Security in Times of Pandemic: Legacies of War and Organized Crime in Colombia

Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

1 Director León Valencia A. Academic subdirector Ariel Ávila M.

Conflict, Peace and Post-conflict Research Group

Diego Alejandro Restrepo (Coordinador de Línea de investigación)

National Researchers

Paola Perdomo Francisco Daza

Territorial researchers

Ivonne Quiñónez (Investigadora Regional Costa Pacífica nariñense) Vanessa Useche (Investigadora Regional Cauca) Ximena Sierra (Investigadora Regional Bajo Cauca antioqueño)

Research Assistants

Lina Gaitán Juan Camilo Rodríguez

Content Editor

Carlos Castelblanco

Maps

Andrés Narváez

Design

Laura Sanabria Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

2 Contents

Security in times of pandemic: legacies of war and organized crime in Colombia

- Introduction: An overview on security and violence 4

- Safety indicators 8

- Presence of Organized Armed Groups and Illegal Armed Groups 20

- ELN: National perspective in times of COVID-19 21

- Post-Farc Armed Groups (GAPFs): National perspective in times of COVID-19 31

- Expansion, consolidation and disputes of heirs of paramilitarism: Clan del Golfo and Caparrapos 43

- References 47 Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

3 Introduction An overview on security and violence

It has been nearly four years since the Peace Accords were signed between the Colombian government and Farc-Ep and two years since Ivan Duque Marquez - from Centro Democratico political party was sworn in as President of Colombia. In recent weeks there have been acts of violence with such degree of intensity that they have sunken the Colombian society into concern and fear. There have also been a series of massacres that have left several dozens of people dead. In addition, there have been attacks against the Law Enforcement Agencies resulting in many if their members injured and dead, and eventually communities in different parts of the national territory have witnessed in horror confrontations between criminal organizations that last entire days.

After months of research in this regard, Fundación Paz y Reconciliación – Pares Foundation presents this report on the critical security situation in Colombia. Below we find five major conclusions:

1. Analyzing the data on security, it can be said that homicides have decreased as compared to 2019 as a result of the preventative confinement measures, but in truth several security indicators have had complex setbacks – for instance, forced displacement, violent actions in territories and subversive actions. Indicators from several years seem to show that this decline in security had been in progress for at least two years, but could be regarded as an underground reality as it was not clearly visible.

2. The so-called Post-Farc or Dissident Groups, the ELN guerrilla and the Organized Armed Groups (GAOs) have almost doubled their territorial armed presence over the last two years. Post-Farc Armed Groups went from operating Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

4 in 56 municipalities in 2018 to 113 as of August 2020. ELN went from having presence in 99 municipalities to more than 160 in 2020, and Clan del Golfo Organized Armed Group currently operates in over 200 municipalities.

3. The most recent wave of violence that has included several massacres could be explained by the concept of a negative technical tie. Criminal disputes generally last for two (2) years or a little longer. Currently, the dispute over several zones that belonged to the former FARC has been raging on for three (3) years as a result of the impossibility for one criminal organization to prevail over the others. None is strong enough to win the war; therefore, they resort to violence against the civilian population to win the support of the communities. There will be at least one more year of criminal dispute in various regions of the country.

4. Despite formally adding the guidelines of the Implementation Framework Plan – PMI (from its original Spanish language initials, Plan Marco de Implementación), which drives public policy for the implementation of the Agreement in the National Development Plan (mainly due to national and international regulatory obligations), the truth is that the balances of implementation of the Peace Agreement made by think tanks, government- independent social organizations, and even State Agencies, have shown a lack of political will for the implementation of the agreements and constant delays in such critical matters as payments to the families that voluntarily substitute their coca crops, or security guarantees of leaders and Farc-Ep ex-combatants.

One of the main conclusions of the report issued by the Comptroller General of the Nation on the implementation of the Agreement is that in none of the years of implementation has 100% of the resources allocated per year been executed, and only up to 65% execution is achieved. In this sense, they predict that the implementation could last 25 years should it continue to evolve at this pace; i.e. 10 years longer than expected.

In regards to the lack of security guarantees, data collected by Fundación Paz y Reconciliación -Pares Foundation indicate that 437 social leaders have been assassinated – 231 during the Duque government – from the signing of the Peace Agreement on November 24, 2016 to August 25, 2020. In addition, 224 FARC peace signatories have been assassinated from the signing of the Agreement to August 25, 2020 (148 during this administration), according to data provided by FARC political party.

The comprehensive security perspective outlined in the Agreement to build alternatives in a participatory manner for the dismantling of criminal structures was replaced by a return to a militaristic vision of security. This latter approach has been characterized by the deployment of Military Forces in the most violent areas of the Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

5 country (amongst other measures) without comprehensive support from justice institutions or recovery of the territory on the part of the State.

5. A crisis is evident in the Law Enforcement Agencies – in particular the Military Forces. Since the beginning of President Iván Duque’s administration, the Military Forces have been at the center of the hurricane. There have been complaints from international organizations about the election of its military leadership, as some members were involved in investigations and scandals for human rights violations and serious breaches of International Humanitarian Law, among which is former commander of the Army Nicacio de Jesús Martínez. The New York Times complaint (May 2019) points out that the guidelines that promoted the reduction of the standard of precision in military operations – along with incentives for the purpose of obtaining results – were the beginning of a series of scandals.

In the months following the New York Times’ revelations, Revista Semana magazine reported the counterintelligence operations to persecute the members of the military who had leaked information to the US newspaper. Similarly, journalists from Revista Semana who were working on this investigation reported intimidation and persecution by military intel. In August, Revista Semana revealed the words uttered by Vulcano Task Force Commander General Diego Villegas during a meeting of the 30th Brigade in Cucuta, in January 2019, which would later be confirmed by seven witnesses from the Army:

[…] The Army speaking English, protocols, and human rights… all of that is over now. Killing; that’s what we need to do here. And if we have to partner with Los Pelusos, we will. We have already spoken with them, to hit ELN. If it takes drive-by shooting, then that’s what we’ll do. And if the problem is “money, then there is money for that. (Revista Semana Magazine, September 7, 2019) ” The members of this Task Force that operates in the Catatumbo subregion were those who disappeared, tortured and murdered former FARC-Ep combatant Dimar Torres in the municipality of Convencion in April 2019. This case was publicly known thanks to the collective action of farmers who – within hours of Dimar’s disappearance – questioned the soldiers, insisted on the inconsistencies in their reports and recorded with their cell phones a hole that the soldiers were filling, the belongings of the person disappeared, and later the victim’s allegedly mutilated body (PARES, April 23, 2019). Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

6 A week after this action, General Diego Villegas publicly recognized the murder at the hands of the army and apologized on behalf of the institution. These facts led to the sentencing of a Corporal to 20 years in prison and other military members are still involved in the process. In turn, the Attorney General’s Office removed and disqualified five soldiers.

In the first half of 2020, two National Army scandals shook the public arena. Firstly, a revelation was made by Revista Semana Magazine about a series of illegal wiretappings and profiling carried out by the National Army against social organizations, opposition political leaders and journalists for purposes that remain unknown until now. Then there was a report about a group of soldiers of the National Army who raped an Emberá indigenous minor. This report uncovered what appeared to be a repetitive practice of some members of the institution in different territories of the country. Media pressure on this serious situation forced newly appointed Army Commander Eduardo Zapateiro, to inform the public that there are currently 118 cases under investigation for alleged sexual abuse by members of the National Army.

All these scandals occurred within a context of deteriorating security, although with some positive indicators. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

7 Security indicators

In the case of homicide, at the national period in 2020, understanding that level there was a nearly 2% decrease the conditions of mandatory isolation from 2018 to 2019. This trend that and states of exception derived from has been going on since 2012 – except the Covid-19 pandemic this year must for 2018 when there was an atypical have meant a radical reduction of this increase in the phenomenon. However, phenomenon. In this vein, and in light of there is a slight decrease comparing the current context, the variation in the the figures between the period running figure does not imply a reduction in this March through June 2019 to the same type of violence.

Homicide Rate – 2012-2019

Source: Colombia’s National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences - INMLCF. Prepared by: Fundación Paz y Reconciliación Foundation.

