State Department, it was also officially a department within the CIA. This nebulous existence gave OPC little direct oversight and left Wisner largely responsible for the OPC’s extensive propaganda and paramilitary campaigns against worldwide communism.464 In 1951, the OPC merged with the CIA’s

Office of Special Operations (OSO) to form the Directorate for Plans, and Wisner was promoted to lead the rapidly expanding new department.465 Although it was now fully under the control of the CIA, Wisner’s department continued to conduct its campaigns with “virtual autonomy” as vast new sums were made available to fund its work.466

In 1950, a new National Security Council assessment (NSC 68) encouraged a more aggressive Cold War foreign policy with a massive expansion of the use of covert operations, and the budget for this work expanded commensurately.467 When it had first been created in 1948, the OPC had a relatively modest annual operating budget of 4.7 million dollars, but within three years it was spending three times the CIA’s budget for traditional intelligence gathering.468 By 1952, Wisner’s budget ballooned to nearly 200 million dollars, approximately half of which went to efforts to undermine the Soviet

Union in Eastern Europe.469

464 Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin, 20. 465 The two organizations merged largely to resolve issues related to professional redundancy and rivalry between the two departments, although OSO was fundamentally concerned with intelligence collection and OPC with covert action (Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin, 21). 466 Kevin Conley Ruffner, “Chapter Seven: Could He Not Be Brought to This Country and Used?” Eagle and Swastika: CIA and Nazi War Criminals and Collaborators, CIA History Staff (April 2003), CIA Subject Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 29, NARA II, 3. 467 Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin, 58. 468 Grose, Operation Rollback, 114. 469 Ibid.

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The scope of such operations would expand even further during the so-called

“Golden Age” of the CIA under the Eisenhower administration, when Allen Welsh

Dulles became the director of the agency.470 Eisenhower’s stated policy of “liberation” emphasized the use of covert action and political and psychological warfare to erode

Soviet power and influence by loosening Moscow’s control over communist satellite states and national minorities within the USSR. A veteran of the Office of Strategic

Services (OSS), Allen Dulles’ “enthusiasm for extravagant covert actions” shaped the

CIA’s work for nearly a decade.471 The Eisenhower administration would also consider using anti-Soviet émigrés from Eastern Europe to form auxiliary military units in the event of an open war with the USSR. For several years, President Eisenhower and members of the NSC toyed with the creation of a Volunteer Freedom Corps (VFC) composed of “stateless, single, anti-Communist young men…from countries behind the

Iron Curtain.”472 This proposed anti-Soviet foreign legion never materialized, but the plan closely reflected the ambitions of the Belarusian collaborators, who continually pushed the CIA to create Belarusian military units “for use in a war with the Soviet Union.”473

470 Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 7, 148. 471 Allen Dulles was the brother of John Foster Dulles, who would become Eisenhower’s secretary of state in 1953 (Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2013], 66-76, 107-8). 472 “NSC 143: Memorandum by the President to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council,” 14 February 1953, Office of the Historian, Department of State, accessed 25 March 2019, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v08/d70; James Jay Carafano, “Mobilizing Europe’s Stateless: America’s Plan for a Cold War Army,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 2 (Spring 1999), 84-5. 473 Historian James Jay Carafano notes that opposition from key US allies among the governments of Western Europe kept the proposal from developing (Carafano, “Mobilizing Europe’s Stateless,” 80-4; “Subject: Conference with Mikola ABRAMCHIK,” 29 November 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 1, NARA II, 3).

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Although such practices have become more closely associated with the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration, Project Aequor reflects the fact that the use of clandestine paramilitary campaigns to undermine the Soviet Union actually developed years earlier during the Truman administration.474 Like Truman, Eisenhower relied on the use of covert action to challenge the Soviet Union “without precipitating a Third World

War.”475 Historian Richard M. Filipink, Jr. notes that although Eisenhower “escalated the use of the CIA for covert operations,” he also “renewed the commitment to containing rather than dislodging communism” when the time for campaign rhetoric subsided and he assumed the office of the presidency.476 Historian Melvyn P. Leffler agrees, suggesting that the incoming Republican administration “acted much like their

Democratic predecessors” and remained “focused on containing Soviet influence and power” rather than reducing it.477 Although the operational goals of US clandestine operations would soon expand to include regime change in the Middle East and Latin

America, Eisenhower’s reliance on covert paramilitary operations had its roots in the policies of his predecessor.478

The US Army CIC first began using former Nazi German officials with professional expertise on the Soviet Union in the late 1940s in order to fill the enormous gaps of information on the USSR. This group included figures such as Reinhard Gehlen,

474 Melvyn P. Leffler, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 121. 475 James David Marchio, Rhetoric and Reality: The Eisenhower Administration and Unrest in Eastern Europe, 1953-1959 (PhD diss., American University, 1990; University Microfilms Ind., 1993), 496. 476 Richard M. Filipink, Jr., Dwight Eisenhower and American Foreign Policy during the 1960s: An American Lion in Winter (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 1. 477 Leffler, The Specter of Communism, 123; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 203, 234. 478 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 156-7.

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the former head of Fremde Heere Ost (FHO, or Foreign Armies East), which had been the Wehrmacht’s military intelligence department charged with analyzing information on the Soviet Union during World War II. Although historian David Cesarani has asserted that Gehlen’s “entire wartime apparatus…simply transferred under the wing of the US

Army,” recently declassified government files reveal that Gehlen and the “key associates” from his wartime apparatus used US funds “to create a large intelligence bureaucracy” with expanded intelligence gathering activities.479 The first American sponsor of the Gehlen Organization was the US Army, but the CIA assumed control in

1949 despite misgivings that Gehlen’s network employed many military and intelligence professionals who had recently worked for the Third Reich.480 In 1956, the Gehlen

Organization would become the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, or Federal Intelligence

Service), and Gehlen would become West Germany’s first spy chief.481

Another important source of intelligence on Soviet national minorities recruited by the CIA was Gerhard von Mende, a former official within Alfred Rosenberg’s

Ostministerium. One of the architects of Nazi Germany’s use of fifth column national minorities during World War II, Mende became a crucial link between US intelligence and the Belarusian Nazi collaborators.482 After the war, he remained in contact with the various Eastern European nationalist groups that had collaborated with Nazi Germany, including Estonians, Latvians, Ukrainians, and both factions of the anticommunist

479 David Cesarani, Justice Delayed: How Britain Became a Refuge for Nazi War Criminals (London: William Heinemann, 1992), 154-5; Timothy Naftali, “Reinhard Gehlen and the United States,” in Breitman, et al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis, 380, 406. 480 Naftali, “Reinhard Gehlen and the United States,” 385-93. 481 Ibid., 376-7. 482 “CAPRIFORM: Contact with Russian National Minorities,” 18 May 1949, CIA Name File of Gerhard von Mende, RG 263, ZZ-18, Box 88, NARA II, 2; Johnson, A Mosque in Munich.

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Belarusian diaspora. In May 1949, he provided the CIA with the names of leading members of the BCC and the BNR.483 Before Ostrowski temporarily immigrated to

Argentina in late 1950, Mende “put in a good word” for him with an unknown CIA asset working with the IRO in Hanover.484

The outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula in summer 1950 made the possibility of open war between the US and the USSR seem more likely, which inspired the rapid development of new and more ambitious anti-Soviet clandestine projects.

Gordon M. Stewart, the chief agent overseeing covert operations at the CIA base in

Karlsruhe at the time, would later recall how war in Korea impacted the growth of covert anti-Soviet activities in Europe. “As a result of Korea,” Stewart explained, “we found ourselves in the midst of a large military buildup and the hectic expansion of CIA’s activities…One cold war project was piled on top of another, [and] agents were recruited by the hundreds. Any project which would contribute to the slowdown or harassment of invading Soviet or satellite forces got a hearing.”485 This was the atmosphere in which

OPC began deliberately recruiting Belarusian Nazi collaborators to conduct anticommunist propaganda campaigns and paramilitary infiltration missions into the western Soviet Union.

Known as Project Aequor, the CIA’s unsuccessful Belarusian operations first began in late 1950 as part of early US Cold War policies relying on covert operations and

483 “Internal Memorandum on Mende’s Contacts with ‘Russian National Minorities,’” 18 May 1949, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 88, NARA II, 1-2; “Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 19. 484 “Memorandum on ‘Radoslow Ostrowsky,’” 7 October 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 2. 485 Ruffner, “Chapter Seven: Could He Not Be Brought to This Country and Used?” Eagle and Swastika, 5.

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psychological warfare to challenge Soviet power and influence without provoking open military conflict.486 Operational failures, recruiting difficulties stemming from political rifts within Belarusian émigré circles, and the audacious behavior of the project’s principal Belarusian agent would soon cause the CIA to halt its infiltration missions and pursue additional contacts with more notorious Belarusian Nazi collaborators. These ill- conceived operations ultimately resulted in nearly all of the CIA’s Belarusian assets being captured, killed, or exposed in the press for their collaboration with the Third Reich and their relationships with US intelligence.

The CIA began seeking out potential Belarusian underground resistance cells in the USSR in 1950, before the agency is known to have possessed the clear authority to conduct covert guerrilla activities in the USSR. Once policymakers passed a resolution approving such projects, the agency proceeded quickly. In August 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a study titled “The Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” which became official policy on October 23 as NSC 10/5.487 This paper vested the CIA with the authority to “develop underground resistance and facilitate covert guerilla operations in strategic areas…and ensure availability of these forces in the event of war.”488 In line with these directives, Project Aequor was initiated in order to establish “a broad framework for long-term operations into the USSR, calling for the development of agents

486 Although preparations for Project Aequor began in late 1950, official authorization for the operation was not granted until August 1951 (“Project Outline of Project Aequor Presented for Approval,” 8 August 1951, CIA Subject Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 6, NARA II, 1, 6). 487 “NSC 10/5: Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” 23 October 1951, in The CIA Under Harry Truman, ed. Michael Warner (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), 437-439. 488 NSC 10/5, in Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin, 67.

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and the establishment of chains of observers…for immediate activation in the event of war.”489

These actions were taken not only as a defensive precaution to prepare for the possibility of war, but also to foment nationalist unrest. Mitrovich explains that the ultimate goal of these operations was to create conditions that would lead to “the breakup of the USSR into separate national component states.”490 The Belarusian nationalists beginning to work with US intelligence at this time shared this vision. Project Aequor’s principal Belarusian agent would later describe how he and his compatriots had “wanted the Americans to destroy the Communist regime, thereby opening the door for them to return to Belarus.”491 Leading Belarusian collaborators had attempted to exploit Nazi

Germany’s war against the Soviet Union to create an independent Belarusian state, and now they hoped that a war between the US and the USSR would make this dream a reality.

Project Aequor operated out of the CIA station in Munich, which became the center of US covert operations against the Soviet Union in the early 1950s.492 An internal agency history written after the end of the Cold War would note that “many of the

Central Intelligence Agency’s earliest operations” into the Soviet bloc started at the agency’s station in Munich due to the city’s proximity to Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the DP camps in the US zone of occupied Germany.493 Hundreds of thousands of

489 “Background on AECAMPOSANTO/6,” March 1995, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ- 18, Box 105, NARA II. 490 Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin, 69. 491 Ragula, Against the Current, 110. 492 Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin, 74-5. 493 Ruffner, “Chapter Three: Persons from All Spheres of Influence,” Eagle and Swastika, 1; Johnson, A Mosque in Munich, 36-7.

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refugees from the USSR poured through Munich after WWII ended.494 At the time the

Munich station chief initiated Project Aequor in 1950, agents and officials attached to

OPC typically planned and ran covert operations from individual CIA stations without much direct oversight from Washington.495 Although case officers and station chiefs operated these projects with a great deal of independence, at times CIA director Walter

Bedell Smith personally intervened in Project Aequor in order to curb its agents’ ambitions.496

Because Belarusian lands comprised the westernmost territories of the Soviet

Union, this region became a natural target for infiltration operations into the USSR.

Belarusian anticommunist refugees’ familiarity with the area, the language, and the people made them particularly valuable assets in the CIA’s covert campaigns against the

Soviet Union. The veterans of the Third Reich’s auxiliary Belarusian military forces had both the military experience and the ideological indoctrination deemed necessary to combat Soviet Communism, and US intelligence assured these recruits that their recent collaboration with Nazi Germany would be overlooked. Belarusian politicians who had helped to facilitate the German occupation of their homeland in the Second World War also became highly sought after for their potential as anticommunist propagandists and mobilizers of the Belarusian diaspora.

US intelligence agents had first begun investigating unreliable reports of loosely organized anticommunist Belarusian guerilla cells operating within the Soviet Union in

494 Johnson, A Mosque in Munich, 36-7. 495 Thomas, The Very Best Men, 130; Ruffner, “Chapter Seven: Could He Not Be Brought to This Country and Used?” Eagle and Swastika, 3-5. 496 “From Director, CIA,” 21 October 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II; “From Director, CIA to SMUNI: REDSOX/AEQUOR,” 23 October 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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1947. Not only was the initial intelligence on these forces unfavorable, but reports concluded that these cells were in fact terrorists connected to the Nazis. Nevertheless, interest in the Belarusian anticommunist diaspora was initially predicated on the possibility of contacting these anti-Soviet guerrilla forces within the Belarusian Soviet

Socialist Republic (BSSR). Known as Chorny Kot (Black Cat), this so-called

“underground liberation movement” behind the Iron Curtain had first been formed when

German forces retreating from Soviet territory had parachuted two small groups of

Belarusian anticommunist saboteurs behind the Red Army’s advancing lines in July

1944.497 After the fall of the Third Reich, Chorny Kot apparently maintained its connections to groups of ardent Nazis in occupied Germany. A US Army

Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) report from spring 1947 described Chorny Kot as “a terrorist organization in USSR which is in contact with the German nationalist underground.”498 In the late 1940s, the “German nationalist underground” described in the CIC report was composed of groups of prominent Nazis striving to regain political power through shadowy fraternal organizations such as the Bruderschaft (Brotherhood) and the Spinne (Spider).499 US intelligence officials had become aware of Chorny Kot’s

Nazi ties well before any attempt was ever made to recruit these dubious assets. The members of Chorny Kot had allegedly managed to stay in contact with the leadership of

497 “The Belorussian Central Rada (Council): Past and Present,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 10. 498 The initial CIC report was summarized in the later CIA memorandum to the station chief in Karlsruhe (“From Chief, POB to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe: Agents and Informants-Pullach,” 6 November 1950, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II). 499 Richard Breitman and Norman J. W. Goda, “The CIC and Right Wing Shadow Politics,” Hitler’s Shadow: 53-72.

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the BNR as well, which is the reason the agency first sought a relationship with

Abramchik’s faction.

The CIA first began seriously pursuing the rumored resistance movement through officers of the BNR in 1950, but these early contacts were disappointing and raised doubts about Chorny Kot’s very existence. In fact, an internal CIA memorandum from

November 1950 dismissively summarized the organizational structure and operational strength of the underground network: “The Black Cat (Chorny Kot) organization has been reported on at various times, generally as a loose alliance of bandit groups with little strength as a controlled movement. Its name is used generically to describe any and all types of resistance by discontented persons in Byelorussia [sic] as well as in Ukraine.”500

A CIA report dated November 14 also cast grave doubts that the BNR still maintained contact with Chorny Kot. The memorandum concluded that the “only possible ‘Byelorussian [sic] courier’” who could have traveled between the cells and their contacts in Western Europe was “never…in contact [with] partisans”; his entire story was deemed to be either outright “fabrication” or rearranged “parroting” of the information received from his case officer during the courier’s pre-mission briefing.501 In spite of these inauspicious signs, CIA officials based in Munich pushed forward with their plans to exploit Chorny Kot by arranging a meeting with Boris Ragula, a young medical

500 “From Chief, Foreign Division M to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe: Operational Case of 11 166,” 3 November 1950, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 501 “From Pullach to Special Operations: Incoming Classified Message,” 14 November 1950, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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student and veteran officer of the Third Reich’s Belarusian military forces representing the BNR.502

Initial reports on Ragula suggest that agents knew that they were involving themselves with a potentially difficult and unreliable individual driven solely by his own agenda. These worrisome first impressions, however, would not prevent Ragula from rapidly making himself into an extremely influential figure in the early relationship between the CIA and its Belarusian assets. An early character assessment of Ragula compiled by the CIC in 1948 noted his potential usefulness with some important reservations:

He is considered to be above average intelligence, strongly anti-Communist and to have had considerable experience in anti-Soviet counter intelligence work with White Ruthenian [Belarusian] groups. However, he cannot be recommended unconditionally as he is egotistic, ambitious and primarily interested in furthering White Ruthenian nationalism.503 Despite these concerns, agents invited Ragula to meet with a CIA case officer in early

1951 at the Café Au Roi D’Espagne in Brussels. 504 As a result of this first meeting,

Ragula promised that he would provide four Belarusian recruits to connect with the resistance behind the Iron Curtain and restore its broken clandestine radio network, which was supposedly responsible for the recent lack of communications between the BNR and

502 “FROM Chief of Base, Munich to Chief, EE: REDSOX/Financial: Cambista 2 Expenditures,” 25 September 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 503 M.R. Hamilton, “Info from Agent Report, 7970th CIC, file III-M-1239, dated 1 October 48, subj Boris RAGULA, re: White Ruthenian Activities,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II; “From Chief of Station, Karlsruhe: RAGULA, Boris/ RAHULIA, Boris, 8 November 1948,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 504 “To Munich, Karlsruhe from Special Operations: REDBIRD,” 20 January 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II; “To Special Operations: Incoming Classified Message,” 14 December 1950, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II; “From Special Operations: Outgoing Classified Message,” 21 November 1950, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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Chorny Kot. In return, Ragula’s case officer made clear that “subject…will spread word

Americans do not intend trying German collaborators as war criminals.”505 The genesis of Project Aequor reveals how desperate US intelligence officials were to take action against the Soviet Union at this time. In its desire to exploit a spectral anticommunist partisan network whose continued existence was in doubt, the CIA instructed Ragula to recruit his fellow Belarusian Nazi collaborators and to assure them that the US would not pursue justice for their past crimes.

Within days, CIA analysts in Germany concluded that Ragula had intentionally obscured his past collaboration with the Third Reich, but this did not compromise his standing with the agency. On the contrary, his background had been known to US intelligence as early as 1946. Ragula had been found ineligible for DP status by the screening board of the 1st Infantry Division of the United States Third Army on June 1,

1946 because he had served “in German uniform” during the war.506 Under questioning, he also conceded that he had served as “an aide to [Radoslaw] Ostrowski, the Germans’ puppet president of Belorussia [sic]” after the council had been forced to flee to Berlin in

1944 with the German forces retreating before the advance of the Red Army.507 After the war ended, he had helped to resurrect this Nazi puppet regime under a slightly altered name at a DP camp outside of Regensburg, Germany. The report from early February

1951 noting Ragula’s admissions about his past collaboration with the Third Reich did

505 “From Munich to Special Operations: REDBIRD,” 2 February 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 506 “Displaced Person Questionnaire for Boris Ragula,” 79637592, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM. 507 “To Chief, Foreign Division M from Chief of Station, Karlsruhe: REDBIRD/Operational: Belorussian Émigré Organizations and Major Boris Ragula,” 7 February 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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not question these associations or actions, but rather it concluded with a flattering personal appraisal of the man and his language skills:

Ragula is mature, intelligent, straight-forward, and endowed with a good sense of humor. He is completely Western in manner. He thinks rapidly and expresses himself well. He speaks directly with no attempt to be secretive or to sound important. He speaks Belorussian [sic], Russian, Polish, German, French, and a smattering of Flemish…and Italian.508 Analysis revealed that Ragula had “considerably revised his life-history to conform to the requirements of his present environment,” but agents suggested only that further exploration into the “actual story” of his activities as an officer of the Third Reich’s

Belarusian military during the Second World War could be used to blackmail Ragula and control him more effectively: “Independent investigation of the subject’s past might serve to strengthen this control.”509

Throughout 1951, Ragula used his contacts with his fellow Belarusian Nazi collaborators to tighten the connections between the CIA, the BNR, and his fellow

Belarusian veterans of the auxiliary military forces of the Third Reich. Ragula had become a leader of organizations of Belarusian students and Belarusian veterans in

Belgium after the war, and he had been maintaining contacts with similar organizations throughout Western Europe long before the CIA recruited him. In 1948, for example,

Ragula had sent letters to several of the organizations in this network declaring the foundation of one of his groups. The following passage from one such letter to a

508 “To Chief, Foreign Division M from Chief of Station, Karlsruhe: REDBIRD/Operational: Belorussian Émigré Organizations and Major Boris Ragula,” 7 February 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 509 “Summary Report on Carriage Test of Cambista 2 on 22 April 1952,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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veterans’ organization in Germany describes his hope that a war for Belarusian liberation from Soviet rule would come soon:

The Association of White-Ruthenian [Belarusian] Veterans in Belgium, which was founded on 12 September 1948, sends hearty greetings to White- Ruthenian Veterans in Germany. We want to assure them that we, on our part, are ready and will always be ready to devote all our forces to the fight for the liberation of White Ruthenia. We are convinced that the blood and the sufferings of our brethren who were killed in this fight will not have been in vain. We believe that the moment of White Ruthenia’s liberation is not far away. Long Live White Ruthenia!510 Groups of Belarusian veterans of the Third Reich’s auxiliary military forces throughout

Western Europe organized themselves and courted powerful sponsors in hopes that tensions with the Soviet Union would erupt into open warfare and provide an opportunity to pursue Belarusian independence.

Ragula culled these networks of Belarusian veterans for recruits and ingratiated himself to the leader of the BNR as Project Aequor began to take shape. Through his position as the president of a Belarusian student organization in Belgium, Ragula increased his correspondence and strengthened his connections with Abramchik in

Paris.511 Although Ragula had worked closely with the BCC during the war, the BNR became the political organization to serve as the front for Ragula’s actions on behalf of the CIA. An internal agency memorandum explained that Project Aequor would secretly use the BNR “as a pool of agent and consultant recruiting candidates…and as a political

‘partner’ in the development of any anti-Soviet resistance movement contacts that are

510 “’Translation: To White-Ruthenian Veterans in Germany,’ originally published in Fatherland (Bazkaushtshyna),” 10 October 1948, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 511 “Incoming Classified Message to Special Operations: Routine,” September 16, 1950, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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made in Byelorussia [sic].” 512 Ragula was instructed to keep US sponsorship of the project secret, and all of his organizing and recruiting work on behalf of the CIA would be conducted in the name of the BNR in order to lend a sense of legitimacy to his efforts among the Belarusian diaspora.

Ragula was not only misleading his fellow Belarusians about his American connections, but he was also misleading his CIA contacts about his own influence and his contacts with Chorny Kot. Ragula had only ever possessed the most tenuous connection to the spectral guerrillas supposedly operating in the BSSR, and these communications had dried up years earlier. In a memorandum questioning Ragula’s connections to

Chorny Kot and the BNR’s proposals for cooperative projects with the CIA, the chief of the Karlsruhe CIA station observed that there had been “no direct, or organized, contact” between the Belarusian diaspora in Western Europe and the resistance movement since

1946, and what communication there had been before that time had been “weak.”513

Groups of Belarusian agents had supposedly been dispatched to the BSSR by the BNR on four separate occasions in the late 1940s, but none of them had ever been heard from again. Two additional agents had allegedly been infiltrated by the BNR in 1947, although one man’s debriefing raised doubts about the veracity of his reports. 514 A CIA memorandum summarizing early progress establishing contact with assets in the BSSR concluded that Ragula and the BNR had maintained “no substantiated contact with the

512 “Memorandum on Project Aequor,” 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 513 “To Chief, Foreign Division M from Acting Chief of Station, Karlsruhe: Operational/REDBIRD: Basis for Operational Collaboration Proposed by Belorussian National Council,” 15 February 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 514 Ibid.

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interior since the immediate post-war period.” 515 Nevertheless, the CIA agreed to provide

“the financing and technical aid (transportation and communications) for the realization of this group’s long desired contact with the homeland.” 516 The agency would infiltrate fifth column forces itself.

Project Aequor had begun modestly, but ambitions and budgets soared as agents heard encouraging recruiting updates from Ragula. After listening to a report in Munich in June 1951, Ragula’s case officer reported that the agency could now expect “our future relations with Cambista 2” [Ragula’s CIA cryptonym] to produce interviews of “200 young Belos [sic] in Western Europe…for missions.”517 Plans for the reestablishment of an extensive underground network were launched, and Ragula was entrusted with all of the details. Agents even requested that he identify and recruit “an elderly couple to act as house-keepers for agent-candidates in the training area.”518 CIA agents believed that the

BNR and its loose network of Belarusian émigrés throughout Western Europe and North

America could potentially provide “a clearing house for such events and individuals” for use in a number of ambitious paramilitary missions and propaganda campaigns.519 These plans for the expansion of Project Aequor in 1951 reflected the CIA’s increased use of

515 “Memorandum on Project Aequor,” 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 516 Ibid. 517 “From Munich to OPC/OSO: Incoming Classified Message,” 21 June 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 518 “Aequor Progress, 20 September 1951,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 519 “Memorandum on Project Aequor,” 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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covert operations and paramilitary émigré groups with the adoption of NSC 10/5 that same year.520

During the spring and summer of 1951, Ragula and four men under his direction identified sixty potential recruits from Belarusian veterans’ organizations in France,

Belgium, England, and West Germany. 521 Although Ragula and his assistants had identified dozens of candidates by fall 1951, only two men passed the psychological and security screenings required to train for infiltration operations. These two Belarusian agents, code-named “Camposanto,” were “trained, briefed, and dispatched by American case officers in the field who [were] assisted by Cambista 2.” The first Camposanto agent was “dispatched by air” on the night of September 21st, 1951. The second agent remained in West Germany to receive additional training in clandestine wireless communications in anticipation of future infiltration operations. A memorandum on the progress of Project

Aequor anticipated the expansion of these operations, noting that agents in Washington and Germany were busily reviewing “approximately sixty additional names of possible agent or partisan-warfare trainees collected under Cambista 2’s direction…for future operational employment.” CIA analysts believed that the initial outlook of Project Aequor seemed promising due largely to “the enthusiastic cooperation of Cambista 2…and the

‘pool’ of sixty possible recruits now being studied.” 522 This estimate, however, was completely premature, especially since the first Camposanto agent never made contact with the CIA after he had been parachuted into the BSSR. He had been instructed to use a

520 “NSC 10/5,” in Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin, 67. 521 “Aequor Progress, 20 September 1951,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 522 “Memorandum on Project Aequor,” 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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form of “secret writing” and to send word through regular mail channels, but no such message was ever received.523 There is no evidence that suggests that his case officers in

Munich ever heard from Camposanto 1 again, but preparations for further infiltration operations continued in spite of the failure of the first Aequor mission.

Although Project Aequor had begun as a modest operation with only a single

Belarusian liaison officer and a lone infiltration agent, the costs of the project quickly began to escalate along with its scope. Over the course of 1951 and 1952, CIA agents arranged regular payments and sporadic infusions of money to the BNR as training and infiltration operations progressed. Agents noted with approval that Ragula and the BNR did not seem greedy when submitting budgetary requests:

Cambista 2’s requests for financial support seemed tempered with moderation, as indeed is his general approach to American aid. One has the feeling that, unlike some of his émigré counterparts, his concept of collaboration with Americans is not merely a dollar-squeezing proposition, but a joint effort based on services rendered and returned.524 Regular cash payments from the CIA to Ragula had first begun to fund the operations of

Project Aequor and the BNR in April 1951, and they soon increased in both amount and frequency. Ragula received a regular personal salary, but many other large sums of cash also sporadically appeared for him throughout his relationship with the CIA in the early

1950s.525 For instance, in June 1951 the CIA office in Munich instructed its courier to leave a large additional sum in Ragula’s mailbox at the student housing complex in which

523 “Memorandum on Project Aequor,” 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 524 “Aequor Progress, 20 September 1951,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 525 Ibid.

