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Où Va L'économie ? Revue De L'ofce Revue de l’OFCE 153 Modèles Décembre 2017 Réformes Interactions StagnationS séculaire InstabilitéIn Consensus Histoire économiquee Environnement Modélisation Épargne Inégalitésés ProductivitéP Emploi Long terme Crisee Divergence Politiques Fiscalité Zone euro Informationn Innovations Progrès HistoireH CroissanceCii Rigidités Crise technique Entreprises Crédit Où va l’économie ? Cycles Emploi Dépensesp publiques Consensus Crédit Modèless Rationalité Hétérogénéité Instabilité Politiques InstabilitéFinance Stagnation MonnaieM e InformationI Chocs Entreprises séculaire Équilibres PolitiquesP économiques Crise Cliométrie Politiques Productivité Rationalité Borne Zéro Agents Progrès technique Zone euro Fluctuations Inégalités Narration Consensus Crisee Croissance Revue de l’OFCE OFCE L’Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques est un organisme indépendant de prévision, de recherche et d’évaluation des politiques publiques. Créé par une convention passée entre l'État et la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques approuvée par le décret n° 81.175 du 11 février 1981, l'OFCE regroupe plus de 40 chercheurs (es) français et étrangers. « Mettre au service du débat public en économie les fruits de la rigueur scientifique et de l’indépendance universitaire », telle est la mission que l’OFCE remplit en conduisant des travaux théoriques et empiriques, en participant aux réseaux scientifiques internationaux, en assurant une présence régulière dans les médias et en coopérant étroitement avec les pouvoirs publics français et européens. Philippe Weil a présidé l’OFCE de 2011 à 2013, à la suite de Jean-Paul Fitoussi, qui a succédé en 1989 au fondateur de l'OFCE, Jean-Marcel Jeanneney. Depuis 2014, Xavier Ragot préside l’OFCE. Il est assisté d'un conseil scientifique qui délibère sur l'orientation de ses travaux et l'utilisation des moyens. Président Xavier Ragot. Direction Jérôme Creel, Estelle Frisquet, Éric Heyer, Lionel Nesta, Xavier Timbeau. Comité de rédaction Guillaume Allègre, Luc Arrondel, Frédérique Bec, Christophe Blot, Carole Bonnet, Julia Cagé, Ève Caroli, Virginie Coudert, Anne-Laure Delatte, Brigitte Dormont, Bruno Ducoudré, Michel Forsé, Guillaume Gaulier, Sarah Guillou, Florence Legros, Éloi Laurent, Mauro Napoletano, Hélène Périvier, Mathieu Plane, Franck Portier, Corinne Prost, Romain Rancière et Raul Sampognaro. Publication Xavier Ragot, directeur de la publication. Sandrine Levasseur, rédactrice en chef Laurence Duboys Fresney, secrétaire de rédaction Najette Moummi, responsable de la fabrication. Contact OFCE l 10, place de Catalogne 75014 Paris Tel. : +33(0)1 44 18 54 24 web : www.ofce.sciences-po.fr Dépôt légal : janvier 2018 ISBN : 979-10-90994-04-1 N° ISSN 1265-9576 – ISSN en ligne 1777-5647 – © OFCE 2018 Sommaire OÙ VA L’ÉCONOMIE ? Où va l’économie ? . 5 Xavier Ragot Où en est l’histoire économique ? Entre narration et quantification . 19 Pamfili Antipa, Vincent Bignon Croissance de long terme et tendances de la productivité Stagnation séculaire ou simple trou d'air ? . 43 Antonin Bergeaud, Gilbert Cette, Rémy Lecat Progrès technique et croissance depuis la crise . 63 Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin La macroéconomie à l'heure de la stagnation séculaire . 79 Gilles Le Garrec, Vincent Touzé Les inégalités dans les modèles macroéconomiques . 105 Cecilia García-Peñalosa Macroéconomie et environnement . 133 Katheline Schubert État de la macroéconomie environnementale appliquée . 151 Gissela Landa Rivera, Paul Malliet, Aurélien Saussay, Frédéric Reynès L'étude des fluctuations macroéconomiques est-elle « scientifique » ? . 171 Édouard Challe L’hiver de notre mécontentement : la macroéconomie après la crise 187 Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira Macroéconomie et information imparfaite . 201 Paul Hubert, Giovanni Ricco Finance et macroéconomie : la prépondérance du cycle financier . 221 Michel Aglietta L'instabilité des économies de marché . 253 Franck Portier Vers une macroéconomie non-walrasienne . 265 Jean-Luc Gaffard Revue de l’OFCE, 153 (2017) Les modèles multi-agents et leurs conséquences pour l’analyse macroéconomique . 289 Mauro Napoletano Sur les modèles macroéconomiques . 317 Olivier Blanchard Que doit faire la politique monétaire face aux emballements du prix des actifs et au développement du crédit ? . 327 Anne Épaulard Quelles sont les difficultés essentielles de la zone euro ? . 345 Patrick Artus La fin du Consensus ? La crise économique et la crise de la macroéconomie . 