Homicides Nationwide March-June 2019/2020

Source: Colombia’s National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences - INMLCF. Prepared by: Fundación Paz y Reconciliación Foundation. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

8 On the other hand, the 281 over a large part of the areas vacated municipalities prioritized by Fundación by Farc-Ep after their concentration Paz y Reconciliación Foundation for the and subsequent disarmament. Lethal post-conflict period also showed a slight violence is not a useful strategy for the decrease in number. However, field permanence or sustainability of this investigation showed that organized organization in areas wherein a group armed groups have strengthened their has consolidated its dominance or has territorial control and their actions, made pacts with other structures. thereby consolidating their dominance

Homicide in the 281 municipalities prioritized for the post-conflict

Source: Colombia’s National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences - INMLCF. Prepared by: Fundación Paz y Reconciliación Foundation. Furthermore, forced displacement from the Victims Unit, as shown by the has been increasing according to figures results below.

Forced Displacement – Colombia 2010-2019

Source: Victims Unit. Prepared by: Fundación Paz y Reconciliación Foundation. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

9 Forced Displacement in the 281 municipalities prioritized for the post-conflict

Source: Victims Unit. Prepared by: Fundación Paz y Reconciliación Foundation.

As can be gathered from the graphs repertoire of violence of the guerrillas, on forced displacement, the 281 although not exclusive to these municipalities prioritized for the post- organizations – a constant reduction conflict (25% of the total number of has been evidenced since 2012, when municipalities in the country) concentrate the public phase of negotiations began the largest number of displaced between the Colombian State and Farc- people. In 2019, they concentrate Ep until 2018, when there was a significant 82% of this violence. In this sense, the increase. This trend decreased by 67 confrontations between illegal armed cases in 2019. However, upon observing structures and the combats between the distribution of this phenomenon by Law Enforcement Agencies and the ELN departments it can be demonstrated and Post-Farc Armed Groups are once that the practice of planting mines is a again generating an alarming situation legacy of war is particularly maintained in terms of displacement. in areas of influence of Post-Farc Armed Groups, whose trajectory comes from As for victims of antipersonnel mines the former Farc-Ep and ELN guerrilla. – a practice that is historically part of the

LM & UXO Victims – Colombia 2010-2020*

Source: Colombian Directorate for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines -DAICMA. Prepared by: Fundación Paz y Reconciliación Foundation.

Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia * Data for 2020 corresponds to the period between January 1 and June 30.

10 Department distribution of LM & UXO Victims – 2019

Source: Colombian Directorate for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines -DAICMA. Prepared by: Fundación Paz y Reconciliación Foundation

Department distribution of LM & UXO Victims – 2019

Source: Colombian Directorate for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines -DAICMA. Prepared by: Fundación Paz y Reconciliación Foundation. * Data for 2020 corresponds to the period between January 1 and June 30.

When comparing the periods running March-June 2019 with the same period of 2020, the results are as follows: Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

11 LM & UXO Victims, March-June 2019/2020

Source: Colombian Directorate for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines -DAICMA. Prepared by: Fundación Paz y Reconciliación Foundation. *

Similar to the case of landmines violence shows a sustained reduction and unexploded ordnance, kidnapping from 2012 to the present. In this sense, became part of the repertoire of much of the variation in kidnapping is action on the part of insurgent groups due to the Peace Agreement. – although not exclusively. This type of

Kidnapping – Colombia, 2010-2019

Source: CNP (Colombian National Police). Prepared by: Fundación Paz y Reconciliación Foundation.

There was an increase in cases in 2017 of the total cases, in addition to the fact and a slight decrease in 2018 in the 281 that most of these municipalities do not municipalities prioritized for the post- correspond to large cities or significant conflict. In 2019, kidnapping in this 25% conurbations. of the national territory accounts for 52% Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

12 Kidnapping – 281 municipalities prioritized for the post-conflict 2010-2019

Source: CNP (Colombian National Police). Prepared by: Fundación Paz y Reconciliación Foundation.

The operational balance sheet of the for Colombia in this sector. There was Defense Sector delivered by Minister also an increase in operations by the Carlos Holmes Trujillo in June 2020 shows Law Enforcement Agencies against a decrease in homicides, kidnappings ELN and organized crime through and high-impact crimes. This is a victory neutralizations1 .

ELN Members neutralized 2010-2020*

Source: General Command of the Military Forces and the Colombian National Police – Presentation of Achievements of the Defense Sector, June 2020: https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/estudios_sectoriales/info_ estadistica/Logros_Sector_Defensa.pdf. * 2020 data corresponds to the period running January 1 through June 30.

1 According to the balance presented by the Ministry of National Defense in June 2020, neutralizations in the case of the ELN include “demobilized, captured and killed in the development of operations of the Law Enforcement Agencies.” In the case of Organized Crime, they include captured and dead members. https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/ Documentos/descargas/estudios_sectoriales/info_estadistica/Logros_Sector_Defensa.pdf Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

13 Members of Organized Crime Neutralized 2010-2020*

As discussed in the sections that follow, territorial control and have expanded despite the increase in actions of the their presence. Similarly, terrorist acts, security forces (according to the balance subversive actions and massacres have of the MoD) Organized Armed Groups shown an increase in 2019 and in the in Colombia have strengthened their first half of 2020.

Acts of Terrorism 2010-2020*

14 The first five months of 2020 exceed the increase in the actions of the the total number of cases observed in Law Enforcement Agencies does not 2019 by 44 cases. In turn, the subversive correspond to a reduction in terrorist and actions of the first five months of subversive actions, which would indicate 2020 exceed the total presented in that intel work has failed to be effective the previous year by 10. In this sense, in preventing these phenomena.

Subversive Actions 2010-2020*

Source: Colombian National Police – Presentation of Achievements of the Defense Sector, June 2020: https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/estudios_sectoriales/info_ estadistica/Logros_Sector_Defensa.pdf. * 2020 data corresponds to the period running January 1 through June 30.

Another critical element presented in same perpetrating agents. the achievements of the Defense Sector of the Ministry of Defense is the increase This violence has increased in (what they call) collective homicides2. dramatically since 2019, evidencing These so-called collective homicides can the multiple existing disputes between be read as massacres, according to the illegal armed structures, and in turn definition adopted by the National Center the degradation of violence against the for Historical Memory – CNMH (from its civilian population. This is also a negative original Spanish language initials - Centro indicator of the action of the institutions Nacional de Memoria Histórica); in both in terms of guarantees of protection cases, this act consists of the murder of for the territories most affected by four or more defenseless people in the the armed conflict, where most of the same place, at the same time, by the massacres are concentrated.

2 Collective homicide is defined as: “...facts wherein four (4) or more persons are killed; cases where by action of the Law Enforcement Agencies, in its constitutional duty, four (4) or more criminals are killed are not counted. The victims of the Law Enforcement Agencies are not taken into account when they exceed four (4). For it to be classified as a collective homicide, the crime must be committed in the same place, at the same time, by the same perpetrators and in defenseless persons. These events are not counted as terrorist acts”. https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/ descargas/estudios_sectoriales/info_estadistica/Logros_Sector_Defensa.pdf Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

15 Collective Homicides (Cases) 2010-2020*

As can be seen in the graph of to the appointment of Darío Acevedo as ”collective homicides”, there was Director – there had been 16 massacres an increase in 10 cases in 2019 as until June 2020. This constitutes a compared to 2018, and only 7 in the first radical difference as compared to the five months of 2020. According to data official figures both in July and August, from Fundación Paz y Reconciliación as this figure increased to a total of 27 Foundation – whose definition criterion massacres this year. is limited to that provided by CNMH prior

Massacres* in Colombia, 2020

Source: Information System with Fundación Paz y Reconciliación-SIPARES. August figures’ cut-off date is Aug. th27 . Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

16 On the other hand, the figures people killed in a defenseless state with vary according to the source and the the same characteristics mentioned criteria used to define them. According above), there have been 47 massacres to the United Nations Office for the in the country from January 1, 2020 to Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs- August 31, 2020 resulting in 192 victims OCHA (whose criterion is three or more (August 31, 2020).

Massacres and number of victims in Colombia 2008-2020*

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs-OCHA. Prepared by: Fundación Paz y Reconciliación Foundation.

At any rate, massacres are increasing territories of the country. The National in Colombia. This goes to show the Government has also downplayed these worsening of territorial disputes between killings through generic statements illegal armed structures, whose target is saying that the cause of this violence in these cases the civilian population. is only disputes over drug trafficking, Recently, the discordant figures and and associating the victims with illegal definitions of massacres and mass activities without prior investigation. murders have sparked much controversy due to strong criticism from political For example, CNP General Jorge sectors, the civil society, communities Vargas has indicated a potential link and grassroots organizations for the use between several young victims of the of the euphemism collective murders on Samaniego massacre (which occurred the part of the National Government, in on August 15, 2020), with illegal activities, order to minimize the media impact of which has been emphatically rejected the violence that occurred in different by their families and people close to the Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

17 youths murdered. Of late, PARES had Moreover, the figures presented by access to videos in which soldiers of the Ministry of Defense on manual coca the Army insulted farmers in the south eradication are much higher in 2019 of the Department of Meta, and yelling than they were in previous years, whilst “guerrilla members dressed as civilians” cocaine seizures remain at historic highs, at them. These narratives revictimize the as shown in the graphs below. civilian population and put at an even greater risk.

