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Kerr, K. 2020. Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments: stability The Case of Colombia. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 9(1): 5, pp. 1–21. DOI: https://doi. org/10.5334/sta.720 RESEARCH ARTICLE Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments: The Case of Colombia Katie Kerr Countries emerging from armed conflict often experience heightened violence and youth gang activity. Following the signing of peace accords with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army (FARC-EP), what are Colombia’s risks in terms of youth gangs? To assess these risks, this article draws from gang research and literature on post-war violence to identify six factors that recur in post-war environments and are likely to fuel a rise in gangs: illicit economies and criminal networks, exposure to violence, marginalization, social disorganization, security gaps and state responses, and former combatants. After analyzing Colombia’s risks with reference to each of these, the article concludes that the strengthening ties between youth gangs and Colombia’s illicit economies, mediated by adult-run criminal networks, increase gang numbers and violence. Moreover, some disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods are vulnerable to gang escalation due to the effects on local youths of protracted violent exposure, marginalization, and social disorganization. Finally, while ex-combatant recidivism and security gaps are prominent concerns in Colombia, they are not expected to contribute significantly to youth gang dynamics in urban areas. Introduction and the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército In November 2016, the Colombian govern­ Popular de Liberación — EPL) (International ment signed a peace accord with the Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] 2019), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — while many former FARC­EP strongholds are People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolu­ experiencing a return to violence (Fundación cionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Paz y Reconciliación ­Peace and Reconciliation Pueblo — FARC­EP), the country’s largest Foundation [PARES] 2019). guerrilla group. Over three years later, mul­ That post­accord Colombia does not fit tiple armed conflicts are still under way in neatly with any common­sense concept of the country, involving FARC­EP ‘dissident’ or post­war is not unusual. Countries emerging successor elements, the National Liberation from armed conflict often see an escalation Army (Ejército Nacional de Liberación — ELN), in violent crime, which can topple peace pro­ the Clan del Golfo (also referred to as Urabeños cesses. Even when a negotiated settlement or Gaitanist Self­Defense Forces of Colombia), holds up, protracted insecurity precludes real recovery and erodes support for peace (Darby 2006). In an effort to reconcile such Independent, US tendencies with a ‘post­conflict situation,’ [email protected] Art. 5, page 2 of 21 Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Brown, Langer and Stewart (2011: 4–5) sug­ ethnographic, case study, and quantitative gest that post­conflict is best understood as research analyzing risk for gang recruitment a process continuum that can suffer regress. and intensification, including compara­ Colombia’s peace accord, ceasefire, and tive research on other forms of organized demobilization of most FARC­EP members youth violence to supplement gang­specific are milestones on that continuum, represent­ research in developing country contexts. ing a significant reduction in political vio­ I then reviewed the growing body of litera­ lence and creating space for peacebuilding. ture on post­war violence to identify recur­ I worked in Colombia for the International ring features of post­war environments that Organization for Migration (IOM)1 from 2000 intersect with major risk factors for gangs. to 2002, during the peak of paramilitary vio­ This exercise generated a short list of risks lence, and again from 2011 to 2017, during that were likely to emerge in the aftermath the FARC­EP negotiations and the start of of armed conflict and to contribute to gang peace implementation. My work involved intensification. Finally, each of these factors ex­combatant reintegration, rehabilitation was applied to the Colombian context, taking of child soldiers, and prevention of child account of its experience of armed conflict, recruitment into illegal armed groups. After the overall security context, and youth gang the FARC­EP accord was signed, the ques­ dynamics drawn from academic and institu­ tion of Colombia’s susceptibility to youth tional literature, media reports, and personal violence was a frequent subject of debate communications with Colombian experts. within the peacebuilding community. Since