Kerr, K. 2020. Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments: stability The Case of Colombia. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 9(1): 5, pp. 1–21. DOI: https://doi. org/10.5334/sta.720

RESEARCH ARTICLE Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments: The Case of Colombia Katie Kerr

Countries emerging from armed conflict often experience heightened violence and youth gang activity. Following the signing of peace accords with the ­Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army (FARC-EP), what are Colombia’s risks in terms of youth gangs? To assess these risks, this article draws from gang research and literature on post-war violence to identify six factors that recur in post-war environments and are likely to fuel a rise in gangs: illicit economies and criminal networks, exposure to violence, marginalization, social ­disorganization, security gaps and state responses, and former combatants. After analyzing Colombia’s risks with reference to each of these, the article concludes that the ­strengthening ties between youth gangs and Colombia’s illicit economies, mediated by adult-run ­criminal networks, increase gang numbers and violence. Moreover, some ­disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods are vulnerable to gang escalation due to the effects on local youths of protracted violent exposure, marginalization, and social disorganization. Finally, while ex-combatant recidivism and security gaps are prominent concerns in Colombia, they are not expected to contribute significantly to youth gang dynamics in urban areas.

Introduction and the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército In November 2016, the Colombian govern­ Popular de Liberación — EPL) (International ment signed a peace accord with the Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] 2019), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — while many former FARC-EP strongholds are People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolu­ experiencing a return to violence (Fundación cionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Paz y Reconciliación -Peace and Reconciliation Pueblo — FARC-EP), the country’s largest Foundation [PARES] 2019). guerrilla group. Over three years later, mul­ That post-accord Colombia does not fit tiple armed conflicts are still under way in neatly with any common-sense concept of the country, involving FARC-EP ‘dissident’ or post-war is not unusual. Countries emerging successor elements, the National Liberation from armed conflict often see an escalation Army (Ejército Nacional de Liberación — ELN), in violent crime, which can topple peace pro­ the Clan del Golfo (also referred to as Urabeños cesses. Even when a negotiated settlement or Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), holds up, protracted insecurity precludes real recovery and erodes support for peace (Darby 2006). In an effort to reconcile such Independent, US tendencies with a ‘post-conflict situation,’ [email protected] Art. 5, page 2 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments

Brown, Langer and Stewart (2011: 4–5) sug­ ethnographic, case study, and quantitative gest that post-conflict is best understood as research analyzing risk for gang recruitment a process continuum that can suffer regress. and intensification, including compara­ Colombia’s peace accord, ceasefire, and tive research on other forms of organized demobilization of most FARC-EP members youth violence to supplement gang-specific are milestones on that continuum, represent­ research in developing country contexts. ing a significant reduction in political vio­ I then reviewed the growing body of litera­ lence and creating space for peacebuilding. ture on post-war violence to identify recur­ I worked in Colombia for the International ring features of post-war environments that Organization for Migration (IOM)1 from 2000 intersect with major risk factors for gangs. to 2002, during the peak of paramilitary vio­ This exercise generated a short list of risks lence, and again from 2011 to 2017, during that were likely to emerge in the aftermath the FARC-EP negotiations and the start of of armed conflict and to contribute to gang peace implementation. My work involved intensification. Finally, each of these factors ex-combatant reintegration, rehabilitation was applied to the Colombian context, taking of child soldiers, and prevention of child account of its experience of armed conflict, recruitment into illegal armed groups. After the overall security context, and youth gang the FARC-EP accord was signed, the ques­ dynamics drawn from academic and institu­ tion of Colombia’s susceptibility to youth tional literature, media reports, and personal violence was a frequent subject of debate communications with Colombian experts. within the peacebuilding community. Since This paper is presented in three main the rise of maras in post-war Central America parts. The first one provides an overview of was both the closest-at-hand and most noto­ Colombia’s current security environment and rious example of gang intensification in the gangs. The second part mines studies of gangs aftermath of civil conflicts, these discussions for major risk factors and the newer literature often turned to how Colombia was — or, on post-war violence to posit — where these more often, was not — perceived as similar to two bodies of scholarship intersect — prob­ El Salvador and Guatemala in the mid-1990s. able risk factors for post-war gang escalation. This framing seemed to fall short. Post- The third part analyzes Colombia’s risks with war gang intensification has been observed reference to each of these factors. The article across continents and has historical roots. concludes that some disadvantaged, urban In addition to El Salvador (Cruz 2005, 2014), neighborhoods in Colombia are vulnerable Guatemala (Demoscopia 2007; Kurtenbach to increased gang activity in light of their 2008), and Nicaragua (Rodgers 2003, 2012), prolonged exposure to violence, marginaliza­ increased gang activity has been reported in tion, social disorganization, and the strength post-war and transition settings in Europe of illicit economies. Ex-combatant recidivism after World War II (Cavan and Cavan 1968; and security gaps, though acute in Colombia, Fyvel 1961) as well as in South Africa (Covey do not represent a first-order threat of escalat­ 2010; Jensen 2014), Sierra Leone (Utas 2014), ing urban street gangs. Moreover, Colombian East Timor (Timor Leste Armed Violence authorities may attenuate these risks by 2009), Cambodia (Kurtenbach 2012), Nepal expanding preventive measures grounded in (Upreti et al. 2010), and Haiti (Kolbe 2013). citizen security and avoiding overly repres­ While these accounts often describe the sive, militaristic approaches that have exacer­ impacts of armed conflict and peace on bated gang violence elsewhere. local gang dynamics, what is missing is a framework for identifying those features of Colombia’s Security Landscape post-war situations that are most likely to Traditional FARC-EP strongholds with sig­ fuel a rise in gang numbers and violence. To nificant criminal assets, like coca crops and develop such a framework, I first reviewed illegal mines, have been hard hit by post-war Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 