Hectares of Coca Manually Eradicated, 2010-2020*

Tons of Cocaine Seized, 2010-2020*

18 Despite the increase in manual the same proportion as institutional eradication of coca and the maintenance action has increased. Interpreting the of cocaine seizures at levels above the two figures above, the phenomenon has average, the number of hectares of with increased abruptly – especially in 2018 coca in Colombia has not decreased in and 2019.

Hectares with Coca, Colombia 2012-2019

Source: Colombian Drug Information System-SIDCO. Prepared by: Fundación Paz & Reconciliación Foundation. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

19 Presence of Organized Armed Groups and Illegal Armed Groups

The field research carried out in violence3 has shown the following: multiple areas particularly affected by

1. There is a strengthening of Organized Armed Groups in Colombia – mainly Ejército Nacional de Liberación - ELN, Clan del Golfo, Post-Farc Armed Groups and Caparrapos. Said strengthening has become apparent mainly in terms of their in expansion to municipalities vacated by Farc-Ep, an increase in territorial management – for instance with the declaration of curfews or various types of restrictions on mobility and targeted violence.

2. In some municipalities, the consolidation of an Organized Armed Group as the dominant one reduces violent actions as there is no armed competition – with the exception of actions by the Law Enforcement Agencies.

3. The situation of dispute between organized armed groups– mainly territorial control and income from illegal economies such as the production and commercialization of cocaine, criminal large-scale mining, smuggling and trafficking and exploitation of migrants from Venezuela increases violent actions in some municipalities. This situation is taking place in some municipalities of Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, Norte de Santander, Chocó, Putumayo and north of the Cauca department. The subsequent confrontations have resulted mainly in forced displacement (this figure is on an increasing trend), confinement and massacres.

This report explores the security in the midst of the pandemic, and the dynamics at the national level from the manner in which this global health perspective of the presence and actions emergency has had a particular impact of Organized Armed Groups (GAOs) on the situation.

3 Putumayo, Guaviare, Meta, Caquetá, Nariño, Pacific, North of Cauca, Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, South of Córdoba, North of Santander and Guajira. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

20 ELN: National perspective in times of COVID-19

Variation in the homicide rate, March-May 2019/2020 167 municipalities with presence of ELN Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

21 Presence and organizational structure

ELN currently groups over 3,000 Chocó through the Western War Front, combatants distributed in 167 places where there has recently been municipalities, in 17 departments of a constant offensive action against the country. In addition, ELN has a the Law Enforcement Agencies and presence in the Venezuelan territory organized armed groups such as Clan del with an estimate of half of these armed Golfo, EPL or Pelusos and Los Rastrojos. men – especially in the border area with In southern Bolívar and Cauca, there Colombia. In addition to this number of are substructures of ELN that have armed members is a (so far inaccurate) been weakened by the offensive of number of militias or support networks the Law Enforcement Agencies in the that are part of the group. This part first department, and Post-Farc Armed could very well be twice as many men Groups in the second. and women in arms. The structure of the ELN is Each of these confrontations takes characterized by the existence of fronts place within the context of a military with a wide margin of autonomy, despite consolidation of the guerrilla group, the operation of a Central Command a strategy of expansion to territories (COCE) and a National Directorate. These of former Farc-Ep presence (after the are fronts with presence in specific signing of the Peace Agreement signed regions of these 17 departments of the by Farc-Ep), as well as a dispute due country: The Northern War Front, The to the incursion or maintenance in the Eastern War Front, The Darío Ramírez control of illegal economies of interest to War Front, The Central War Front, The the ELN such as illegal mining, smuggling Western War Front, The Southwest War (cattle, cheese, gasoline, inter alia), drug Front and The Northeast War Front. Lack trafficking and illegal crossings in border of political and military homogeneity of areas. these fronts is expressed in the different territories where they are present, With respect to repertoires of showing a variation in each in regard violence, the actions of the ELN to the relationship with other Armed are largely linked to acts of forced Groups, the Law Enforcement Agencies displacement, confinement, recruitment and the civil society. This variation is forced mobility restrictions, threats observed in two key aspects regarding and kidnapping. Forced displacement the ELN’s repertoires of action (among is related to disputes with other legal others). and illegal armed groups. These forms of victimization are concentrated in On the one hand, there is a belligerent areas like Chocó, Antioquia, Nariño and action of greater capacity to the east Norte de Santander. Additionally, ELN of the country in Arauca and Norte has a strategy which can be observed de Santander, with the Eastern and within the framework of these disputes Northeastern War Fronts, respectively, seeking to contain the military offensive and to the west, in the department of through the use of antipersonnel mines. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

22 This can be evinced in the concentration social dynamics and assuming functions of 92%4 of the victims of these artifacts of control and regulation of activities during January and May 2020 in areas and social processes. This control has where ELN is present – specifically in 19 been exercised through rules of conduct municipalities of six departments (Map and prohibitions directed at the civilian 1), of the 17 in which ELN has presence. population, as is the case in Arauca, Nariño, Catatumbo (Norte de Santander) Curfews and threats are more and the south of Bolívar. recurrent repertoires in areas where ELN has reached a greater insertion into

Repertoire of Action during the COVID-19 pandemic

At least 27 acts of war and 22 Estructura Décima Martin Villa in the human rights affectations linked to department) has led to a much greater the ELN have been reported during de-escalation of violence against the period of mandatory isolation the civilian population than in other due to COVID-19. These have been departments during the isolation due concentrated in Antioquia, Arauca, to COVID-19. “They are fighting between Bolívar, Cauca, Chocó, Nariño, Norte de armed forces; they have left us civilians Santander and Venezuela. This evinces in peace”, says a social leader from the organizational variety of this illegal Arauca, referring to the behavior of the armed structure. ELN between March and June 2020.

On the one hand, there is an ELN On the other hand, there is another in Arauca with a hegemonic presence ELN in dispute with other illegal armed and an important belligerent capacity actors within the framework of a that translates into broad social shared territorial presence, such as in control and an offensive capacity to Antioquia, Chocó, Norte de Santander, act in warfare – shown, among other Cauca and Nariño, where the strategy things, in the imposition of mobility of expansion to municipalities of former restrictions on civilians, actions against control by Farc-Ep has cost them strong the Law Enforcement Agencies and oil confrontations with actors such as Clan infrastructure during the mandatory del Golfo, EPL or Pelusos, and GAPF such isolation dues to COVID-19. The non- as the Oliver Sinisterra Front, among existence of disputes with other illegal others. Antioquia and Chocó have been armed groups (despite the presence the main scenarios of confrontation – of the Post Farc Armed Group - GAPF intensifying even in times of mandatory

4 Calculation estimated from the database of victims of antipersonnel mines (January-May 2020) by Descontamina Colombia. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

23 isolation, as though it had been an condition, it became impossible to opportunity for the ELN to advance in transport the minor to the health center the offensive against its enemies. Below of the municipality due military control are some of the main dispute scenarios. operations imposed by these Armed Groups (Interchurch Commission for With regard to Antioquia and Chocó, Justice and Peace, 2020). ELN has maintained clashes during the quarantine against Clan del Golfo – a According to the Ombudsman’s Office group with which it has been in dispute (Early Warning 025-19, 2019), clashed since 2016 for the control of illegal mining along the coast of San Juan (south of and drug trafficking, especially from a Chocó) are due to: regulatory activity through grammage. Former combatants in the process of reincorporation in the municipality of Frontino (Antioquia) have been amongst the main victims of these confrontations; in April, three of them (along with their families) were forced to leave the New Regrouping Point (NPR) located in the municipality, after receiving death threats from Clan del Golfo, within the context of the dispute with the ELN guerrilla (Pares, 2020).

As for Chocó, both groups had agreed to a non-aggression pact during 2018. However, this agreement seems to have ended at the end of 2019, and so far in 2020 (especially during the national quarantine) there has been an intensification of confrontations between the two groups, leaving a balance of 393 people (74 families) displaced from the Emberá community and 969 people confined in the rural area of the municipality of Bojayá after several days of clashes at the end of March and the beginning of April, among others (OCHA, 2020). Disputes between these groups to the south of the department of Chocó (on the coast of San Juan) have also led to the confinement of communities in the area, even leading to the death of a minor in the Wounnan community; being in a serious health Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

24 The geostrategic position of the municipality and the advantages derived from their condition, as they have an outlet to the Pacific Ocean and communicate with the municipality of Buenaventura and at large with the department of Valle de Cauca and Risaralda using the area of tidelands, which allow the mobility of illegal armed groups, drug trafficking, weapons trafficking from Choco and the interior of the country, for commercialization and shipments to international markets.