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he lived in Louvain, Belgium.526 These funds supported his recruiting operations and stimulated the organizational and propaganda efforts of the BNR.

Financial leverage and knowledge of the collaborators’ pasts were the primary means of control exercised over the CIA’s new Belarusian assets, and agents worried when payments were delayed or went missing. In November 1951, a telegram from the

Munich station to CIA headquarters explained that “delays in prompt delivery funds

Cambista 2 reflection our ability fulfill financial commitments. This detrimental our rapport with him. Necessary take steps insure more reliable deliveries.”527 Classified messages frequently flew between Munich and CIA headquarters describing Ragula’s complaints that he required additional funds or had not yet received his monthly stipends.528

CIA headquarters began asking for a more thorough accounting of disbursements for Project Aequor in 1952 as Ragula was growing more demanding and difficult to please. Sums paid to Ragula increased even as CIA headquarters called the security of the payment channels and the operation’s accounting into question. An official summary of costs and payments related to Project Aequor compiled in August 1952 appears to be flawed and incomplete. For example, while the August memorandum supposedly outlined “all Cambista/2 payments to date,” a line item list attached to this message does

526 “From Munich to OSO/OPC: Incoming Classified Message,” 21 June 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 527 “From Munich to OPC/OSO: REDSOX/AEQUOR,” 8 November 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 528 “To OPC/OSO: Incoming Classified Message,” 22 January 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II; “From Munich to OPC/OSO: REDSOX/AEQUOR,” 23 January 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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not contain several of the large payments recorded in other individual telegrams.529

Especially noticeable by its absence is an unusually large payment of 250,000 Belgian francs (approximately 5,000 US dollars at the time) made to Ragula in late January 1952, for which agents in Munich had made a pressing request: “urge prompt delivery….please confirm.”530

Although problems had quickly arisen with the costs and payments involved with

Project Aequor, the CIA had also begun providing money to fund a Belarusian language political newspaper in September 1951. The agency covertly provided funds to publish the Belarusian language newspaper, Bazkaushtshyna (The Fatherland), which had been circulating within Belarusian DP Camps and among the Belarusian diaspora for years. An internal memorandum explained that the CIA’s support for Bazkaushtshyna would proceed on a trial basis “with our covert financial support for the next three months…during which time copies of the newspaper will be pouched…for final analysis and disposition…it is hoped that final approval will be granted following the three months trial period.” 531 The CIA agreed to fund this newspaper on Ragula’s suggestion without any detailed knowledge of the paper’s contents or politics, and they relied upon him to provide the translations. The early message about Bazkaushtshyna acknowledged that further analysis of the paper was still required, but the message minimized this fact while also suggesting that the CIA had agreed to the covert publication of a political newspaper that the agency could not translate itself: “Our present knowledge of Cambista

529 “Notification of Transfer of Funds,” 8 August 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 530 Ibid. 531 “Aequor Progress, 20 September 1951,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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1’s [the CIA cryptonym for the BNR] internal political trends and activities is limited…Thorough analysis of the available Cambista 1 newspapers and pamphlets has not been possible due to language difficulties.”532 The report concluded optimistically while revealing the extent of the CIA’s reliance on Ragula for information about the

BNR, Chorny Kot, and Bazkaushtshyna. The report’s conclusion suggested that “it is expected that a clearer understanding of Cambista 1’s organizational structure will be reached in the near future when translated publications and a detailed brief of Cambista

1’s affiliated parties will be made available to us by Cambista 2.”533

Before Bazkaushtshyna’s trial period had expired, Ragula began petitioning his case officers for additional funding for Belarusian military academies and the creation of

Belarusian paramilitary units in Western Europe. In early 1952, Ragula pushed the CIA to establish “some sort of military unit as soon as possible,” which he believed would cement the authority of the BNR within the Belarusian diaspora and provide a recruiting pool for all future paramilitary operations with the CIA.534 Although CIA officials briefly considered the formation of such Belarusian “guard companies” in early 1952, by March the conversation had shifted to a more modest proposal to find a house for a secret school that would emphasize Belarusian cultural development, instruction in military and guerrilla tactics, and anticommunist political indoctrination.535 CIA agents rejected

532 “Aequor Progress, 20 September 1951,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 533 Ibid. 534 “REDSOX/AEQUOR: Statement from Cambista 2 on Need for a Military Unit,” 18 March 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II; “Cable Re: Guard Companies,” 30 January 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 535 “Cable Re: Guard Companies,” 30 January 1952; “REDSOX/AEQUOR: Contact Report with Cambista 2,” 15 July 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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Ragula’s more ambitious proposals for the creation of Belarusian military units in favor of plans to establish a single school to train recruits for infiltration missions.

Codenamed Plan Cadre, the creation of a covert operations academy consumed the leadership of the BNR for months and caused tensions between Ragula and his case officers. The reorganization of Belarusian military forces under the auspices of the US was Ragula’s paramount priority. His primary reason for working with the CIA in the first place had been to form Belarusian military units which would be used in a war with the Soviet Union. Barring an imminent war between the US and the USSR, Ragula and the BNR hoped that the creation of US-sponsored Belarusian military units would help to keep the remnants of the Third Reich’s Belarusian auxiliary military forces from dissipating further through emigration and assimilation. Belarusian nationalists believed that these formations would become the foundation of a future Belarusian nationalist army and would buttress BNR claims that Abramchik’s faction represented the only legitimate Belarusian government-in-exile.

Anxious to make the most of any opportunity to put American resources behind the reorganization of Belarusian military forces, Ragula prepared a detailed argument for

“the prompt organization of schools for officers” in March 1952 with a strong warning that action must be taken quickly if the Americans wanted to make use of the anticommunist Belarusian diaspora in the West:

This school should be organized under the cover of ‘foreigners in the American army,’ which will obviate suspicion…This would form a permanent base from which it could always be possible to man cadres for the work that is now being carried on…The program of such a school would represent a special plan. Aside from military subjects, there should be political, propaganda, organizational, and administrative instruction…

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Today the organization of such a group as I have proposed has been undertaken with the full support of one of the western governments. In this connection, I make this warning, that if we do not succeed in doing this in time, not one person will be left to us. At the beginning of our working together, the principal condition was the organization of such a school, for at that time I already foresaw the difficulties which we are now facing. There was agreement in principle, and the organization of the school was contemplated for the beginning of March. I shall not retreat from this position in the future. If one side fails to carry out its obligations, the second is automatically released from its obligations. If the local establishment is not able to decide this question, I request that you put me into contact with those persons on whom the decision of the problem depends. 536 Ragula firmly threatened that if a school were not quickly established, he and the

BNR would be compelled to end their relationship with the CIA and shop their assets around elsewhere.

In the summer of 1952, Ragula met several times with an unnamed agent, who provided him with detailed outlines for Plan Cadre that reflected a much more limited version of Ragula’s proposals.537 The CIA plan revealed that the agency was hesitant to deepen its involvement with the BNR. The proposed clandestine school was to be financed by the CIA, but the agency emphasized that

“in every other aspect it must be completely a product of the BNR. The United

States can provide absolutely no assistance, supervision, or other help beyond the financial assistance.”538 The CIA’s program for the proposed school consisted of cultural nationalism, political indoctrination, and military training. Military

536 “REDSOX/AEQUOR: Statement from Cambista 2 on Need for a Military Unit,” 18 March 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 537 “REDSOX/AEQUOR: Contact Report with Cambista 2,” 15 July 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 538 “Attachment ‘B’: Proposal for the Implementation of Plan ‘Cadre,’” 15 July 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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instruction would include physical training; study of the organization of the

Soviet and American armies; familiarization with the topography of Soviet territory; instruction in communications and first aid; a course on “life in the forest”; and training in reconnaissance and sabotage.539 CIA planners designed the

Cadre school to be modest, comprising no more than a house for classes and lodgings for its students. There were to be merely two or three instructors and ten to fifteen students for the first ten month course of study. 540 “It is particularly important,” the plan stated, “that the beginnings of the school be simple, in order that it may be developed…or even abandoned if insurmountable difficulties arise.”541

Minimum estimates for the creation of the Cadre school were $44,580, and the CIA slowly backed away from this proposal as relations with Ragula and the BNR soured further.542 One agent noted plainly that the project was only ever intended to placate Ragula and the BNR while keeping the group available for future exploitation: “Plan ‘Cadre’ is frankly designed as a sop to the BNR for the military company which we are unable to give them; however….a BNR cadre school could be the solution to our recruiting problems in Europe by attracting to itself the most eager and talented young Byelo-Russians [sic], letting us watch

539 “Attachment ‘C’: Program of the BNR School,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 540 “Attachment ‘B’: Proposal for the Implementation of Plan ‘Cadre,’” 15 July 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 541 Ibid. 542 Ibid.

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their progress over a given period of time, and giving us a secure and convenient pool from which to recruit.”543

Preparations for the Cadre school continued through the spring and summer of

1952 as the CIA trained 25 Belarusian recruits in guerrilla warfare and secretly infiltrated

18 of them into the Soviet Union. After the recruits underwent physical training and courses of instruction in clandestine radio communications and other espionage and sabotage skills in Munich, small teams of Belarusian guerrillas parachuted into the BSSR

“via a ‘black’ flight” conducted by the CIA before meeting a disastrous end.544 For example, after landing in the Soviet Union one night in late August 1952, one four-man team buried their parachutes and hid in the wilderness as they established radio contact with mission headquarters back in Germany. After three days in hiding, the team split into pairs in order to conduct reconnaissance around the town of Navahrudak (Ragula’s hometown). Upon their return to their designated rendezvous point, two of the operatives found that the area had been completely surrounded by Soviet forces, which had also blocked all of the roads. Concluding that their compatriots must have been captured and forced to reveal their rendezvous site, the men fled Soviet authorities for several weeks,

“ditching most of their equipment and weapons along the way.” 545 These two surviving team members were eventually ambushed by the KGB, arrested, interrogated, and imprisoned. One of the two confessed that after he had been captured, he agreed to serve as a KGB double agent in order to save his own life. A CIA report created decades later

543 “REDSOX/AEQUOR: Contact Report with Cambista 2,” 15 July 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 544 Ibid. 545 Ibid.

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would note that 1952 became “a particularly inauspicious year for the program”: Soviet forces captured or killed the other sixteen Belarusian recruits parachuted into the BSSR by the CIA’s covert flights that year “not long after they landed.”546

The failures of these infiltration operations and Ragula’s growing demands caused

CIA policymakers to begin questioning the BNR’s remaining potential for such operations. By summer 1952, American agents were speculating that the BNR might have already exhausted its limited resources to mobilize suitable candidates for Project

Aequor. A report from July described the disappointing recruiting and infiltration operations that year and concluded that “our experiences of the past eight months have demonstrated that, under present circumstances, the BNR (at least in Europe) is fast approaching bankruptcy in the commodity of bodies.”547

While CIA officials were beginning to reconsider the agency’s commitments to the BNR, Ragula began to insist that the Americans pay the salaries of other BNR leaders in order to allow them to work full-time for the cause as well. 548 CIA officials conceded to an extremely limited form of Ragula’s proposal for paid positions for BNR representatives in Western Europe on a trial basis even as they began to develop tentative contacts with the leadership of the

BCC.549 Agency officials ultimately decided to appoint a single individual to

546 Background on AECAMPOSANTO/6,” March 1995, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 105, NARA II. 547 “REDSOX/AEQUOR: Contact Report with Cambista 2,” 15 July 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 548 “Aequor Progress, 20 September 1951,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II; “From DIRECTOR CIA to SR REPRESENTATIVE GERMANY: REDSOX AEQUOR,” 28 November 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 105, NARA II. 549 “Plan for Organization of American-Byelorussian Intelligence Group,” 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II.

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represent the BNR in England, France, and Belgium for a trial period of three months, during which time the representative would be charged vaguely with determining “the most profitable fields for future political and psychological anti-

Communist activities.”550 By the time this three month trial period had ended, however, the CIA had already concluded extensive discussions with Radoslaw

Ostrowski, the former president of the Nazi puppet government of occupied

Belarusian territories and the BNR’s chief rival.551

The CIA did not wish to sever all connections to Ragula and Abramchik, but the agency halted its covert operations with the BNR and retreated further from the Cadre school idea. CIA director Walter Bedell Smith had begun exercising more control over the more dubious OPC operations based in West

Germany in 1951, and now he began intervening directly to curtail Project

Aequor.552 Smith wrote a memorandum in late October 1952 suggesting that an innocuous public school for Belarusian culture in Louvain under Ragula’s leadership might provide the same opportunities for the “future agent use of graduates,” but he was clear that there could be “no covert training or operations connected with school.”553 Smith authorized his agents to encourage Ragula to design a curriculum and courses for such a school, but he chastised them for encouraging Ragula’s expectations without seeking his approval and cautioned

550 “Attachment ‘A’: Proposal for Preliminary Phase of Plan ‘West’ under Project Aequor as Presented to Cambista 2,” 15 July 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 551 “Plan for Organization of American-Byelorussian Intelligence Group,” 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II. 552 Tim Wiener, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (London: Penguin, 2011), 64. 553 “From Director, CIA,” 21 October 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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them that “under no circumstances must he be permitted take any overt steps, i.e., recruiting, purchasing equipment, leasing building, etc.”554

News that the CIA would not proceed with the plans for the Cadre school so dearly desired by Ragula caused him to react with a bold and direct threat. On

January 9, 1953, the chief of the CIA station in Munich passed along a letter given to him by Ragula for “the boss.”555 In an extraordinary attempt to blackmail the director of the CIA, Ragula presented an ultimatum insinuating that the agency had been infiltrated by communists and demanding a personal meeting with the CIA director:

If the school is not organized, or even if a substitute for the school is found, we shall be compelled, in order not to lose confidence, to explain the actual reasons for the failure and to admit our naïve confidence in the Americans was too great…we have refrained from doing this up to now…The fact that I…am not able to meet with you to discuss the difficulties that are developing, is unprecedented in any sort of collaboration…I do not want to assume the most adverse possibility, namely communist infiltration and deliberate sabotage of an action so well begun. It is also hard to assume that a person such as you would have to hide from me. In order to clear up all of these matters, I must without question have a meeting with you. If I am met with a refusal, I shall have to find other ways to notify the proper American officials of the developing situation and to present them with the actual facts. I shall consider this my first duty, since a refusal to this request for a meeting would confirm my assumptions. I assure you that any steps I take or that will be undertaken in the near future stem from sincere desire for the best possible relations between us and for the most fruitful results possible in our work against the common foe, bolshevism…the answer to this letter will decide the fate of our further collaboration.556

554 “From Director, CIA to SMUNI: REDSOX/AEQUOR,” 23 October 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II. 555 “Transmittal of Letter Written by Cambista 2,” 9 January 1953, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 105, NARA II, 1. 556 Ibid., 3.

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Although analysts considered this remarkable letter to be “a threat which may or may not be carried out,” Ragula was nevertheless granted provisional operational clearance to continue working as an occasional spotter and recruiter.557 The agency had begun to grow frustrated with the “uncooperative attitudes” and “indifferent performance” of the BNR leadership, however, and Project Aequor’s paramilitary operations languished for several years during the height of the CIA’s covert campaigns against the Soviet bloc in spite of the incoming Eisenhower administration’s enthusiasm for such projects.558

As the project’s operational failures and Ragula’s actions placed the relationship between the BNR and the CIA in jeopardy, the agency began to pursue operational possibilities with Abramchik’s rival instead. Ostrowski had left West Germany for

Argentina in 1950, but he returned to Europe in summer 1952 when agents from the CIA office in Munich contacted him “with a view to conducting exploratory conversations concerning matters of operational interest” with the CIA.559 Ostrowski came prepared with detailed plans for an extensive collaborative relationship with US intelligence. Like

Ragula and the BNR, Ostrowski falsely claimed that he was in touch with underground

Belarusian resistance cells behind the Iron Curtain in order to convince US intelligence to sponsor his faction’s operations. The BCC president proposed the creation of an

“American-Byelorussian Intelligence Group” that would act as “a secret intelligence service in collaboration with the corresponding agency in the United States” and would

557 Ibid., 1. 558 “Classified Message,” 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 96, NARA II, 1; “From Chief of Base, Munich to Chief, EE: REDSOX/ Operational: AEQOR/Transmittal of Letter Written by Cambista 2 to [redacted],” 9 January 1953, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 105, NARA II; “Provisional Operational Clearance,” 12 January 1953, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 105, NARA II. 559 “Operational Discussion with R. Ostrowski,” 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 1.

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be responsible for “the operational direction of the Byelorussian revolutionary-liberation underground movement, whose forces are in Byelorussia.”560 Ostrowski claimed that he had recently been in touch with resistors in the BSSR and Poland, but he implied that his contacts would require an assurance that his faction would not be prosecuted by the US before he were to cooperate with the agency:

I have very fresh news from behind the Iron Curtain (July of this year), where anti-bolshevik underground workers who have penetrated the administrative apparatus pose the following questions: What will be the attitude of the Americans and English when they meet us in the uniforms of the MVD [the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs], the MGB [the Soviet Ministry of State Security], or the Polish secret police….and will they not send us into the cellars of the same MVD and US (secret police), so that they can set up a [Nuremberg] trial and reward us with the gallows?561 Agents concluded that although “Ostrovsky appears at least opportunistic,” the potential benefits of the BCC president’s proposal warranted further exploration as long as the agency could maintain “full [US] control of entire operation and agents he may furnish.”562

Ostrowski provided agents with many details of his work for the German occupation of Belarusian territory during World War II, correctly assuming that the

Americans were less concerned about his collaboration with Nazi Germany than with his ability to mobilize Belarusian anticommunist forces against the Soviet Union. In a deposition prepared for American agents, Ostrowski confidently declared that “it is unimportant that we were collaborators during the war, and it is utterly unimportant with

560 Ostrowski, “Plan for Organization of American-Byelorussian Intelligence Group,” 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, ZZ-16, Box 39, 1. 561 “One of the Resources in the Struggle Against Bolshevism,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, 1. 562 “Classified Message,” 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 96, NARA II, 1.

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whom we collaborated - Germans or devils. What is important is that we were never collaborators of Stalin and that we have fought against him without interruption.”563 This remarkable statement succinctly and accurately summarizes the prevailing attitudes of US intelligence and reflects leading Belarusian collaborators’ growing confidence that they no longer needed to fear being brought to justice for their past collaboration with Nazi

Germany.

In order to provide cover for the clandestine operations he had in mind, Ostrowski suggested that his proposed joint intelligence group operate behind the cover of an official public organization affiliated with the BCC. Ostrowski had founded the

Belarusian Liberation Movement (BLM) with Ludvik Zarechny in the UK in order to serve as the revolutionary arm of the BCC in the future liberation of Belarusian territories from Soviet control; he now suggested that the Americans fund his proposed “American-

Byelorussian Intelligence Group” by funneling money to the BLM through the publishing offices of Nezalezhnaya Belarus, the BLM’s Belarusian language newspaper.564

Ostrowski’s detailed proposal described how “the entire Intelligence Group will consist of two parts, the official section and the secret section…officially all of the activities of the American-Byelorussian Intelligence Group will be under the cover of the publication of the newspaper ‘Nezalezhnaya Belorus’ [sic], the organ of the Byelorussian Liberation

Movement.”565 Money would flow from the “official section” located in the offices of the

563 “One of the Resources in the Struggle Against Bolshevism,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, 1-2. 564 “Plan for Organization of American-Byelorussian Intelligence Group,” 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 2; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 326. 565 “Plan for Organization of American-Byelorussian Intelligence Group,” 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 2.

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newspaper to the BLM in “the secret part…of the Intelligence Group,” which would be responsible for providing intelligence, recruiting paramilitary candidates, and coordinating underground resistance forces.566

Ostrowski’s ambitious and detailed proposals apparently did not impress the

American agents, who expressed doubts about the strength of the BLM and the personalities of its leaders. Although agents had been monitoring the BCC president for years, very little operational potential actually existed with Ostrowski’s relatively limited following and the BLM would never manage to significantly expand its activities or influence.567 One CIA analysis concluded that the BLM had not succeeded in gaining much support among the Belarusian diaspora, and in fact the organization was really little more than a “diversion” created by Ostrowski in order “to break up the ranks of the

BNR.”568 The chief of the CIA station in Munich concluded that Ostrowski and Zarechny possessed “all the qualities of a Fuehrer…to an equal degree.”569 These personalities came into conflict with one another, which reduced the influence of the BLM even further. In February 1954, a final rift occurred between Ostrowski and Zarechny, the leading figure of the BLM. Ostrowski was living at Zarechny’s home in West Germany, and one night in early February the two got into a heated argument that ended their relationship. The CIA Munich station chief explained that “the rift occurred under rather

566 “Plan for Organization of American-Byelorussian Intelligence Group,” 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 2. 567 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 326. 568 “Report on Antonovich-Zarechnyi,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 96, NARA II, 1. 569 “Rift between Ostrovskiy and Zarechnyy,” 1954, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 96, NARA II, 2.

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humorous circumstances” one evening when Zarechny “came home drunk and happy.”570

Disapproving of his carousing, Ostrowski criticized Zarechny, which then “led to mutual abuse, both of them having vocabularies [that] equip them more than adequately for the purpose.”571 Their movement collapsed, and months later Ostrowski purchased a rowhouse in London where he and his son, Wiktor, would live and print propaganda for the BCC for years.

After breaking with Zarechny and the BLM, Ostrowski helped to create the

Belarusian Liberation Front (BLF), a rival organization under the command of Dmitri

Kasmovich that was intended to replace the BLM.572 Although he traveled to the US in

1957 and 1960, Ostrowski would wait until after his daughter, Halina, had become a US citizen in 1960 to begin filing the paperwork for his own immigration.573 With his smaller group of supporters, Ostrowski had been less useful to the agency than the BNR. The

CIA had now pursued operational possibilities with both factions of the anticommunist

Belarusian diaspora, but neither Abramchik nor Ostrowski had proven able to fulfill their promises to connect the agency with the spectral Belarusian underground or to supply suitable recruits for the ambitious covert operations they had proposed.

The CIA stopped Project Aequor’s guerrilla activities in December 1956 when a series of stories in Komsomolskaya Pravda announced the capture of the members of the

570 “Rift between Ostrovskiy and Zarechnyy,” 1954, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 96, NARA II, 1-2. 571 Ibid. 572 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 327. 573 “Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration of Ostrowski, Radoslaw,” 1961, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 7, NARA II, 1; “Petition to Classify Status of Alien for Issuance of Immigrant Visa,” 1961, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 7, NARA II, 1.

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team that had parachuted into the USSR in August 1952.574 The articles also exposed the architects of the plans. One of the captured Aequor agents was supposedly quoted proclaiming his “hatred of those who tried to cripple my life. I am speaking of my

‘friends’ Boris Rogulya [sic] [and] Mikola Abramchik [sic]…who sold me…to the

American intelligence service.”575 Although the Soviet press denounced Ragula and

Abramchik by name and would continue to issue condemnations of Belarusian Nazi collaborators and their relationships with US intelligence for years, the agency would continue to work with them and with several other prominent collaborators after Project

Aequor’s abrupt cancellation.576 With his hopes of US sponsorship of his grand schemes shattered, Ragula emigrated to Canada with his family and began practicing medicine.577

He would remain peripherally involved in intelligence operations for a short time, but he would stay active in Belarusian nationalist émigré politics in North America for several decades.578

Although all of the agency’s attempts to exploit the operational potential of the anticommunist Belarusian diaspora had so far been frustrated, the CIA continued to pursue such possibilities in more limited forms. The agency began planning more

574 “Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 7; P. Barashev and V. Kitain, “Taste of the Homeland,” The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 9, No. 2, 20 February 1957, 9-10. 575 P. Barashev and V. Kitain, “Taste of the Homeland,” 9. 576 K. Petrov, “They Have Confessed,” The Current Digest of the Russian Press 6, No. 24, 28 July 1954, 32-4; “On U.S. Subversive Activities Against the Soviet Union: Press Conference for Soviet and Foreign Newsmen at Moscow’s Central Journalists’ Club,” The Current Digest of the Russian Press 9, No. 5, 13 March 1957, 3-8; A. Stuk, “On the Slander Wave: Former Mayor in the Role of Literary Commentator,” The Current Digest of the Russian Press 20, No. 32, 28 August 1968, 16-7. 577 Ragula, Against the Current, 111. 578 “Memorandum for: Chief, CI/CA. Subject: AECAMBISTA/2, C-16821,” 5 October 1960, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 105, NARA II; Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 380.

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cautious and less ambitious plans for the BNR and began searching for a new Belarusian liaison officer to replace Ragula even as Project Aequor was being exposed in the Soviet press. Abramchik introduced his candidate, Constantine Mierlak, to an unnamed CIA case officer at the Hotel Governor Clinton in New York City on December 17, 1956.579

Like Ragula, Mierlak made a good first impression on the agent with his “excellent bearing.”580 The agent’s report described Mierlak as “well-dressed, extremely well- mannered, and friendly though somewhat reserved and extremely neat and fastidious about his personal appearance…He showed himself to be a man capable of clear, logical thinking and conservative in his statements regarding international political affairs.”581

Western in his manners, Mierlak reportedly presented “the appearance of a prosperous businessman.”582 He was quickly approved and appointed as the principal spotter and recruiter for Project Aeprimer, which replaced Aequor when the latter was exposed. Like

Aequor, Project Aeprimer sought “to establish long-term, durable assets illegally infiltrated into the Byelorussian SSR.”583 Unlike its predecessor, however, Project

Aeprimer was designed to have only a “limited” association with the BNR.584

The agency planned several other operations involving the Belarusians as well, and Ragula’s replacement would soon become involved in them all. Mierlak was appointed to act as a spotter and recruiter for Project Aeprimer, but he also served in this capacity for Operation Redskin, which involved “placing, recruiting, and communicating

579 “Memorandum for the Record: Report of Contact with Nykola Abramtchik,” 9 January 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 580 Ibid. 581 Ibid. 582 “Secret: Personal Record Questionnaire: Part II – Operational Information,” 9 January 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 11. 583 “Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 7. 584 Ibid.

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with agents within the USSR” by legal means rather than infiltration operations.585 As a part of this larger effort, Mierlak also became involved in Project Aefulfill, which was designed to establish long-term correspondence with contacts in the Soviet Union by sending care packages to friends and relatives who might ultimately become sources of information or members of an underground safehouse network. Finally, Mierlak became

“a spotter of Hot War type agent candidates” for the newly created Project Aeready, which was designed to assemble a paramilitary “Hot War” cadre that would remain in readiness to be deployed “during a period of heightened tensions/increased alert or during actual hostilities against the Soviet Union.”586

Project Aequor’s public exposure in the Soviet press provided Mierlak with unique opportunities to advance his intelligence career and bolster his personal prestige.

He had originally been recruited “as a Hot War cadre trainee” for Project Aeready before the Soviet press had exposed Project Aequor, but before long he would become a pivotal link between the Americans and the Belarusians and an increasingly influential figure in the Belarusian diaspora.587 Project Aeprimer and the other new operations provided an opportunity for Mierlak to rise rapidly from trainee to spotter to principal agent. Because the agency sought to keep more “limited” contacts with the BNR as a result of Aequor’s public exposure, in January 1957 Abramchik instructed Mierlak to “handle all contacts

585 “Request for Investigation and Approval: Mierlak, Constantine: Hot War Redsox Agent Candidate,” 27 November 1956, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II; “Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 49. 586 “Memorandum for Chief, Security Office: Aeready 2 Request for PCSA and CSA,” 26 January 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II; “Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 7. 587 “Request for Investigation and Approval: Mierlak, Constantine: Hot War Redsox Agent Candidate,” 27 November 1956, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II.