365 Francesco Saraceno Les propos des auteurs et les opinions qu’ils expriment n’engagent qu’eux-mêmes et non les institutions auxquelles ils appartiennent. Présentation générale OÙ VA L’ÉCONOMIE ? Xavier Ragot OFCE, Sciences Po Paris L’économie mondiale sort péniblement de la crise financière, commencée en 2008 aux États-Unis avant de venir secouer l’Europe. S’extirpant des urgences de la crise, le débat économique regarde maintenant des horizons plus éloignés. Le réchauffement climatique demande aujourd’hui des investissements dans des technologies nouvelles et des changements de mode de consom- mation. De manière plus générale, les tendances actuelles reposent à nouveau la vieille question, mais toujours d’actualité, de la stabi- lité économique et sociale des économies de marché. Cette dernière contient de nombreuses ramifications : à la question de l’instabilité et des crises financières s’ajoute celle de la dynamique des inégalités et de la répartition du revenu. Enfin, le changement technique, avec l’émergence des technologies numériques, suscite de nouvelles interrogations. Si les potentialités numériques sont souvent formulées de manière anxiogène, la capacité de ces tech- nologies à améliorer notre quotidien fait partie des questions essentielles pour penser l’économie dans vingt ans. À ces nouvelles questions correspondent des évolutions dans la recherche économique, dont ce numéro de La Revue de l’OFCE souhaite rendre compte en présentant les recherches récentes et les questions ouvertes. Ce numéro est composé de contributions écrites par des auteurs tous spécialistes de leur sujet. Ils ont pu écrire des textes où la pensée, certes argumentée, pouvait faire place à des considérations personnelles que les contraintes de la rigueur académique ne permettent pas toujours d’exprimer : les mécontentements et les enthousiasmes sont instructifs pour Revue de l’OFCE, 153 (2017) 6 Xavier Ragot observer la pensée en train de se faire. Les auteurs des contributions se sont attachés à présenter les résultats robustes et les questions nouvelles. Ce numéro a donc pour but de transmettre autant un savoir que des interrogations. Certains économistes ont récemment affirmé que l’économie avait maintenant le statut scientifique des sciences expérimentales. Cette affirmation contient une part de vérité : on comprend beaucoup de choses sur les dynamiques sociales avec le regard de l’économiste, et il est de la responsabilité du chercheur d’intervenir dans le débat public pour aider chacun à être mieux informé des conséquences de ses choix. Cependant, cette affirma- tion est bien trop forte et n’informe pas le public des incertitudes et débats au sein des économistes académiques. Les dix-huit contributions ne sont pas exhaustives mais couvrent la plus grande partie des débats actuels, avec un regard spécifique sur les questions macroéconomiques. À la diversité des sujets traités par chacune des contributions s’ajoute la différence de « séniorité » dans la discipline, le jeune chercheur voulant déplacer la frontière du savoir dans une direction précise côtoie le chercheur plus expérimenté présentant une version plus topogra- phique de la discipline, en décrivant ce que l’on sait déjà. Le but de cette introduction n’est pas de se substituer à la lecture de ces textes, tous instructifs et éclairants, mais d’en dégager des points d’intersection ou des sentiers divergents aussi bien en termes de méthodes que de mesures de politiques économiques. Quatre thèmes se dégagent. Le premier est la relation entre économie et histoire. Le second est la question de la stabilité des économies de marché. Le troisième est le besoin de repenser la cohérence des politiques économiques en lien notamment avec les instabilités et divergences économiques et sociales de nos écono- mies. Enfin, le quatrième thème concerne l’évolution des outils et méthodes des économistes. Le temps de l’économie : Économie et Histoire pour penser tendances et crises À la lecture de ces textes, ce qui marque est tout d’abord le retour au temps historique et à l’histoire économique. C’est face à l’histoire qu’une situation devient événement, un cycle ou révéla- Présentation générale. Où va l’économie ? 7 teur d’une tendance. En effet, ce numéro montre la richesse de l’analyse du temps historique sur les sujets qui animent les débats économiques. Ainsi, un grand débat qui divise les économistes est celui de la croissance et du progrès technique. Dans le temps long que décrivent Antonin Bergeaud, Gilbert Cette et Rémy Lecat, on observe un ralentissement progressif de la productivité et du progrès technique qui laisse planer le risque d’une croissance faible, voire d’une stagnation séculaire. Cela fait contraste avec l’accélération apparente du progrès technique dû aux technologies numériques. Trois explications sont présentées dans ce numéro. La première, défendue par Céline Antonin et Philippe Aghion, voit dans le débat sur la stagnation séculaire un pessimisme mal fondé. En premier lieu, des erreurs de mesure ne rendent pas compte du changement en cours de la nature de la croissance. En second
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