A similar situation is found in Cauca and a minor who would later die in combat Nariño. However, ELN’s dispute there is with the National Army, among others. geared against Post-Fact Armed Groups “(…) Due to the aforementioned events, (GAPFs) Frente Carlos Patiño and Jaime we hereby inform all the communities Martínez in Cauca, and Frente Oliver that Ejército Nacional de Liberación – Sinisterra in Nariño. ELN has openly ELN - will continue fighting these criminal announced its fight against these groups, gangs to the point where they are declaring curfews and warning of violent exterminated” (ELN, 2020). In addition to actions in response to the violence the elements above, there is a financial carried out by these groups against the interest in the control of the illegal civilian population, including the murder economies between both departments of two social leaders, the recruitment of in relation to coca crops.

Pamphlet of April 19, 2020 released by the ELN in Algeria, Cauca. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

25 Meanwhile in the east of the country Additionally, with regard to illegal ELN maintains a dispute against the economies different from drug trafficking, EPL or Pelusos in the Catatumbo sub- these trails represent an incentive for ELN region and Los Rastrojos in the Cucuta to the extent that this illegal armed group metropolitan area. Since an Armed Strike “controls, today, a very high percentage of was declared by the ELN and the EPL in businesses such as smuggling fuel, meat Catatumbo, an advance has begun to and coal, and extortion and kidnapping. become verifiable towards the border of All of this is done, in part, at the expense the Metropolitan Area of Cucuta, where of the recruited migrant population and it led to the withdrawal of Los Rastrojos silent but sustained political work among (allies of the EPL) from their main the social fabric (with cultural, productive checkpoint in Bocas de Grita, Táchira and educational entities) and patiently (Venezuela). This has even generated penetrated social and community clashes between the latter group and networks” (El Colombiano, 20205 . This the Bolivarian National Armed Force. situation shows place gained by ELN on both sides of the border - especially The dispute against Rastrojos in Cucuta, in the sectors of the States of Zulia and Puerto Santander and Villa del Rosario is Táchira adjacent to the Catatumbo and due to a confrontation for the control of Metropolitan Area of Cucuta, in addition drug trafficking routes and other illegal to the State of Apure on the border with border economies under broad control Arauca. Although the presence of ELN of this Organized Armed Group (Pares, in the neighboring country has been 2020b). This control includes the trails, historical6 , it has become more evident which are particularly critical in Norte de through very active recent military actions Santander for the mobility of supplies – even amid the border closure resulting for the production and distribution of from the isolation measures due to cocaine hydrochloride. According to COVID-19, plus what looks like political- sources on the ground several of the military support with failure on the part trails remained active even during the of the Venezuelan law enforcement in national quarantine and in the middle light of the actions of ELN. of the border closure, thus allowing the transport of supplies for the processing of The effects of these disputes between cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride ELN with and other illegal Armed Groups in illegal passages such as La Piragua on civilians are fully visible (among and Boca Grita, in Puerto Santander; El other) when observing homicidal Águila, La Carbonera and El Escobal, in violence nationwide during the months Cucuta; in addition to those located in of the national quarantine as compared Tibú in the sector known as Tres Bocas. the same period in 2019, based on

5 However, the dispute between ELN and Rastrojos in this area of the department continues to be mainly due to the control of drug trafficking routes, taking into account the greater relevance that this economy acquires in the framework of the municipality with the highest concentration of crops of coca in the country, Tibú (19,892 has) (UNODC, 2019). 6 “Where there are ELN forces, there are ELN commanders and there is also a very concrete reality, all these communities are binational, i.e. they have 2 nationalities, each boy or girl born on that border has 2 identification cards. Many of our Commanders and our combatants have both ID cards, […] that has always been the case, this is what happens with the ELN” (Pablo Beltrán in Reuter News Agency Interview conducted on May 28, 2020). Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

26 figures from the National Institute of Command and part of the Negotiating Legal Medicine (INML, 2020). Thus, the Delegation, recently confirmed the number of homicides increased between recurrent use of these devices, noting: March and May 2020, in some of the “They are used defensively and offensively, municipalities that report simultaneous all of our camps have peripheral security presence of ELN and other armed with mines, like all the bases of the Army groups, such as Frontino, Antioquia (with and the Police do. Colombia is a country a 200% increase); El Tambo (260%) and at war and mines are the best soldier”. Mercaderes (500%) in Cauca; Quibdó Reuter news agency. Interview conducted (207%) in Chocó; Leiva (300%) in Nariño; on May 28, 2020. Puerto Santander (250%) and El Tarra (300%) in Norte de Santander, inter alia.

Also (as stated throughout this document), the product of these conflict scenarios amidst the health emergency doe to COVID-19 have included recurrent acts of forced displacement, confinement, Curfews7 , threats8 , kidnapping9 in these areas of the country, and most especially forced recruitment, as confirmed by sources in the territory and the Attorney General’s Office (2020). Similarly worrying is the increase in the number of victims of antipersonnel mines. There was a total of 59 victims between January and May 2020 (Graph 1) in 19 municipalities of 6 of the 17 departments in which ELN is present – 92% of the country’s total victims for 2020 (64 people). 61 victims were reported nationwide during this same period in 2019, according to data from Descontamina Colombia, 2020. Pablo Beltrán – member of the ELN Central

7Mandatory curfews, except in health emergencies or funerals. “Any persons caught wandering the streets, the roads or in any other place where they can become infected [we will be in the obligation to give them their deserved punishment] / [People who are carriers of the COVID 19 virus, have not isolated themselves and consequently are spreading the disease, will receive the revolutionary punishment] Frente Jaime Toño Obando - War Front of Ejército Nacional de Liberación. 8 Threats for disobedience to isolation measures. “In the event of failure to heed the call with the intention of saving many lives, you will be liable before ELN. Let’s avoid such a great calamity...” Frente Héroes y Mártires de Santa Rosa of Ejército Nacional de Liberación. Threats also directed at banks and daily lenders to stop the collection of payments to the community. “Banking entities shall refrain from collecting bank fees. Daily lenders shall stop their collections until March 30, so people on a daily livelihood can make their purchases for the whole quarantine” – Frente Héroes y Mártires de Santa Rosa of Ejército Nacional de Liberación. 9 22 people kidnapped between January and May (MoD Statistical Data Group, 2020). Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

27 Graph: Own preparation upon the basis of figures from Descontamina Colombia (2020).

With regard to the Law Enforcement the latter department (in the municipality nationwide there is a large number of of Montecristo, south of Bolívar). This combats, skirmishes and kills wherein event was described as a disproportionate ELN has been involved. There were 36 use of force by ELN (Reuter News Agency, events between March 24 and June 24, 2020). 2020 (SIPARES, 2020). The MoD reports 16 ELN members killed in operations as of May 2020, in addition to 116 demobilized members and 176 captured between January and May 2020 (MoD Statistical Information Group, 2020). ELN member arrests has been especially concentrated in the departments of Arauca, Norte de Santander and Bolívar. Aka Gallero – a member of the National Directorate of the ELN and delegated by the Central Command before the Darío Ramírez Castro War Front – was terminated alongside 4 more guerrilla members (Semana, 2020) after a bombing by the Law Enforcement Agencies on May 14, 2020 in

10 En todos los municipios de la gráfica se identifica presencia del ELN, excepto aquellos resaltados en color verde. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

28 Main conclusions

• The military and social consolidation and strengthening of the ELN is maintained in areas of historical presence such as Arauca, Norte de Santander, Chocó and Nariño, which began to become visible in 2017 and has intensified since 2019, after the Negotiating Dialogue Table was set up with the government of Iván Duque. This has been demonstrated most clearly in the military actions during the health emergency due to COVID-19. Despite compliance with the Unilateral Ceasefire in April as a humanitarian gesture amid the emergency, ELN maintained its offensive actions – especially against Clan del Golfo, Rastrojos and GAPFs besides the Law Enforcement Agencies in the aforementioned territories.

• However, there are still areas of lower activity where the confrontations of these groups – especially the Law Enforcement Agencies – has generated significant blows against ELN, such as in the South of Bolivar or the department of Cauca with the resulting withdrawal of the offensive on the part of GAPFs. The dispute with other Illegal Armed Structures such as GAPFs is beginning to respond to the growth scenario of these latter groups in the country, which produces a rapidly changing dynamic regarding alliances and disputes for control of the territory.

