Security in Times of Pandemic: Legacies of War and Organized Crime in Colombia

Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia 1 Director León Valencia A. Academic subdirector Ariel Ávila M. Conflict, Peace and Post-conflict Research Group Diego Alejandro Restrepo (Coordinador de Línea de investigación) National Researchers Paola Perdomo Francisco Daza Territorial researchers Ivonne Quiñónez (Investigadora Regional Costa Pacífica nariñense) Vanessa Useche (Investigadora Regional Cauca) Ximena Sierra (Investigadora Regional Bajo Cauca antioqueño) Research Assistants Lina Gaitán Juan Camilo Rodríguez Content Editor Carlos Castelblanco Maps Andrés Narváez Design Laura Sanabria Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia 2 Contents Security in times of pandemic: legacies of war and organized crime in Colombia - Introduction: An overview on security and violence 4 - Safety indicators 8 - Presence of Organized Armed Groups and Illegal Armed Groups 20 - ELN: National perspective in times of COVID-19 21 - Post-Farc Armed Groups (GAPFs): National perspective in times of COVID-19 31 - Expansion, consolidation and disputes of heirs of paramilitarism: Clan del Golfo and Caparrapos 43 - References 47 Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia 3 Introduction An overview on security and violence It has been nearly four years since the Peace Accords were signed between the Colombian government and Farc-Ep and two years since Ivan Duque Marquez - from Centro Democratico political party was sworn in as President of Colombia. In recent weeks there have been acts of violence with such degree of intensity that they have sunken the Colombian society into concern and fear. There have also been a series of massacres that have left several dozens of people dead. In addition, there have been attacks against the Law Enforcement Agencies resulting in many if their members injured and dead, and eventually communities in different parts of the national territory have witnessed in horror confrontations between criminal organizations that last entire days. After months of research in this regard, Fundación Paz y Reconciliación – Pares Foundation presents this report on the critical security situation in Colombia. Below we find five major conclusions: 1. Analyzing the data on security, it can be said that homicides have decreased as compared to 2019 as a result of the preventative confinement measures, but in truth several security indicators have had complex setbacks – for instance, forced displacement, violent actions in territories and subversive actions. Indicators from several years seem to show that this decline in security had been in progress for at least two years, but could be regarded as an underground reality as it was not clearly visible. 2. The so-called Post-Farc or Dissident Groups, the ELN guerrilla and the Organized Armed Groups (GAOs) have almost doubled their territorial armed presence over the last two years. Post-Farc Armed Groups went from operating Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia 4 in 56 municipalities in 2018 to 113 as of August 2020. ELN went from having presence in 99 municipalities to more than 160 in 2020, and Clan del Golfo Organized Armed Group currently operates in over 200 municipalities. 3. The most recent wave of violence that has included several massacres could be explained by the concept of a negative technical tie. Criminal disputes generally last for two (2) years or a little longer. Currently, the dispute over several zones that belonged to the former FARC has been raging on for three (3) years as a result of the impossibility for one criminal organization to prevail over the others. None is strong enough to win the war; therefore, they resort to violence against the civilian population to win the support of the communities. There will be at least one more year of criminal dispute in various regions of the country. 4. Despite formally adding the guidelines of the Implementation Framework Plan – PMI (from its original Spanish language initials, Plan Marco de Implementación), which drives public policy for the implementation of the Agreement in the National Development Plan (mainly due to national and international regulatory obligations), the truth is that the balances of implementation of the Peace Agreement made by think tanks, government- independent social organizations, and even State Agencies, have shown a lack of political will for the implementation of the agreements and constant delays in such critical matters as payments to the families that voluntarily substitute their coca crops, or security guarantees of leaders and Farc-Ep ex-combatants. One of the main conclusions of the report issued by the Comptroller General of the Nation on the implementation of the Agreement is that in none of the years of implementation has 100% of the resources allocated per year been executed, and only up to 65% execution is achieved. In this sense, they predict that the implementation could last 25 years should it continue to evolve at this pace; i.e. 10 years longer than expected. In regards to the lack of security guarantees, data collected by Fundación Paz y Reconciliación -Pares Foundation indicate that 437 social leaders have been assassinated – 231 during the Duque government – from the signing of the Peace Agreement on November 24, 2016 to August 25, 2020. In addition, 224 FARC peace signatories have been assassinated from the signing of the Agreement to August 25, 2020 (148 during this administration), according to data provided by FARC political party. The comprehensive security perspective outlined in the Agreement to build alternatives in a participatory manner for the dismantling of criminal structures was replaced by a return to a militaristic vision of security. This latter approach has been characterized by the deployment of Military Forces in the most violent areas of the Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia 5 country (amongst other measures) without comprehensive support from justice institutions or recovery of the territory on the part of the State. 5. A crisis is evident in the Law Enforcement Agencies – in particular the Military Forces. Since the beginning of President Iván Duque’s administration, the Military Forces have been at the center of the hurricane. There have been complaints from international organizations about the election of its military leadership, as some members were involved in investigations and scandals for human rights violations and serious breaches of International Humanitarian Law, among which is former commander of the Army Nicacio de Jesús Martínez. The New York Times complaint (May 2019) points out that the guidelines that promoted the reduction of the standard of precision in military operations – along with incentives for the purpose of obtaining results – were the beginning of a series of scandals. In the months following the New York Times’ revelations, Revista Semana magazine reported the counterintelligence operations to persecute the members of the military who had leaked information to the US newspaper. Similarly, journalists from Revista Semana who were working on this investigation reported intimidation and persecution by military intel. In August, Revista Semana revealed the words uttered by Vulcano Task Force Commander General Diego Villegas during a meeting of the 30th Brigade in Cucuta, in January 2019, which would later be confirmed by seven witnesses from the Army: […] The Army speaking English, protocols, and human rights… all of that is over now. Killing; that’s what we need to do here. And if we have to partner with Los Pelusos, we will. We have already spoken with them, to hit ELN. If it takes drive-by shooting, then that’s what we’ll do. And if the problem is “money, then there is money for that. (Revista Semana Magazine, September 7, 2019) ” The members of this Task Force that operates in the Catatumbo subregion were those who disappeared, tortured and murdered former FARC-Ep combatant Dimar Torres in the municipality of Convencion in April 2019. This case was publicly known thanks to the collective action of farmers who – within hours of Dimar’s disappearance – questioned the soldiers, insisted on the inconsistencies in their reports and recorded with their cell phones a hole that the soldiers were filling, the belongings of the person disappeared, and later the victim’s allegedly mutilated body (PARES, April 23, 2019). Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia 6 A week after this action, General Diego Villegas publicly recognized the murder at the hands of the army and apologized on behalf of the institution. These facts led to the sentencing of a Corporal to 20 years in prison and other military members are still involved in the process. In turn, the Attorney General’s Office removed and disqualified five soldiers. In the first half of 2020, two National Army scandals shook the public arena. Firstly, a revelation was made by Revista Semana Magazine about a series of illegal wiretappings and profiling carried out by the National Army against social organizations, opposition political leaders and journalists for purposes that remain unknown until now. Then there was a report about a group of soldiers of the National Army who raped an Emberá indigenous minor. This report uncovered what appeared to be a repetitive practice of some members of the institution in different territories of the country. Media pressure on this serious situation forced

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