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NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. See Léon Baudry, ed., La querelle des futurs contingents, Etudes de philosophie médiévale 38 (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1950). seems to have held with the Greek commentators on that future contingent singular propositions are neither true nor false—though his position is somewhat ambiguous in that he writes "definitely" true or false—, but nevertheless held that God does know contingent states of affairs which are future to us. The Jewish theologian Gersonides denied not only the truth-value of such propositions but also God's knowledge of future contingent states of affairs, claiming that such a denial did not impugn God's omniscience, since He still knows all the truth there is. By contrast, Peter Aureoli, who first gave precise expression to a three-valued to deal with future contingent singular propositions, maintained that God does know future contingent states of affairs, but that this fact does not entail that the future-tense propositions correlated with them are true or false. Of the scholastics, Bonaventure, Aureoli, Ockham, Antonius d'Ailly believed that Aristotle held future contingent singular propositions to be neither true nor false, but only Aureoli, Antonius Andreas, and the Scotus of the Opus secundum joined him in this opinion. By far most Christian thinkers adhered both to the Principle of Bivalence vis à vis future contingent singular propositions and to God's knowledge of contingent states of affairs which are future for us. (See also Philotheus Boehner, " Connected with the Tractatus," in The "tractatus de praedestinatione et de praes- cientia dei et de futuris contingentibus" of William Ockham, ed. P. Boehner, Fran• ciscan Institute Publications 2 [St. Bonaventura, Ν.Y.: Fransiscan Institute, 1945], pp. 87-8.) 2. For bibliography on Diodorus's "Master Argument," see Richard M. Gale, ed., The Philosophy of Time (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1968), pp. 509-10. For a brief discussion of non-Aristotelian , see Richard Sorabi; Necessity, Cause and Blame (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980), chap. 6. For an annotated bibliography through 1972 on De interpretatione 9, see Vincenza Celluprica, II capitolo 9 del "De interpretatione}} di Aristotle (Bologna: Societa' Editrice il Mulino, 1977), pp. 79-181. 3. Anne Dickason, "Aristotle, the Sea Fight, and the Cloud," Journal of the History.of Philosophy 14 (1976): 19. In the end she prefers the standard modern interpretation. For Williams's comment, see D.C. Williams, "Professor Linsky on Aristotle", Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 253; cf. idem, "The Sea Fight Tomorrow," in Struc­ ture, Meaning, and Method, ed. Paul Henle, Horace M. Kallen, and Susanne Κ. Langer, with a Foreword by Felix Frankfurter (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1951), p. 289, where he refers to Aristotle's discussion as "more than usually condensed and garbled, but not altogether inscrutable." 4. Lynne Spellman, "DI9: an Exegetical Stalemate," Apeiron 14 (1980): 115-24. She nonetheless defends the nonstandard interpretation. 5. Dorothea Frede, Aristoteles und die "Seeschlacht", Hypomnemata 27 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), p. 6. 6. W. V. O. Quine, "On a so-called Paradox," Mind 62 (1953):65. The reference is to Aristotle's purported contention that "It is true that p or q" is an insufficient condition for "It is true that p or it is true that #." 7. Aristotle De interpretatione 9. All translations of this work unless otherwise noted will be from Aristotle, Aristotle's "" and "De Interpretatione", trans, with Notes by J. L. Ackrill, Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). For the Greek text see L. Minio-Paluello, Aristotelis Categoriae et liber de interpretatione, Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis (London: Oxford University Press, 1949). NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 235

8. See W. D. Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, 1953), p. 31; Jan Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), pp. 134-5; J. L. Ackrill, ed., Aristotle's "Categories" and ccDe Interpretationen Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 149, 151-3; Sarah Waterlow, Passage and Possibility: A Study of Aristotle's Modal Concepts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 16-48. 9. Colin Strang, "Aristotle and the Sea Battle," Mind 69 (1960): 447-8; Ackrill, Aristo• tle's "De Interpretationen ' p. 132. 10. Aristotle De interpretatione 9.18b31. 11. Ibid. 9.19a8-10, 19al8-19. 12. Jaakko Hintikka, "The Once and Future Sea Fight: Aristotle's Discussion of Future Contingents in De interpretatione 9," Philosophical Review 73 (1964):468. McKim follows Hintikka in this, claiming that this understanding of the structure supplies an important interpretive key to the passage. (Vaughn R. McKim, "Fatalism and the Future: Aristotle's Way Out," Review of 25 [1971-2] :85.) 13. Nicholas Rescher, "Truth and Necessity in Temporal Perspective," in Gale, Philosophy of Time, pp. 188-90. In the same way, Strang asserts that not until 19a7 does Aristotle begin to speak on his own behalf. (Strang, "Sea Battle," p. 457.) 14. Some proponents of the non-standard interpretation agree that in ILA.4 Aristotle is voicing his own opinion. (G. E. M. Anscombe, "Aristotle and the Sea Battle," Mind 65 [1956]:4; Hintikka, "Sea Fight," p. 468.) 15. Ackrill, Aristotle's "De Interpretatione", p. 132; cf. p. 135. What Ackrill does not sçe, and where Hintikka is correct, I think, is that the dialectic requires 19a7-22 to belong to section II, not III. 16. Hintikka, "Sea Fight," p. 468. 17. In using the word "proposition," I do not mean to imply any sort of ontological commitments on Aristotle's part. This term merely serves to preserve continuity with contemporary discussions of fatalism. Aristotle himself seems to have regarded tensed sentences as the truth bearers (see Hintikka, "Sea Fight," pp. 464-5, William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic, [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978], pp. 45-6). Similarly when I use the expression "states of affairs" this should not be taken as a commitment to abstract objects. I mean merely reality as some proposition describes it. 18. Aristotle De interpretatione 9.18a 28-29. 19. See Jan Lukasiewicz, "Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional Logic," in Polish Logic 1920-1939, with an Introduction by Tadeusz Kotarbinski, ed. Storrs McCall (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 52, 64-5; Kneale and Kneale, Development of Logic, p. 47; Ackrill, Aristotle's "De Interpretatione," pp. 133-4; Susan Haack, Deviant Logic: Some philosophical issues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 65-71, 77-84. 20. Ackrill, Aristotle's "De Interpretatione " pp. 133-4. 21. Aristotle De interpretatione 9.18a30. 22. Ibid. 7.17b26-30. "δσαι μεν οΰν αντιφάσεις των καθόλου εισί καθόλου, ανάγκη την έτέραν αληθή είναι ή ψευδή, και δσαι επί των καθ' έκαστα, οίον εστί Σωκράτης λευκός—ούκ εστί Σωκράτης λευκός, δσαι δ' επί των καθόλου μή καθόλου, ούκ άεί ή μεν αληθής ή δε ψευδής." 23. Kneale and Kneale, Development of Logic, p. 47. Cf. Aristotle De interpretatione 6.17a34. 24. The possibility, intimated in Spellman, "Exegetical Stalemate," p. 121, that Aristotle is not here contrasting past/present particular propositions with future particular propositions, need not give us serious pause. For the contrast is not between the subdivisions of propositions, but between the major divisions. More­ over, this would suggest that Aristotle affirmed Bivalence for future singular propositions, while denying Excluded Middle, so that such propositions have the same status as indefinite propositions. But this would not only utterly confuse the argument, but is also explicitly rejected by Aristotle when he argues that in an