• Affectations on human rights in times of national quarantine by the ELN have been mainly due to the combats held with the other illegal armed units. There have been damages from the use of antipersonnel mines, forced displacement and confinement. The acts of direct violence against the civilian population attributable to the group are less proportional, with the exception of kidnapping and forced recruitment. This does not mean that homicidal violence does not represent a characteristic scenario of the areas where this group is present and clashes with other Illegal Armed Structures. Social control exercised by ELN around the isolation measures due to COVID-19 through curfews, restrictions on movement, checkpoints and death threats against people who do not abide by these measures is much stronger in the areas of greater hegemony of this armed structure.

Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

29 • The possibilities of dialogue between the National Government and the guerrilla group are almost nonexistent, despite the repeated willingness of the Delegation of Dialogues of the ELN. This is due chiefly to the resistance of the government of Iván Duque to continue with these talks, under the argument of the continuous criminal actions of the ELN – which have been reiterated even during the most recent formal request of the ELN for a Bilateral Ceasefire, based on the call of the UN Security Council to stop hostilities. This situation is also due to a context that is less and less conducive to the configuration of incentives for the ELN – especially on the part of fronts and commanders that insist on strengthening the armed forces.

• Thus, breaches in implementation of the Peace Agreement and the increasing selective murder of ex-combatants linked to the reincorporation process, added to the consolidation of a presence of the illegal armed group on both sides of the border area between Colombia and Venezuela (where they are expanding their military and social control over the main illegal economies in this area of the country, including drug trafficking in Norte de Santander, smuggling in Arauca and illegal mining in the department of Vichada) make a negotiated solution very difficult at this time. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

30 Post-Farc Armed Groups (GAPFs): National perspective in times of COVID-19

Presence of GAPFs in Colombia – June 2020 Variation in homicide rate – March-May 113 municipalities with presence of GAPFs Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

31 Post-Farc Armed Groups (GAPFs) their participation in the war economies are understood by Fundación Paz y managed by the now extinct Farc-Ep. Reconciliación Foundation as illegal armed groups made up mainly of some Below we present a brief ex-combatants of the extinct Farc-Ep who characterization of these groups never participated or did not continue in spanning from their emergence, the peace process and decided to rearm territorial presence, organizational to continue illegal activities. These are structure and current action, to an heterogeneous groups that differ in emphasis on the national quarantine their motivations, composition and form period due to COVID-19. Next, we will of organization. In addition, GAPFs have present the main dispute scenarios that proven to have a very dynamic character explain the dynamics of recent violence within which the emergence of new in departments where the presence of groups and disputes between them are most of these GAPFs is concentrated, constantly produced. i.e. in the south and west of the country. Finally, we will propose a reconfiguration This are characteristics of a complex scenario with respect to the alliances phenomenon, wherein it is important and disputes of these GAPFs that would to understand and analyze its existence appear to be quickly reorganizing and actions. GAPFs are not understood themselves upon the basis of two as dissidents or deserters; regional commands that separately demand the dynamics show in some cases, that unification of these groups throughout the unification of structures does the country. not necessarily respond to a political nature. Also, in most cases GAPFs are structures motivated exclusively by

Presence, organizational structure and actions

The first Post-Farc Armed Groups combatants in Guaviare who had (GAPF) in Colombia were formed in the already withdrawn from the process. Amazon and the Colombian Pacific. This is how the largest GAPF currently They first emerged in the Amazon with with presence in the country came to be, ca. 300 former members of FARC Fronts under the command of a guerrilla fighter 1 and 7 who did not participate in the with more than 40 years of experience process and continued illegal activities in Farc. According to military intelligence in Guaviare, Guainía and Vaupés. This information, Gentil Duarte is currently group is currently known as GAPF Frente at the command 1,700 men and women Primero or Bloque Suroriental. Other in arms (intelligence document cited in El structures arise from here under the Tiempo, 2020), which represents 65% of command of Gentil Duarte, who walked the total number of combatants linked out of the Peace Agreement, partnered to GAPFs in the country. with Néstor Gregorio Fernández, aka Iván Mordisco and joined the ex- Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

32 On the other hand, over 200 ex-Farc by Gentil Duarte. Secondly, Scattered men began to form the groups Gente GAPFs display a repertoire of violence de Orden, Guerrillas Unidas del Pacífico characterized by selective assassinations (GUP) and Frente Oliver Sinisterra (FOS) of social leaders. Thirdly, Scattered in the Pacific area – specifically in the GAPFs have their origin and predatory municipality of Tumaco, Nariño. The actions in the west of the country – first of these groups emerged mid-2016 especially in southwestern Colombia in the rural area of Tumaco with 200 around illicit crops: production, control people, half of them ex-militia members and export of cocaine hydrochloride. of the guerrilla group who did not join the Some of them even have alliances with peace process, as well as the members groups such as Clan del Golfo – one of of the second group (GUP), made up the largest criminal organizations in of some former members of the 29th the country controlling 45% of the drug front, initially commanded by ’Don Ye’. output (Ávila, 2017). According to recent In turn, Frente Oliver Sinisterra Front figures (El Tiempo, 2020), Fundación Paz – one of the largest in the region, was y Reconciliación Foundation estimates made up of some former members of that these Scattered GAPFs gather over the Daniel Aldana mobile column, under 700 combatants today. the command of Walter Patricio Arizála, aka Guacho. In 2017, Guacho claimed to All these first GAPFs – consolidated in command a structure 250 men strong just two years between the end of 2016 who reorganized after Farc laid down its and 2018 – were just the beginning of an arms while the guerrilla was beginning important phenomenon that has gained to demobilize in the village of El Playón, greater strength with the emergence of Tumaco. new GAPFs in these and other regions of the country, especially in departments The last type of GAPFs – called where there was already a significant Scattered GAPFs by Fundación presence of this type of structures: Paz y Reconciliación Foundation is Cauca, Nariño, Putumayo, Norte de characterized by three aspects. Firstly, Santander, inter alia. due to the autonomous and disjointed character they acquired with respect These are 10 groups consolidated to the GAPFs that aligned themselves after the declaration of “Segunda under the command of Gentil Duarte Marquetalia” in August 2019, when a at the time of its organization, thus group of former commanders of the expressing an absence of aspiration to extinct FARC (namely Iván Márquez, consolidate within a larger structure Jesús Santrich, El Paisa and Romaña) with a national character. This announced that they would lead the characteristic was shown at least initially reordering of this guerrilla, rising again because – as will be presented later – as in arms in areas of former influence. a criminal reconfiguration scenario has From that moment on, GAPFs Front become visible during the time of the 18, Front 5, a faction of the Frente COVID-19 pandemic within which some Décimo Martín Villa, Front 33 Danilo of these Scattered GAPFs have begun García, among others, have organized to adhere to the GAPF guidelines led under that leadership. According to the Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

33 intelligence information revealed by El The multiplicity of GAPFs throughout Tiempo, Segunda Marquetalia would the country has implied the existence have 202 combatants since their return of disputes and alliances between them to arms (El Tiempo, 2020). and other types of illegal armed groups such as Clan del Golfo, ELN and EPL. This panorama results in a presence Thus, in the areas with the greatest at the national level of 30 GAPFs, presence of GAPF there are dynamics among those organized by Duarte, of violence that have evolved rapidly, Márquez and the Scattered GAPFs, setting off alarms both in terms of human throughout 113 municipalities. 44 of rights and in the behavior of the main these municipalities are part of the illegal economies in these territories. 281 municipalities prioritized for the The actions of GAPFs amid the national post-conflict or have historically had quarantine demonstrate the use of presence of the extinct Farc-Ep prior to the mandatory isolation measures on the end of the conflict. 19 departments the part of GAPFs to perpetrate harsh have GAPFs; the departments of Cauca, violence against their military targets Nariño, Norte de Santander, Guaviare, (both from other illegal armed groups Meta, Putumayo and Antioquia have a and the civil society); this has resulted in wide territorial presence (Map 1). a worrying number of selective murders in the areas where these groups are Its accelerated growth between present. 2016 and 2020 is most clearly seen in the increase in the number of ex- Selective murder is part of one of the combatants linked to these groups, from most recurrent repertoires of violence 1600 men and women in arms in 2018 of these groups; of 81 selective murders to more than 1800 at the end of 2019 in at the national level between March 24 85 municipalities (Pares, 2019), to 2,600 and June 30, 2020, registered by the combatants by May 2020 as a result of new Information System of the Fundación Paz recruits (intelligence document cited by y Reconciliación Foundation (SIPARES), El Tiempo, 2020). 94% of ex-combatants 23 have been identified as perpetrated in the process of reincorporation by GAPFs in Cauca (18), Antioquia (3), (12,767 ex-combatants out of a total of Putumayo (1) and Tolima (1). Of these 13,510 – Agency for Reincorporation victims, four (4) were indigenous leaders, and Normalization ARN), 2020) currently two (2) community leaders - JAC, two (2) remain in this process after the signing peasant leaders, two (2) people in the of the Peace Agreement. This confirms process of reincorporation and 2 of their that the recruitment of these GAPFs relatives inter alia. does not correspond to recidivism of former Farc-Ep combatants who joined Also as a result of the presence of the peace process, but mainly to new these GAPFs – and above all resulting recruits among the civilian population, from the disputes they wage over combatants who never joined the territorial control – there has been an Agreement, and people linked to other increase in homicides amidst the national illegal armed groups. quarantine in 29 municipalities of the 113 in which they are present. These Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