3 of 21 violence as different criminal actors have and has 2,500 members (ibid.). The FARC scrambled to fill the vacuum. PARES (2019) ‘dissident’ or successor groups have also reports that 107 municipalities of the 242 strengthened, with estimates in August 2019 vacated by the FARC had suffered a significant of over 2,200 members, including at least incursion by other criminal actors by August 400 new recruits, spread across 23 groups 2019. In these municipalities, the homi­ and active in 85 municipalities (ibid.). Recent cide rate increased enough in 2018 to offset high-level defections from the peace process reductions elsewhere and raise the national and calls to rearm by demobilized command­ murder rate for the first time since the peace ers may herald greater military and ideologi­ talks started in 2012 (Castillo, Lleras, and cal consolidation among these groups (The Suarez 2018). Economist 2019b). Underlying these developments is a crimi­ Colombian politics shifted to the right in nal underworld that feeds off the cocaine 2018 with the election of a president who trade. Coca production increased throughout opposed the peace process throughout his the peace talks and the start of peace imple­ campaign. President Iván Duque’s adminis­ mentation, breaking historic records in 2016 tration launched a new national security pol­ and again in 2017 (Asmann 2018). According icy in 2019 that favors military solutions over to the Ideas for Peace Foundation (Fundación negotiated settlements with armed groups Ideas para la Paz — FIP), a Colombian like the ELN and Clan del Golfo (Alonso and think tank, the rise is partly attributable to Robbins 2019). The policy is largely focused increased output by small-scale farmers in on rural strategies and is unlikely to impact anticipation of volunteer eradication pro­ security conditions in cities (The Economist gramming that many believed would com­ 2019a). pensate farmers based on their production (Llorente and Garzón 2018). Although the Colombia’s gangs number of coca-growing crops levelled off in For the purposes of this discussion, youth 2018, more intensive cultivation meant that or street gangs are groups that display some production continued to rise (Colombian continuity over time, engage in illegal behav­ Observatory of Organized Crime 2019). ior, and consist mostly of members under the The ICRC (2019) identified five ongoing age of 25 (Rodgers and Hazen 2014: 8). The armed conflicts in Colombia. Four involve gangs that first appeared in Colombia in the the Colombian army against illegal armed 1960s were hierarchical, with large member­ groups: the ELN, the EPL, the Clan de Golfo, ships and territories, and well-established and successor FARC-EP groups. The fifth rituals (Perea 2007). Starting in the 1980s, refers to a conflict between the EPL and however, these gangs have undergone con­ the ELN. The five conflicts are in addition tinuous transformations, and vary from to the ‘other situations of violence’2 identi­ one city to another, depending largely on fied in numerous cities, such as Medellín, the city’s relationship with armed conflict Buenaventura, Cali, and Tumaco (ibid.). and illicit economies. The number of gangs The ELN has grown in numbers, territory, has increased over time, but they generally and capabilities since the signing of the have fewer members and control smaller ter­ accord, rising from 1,100 to 3,000 combat­ ritories (Semana 2018). Their structures are ants and establishing a presence in 35 new looser and more horizontal, and the old rules municipalities (101 to 136 out of a total of and rituals have largely disappeared (Perea 1,122 municipalities in Colombia) (PARES 2007; Semana 2018). They are also more 2019). The Clan del Golfo, the strongest of violent, more criminal, and better armed, the so-called bacrim, or criminal bands, has especially in those cities where links to the also expanded into 26 new municipalities, adult criminal world are strongest (Resource up from 276 when the accord was signed, Center for Conflict Analysis [CERAC] 2014). Art. 5, page 4 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments

In its recent report on gangs in seven cit­ to focus on gangs’ (Perea 2007: 14). When a ies, Colombia’s Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Colombian senator brought the issue up for observed that contradictory estimates, parliamentary debate in 2017, he remarked incomplete data, and divergent methods that the gang threat grew without notice while made it impossible to estimate the number the country worried about the armed conflict of gangs and their members in Colombia (HSB Noticias 2017). (MOJ 2017). The ministry hazarded to say that in the seven cities in its study, there may Understanding the Risks: be some 1,200 gangs with 21,000 members Contributions from Gang Research (ibid.). Credible research from other sources and Literature on Post-war Violence suggests that gangs are viewed as problem­ Risk factor analysis in gang studies atic in at least 12 Colombian cities, with Cali Risk factors here refer to experiences and and Medellín at the top of the list (El Tiempo characteristics that increase the probability 2015; Semana 2018). Gang activity is concen­ that a young person will join a gang. Gang- trated in crowded neighborhoods set apart related risk is often discussed on two levels: from the city, with low-quality education at the micro level, research looks at risk across and jobs, where young people are effectively five domains of the individual, family, school, excluded from the practices of citizenship peer group, and community; the macro level (MOJ 2017). Gang members tend to come takes on the larger forces at work in society from dysfunctional families with high rates — the ecology that surrounds and shapes the of domestic violence; they typically neither smaller domains (Howell and Griffiths 2016). work nor go to school (Semana 2018). Much of the evidence-rich analysis on risk With some exceptions, Colombia’s gangs has emerged from the US, which benefits are not as persistent or rooted as many gangs from the ‘longest and densest’ gang scholar­ in Central America or the US, but they may be ship in the world (Rodgers and Hazen 2014: on a development path that is headed in that 9). While there is substantial research on direction. In his historical analysis of street gangs from Central America, and, to a lesser gangs, Howell (2015) mapped five phases extent, from South Africa and Brazil, much that describe the development of gangs in of this literature lacks the statistical rigor to much of the US. The path starts with social pinpoint and assess predictors of gang mem­ disorganization in phase 1 and low neighbor­ bership. Comparative research on youth hood and family control in phase 2, followed engagement in a broader sample of armed by the formation of gangs in phase 3 and the groups, like Dowdney’s (2005) research on interplay with ‘gang violence facilitators’ like youth involved in organized armed violence, drug trafficking and weapons availability in can help fill the gap. phase 4, and culminates with widespread, While findings from global literature must transformed gangs in phase 5 (ibid.: 76–94). be applied cautiously to the Colombian case, Many Colombian gangs would be classified in risk profiles across countries and group types phase 3 or 4, but almost all gangs in Medellín are surprisingly similar (Dowdney 2005; and some in Cali meet the description for Hagedorn 2008). It is possible to identify phase 5. Nationally, the major gang violence core risk factors supported by solid evidence facilitators have been adult armed groups from the US and emerging support from that bring drugs and weapons, and also gen­ other countries. Drawing from Howell and erate the cultural conditions for violence. Griffiths (2016) and Thornberry et al. (2003) While cities like Medellín and Cali have in the US, as well as the Small Arms Survey made sustained efforts to address youth gangs, (2010), Higginson et al. (2018), Dowdney national government attention to gang issues (2005) and Covey (2010) for international is relatively new, in part because the ‘complex­ perspectives, the following factors may be ity of the armed conflict did not leave space relevant to gangs in Colombia. Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 5 of 21