This paper is presented in three main the rise of maras in post­war Central America parts. The first one provides an overview of was both the closest­at­hand and most noto­ Colombia’s current security environment and rious example of gang intensification in the gangs. The second part mines studies of gangs aftermath of civil conflicts, these discussions for major risk factors and the newer literature often turned to how Colombia was — or, on post­war violence to posit — where these more often, was not — perceived as similar to two bodies of scholarship intersect — prob­ El Salvador and Guatemala in the mid­1990s. able risk factors for post­war gang escalation. This framing seemed to fall short. Post­ The third part analyzes Colombia’s risks with war gang intensification has been observed reference to each of these factors. The article across continents and has historical roots. concludes that some disadvantaged, urban In addition to El Salvador (Cruz 2005, 2014), neighborhoods in Colombia are vulnerable Guatemala (Demoscopia 2007; Kurtenbach to increased gang activity in light of their 2008), and Nicaragua (Rodgers 2003, 2012), prolonged exposure to violence, marginaliza­ increased gang activity has been reported in tion, social disorganization, and the strength post­war and transition settings in Europe of illicit economies. Ex­combatant recidivism after World War II (Cavan and Cavan 1968; and security gaps, though acute in Colombia, Fyvel 1961) as well as in South Africa (Covey do not represent a first­order threat of escalat­ 2010; Jensen 2014), Sierra Leone (Utas 2014), ing urban street gangs. Moreover, Colombian East Timor (Timor Leste Armed Violence authorities may attenuate these risks by 2009), Cambodia (Kurtenbach 2012), Nepal expanding preventive measures grounded in (Upreti et al. 2010), and Haiti (Kolbe 2013). citizen security and avoiding overly repres­ While these accounts often describe the sive, militaristic approaches that have exacer­ impacts of armed conflict and peace on bated gang violence elsewhere. local gang dynamics, what is missing is a framework for identifying those features of Colombia’s Security Landscape post­war situations that are most likely to Traditional FARC­EP strongholds with sig­ fuel a rise in gang numbers and violence. To nificant criminal assets, like coca crops and develop such a framework, I first reviewed illegal mines, have been hard hit by post­war Kerr: Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments Art. 5, page 3 of 21 violence as different criminal actors have and has 2,500 members (ibid.). The FARC scrambled to fill the vacuum. PARES (2019) ‘dissident’ or successor groups have also reports that 107 municipalities of the 242 strengthened, with estimates in August 2019 vacated by the FARC had suffered a significant of over 2,200 members, including at least incursion by other criminal actors by August 400 new recruits, spread across 23 groups 2019. In these municipalities, the homi­ and active in 85 municipalities (ibid.). Recent cide rate increased enough in 2018 to offset high­level defections from the peace process reductions elsewhere and raise the national and calls to rearm by demobilized command­ murder rate for the first time since the peace ers may herald greater military and ideologi­ talks started in 2012 (Castillo, Lleras, and cal consolidation among these groups (The Suarez 2018). Economist 2019b). Underlying these developments is a crimi­ Colombian politics shifted to the right in nal underworld that feeds off the cocaine 2018 with the election of a president who trade. Coca production increased throughout opposed the peace process throughout his the peace talks and the start of peace imple­ campaign. President Iván Duque’s adminis­ mentation, breaking historic records in 2016 tration launched a new national security pol­ and again in 2017 (Asmann 2018). According icy in 2019 that favors military solutions over to the Ideas for Peace Foundation (Fundación negotiated settlements with armed groups Ideas para la Paz — FIP), a Colombian like the ELN and Clan del Golfo (Alonso and think tank, the rise is partly attributable to Robbins 2019). The policy is largely focused increased output by small­scale farmers in on rural strategies and is unlikely to impact anticipation of volunteer eradication pro­ security conditions in cities (The Economist gramming that many believed would com­ 2019a). pensate farmers based on their production (Llorente and Garzón 2018). Although the Colombia’s gangs number of coca­growing crops levelled off in For the purposes of this discussion, youth 2018, more intensive cultivation meant that or street gangs are groups that display some production continued to rise (Colombian continuity over time, engage in illegal behav­ Observatory of Organized Crime 2019). ior, and consist mostly of members

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