34 numbers are according to homicide During the national quarantine rates compared to the months between between March 24 and June 30, Fundación March and May 2019 and 2020, based Paz y Reconciliación Foundation has on figures from Colombia’s National identified 64 human rights violations and Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic 69 acts of war related to GAPFs (SIPARES, Sciences - INMLCF (INML, 2020). The 2020). The effects on human rights are most alarming increases in homicides mainly concentrated in Cauca, Nariño, have taken place in Uribe, Meta (350 %); Antioquia, Caquetá, Arauca, Putumayo El Tarra , Norte de Santander (247 %); and Tolima; not only have murders been El Tambo (159 %) and Toribío (150%), in committed here, but there have also Cauca; Puerto Asís (141%) and Puerto been cases of forced displacement and Leguízamo (10 3%), in Putumayo ; and threats against social leaders (Graph 1). Yarumal, Antioquia (100%) – Map 1. There has also been excessive, violent social control, regarding the isolation measures due to COVID-19.

Human rights violations by GAPFs during the national quarantine

Source: SIPARES (figures between March 24 and June 30, 2020). Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

35 To the 69 military actions are related to Thus, the military actions are the confrontations for territorial control concentrated in the dispute with other with other illegal armed structures. armed actors around the control of Combats with Law Enforcement illicit economies – especially in the Agencies are not part of the recurring war west of the country. Violence in this repertoire of GAPFs; this supports the area includes, the dynamics of GAPFs characterization of these groups based located along the Pacific region (among on their predatory economic interests others); Scattered GAPFs are especially and the range of political interests; located here, i.e. Frente Oliver Sinisterra despite the self-proclaimed subversive Front, Guerrillas Unidas del Pacífico legacy of most of these GAPFs in terms GAPF, Frente Estiven González Front, of the destabilization of the State. Added GAPF Frente Carlos Patiño Front and to this is a relationship with the civilian GAPF Rafael Aguilera, or Frente 30, in population that does not correspond to addition to the two remaining scattered a project of articulation with the social GAPFs located outside the region in the processes of the communities; on the departments of Antioquia (GAPF Frente contrary, it is based on the imposition of 36) and Putumayo (GAPF Frente 48). power through violence. These are the scenarios of the strongest

Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

36 disputes around drug trafficking the vicinity of Nudo de Paramillo” (Early revenues, as a result of its strategic place Warning 044-20). Lastly, what appears in the production and export of cocaine to be a decrease in the capacity to act hydrochloride. In the first place, this is of GAPF Frente 36, commanded by alias the area with the highest concentration “Cabuyo”, in the face of the operations of of coca crops at the national level, the Law Enforcement Agencies against according to figures from UNODC (2019), them. with municipalities such as Tumaco There is concern about the way in (11,830 ha) and El Charco (5,318 ha) in which the clashes between these illegal Nariño; El Tambo (7,102 ha), Cauca; armed structures have not stopped and Puerto Asís (6,809 ha), Putumayo. during the COVID-19 pandemic, thus The international connection of these taking place in Antioquia between April corridors through the Pacific Ocean is and May 2020 that have resulted in the also highly relevant. Lastly is incentive confinement and subsequent forced represented by criminal revenues displacement of more than 90 people in around illegal mining. The main disputes Ituango, who has been forced to mobilize of these Scattered GAPFs in this area towards the Territorial Space for Training of the country are with Clan del Golfo, and Reincoporation (ETCR) of Santa Lucía ELN, EPL and GAPFs Gentil Duarte and village in the same municipality (Caracol Segunda Marquetalia, with Cauca being Radio, 2020), seeking refuge from the one of the main scenarios11 . clashes between the two illegal armed groups which have killed four civilians. The dispute against Clan del Golfo is particularly strong in the department Contrarily, in Putumayo, Cauca and of Antioquia, where GAPF Frente 18 Nariño, there is an intense dispute (commanded by aka Román Ruíz), in between GAPFs. In this department addition to the GAPFs led by Iván Márquez, there are confrontations specifically has agreed to a military alliance with between GAPF Frente Carolina Ramírez Caparros in the municipalities of Tarazá Front, of the line commanded by Gentil and Ituango, in addition to the south of Duarte, and Scattered GAPFs Frente Córdoba, to attack this armed structure. 32 and 48, related to the criminal The confrontation between these organization La Constru and a recent groups is produced by the control of group of which there is still no more the processing of cocaine hydrochloride information called La Mafia Sinaloa. and the commercialization routes, These confrontations – in addition to taking three factors into account (Early daily threats to the inhabitants and Warning 004 - 20). Firstly, the rapid leaders and social leaders – have left a growth that GAPF Frente 18 has had in balance during the national quarantine the municipality of Ituango. Secondly, (between March 24 and June 2020) of, the alleged “alliances with emissaries of two (2) ex-combatants in the process Central American drug cartels to whom of reincorporation assassinated and they sell the coca grown and processed in one (1) President of the Community

11 This context is developed in further detail in the section dedicated to the North of Cauca. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

37 Action Board (JAC) (SIPARES, 2020). the repertoires of violence in Nariño As with the case of the departments that have continued during the health above, the dispute arises mainly emergency. over the management of coca crops and the production or crystallization This type of confrontation is becoming laboratories located in the department more and more recurrent between – particularly in the municipality of GAPFs at the national level, who until Puerto Asís. Another criminal objective mid-2019 had generally been fighting is the distribution routes connecting with other illegal armed structures or Putumayo with Ecuador, wherefrom between the Scattered GAPFs and those shipments are made to Central America, recognized under the line of Gentil the United States and Europe. Duarte, but that began to generate some reconfigurations after the end of 2019, A similar situation occurs in Nariño with the emergence of the Segunda in the municipalities of the Telembí Marquetalia line, wherein this last type Triangle and the banks of the Patía River; of GAPFs is advancing very quickly. there have been confrontations in recent months (between May and June 2020), in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, between Scattered GAPF Frente Oliver Sinisterra Front (FOS) - presumably aligned only a few months ago with the Gentil Duarte line, and GAPF Frente 30, which would be made up of dissidents from FOS and would of late be recently abiding by the guidelines of Segunda Marquetalia – led by Iván Márquez.

The latter have caused the Forced displacement of various communities, with reports that 82% of the people displaced nationwide between January and May 2020 have concentrated in departments of the Pacific region. 74% of the displaced persons correspond to people from Afro-Colombian (49%) and indigenous (25%) communities. 30% of the confinement focused on the

Departments of Choco, Antioquia and Nariño, affecting ethnic communities. Disappearances, homicides with signs of torture, mobility restrictions and threats to the civilian population – especially migrants –are just some of Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