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between the United States” and the BNR himself.588 In the presence of Mierlak’s case officer in January 1957, Abramchik “delegated the responsibilities of future contacts and liaison with the United States Government to Mr. Mierlak.”589 After Abramchik appointed him to serve as “the contact between the BNR and CIA,” Mierlak would start to become a much more prominent figure within the Belarusian nationalist movement and proudly assumed leading positions in Belarusian and American political organizations.590

In 1959, his case officer would report that Mierlak was boasting about having authority over thousands of Belarusians living in the US: “Subject said that as the undersigned well knew, Subject was recently elected to the Presidency of the Byelorussian-American

Association [BAA] which means leadership over many thousands of Byelorussians in the

United States.”591 Although its influence may not have been as extensive as Mierlak claimed, the BAA had chapters in many states and actively promoted Belarusian cultural and political interests in association with Abramchik’s BNR.592

Of all the new projects with which Mierlak and the BNR became involved, the creation of the “Hot War cadre” for Project Aeready initially occupied most of their energy.593 Abramchik, who was reportedly “enthusiastic” about the idea, “stated that he

588 “Memorandum for the Record: Meeting with M. Abramtchik and K. Mierlak,” 19 February 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2; “Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 7. 589 “Memorandum for the Record: Meeting with M. Abramtchik and K. Mierlak,” 19 February 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 590 “Memorandum for the Record: Report of Contact with Nykola Abramtchik,” 9 January 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 3. 591 “Memorandum on Personal Meeting with Aeprimer/1,” 10 July 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 592 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 214-9. 593 “Memorandum for Chief, Security Office: Aeready 2 Request for PCSA and CSA,” 26 January 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II.

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would cooperate fully in the development of the program.”594 During Mierlak’s introductory meeting in December 1956, the BNR president urged him to provide his new case officer with the list he had brought containing the names of approximately thirty potential Belarusian recruits for Project Aeready.595 Mierlak was eager to see that the individuals he recommended were able to attend the next Aeready training course scheduled for October 1, 1957.596 In March 1957, Mierlak met with his case officer and inquired about the Belarusians whose names he had submitted: “He asked about the status of the names he had originally submitted and was told that the information was not adequate to complete the necessary clearance action.”597 Mierlak agreed to supplement the data he had originally provided, and he continued to submit additional names of potential recruits.598 In summer 1957, he traveled to several cities in North America to spot potential recruits for Aeready. From his home in New York City, Mierlak flew to

Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago before traveling to London, Ontario, where Ragula had recently settled.599

After returning briefly to New York City, Mierlak flew to Washington, DC in order to undergo a series of “medical, psychological, and polygraph” assessments before

594 “Memorandum for the Record: Meeting with M. Abramtchik and K. Mierlak,” 19 February 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 595 “Memorandum for the Record: Report of Contact with Nykola Abramtchik,” 9 January 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2-3. 596 “Memorandum for the Record: Meeting with Mr. K. Mierlak,” 21 March 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 597 Ibid. 598 “Contact with AEREADY-2 on 21 May 1957 in New York,” 23 March 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 599 “Travel Expenses for Aeready-2 for Period 29 June – 5 July 1957,” 9 July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II; “Contact with AEREADY-2 on 21 May 1957 in New York,” 23 March 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1; Ragula, Against the Current, 117.

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a formal contract could be struck to replace his provisional clearance with the CIA.600

The agency reserved a hotel room for Mierlak near the White House under the name

“Conrad P. Mason” and arranged an extensive series of interviews and examinations for him.601 On Monday, July 8, 1957, Mierlak began a long week of biographical debriefings, intelligence tests, psychological interviews, medical examinations, and polygraphs.602

The results of this battery of tests revealed that he possessed limited abilities but would nevertheless be an acceptable candidate. An analysis of Mierlak’s intellect and psychology concluded that although he had above average intelligence, he possessed little humor or imagination and was certainly “not a charmer.”603 In addition, his examiners found that Mierlak possessed a “lack of subtlety…and lack of intuitiveness in judging others.”604 Although these qualities certainly did not make Mierlak particularly suited to clandestine work, he was deemed acceptable because of his planning and organizational abilities: “He likes things to be well-planned and thoroughly organized. His organization tends to be conventional, strictly according to protocol. He looks upon deviation from protocol with considerable suspicion…he is a thorough organizer, and on the whole he should be an effective one.”605

600 “Full Assessment and Polygraph for Constantine Mierlak,” 5 May 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 601 “Contact with Constantine Mierlak on Wednesday, 19 June 1957,” 24 June 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1; “Memorandum on ‘Conrad P. Mason,’” July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 602 “Assessment Schedule: Constantine Mierlak,” July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ- 18, Box 90, NARA II. 603 “Memorandum on ‘Conrad P. Mason,’” July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 604 Ibid., 2. 605 Ibid., 1.

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While he was in Washington, Mierlak also met with agents to discuss the status of the projects to which he had been attached. On Thursday, July 11, Mierlak had a scheduled meeting with his case officer over lunch at Yenching Palace, the iconic

Washington restaurant where John Scali and Aleksandr Fomin would meet to conduct and celebrate the backstage diplomacy that ended the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.606

Mierlak seemed eager to settle details of the arrangement between the CIA and the BNR, stating that he had “a number of matters to discuss before his return to New York.”607

They agreed to meet later in the day in his room at the Roger Smith Hotel on

Pennsylvania Avenue in order to complete their discussions.608 His case officer noted that

Mierlak “appeared rather upset,” and he “seemed to be under a strain” during their meeting later in the day.609 Although Mierlak claimed that he had several specific questions “in his own mind” about Belarusian Aeready candidates “and the Aecambista-

Agency relationship,” he kept looking through his briefcase and reading his questions directly off of different pieces of paper.610 His case officer noted that “this fumbling was rather surprising,” as Mierlak had previously “given the impression of being very neat, composed and methodical.”611

Mierlak’s nervous fumbling led the agent to conclude that he was not presenting his own questions, but rather was “acting under directions” from Abramchik to obtain

606 Judith Weinraub, “Tales from the Yenching Palace,” Washington Post, 14 March 2001, F7A; Clyde H. Farnsworth, “Where the Spies Are…or Have Been, or Might Be,” New York Times, 14 November 1985, B14. 607 “Contact with AEPRIMER-1 on 11-12 July 1957,” 16 July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 608 Ibid. 609 Ibid. 610 Ibid. 611 Ibid.

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details about Project Aeready.612 Consulting the papers in his briefcase, Mierlak asked about the details of the contract that Aeready recruits were asked to sign. He was informed that a candidate must sign a secrecy agreement promising “not to disclose any information about the training activities” or operational details.613 Recruits would initially receive training “in technical aspects only,” but “political aspects would be covered at the time of an emergency.” 614 At such a time, the contracts stipulated that an Aeready agent

“will be sent only to the area of his birth.”615 Mierlak gave no objection to this arrangement, but he declared that a representative of the BNR should be present to brief the Belarusian Aeready agents on political considerations “before they are sent anyplace in event of an emergency.”616

Other questions suggest that Mierlak may have been exhibiting signs of anxiety because he had reason to be concerned about the internal security of the operation and the extent of “Agency commitments” to the BNR in the event of exposure.617 In the wake of

Project Aequor’s exposure, Mierlak was eager to learn if the CIA would help refute recent propaganda attacks in a Canadian Belarusian language newspaper linking the BNR to these “espionage activities.”618 Mierlak did not say exactly how the CIA might be able to help distance the BNR from allegations of espionage, but his case officer suggested that agency involvement would be less effective than an independent initiative from the

BNR, asserting that “the Aecambista-1 newspaper in Munich [Bazkauczyna] should be

612 Ibid. 613 Ibid., 4. 614 Ibid. 615 Ibid. 616 Ibid. 617 Ibid., 1. 618 Ibid., 2.

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able to print a denial of such statements.”619 Mierlak’s case officer also noted that he asked about what type of “personal protection” could be expected for himself and others involved with the agency “in the event an Aeready candidate in training talked out of turn, perhaps while under the influence of liquor, and inadvertently exposed the activity.”620 Mierlak’s case officer responded plainly that “there could be no guarantee of

‘personal protection’. The Secrecy Agreement makes the candidate personally liable under the espionage laws and each candidate would be treated accordingly.”621 After receiving this disappointing reply, Mierlak requested that the name of one Belarusian candidate he had recruited “be dropped…because he has been drinking very heavily lately.”622

Mierlak also had become anxious to have questions answered about the financial compensation for his work on behalf of the CIA. Although he had originally been told that he would receive $250 each month plus expenses, Mierlak’s case officer informed him that it was likely that the finance division would only approve $150 per month.623

Somewhat taken aback, Mierlak seemed “slightly embarrassed and asked why he would be allowed only $150.00 when Aecambista-4 [Abramchik] had received so much more.”624 Although he accepted the explanation that “it was considered appropriate to pay the higher salary” to Abramchik because of his position as president of the BNR,

619 Ibid. 620 Ibid. 621 Ibid. 622 Ibid., 4. 623 “Memorandum for the Record: Report of Contact with Nykola Abramtchik,” 9 January 1957, Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 3; “Contact with AEPRIMER-1 on 11-12 July 1957,” 16 July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 3. 624 “Contact with AEPRIMER-1 on 11-12 July 1957,” 16 July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 3.

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Mierlak remained intently focused on the effect that his monthly salary might have upon his income taxes.625 He declared that he would accept “whatever it was agreed to pay him,” but he wanted to know “how his salary would be accounted for on the books and whether he would have to pay income tax on the amount received.”626 Mierlak argued that because he intended to turn over his salary to the BNR, “the money should be shown as received by [the BNR] and not by him…He was concerned about having to pay a high tax.”627 His case officer, however, explained in no uncertain terms that this was impossible. “So far as we were concerned,” the agent said, “the money was being paid to him for his personal services and if he wished to turn it over to Aecambista-1 he was free to so do…However, the Agency could not pay his salary to the organization, because the

Agency then would be accused of supporting the organization.”628 Of course, the CIA had been supporting the BNR for several years, but after Project Aequor’s exposure the agency desired more than ever to keep its continued “association with the BNR” quiet.629

Mierlak accepted this explanation, but he tried one last time to ensure that his own finances would not be adversely affected. Mierlak suggested that “perhaps if the salary were increased by about $50.00 the difference would take care of the higher income tax he would have to pay.”630 The case officer finally put an end to the conversation by agreeing to look into Mierlak’s proposal and advise him of the finance division’s response.

625 Ibid. 626 Ibid. 627 Ibid. 628 Ibid., 3-4. 629 “Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 7. 630 “Contact with AEPRIMER-1 on 11-12 July 1957,” 16 July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 4.

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Before he left Washington, Mierlak received his long-awaited authorization for

Project Aefulfill and discussed details of the “package program” being planned.631 He was eager to begin sending Aefulfill parcels and had been gently pushing for the program to begin since that spring. In March 1957, Mierlak’s case officer had even asked him “to be patient with Government methods and as soon as the approval was granted he would be so informed.”632 Mierlak had already submitted the names of several potential addressees in the USSR as well as addressors in the US through which the parcels would be sent, and now his case officer informed him that the names had been approved and “he could start making up the parcels for mailing.”633 Mierlak had prepared estimates for the cost of sending individual packages, and he explained “that approximately $100-$125.00 would be needed to assemble one parcel.”634 In order to provide the time necessary to exchange correspondence and acknowledge that each package had been received, no more than two packages a year were to be mailed to any one addressee. In addition,

Mierlak’s case officer instructed him to discuss nothing in the letters except casual conversation about family and friends “unless specific instructions are received.”635

Mierlak would continue to push for the further development of Project Aefulfill as it unfolded over the coming months, including the use of his own father as an addressee within the USSR.636

631 Ibid., 3. 632 “Memorandum for the Record: Meeting with Mr. K. Mierlak,” 21 March 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 633 “Contact with AEPRIMER-1 on 11-12 July 1957,” 16 July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 3. 634 Ibid. 635 Ibid. 636 “Memorandum on Contact with Aeprimer 1 in Washington, D.C., 7 January,” 14 January 1958, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1.

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Although his time in Washington was filled by agency assessments and operational meetings, Mierlak came with his own agenda as well. Politically active in the

Belarusian-American community, Mierlak intended to take advantage of his trip to

Washington to meet with government officials and advocate on behalf of the BAA and the BNR. Before he embarked on his trip, Mierlak had informed his case officer that “he had many things to do while he was in Washington, people to see in Congress, etc. and hoped that he would have some free afternoons in which to accomplish this.”637

Disappointing Mierlak’s hopes, the agent had told him “not to count on free afternoons because his time…would be fully occupied.”638 He was informed, however, that he

“could try to arrange something with the men with whom he would be working” once he arrived in Washington.639 When he arrived in the capital, Mierlak was able to arrange meetings with officials at the State Department late in the week. The BNR was heavily involved in a campaign to convince State Department officials to arrange a Belarusian section of the Voice of America broadcasts, and these meetings were almost certainly a part of this project.640 Mierlak’s case officer allowed him to interrupt their meetings multiple times in order to take a telephone call from an unidentified “someone in the

State Department” and to go meet with the man in person.641

On his final day in Washington, Mierlak met again with his case officer before being taken to “a covert location” for over three hours to undergo a “technical interview”

637 “Contact with Constantine Mierlak on Wednesday, 19 June 1957,” 24 June 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 638 Ibid. 639 Ibid. 640 “Report of Contact with Aeprimer-1 on 19 May 1958,” 22 May 1958, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 641 “Contact with AEPRIMER-1 on 11-12 July 1957,” 16 July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1-2.

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and polygraph examination.642 In their morning meeting, Mierlak seemed “more like himself” and was again “relaxed and composed.”643 He expressed the hope that he “had been considered cooperative during the assessment” and said that he had “enjoyed his stay in Washington.”644 During his polygraph examination, Mierlak admitted to falsifying his personal history on his immigration paperwork. He confessed to working for the

German Abwehr (Wehrmacht intelligence) to undermine the Allied cause, participating in “blackmarket speculation,” and forging documents. Under questioning, Mierlak explained that he had been “asked by the German Intelligence Abwehr to go to Italy and join the Polish Army in Italy and attempt to convince the Belorussian members of the

Polish Army in Italy to cease fighting against the Germans.”645 He also described how he had forged a variety of documents under the German occupation in order to obtain allowances of merchandise for sale on the black market.646 At times, Mierlak seemed proud of his achievements as a forger, boasting that the false identity he created for himself in Warsaw in 1944 involved “a major forgery of documents.”647 This was certainly something of an odd boast, as Mierlak’s false identity in 1944 had been created with the assistance of the Abwehr in order to undermine Allied forces.648 During his polygraph test, Mierlak’s charts indicated “a pattern of extreme nervousness which makes it diffucult [sic] to specifically pin point an area of uneasiness other than to state that he is

642 “Report of Technical Interview,” 25 July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 643 “Contact with AEPRIMER-1 on 11-12 July 1957,” 16 July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 5. 644 Ibid. 645 “Report of Technical Interview,” 25 July 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 5. 646 Ibid., 2. 647 Ibid. 648 Ibid., 1.

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generally disturbed throughout this whole phase of testing.”649 Nevertheless, his examiner concluded that Mierlak “seemed to give straightforward and honest answers during the entire interrogation…Subject’s charts indicate that there was no apparent attempt at deception to the pertinent questions asked of him.”650 At the conclusion of his intense weeklong assessment, the agency approved Mierlak and began drafting a contract for his services. He was given the operational pseudonym “Philip E. Launais” in addition to the alias “Donald R. Wakild” and the cryptonyms “Aeprimer-1” and “Aeready-2.”651

Ultimately, Mierlak received only $150 per month, and if he was concerned about the effect on his taxes he would simply have to “figure in advance approximately how much higher his taxes will be and deduct that amount from his contribution to the BNR.”652

Mierlak would continue to fulfill his responsibilities to Projects Aeready and

Aefulfill, but establishing legal contacts with disloyal elements within the Soviet Union would become the agency’s priority in 1958. Although little had been done to move

Project Aeprimer forward, Mierlak had successfully established correspondence with contacts in the USSR under Aefulfill and he continued to submit names of potential recruits for Aeready’s “Hot War cadre.”653 In order to obtain intelligence on the USSR through “legal methods” under Operation Redskin, Mierlak sought to develop friendly relationships with Soviet citizens in the US and to recruit US citizens with legitimate reasons for traveling to the USSR.654 His first opportunity to develop friendly contact

649 Ibid., 3. 650 Ibid., 6. 651 “Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 40. 652 “Memorandum for Record: Contact with AEPRIMER-1,” 16 September 1957, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 653 “Request for Investigation and Approval: Mierlak, Constantine: Hot War Redsox Agent Candidate,” 27 November 1956, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II. 654 “Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 49.

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with a Soviet citizen in the US came through his employer in Brooklyn, the Holland-

America Line, a transatlantic passenger and shipping line where he worked as a bookkeeper.655 Because it was well known that Mierlak spoke “several Slavic languages,” his boss asked him to act as an interpreter “in some dealings involving shipments assigned to the Soviet Mission in New York City.”656 Mierlak acted as interpreter for two Soviet officials and had the chance to pursue “a friendly conversation” with one of the men, who offered him a Russian cigarette “and promised to bring a bottle of real Moscow vodka next time.”657 Although this seemed like a promising start, little ultimately came of the contact.

A more encouraging development came about in early 1959 when a “close friend and collaborator” put Mierlak in touch with Alexander Sitnikov, the second secretary of the BSSR delegation to the UN.658 Sitnikov had recently been expressing an interest in

Belarusian history and politics at the Belarusian Press Exchange in New York, which maintained a correspondence of newspapers and books with contacts in Poland and the

BSSR.659 After asking to meet with a Belarusian historian, Sitnikov was instead presented to Mierlak in the latter’s capacity as the president of the BAA.660 Mierlak and Sitnikov met together several times to discuss Belarusian issues, although their meetings frequently devolved into intense drinking sessions. “Mr Sitnikov is heavy drinker and to

655 “Biographic Data,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II. 656 “Memorandum on Contact by Aeprimer/1 of a Member of the Soviet Mission in New York City,” 12 December 1958, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 657 “Report by ‘Philip E. Launais’ on Meeting with N. Sakharov,” 18 December 1958, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 658 Report by ‘Philip E. Launais’ on Alexander P. Sitnikov,” 30 January 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 659 Ibid. 660 Ibid., 2.

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match him is rather difficult,” Mierlak reported, “although I always go prepared for such events.”661 One of their meetings had “jokingly” been arranged “to test the virtues of

American vodka and Soviet vodka,” but the men did consume “several water glasses of vodka” and had an exchange that made Mierlak suspicious that Sitnikov worked for

Soviet intelligence.662 Sitnikov “became talkative” once drunk and explained that although he could not speak the Belarusian language after growing up in a Soviet orphanage, he was actually Belarusian himself.663 When Mierlak expressed his disbelief,

Sitnikov suddenly exclaimed “’how can I prove it to you – what do you want me to do’?”664 Mierlak reported that it seemed as if Sitnikov “was placing himself in position for a recruitment pitch,” but he was advised to “play it cool” and do nothing other than cultivate a rapport.665 Mierlak remained hopeful that he might develop Sitnikov into a

Redskin asset, although it soon became evident that Sitnikov was in fact working with

Soviet intelligence to inform on the Belarusian immigrant community in the US. In May

1958, Mierlak reported that in their most recent meeting, “Mr. Sitnikov disclosed that his job is to read all newspapers and publications and to make reports.”666 Consequently, the

FBI was notified of the situation and Mierlak was instructed to discontinue his meetings with Sitnikov.667

661 “Report by ‘Philip E. Lainais’ on Alexander Sitnikov,” 27 May 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 662 “Memorandum on Personal Meeting with Aeprimer/1,” 6 April 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 663 Ibid. 664 Ibid. 665 Ibid; “Memorandum on Personal Meeting with Aeprimer/1,” 3 March 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 666 “Report by ‘Philip E. Lainais’ on Alexander Sitnikov,” 27 May 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 667 “Memorandum on Constantin Mierlak to Jane Roman, FBI Liaison Officer,” 24 June 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1; “Memorandum on Expenses

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Having failed to recruit a Soviet citizen as an internal defector for Operation

Redskin, Mierlak began to focus instead on recruiting a US citizen to conduct surreptitious reconnaissance for the CIA while traveling through the BSSR with a legitimate purpose. In early 1958, Mierlak had been instructed “to look for and submit names of 2-3 candidates who are citizens of the United States” and might be asked to conduct a “Redskin mission” during their “legal travel” to the BSSR.668 By February,

Mierlak reported that “he has gone as far as he could on spotting a candidate” and felt that “it might be a good idea” if he were to approach people as a representative of the

BNR, suggesting that “in the interest of BNR” he himself would finance their trip.669 His case officer, however, informed him that “she was sure this was not the intention,” and that the original plan called only for an informal briefing of the candidates before their departure so that they would simply know “what to look for” as they traveled.670 Mierlak failed to locate any promising candidates according to the instructions he had been given.

Later that year, however, Mierlak attended “a family get-together in New Jersey,” at which he met with his distant relatives Michael and Katherine Marlak of Terryville,

Connecticut.671 Pulling them aside, Mierlak “propositioned them about making a trip to the USSR…[and] offered to pay all their expenses if they could go right away,” but the

Incurred by Aeprimer/1,” 6 July 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 668 “Memorandum on Contact with Aeprimer 1 in Washington, D.C., 7 January,” 14 January 1958, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1-2. 669 “Memorandum on Contact with AEPRIMER-1, 10 February 1958,” 13 February 1958, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 670 Ibid. 671 “Memorandum on Legal Travelers to the Soviet Union: Mr. and Mrs. Constantine Mierlak,” 15 July 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1; “Memorandum on CIA Financial Responsibility to Michael Marlak,” 4 December 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2.

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Marlaks were not able to arrange time off from work for an expensive vacation on such short notice.672 Mierlak pushed several times for his relatives’ trip to be accepted as an element of Operation Redskin. Concerned that he would be left responsible for funding the Marlaks’ trip himself, Mierlak asked his case officer for “firm approval…that once he has committed himself, the undersigned will not at a later date notify him that the project has been canceled.” Mierlak’s case officer told him in no uncertain terms that the agency had not approved, so he was “to hold the recruitment in abeyance.”673 Sometime that winter, “Connie” broached the subject again.674 Although he had explicitly been told not to promise funding for recruits’ travel to the BSSR and had specifically been instructed not to proceed with the Marlaks’ candidacy for Redskin, Mierlak nevertheless told his relatives “to go ahead and buy their tickets and to give him the receipt,” assuring them that “he would get the money and pay them back on their return.”675 One agent involved would later explain that “things had gotten out of joint” with Mierlak simply because he

“had over-extended his authority and had made the Marlaks commitments he had no right to make.”676

The Marlaks “did as they were told,” and their unauthorized trip to the Soviet

Union would cause them significant distress.677 In an internal memorandum about the

Marlaks’ travel in the USSR, one agent suggested that the summary seemed as if they

672 “Memorandum on CIA Financial Responsibility to Michael Marlak,” 4 December 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 673 “Memorandum on CIA Financial Responsibility to Michael Marlak,” 4 December 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 674 Ibid. 675 Ibid. 676 “Memorandum on Michael and Katherine Marlak,” 7 February 1962, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 677 “Memorandum on CIA Financial Responsibility to Michael Marlak,” 4 December 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2.

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were scenes from the television espionage drama Foreign Intrigue, complete with “doped champagne, arrest for picture taking, tailing by security agents (and vice versa).”678 The

Marlaks flew to Moscow on July 1, 1959 before traveling to Leningrad and Riga for several days on their way to Minsk.679 On their second day in the Belarusian capital, the

Marlaks were arrested for taking photographs near the railroad station. Their film was confiscated by a Soviet officer who proclaimed that “all these American tourists are spies sent over to take pictures,” and the Marlaks were put under surveillance for the rest of their time in the city.680 They were followed everywhere that they went the next day, and that evening the orchestra leader at the hotel told them “almost in a whisper” that the dining room was full of agents of the Soviet secret police.681 “He left almost at once and did not stay to talk,” Michael Marlak recalled.682 Marlak did, however, have a “very friendly chat” with the hotel’s head waiter, who was “very gracious” and “very solicitious…when I told him of being arrested.”683 Marlaks’ Soviet friends informed him at their table later that the head waiter was actually the chief of the local secret police.684

When the Marlaks invited their Soviet friends out to dinner at the hotel again the following evening, they danced and sipped champagne before becoming suddenly and

678 Ibid. 679 “Memorandum on Mr. Michael Mierlak – Travel to USSR,” 21 August 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 680 “Report on Drugging of US Tourist to the USSR Michael Mierlak,” 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1-2. 681 Ibid., 2. 682 Ibid. 683 Ibid. 684 Ibid.

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violently ill. After their return, Michael Marlak would provide the CIA with a report of these events:685

We were sitting at our table sipping champagne. Both couples of us left the table to dance. Upon our return to the table my wife suddenly became violently ill and rushed from the table to our room. As she was leaving I too became ill with sharp pains in my chest. I rushed to the men’s room, where I vomited. I noticed that on this occasion, as on subsequent trips to the men’s room when I was struck by waves of nausea, I was followed.686 The Marlaks recovered physically, but they were kept under surveillance and were prevented from visiting their family members in the countryside as they had originally intended.687

While the Marlaks were in the Soviet Union, the CIA was reconsidering its scaled back operations with Mierlak and the BNR. Mierlak had functioned adequately as a spotter, but Projects Aeprimer and Aeready had never materialized as anticipated. Project

Aefulfill had seen some success, but this was a modest, long-term operation that had yet to produce anything of significance. Mierlak had failed to recruit any Soviet citizens for

Operation Redskin, and the only US citizens he had found who were willing to travel to the USSR through legal channels for this project were his own unapproved family members. Before the Marlaks even arrived in Minsk, Mierlak’s case officer informed him that his contract was being terminated.688 Mierlak responded with a speech about the role of the BNR in the struggle against communism, and he then pulled out a postcard he had

685 “Letter from Michael Marlak,” 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 686 “Report on Drugging of US Tourist to the USSR Michael Mierlak,” 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 687 Ibid., 1. 688 “Memorandum on Personal Meeting with Aeprimer/1,” 10 July 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1.

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received from the Marlaks and “displayed a bill, forwarded by his relative, amounting to fifteen hundred dollars.”689 Mierlak stated that because he had “never been informed that the project had been cancelled,” he felt that “reimbursement should be forthcoming” for his relatives’ trip.690 His case officer, however, replied that “at no time was it told, or implied…that the undersigned would undertake such reimbursement.”691

Mierlak began to protest the termination of his contract by threatening to sabotage any future relationship between the CIA and the Belarusian immigrant community.