In the individual domain, prior involvement communities are uprooted, schools are with violence and drugs; antisocial attitudes, destroyed, firearms are cheap, and social including the belief that aggression is neces­ bonds are tenuous. Three areas of major risk sary to resolve conflict; traumatic life experi­ identified in gang literature that feature heav­ ences, especially victimization or exposure to ily in post-war settings are discussed below. substantial violence; as well as being young, marginalized, and male, increase the risk of Exposure to violence gang involvement. Within families, economic One explanation for the noted rise in homi­ disadvantage, domestic violence, family dys­ cide during and after wars is that wars change function, and gang membership within the societal norms and attitudes toward non- home are risk factors. In the school domain, combat violence (Archer and Gartner 1976). low educational attainment and attachment The rationale is that people whose daily lives to school, together with dropping out, are are imbued with violence will cease to see associated with higher rates of gang involve­ violent acts as exceptional, while the tradi­ ment. Regarding peers, having friends in a tional prohibitions on violence lose cred­ gang is one of the strongest factors in the US ibility when they are breached repeatedly and elsewhere. At the community level, high- without consequence. The effects deepen risk neighborhoods tend to be urban and over time: as people become inured to vio­ marginalized, with few opportunities, scarce lence, they are quicker to commit — and services, and inadequate security provision. slower to punish — violent acts (Bos 2013). Firearms and drugs are often on hand, and Increased violence reaffirms its normality the bonds among neighbors are weak. and erodes communal capacities to resolve More research on the risk factors for gang conflicts pacifically, further entrenching involvement for girls and young women violence into day-to-day affairs (Steenkamp is needed (Howell and Griffiths 2016; 2009). Violence imprints on value systems Organization of American States [OAS] 2007). as well as emotional and moral lives, thereby Research to date suggests that risk profiles leaving a ‘legacy’ that makes violence more overlap, but some factors weigh more heav­ likely in the aftermath of war (ibid.: 8). ily in girls’ decisions to join a gang, including Persistent violence has serious consequences domestic violence and sexual abuse (Kinnear for young people whose development, sociali­ 2009; Taylor 2008), early sexualized behav­ zation, and transitions to adulthood are iors, and difficulties in school (Howell and threatened. Kurtenbach (2012: 8) explains that Griffiths 2016; Thornberry et al. 2003). for a young person ‘whose identity has been At the macro level, Thrasher’s (1927) views shaped by the experience of violence and a on social disorganization resonate with the lack of even rudimentary forms of security, international literature. Social disorganization the development of a stable personality will describes a situation in which conventional be much more difficult.’ She further describes institutions like families, schools, and neigh­ how conflict alters or destroys the sources of borhood structures lose the ability to control socialization — families, schools, peers, media, delinquency. Such disorganization results institutions — and creates obstacles for transi­ from rapid and unpredictable change that tions to adulthood (Kurtenbach 2012). dismantles old institutions without giving The consequences of youth exposure to, new ones a chance to consolidate (Hagedorn victimization by, and participation in vio­ 2008). The impact on gangs is twofold: com­ lence on future behavior are echoed in the munities lose the power to mediate juvenile gang literature. In their statistical analysis misconduct and gangs emerge to provide the of children aged nine to fifteen years in dis­ missing order (Papachristos and Kirk 2006). advantaged neighborhoods in a midwestern Most of these risks are heightened in post- city, Patchin et al. (2006), find that those war environments: families are fragmented, who were more exposed through personal Art. 5, page 6 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments experience to community violence self- to exclude young newcomers, especially reported higher rates of weapon possession in communities under strain. The UN has and aggressive behavior. Youths who witness noted that refugees and internally displaced firearm violence are about twice as likely to persons are at increased risk of recruitment engage in serious violence within the follow­ by armed groups due to the discrimination ing two years (Bingenheimer, Brennan, and and deprivation many confront (UN 2015; Earls 2005). Writing about gang dynamics IOM 2017). For forced migrants, the element in Central America, Cruz (2005) views the of negative change may increase the risk ubiquity of violence in the home and school of gang involvement beyond the usual cor­ lives of many poor, urban youths as a key relates of marginalization. Cruz (2014) cites to understanding the extreme violence dis­ research in El Salvador that suggests that played by the maras. young people who are forced to move into poor neighborhoods or drop out of school Marginalization are more susceptible to joining a gang than The concept of marginalization refers to those who have always been poor and never pushing certain people and groups out of gone to school. mainstream society, away from opportuni­ ties, and relegating them to the economic, Social disorganization social, and geographic ‘fringes of society’ Post-war research in countries involved in (Vigil 2002: 7). It can facilitate gang par­ World War II identified a cross-national rise ticipation when marginalized youths look in juvenile delinquency and an intensifica­ to the gang for a sense of belonging, social tion of gang activity (Fyvel 1961). Cavan recognition, and success. Marginalization and Cavan (1968) found that juvenile delin­ is rife in countries coming out of conflict. quency increased during and after World War The structural conditions that underlie II even in countries that were not exposed to marginalization, such as economic inequal­ combat or occupation. War destroyed