38 Scattered GAPFs adhering to Gentil Duarte and Iván Márquez’ GAPFs?

The escalation of these disputes important drug trafficking route would between GAPFs (clearly evident during be developing in the departments of the COVID-19 pandemic) must be Caquetá, south of Meta and west of understood in light of one key issue: Guaviare from the Orinoco and the the organizational importance of Gentil Amazon to the borders with Brazil and Duarte for the GAPFs across the country Venezuela, within the framework of an currently responding to this guideline. alleged relationship with the Sinaloa The military and economic capacity of Cartel through GAPFs Frente Séptimo GAPFs led by Gentil Duarte (starting with Front and Frente 16 Front. GAPF Frente Primero Front), is observed in the concentration of weapons in the These capabilities translate into south of the country where it is located greater incentives for GAPFs that are and the increasing control it acquires in already supported by this command, the drug trafficking chain. but also for Scattered GAPFs, which have less military capacity vis-à-vis territorial This fact is evidenced in recent presence and number of combatants, recurring operations of the Law and can be subjected to adhesion by Enforcement Agencies in Guaviare, a larger structure like the one that Putumayo and Meta, where they have Duarte intends to organize under his found clandestine explosive factories command. This, in turn, poses a threat and hideouts with long war weapons to the line of Iván Márquez who (in and other material belonging to Frente 1 addition to growing) has sought to unify GAPF 12 (at least five of these complexes the country’s GAPFs under Segunda were found by the Army during the Marquetalia, even inviting Gentil Duarte health emergency – SIPARES, 2020). It to be part of his project. is further evidenced that Gentil Duarte “has its own crop structures and coca Given the impossibility of the production, thus becoming the largest consolidation of both commanders due cocaine factory in Colombia [Tibú, Norte to Duarte’s categorical rejection of such de Santander], with great power in terms a proposal, there seems to have been of budget and weaponry” (La Opinion, an intensification of the confrontations 2020), which allows it to control 20% of between the GAPFs led by each illicit crops in the Catatumbo subregion commanders, also implying a dispute through participation in a large part of for the adhesion of Scattered GAPFs the drug trafficking chain. They have to their ranks. Amidst this scenario, their own coca crops, laboratories and the Scattered GAPFs have responded some routes to Venezuela, as reported violently and, in only a few cases (under by the same source. Similarly, , an the panorama of military and economic

12 Este panorama permite pensar en el “legado bélico” que, siguiendo el poder que tuvo el Frente 1 de las extintas FARC en esta zona del país, busca abanderar Gentil Duarte con la reunión de GAPF que recoge y pretende unificar. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

39 incentives related to drug trafficking), understand the intense disputes in have they give in and adhered to the Telembí Triangle and the banks of broader guidelines such as those of the Patía River that have taken place Gentil Duarte, as it has been evidenced during the national quarantine due to in Cauca and presumed in Nariño. COVID-19, and which have exacerbated Information from secondary sources (on the complex humanitarian situation. which sufficient confirmation has not yet been obtained through sources on These confrontations between the the ground), indicate that the Scattered GAPFs grouped by Duarte and Márquez GAPF Frente Oliver Sinisterra Front (FOS) have already advanced and escalated (in – located in Nariño with 350 combatants, addition to the departments highlighted “today is torn between loyalty to Duarte throughout this report) in the border and Márquez”. Aka Andrés or Allende area with Venezuela along Arauca and – second in command of this group – Norte de Santander, where combatants would have been called by Gentil Duarte and commanders of Segunda and appointed head of the Western Marquetalia allegedly have significant Block, a new structure subordinate to presence (La Opinion, 2020). However, the command of Duarte. a clear consolidation of Duarte’s power is observed in this eastern part of the “This commander promised aka country with GAPF Frente 33 Mariscal Andrés to support him with men and Sucre (Catatumbo, Norte de Santander) weapons, and to be his direct link and the Estructura Décima Martín Villa with the Mexican cartels”. In turn, aka (Arauca). The statement made by the “Comandante Gringo” – FOS main commander of GAPF Frente 33 (located leader – would have sided with Márquez in Catatumbo) is very telling of the and his “Segunda Marquetalia”. This widening gap between this command reconfiguration would allow us to and that of Márquez.

“Iván Márquez and Jesús Santrich, among others, call themselves Segunda Marquetalia – a project that to this day has not been consulted with all the guerrilla units deployed throughout the national territory. For this reason, we do not relate to this proposal. […] We have decided to give continuity to the Farc-EP project with the ideals of our Marquetalian (sic) martyrs under the direction of comrades Gentil Duarte, Iván Mordisco and Eduardo Posada, among others ”13. John Milicia aka John Catatumbo – is the commander of GAPF Frente 33 located in the Catatumbo subregion, Norte de Santander.

13 A GAPF from Segunda Marquetalia has allegedly been trying to contest the power of John Catatumbo in the GAPF since mid-2019, through aka Villa. This GAPF walked out of the peace process without having the expected results, and failed to consolidate the GAPF of Marquetalians – which also claimed the flags of the 33rd Front in Catatumbo, and for now seem to have lost territorial presence. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

40 Thus, as it stands the GAPF line led well as some fronts and blocks under by Márquez has eagerly expressed its which the structure would be organized. interest in achieving the organizational This is also a military strategy of “acting structure of the extinct FARC-EP without in small armed commissions, with much success. They have been doing mobile camps and coordination, as well so by calling for the unification of the as structuring their former collaborators different GAPFs formed in the country. as intelligence services to keep them The GAPF line led by Márquez has also informed as to the movements of the been configuring a central body such as troops and the presence of the Police the Secretariat (Secretariado) and the and the Prosecutor’s Office” (El Nuevo Major Command (El Estado Mayor), as Siglo, 2020).

Main conclusions

The growth of the GAPFs led by Under this context, it is important to Márquez and Gentil Duarte – especially move forward in monitoring the place of the latter – has led to an accelerated the Mexican cartels as catalysts for these intensification of the disputes between structures and disputes, bearing in mind these groups and the reconfiguration that they could have wider interference of some dispersed GAPFs that would than has been identified thus far. be currently being monopolized into an isolated strategy of unification by Marquez and Duarte. Within this scenario, the disadvantage of Márquez in the face of military and economic power is evident (as a result of drug trafficking activities, among others), that Duarte has acquired both in the south and east of the country, where he has managed to regroup dispersed GAPFs, and even erode them, generating ruptures from the incentives that their belligerent and criminal capacities suppose. Thus, the West region (especially the Pacific region) has become one of the scenes of greatest dispute in this attempt to consolidate and within the framework of a very close relationship with drug trafficking. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

41 • The repertoires of action of these GAPFs have focused on clashes with illegal armed structures and selective violence against the civilian population. This has been fully evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic; GAPFs have intensified their imposition through violence. Social leaders and ex-combatants have been the first and foremost target of this violent intensification, followed by the general population of the places where they are present, who have been subjected to violent social control through threats, assassinations and harsh restrictions in terms of isolation and prevention measures as a result of the health emergency. This complex humanitarian scenario is worsened by forced displacements and confinements as a result of the confrontations between these GAPFs or other structures such as Clan del Golfo and ELN, inter alia.

• In this vein, the relations between these GAPFs and the civilian population and their organizational structure prevent them from constituting a structure that bears the staff of the extinct Farc-Ep, although these GAPFs seek to champion the legacy of the extinct FARC-EP guerrilla – at least those led by Gentil Duarte and Iván Márquez. This is chiefly due to the fact that their violence does not show an interest in articulation and legitimacy within the social processes of the communities in which they are present. Secondly, the organizational structure that Duarte and Márquez separately seek (through a general command and the existence of GAPFs with great autonomy), would not respond to the characteristic traits of verticality, homogeneity and broad capacity for cohesion of the extinct FARC-EP. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

42 Expansion, consolidation and disputes of heirs of paramilitarism: Clan del Golfo and Caparrapos

Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – Clan del Golfo and Caparrapos in Colombia, 2020 Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

43 By August 2020, Clan del Golfo, is Groups (GAPF) with the same interest in present in 211 municipalities of the dominating certain geographic areas. country. Clan del Golfo is the largest illegal armed group in Colombia. It should The disputes of Clan del Golfo with be mentioned that this presence is other illegal armed structures are mainly concentrated in the departments focused on areas of the country where of Antioquia (52 municipalities), Bolívar their presence has been permanent. (23 municipalities), Córdoba (23 For instance, it is found that there is municipalities), Chocó (21 municipalities) a confrontation against ELN in the and Nariño (10 municipalities), with department of Chocó, while Caparros a national coverage that has allowed are their contenders in the Bajo Cauca them to consolidate their presence in Antioqueño area, and GAPFs are their other departments such as Meta (12 main barrier in the Pacific coast of Nariño municipalities), Sucre (11 municipalities), and some municipalities of Putumayo. Magdalena (9 municipalities), Valle del The Catatumbo region shows a contrary Cauca (8 municipalities), La Guajira (6 landscape, as historically there has been municipalities), among others. presence of groups such as ELN and EPL; this causes the presence of Clan del Golfo The territorial deployment of Clan to not be significant. del Golfo in different departments of Colombia is largely based on an The events related to confrontations outsourcing strategy. This is the case of between Clan del Golfo and the municipalities in the department of Meta aforementioned illegal armed structures such as Puerto López, Puerto Gaitán and are initially part of the dynamic of Cabuyaro (Ombudsman’s Office, 2020), appropriation of territories to consolidate or El Carmen de Bolívar (Ombudsman’s their position in the drug trafficking Office, 2020). This strategy allows them to business. In this sense, Clan del Golfo as expand the criminal network from their an illegal armed structure falls into the historical epicenters such as Bajo Cauca category of organized crime, which states Antioqueño, and Urabá Antioqueño and that its illicit activities are geared towards Urabá Chocoano towards regions such the main objective of obtaining economic as the Atlantic coast and the center of income. the country, through the creation of links with organized criminal groups The occupation by Clan del Golfo of to achieve greater deployment of their territories formerly dominated by Farc- criminal actions. It should also be noted Ep (where there is a high density of coca that Clan del Golfo’s intention to expand crops) aims at controlling the production their national presence territorially is and commercialization chain of the drug. not without barriers; their opponents Being an illegal economy with a significant are the Law Enforcement Agencies supply and demand, drug trafficking and other illegal armed groups such leaves large profits that circulate to legal as ELN, Caparros and Post-Farc Armed markets through money laundering or Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