Reminding the agent of his position with the BAA and its influence among the

Belarusian-American community, Mierlak warned that if he were to feel slighted he would use his station to prevent any future operations between the CIA and the

Belarusians in the US from taking place. A report of this meeting recalls his threat:

Subject said that as the undersigned well knew, Subject was recently elected to the Presidency of the Byelorussian-American Association which means leadership over many thousands of Byelorussians in the United States. Subject stated that he was willing to use his position to aid the undersigned in any way possible but that if the termination of his contract was a prelude to the denigration of Subject in the eyes of the Byelorussians in U.S.A. or for any purpose contrary to the good interests of the Byelorussians in U.S.A. that he would be forced to sever all contact with the undersigned and to prevent the undersigned or his fellow-workers from having any contact with the Byelorussians.692 When it became obvious that he could not argue his way back into a renewed contract,

Mierlak changed his tone and “reiterated the role of the BNR, the anti-communist fight etc.”693 He stated that he hoped the termination of his contract with the CIA would not

689 Ibid. 690 Ibid. 691 Ibid. 692 Ibid., 2. 693 Ibid.

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also mean “all severance of his relationship with the U.S. Government, as this relationship was of mutual benefit and vital interest to both parties in the fight against

Communism.”694 The agent noted that in spite of Mierlak’s grandstanding and the important topics of his termination and his relatives’ trip, “the greater portion of the meeting” was still devoted to Mierlak’s obsession with the effect his salary could have on his taxes. Much of the time at this final meeting was spent explaining “the method by which Subject’s income tax payment was computed” in order to satisfy his anxiety.695

Even though Mierlak’s contract had been terminated and the Marlaks’ trip had not been approved for Operation Redskin, agents still considered interviewing the Marlaks on their return. At approximately the same time that the Marlaks were becoming violently ill from drinking tainted champagne in a Minsk hotel, a CIA memorandum exploring the possibility of debriefing the Marlaks after their trip concluded only that “if contact is made with Subjects, it is requested that the ‘cover’ used by the interviewer not be CIA or connected with the intelligence community.”696 When the Marlaks returned from the

Soviet Union, “Connie” met them at the airport, and the following day CIA agent James

Pye called the Marlaks from Boston in hopes of debriefing them about their trip.697 In the coming days, the Marlaks gave the details of their experience to Pye, whom they suspected of being with the CIA.698 Clues gathered from “verbal discussions with

694 Ibid. 695 Ibid., 1. 696 “Memorandum on Legal Travelers to the Soviet Union: Mr. and Mrs. Constantine Mierlak,” 15 July 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 697 “Memorandum on CIA Financial Responsibility to Michael Marlak,” 4 December 1959, 2, Mierlak CIA Files; “Letter from Michael Marlak,” 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 698 “Letter from Michael Marlak,” 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2.

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Connie” had already made the Marlaks suspect that “Connie’s superiors were the Central

Intelligence Agency,” and this suspicion was confirmed for them when Pye contacted them so rapidly upon their return.699

When the Marlaks met again with Mierlak in August, they were “dumbfounded” to learn that neither he nor the agency planned to reimburse them for their expenses.700

Although Mierlak had assured them that he would get the money to pay for their air fare, he had not had the authorization to do so and the agency was not prepared to cover the cost of his promise now. Mierlak claimed that he had not induced them to go, but claimed instead that “he learned that the Marlaks were making a trip abroad” and they happened to have come to him as the president of the BAA in order to help them locate the

“whereabouts of relatives and friends” whom they wished to visit during their travels.701

When pressed about the Marlaks’ trip, however, Mierlak admitted that he had “asked them to do some things” because he feared that his contact “would not call him in time” with approval and instructions before their trip.702 Mierlak also admitted that he told

Katherine Marlak that he would fund the trip in the interests of the BAA, but that he had only done this because he did not wish “to disclose the Government as the source of the funds.”703 An internal agency memorandum from December 1959 concluded that Mierlak may have intended to stick the CIA with the cost of their trip from the beginning, and that

699 “Memorandum on CIA Financial Responsibility to Michael Marlak,” 4 December 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 3. 700 Ibid., 2. 701 “Memorandum on Operational Meeting with Mr. Constantine Mierlak,” 17 December 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 702 Ibid., 2. 703 Ibid.

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“the entire situation was a BNR operation with an attempt being made to force reimbursement from ‘rich uncle’ rather than deplete the BNR coffers.”704

Neither the CIA nor the BNR initially reimbursed the Marlaks for their traumatic trip, causing tension between them and Mierlak and creating “a continuing knotty problem” for the agency.705 After Mierlak informed them that they would not be getting reimbursed, Katherine wrote him a letter explaining that they were “more than disappointed” and had come to the conclusion that they had “not been treated in a fair manner.”706 She continued to recount how Mierlak had “confirmed several times to go ahead and make all our own arrangements and not to worry about the fare, as it would definitely be repaid to us…we went according to your instructions to observe Minsk and take pictures of all Minsk areas…and had many embarrassing events along with the deal.”707 For his part, Mierlak appeared not to understand that his relatives blamed him for his broken promises. “I see that you put together two and two,” wrote Mierlak, “and as I understand you are convinced that I did not made [sic] a foul play about this business, and your deductions are correct, but I can not help.”708 Stonewalled by their relative, the Marlaks tried appealing to the CIA to rectify the situation. Michael Marlak wrote a letter explaining the situation, which agents judged was not something “that can be brushed under the rug.”709 Arguing that this represented “an $1,800 fraud perpetrated

704 Ibid., 3. 705 “Memorandum on Question of Reimbursing Marlaks for Travel to USSR,” 31 January 1962, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 706 “Letter from Katherine Marlak to Constantine Mierlak,” 14 September 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 707 Ibid. 708 “Letter from Constantine Mierlak to Katherine and Michael Marlak,” 15 October 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 1. 709 “Memorandum on CIA Financial Responsibility to Michael Marlak,” 4 December 1959, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 3.

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in the name of the Central Intelligence Agency,” one memorandum urged a priority investigation into the matter and “urgent remedial action.”710

Although the Marlaks had undertaken their trip with the best intentions, agents involved in Operation Redskin worried that their traumatic experience and subsequent financial burdens could make them hostile to the agency and increase the likelihood of exposure. Concerned that the situation could bring unwanted attention to the clandestine operations the CIA had been conducting with the Belarusian collaborators in the BNR and the BCC, agents concluded that “it might then be necessary for us to reimburse these people as a matter of security and public relations.”711 One memorandum from early 1960 explains that agents urged reimbursement for the Marlaks’ trip in order to prevent internal investigations of these operations. The report suggests that the Marlak’s unpaid travel bill “is a fuse smouldering…that better be dealt with before that fire marshal in 231

Admin gets a whiff of it.”712 At that time, “231 Admin” was the office of the inspector general, which was authorized to conduct investigations of the agency’s missions, offices, and personnel.713 Like many of Wisner’s covert operations run through the CIA’s Munich offices, the Belarusian projects developed without much direct oversight from agency

710 Ibid., 1. 711 “Internal Memorandum on the Mierlak Case from Acting Chief of SR Division,” 31 January 1962, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II. 712 “Office Memorandum on Case 30973 to Chief of Contact Division,” February 1960, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 713 “Letter from Allen W. Dulles to Rep. John Taber: Central Intelligence Agency Official Routing Slip,” 14 November 1961, CIA Website, accessed on 20 November 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000700190020-5.pdf; “Offices of CIA: Inspector General,” CIA Website, accessed 20 November 2018, https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/inspector-general/history.html.

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headquarters, and the agents involved were eager to avoid attracting the attention of the

“fire marshal” in the office of the inspector general.714

Project Aequor’s initially ambitious scope had shrunk until it was limited to subsidizing the publication of Bazkaushtshyna, and the CIA terminated the operation completely at the end of 1961.715 The CIA’s clandestine operations with the BNR may have ended ignominiously, but they reveal several interesting aspects of the development of American covert operations and early Cold War foreign policy. Many historians have examined US covert operations and the Cold War relationships between US intelligence and former Nazis and Nazi collaborators, but little reputable scholarship is available on the CIA’s operations using Belarusian collaborators.716 This can partly be explained by the relative obscurity of Belarusians and Belarusian history within English language scholarship, but examining the documents chronicling these operations was not possible until the declassification of millions of US government files in recent years. Studies using these newly available sources have made important contributions to this body of historiography, but scholars have not yet used these records to examine Belarusian collaborators’ roles in Projects Aequor, Aeprimer, Aeready, or Aefulfill.717

Exploring these events reveals how émigré politics and the efforts of the relatively powerless Belarusian actors affected the development of the US campaigns to undermine

714 “Office Memorandum on Case 30973 to Chief of Contact Division,” February 1960, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 90, NARA II, 2. 715 “Memorandum on Termination of Project Aequor,” 3 October 1961, CIA Subject Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-19, Box 7, NARA II. 716 Grose, Operation Rollback; Herken, The Georgetown Set; Hersh, The Old Boys; Thomas, The Very Best Men; Ryan, Quiet Neighbors; Schiessl, Alleged Nazi Collaborators in the United States after World War II; Simpson, Blowback; Zuroff, Occupation: Nazi-Hunter. 717 Breitman, et al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis; Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow.

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the Soviet Union in small but consequential ways. Originally designed to use the BNR for intelligence gathering missions inside the BSSR, the initial failures of Project Aequor contributed to the CIA’s involvement with several of the former members of the Nazis’

Belarusian puppet government. Ragula and Mierlak continually exaggerated their influence and resources and attempted to persuade their new American sponsors to make greater use of the Belarusian émigrés.

Because the factional struggle for leadership had split the Belarusian nationalist movement and limited the recruiting potential of the BNR, the CIA began exploring the possibilities of collaboration with the leadership of the BCC as well. US relationships with the most notorious Belarusian Nazi collaborators resulted not only from the Cold

War struggle between the international power centers of Washington and Moscow, but also as a consequence of the competition for the political leadership of the Belarusian diaspora. After joining Abramchik’s faction during the postwar struggle for the leadership of the anticommunist Belarusian diaspora, Kushel, Stankievich, and other former members of the BCC became integral components of the CIA’s operations with the BNR. Studying the development of the CIA’s clandestine operations with Belarusian collaborators reveals how these minor players in the Cold War were able to use their relatively weak position as a small and divided nationalist émigré movement connected to

Nazi Germany in order to win powerful sponsorship and inflate their own importance.

Wisner’s OPC and the CIA station in Munich conducted these operations with little direct oversight, which reinforces other scholarship demonstrating how the CIA’s covert operations against the Soviet bloc in the early 1950s developed without close

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supervision from government officials and intelligence professionals in Washington.718

Declassified CIA documents reveal that agents involved in the Belarusian operations were still trying to prevent internal investigations of the projects even as they ended their relationship with Mierlak. CIA officials had been aware of their Belarusian assets’ Nazi connections from the beginning, and agents had explicitly directed Ragula to assure recruits that the US would not prosecute them for their recent collaboration with the

Third Reich. Although many scholars have examined Cold War relationships between US intelligence and former Nazis and Nazi collaborators, studying these particular operations reveals that the agency was aware of the questionable pasts of its new assets and intentionally sought to recruit more Nazi collaborators for their paramilitary operations to undermine the USSR while keeping oversight of the projects to a minimum.

The development of these covert operations also suggests that the Eisenhower

Administration’s reliance on the use of ambitious covert operations had its roots in the clandestine projects initiated under the Truman Administration in the late 1940s and early

1950s. Several scholars have noted these continuities and examined the role of covert operations in the US approach to the perceived Soviet threat.719 As Project Aequor reveals, US intelligence actively recruited Nazi collaborators, trained them in guerrilla warfare, and secretly infiltrated them into the Soviet Union in order to challenge the authority of the Kremlin, to destabilize the USSR, and to prepare for the possibility of an open military conflict with the Soviet Union. The CIA’s clandestine projects with

718 Grose, Operation Rollback; Herken, The Georgetown Set; Hersh, The Old Boys, 212; Thomas, The Very Best Men; Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer. 719 Filipink, Dwight Eisenhower and American Foreign Policy during the 1960s, 1; Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 125, 156-7; Leffler, The Specter of Communism, 121-3.

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Belarusian Nazi collaborators began as the US started making greater use of covert operations in anticipation of war with the Soviet Union under President Truman in 1950, but the paramilitary aspects of Project Aequor ceased as a result of the mission’s failures and the exposure of the project in the Soviet press during the Eisenhower Administration.

This reduction in the scope of the project occurred during the so-called “Golden Age” of

CIA covert operations at the same time that the agency was expanding its clandestine projects across the globe.720 This reveals that these disastrous early attempts to establish an underground guerrilla network in the western Soviet Union were abandoned in favor of more modest propaganda projects even as the agency was pouring money and resources into other ambitious covert operations focused on the peripheries of Soviet power and influence.

720 Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer, 7, 148.

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Chapter Five: Belarusian Collaborators in Cold War American Life, 1948-1991

As waves of DPs emigrated from Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s, many anti-Soviet Belarusians brought their vehement anticommunism with them to their new homes. Thousands of Belarusians settled in the US, including virtually all of the most influential Belarusian political and military collaborators associated with the Belarusian

Central Council (BCC), the SS puppet regime created in late 1943.721 These individuals immigrated to the US by falsifying their pasts and obscuring their connections to Nazi

Germany at a time when government agencies were more concerned with confronting the

Soviet Union and finding communist subversives than with searching for Nazi war criminals.

Although the Belarusian quislings were only a tiny segment of the larger

Belarusian-American community in the US, they occupied leading positions in both the

BCC and the Belarusian National Republic (BNR). The majority of politically active

Belarusian Americans supported one of these two competing groups, which meant that the leading Belarusian Nazi collaborators came to dominate Belarusian-American

721 In addition to the United States, many anti-Soviet Belarusian émigrés settled in Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. There is virtually no scholarship focused on the immigration of Belarusian collaborators to these countries or their political activities in their adoptive homes, but several scholars have investigated how Nazi war criminals escaped to such destinations. Primary source materials on the Belarusian diaspora can be found in the Francis Skaryna Library in London and the Immigration History Research Center Archives at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis (Series 3, Subseries 1-7, FSL; Cesarani, Justice Delayed: How Britain Became a Refuge for Nazi War Criminals; Uki Goni, The Real Odessa: How Perón Brought the Nazi War Criminals to Argentina [London: Granta, 2009]; Gerald Steinacher, Nazis on the Run: How Hitler’s Henchmen Fled Justice [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011]).

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political discourse for years. Several of the most prominent Belarusian Nazi collaborators also became involved in the local and national political life of the US, where their ardent anticommunism found a receptive and sympathetic audience during the early decades of the Cold War.

As they settled into their new American lives, these collaborators continually promoted an aggressive anti-Soviet US foreign policy while mythologizing their actions during World War II. Embracing their US citizenship, they pursued the American dream for their families and communities while celebrating their own nationalist narrative of recent Belarusian history. The leading Belarusian Nazi collaborators in the US quickly developed a distinct Cold War Belarusian-American identity for themselves that combined their intense Belarusian nationalism, their newfound American patriotism, and their ardent anticommunism. Although the CIA stopped utilizing its Belarusian assets in clandestine paramilitary operations in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the agency would continue to support the anti-Soviet propaganda work of Belarusians and other groups with connections to Nazi Germany through front organizations like Radio Liberty and the

Institute for the Study of the USSR.

After many years of little public scrutiny, investigations into Nazis and Nazi collaborators living in the US began bringing unwanted attention to the Belarusian quislings. As the government began to focus on allegations of Nazi war criminals living in the US in the 1970s, the Belarusian Nazi collaborators became a top priority of the investigations. Conspiratorial allegations about their presence in the US caused a public scandal in the early 1980s, but many of the most prominent Belarusian collaborators had already died by the time public outrage and official investigations made deportation and

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prosecution real possibilities. This scandal, however, did inspire more extensive government investigations into similar cases and contributed to the growing public interest in the history of the Holocaust.

Belarusian Collaborators and American Anticommunism

Most of the leading Belarusian collaborators who immigrated to the US did so under the provisions of the DP Acts of 1948 and 1950. Under the provisions of the DP

Act, a federal agency oversaw the resettlement of immigrants, who first needed to secure arrangements for their housing and employment.722 Approximately 400,000 people settled in the US under the DP Act between June 1948 and June 1952, when the

McCarran-Walter Immigration Act narrowly passed over a presidential veto and restored the restrictive immigration quota system of the Immigration Act of 1924.723 This immigration legislation provided the means by which nearly half a million people immigrated to the US, but its structure was less welcoming to Jewish victims of Nazism than it was to non-Jewish DPs, including former Nazi collaborators.724

Because the bill originally defined a DP as a person who resided in the western zones of Germany, Austria, and Italy by December 1945, it excluded the large numbers of Jewish refugees who had first tried returning to their homes in Poland after the war only to face hostility and violence from their former neighbors, many of whom had taken possession of the survivors’ houses and belongings.725 Many of these Jewish refugees did not begin arriving in the prescribed zones until 1946, which meant that they were

722 Genizi, America’s Fair Share, 114. 723 Ibid., 206, 208; Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies; 251. 724 Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies, 251. 725 Ibid.

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effectively excluded from the possibility of resettlement under the original provisions of the DP Act.726 The final bill extended this deadline to January 1, 1949, but it still contained other problematic articles.727 Although President Harry S. Truman ultimately signed the bill into law on June 25, 1948, he first denounced several of its provisions as discriminatory and intentionally antisemitic.728

The bill proved controversial not simply because it discriminated against Jewish

DPs, but also because the provisions of the DP Act and the screening process allowed thousands of individuals with connections to the Third Reich to immigrate to the US.729

In late August 1948, a New York Times front page article by Michael L. Hoffman criticized the security screening provisions of the DP Act. “As matters stand,” Hoffman wrote, “it is easier for a former Nazi to enter the United States than for one of the Nazis’ innocent victims.”730 Article 12 of the DP Act provided for the inclusion of large numbers of so-called Volksdeutsche: ethnic Germans living outside of the state borders of

Germany, many of whom had participated in Nazi Germany’s occupation of the conquered eastern territories.731 The bill also reserved a large percentage of immigration visas for people from Baltic countries whose Jewish populations had been decimated with the assistance of local collaborators.732

Many of the DPs hailing from these regions held political beliefs and worldviews that were pro-Nazi and anti-Soviet, which meant that the US faced an influx of rightwing

726 Genizi, America’s Fair Share, 81. 727 Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies, 251. 728 Genizi, America’s Fair Share, 80. 729 Allan A. Ryan, Jr., in Genizi, America’s Fair Share, 90. 730 Michael L. Hoffman, “DP Movement to U.S. Stalls; Our Visa Policy Is Blamed,” New York Times, 30 August 1948, 1. 731 Genizi, America’s Fair Share 97; 81. 732 Ibid.

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anticommunist immigrants. Allan A. Ryan, Jr., who would direct the special office created to investigate allegations of Nazi war criminals in the US in the 1980s, notes that because the DP Act reserved so many visas for these groups, the US was soon

“overcome” by a wave of anticommunists hailing from DP camps that had been “thick with collaborators.”733 Volksdeutsche, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians with ties to

Nazi Germany all entered the US under the DP Act, as did many Belarusian and

Ukrainian collaborators.734 Some of the more notorious Belarusian collaborators, however, such as Ostrowski and Stankievich, did not immigrate to the US until their families had secured US citizenship in the early 1960s and could sponsor the applications for their immigration visas. The anti-Soviet nationalism that these immigrants brought with them would find a receptive climate created by the anticommunist discourse of the early Cold War in the US.

Some of the first Belarusian collaborators to immigrate to the US in the years after the war began forming Belarusian organizations to facilitate the immigration of other collaborators under the DP Act. Although a relatively small Belarusian-American community had existed in the US for several decades before World War II, they were not especially active in either American political life or Belarusian diaspora politics. When the postwar wave of Belarusian immigrants arrived, however, they quickly began to form a variety of clubs, committees, and organizations to keep Belarusian cultural life alive in the US and to facilitate the integration of the Belarusian-American community into

American life. For example, Ivan Ermachenko arrived in New York City in 1948 and soon founded the United Whiteruthenian (Belarusian) American Relief Committee,

733 Ryan, Quiet Neighbors, 325. 734 Genizi, America’s Fair Share, 81.

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which assisted newly arrived Belarusian immigrants financially and helped them find employment in the US.735 Ermachenko, whose sycophantic ambition during the German occupation of Belarusian territories in World War II had earned him the derisive nickname “Herr Jawohl,” became a practicing psychiatrist at the Binghamton State

Hospital in upstate New York, and he was particularly active in securing the US sponsorships required for other Belarusian émigrés in the late 1940s and early 1950s.736

Emmanuel Jasiuk, who had been a regional representative of the BCC during the

German occupation, became similarly important in providing early assistance to

Belarusian immigrants to the US.737 Jasiuk headed the Passaic, New Jersey branch of

Ermachenko’s Belarusian charitable committee, through which he facilitated the immigration of other members of the BCC to the area. Ermachenko became less involved in Belarusian political and cultural affairs as the years passed, but Jasiuk became a prominent and influential member of several Belarusian-American organizations for decades. Jasiuk worked for an electronics company in Passaic and secured employment for many Belarusian immigrants there, including prominent BCC members like Ivan

Awdziej and Juri Sobolewski.738 Jasiuk also tried to prevent rival Belarusian

735 “Alien Passenger Manifest Form of the SS Marine Flasher,” 81651671_0_1; 81651678_0_1, ITS Digital Archive, USHMM; Belaruskaye Slova, 17 December 1948. 736 Belaruskaye Slova, 17 December 1948; “Physician Dies; 3 Hurt In Accident,” Syracuse Herald-Journal, October 22, 1949, 3; Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 204. 737 “Certificate of Lawful Admittance to the United States,” October 25, 1949, 2, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 3, NARA II; “Title: George Sabolewski, was.,” 9 May 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 62, NARA II, 3; “Changed: Jan Awdziej, was. Jonas Awdziej, John Awdziej, Jan Audzeej,” 6 May 1955, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 1, NARA II, 6; Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 213-4. 738 During the war, Awdziej had banned the sale of food to Jewish inhabitants of the ghetto in Stoubcy, where the German occupation authorities had appointed him mayor (Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 266-7; “Certificate of Lawful Admittance to the United States,” October 25, 1949, 2, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 3, NARA II; “Title: George Sabolewski, was.,” 9 May 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 62, NARA II, 3; “Changed: Jan Awdziej,

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collaborators from “the New York faction” aligned with the BNR from immigrating to the US.739 In 1951, he informed the FBI that he and fellow BCC member Ivan Kosiak had

“prepared [a] list of nine names reported to be Bolshevik Agents who were attempting to get into the United States,” including Francishak Kushel, the collaborationist police and military leader.740 Kushel, however, had actually managed to settle in New York City by the time Jasiuk and Kosiak attempted to sabotage his immigration.

Scores of Belarusian cultural, political, professional, social, and veterans groups established themselves in the US in the 1950s, and nearly all of them were affiliated with one of the two major factions of the Belarusian diaspora: the BCC or the BNR. Although

Belarusian Americans supporting both groups settled throughout the country, the BNR rapidly established New York City as the center of its activities while the BCC became most active throughout New Jersey. Both factions created umbrella organizations in the

US to oversee the kaleidoscopic array of various clubs, groups, and associations formed by Belarusian Americans. Abramchik’s supporters established the Belarusian American

Association (BAA) in New York City in 1949, and Ostrowski’s loyalists created the

Belarusian Congress Committee of America (BCCA) in 1951 in South River, New

Jersey, which became an important center of BCC/BCCA activity in the US for decades.741 This factionalism created competition between the BNR and the BCC, inspiring their respective supporters to create a plethora of new Belarusian-American organizations to lend each group the impression of greater support.

was. Jonas Awdziej, John Awdziej, Jan Audzeej,” 6 May 1955, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 1, NARA II, 6; Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 213-4). 739 “Report on George Sabolewski,” 9 May 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 8. 740 Ibid. 741 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 215, 221.

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Some of these smaller clubs did not explicitly support either faction, but virtually all of the Belarusian-American organizations formed in the US after World War II did work under the political direction of either the BNR/BAA or the BCC/BCCA.

Belarusian-American historian Vitaut Kipel, whose father Joachim Kipel presided over the Second All-Belarusian Congress in Minsk in June 1944 before fleeing to Germany with his family, notes that although “many of the newly-formed organizations claimed political neutrality concerning Belarusan [sic] politics, they all in some way aligned either with the Belarusan-American Association [sic] or the Belarusan-American

Congress Committee [sic].”742 These groups ranged from social clubs affiliated with the

BCC, like the “citizen’s group” in Passaic led by Jasiuk and Joachim Kipel, to professional associations that aligned themselves with the BNR, like the Belarusian

Medical Association and the Belarusian Institute for Arts and Sciences in New York

City.743 The latter organizations were both headed by Vitaut Tumash, whom the German occupation authorities had appointed mayor of Minsk in summer 1941.

Several Belarusian collaborators became more influential within the Belarusian nationalist movement after they immigrated to the US and began leading Belarusian-

American groups. The generation of Belarusian nationalists who had led the BCC were no longer young men and possessed limited English language skills. This created opportunities within both factions for younger collaborators to advance themselves. Men such as Tumash, Mierlak, Jasiuk, and Kosiak became far more prominent and important

742 Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of a Nation, 204; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 263; Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 222; Vera Titunik, “Cheers, Fears for Their Byelorussian Homeland: Past Makes Them Wary,” The Record, 3 September 1991, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 1, IHRCA, A6. 743 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 239; 247-9.

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figures within the Belarusian community in the US than they had been in Europe. In the

BNR stronghold of New York, Tumash became a pivotal figure in Belarusian-American cultural and intellectual life. Mierlak had merely been the supply officer of Boris

Ragula’s collaborationist military unit during World War II, but he would become the

CIA’s principal Belarusian contact after the agency ended Project Aequor and Ragula emigrated to Canada.744

Jasiuk had been unwaveringly loyal to Ostrowski throughout the postwar struggle for the leadership of the anticommunist Belarusian diaspora, and he became the de facto leader of Ostrowski’s supporters in the US for much of the 1950s. Although Sobolewski became the chairman of the BCCA after Jasiuk helped him immigrate to New Jersey, the

BCC vice president’s advancing age and deteriorating health prevented him from fulfilling all of his responsibilities as the head of the BCC’s Belarusian-American umbrella organization. With Sobolewski incapacitated, Jasiuk absorbed many of his duties and directed the activities of the BCCA until Sobolewski’s death in 1957. Kosiak, the former BCC representative for the Hlybokaye district, succeeded him and remained in the post for decades.745 Jasiuk officially became national vice-chairman of the BCCA and participated in the leadership of several other Belarusian-American groups, including the

Belarusian Veterans of Passaic and Garfield.746

Belarusian veterans clubs in the US included soldiers of Belarusian collaborationist forces, and they actively celebrated the anniversaries of Belarusian

744 “Biographical Debriefing, Constantine Mierlak,” 9 July 1957, CIA Name Files, Entry ZZ-18, RG 263, Box 90, NARA II, 14. 745 “FBI Report on George Sabolewski,” 20 December 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1- 136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 5; Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 221; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 264, 276; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 97-8. 746 “Emanuel Jasiuk, 71; Agricultural Engineer,” The Herald-News, 12 December 1977.