social ity, political exclusion, social divisiveness, institutions and ‘postwar conditions brought and discrimination, are at the root of many new problems’ (ibid.: 195). Through the civil conflicts. These conditions are rarely lens of gang studies, the picture that forms resolved — and are frequently exacerbated — is social disorganization on a massive scale, by wars that act as ‘development in reverse’ with the corollary impairment of traditional (Collier 2007: 27). Internal wars often reduce mechanisms to control youth delinquency. incomes, exports, investment, and food pro­ Although the battles of many internal duction and they weaken government and wars take place in rural areas, civil conflict is social institutions; their costs are rarely dis­ linked to urban social disorder (IOM 2015). tributed equitably, and internal wars can Conflict chaos enters cities when armed increase individual and horizontal inequality actors use cities to recruit, restock, and recu­ (Fakuda-Parr 2011). perate; war-fueled criminal networks set up Furthermore, forced migration produced shop in urban areas; economic losses impact by war often exacerbates marginalization. on urban livelihoods; and depleted state Migrants can face discrimination and stigma resources mean fewer or worse services in upon arrival in new communities (IOM cities, including security services. 2015), compounding the difficulties of social Internal displacement also interacts with and economic integration. Immigrant youth social disorganization. According to IOM’s are especially vulnerable to marginaliza­ World Migration Report for 2015, forced tion (Vigil 2002). Differences in language, migrants often move into cities for safety and culture, religion, ethnicity (van Gemert and opportunities. Cities that are already reeling Decker 2013), rural backgrounds, and per­ from the urban impacts of conflict are ill- ceived political loyalties are used as grounds equipped to meet the basic needs of new Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 7 of 21 residents. These migrants may be required to war economies (Geneva Declaration 2008), start new lives in informal, poorly planned, weak governance, gaps in public security, and spatially segregated neighborhoods with mass trauma (Boyle 2014), former combat­ numerous risks, including violence (ibid.). ants, and widespread availability of arms IOM also suggests that urban mobility is (Kreutz, Marsh, and Torre 2012). Although more likely to expose newcomers to violence each of these could contribute to collective when migration is forced, likely due to the youth violence, the following discussion is ‘disintegration of established community focused on three post-conflict features that dynamics that provide a degree of control intersect in obvious and recurring ways with over crimes’ (ibid.: 78). youth gangs. Human mobility patterns around war may also connect with gangs by facilitating the Security gaps and state responses transmission of gang cultures and meth­ States struggle to establish adequate secu­ ods (Maxson 1998). For example, during El rity in the aftermath of conflict for at least Salvador’s conflict, hundreds of thousands of five reasons. First, some war-ending accords Salvadoran families became refugees in the call for security sector reform, which can US. As a response to intense, layered margin­ debilitate enforcement capabilities in the alization, and their need for protection, some short term (Stanley 2000). Second, where Salvadoran youth joined gangs, including the law enforcement efforts have been focused MS-13 and 18th Street gangs (Vigil 2002). narrowly on winning a war, the state may be Starting in 1996, the US increased deporta­ short on the skills required for peacetime tion of Salvadorans, including an unknown policing (Malan 2000). Third, a state may be — but significant — number of gang mem­ unable to move into zones previously domi­ bers (ibid.). On arriving in El Salvador, these nated by non-state actors fast enough to fill youths again found themselves culturally a security vacuum (Boyle 2014). Fourth, if dislocated and marginalized, with the added police played a combat role during conflict, stigma of gang membership (Covey 2010). communities may be resentful or untrusting They transmitted to El Salvador’s street gangs (Malan 2000). Fifth, conflicts often take a toll the organizational culture, brutal violence, on national revenues, which has impacts on and brands of their US-based gangs (Cruz service delivery across sectors, including law 2014; Rodgers and Baird 2015). enforcement. The resulting security gap leaves some Contributions from literature on violence parts of a country or groups feeling vulner­ after wars able to violence or crime, which incentiv­ The frequency with which countries emerg­ izes gangs. Young people frequently cite the ing from armed conflict see security condi­ search for protection as motivation for their tions worsen during peacetime lends support entry into gangs (Howell and Griffiths 2016). to Boyle’s hypothesis that the experience of Further, residents who feel that the state war changes the landscape for violent actors cannot provide for their safety may seek out and ‘primes’ post-conflict states for high lev­ non-state security providers, including street els of violence (Boyle 2014: 52). Research gangs (Geneva Declaration 2008). across countries converges around common Faced with a security gap and a perceived drivers of violence in post-conflict situations, gang problem, many states have added fuel including the presence of ‘spoilers’ who use to the fire by adopting repressive, militaris­ violence to prevent peace (Stedman 2000), tic tactics under the label of zero tolerance. inadequate social services and infrastruc­ It is easy to see how a country emerging ture, high rates of unemployment, property- from armed conflict could follow a path related disputes, changes in power relations of least resistance from a war against, say, and the emergence of power vacuums, illegal insurgents, to a war against gangs. Hagedorn Art. 5, page 8 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments

(2008) observed how one war replaced the recidivism, while educational attainment, other in El Salvador. Wartime leaders who family bonds (including having children), retain overt or behind-the-scenes power may and effective policing reduced risks (ibid.). well be more comfortable with militaristic These same risk factors for recidivism can approaches or see these as one way to main­ spur young former fighters to form gangs tain status in a shifting political landscape (Marcy 2014). Rodgers (2012) described how (Mani 2000; Stanley 2000). demobilized youth in Nicaragua, Guatemala, If post-war settings make zero tolerance a and El Salvador responded to insecurity and more likely choice by lawmakers, they also exclusion by starting territorial gangs or pan­ render it a less promising one. Dowdney dillas to protect themselves and their neigh­ (2005) found that such policies routinely fail borhoods. He observed that while gangs in countries lacking social investment and predated civil conflict in these countries, the economic opportunities, which are recurring ex-combatants brought weapons and mili­ features in post-war contexts. Cruz (2014: tary skills, resulting in better organization 124) described