44 go to investments in obtaining weapons forefront – in certain areas of the country and war material to further strengthen also derives from the control of population the structure. in regions where their presence is concentrated, and wherein conversely On the understanding that the practice the presence of the State is scarce or of drug trafficking represents for Clan del weak. This situation could be leveraged Golfo an increase of its economic capital by illegal actors to establish some kind and the strengthening of its structure, of institutional link wherethrough they said Illegal Armed Structure (IAS) has can carry out their criminal activities with become allied with the Sinaloa cartel – impunity. recognized as one of the greatest criminal organizations at the international level. Importantly, the various types of violent actions exercised by Clan Fundación Paz y Reconciliación del Golfo and Caparros does not fall Foundation (2020) could establish exclusively within the arena of disputes that this relationship occurs through with illegal and legal actors, but also articulation, and allows them to carry out as a mechanism oriented towards the joint efforts in order to control the chain establishment of a social order among of production and commercialization of the population of the territories where cocaine to the world market. However, they are present. In this vein, population this alliance with Mexican cartels is not control is based on the development exclusive to the Clan del Golfo. PARES of other illegal economies such as has also established that the Caparros extortion, collection of “vaccines” – i.e. group has ties with the Jalisco Nueva charges to allegedly provide security Generación Cartel through financing. for inhabitants – among others, where “protection” services similar to those Through this modality, a strong used by the mafias are offered and injection of capital and weapons would focus on exercising violence of a more be given by the Mexican organization selective nature. for Los Caparros to not only consolidate their presence in several municipalities As can be seen, the criminal portfolio of the department of Antioquia (Cáceres, of Clan del Golfo does not circumscribe Caucasia, Tarazá, Frontino, among to drug trafficking as the only source of others); bur also to have an expansion high income. Large-scale illegal mining process towards the south of Córdoba activities developed by this structure (San José de Uré, Puerto Libertador, in municipalities such as Caucasia Montelíbano, among others) as this (Colombian Navy, 2020) account for the could facilitate their presence in other management of large sums of capital departments of the Atlantic coast. invested in river and land machinery, which allows them to have a permanent The objective of controlling illicit income of money due to the intensive economies – with drug trafficking at the exploitation of mines. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

45 Under this panorama, it is pointed development of illegal economies led by out that the expansion of Clan del Golfo drug trafficking. In light of the foregoing at the national level is explained by the we have drawn the following conclusions: confluence of alliances, outsourced expansion processes and the constant

• Clan del Golfo’s expansion observed on the Atlantic coast and other regions of the country is a matter of utmost concern. The outsourcing model allows Clan del Golfo to have greater influence over departments such as Bolívar and Magdalena. The consolidation of Clan del Golfo is arguably originated in the south of Córdoba. On the other hand, nodes created with organized criminal groups through outsourcing would prove useful for them in more remote regions.

• The strengthening and expansion of Clan del Golfo also evinces that the drug trafficking business continues to operate despite the current COVID-19 pandemic. The alliance with the Sinaloa Cartel would be keeping this illegal business afloat, in turn leaving revenues that would allow them to maintain and expand their structure.

• Disputes with ELN, Caparros and GAPFs for the control of territories with a high density of coca crops are permanent in areas of Chocó, Antioquia and Nariño. This could show that there are regions in which Clan del Golfo does not have a visible domain and in which confrontations are permanent.

• The development of other illegal economies such as large- scale illegal mining provide capital support to this illegal armed structure, so that it does not depend solely on income from the drug trafficking business. This criminal diversification of the portfolio for economic purposes has also allowed them to expand geographically. Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

46 References

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• Procuraduría General de la Nación. (9 de Junio de 2020). Procurador denunció ante la Fiscalía reclutamiento ilícito y uso de menores en la comisión de delitos durante la pandemia del covid-19. Obtenido de https://www.procuraduria.gov.co/portal/Procu- rador-denuncio-ante-la-Fiscalia-reclutamiento-ilicito-y-uso-de-menores-en-la-comi- sion-de-delitos-durante-la-pandemia-del-covid-19.news

• Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos ilícitos. (2019). Informe N°19. Bogotá: Oficina de Las Naciones Unidas Contra la Droga y el Delito.

• Radio Santafé. (22 de mayo de 2020). Desarticularon bandas que apoyaban al Clan del Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia

51 Golfo en el Meta. Obtenido de Radio Santafé: http://www.radiosantafe.com/2020/05/22/ desarticularon-bandas-que-apoyaban-al-clan-del-golfo-en-el-meta/

• Red de Derechos Humanos del Suroccidente Colombiano “Francisco Isaías Cifuentes” Red Nacional de Garantías y Derechos Humanos de la Coordinación Social y Política Marcha Patriótica. (2020). Presencia de Grupos Armados Ilegales, Fuerzas Militares y Policía Nacio- nal en el Departamento del Cauca. Popayán: Red de Derechos Humanos del Suroccidente Colombiano.

• Redacción digital BLU Radio. (2 de junio de 2020). Asesinan a dos líderes campesinos en Puerto Libertador, sur de Córdoba. Obtenido de Blu Radio: https://www.bluradio.com/nacion/asesinan-dos-lideres-campesinos-en-puerto-libertador-sur-de-cordoba-253819-ie430/ asesinan-dos-lideres-campesinos-en-puerto-libertador-sur-de-cordoba-253819-ie430

• Redacción Nacional. (26 de febrero de 2020). Cerca de 1.000 personas confinadas por enfrentamientos armados en Vigía del Fuerte. Obtenido de El Espectador: https://www. elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/antioquia/cerca-de-1000-personas-confinadas-por-enfrentamientos-armados-en-vigia-del-fuerte-articulo-906484/

• Semana. (16 de mayo de 2020). Cayó alias Gallero, jefe de la Dirección Nacional del ELN. Obtenido de https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/cayo-alias-gallero-jefe-de-la-direc- cion-nacional-del-eln/671930

• Semana. (3 de marzo de 2020). Amenazan a líder social en Córdoba tras ser acusada de tener covid-19. Obtenido de Revista Semana: https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/co- ronavirus-amenazan-a-lider-social-en-cordoba-tras-ser-acusada-de-tener-covid-19/659879

• Serrano, N. (30 de enero de 2020). Cayó ‘Zaider’ presunto extorsionista del Clan del Golfo. Obtenido de El Universal: https://www.eluniversal.com.co/sucesos/cayo-zaider-presun- to-extorsionista-del-clan-del-golfo-CJ2308307

• UNODC. (2019). Cultivos de uso ilícito (coca). Obtenido de http://www.odc.gov.co/sidco/ oferta/cultivos-ilicitos/departamento-municipio

• Varese, F. (2010). Organized crime: Critical concepts in criminology. Routledge.

• Vélez, J. F. (10 de junio de 2020). Procuraduría de Colombia denuncia reclutamiento de menores durante pandemia. Obtenido de Panam Post: https://es.panampost.com/juan-fe- lipe-velez/2020/06/10/procuraduria-reclutamiento-menores/

• VerdadAbierta.com. (Febrero de 2018). Políticos y criminales: ¿aliados en el Bajo Cauca? Co- lombia. Obtenido de https://verdadabierta.com/posibles-alianzas-entre-politicos-y-las-autodefensas-gaitanistas-de-colombia-en-el-bajo-cauca-antioqueno/

• W Radio. (15 de julio de 2020). Capturado concejal y cinco presuntos integrantes del Clan del Golfo en Chocó. Obtenido de W Radio: https://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/regionales/ capturado-concejal-y-cinco-presuntos-integrantes-del-clan-del-golfo-en-choco/20200715/ nota/4055278.aspx Security in times of pandemic: legacies war and organized crime Colombia