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nationalist events sponsored by the German SS. Many small local clubs belonged to the

Union of Belarusian Veterans, an umbrella group led by Kushel, the leader of the Third

Reich’s auxiliary police and military forces during World War II.747 Kushel’s influence among Belarusians in the US rose significantly in the early 1950s as the CIA’s projects involving Belarusian paramilitary forces developed and he assumed leadership of the

BAA.748 Members of these veterans clubs in the US remained active throughout the year, organizing commemorations on the anniversaries of the Second All-Belarusian Congress in June and the formation of the Belarusian Home Army (Belaruskaya Krayovaya

Abarona, or BKA) in March.749 Vitaut Kipel also explains that “a special committee of various veterans groups” convened to organize celebrations of a new nationalist holiday in July to be known as the Day of the Belarusian Soldier.750 Belarusian veterans also participated in American political events, such as the Loyalty Day parades organized by the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) in the late 1940s and early 1950s.751 The VFW scheduled these parades throughout the country each year on May 1 in order to disrupt

International Workers’ Day celebrations dominated by the Communist Party, thus striking “at the heart of the radicals’ celebratory calendar.”752

On May 1, 1953, a division of Belarusian veterans marched in the Loyalty Day parade in New York City in front of a banner reading “Long Live America,” yet they

747 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 239. 748 “Byelorussian Exile Chief Succumbs in Irondequoit,” Democrat Chronicle, 29 May 1968, 749 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 341. 750 Ibid., 341, 390. 751 Ibid., 390; “Photograph of Belarusian Veterans Division ‘Windischbergerdorf’ Marching in Loyalty Day Parade,” 1 May 1953, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 28, IHRCA; Donna T. Haverty- Stacke, America’s Forgotten Holiday: May Day and Nationalism, 1867-1960 (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 197. 752 Haverty-Stacke, America’s Forgotten Holiday,197.

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wore insignia that was nearly identical to the collar and arm patches worn by the BKA and the 30th Waffen SS division that fought against Allied forces in the closing stages of

World War II.753 In a photograph of the 1953 Loyalty Day parade in New York City, one of the Belarusian veterans carries a flag indicating that his group came from

Windischbergerdorf, a DP camp just east of Cham, Germany.754 This is precisely where many of the collaborationist Belarusian soldiers taken prisoner by the US Army in spring

1945 had been interned.755 These particular soldiers had been reorganized by German authorities shortly before their capture into a unit that the BCC had hoped would become the kernel of a future Belarusian “Liberation Army” that would someday return from exile to liberate Belarusian territories from Soviet domination.756 Just eight years after

American forces captured them fighting for Nazi Germany, it seems that several veterans of the “First Storm Brigade ‘Belarus’” were marching down 5th Avenue in New York

City while wearing the emblems of their service to the Third Reich.757

Belarusian collaborators were beginning to engage actively in US politics in the

1950s as domestic anticommunist fervor grew. Belarusian Americans, of course, did not all belong to one single American political party, but the hardline anticommunism within the Republican Party during the early years of the Cold War resonated powerfully with

753 “Photograph of Belarusian Veterans Division ‘Windischbergerdorf’ Marching in Loyalty Day Parade,” 1 May 1953, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 28, IHRCA; Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 386. 754 “Photograph of Belarusian Veterans Division ‘Windischbergerdorf’ Marching in Loyalty Day Parade,” 1 May 1953, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 28, IHRCA;; “List of Jewish Residents of Windischbergerdorf DP Camp,” 2 April 1947, 3.1.1.2/0201-0395/0354/0019, ITS Digital Archives, USHMM. 755 Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 376; Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 290. 756 Kasiak, Byelorussia: Historical Outline, 288-9; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 376. 757 Ibid.; “Photograph of Belarusian Veterans Division ‘Windischbergerdorf’ Marching in Loyalty Day Parade,” 1 May 1953, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 28, IHRCA.

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the anti-Soviet Belarusian collaborators. As tensions between the Soviet Union and its former allies grew in the late 1940s and hostilities on the Korean peninsula erupted into open warfare in 1950, US domestic politics began reflecting a growing anticommunist sentiment that reflected the anti-Soviet convictions of the newly arrived Belarusian collaborators. The Belarusian collaborators had the good fortune to arrive in the country at the height of the anticommunist fervor of the Second Red Scare, which has come to be known as McCarthyism after Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin claimed in 1950 that he was in possession of a long list of Communist Party members who had infiltrated the Department of State. Combined with “the reality of limited war” in Korea and “the specter of expanding Communist power abroad,” McCarthy’s charges ushered in the peak years of US anticommunist discourse.758 McCarthy’s claims charged the

American political and social landscape for several years and initiated a zealous search for communist infiltration culminating in the hearings of the House Un-American

Activities Committee (HUAC) and the blacklisting of many US citizens suspected of having communist ties or sympathies.

Belarusian collaborators added their voices to the country’s chorus of anticommunist rhetoric, utilizing McCarthy’s smear tactics themselves and even testifying in front of HUAC. When the CIA did not respond to Ragula’s demands to establish the “Cadre” school, he followed McCarthy’s example by promising to expose the infiltration and manipulation of the CIA by subversive communist elements.

Although Ragula worded his blackmail attempt politely, his threat was clear:

I do not want to assume the most adverse possibility, namely communist infiltration and deliberate sabotage of an action so well begun…If I am met

758 Leffler, The Specter of Communism, 120.

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with a refusal, I shall have to find other ways to notify the proper American officials of the developing situation and to present them with the actual facts. I shall consider this my first duty, since a refusal to this request for a meeting would confirm my assumptions.759 McCarthy’s own influence began to wane in 1954 after overextending and discrediting himself, but Belarusian Americans would still be employing similar smear tactics decades after McCarthyism began to slowly subside. For example, when the US radio propaganda project Voice of America (VOA) continued to deny Belarusian

Americans’ requests for Belarusian language broadcasts, Vitaut Kipel alleged that the denial was the work of communist sympathizers infiltrating the government.760 Kipel questioned whether the refusal to initiate Belarusian language broadcasts was simply a

“misunderstanding” or “a deliberate action in tune with the Russians.”761 Just as Ragula had done when he attempted to blackmail the director of the CIA, Kipel suggested that communist infiltrators or sympathizers within the US government were responsible for promoting Soviet interests by thwarting the Belarusians’ efforts to initiate VOA programming in their own language. Other Belarusian nationalists in the US agreed, alleging that this further evidence of “a liberal-led policy of systematic appeasement toward the Russian Bear.”762

Belarusian collaborators also acted to spread their belief that the Soviet Union sought global domination and posed an existential threat. In December 1959, Mierlak and

Tumash appeared before HUAC to provide testimony on Soviet oppression of the

759 “Transmittal of Letter Written by Cambista 2,” 9 January 1953, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 105, NARA II, 3. 760 Vitaut Kipel, “The Voice of America and Broadcasts in Byelorussian: A Case of Living Discrimination,” Heritage Review, May 1973, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 8, IHRCA, 8. 761 Ibid. 762 Bui Anh Tuan, “Byelorussia: Captive because of U.S. Inaction—Then and Now,” 15 April 1981, New York Tribune, VKP, Box 21.

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Belarusian people and their culture.763 Mierlak provided his testimony first, introducing himself as the national president of the BAA before giving the committee a brief summary of Belarusian nationalist history and the Soviet campaigns to marginalize the use of the Belarusian language. Mierlak concluded his testimony by saying that the

Soviet Union was bent on destroying the Belarusian nation through the gradual elimination of its culture and ultimately sought “to dominate all over the world.”764

Tumash agreed with Mierlak’s assessment of Soviet intentions in his subsequent testimony, accusing the Soviet Union of committing genocide against the Belarusian people by implementing mass arrests and deportations to other regions within the Soviet

Union. The goal of these resettlement schemes, Tumash claimed, was “to raise [the] economic and military strength of Russian communism for the future conquest of the world.”765 The politics of these former Nazi collaborators harmonized with the anticommunist fervor of McCarthyism and its subsequent years.

The aggressive anticommunist foreign policy position adopted by Eisenhower during the presidential campaign of 1952 resonated with the Belarusian collaborators, as did his subsequent administration’s stated policy of liberation of the captive peoples living under communist oppression. The Eisenhower campaign portrayed its foreign policy as a bold departure from the supposedly passive and unsuccessful Cold War foreign policy of containment adopted by the Truman administration, but much of this was campaign rhetoric. Historian John Lewis Gaddis notes that Eisenhower actually had

763 “The Crimes of Khrushchev, Part 6: Consultations with Mr. Rusi Nasar, Mr. Ergacsh Schermatoglu, Mr. Constant Mierlak, Dr. Vitaut Tumash, and Mr. Anton Shukeloyts,” 17 December 1959 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1960). 764 Ibid., 18. 765 Ibid., 23.

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no “burning sense of dissatisfaction with the Truman administration’s approach to containment,” but he and his campaign nevertheless emphasized the supposed passivity of the Truman administration’s policy of containment in order “to put ‘distance’ between himself and the incumbent administration in the area of foreign affairs.”766 In fact, the

Eisenhower policy of liberation would not prove to be drastically different from the containment strategy of his predecessor. Despite the continuities between them, the

Eisenhower campaign made the difference between containment and liberation one of the

“big issues” of the 1952 presidential campaign.767

The heated rhetoric from Eisenhower’s campaign and administration that depicted national minorities and satellite countries as “captive peoples” of communist totalitarianism and potential fifth column forces mirrored the Belarusian collaborators’ views and aspirations exactly.768 John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s foreign policy architect and future secretary of state, denounced the Democrats as “the silent partners of the Kremlin despots” at a campaign event in Boston in October 1952, suggesting that

Eisenhower’s more aggressive liberation policy would be able to “cut short the over-all menace of Russian communism by bringing to life the forces which can destroy it from within.”769 Elsewhere on the campaign trail, Dulles explained that Eisenhower was committed to bold but “quiet” action to defeat the Soviet Union, and liberation policy

766 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 125. 767 Russell Porter, “Dulles Gives Plan to Free Red Lands: He Tells Political Scientists Eisenhower Bars Violence in Liberating ‘Captives,’” New York Times, 28 April 1952, 12. 768 “Dulles’ Foreign Policy Remarks,” New York Times, 19 February 1953, 3. 769 For a detailed examination of John Foster Dulles and the heated rhetoric of the 1952 presidential campaign, see Marchio, Rhetoric and Reality, 51-81 (“Dulles Says G.O.P. Could Bring Peace: Tells Meeting in Boston That Democrats Are the ‘Silent Partners’ of Kremlin,” New York Times, 12 October 1952, 7).

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relied instead on using propaganda to “stir up” discontent behind the Iron Curtain.770

Dulles claimed that underground resistance movements would then spontaneously

“spring up among patriots” and “the Communists’ conquests would disintegrate from within: the Russians, preoccupied with their own problems, would cease aggressive actions and…would have to give up and go home.”771

This foreign policy plan required an expansion in the scope of the Truman administration’s already burgeoning covert paramilitary operations, such as Project

Aequor. Liberation of the captive nations became “a favorite campaign slogan” of

Eisenhower and Dulles, and the issue had “a major effect in swinging nationality bloc votes toward the Republicans” in 1952.772 In fact, Gaddis suggests that the Eisenhower administration’s appeal for liberation was actually motivated more from a desire to secure these votes “than from any realistic expectations of ‘rolling back’ Moscow’s sphere of influence.”773 The Belarusian émigrés shared this dream for the liberation of their homeland, and for years they had urged US intelligence to create Belarusian paramilitary units and underground guerrilla networks within the BSSR. Although these efforts had been largely unsuccessful, the captive nations rhetoric of using Soviet national minorities as the “first line of offense and defense” provided new opportunities for them to push their ideas.774 Consequently, they would become closely involved in the propaganda campaigns organized under this initiative to liberate the captive peoples living under

770 Russell Porter, “Dulles Gives Plan to Free Red Lands: He Tells Political Scientists Eisenhower Bars Violence in Liberating ‘Captives,’” New York Times, 28 April 1952, 12. 771 Ibid. 772 “Goal of Freeing Satellite Lands Restated by U.S.: Eisenhower and Dulles Back Avowal That Liberation Is a Continuing Policy,” New York Times, 31 December 1955, 1, 3. 773 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 126. 774 Bernadine Bailey, The Captive Nations: Our First Line of Defense (Chicago: Chas. Hallberg & Company, 1969), 165.

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communist totalitarianism. The rhetoric of liberation closely mirrored the Belarusian collaborators’ dreams of throwing off Soviet control of their homeland, but US authorities did not share their determination to carry out these designs.

US intelligence had already been working with Belarusian collaborators to publish anti-Soviet propaganda in furtherance of their efforts to build an underground resistance movement in the BSSR before the Eisenhower administration’s policy of liberation expanded the emphasis placed on this aspect of US foreign policy. Stankievich became an active part of the propaganda campaigns first initiated under the CIA’s

“Project QKACTIVE” in 1950, and the agency began funding the BNR newpaper

Bazkaushtshyna (The Fatherland) in September 1951.775 Project QKACTIVE conducted overtly anti-Soviet propaganda campaigns under the aegis of the American Committee for the Liberation from Bolshevism (AMCOMLIB), a supposedly independent group of representatives of nations dominated by communist rule.776 These campaigns included the anti-Soviet radio broadcasts of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe and the scholarly publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR (codenamed

“BGCALLUS”).777 From Paris, Abramchik served as AMCOMLIB’s Belarusian representative and chaired a group of non-Russian representatives within the committee.

Stankievich broadcast Belarusian nationalist radio programs into the Soviet Union with

Radio Liberty and chaired the Institute for the Study of the USSR, located in Munich.778

775 “Aequor Progress, 20 September 1951,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II; “Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,”, 46. 776 “Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 46. 777 Ibid. 778 “Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 46.

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The Eisenhower administration’s liberation policy expanded the scope of these operations begun under the Truman administration’s policy of containment and publicly proclaimed US support for subversive anti-Soviet propaganda as a nonviolent means of

“waging peace.”779 Shortly after Eisenhower’s inauguration in 1953, the White House proposed a congressional resolution pledging US commitment to the peaceful liberation of captive peoples under communism.780 The liberation of captive peoples from communist oppression remained “a major goal” of US foreign policy throughout

Eisenhower’s presidency.781 In 1959, Congress passed the Captive Nations Resolution, which designated the third week of July as Captive Nations Week. Each year, a presidential proclamation invites the public to express their support for the liberation of captive nations. This tradition still continues, but public commemorations of Captive

Nations Week have faded since the passage of the resolution in the anticommunist political climate of 1959.782 Parades, rallies, and concerts have all been part of the commemorations over the years, but by the late 1960s the diminished fanfare accorded to

Captive Nations Week led supporters of the initiative to complain that it had been

779 Russell Porter, “Dulles Stresses Peaceful Freeing of Red Countries: With President’s Approval He Implies Policy Now Includes Soviet Itself: Links It to Foreign Aid,” New York Times, 23 April 1957, 1. 780 John D. Morriss, “Treaty Resolution Disappoints Wiley, But It May Stand,” New York Times, 22 February 1953, 1; William S. White, “Treaty Resolution Held Up As Crisis in Senate Mounts,” New York Times, 5 March 1953, 1; “Test of Dulles’ Plea in House for Eisenhower Treaty Resolution,” New York Times, 27 February 1953, 4; “Dulles’ Foreign Policy Remarks,” New York Times, 19 February 1953, 3. 781 “Goal of Freeing Satellite Lands Restated By U.S.: Eisenhower and Dulles Back Avowal That Liberation Is a Continuing Policy,” New York Times, 31 December 1955, 1. 782 “President Donald J. Trump Proclaims July 15 through July 21, 2018, as Captive Nations Week,” 13 July 2018, White House website, accessed 17 February 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-proclaims-july-15- july-21-2018-captive-nations-week/; Stephen A. Garrett, “Eastern European Ethnic Groups and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 93, No. 2 (Summer 1978), 316.

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“buried” and had “hit dead bottom.”783 In 1975, New Hampshire was the only state whose governor issued a proclamation supporting Captive Nations Week.784 The previous year, the keynote speaker at New Hampshire’s observations of Captive Nations Week was Raisa Stankievich, the daughter of the former BCC member who had become a propagandist for the CIA’s Project QKACTIVE in Munich.785

Throughout the 1950s, Belarusian collaborators were actively encouraging

Belarusian-American patriots to join the US Army in order to receive military training for

Belarusian liberation forces and to fight against communism. During the Korean War, both the BNR and the BCC encouraged Belarusian Americans to volunteer. Abramchik and the BNR pushed Belarusian Americans to join the US armed forces in order to obtain military training that would prepare them for the anti-Soviet covert operations being orchestrated by the CIA or would eventually be used for the liberation of their homeland someday in the future. Ostrowski and the BCC, however, were urging all able-bodied

Belarusians everywhere to volunteer to fight immediately against communism in Korea, believing that the conflict was merely the opening phase of a Third World War and that the liberation of their homeland was at hand.

The CIA’s clandestine operations with the BNR were still developing when

Abramchik suggested the creation of a special Belarusian military unit from Belarusian

Americans serving in the US Army. During a meeting with his CIA case officers in late

1951, Abramchik mentioned that “several Byelorussian youths in the United States have been drafted into the American army. Many of these lads…would like nothing better than

783 Bailey, The Captive Nations: Our First Line of Defense, 175-9. 784 Garrett, “Eastern European Ethnic Groups and American Foreign Policy,” 317. 785 Mrs. Howard T. Ball, “Captive Nations,” Portsmouth Herald, 19 July 1974, 4; “Captive Nations Day Scheduled,” Nashua Telegraph, 16 July 1974, 24.

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to participate in an American-sponsored Byelorussian military unit inside or outside the

American army.”786 The case officers agreed to take these soldiers’ information and “to earmark them for future reassignment” if possible, “or at least to see that they have the opportunity of volunteering for special U.S. Army training which would increase their usefulness for whatever Byelorussian military units are formed in the future.”787

Belarusian Americans began receiving special military training in preparation for the unit’s creation, but it does not appear that the proposal came to fruition. Two months after his initial suggestion, Abramchik noted that “one young Byelorussian who had recently been drafted into the U.S. Army had succeeded in getting himself placed in a paratroop outfit. The young man hopes that the training he is about to receive will prepare him for service in the Byelorussian unit when it is eventually organized.”788 The creation of a special Belarusian military unit was an exciting prospect for the BNR leadership, but it was not as important to them as the plans for the clandestine “Cadre” officer training school and there is no indication that anything ever became of the project. The creation of a Belarusian military unit seems to have been the focus and limit of Abramchik’s expectations for the mobilization against communism in Korea.

Unlike Abramchik, Ostrowski asserted that the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula in summer 1950 was the first front in an inevitably widening global conflict that might ultimately destroy the Soviet Union and pave the way for the BCC to establish an independent Belarusian state. Ostrowski and the BCC urged Belarusians throughout

786 “Subject: Conference with Mikola ABRAMCHIK,” 29 November 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 1, NARA II, 5. 787 Ibid. 788 “Contact Report on Mikola Abramchik,” 31 January 1952, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 1, NARA II.

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the world to join the military forces of any state they could in order to join the existential fight against communism immediately. In 1950, Ostrowski issued a call to arms, exclaiming that the war in Korea was “the first shot against World’s

Communism…against Soviet Bolshevism which has subjugated our people, [and] against

Moscow…which has exiled us from our native country into emigration.”789 Calling for all veterans of the BKA and any other military forces to enlist (as well as all other

Belarusian men and women “in whom a true Byelorusian heart is still palpitating”),

Ostrowski depicted the conflict in Korea not only as “the beginning of the struggle for a free independent and sovereign Byelorusia,” but also as a Manichaean battle for “the deliverance of the whole world.”790 Ostrowski concluded his exhortation with a rousing but unlikely promise to enlist himself: “I myself shall be with you in the first lines!” the sexagenarian BCC president vowed.791

Ostrowski’s political adversaries mocked him for his unrealistic call to arms in a political cartoon in the Belarusian satirical journal Scharscen (The Hornet), which was published by Belarusian émigrés living in West Germany. In the cartoon, Ostrowski is seen limping back to Munich after years of fighting in Korea. Battered, ragged, and leaning on a crutch, Ostrowski wears a US Army helmet and is heavily laden with handguns, grenades, automatic rifles, a bayonet, and a rather large missile. The cartoon’s

Belarusian caption mercilessly belittles the BCC president and his call to arms: “Two years ago, Prof. Ostrowski called us to voluntarily join the war in Korea, promising to take the lead and be the first to go into the fire…The truth is that nobody went then, so

789 “Report on Interview of George Sabolewski,” 20 December 1951, FBI Name Files, RG 65, Entry A1-136AB, Box 129, NARA II, 9. 790 Ibid., 10. 791 Ibid.

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Ostrowski had to go himself. After two years of heroic struggle in Korea (although some say that the chicken headed to Argentina) our knight returned.”792 The aging BCC president did not enlist to fight in Korea, and he did actually migrate temporarily to

Argentina instead. Both of his grandsons, however, did serve in the US Army, with one training as a paratrooper.793

Belarusian Americans began making significant contributions to Republican national political campaigns by the early 1960s, and leading Belarusian collaborators became important parts of these efforts. Two of the Belarusian collaborators most involved in organizing Belarusian Republicans turned to politics after their work with the

CIA ended. Stankievich began participating in American politics after he stopped producing anti-Soviet propaganda as the chairman of the Institute for the Study of the

USSR, which was a CIA front organization that created scholarly content analyzing and criticizing the Soviet Union.794 Mierlak had acted as the principal liaison between the

CIA and the BNR for years before the CIA terminated his contract in summer 1959, and he would ultimately become the central figure of the Belarusian collaborators’ broader participation in national Republican politics for decades. Mierlak and other Belarusian

Americans with connections to the BCC gained significant access to highly influential

US politicians through their political work on behalf of Republican candidates, with some

792 “Political Cartoon Mocking Radoslaw Ostrowski,” Scharscen No. 2 (1952), 5. 793 “Husband-Wife Team on MSH Staff: Hope Years of Hardships Ended,” The Evening Independent (Massillon, OH), 25 September 1962, 2. 794 The work of this institute was part of the CIA’s overt anticommunist propaganda operations, which also included the anti-Soviet broadcasts of CIA front organizations Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. These projects all operated through the American Committee for the Liberation of the People of the USSR (AMCOMLIB), which was another “proprietary cover organization” of the CIA (“Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 13, 46; “Teresa Student Born in Russia,” Winona Sunday News, 4 March 1962, 5).

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even attending social and political functions at the White House. As they participated in

American politics, leading Belarusian collaborators in the US sought out official endorsements of their organizations, their holidays, and their anti-Soviet, pro-German narrative of recent Belarusian history.

Established in several US cities in the late 1950s, Belarusian Republican clubs first began to show their influence in national politics during the presidential election of

1960. By 1964, Belarusian Republican clubs across several states had formed the

Belarusian Republican Federation under the leadership of former collaborators

Stankievich and Mierlak.795 This association of Belarusian-American Republicans operated under the auspices of the Nationalities Division of the Republican Party, which appointed Mierlak chairman of the Belarusian Section of the Republican National

Committee in August 1964.796 As chairman, Mierlak was “responsible for selecting state chairmen and for developing a nationwide organization of Byelorussian-Americans for the Republican ticket.”797 Mierlak appointed himself chairman for New York state and selected Jasiuk to lead the organization’s New Jersey chapter.798 In 1968, the association became a member of the newly created National Republican Heritage Groups

Federation.799 Twenty years later, a report by journalist Russ Bellant exposed a number of individuals with connections to Nazi Germany who had held leadership positions in this association of Republican ethnic voters over the years. Stankievich was named

795 “Byelorussian Republican Federation,” Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 14, IHRCA. 796 “Press Release Announcing Appointment of Constant Mierlak to Chairmanship of Belarusian Section of the Republican National Committee’s Nationalities Division,” Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 14, IHRCA. 797 Ibid., 1. 798 Ibid., 2. 799 “Byelorussian Republican Federation,” Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 14, IHRCA.

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personally, as were other former Nazi collaborators from Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia, and elsewhere.800

The Belarusian Republican Federation would demonstrate especially strong support for the presidential campaigns of Richard M. Nixon in 1968 and 1972.801 The anticommunism of these Belarusian-American Republicans made them natural supporters of Nixon, who began his political career by smearing his Democratic opponent with

“routine red-baiting” tactics years before McCarthy first made his own public accusations in 1950.802 Leading members of the Belarusian Republican Federation obtained significant political access as a result of their work on behalf of Nixon’s campaigns. For example, Mierlak worked with the New York Committee to Re-elect the President in

1972 and was invited to celebrate election night festivities with the committee in the

Grand Ballroom of the iconic Hotel Roosevelt in Midtown Manhattan.803 Members of the

Belarusian Republican Federation attended Nixon’s inauguration ceremonies in 1969 and

1973, and they participated in social and political functions as “invited guests to the State

Department and the White House.”804 Vitaut Kipel’s personal notes explain that at these

800 “Ex-Nazis Among Leadership Ranks of Republican Outreach Groups,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 26 September 1988; Russ Bellant, Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party (Boston: South End Press, 1988). 801 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 259; “Byelorussian Republican Federation,” Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 14, IHRCA. 802 Jonathan Michaels, McCarthyism: The Realities, Delusions and Politics Behind the 1950s Red Scare (New York: Routledge, 2017), 108. 803 Constant Mierlak, Activity of Constant Mierlak in the Emigration: Penetrating and Practical Approach (New York: Polacak, 1992), 298. 804 “Byelorussian Republican Federation: Byelorussian Republican Clubs,” Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 14, IHRCA; “Byelorussian Republican Federation,” Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 14, IHRCA, 2; “Invitation to Vitaut Kipel to Attend the Inauguration of Richard Milhous Nixon,” December 1972, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 14, IHRCA.

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events (several of which he himself attended), “political contacts are made and favors are dispensed.”805

Belarusian-American Republican activists valued these contacts and stayed loyal to Nixon and his administration throughout the Watergate scandal of the early 1970s. In

February 1974, Vitaut Kipel published an article in Heritage Review predicting that

“Watergate and skirmishes within the Republican ranks…will not have an enormous affect” on “the heritage vote” during the midterm elections of 1974.806 Kipel argued that

Belarusian Americans and other ethnic voters still firmly believed in “strong leadership, law and order and strong authoritative government,” and therefore the average member of this electoral demographic “is a lesser believer in Watergate and the anti-Nixon campaign of the liberal press.”807 He closed by urging his readers to “be proud” of President

Nixon’s achievements and to refute publicly the “false and incorrect” press reports of the administration’s wrongdoing.808

Belarusian collaborators living in the US also engaged with the legislative branch, continually petitioning members of Congress to endorse Belarusian nationalist anniversaries and to bestow some sense of legitimacy on collaborationist organizations.

Over the years, Belarusian-Americans became “frequent visitors in the offices of

Republican legislators” and corresponded with numerous members of Congress.809 In

805 The original and unaltered draft of this sentence reads: “Undoubtedly some political contacts are made and certain political favors are obtained” (“Byelorussian Republican Federation,” Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 14, IHRCA, 2; “Vitaut Kipels Nixon Guest,” The News Leader, 28 December 1972, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 1, IHRCA). 806 Vitaut Kipel, “Heritage View 1974,” Heritage Review (Winter), 1974, 5. 807 Ibid. 808 Ibid. 809 “Byelorussian Republican Federation: Byelorussian Republican Clubs,” Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 14, IHRCA; “Byelorussian Republican Federation,” Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 14, IHRCA, 2.