how El Salvador’s harsh anti- and more violence (ibid.). In Sierra Leone, gang laws — interwoven with the ‘politics street gangs that formed following independ­ of violence’ or the institutions, actors, and ence were recruited into combat roles dur­ policies that made extreme violence nor­ ing the civil war in 1991 (Hagedorn 2008). mal among youth gangs — played a decisive According to Utas (2014), in the aftermath part in the evolution of El Salvador’s maras. of war, demobilized child and young soldiers In post-war settings where violence has recreated gang structures and infused them become engrained in institutional and com­ with more serious violence learned during munity culture, zero tolerance pits the gangs war. against almost everyone. As Thrasher (1927) observed, conflict forges the gangs, deepens Illicit economies and criminal networks the bond, and incentivizes better organiza­ The criminal underworld is a major factor tion to survive the onslaught (Howell and in the prolongation of armed conflict and Griffiths 2016). the persistence of violence after hostilities end. Boyle (2014) described how criminal Former combatants networks can proliferate during wars where Former fighters sometimes challenge post- weak law enforcement is coupled with high war security with harmful behaviors that societal tolerance for violence. Parties to a range from thuggery to derailing a peace conflict often engage heavily in illicit com­ process (Gamba 2006; Wessells and Jonah mercial activity, first to fulfill military goals 2006). Based on his research in Congo and and later, often, as an end in itself. Sierra Leone, Themnér (2011) concluded Illegal economies are dominated by adult that former fighters from groups that lacked structures designed primarily to perpetrate economic opportunities, felt threatened, crime. Youth gangs are not the same thing. failed to reintegrate politically, retained Generally, their members are younger and access to weapons, and lived in insecure set­ they sustain a mix of criminal and non- tings were more likely to rearm. Kaplan and criminal purposes (Covey 2010). With some Nussio (2016) were able to identify risk fac­ important exceptions, youth gangs rarely tors in the individual domain by tracking play leadership roles within illegal econo­ recidivism among a sample of almost 1,500 mies, in part because gangs have typically Colombian former fighters. They found that lacked the discipline, organizational skill, having strong personal reasons for joining and diligence to compete with more sophis­ the group, the duration of a combatant’s ticated criminal networks (Hagedorn 2008; stay with the armed group, and resettlement Kinnear 2009). However, the effects of illegal in areas with criminal bands correlate with economies on gangs are powerful. Hagedorn Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 9 of 21

(2008: 37) described how organized crime Third, youth gangs’ relationships with organ­ ‘bends the form of area youth gangs to the ized crime have transformed — and continue needs of older armed groups.’ to transform — youth gangs, with harmful Drugs, in particular, have altered gangs in consequences for youths, their communities, ways that make them more problematic all and national security. over the world. Drug use is rampant in many In general terms, Colombian street gangs gangs and dealing is increasingly common in are younger, bounded to a smaller territory, many contexts (Covey 2010; Kinnear 2009; and combine criminal activity with some Rodgers and Baird 2015). Escalating violence social, identity, and noncriminal interests by gangs is often attributed to their involve­ that set them apart from criminal bands and ment in the drug trade (Jütersonke, Muggah drug-trafficking organizations (CERAC 2014; and Rodgers 2009). Looking at gangs together Giraldo et al. 2015). These gangs are also with other organized armed groups that more visible than their adult counterparts; involve children, Dowdney (2005) noted how they call attention to themselves and seek the demands of drug dealing make groups the recognition that comes from public mis­ more territorial, combative, and violent. behaving (Covey 2010; Perea 2007). Even in Medellín, where distinctions between organ­ The Impact of Identified Risks on ized crime and youth gangs are at their murki­ Gang Development in Colombia est (Semana 2018), the youth gangs or combos Six major risk factors for post-war gang are distinguishable from older, more power­ intensification were identified in the discus­ ful criminal groups. Blattman et al. (2019) sion above: illicit economies and criminal explain the relationships and points of differ­ networks, exposure to violence, marginaliza­ ence between the city’s street gangs or com­ tion, social disorganization, security gaps and bos and its more powerful, mafia-like groups state responses, and former combatants. The or razones. Based on interviews with combo following discussion situates these factors in and razón leaders, administrative crime data, the Colombian context to gauge their rele­ and surveys of city residents, they observe that vance and assess the risks of gang escalation. combo members are typically youths under the age of 25 who come from and reside in Illicit economies and criminal networks the neighborhood where the combo is active Among the post-war ills that can contribute (ibid.). Razones manage broader, often non- to gang growth, Colombia’s gravest con­ contiguous territories, and are primarily made cern comes from organized criminal activ­ up of men aged between 30 and 50 years who ity around the production and distribution tend to live in Medellín’s more affluent neigh­ of cocaine and other illegal markets. These borhoods (ibid.). include illegal gold extraction, extortion, In many Colombian cities, criminal bands, arms trafficking, and contraband (InSight drug-trafficking organizations, mafia-like Crime 2018). To assess this factor in the structures, or intermediaries hire gang mem­ Colombian context, it is necessary to under­ bers for a variety of criminal tasks. Gang stand how gangs relate to these markets members provide labor for local drug sales, and the criminal networks that dominate and act as messengers, lookouts, transport­ them. Their interactions vary enormously ers, dealers, debt collectors, and contract between cities, but the three defining char­ killers, but generally do not play leadership acteristics explored below are generally true roles in domestic or international markets in Colombia. First, youth gangs can be dis­ (CERAC 2014; Ordóñez Valverde 2017). tinguished from the adult actors that domi­ Within these adult groups, gang members nate the criminal underworld. Second, gang are generally treated as ‘expendable’ (Bargent members sometimes participate, but rarely 2015), and their access to upper manage­ play leadership roles, in organized crime. ment is restricted (Semana 2018). In cities Art. 5, page 10 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments like Medellín and Cali, where recruitment by or being squeezed out by them. The MOJ adult groups is highly structured, many gang (2017: 213) suggests that the gangs’ relative members communicate only with interme­ autonomy and fights for territory may soon diaries without learning the identity of their be ‘a thing of the past.’ Gang transformations employer (Durán-Martínez 2018). Youths in are occurring at different rates and degrees gangs are attractive recruits because of their among Colombia’s cities. The process is most knowledge of urban geography and warfare advanced in Medellín (CERAC 2014, MOJ (Riaño-Alcala 2006), as well as their inno­ 2017), where the vast majority of combos are vation, creativity, and technological skills dedicated to criminal purposes and subordi­ (Semana 2018). Such recruitment is not new nate to older, more powerful actors in organ­ in Colombia, but the practice has increased ized crime (Blattman et al. 2019). since the 1990s as criminal structures have In Cali, where gangs and adult groups fragmented (Bargent 2015) and sought to have likewise co-existed for several decades, exploit growing domestic markets in cocaine the police believe that 31 of an estimated and marijuana (ibid.). 104 gangs city-wide have been co-opted There are two common patterns of recruit­ by criminal organizations, while others ment in Colombia. In one, gang members are retain some autonomy (MOJ 2017). The Cali recruited by an adult organization, based on Mayor’s Office finds support for these esti­ their reputation for violence and capabilities mates in its implementation of an exem­ navigating and securing territory, to perform plary program to reduce gang involvement. services connected to local drug sales, includ­ Rocío Gutiérrez Cely, Cali’s Peace and Citizen ing street-level dealing and transportation Culture Secretary (2016–2019) explains that (Ordóñez Valverde 2017). As these gang mem­ the program team has been able to inter­ bers prove themselves, they may be assigned vene in about 70 per cent of the city’s gangs a gun and enlisted to perpetrate additional to persuade some members to exit.3 While criminal tasks, including murder-for-hire (MOJ efforts are continuing among the remaining 2017). In this pattern, individual gang mem­ 30 per cent, Gutiérrez recognizes that some bers, as opposed to the gang as a collective, of these are too attached to organized crime work for the adult group (Castillo V 2015; to allow for members to explore exit strate­ Ordóñez Valverde 2017). They may be com­ gies with municipal authorities. pensated with cash, motorcycles, or weapons, Gangs in other cities are less attached and motivated by a boost in status from asso­ to adult criminal networks. For instance, ciating with an adult group (Semana 2018). Cartagena lies at the far end of the spec­ The second pattern, which is well-estab­ trum with gangs that are minimally related lished in Medellín and increasingly employed to organized crime (Álvarez 2016). Cartagena by the bacrim elsewhere (Ávila 2019), involves confronts similar conditions of marginaliza­ co-opting the gang as a whole. Durán- tion and social disorganization as Medellín Martínez (2018: 15) describes this practice as and Cali but was not impacted to the same ‘criminal outsourcing’ or ‘a situation where degree by the armed conflict or the ‘criminal business activities are allocated to an exter­ sagas’ described in the next section. nal source, and where lines of authority are The engagement of gangs by organized fuzzy, but there is a clean alignment between crime is deeply concerning. In their work organizations and contractor and some level on Central American gangs, Jütersonke, of control.’ Muggah, and Rodgers (2009: 385) conclude that ‘professionalization is ominous, insofar Gang transformations as the corrosive roles that organized crime These interactions with organized crime have can play in developing contexts is extremely a powerful impact on Colombian gangs. well-known.’ There is a sense that youth gangs are los­ Colombia’s gangs become better armed, ing space, morphing into adult structures exposed to more violence, and increasingly Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 11 of 21 combative over territory because of their Given the strength and numbers of adult links to organized crime (Castillo V 2015). criminal groups in many cities, it is remark­ The situation in Quibdó, the departmental able that many gangs still stand as distinct capital of one of Colombia’s poorest states entities with some of the territorial, social, (Chocó), illustrates a pattern that is repeated and identity concerns that typically charac­ in war-torn cities around the country. Gangs terize youth gangs (CERAC 2014; Semana there started spontaneously, spurred by con­ 2018). Their continued existence in cities ditions of marginalization and social disor­ dominated by adult criminal actors sug­ ganization with roots in the armed conflict. gests that gangs fulfill a different purpose According to local officials, youths probably for young people than adult criminal struc­ joined these gangs for social reasons, but the tures. The availability of criminal jobs does situation spiraled when adult groups started not eliminate the organic demand for youth offering members ‘an immediate future’ with gangs. Borrowing from Hagedorn (2008: 49), guns, phones, and salaries in exchange for a criminal job may solve a gang member’s criminal labor (Semana 2018: 55). problem of ‘survival,’ but leaves unaddressed This association also means worse out­ his problem of ‘meaning.’ comes for the young people who join gangs. In their research on US gangs, Howell and Exposure to violence Griffiths (2016) explain how gang member­ Colombia’s conflict encroached on the ship, which is a step in escalating delinquent everyday­ life of civilians. In the government’s behavior, sets up an individual for increased database, the number of civilian victims risks into adulthood, with higher probabili­ since 1985 is close to nine million, primar­ ties of prison, drug use, poor health, and ily victims of forced displacement, followed unemployment compared to former delin­ by homicide, threats and forced disappear­ quents who did not join gangs. In Colombia, ance (Unit for Assistance and Comprehensive there is a worrying trend in which young Reparations to Victims 2020). The National people join gangs, start using drugs, start Center for Historical Memory (2013: 32) dealing, take on escalating criminal tasks reported that civilians were killed in much for adult groups (CERAC 2014; Giraldo et al. larger numbers than parties to the conflict: 2015), and — in exceptional cases —become 82 per cent of the 220,000 conflict deaths full-fledged members of adult armed struc­ were non-combatants. tures (Durán-Martínez 2018). Further, armed actors exerted a powerful Another negative consequence of criminal and lasting influence in some Colombian outsourcing is that it appears to generate cities. The MOJ (2017: 99–101) traced what more violence than what criminal groups it called ‘criminal sagas,’ in which different produce when they rely on internal human armed actors arrived in waves to Colombia’s resources (Durán-Martínez 2018). Based largest cities, each taking on a mythical status on research in five cities in Colombia and for the cities’ youths. Cali is a case in point: Mexico, Durán-Martínez (2018: 15) explains in the 1980s, as part of peace negotiations, that ‘where criminals outsource to youth the M-19 guerrilla group was authorized to gangs, they…lose the ability or willingness to set up urban camps in Cali, where members control their “soldiers.”’ Looking at Medellín, provided political training to youths; the the author observes that the city’s most vio­ 1990s brought in drug-trafficking organiza­ lent periods are characterized by outsourcing tions that employed brutal tactics to main­ to gangs (Durán-Martínez 2018). Colombian tain territorial control; in the late 1990s, the analysts are concerned that youth gangs pro­ ELN and FARC-EP committed large-scale kid­ vide organized crime a ready stream of urban nappings in Cali (MOJ 2017). This may have labor and enable more sophisticated crimi­ paved the way for the right-wing and ostensi­ nals to evade law enforcement by reducing bly anti-guerrilla paramilitaries to exert more their visibility (Ávila 2019; Semana 2018). influence in Cali in the 2000s; after their Art. 5, page 12 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments demobilization in 2005, the so-called crimi­ MOJ (2017), in cities like Cali, Medellín, and nal bands or bacrim filled the vacuum (ibid.). Bogotá, youth groups learned how to com­ The incursion of armed actors into some mit violent crime from a succession of armed Colombian cities exacerbated urban conflict, actors, whose methods are mirrored in today’s normalized violence, and supplied gangs gang activity. Gangs learned about local net­ with new criminal skills and brutal meth­ working and weapons from the guerrillas; ods. Describing Medellín, Pécaut (1999: 142) workforce organization from drug-trafficking characterizes urban conflict as an interplay organizations; and recruitment and territorial of ‘extremely heterogenous’ violence, includ­ control with ‘invisible frontiers’ from paramil­ ing armed confrontations between guerrillas itaries and criminal bands (ibid.). and state forces, extortion by urban militias, paramilitary operations, drug trafficking, Marginalization and social disorganization political assassinations, delinquency, organ­ Though costly, Colombia’s conflict did not ized crime, and inter-gang warfare. Perea destroy the national economy as often hap­ (2007: 2) describes youth gangs as being at pens in protracted internal wars. Poverty, the ‘heart of the urban conflict,’ rejected by extreme poverty, and, to a lesser extent, income communities, intermittently hunted down inequality declined from the mid-2000s until and recruited by organized crime and armed 2017 (Joumard and Londoño 2013, World Bank groups, and continuously battling for terri­ 2019). Nonetheless, economic marginalization tory with other gangs. is a significant risk factor in Colombia, which The prolonged exposure of Colombia’s cit­ remains one of the most unequal countries ies to conflict has normalized violence for globally and, contrary to expectations on post- some urban youth. The MOJ (2017) concludes conflict economic growth, experienced a rise that one legacy of the criminal sagas was to in both poverty and urban income inequality position violence as the principal method in 2018 (World Bank 2019). of resolving disputes. Waldmann (2007: 66) Young people who were uprooted by armed sees evidence of cultural norms that pro­ conflict are especially prone to layered mar­ mote violence in Colombia in its widespread ginalization. A report on protracted displace­ incidence, high homicide rates, entrenched ment by the UN (Kälin and Entwisle 2017) armed actors, and the ‘glaring discrepancy concludes that most internally displaced per­ between the brutality of means and mod­ sons (IDPs) in Colombia were forced to reset­ esty of the ends pursued.’ The consequences tle in precarious settlements or slums. Kälin creep into everyday life. Santos (2015) notes, and Entwisle (2017) observed that even years for instance, a high correlation between after displacement, these families remain at household exposure to armed conflict and a stark economic disadvantage, and many domestic violence against women, leading displaced youths face stigma and discrimina­ him to argue that Colombians are ‘sick with tion in underserved, high-crime areas, with­ violence,’ which makes them believe that out access to formal education or livelihood violence is ‘a valid mechanism to resolve dis­ opportunities. putes.’ Prolonged exposure to brutality may Internal displacement and other conflict also deaden societal responses to loss of life. shocks can produce social disorganization. Looking at Colombia and Mexico, Lemaitre Based on a survey of more than 2,000 dis­ Ripoll (2014: 4) finds the absence of ‘moral placed households throughout Colombia, indignation’ to homicides, especially of poor, Ibañez, Moya, and Velásquez (2006) find young men of color, as a sign of widespread that forced displacement stripped victims habituation to violence. of their customs, ways of life, and identi­ The Colombian case sheds light on an ties, and deprived them the support from additional outcome of violent exposure on social networks and decision makers they gangs: criminal learning. According to the relied on in their places of origin. Displaced Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 13 of 21 persons typically moved with their nuclear and Bogota are recognized for their innova­ families, only rarely migrated with neigh­ tive preventive approaches (Cousins 2019; bors or other relatives, and sharply reduced Muggah and Aguirre 2018; Muggah, cited in their participation in communal and civic Gagne 2015). spaces after displacement (Ibañez et al. In general terms, Colombian policy makers 2006). The writers conclude that ‘displace­ have demonstrated awareness of the soci­ ment obstructs the formation of commu­ etal factors at play in the creation of urban nity organizations and contributes to the gangs and the importance of integrated destruction of social networks and social carrot-and-stick solutions. For example, in its capital’ (ibid.: par. 15). recent report on gangs, the MOJ’s foremost recommendation to the government is to Security gaps and state responses reduce the factors that make young people As described above, post-war security gaps ‘easy prey’ to crime and violence by invest­ can increase gang activity both by moti­ ing in education and economic opportuni­ vating youths to join gangs for protection ties in problem neighborhoods (MOJ 2017: and by triggering counter-productive state 234). Law 1622 on Youth Citizenship calls for responses. Regarding the first effect, just as intervention in the social and political lives Howell and Griffiths (2016) find among US of youths to prevent their engagement in gangs, the search for protection is a common violence and crime (L. 1622, abril 29, 2013, motive for a youth to join a gang in Colombia Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.). Law 1577 — (CERAC 2014). The strength of this motive the first national law dealing expressly with may depend on both objective and subjective gangs — seeks to rehabilitate young people factors. Objectively, Colombian youths are dis­ at risk of joining or already involved in gangs proportionately impacted by violence: almost and foster their social and economic inclu­ half of all murder victims in 2016 and 2017 sion (L. 1577, septiembre 20, 2012, Diario were aged between 15 and 29 years (Castillo Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.). 2018). Subjectively, Colombian city and town- Finally, the same survey that found that dwellers perceive themselves as highly inse­ Colombian city and town dwellers are fear­ cure. In a national survey from 2017, 78 per ful of murder also found that a large majority cent of respondents reported feeling fearful of them (70 per cent) favor preventive meas­ of being murdered, mostly by common crimi­ ures, such as job and education opportunities nals rather than by conflict actors (FIP 2017). over increasing punishment (28 per cent), as In terms of state responses, there is reason the preferred way for government to reduce to be optimistic that Colombia can avoid the homicides (FIP 2017). kind of zero- tolerance approaches to youth gang reduction that backfired in Central Former combatants America. While the Duque administration As in other countries emerging from conflict, has adopted a more militaristic approach to Colombia’s former combatants are viewed as organized criminal groups, with fewer options a source of insecurity. And indeed, the deci­ for negotiations (Alonso and Robbins 2019), sion by some FARC-EP members to rearm rep­ street gangs are generally treated as issues resents a serious threat to national security of urban crime and youth development that and the peace process (The Economist 2019b). fall within the purview of city mayors and However, demobilized combatants of the police departments (International Institute FARC-EP are unlikely to join street gangs. First, for Strategic Studies 2018). Colombia was the while some former fighters are moving into cit­ first country in Latin America to launch citi­ ies, ex-combatants are mostly from rural areas zen security programming, with a heavy focus and the majority have expressed an interest in on rights, civic engagement, and government working in agriculture (Kaplan 2017). Second, responsibility, and cities like Medellín, Cali, the demographics of the group do not align Art. 5, page 14 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments with the profiles of Colombian gang members. By looking at how Colombia’s gangs have At the time of demobilization, the average age developed over time and the differences among the ex-combatants was 33, almost a between cities, there is no doubt that asso­ quarter were women, and over half were par­ ciating with organized crime underlies gang ents (ibid.). mutations that are injurious to gang mem­ While the FARC-EP historically recruited bers and their communities. children in large numbers, recruitment was Furthermore, absent concerted preventive sharply reduced during the peace talks, and efforts, gang membership is likely to grow only 123 were released under the accord, among urban youth in cities where conflict most of whom are now adults (UN 2019). exacerbated the conditions of marginaliza­ The risk that children released from the tion, social disorganization, and violent expo­ FARC-EP will join urban gangs is minimal. sure. Notably, Colombia’s conflict has resulted Former child combatants benefit from com­ in the marginalization of many young peo­ prehensive rehabilitation support from the ple who were forcibly uprooted from their government until they reach adulthood, at homes, saw their opportunities reduced, and which point they are entitled to adult social put at sharp economic disadvantage. The and economic services (Colombian Family armed conflict also damaged, and sometimes Welfare Institute n.d.). Like their adult coun­ destroyed, the social institutions that enabled terparts, most children released by the FARC communities to mediate youth misconduct, are from rural areas and many are expected resulting in widespread social disorganiza­ to opt for rural reintegration. tion. Many young people have been exposed More generally, Nussio (2018) argues that to extreme violence and socialized within focusing on the relatively small number of neighborhoods where violence has become former combatants may distract authorities normal, tolerated, and even encouraged. from addressing potentially larger sources of The risk that former combatants could insecurity. He notes that youths, especially create or join gangs was the least relevant young males, living in Colombia’s marginal­ of the six factors to the Colombian context. ized neighborhoods are at risk of becoming Recidivism by the FARC-EP is a security threat, the ‘human resources of post-conflict violence’ but members’ demographic profiles and rural (ibid.: 143). Children and youths who have aspirations make it unlikely that they will been recruited by criminal bands and drug- engage with youth gangs in a significant way. trafficking organizations may be especially vul­ The final factor related to post-war inse­ nerable. They rarely receive the kind of holistic curity and state responses. Urban insecurity and sustained support provided to children and homicide rates remain high, especially associated with paramilitaries and guerril­ for youths, and some youths will continue las even though they face many of the same to seek out gangs for protection. State ­vulnerabilities and reintegration challenges. responses are difficult to predict, but the article posited that Colombia may well avoid Conclusion so-called zero-tolerance approaches to gang In order to gauge Colombia’s future risk of reduction that have proven counterproduc­ gang violence, this article drew from gang tive in other post-war environments. research and literature on post-war violence The Colombian government can mitigate to identify six factors that recur in post-war the risks identified in this article by investing settings and tend to drive gang escalation. in prevention, including by increasing oppor­ Their application to the Colombian context tunities for marginalized urban youths, devel­ suggests that Colombia’s street gangs are oping law enforcement approaches to sever likely to become more violent, harmful, and links between street gangs and organized criminal if they continue to strengthen ties crime, and supporting communities to design to illicit economies and criminal networks. solutions locally. In doing so, Colombia can Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 15 of 21 build on existing municipal-level programs American Sociological Review, 41(6): 937– to address youth violence and draw from 63. Available at https://www.jstor.org/ international experience and the growing stable/2094796. DOI: https://doi.org/​ ‘what works’ literature – See, for example, 10.2307/2094796 Cunningham et al. (2008); O’Connor and Asmann, P. 2018. Colombia coca produc­ Waddell (2015); Office of Juvenile Justice tion hits new record high. InSight Crime, and Delinquency (n.d.); and WHO (2015). 19 September. Available at https://www. Colombia can also learn from the country’s insightcrime.org/news/analysis/colom­ decades-long efforts to prevent child recruit­ bia-cocaine-production-breaks-new- ment by actors to the conflict. As noted in the record-levels-unodc-report/. discussion on gang research, the risk profiles Ávila, A. 2019. 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How to cite this article: Kerr, K. 2020. Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments: The Case of Colombia. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 9(1): 5, pp. 1–21. DOI: https://doi. org/10.5334/sta.720

Submitted: 05 March 2019 Accepted: 02 March 2020 Published: 02 April 2020

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