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these exchanges, Belarusian collaborators often attempted to connect their nationalist movement to American political legacies while advancing their anti-Soviet agenda. In

March 1957, for example, Senator Jacob Javits of New York submitted into the senatorial record a letter he received from Ostrowski’s Belarusian-American supporters in the

BCCA, which compared the annual commemoration of Belarusian independence on

March 25 to the American Fourth of July. The letter from the BCCA also denounced the

“Eastern barbarian despotism” of the Soviet Union and assured the senators that the

Belarusian “government in exile [Ostrowski and the BCC]” was leading “the best forces of the nation in the fight for freedom and justice” from Communism.810

Similar statements from the BCC’s rivals also made it into the congressional record. In March 1961, Samuel S. Stratton, a Democratic representative from New York, submitted the text of a speech Mierlak made to a ceremony held by the BAA to commemorate March 25. Mierlak began his address by comparing the US Declaration of

Independence to the Belarusian Declaration of Independence of 1918 before turning to lament “American complacency” to the existential threat posed by Soviet Communism:

“Nobody seems to have learned the lesson…that Communist imperialism destroys everything which stands in its way to world domination.”811 Similar statements affirming the Belarusian nationalist declarations of 1918 appeared in the congressional record over the years, as did a 1964 resolution signed by Stankievich that condemned certain unspecified “slanderous vilifications” of leading Belarusian émigrés by Soviet

810 “Thirty-Ninth Anniversary of Liberation of Byelorussia,” Congressional Record 103 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1957), 4248. 811 “Address of Constant Mierlak, National President of Byelorussian-American Association at the Commemoration of the 43d Anniversary of Byelorussian Independence at the Biltmore Hotel, New York City, on March 26, 1961,” Congressional Record 107 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), A2350-1.

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propagandists.812 Although he had himself been a part of the CIA operations involving the BNR (for which the group and its members received agency funds), Stankievich ridiculed these attempts to “besmirch” the leadership of the Belarusian nationalist movement by representing its members “as a clique of unprincipled careerists and venal agents of American intelligence.”813

Presenting themselves as persecuted anticommunist Belarusian nationalists and

American patriots, Belarusian Nazi collaborators continually lobbied members of

Congress to exert greater pressure on the Soviet Union. For example, in May 1953,

Republican representative Lawrence H. Smith of Wisconsin introduced an official letter from the BCC in New York as part of his remarks to the chamber.814 Smith had recently introduced a resolution to establish direct diplomatic relations with the governments of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist

Republic, and the BCC endorsement enthusiastically supported his resolution. Signed by

Sobolewski and Kosiak, the letter suggested that Smith’s proposal would help the US to win what they described as an imminent Third World War with the Soviet Union by spreading sympathy for the US and creating millions of potential fifth column forces from the oppressed minorities within the USSR: “In this way that resolution is mobilizing the enslaved nationalities for a common defensive-liberation fight of the threatened free

812 For Freedom and Independence of Byelorussia [New York: Byelorussian-American Association, 1960], 19-34. 813 Stankievich’s personal codename had been “Aecambista-17” (“Research Aid: Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified CIA Files,” 2; “Resolution at the Sixth Convention of the Byelorussians of North America,” Congressional Record 110 [Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1964], A4870). 814 “House Concurrent Resolution 58: Endorsement by Byelorussian Central Council,” Congressional Record 99 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1953), A2494-5.

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world and enslaved countries against communistic Russian tyranny in the approaching inevitable global third World War.”815

Belarusian nationalist broadcasts by Stanislaw Stankievich reached the BSSR on

Radio Liberty, but Belarusian-Americans were unable to persuade VOA to initiate similar

Belarusian language programming.816 The absence of the Belarusian language from

VOA’s programming became the focus of a protracted campaign among anti-Soviet

Belarusian nationalists, including leading former Nazi collaborators. Once again, collaborators in the US were influential in these efforts, which began as early as 1952.

During the presidential campaign that year, Dulles had declared that VOA would be an important part of propaganda efforts “to stir up the resistance spirit behind the Iron

Curtain,” but Belarusian language broadcasts were not included in VOA’s propaganda campaigns.817 This aggrieved anticommunist Belarusian nationalists in the US, who hoped to add Belarusian language programs to VOA’s scheduling not only to undermine

Soviet authority in the BSSR, but also to encourage American recognition of Belarusians as a cultural and ethnic minority distinct from Russians.

Several Belarusian-American organizations formed under the leadership of influential collaborators in order to convince VOA to add Belarusian language broadcasts. In the mid-1950s, the Committee for the Independence of Byelorussia in New

815 “House Concurrent Resolution 58: Endorsement by Byelorussian Central Council,” Congressional Record 99 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1953), A2494-5. 816 “Transcript of Radio Liberty Address on the Rehabilitation of Andrey Mry and Lukash Kalyuga by Stanislau Stankievich,” Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 22, IHRCA; “Transcript of Radio Liberty Address on the Centenary of Alyaksandr Serzhputousky’s Birth by Stanislau Stankievich,” Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 22, IHRCA. 817 Russell Porter, “Dulles Gives Plan to Free Red Lands: He Tells Political Scientists Eisenhower Bars Violence in Liberating ‘Captives,’” New York Times, 28 April 1952, 12.

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York operated under the nominal leadership of Sobolewski in order to publicize anti-

Soviet propaganda in English and to advocate for the institution of Belarusian language programming by VOA.818 In 1964, the United Belarusian American Commemorative

Committee, chaired by Mierlak, unanimously adopted a resolution to appeal to the US president, the secretary of state, and members of Congress to resolve the issue. In this resolution, which was introduced to the US Senate by New York Republican Senator

Kenneth Keating in April 1964, Mierlak decried “the unjustified discrimination” against the Belarusian language by VOA, which “cannot but lead the Byelorussian-American community to the conclusion that this U.S. agency is opposed to application of the principle of self-determination by Byelorussians.”819

In 1973, seven different Belarusian organizations in New Jersey published an open letter in the Republican Party periodical Heritage Review explaining that the

Belarusian-American community was “deeply disturbed” by the continued absence of

Belarusian language broadcasts. Months later, an article from Vitaut Kipel claimed that

“hundreds and hundreds of letters, petitions, memoranda and other documents were sent” to VOA over the years to plead for Belarusian language programming without result.

Kipel argued that VOA was now ignoring the distinct language and culture of

Belarusians “like the censors and administrators in Czarist Russia,” and he implied that this intransigence could be the work of communist sympathizers.820 “Is it really

818 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 255-6. 819 “Byelorussian Independence,” Congressional Record 110 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1964), 8252-3. 820 Vitaut Kipel, “The Voice of America and Broadcasts in Byelorussian: A Case of Living Discrimination,” Heritage Review, May 1973, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 8, IHRCA, 8.

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misunderstanding,” Kipel rhetorically, “or a deliberate action in tune with the

Russians?”821

While advancing their anticommunist and nationalist agendas, Belarusian quislings in the US cultivated personal networks of sympathetic American politicians and sought personal contacts and relationships with all levels of government. Mierlak, for example, collected correspondence and photographs with nationally known politicians throughout his decades-long political career with the Republican Party. These included letters and certificates signed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and

George H.W. Bush, among others.822 Mierlak had traveled to Washington, DC to meet with Vice President Nixon on the fortieth anniversary of the 1918 Belarusian Declaration of Independence in March 1958, in his capacity as president of the BAA; a photograph of them together in Nixon’s office in the Capitol became a prized emblem of the gestures of recognition afforded the BNR by officials of the US government over the years.823

Leading Belarusian collaborators also valued personal relationships with local elected officials. In New Jersey, for example, Jasiuk developed a friendly relationship with Passaic mayor Paul G. De Muro in the 1960s through their repeated contacts in his capacity as a representative of the Belarusian community and his advocacy for official recognition of his groups.824 Jasiuk was heavily involved in Belarusian-American

821 Vitaut Kipel, “The Voice of America and Broadcasts in Byelorussian: A Case of Living Discrimination,” Heritage Review, May 1973, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 8, IHRCA, 8. 822 Mierlak, Activity of Constant Mierlak in the Emigration, 290-306. 823 For Freedom and Independence of Byelorussia, 8; Mierlak, Activity of Constant Mierlak in the Emigration, 156. 824 “Letter from Paul G. De Muro to Emanuel Jasiuk,” 27 March 1961, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 18, IHRCA; “Photograph of Emanuel Jasiuk and Paul G. De Muro,” Passaic Sunday Eagle, 25 December 1960, 3; “Photograph of Emanuel Jasiuk, Paul G. De Muro, and Others,” 1961, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 28, IHRCA.

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political life in New Jersey, either running or actively participating in the Belarusian

Veterans of Passaic and Garfield, the Belarusian-American Relief Committee, and the

Friends of the Belarusian Central Council (in addition to serving as a leading member of the BCCA).825

As one of the most influential representatives of the BCC/BCCA faction in the

US, Jasiuk hosted visits by BCC President Radoslaw Ostrowski, who had been living in

London since the mid-1950s. In 1957, Ostrowski was the guest of honor at a reception

Jasiuk put together in Passaic. Among others in attendance were Joachim Kipel and

Kosiak, who became the head of the BCCA that year.826 A photograph from the event shows Jasiuk, Kipel, Kosiak, and others toasting Ostrowski in a festively decorated, formally appointed dining room in front of large American and Belarusian nationalist flags.827 Jasiuk chaired another event in Ostrowski’s honor in 1960 when the Pulaski

Citizens’ League threw a banquet for the Belarusian “ex-president” at the local American

Legion hall.828 Ostrowski’s daughter, Halina Minkevich, became an American citizen that same year and filed an application for an immigrant visa for her father with the

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in early 1961.829

825 Passaic County officials honored Jasiuk with a dinner reception and a camera set in 1962 in recognition for his work with the Belarusian community (“Fled Russia in ’49, Wins Honor Here,” The Paterson Morning Call, 28 August 1962; “Emanuel Jasiuk, 71; Agricultural Engineer,” The Herald-News, 12 December 1977). 826 “Photograph of Emanuel Jasiuk, Radoslaw Ostrowski, Joachim Kipel, and Jan Kosiak, and Others,” 1957, VKP, Box 28, IHRCA. 827 Ibid. 828 “Photograph of Radoslaw Ostrowski, John J. Baron, Raifa Jeviec, Nicholas Lapitzki, and Alex Szudziejkl,” Passaic Sunday Eagle, 30 October 1960, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 18, IHRCA, 3; “Honor Visitor,” The Paterson Morning Call, 29 October 1960, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 18, IHRCA. 829 “Petition to Classify Status of Alien for Issuance of Immigrant Visa,” 1961, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 7, NARA II, 1.

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Ostrowski made preparations to join his daughter in the US, but unlike in many other cases, the State Department’s Office of Security began raising questions about his past collaboration. The director of the office, William O. Boswell, wrote to the CIA in

September 1961 asking for all of the relevant information that the agency might have on

Ostrowski. CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell responded to Boswell’s request with several pages summarizing the agency’s file on the BCC president. Bissell’s summary, however, did not include definitive confirmation of Ostrowski’s collaboration with Nazi Germany and cast aspersions on the evidence it did contain on the subject.

Bissell described several of the sources of intelligence upon which the charges of

Ostrowski’s collaboration were based as “unevaluated,” “of undetermined reliability,” or having originated “from one of Subject’s political opponents.”830 Ostrowski’s own most incriminating statements relating his collaboration with the German occupation authorities did not appear in Bissell’s summary. Boswell and the Office of Security apparently did not pursue their concerns further, and Ostrowski received his immigrant visa from the INS.

Ostrowski flew to the US to live permanently in December 1961, but he would not play a very prominent role in Belarusian-American politics over the coming years.831

His daughter Halina and her husband Nicholas both worked as staff psychiatrists at the

Dayton State Hospital in Ohio, and Ostrowski joined them at their home and became

830 “Letter to Director, Office of Security, Department of State,” 1961, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 7, NARA II, 2. 831 “Statement of Facts for Preparation of Petition,” 1972, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 7, NARA II, 3.

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their “housekeeper-bookkeeper.”832 Ostrowski’s neighbors “had a hard time understanding him” because he never gained “a very good command of the English language.”833 This made it difficult for Ostrowski to engage in American political life, and the aging BCC president’s health also prevented him from participating more fully in

Belarusian-American political events in the years to come. Ostrowski had a stroke near the end of the 1960s and mostly retired from public life.834

Although the competition between the BNR and the BCC continued for decades in the US, Ostrowski’s influence weakened continuously as the BNR gained popularity and supporters. The prestige of the BCC had been fading ever since the end of World

War II, when fears of arrest and prosecution for their recent collaboration with Nazi

Germany had caused Ostrowski and leading members of the BCC to temporarily dissolve the council. The defections of high-ranking members of the BCC in the postwar scramble to evade justice while preserving the networks of Belarusian nationalists created under

Nazi Germany dealt a significant blow to the prestige of the BCC. Several influential members of the BCC, such as Kushel, Boris Ragula, Stankievich, and Tumash, had joined Abramchik and the BNR in the power struggles of the late 1940s. Many veterans of the Third Reich’s auxiliary Belarusian military units followed Kushel when he abandoned Ostrowski for the BNR. The BNR and the BAA continued to gain more influence among the Belarusian diaspora over time, and overall support for the BCC and the BCCA faded as its leading members aged and their health faded. Although the BCCA

832 Helen M. Butsch, “Letter to United States Consul, London, England,” 1961, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 7, NARA II, 1; “Application for Permit to Reenter,” 1965, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 7, NARA II. 833 “Investigative Report: Details,” 1972, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 7, NARA II, 1. 834 Ibid.

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held national congresses of its affiliate groups in South River, New Jersey every few years for decades, by the early 1980s these regular meetings would cease.835

As the BNR became more popular and more widely recognized than the BCC, the leaders of Ostrowski’s faction in the US fought to preserve the council’s legacy and fading authority. BCC supporters in the US increasingly devoted themselves to mythologizing their faction’s Belarusian nationalist work under Nazi Germany in World

War II. Although such efforts had been ongoing at least since the early 1950s, it appears that the BCC leadership spent more time commemorating their work as its members grew older and their political relevance faded. Organizations of Belarusian-Americans that supported the BCC had always marked the anniversaries of the mobilization of the BKA in March and of the Second All-Belarusian Congress in June as national holidays.836

These groups portrayed the congress and the BKA as independent nationalist organizations rather than creations of the SS administration of German-occupied

Belarusian territory. Such organizations also celebrated days honoring several individual collaborators who had worked for the BCC during World War II.837

These efforts to mythologize the legacy of the BCC and the BKA culminated in

1974 on the thirtieth anniversary of the Second All-Belarusian Congress with the dedication of a massive monument to the SS puppet regime and the armed forces it created for Nazi Germany’s war effort. Flanked by a large American flag and the white- red-white Belarusian nationalist flag, the monument still stands today on the grounds of the Byelorussian Orthodox Church of St. Euphrosynia in South River, New Jersey. The

835 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 221. 836 Ibid., 341. 837 Ibid., 382.

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church was first established by Belarusian émigrés arriving in South River after World

War II and has always been affiliated with the BCC, as the Jasiuk and Kipel families were among the very first “pioneers of the parish.”838 Vitaut Kipel explains that instead of joining the town’s existing Orthodox church, “the newcomers ensconced themselves in a storefront, and regular services began to be held in 1950-51.”839 The parish purchased a former synagogue shortly thereafter and held services there for years before building a new church building and community center in 1972.840

The monument stands on top of a small hill just behind these structures and is covered in Belarusian nationalist and collaborationist symbols. Approximately fifteen feet high, the large memorial is mostly constructed of stone and concrete. Its façade is covered in small red and white tiles, and a circular concrete bas-relief sculpture of the ancient Belarusian nationalist symbol of a mounted knight is embedded in the center of the monument. Crowning the concrete, tile, and stone monument is a large bronze or brass casting. This casting is in the shape of a hollow iron cross, and in its center is a vertical cross with two horizontal bars. This latter symbol is a Belarusian nationalist emblem that was worn on the collars of Belarusian military collaborators in the Eskadron, the BKA, and the 30th Waffen SS division.841 Inscribed in Belarusian and English, a stone at the base of the monument reads: “Glory to those who fought for freedom and independence of Byelorussia.”842 The emblems of Belarusian nationalism that adorn the front of the monument do not necessarily reveal who erected it, but if one walks up the

838 Ibid., 305. 839 Ibid., 304. 840 Ibid., 305. 841 Ragula, Against the Current, 77, 89; Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, 386. 842 This quotation was taken directly from the monument to the Belarusian Central Council in South River, New Jersey on March 25, 2018.

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small hill on which the monument sits, the seal of the BCC can be seen on the monument’s back side. The same image of the mounted knight from the front of the monument appears here surrounded by the words “Byelaruskaya Tsentralnaya Rada

[Belarusian Central Council],” which remove any doubts surrounding its origins. The members of the BCC erected this massive memorial to themselves in a figurative and literal attempt to cement the nationalist mythology of the council and its so-called

“Belarusian National Army.”843

The monument was formally dedicated at a ceremony marking the anniversary of the Second All-Belarusian Congress on Sunday, June 23, 1974. A special commemorative committee had formed to plan the celebrations, and its members sent out formal invitations for the event. Ostrowski, who had suffered a stroke a few years earlier, was the honorary chairman of the ceremony. The main speaker, however, was Vitaut

Kipel, whose father had presided over the congress in Minsk in 1944 that they were now commemorating.844 The day’s events began in the morning with a holy liturgy at St.

Euphrosynia, which was followed by a dedication ceremony and the benediction of the monument by several Belarusian Orthodox clergy members.845 Afterward, festivities were held in the newly constructed community center, including a recital by a Belarusian-

American women’s chorus and a dinner banquet.846

843 “The Road to Byelorussian Independence,” Heritage Review, Winter 1974, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 7, IHRCA, 10. 844 “Invitation to the 30th Anniversary Celebration of the Belarusian Central Council in South River, New Jersey,” 1974, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 1, IHRCA. 845 Ibid.; “Photograph of the Dedication of the Belarusian Central Council Monument in South River, New Jersey,” Heritage Review, Fall 1974, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 7, IHRCA, 11. 846 “Invitation to the 30th Anniversary Celebration of the Belarusian Central Council in South River, New Jersey,” 1974, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 1, IHRCA.

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The dedication ceremony and the nationalist festivities that day represented the culmination of decades of Belarusian Nazi collaborators’ efforts to paint themselves as independent anticommunist nationalists. Positive coverage of the event appeared in the

Republican newsletter Heritage Review, but even as the Belarusian collaborators were celebrating their mythologized legacy with the erection of a massive monument to themselves, their escape from justice was finally beginning to be called into jeopardy by the US government.847

Belarusian Collaborators and American Justice The erection of the BCC monument produced little critical attention from the press or the government, but other developments with the American political landscape had finally created an environment in which investigations into allegations of Nazi collaborators living in the US began to become a high priority. During the 1950s and

1960s, anticommunist suspicions were pervasive and provided convenient political cover that members of anti-Soviet national minorities who had collaborated with the Nazis could easily use to obscure their pasts. The same year that the BCC dedicated the monument to itself in South River, however, US congressional representatives initiated extensive investigations into the government’s handling of allegations of Nazi war criminals in the US that had been virtually unimaginable during the anticommunist fervor of the early Cold War. The national political climate was changing dramatically, however, as public disillusionment with the war in Vietnam grew and began to discredit

Cold War anticommunist campaigns. Public confidence in the government was further

847 “Photograph of the Dedication of the Belarusian Central Council Monument in South River, New Jersey,” Heritage Review, Fall 1974, 11, Vitaut Kipel Papers, Box 7, IHRCA.

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shaken with the publication of the so-called Pentagon Papers in the New York Times and the exposure of the Nixon administration’s Watergate scandal in the Washington Post.848

Although the erection of the BCC monument drew some unwanted critical attention to the Belarusian collaborators living in the US, the altered national political landscape and the resulting attention would pose the greatest threat to their security and their carefully constructed historical narrative.

After the dedication of the monument, members of the Belarusian-American community and local press began to ask difficult questions about Belarusian Nazi collaborators living in the US. The 1974 issue of the Belarusian-American annual journal

Vialitva featured a photograph of the newly constructed monument in South River and included descriptions of several of its details, including the inscription and the “memorial stamp” of the BCC on the back of the monument.849 The editor of Vialitva criticized the

“swastica oriented Bielorussians [sic]” and their “partisan church,” wondering rhetorically why Belarusian Americans were building divisive monuments to those whom the German “occupiers favored” during World War II “instead of national-patriotic memorials.”850 Approximately three months after the BCC celebrated the dedication of the monument in South River, Warren Sloat of The Home News in nearby New

848 Marjorie Hunter, “Precedent Seen: Nixon’s Main Concern Over Future Leaks, High Aide Says,” New York Times, 19 June 1971, 1; Max Frankel, “Pentagon Papers: A Great Test – ‘This, Too, Vietnam Wrought,’” New York Times, 20 June 1971, E1; Jim Mann and Bob Woodward, “Judge Seals Watergate Testimony: Watergate Case Testimony Sealed, Washington Post, 23 August 1973, A1; Jim Mann and Bob Woodward, “Watergate Questions Abound,” Washington Post, 3 September 1972, A1; Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, “Nixon Unit Reported Probing Watergate,” Washington Post, 18 November 1972, A3; Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry Revisited: The Church Committee Confronts America’s Spy Agencies (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), xiii. 849 “Memorials,” Vialitva No. 2 (1974), 29. 850 Ibid.

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Brunswick wrote to the INS asking if the agency could confirm rumors of the immigration to the US of “Mr. Radaslau Astrauski, the President of the Belorussian

Central Council…established by the German S.S.”851 Although the INS informed Sloat that the agency had no information on anybody matching his description of “Astrauski,” he wrote again in early November to ask for additional record checks of alternate spellings of Ostrowski’s name, explaining that “there is little doubting…that he is residing in the United States.”852

This was not the first time that an American reporter had pried into the Belarusian collaborators’ presence in the US, but reports published in the early 1960s had produced insufficient public outrage to threaten their immigration status at the time. Public curiosity in these issues had been sparked by the sensational capture of Adolf Eichmann in 1960 and his trial in 1961, but public awareness that Nazis and Nazi collaborators were living in the US was just beginning to grow and would not compel increased government scrutiny for another decade.853

Charles R. Allen, Jr. was among the very first American journalists to shine a light on Nazi war criminals living in the US in the early 1960s, and leading Belarusian collaborators were among the first he exposed. In January 1963, Allen published an article in Jewish Currents about Jasiuk, Kushel, and more than a dozen others living in the US who were either “wanted for war crimes” or “accused of having committed such

851 “Letter from Warren Sloat to LF. Chapman, Jr., Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service,” 9 October 1974, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 7, NARA II. 852 “Letter from Warren Sloat to Verne Jervis, Immigration and Naturalization Service,” 4 November 1974, INS Case Files, RG 85, Entry P3, Box 7, NARA II. 853 Rochelle G. Saidel, The Outraged Conscience: Seekers of Justice for Nazi War Criminals in America (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 4.

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crimes on behalf of Hitler Germany.”854 He included many details of their alleged wartime crimes as well as their new lives in the US. Allen described how defendants on trial for war crimes in the Soviet Union had implicated Jasiuk, alleging that he had given them orders and “personally supervised the shooting” of Jews in Kletsk.855

Allen had even located and spoken with several of his subjects, but his efforts created little public stir or government action. The pervasive anticommunist sentiment in the US in the 1950s and 1960s created a political atmosphere in which the American public and the US government did not make the pursuit of justice for Nazi collaborators living in the US a high priority. Allen sought out several Belarusian collaborators in the

US and asked questions about their pasts and their current associations with other suspected collaborators. He even offered to give Kushel’s address and telephone number

“to any government agency concerned with sending him back to stand trial for his war crimes.”856 This exposure, however, did not produce significant public interest or government action at the time. The Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America sent an inquiry to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy after the first article appeared, and Allen wrote two letters to the attorney general as well.857 He also wrote to the State

Department and the INS about his findings. Although the INS confirmed the accuracy of many of his charges, the State Department simply replied with an explanation of the complicated extradition process without addressing his questions.858

854 Charles Allen, Jr. “Nazi War Criminals Living Among Us: The ‘Fascist Genocides Who Have Bought their Way into the United States,” Jewish Currents, January 1963, 4. 855 Ibid., 9. 856 Ibid., 11. 857 “The Cry for Justice,” Jewish Currents, March 1963, 17; Charles Allen, Jr. “Our Government ‘Replies’ to Charges: State Department and Immigration Service Evade Issue of Nazi War Criminals among Us,” Jewish Currents, May 1963, 36. 858 Allen, “Our Government ‘Replies’ to Charges,” 36.

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Allen tried writing directly to the attorney general and he publicly called for legal action against the Nazi collaborators he exposed, but his efforts did not produce the results he sought at the time. This may be unsurprising due to the public’s fear of nuclear war with the Soviet Union amid the lingering tensions of the recent Cuban Missile Crisis.

Neither Attorney General Kennedy nor the American public were prioritizing new investigations into allegations of Nazi collaborators in the US. Allen’s articles first appeared shortly after the resolution of the crisis in early 1963, when “militantly uncompromising anti-Communists” within the US government such as Republican

Senators Barry Goldwater and Kenneth Keating were falsely accusing Soviet authorities of undermining the terms of the resolution by secretly maintaining missile sites in Cuba and delivering new military equipment to the island.859 With “the worldwide anxiety” provoked by the crisis still in effect, it is little wonder that Allen’s articles and letters did not arrest the attention of the public or the government.860 In fact, the vehement anticommunism still pervading the country at the time created a receptive atmosphere for collaborators’ assertions that Allen’s charges were based on nothing but “communist lies.”861

In a rare case where one high-ranking Nazi collaborator in the US did stand trial amid the anticommunism that gripped the country in the 1950s and 1960s, the political climate effectively protected him from extradition and deportation for decades. During

World War II, Andrija Artukovic had been responsible for the persecution and mass

859 Roger Hilsman, The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy (Westport, CT: Prager Publishers, 1996), 139. 860 Max Frankel, High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 2004), 176. 861 Allen, “Nazi War Criminals Living Among Us,” 10.

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murder of Jews, Serbs, Roma and Sinti, Communists, clergy, and others through his positions as the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice and Religion in the so- called Independent State of Croatia, a Nazi puppet state created in 1941.862 Originally arriving in the US under a false identity in 1948, Artukovic went to work at his brother’s construction company in California and received two extensions on his initial visitor’s visa by claiming that he was a “refugee from communism.”863 When his brother’s congressional representative introduced a bill to bestow lawful admission retroactively on

Artukovic, it was sent to INS for routine review. INS found that Artukovic had been unlawfully admitted to the US and was wanted as a war criminal, and deportation proceedings began in 1951.864 Although he had falsified his visa application in order to enter the country unlawfully, Artukovic claimed that he would be a victim of communist persecution if he were deported to stand trial for his crimes in Yugoslavia. The presiding judge postponed a ruling pending the outcome of the formal extradition request filed by the Yugoslavian government.865

During the eight years of Artukovic’s extradition trial, the anticommunist fervor of the country thoroughly pervaded the proceedings. Leffler explains that “Anti-

Communist rhetoric dominated the public discourse of the early 1950s,” and the introduction of polemical anticommunist rhetoric by the presiding judge compromised

862 Judy Feigin, “The Office of Special Investigations: Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust,” Mark M. Richard, ed., (December 2008), Department of Justice, accessed July 30, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2011/03/14/12- 2008osu-accountability.pdf., 239. 863 Michael C. McAdams, Whitepaper on Dr. Andrija Artukovic (Arcadia, CA: Croatian Information Service, 1975), 3; Saidel, The Outraged Conscience, 21. 864 Judy Feigin, “The Office of Special Investigations: Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust,” 240-1. 865 Ibid., 241.

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the impartiality of the legal proceedings.866 In April 1958, the Croatian Catholic Union in

Pittsburgh called for a “national campaign” to prevent “the extradition of Dr. Artukovic, a true champion of democracy, to Communist Yugoslavia.”867 The following month, the official newsletter of the Croatian Catholic Union of the USA published an appeal to defend the “Croatian patriot and anti-Communist, Dr. A. Artukovic.”868 The presiding judge, Theodore Hocke, continually criticized the communist government of Yugoslavia throughout the trial. Hocke attacked the credibility of the prosecution’s witness statements based on the assumption that they had been coerced into providing false testimonies by Yugoslavia’s communist authorities. He stated that the witnesses testifying on behalf of Artukovic “were in the United States and under no fear, inducement or compulsion to testify falsely. History indicates this might not have been true in Yugoslavia at the time the [prosecution’s] evidence was taken.”869 Ultimately,

Hocke dismissed 130 affidavits on the principle that the veracity of witness testimonies collected by communist authorities could not be trusted.870 He also criticized the prosecution for including testimonies concerning mass killings committed under

Artukovic’s orders, which he complained “constantly refer to children of tender years, new born babes, aged persons, cruel and inhuman treatment, etc.” Hocke claimed that these details had been included simply “to incite passion and prejudice.”871

866 Leffler, The Specter of Communism, 121. 867 Charles Allen, Jr., “Fascist Genocides in Our Midst: Artukovic of Yugoslavia – Bishop Valerian and Nicolae Malaxa of Ramania: A Documented Expose.” Jewish Currents 17, No. 2. (February 1963), 7. 868 Nasa Nada, in Allen, “Fascist Genocides in Our Midst,” 7. 869 Theodore Hocke, in Vrancic Vjekoslav, Dr. Andrija Artukovic Pred Sjeveroamerickim Sudom (Buenos Aires: Hrvatske Misli, 1959), 98. 870 George Danielson, in Blum, Wanted!: The Search for Nazis in America, 176. 871 Theodore Hocke, in Vrancic Vjekoslav, Dr. Andrija Artukovic Pred Sjeveroamerickim Sudom, 98.

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The anticommunist fervor of the 1950s pervaded the courtroom and created an atmosphere in which Artukovic’s defense successfully portrayed him as a victim of communist propaganda and persecution. Ultimately, Hocke agreed that the charges against Artukovic were political in nature, and therefore he was not subject to extradition.

INS issued a stay of deportation for Artukovic after Hocke’s ruling, agreeing with

Artukovic’s original assertion by arguing that “if deported he would face persecution.”872

Artukovic lived in relative obscurity in California with his family throughout the 1960s, but public awareness of the events of the Holocaust and official concern with Nazi war criminals living in the US both grew over the 1970s and began to threaten Artukovic’s quiet existence. He would ultimately be extradited to Yugoslavia in 1986.873

Anticommunism may have quashed the possibility of Artukovic’s extradition or deportation in the 1950s, but the exposure given to the years of legal proceedings did increase public knowledge that Nazi collaborators were living in the US. The Eichmann trial in Israel in the early 1960s also contributed to the growing public awareness that

Nazi war criminals had escaped justice by fleeing to the Americas, and the exposés Allen published on the Belarusians and other collaborators led to some private inquiries but no official investigations or legal filings.

The national political climate at the time was receptive to the idea that these allegations stemmed from communist propaganda, but this would change drastically over the next several years as public disillusionment with the government’s anticommunist

872 “Memorandum of Conversation,” Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-63, XVI: Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, eds. Ronald D. Landa, James E. Miller, William F. Sanford, Jr. and Sherrill Brown Wells (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994), 368. 873 Robert Pear, “U.S. Extradites Croat to Yugoslavia,” New York Times, 13 February 1986, A3.

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campaigns began to grow. Like Eisenhower before him, President John F. Kennedy was concerned with “putting ‘distance’” between his policies and those of his predecessor.874

US Cold War foreign policy, however, stayed rooted in and influenced by the Truman administration’s policy of containment through several successive US presidential administrations. Filipink asserts that the major foreign policy crises that weakened the

American public’s previously strong anticommunist consensus during the presidencies of

Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson were actually rooted in previous presidents’ anticommunist foreign policy.875 Although Kennedy had hoped to chart a new course,

Gaddis argues that his foreign policy remained heavily influenced by the liberation policy of Eisenhower and the containment policy of Truman.876 The new president felt unable to withdraw from “admittedly overextended positions without setting off a crisis of confidence that would undermine American interests everywhere,” Gaddis explains.877 In his study of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, for example, historian Trumbull Higgins argues that the CIA’s failed attempt to foment a counterrevolution in Cuba was “a shining example” of an overextended campaign to undermine communism that had its origins in the expanded covert operations of the Eisenhower administration.878 The Bay of Pigs disaster severely damaged the CIA’s reputation and ended Allen Dulles’ tenure as director of the

CIA, signaling the end of the so-called “Golden Age” of the agency’s more ambitious covert operations begun under his leadership.879

874 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 197. 875 Filipink, Dwight Eisenhower and American Foreign Policy during the 1960s, x. 876 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 203. 877 Ibid., 234. 878 Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pig (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), 176. 879 The CIA would continue to conduct covert paramilitary operations for decades, but the reckless abandon with which the agency had approached its clandestine attempts to undermine

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The growing military quagmire and mounting casualties in Vietnam, another example of a foreign policy crisis of the 1960s with its origins in the Eisenhower years, produced massive domestic protests against the US war on communism in Southeast Asia and did a great deal to discredit such anticommunist campaigns.880 By the early 1970s, the public’s exhaustion with the war in Vietnam caused even the ardently anticommunist

Nixon to declare he would end the conflict and pursue a policy of détente with the Soviet

Union and the People’s Republic of China.881 In his study of the CIA and the Cold War, historian Hugh Wilford notes that the “Cold War consensus” that had begun to fragment in the late 1960s now began disintegrating entirely.882 The Belarusian collaborators in the

US had been effectively shielding themselves behind the anticommunism of the early

Cold War for decades, but the cover provided by this political climate was suddenly shrinking as public and government interest in pursuing justice for Nazi war criminals began to grow.

Although the INS received nearly 60 reports of Nazi war criminals living in the

US over the years, the agency had actively investigated fewer than a dozen of them by the early 1970s.883 A study by CIA staff historian Kevin Conley Ruffner claims that

worldwide communism in the early Cold War years would be supplanted with greater oversight. Higgins observes that after the Bay of Pigs, “the United States could not again hope to disavow its responsibility for supporting such futile pinpricks” (Higgins, The Perfect Failure, 161, 163, 169; John O’Beirne Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA [London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1988], 476,; Wiener, Legacy of Ashes, 2011, 192-4; Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer, 7). 880 Filipink, Dwight Eisenhower and American Foreign Policy during the 1960s, 15. 881 Gaddis asserts that because “Nixon had been so staunch an anti-communist over the years,” his pragmatic foreign policy approach “took on the aura of statesmanship rather than softness, thus according him greater freedom of action than his more liberal rivals for the presidency could have expected” (Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 273). 882 Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer, 248, 251. 883 Ruffner, “Chapter Fifteen: Unfinished Business,” Eagle and Swastika, 1; Ryan, Quiet Neighbors, 29-42.

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investigations into Nazi war criminals were simply not a high priority at the height of the

Cold War. Ruffner explains that the INS “lacked centralized planning and funding to investigate allegations of Nazi war crimes,” and many of the tips were simply dismissed out of hand because of the widespread belief “that Soviet propaganda prompted many of the allegations.”884 The vast majority of the reports of Nazis and Nazi collaborators living in the US that reached INS in the quarter century following World War II were never even investigated. When INS did look into these allegations, as with Ostrowski in 1961, the CIA did not provide all of the evidence it possessed concerning subjects’ past collaboration with Nazi Germany.

These decades of neglect and obfuscation became public scandals in the early

1970s, producing enormous changes in the government’s approach to Nazis and Nazi collaborators in the US. In his study of Nazi collaborators in the US, historian Christoph

Schiessl observes that the well-publicized case of Hermine Braunsteiner-Ryan (a German guard who had served at Majdanek and married an American after the war) “served as a catalyst for research” into how the government’s record of investigating allegations that

Nazi war criminals were living in the US.885 After the extradition of Braunsteiner-Ryan to

West Germany in 1973, attorney Vincent Schiano and investigator Anthony DeVito both resigned from the INS in protest of the agency’s “years of cover-ups.”886 Elizabeth

Holtzman, a Democratic member of Congress from New York, began leading congressional efforts to investigate the presence of Nazi war criminals in the US and the

884 Ruffner, “Chapter Fifteen: Unfinished Business,” Eagle and Swastika, 1-2. 885 Schiessl, Alleged Nazi Collaborators in the United States after World War II, xviii. 886 “War Crimes Trials Stir German Youth: Tedious Legality and Digging-Up of Nazi Past Are Debated by Teen-Aged Spectators,” New York Times, November 1, 1976, 17; Saidel, The Outraged Conscience, 7.

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extent of the government’s involvement with them.887 The federal government began fundamentally changing the way it handled allegations of Nazi war criminals in the US at the same time that the Belarusian collaborators in New Jersey prepared to dedicate a monument to their own legacy.

In 1974, Holtzman and Pennsylvania Democrat Joshua Eilberg, the chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, demanded that the INS provide Congress with current reports on its investigatory efforts and pressured the Department of State to cooperate more closely with foreign governments to uncover and produce evidence against alleged war criminals.888 This included close US allies like Israel and West Germany that independently pursued justice for Nazi war criminals, but also communist states on whose territories the crimes under investigation had been committed, such as Poland, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. No longer was evidence to be dismissed out of hand merely because it had been submitted by a communist government, as had occurred during Artukovic’s trial in the 1950s.

Holtzman’s and Eilberg’s request for updated reports from the INS in 1974 set off a chain of events that would soon culminate in the creation of a special office to investigate and prosecute war criminals.

The work of Holtzman’s subcommittee and the intransigence of multiple government agencies caused Eilberg to order an investigation by the General Accounting

Office (GAO) in January 1977 to determine whether government officials had participated in a conspiracy to withhold information or otherwise obstruct the

887 Ruffner, “Chapter Fifteen: Unfinished Business,” Eagle and Swastika, 1-2. 888 Ibid., 3; Saidel, The Outraged Conscience, 7.

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investigation and prosecution of cases related to Nazi war criminals living in the US.889

Although the GAO report concluded that allegations of obstruction were not supported by the evidence, it also confirmed that the CIA had developed substantial relationships with at least 22 individuals associated with Nazi Germany over the previous three decades.890

Eilberg publicly criticized the CIA and the FBI for utilizing these figures as intelligence assets instead of pursuing justice for their past crimes.891 These revelations inspired the

INS to form a new Special Litigation Unit in 1977 in order to investigate alleged Nazi war criminals living in the US and to initiate denaturalization and deportation proceedings if the evidence supported them.892 The effectiveness of the new task force, however, suffered from funding issues, causing its transfer into the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice in September 1979.893

Reincorporated as the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), the newly created legal task force began reorganizing its offices and opening investigations. All but one of the attorneys of the INS Special Litigation Unit transferred to the new offices under the leadership of Walter Rockler, a former Nuremberg prosecutor.894 Because OSI’s work required expertise in the history of Nazi Germany and World War II, the office also recruited professionally trained historians to provide necessary contextual information

889 GAO changed its name from the General Accounting Office to the Government Accountability Office in 2004 (“History,” About GAO, U.S. Government Accountability Office, accessed 25 March 2019, https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-is/history/; Ruffner, “Chapter Fifteen: Unfinished Business,” Eagle and Swastika, 5). 890 Ruffner, “Chapter Fifteen: Unfinished Business,” Eagle and Swastika, 10. 891 Ibid. 892 Ibid., 9. 893 Judy Feigin, “The Office of Special Investigations: Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust,” 4-7. 894 Ibid., 7-8.

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and investigate accusations into subjects’ pasts.895 Rockler, who had assumed the directorship reluctantly and did not at all enjoy the demanding public relations required of the office’s head, retired in March 1980.896

Under the directorship of his successor, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., OSI began to develop discreet and efficient working relationships with other government agencies that provided documentary evidence used to develop OSI’s cases. Ryan’s duties kept him in almost daily contact with the CIA’s Office of General Counsel, which helped to make OSI’s working relationship with the CIA especially close and productive.897 The investigations into Belarusian collaborators living in the US, however, began severely threatening this relationship and introduced sensational allegations of widespread government conspiracies into the public sphere.

This increased government attention to Nazi war criminals in the US coincided with increased public awareness of the history of the Holocaust. In April 1978, NBC broadcast the influential and widely viewed four night miniseries Holocaust. Historian

Peter Novick observes that “more information about the Holocaust was imparted to more

Americans over those four nights than over all the preceding thirty years,” and Schiessl calls the miniseries “a catalyst in creating awareness about the Holocaust.”898 According to Ryan at OSI, the broadcast was viewed in nearly half of all American homes and had a major impact on the American public school system. Within months of the broadcast of

895 Peter Black was the first professional historian to join OSI (Judy Feigin, “The Office of Special Investigations: Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust,” 22). 896 Ruffner, “Chapter Sixteen: CIA’s First Cases,” Eagle and Swastika, 2. 897 Ruffner, “Chapter Seventeen: In the Shadow of the Cold War,” Eagle and Swastika, 23. 898 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 209; Schiessl, Alleged Nazi Collaborators in the United States after World War II, xx, 137.

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Holocaust, fifty high school districts across the country began pilot programs in the study of the Holocaust.899

OSI’s investigation into Belarusian Nazi collaborators in the US gathered new momentum after Ryan became director in spring 1980. Shortly after taking control of

OSI, Ryan provided the CIA with a list of names that he wished to have reviewed by the agency, adding that “we are particularly looking for information” that the CIA might have concerning “the subjects’ activities and memberships in the quisling government of

Byelorussia during Nazi occupation” and any connections they may have developed with

Western intelligence.900 By summer 1980, the investigations into Belarusian collaborators in the US had become the “top priority” of the OSI under the direction of young attorney

John Loftus, a former US Army officer from Boston.901 Loftus energetically sought information from the CIA on several leading Belarusian collaborators, including

Awdziej, Jasiuk, Kosiak, Kushel, Ostrowski, and Sobolewski.902

As he investigated the Belarusian collaborators in the US, Loftus began dropping hints that he was uncovering a wide-ranging conspiracy to bring Nazi war criminals to the country. In October 1980, Loftus informed a member of the Information Management

Staff of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations that he believed Frank Wisner and members of his staff at the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) had intentionally purged the agency’s files to remove crucial evidence that would establish the extent of the

899 Ryan, Quiet Neighbors, 333. 900 Allan A. Ryan, Jr., in Ruffner, “Chapter Eighteen: Belorussians, 60 Minutes, and the GAO’s Second Investigation,” Eagle and Swastika, 4. 901 Ruffner, “Chapter Eighteen: Belorussians, 60 Minutes, and the GAO’s Second Investigation,” Eagle and Swastika, 5. 902 Ibid., 2.

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relationships between US intelligence and the Belarusian collaborators.903 That same month, Ryan sent a memorandum written by Loftus to Attorney General Benjamin

Civiletti, explaining his theory that OPC had helped Nazi collaborators immigrate to the

US as DPs and asserting that virtually all of the Belarusian collaborationist leadership had been brought to the country.904 The following month, he began implying that the CIA could be criminally liable for violating US immigration law and obstructing justice.905

Loftus announced that he intended to file suit against several Belarusian collaborators, but he grew frustrated with the pace of the investigations and retired abruptly in May

1981 to write a book publicizing his theories.906

Although Loftus’ assertions included several shocking but accurate observations, the grand conspiratorial narrative with which he explained them made multiple logical assumptions that came to be known among OSI historians as “the Loftusian Leap.”907

Many collaborators became morally culpable for their willing involvement with a genocidal invasion force without personally committing war crimes, but Loftus often conflated the categories of Nazis, war collaborators, and war criminals. For example,

Loftus referred to Belarusian Nazi collaborators imprecisely and misleadingly as

“Byelorussian Nazis.”908 Although it may be that they themselves never murdered a

903 Ibid., 7. 904 OSI historian Judy Feigin notes that this was not routine practice, but Loftus’ sweeping conspiracy theories contained assertions of Ronald Reagan’s involvement, and Ryan wanted to avoid any accusations that OSI “were trying to cover things up or save Reagan a month before the election” (Judy Feigin, “The Office of Special Investigations: Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust,” 357). 905 Ruffner, “Chapter Eighteen: Belorussians, 60 Minutes, and the GAO’s Second Investigation,” Eagle and Swastika, 8. 906 Ibid., 6, 12. 907 This phrase is drawn from multiple conversations with former OSI historians. 908 Membership in the Nazi Party itself was restricted to members of the imagined German national community and excluded Slavic people such as Belarusians a priori. Attempts by Belarusian Nazi sympathizer Fabian Akinchyts to establish a Belarusian National Socialist Party

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single person, high-ranking collaborators like Ostrowski and Kushel still acted as crucial facilitators of the German occupation and of Nazi genocidal practices by organizing the local collaborationist administrations and police forces that implemented these policies.

Those in positions of authority as German-appointed mayors and BCC regional representatives, such as Jasiuk, Awdziej, and Stankievich, had submitted lists of targeted individuals and become closely involved in the creation, administration, and destruction of Jewish ghettos. Stankievich and dozens of other Belarusians had been even more directly involved in the crimes of the Holocaust as guides for Einsatzgruppe B in 1941, but Loftus drew few distinctions among this wide spectrum of complicity.

Additionally, Loftus asserted that because the CIA had conducted clandestine operations with Belarusian collaborators, Wisner and the CIA must have known all about their pasts, facilitated their immigration, and destroyed the evidence. While a subsequent government investigation in the mid-1980s would confirm that Stankievich had actually received immigration assistance after having his initial applications flagged and rejected, there is little to suggest any widespread effort to bring Belarusian Nazi collaborators to the US.909

Scholars, journalists, and others who have examined the connections between the

US government and former Nazis and Nazi collaborators during the Cold War disagree on the extent of the government’s relationship with these figures. Some of the relevant historiography refutes Loftus. Ryan, the director of OSI in the early 1980s, explains that he only became aware of “a handful of cases” in which “one could conclude that U.S.

in 1933 foundered after finding little support (Loftus, The Belarus Secret, 96; Rein, The Kings and the Pawns, 94). 909 Ruffner, “Chapter Eighteen: Belorussians, 60 Minutes, and the GAO’s Second Investigation,” Eagle and Swastika, 25.

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officials assisted or sponsored the entry of Nazi war criminals into the United States.”910

Even in these cases, Ryan argues, “questions remain whether the officials knew the incriminating background of the individuals involved.”911 He explains that while there is no evidence of a widespread conspiracy to bring Nazis or Nazi collaborators to the US,

“the record is clear that preventing the entry of Nazi criminals to the United States was not a high priority, and was not taken seriously.”912 Schiessl’s work on the subject agrees with Ryan’s conclusions, asserting that “sensationalist books” are responsible for the exaggerated impression “that former Nazis and their eastern European helpers were lurking everywhere, and that a conspiracy of shadowy figures connected to the U.S. government helped them deliberately escape justice and live in peace in the United States and South America.”913

Several monographs authored by journalists disagree with these assessments and present more shocking interpretations of the numbers of Nazi war criminals who escaped to the US and the extent of the government’s awareness and involvement. Christopher

Simpson, for example, claims that “the CIA, the State Department, and U.S. Army intelligence each created special programs for the specific purpose of bringing selected former Nazis and collaborators to the United States.”914 Simpson asserts that Wisner personally initiated “large-scale programs designed to bring thousands of anti-

Communist exiles to the United States as a means of rewarding them for secret operations overseas and to train others for guerrilla warfare against East bloc countries.”915 In his

910 Ryan, Quiet Neighbors, 327. 911 Ibid. 912 Ibid., 344. 913 Schiessl, Alleged Nazi Collaborators in the United States after World War II, xxii. 914 Simpson, Blowback, xiv. 915 Ibid., 9.

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more recent work, Lichtblau writes that “thousands of Nazis sneaked in on their own, easily gaming the American immigration system…but hundreds more had help…from senior military and intelligence officials.”916

Although such accounts may exaggerate the extent of the relationships between

US intelligence and former Nazis and Nazi collaborators, the declassification of millions of pages of relevant US government files in recent decades reveals that these allegations are based on elements of truth. Wisner did engineer covert operations to undermine the

Soviet Union using former Nazis and collaborators, and many such figures immigrated to the US. As the case of the Belarusian collaborators demonstrates, however, the majority of these figures falsified their pasts in order to manipulate immigration laws, and few received assistance from members of US intelligence. The CIA knowingly did recruit

Nazi collaborators for clandestine paramilitary and propaganda operations, but these figures were of greater value for these projects in Europe. The agency continued to work with collaborators who immigrated to the US, and it helped to protect its assets from investigations. There is little, however, to suggest a widespread conspiracy to bring former Nazis or Nazi collaborators to the US en masse. Loftus was among the first to voice such far-reaching conspiracy theories, and his work still stands out among the more sensationalistic and conspiratorial works on the subject.917

916 Eric Lichtblau, The Nazis Next Door, 2. 917 Loftus’ monograph was preceded by Howard Blum’s 1977 book, Wanted! The Search for Nazis in America, which recounted retired INS investigator Anthony DeVito’s late night, chain- smoking efforts to create a manuscript to publicize his theories that Nazis had “the future all worked out” and had made arrangements “to buy protection after the war in America” (Anthony DeVito, in Blum, Wanted! The Search for Nazis in America, 254).

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A year after his abrupt resignation from OSI, Loftus sparked a public scandal when he appeared on 60 Minutes to promote his upcoming book, The Belarus Secret.918

CBS broadcast the half-hour episode, titled “The Nazi Connection,” on May 16, 1982.

Host Mike Wallace interviewed Loftus, who for the first time publicly aired his accusations that several leading Belarusian collaborators had been living in the US for decades and were deeply involved in clandestine anti-Soviet projects with American intelligence. Loftus named several individual collaborators, including Kushel, Tumash, and the recently deceased Stankievich, whom he alleged were all smuggled into the country by OPC to help secretly fight against the Soviet Union.919 The episode included footage of Wallace trying to interview some of the accused and featured Tumash closing his door on Wallace.920 A series of newspaper interviews with Loftus followed the report on 60 Minutes, repeating these accusations and providing further details about collaborators’ lives in America.921

The Belarusian-American community responded with passionate denials of the charges and with attacks on Loftus and 60 Minutes. A long response appeared almost immediately in the Belarusian-American newspaper Bielarus, which Stankievich had

918 Ruffner, “Chapter Eighteen: Belorussians, 60 Minutes, and the GAO’s Second Investigation,” Eagle and Swastika, 12; Loftus, The Belarus Secret, 1982. 919 “CBS: Trial by Insinuations (‘The Nazi Connections’),” Bielarus, May 1982, 6. 920 Ibid. 921 Ralph Blumenthal, “Possible Cover-Up on Nazis Is Focus of New U.S. Inquiry,” New York Times, 23 May 1982, 1; Robert D. Hershey, “U.S. Recruited Nazis for Intelligence Work, Investigator Says,” New York Times, 17 May 1982, B11; “Nazi Pals Spied for U.S., Prober Says,” Chicago Tribune, 17 May 1982, A1; “Justice, State Deny They Impeded Probe of Nazis,” Chicago Tribune, 18 May 1982, A3; Thomas O’Toole, “The Secret under the Little Cemetery,” Washington Post, 23 May 1982, A1; Dale Russakoff, “American Officials Accused of Aiding Nazi Collaborators,” Washington Post, 17 May 1982, A1; Thomas O’Toole, “Nazis Brought to U.S. to Work against Soviets in Cold War,” Washington Post, 20 May 1982, A1.

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edited for seventeen years until his death just eighteen months earlier.922 The article defended Stankievich from Loftus’ charge that he had been complicit in the destruction of the Jewish ghetto he had overseen as the German-appointed mayor of Barysau, dismissing the accusations as the most recent in a “constant barrage of Soviet propaganda” aimed at Stankievich for a life filled with anticommunist Belarusian nationalist work.923 The editorial continued to assert that broadcasting such libelous

Soviet propaganda on an American network was “a frightening case of irresponsible TV journalism.”924 The paper did not deny that Stankievich or Tumash had served as mayors appointed by the German occupation authorities, but it did deny that they had any complicity in acts of persecution or murder. Likewise, the article did not deny that Kushel had led the Belarusian Waffen-SS division created in the war’s final stages, but it argued that he should be remembered solely as “a military man and a Byelorussian nationalist trying to make the best of what was a very difficult situation.”925

The Belarusian-American community also attacked OSI itself. The piece in

Bielarus concluded by casting aspersions on OSI’s methods, suggesting that “if CBS’s

‘Nazi Connection’ is indicative of the Office of Special Investigation’s work, it is time we ask whether the O.S.I. should not itself be investigated for wasting taxpayers’ money and contributing to the spread of irresponsible insinuations such as those aired by CBS on

May 16, 1982.”926 The Belarusian Republican Federation also became involved in the campaign against OSI. Walter Melianovich, the leader of the group in the mid-1980s,

922 “CBS: Trial by Insinuations (‘The Nazi Connections’),” Bielarus, May 1982, 6; “Stanislau Stankevich,” New York Times, 8 November 1980, 28. 923 “CBS: Trial by Insinuations (‘The Nazi Connections’),” Bielarus, May 1982, 6. 924 Ibid. 925 Ibid. 926 Ibid.

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complained that “the damn OSI is hounding my friends” and doing the “dirty work of

Communism.”927 Many other Eastern European immigrant groups, including several that belonged to the Republican Heritage Groups Federation, also attacked the OSI for using evidence obtained from Soviet sources. These included Croatian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian Republican organizations whose membership included individuals with past connections to Nazi Germany.928

When Loftus published The Belarus Secret later that year, the book received critical reviews and inspired further attacks from the Belarusian-American press. A review in The New York Times noted that the book made valuable contributions to the discussion of Nazi war criminals in the US, but it cautioned that “Mr. Loftus mars his account with some inaccuracies and overstatements…He says 300 Byelorussian

Nazis…were smuggled in. But he fails to draw a distinction between documented war criminals and hangers-on and perhaps other less culpable collaborators.”929 Bielarus called the book “an utterly confusing work…not without harm to an entire group of innocent people, the Byelorussian-Americans, because of its broad innuendos and careless allegations.”930 Ukrainian-Americans also attacked The Belarus Secret, charging that Loftus’ book and the media’s coverage of his allegations were simply “reverse neo-

McCarthyism.”931

927 Bellant, Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party, 11. 928 Ibid., 77-9. 929 Ralph Blumenthal, “Books of the Times: The Belarus Secret,” New York Times, 28 December 1982, C12. 930 “The Loftus Non-Secret,” Bielarus, November-December 1982, 8-9. 931 Katherine C. Chumachenko, “’Not a Collaborator,’” Washington Post, 18 November 1982, A18.

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Loftus also tried publicizing his theories of a widespread government conspiracy to smuggle Nazi collaborators into the country by writing a fictionalized account of his findings for a television thriller. “The Belarus File” starred Telly Savalas in a reprisal of his hardboiled, trenchcoat-wearing character Theo Kojak from the popular 1970s television series Kojak. In Loftus’ story, the New York City detective investigated the murder of several Belarusian immigrants linked to Nazi Germany only to find that the

Department of State had pulled their files and orchestrated a massive cover-up operation.

Loftus provided the story and served as the film’s technical advisor. He included many details from Belarusian collaborators’ actual lives. As Kojak snooped around the grave of one of the murder victims, for example, he stumbles across a large memorial built by a cadre of Belarusian Nazi collaborators living in the US. Although it contained several of the same Belarusian nationalist and collaborationist symbols as the actual monument, the imitation created for use in the film was just approximately half the size of the original.

“The Belarus File” includes several direct representations of real Belarusian collaborators, and Kojak’s character is used as a mouthpiece to share Loftus’ conspiratorial theories with the audience. For instance, “Nikolae Kastenov” stood in for

Kushel as the leader of the Belarusian collaborationist police and military forces.932

Ostrowski was represented in the character of Vadim Sevatsky, who was said to have been “selected by the German invading force to organize the counties around the city of

Minsk” and “headed the government.”933 Stankievich was obviously the character of

Vladimir Fitzev, who, Kojak learns, “directed the massacre of innocent inhabitants of the

932 Kojak: The Belarus File, directed by Robert Markowitz (Universal City Studios, Inc., 1985). 933 Ibid.

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Barysau district” and served as “editor of the fascist newspaper Ranitsa.”934 The film is full of such specific details and includes a monologue in which Kojak provides viewers with a succinct summary of the theories that OSI historians characterized as the

“Loftusian Leap”:

“OK, the war’s over? These bums, these [Belarusian] collaborators, they begin to show up at Displaced Persons camps, passing themselves off as real DPs. Now listen to this: Allied intelligence, they know all about these collaborators. They know all their crimes, they know the whole story. And now we’ve got somebody in Washington comes up with the bright idea, ‘let’s not punish these hyenas for what they did. Let’s use them. We’ll use them as guerrillas against the Soviet Union, but first we’ve gotta train them. We gotta sneak ‘em into the United States, but that’s against the law…They set the whole thing up. The ‘Belarus Brigade.’ These [Belarusian] collaborators training themselves to do something against Russia, and some of them were actually sent!”935

The attention generated by Loftus’ publicity campaign inspired more extensive congressional investigations into the accusations he had made. With his appearance on 60

Minutes and the release of his book, Loftus had created “a public relations crisis” for several federal agencies, especially the CIA.936 Outraged congressional representatives called for renewed investigations into his charges, and the House Judiciary Committee requested that the GAO reopen Nazi war crimes investigations and look into Loftus’ claims that the first GAO investigation in the 1970s had been tainted by federal agencies’ deliberate acts of obstruction.937 The results of the second GAO investigation confirmed that the government had, in fact, rendered immigration assistance to five individuals with connections to Nazi Germany, including Stankievich.938 Many of the most active leading

934 Ibid. 935 Ibid. 936 Ruffner, “Chapter Eighteen: Belorussians, 60 Minutes, and the GAO’s Second Investigation,” Eagle and Swastika, 14. 937 Ibid., 14-5. 938 Ibid., 25.

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Belarusian collaborators, however, died before these investigations had ever been started.939

Jasiuk, Kushel, Sobolewski, and Ostrowski all had died even before the creation of the OSI.940 Stankievich died at his home in Queens in November 1980 while Loftus was preparing to file charges against him.941

Despite the public scandal, OSI investigations led to only two cases where

Belarusian collaborators lost their US citizenship. Awdziej voluntarily surrendered his

US citizenship rather than face prosecution for falsifying his past when he immigrated to

New Jersey. Faced with new evidence, Awdziej admitted that he had concealed his involvement in the persecution of Jewish and Polish citizens of the Stoubcy region when he had served as mayor for the German occupation. He traveled to West Germany in

1984, surrendering his US citizenship in Stuttgart.942 OSI did file formal charges, however, against a Belarusian-American security guard named Sergis Hutyrczyk, who had been known as the “black commander” during his time as a guard in the notorious concentration camp at Koldychevo, which lies between Baranovichi and Navahrudak.943

Hutyrczyk fought the charges, claiming that he had served in a Belarusian antipartisan unit and had only occasionally patrolled the camp perimeter. He also accused witnesses of mistaking him for a cousin, but the court ruled against him in October 1992.

939 Ralph Blumenthal, “Possible Cover-Up on Nazis Is Focus of New U.S. Inquiry,” New York Times, 23 May 1982, 1. 940 “Franciscak Kushel, 73,” Washington Post, 28 May 1968, B8; “R. Ostrowski,” The Herald- Palladium, 18 October 1976, 12. 941 “Stanislau Stankevich,” New York Times, 8 November 1980, 28. 942 Robert L. Jackson, “N.J. Draftsman with Wartime Nazi Ties Expelled from U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, 20 October 1984, A15. 943 “New Jerseyan Is Charged as War Criminal,” New York Times, 16 August 1990, B6; “Sergis Hutyrczyk, 68; Named as Nazi Guard,” New York Times, 6 February 1993, 9.

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Hutyrczyk died four months later from complications from an aneurysm the same week that his lawyer filed an appeal to overturn the order revoking his citizenship.944 Mierlak and Tumash did not face the threat of denaturalization, remaining active in Belarusian-

American cultural and political affairs in the US for the duration of the Cold War. The

Canadian authorities opened an investigation into Ragula, but no charges were filed and he continued to practice medicine until his retirement.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated and the long-awaited independence of

Belarus became a reality, the activities of the surviving Belarusian collaborators in the

US had already greatly faded. The BNR had long eclipsed the BCC, whose activities in the 1990s were reduced to publishing irregular bulletins and issuing occasional memoranda.945 The BNR itself remained much more active, however, and the BAA continues to organize Belarusian cultural events in the New York area. Today the BAA is widely recognized among the Belarusian diaspora as the most important organization of

Belarusians outside of Belarus.

The BCC retained little support among the wider Belarusian-American community, but it continued to exert some influence on the local culture and politics of

South River. St. Euphrosynia held annual Belarusian cultural festivals every summer for many years, and celebrations of the March 25, 1918 declaration of Belarusian independence were held at the Belarusian American Center on Whitehead Avenue for years.946 At these events, the parish regularly invited local politicians to celebrate with them, and the Republican mayoral campaign for South River made the Belarus America

944 “Sergis Hutyrczyk, 68; Named as Nazi Guard.” 945 Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 255. 946 “11th Annual Belarusian Festival,” WCTCAM.COM, accessed 28 March 2018, http://wctcam.com/event/11th-annual-belarusian-festival/.

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Center its campaign headquarters in 2007.947 In 2014, City Council members raised the

Belarusian nationalist flag under the stars and stripes at the South River Museum on Main

Street before retiring for celebratory drinks at the Belarusian American Center on

Whitehead Avenue.948 In recent years, however, even this limited local support and influence seems to be fading.

Local celebrations of Belarusian nationalist anniversaries have continued in South

River, but the monument began to fall into disrepair as the influence and the fortune of the BCC waned. On the important centennial anniversary of the declaration of Belarusian independence made in Minsk in March 1918, the Belarusian American Center in South

River was only sparsely attended. On the hilltop behind the St. Euphrosynia church, a new-looking white-red-white Belarusian nationalist flag hung to the right of the monument, and on its left hung a large American flag. A pair of men paid their respects before the imposing memorial, and one stooped to examine the red and white tiles crumbling off of its facade. The iron gates of the nearby St. Euphrosynia cemetery are now bent and misshapen, but fresh footprints could be seen in the snow in front of

Ostrowski’s grave where somebody had recently placed flowers. The sites are deteriorating and in evident need of repair, but they still have their supporters. Some

Belarusian Americans continue to honor these collaborators as nationalist heroes even though their faction’s political influence has all but vanished.949

947 Michael Ackerman, “Incumbents Defeated in South River Race: Eppinger, GOP Candidates Unseat Szegeti, Sliker,” GMNews Archive, 8 November 2007, accessed 28 March 2018, https://www1.gmnews.com/2007/11/08/incumbents-defeated-in-south-river-race/. 948 “2014 Flag Raising,” Borough of South River, accessed 28 March 2018, http://www.southrivernj.org/albums/2014-FlagRaising.html. 949 BCC supporters’ funds are evidently insufficient to repair the crumbling monument or the sign on the front of South River’s Belarusian American Center, which reads as “Belarus Amer can Center [sic]” since several of the large white letters fell from the building’s façade. Kipel notes

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For more than four decades, leading Belarusian collaborators within both the BCC and the BNR had participated in American political life and agitated for greater action against the Soviet Union. With extremely few exceptions, the Belarusian Nazi collaborators who had immigrated to the US lived comfortable lives and remained unthreatened by the prospects of denaturalization, deportation, or prosecution for their crimes during World War II. Their presence in the US, however, contributed to official government investigations in the 1970s and created a far-reaching public scandal in the

1980s. This scandal would spark so many renewed investigations and would produce so much public attention that Ruffner refers to the subsequent years as the “decade of the

Nazi war criminal.”950

These events not only contributed to further government investigations and increased public awareness that Nazi war criminals had escaped justice and were living in the US, but they also added to the growth of popular interest in the history of the

Holocaust in the 1980s and 1990s. Schiessl describes several important developments during these years that also added to the spread of public awareness, including the establishment of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and various other memorial sites, the popularity of the 1993 film Schindler’s List, and the publication of a large body of historical scholarship.951 This period began bringing unprecedented academic attention to the field of Holocaust studies, and several scholars have explored different aspects of postwar justice and the relationships between US intelligence and

that by the end of the twentieth century, the activities of the BCC had become “very limited…a couple of annual memoranda, an irregularly published bulletin, or greetings from the president of the group (Kipel, Belarusans in the United States, 255). 950 Ruffner, “Chapter Nineteen: The Decade of the Nazi War Criminal,” Eagle and Swastika, 1. 951 Schiessl, Alleged Nazi Collaborators in the United States after World War II, xx.

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former Nazis and Nazi collaborators since Loftus first caused a public scandal in the early

1980s.952

Little research has been done, however, on the Belarusian collaborators themselves and their participation in US Cold War politics. In the late 1980s, journalist

Russ Bellant published a study exploring the connections between the Republican Party and former Nazi collaborators among different immigrant communities in the US, but this work examines Belarusian Americans for less than two pages.953 Scholars of US domestic politics and foreign policy in the Cold War have established how anticommunism pervaded the American political landscape from the late 1940s through the 1960s and how Eastern European ethnic groups participated in and affected this phenomenon.954 The vehement anticommunism of the Belarusian collaborators harmonized closely with McCarthyist domestic politics and the Eisenhower administration’s stated policy of liberating captive nations from communism. Leading collaborators’ repeated insistence on the inevitability of a Third World War with the

Soviet Union placed them among the vanguard of anticommunist activists in the US.955

The Eisenhower administration, however, “rejected the idea that world war was inevitable” and favored “waging peace” to provoking conflict.956 Many of the Belarusian

952 Breitman, et al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis; Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow; Ryan, Quiet Neighbors; Christoph Schiessl, Alleged Nazi Collaborators in the United States after World War II; Simpson, Blowback. 953 Bellant, Old Nazis, the New Right and the Republican Party, 11-2. 954 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment; Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History; Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power; Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind; Leffler and Painter, Origins of the Cold War; Leffler, “Cold War and Global Hegemony”; Garrett, “Eastern European Ethnic Groups and American Foreign Policy,” 301-24; Kipel, Belarusans in the United States. 955 Russell Porter, “Dulles Stresses Peaceful Freeing of Red Countries: With President’s Approval He Implies Policy Now Includes Soviet Itself: Links It to Foreign Aid,” New York Times, 23 April 1957, 1. 956 Ibid.

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collaborators living in the US actively engaged in anticommunist American politics for decades, continually adding their particular variety of uncompromising anticommunism to the prevailing political climate.

Examining Belarusian collaborators’ long involvement in Cold War politics adds new details to the historiography relating to Nazi war criminals in the US and to

American anticommunist politics during the Cold War. These figures did not escape justice by vanishing into obscurity in their adoptive country, but rather they continually exerted their limited influence by adding their hardline anti-Soviet positions to American political discourse. Neither pawns nor quiet neighbors, the leading Belarusian Nazi collaborators in the US engaged in American anticommunist politics as they mythologized and obscured their pasts. They advanced a self-exculpatory Belarusian nationalist narrative for decades, celebrating and memorializing themselves and the nationalist organizations created by the SS occupation of their homeland during World

War II.

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Conclusion

The Belarusian quislings at the center of this study were a small group of elite

émigrés frequently fighting among themselves for control of a stateless and relatively powerless nationalist movement, and yet they impacted several historical events and phenomena in the twentieth century. Compromising the independence and integrity of the fragile young Belarusian nationalist movement by opportunistically tying their movement to Nazi Germany and becoming complicit in the crimes of the Holocaust, they exploited every possible opportunity to advance Belarusian nationalism under the constraints of

German occupation policies. When Nazi Germany crumbled at the end of World War II, they abandoned their sponsors and projected their influence into the postwar world by working with US intelligence in the Cold War. Although the Belarusian quislings were relatively minor and peripheral historical actors maneuvering among much more powerful players, exploring the roles they played can provide new insights into the study of Belarusian nationalism, collaboration in World War II, and Cold War US politics and foreign policy.

When the Nazi Party assumed control of Germany in 1933, opportunistic

Belarusian émigrés eagerly sought the militaristic new regime’s sponsorship of their fledgling nationalist movement. The anti-Polish and anti-Soviet tenets of Nazi ideology resonated with these nationalist Belarusian elites, who dreamed of an autonomous

Belarusian state free from both Polish and Soviet control. When German forces invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, many Belarusian émigrés returned to their homeland to facilitate the German occupation. Several leading Belarusian collaborators became complicit in the crimes of the Holocaust as auxiliary administrators, police leaders, or

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guides to the Einsatzgruppen. Throughout the occupation, these figures pushed for closer collaboration and sought to convince the German authorities to make greater concessions to Belarusian nationalism. Although they succeeded in creating new Belarusian nationalist organizations that would remain active for decades after World War II, collaborationist leaders ultimately compromised the fragile young Belarusian nationalist movement’s independence and integrity through their obsequious attitude to Nazi

Germany and their adoption of and support for their sponsors’ antisemitic rhetoric and practices.

The leading Belarusian collaborators became responsible for the crimes of the

Holocaust in their homeland not because they themselves committed murder and became executioners, but rather because they facilitated and promoted persecution and mass murder at several different levels. These nationalist elites included several well-educated scholars, teachers, and doctors who chose to collaborate with Nazi Germany in hopes of advancing their own agendas. They created collaborationist police and military forces and engaged in the persecution of their former neighbors without bloodying their own hands.

Instead, they spread anticommunist and antisemitic propaganda, oversaw the administration and destruction of Jewish ghettos, and identified targeted individuals.

They were neither the Holocaust’s architects nor its executioners, but they involved themselves in a myriad of ways as willing and integral bureaucratic participants. As such, these figures could be considered classic examples of Schreibtischtäter (“desk murderers”) for their indirect involvement in Nazi persecution.

These Belarusian facilitators of genocide, however, were themselves members of a group ultimately targeted for mass starvation and replacement under the Nazis’

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grandiose schemes for territorial expansion and resettlement in Eastern Europe. The Nazi

Party’s racial thinking classified Slavic peoples as inferior Untermenschen

(“subhumans”) worthy only of exploitation and enslavement. Although Nazi ideology reserved its most anti-Slavic enmity for Poles and Russians, it also classified the

Belarusians as uncivilized Slavic peasants capable only of laboring for the Germans.

Nevertheless, many Belarusian collaborators supported the Nazi regime’s brutal occupation of their homeland in an opportunistic attempt to advance the cause of

Belarusian nationalism. The Belarusian quislings responsible for facilitating the German invasion and occupation of their homeland became indirect perpetrators of the Holocaust, but attempting to locate their places on the spectrum of culpability is complicated by the fact that they themselves belonged to a targeted group with extremely limited power. It is important to remember, however, that although Nazi genocidal resettlement schemes targeted Slavic peoples for enslavement, exploitation, and mass starvation, the Belarusian collaborators maneuvered themselves to experience the occupation as the beneficiaries of

German policies rather than as the victims of them.

Because of these facts, it is useful to consider the “gray zone” of complicity and victimization described by Holocaust survivor and author Primo Levi rather than attempting to situate these collaborators within more rigid categorizations of perpetrators, bystanders, and victims.957 Levi wrote that he might absolve those who had been coerced into collaboration, but that those who willingly adopted “commanding positions” were

957 Primo Levi, “The Gray Zone,” The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1986): 25-56; Jonathan Petropoulos and John K. Roth, eds., Gray Zones: Ambiguity and Compromise in the Holocaust and Its Aftermath (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005).

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more difficult to judge.958 While the Belarusian soldiers forcibly conscripted into the

BKA in spring 1944 would fall into the former category, the Belarusian quislings continually pressing the German authorities for more authority and responsibility certainly fall into the latter.

These elite Belarusian nationalists’ decision to collaborate was not made out of naivete or necessity. Instead, it sprang from an attempt to distinguish the Belarusian people from Poles, Russians, and other Slavic groups and to manipulate the situation to their own advantage. For example, Ostrowski explained to CIA agents in 1952 that one of his prime motivations for first collaborating with Nazi Germany in the 1930s was his awareness of “the relation of the Germans to the Poles and Jews.”959 Ostrowski and other leading collaborators knew that “these two nationalities were treated worst of all by the

Germans,” and they wished to secure a relatively advantageous place for themselves within a reorganized Europe dominated by Nazi Germany.960 Leading Belarusian collaborators sought to exploit the destructive racist policies of their sponsors and position themselves as the German forces’ allies against Jews, Poles, Russians, and other targeted groups.

Leading Belarusian collaborators continually sought to advance the Belarusian nationalist movement under the auspices of Nazi Germany and the constraints of the war.

After witnessing the brutality of the German occupation of their homeland for years, the highest-ranking and most influential Belarusian collaborators still sought to bind their movement closer to the Third Reich. When the tide of war turned against Nazi Germany

958 Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 33. 959 “The Belorussian Central Rada (Council): Past and Present,” CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-16, Box 39, NARA II, 2. 960 Ibid.

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and defeat began to seem inevitable, leading Belarusian collaborators continued to organize nationalist military and political bodies to retain the progress achieved under the

German occupation and to present themselves after the war as members of a legitimate anti-Soviet Belarusian government-in-exile.

Although the Nazis did not respect the Belarusians’ nationalist aspirations and never had any intention of granting them autonomy or sovereignty, the German occupation authorities found it expedient to indulge limited degrees of the nationalist goals of their collaborators in order to mobilize local support. Wilhelm Kube’s civil administration made few concessions to Belarusian nationalists’ aspirations, but after his assassination in 1943 the SS administration headed by Curt von Gottberg created new

Belarusian nationalist organizations in order to recruit more auxiliary troops for the failing German war effort. The creation of the BCC and the BKA demonstrate that

German occupation authorities’ positions regarding Belarusian nationalism were influenced more by the developments of the war than by adherence to Nazi racial dogma.

The establishment of these organizations were important victories for the Belarusian nationalist collaborators, as they would be able to use them to exaggerate their own importance during the Cold War.

After the collapse of the Third Reich and the end of World War II, the leading

Belarusian collaborators posed as victims of Nazi persecution, fought over the leadership of the anti-Soviet Belarusian diaspora, and sought powerful new sponsors in their anticommunist nationalist struggle against the USSR. As Nazi Germany collapsed and

Allied forces occupied Germany, members of the Belarusian collaborationist leadership falsified their pasts and began to assume positions of authority within the DP camp

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system. Thousands of Belarusian refugees immigrated to the US under the DP Act, and virtually all of the highest-ranking Belarusian Nazi collaborators settled in New York and

New Jersey.

Leading Belarusian collaborators ultimately found crucial if limited support for their nationalist anticommunist activities with the CIA as the agency expanded its use of covert operations in the early 1950s. Belarusian collaborators became involved in the creation and execution of clandestine paramilitary and propaganda projects conducted under the sponsorship of the CIA. In 1951, agents instructed Boris Ragula to recruit his fellow Belarusian Nazi collaborators for Project Aequor and to “spread word Americans do not intend trying German collaborators as war criminals.”961 As he had done with his sponsors in the SS, Ragula continually pressured the CIA to approve more grandiose plans. After the project’s disastrous infiltration operations and its exposure in the Soviet press, the agency replaced Ragula and began new operations with another collaborator named Constant Mierlak operating as the principal Belarusian agent. Other influential

Belarusian collaborators, such as Kushel and Stankievich, were also involved in clandestine anti-Soviet projects with the CIA.

Exploring the relevant declassified CIA documents reveals several interesting things about the role of the CIA’s covert operations in US foreign policy during the early

Cold War. Although the CIA’s operations with Belarusian Nazi collaborators coincided with the expanded reliance on covert operations usually associated with the Eisenhower administration’s foreign policy, these projects actually originated under the Truman administration. Agents involved in these operations sought to minimize direct oversight

961 “From Munich to Special Operations: REDBIRD,” 2 February 1951, CIA Name Files, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 104, NARA II.

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and prevent internal investigations into these projects, and the use of dubious assets with questionable pasts and exaggerated support ultimately failed to produce the desired results. Instead, Soviet authorities forced captured infiltrees to become double agents and exposed the CIA’s Belarusian operations in the Soviet press. These operations were relatively small and inconsequential in the grand scheme of events, but examining the

CIA’s Belarusian projects reveals that US intelligence deliberately recruited Nazi collaborators and sought to keep the operations from oversight.

Virtually all of the leading Belarusian quislings immigrated to the US, and many of them participated in American politics. McCarthyism provided a receptive climate for their hardline anticommunism and created an environment in which former Nazi collaborators could convincingly claim that allegations against them were communist propaganda. As they settled into their new lives, the leading collaborators’ Belarusian nationalism blended well with a newly acquired American patriotism rooted in Cold War anticommunism. They pushed the idea that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable, and several Belarusian collaborators became active in Republican Party politics. Their goal of liberating their homeland from Soviet domination closely reflected the Eisenhower administration’s stated policy of liberating captive nations from communist control, and they enthusiastically threw their support behind hardline anticommunist Republican politicians such as Richard Nixon.

For decades after World War II, leading Belarusian collaborators in the US pushed a self-exculpatory nationalist narrative of their collaboration with Nazi Germany that situated their anticommunist immigrant group within the broader context of patriotic

Cold War American life. After initially claiming to be victims of Nazi persecution to

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escape justice and blend into the DP camps of postwar Europe, these figures began to mythologize their collaboration and to misrepresent the nature of the collaborationist nationalist organizations formed under the SS in the final months of the German occupation of Belarusian territories. Portraying their organizations as independent local bodies spontaneously formed by the will of the Belarusian people to throw off the chains of Soviet oppression, the former collaborators publicly celebrated the anniversaries of the founding of the BCC and the BKA and wore the trappings of their collaboration in

American parades. They held celebratory events under American and Belarusian nationalist flags, and in 1974 the BCC even erected an imposing monument to themselves in a small New Jersey town. Leading Belarusian collaborators actively promoted themselves as refugees from Soviet persecution, and for decades the anticommunist political climate in the US permitted them to dismiss any allegation against them simply as communist propaganda.

When the fading anticommunist consensus of the 1950s and 1960s began providing less effective political cover, the Belarusian quislings living in the US became the subjects of government investigations and a public scandal. The Belarusian collaborators quickly became the highest priority of the newly created Office of Special

Investigations (OSI) after its formation in the late 1970s. Although many of the highest- ranking collaborators had died before denaturalization or extradition proceedings could be started, they became the subjects of sensationalistic headlines and television reports when OSI attorney John Loftus resigned and went public with his conspiratorial theories of US intelligence and “Byelorussian Nazis.”962

962 Loftus, The Belarus Secret, 96.

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Although these theories made several unsubstantiated logical assumptions, this study demonstrates that some of Loftus’ shocking accusations were grounded in truth.

The leading political collaborators had not themselves acted as executioners, but there is evidence that they became complicit in the crimes of the Holocaust in a number of ways as indirect facilitators and administrators. As Project Aequor reveals, the CIA intentionally sought out Belarusian Nazi collaborators for its expanding covert anti-

Soviet operations. Although there is no evidence of a widespread conspiracy to bring

Belarusian Nazi collaborators to the US as Loftus claimed, a subsequent government investigation revealed that Stankievich received assistance immigrating after his first applications to enter the country had been rejected.963 Although much of it is flawed and unsubstantiated, Loftus’ book is still the only monograph focused on the postwar careers of the leading Belarusian Nazi collaborators.

This study fills gaps among several bodies of historiography and points to new areas for further research. Several scholars have focused on Belarusian nationalism or the

German occupation of Belarusian territories in World War II, but none have examined how the leading Belarusian nationalist collaborators escaped justice and immigrated to the United States.964 Future researchers studying the immediate postwar years, the DP camp system, and the Belarusian émigré community in the US will find ample primary source materials to develop these topics further in the archives of the International

963 Ruffner, “Chapter Eighteen: Belorussians, 60 Minutes, and the GAO’s Second Investigation,” Eagle and Swastika, 25. 964 Bekus, Struggle over Identity: The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness”; Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front; Dallin, German Rule in Russia; Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust; Marples, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation; Munoz and Romanko, Hitler’s White Russians, Rein, The Kings and the Pawns; Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand; Rudling, The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism; Walke, Pioneers and Partisans.

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Tracing Service in Bad Arolsen, Germany, the collections of the Francis Skaryna Library in London, and the Immigration History Research Center Archives at the University of

Minnesota. Scholars wishing to explore Belarusian collaboration with Nazi Germany and local participation in the crimes of the Holocaust in greater detail could consult archival sources outside of the scope of this study, such as the files of the Extraordinary State

Commission to Investigate German‐Fascist Crimes Committed on Soviet Territory from the USSR, 1941‐1945.965

This project also augments the historiography of Cold War intelligence, covert operations, and relationships between former Nazis and Nazi collaborators and the US government.966 The last topic has drawn much attention, and yet the role played by these high-ranking Belarusian collaborators in the Cold War has not been seriously examined.967 This is partly because this study would not have been possible before the relatively recent declassification of millions of pages of US government documents related to Nazi war crimes. Important scholarly works have been published using these recently declassified files, but this dissertation is the first study of the CIA’s anti-Soviet

Belarusian projects using these sources.968 These declassified document collections at the

National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland have the

965 These collections can be accessed at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC. 966 Charles Gati, Failed Illusions; Grose, Operation Rollback; Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin; Rudgers, et al., Creating the Secret State; Thomas, The Very Best Men. 967 Blum, Wanted! The Search for Nazis in America; Lichtblau, The Nazis Next Door; Zuroff, Occupation: Nazi-Hunter; Ryan, Quiet Neighbors; Schiessl, Alleged Nazi Collaborators in the United States after World War II; Simpson, Blowback. 968 Breitman, et al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis; Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow.

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potential to supply innumerable new details about similar phenomena with other groups of collaborators and to provide new insights into the development of the Cold War.

Although the Belarusian quislings at the center of this study were few in number and possessed relatively little power, focusing on these understudied figures helps illuminate new details about the larger events in which they participated and reveals how they influenced these events from their peripheral position in world affairs. Leading

Belarusian collaborators obtained significant concessions from the German occupation in

World War II, forming nationalist political and military organizations that represented the culmination of years of Belarusian nationalist aspirations. By allying their movement with Nazi Germany and becoming complicit in the crimes of the Holocaust, however, these figures indelibly associated their cause with the Third Reich and compromised their movement’s integrity and independence. In the early 1950s, these collaborators began working with US intelligence to undermine the USSR and began participating in

American anticommunist politics. For decades, they worked to mythologize themselves as independent anti-Soviet Belarusian nationalists, but these leading Belarusian collaborators ultimately became the center of a public scandal that contributed to growing public interest in the history of the Holocaust and initiated a period of renewed government investigations into alleged Nazi war criminals in the US. Although they were relatively minor historical actors, these Belarusian quislings played important roles in the expansion of the Belarusian nationalist movement, the German invasion and occupation of the Soviet Union and the Holocaust in Eastern Europe, and the Cold War histories of

US covert operations, anticommunist politics, and the development of postwar justice.

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