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Gericht Entscheidungsdatum Geschäftszahl Spruch Text 09.11.2017 Gericht BVwG Entscheidungsdatum 09.11.2017 Geschäftszahl L524 2139556-1 Spruch L524 2139556-1/7E IM NAMEN DER REPUBLIK! Das Bundesverwaltungsgericht hat durch die Richterin Mag. Veronika SANGLHUBER, LL.B. als Einzelrichterin über die Beschwerde von XXXX , geb. XXXX , StA. Irak, vertreten durch den Vater XXXX , geb. XXXX , dieser vertreten durch ARGE Rechtsberatung – Diakonie und Volkshilfe, gegen den Bescheid (Spruchpunkt I.) des Bundesamtes für Fremdenwesen und Asyl vom 14.10.2016, Zl. 1071019109- 150570217/BMI-BFA_STM_RD, nach Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung am 18.10.2017 zu Recht erkannt: A) Die Beschwerde wird gemäß § 3 Abs. 1 AsylG als unbegründet abgewiesen. B) Die Revision ist gemäß Art. 133 Abs. 4 B-VG nicht zulässig. Text ENTSCHEIDUNGSGRÜNDE: I. Verfahrensgang: 1. Der minderjährige Beschwerdeführer, ein irakischer Staatsangehöriger, stellte am 27.05.2015 einen Antrag auf internationalen Schutz. Bei der Erstbefragung durch ein Organ des öffentlichen Sicherheitsdienstes am 28.05.2015 gab der Beschwerdeführer an, er sei Araber, Sunnit und stamme aus Bagdad. Seine Mutter und seine beiden Geschwister würden noch in Bagdad leben. Er sei mit seinem Vater nach Österreich gekommen. Hinsichtlich seines Fluchtgrundes brachte der Beschwerdeführer vor, dass sie Angst vor dem Krieg und dem Sterben hätten. 2. Am 05.10.2016 wurde der Vater des Beschwerdeführers vor dem Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl (im Folgenden: BFA) einvernommen und brachte vor, dass sein Sohn keine eigenen Fluchtgründe habe. Sein Sohn solle nur in Sicherheit leben können. 3. Mit Bescheid des BFA vom 14.10.2016, Zl. 1071019109-150570217/BMI-BFA_STM_RD, wurde der Antrag auf internationalen Schutz hinsichtlich der Zuerkennung des Status des Asylberechtigten gemäß § 3 Abs. 1 iVm § 2 Abs. 1 Z 13 AsylG 2005, BGBl. I Nr. 100/2005, idgF, abgewiesen (Spruchpunkt I.). Gemäß § 8 Abs. 1 AsylG wurde der Status eines subsidiär Schutzberechtigten zuerkannt (Spruchpunkt II.) sowie gemäß § 8 Abs. 4 AsylG eine befristete Aufenthaltsberechtigung erteilt (Spruchpunkt III.). Begründend wurde ausgeführt, dass dem Vorbringen des Vaters zum Verlassen des Iraks im Jahr 2005 keine Asylrelevanz zugebilligt werden könne. Das Vorbringen zum aktuellen Fluchtgrund, der auch für den Beschwerdeführer gelte, entbehre jedoch der nötigen Asylrelevanz. Eine aktuelle konkrete persönliche Bedrohung habe der Vater Beschwerdeführer nicht glaubhaft gemacht. Die Gewährung von subsidiärem Schutz wurde mit der allgemeinen Lage im Irak begründet. www.ris.bka.gv.at Seite 1 von 27 Bundesverwaltungsgericht 09.11.2017 4. Gegen Spruchpunkt I. dieses Bescheides richtet sich die fristgerecht erhobene Beschwerde. Darin wird vorgebracht, das Parteiengehör sei verletzt worden, die Beweiswürdigung sei mangelhaft und die rechtliche Beurteilung sei falsch. Beantragt wurde die Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung. 5. Vor dem Bundesverwaltungsgericht wurde am 18.10.2017 eine mündliche Verhandlung betreffend das Verfahren des Beschwerdeführers sowie das Verfahren seines Vaters XXXX , geb. XXXX , Zl. L524 2139557- 1, durchgeführt. Teilgenommen haben die beiden Beschwerdeführer sowie deren gemeinsamer Rechtsvertreter. Die belangte Behörde entsandte keinen Vertreter, stellte jedoch mit Schreiben vom 25.09.2017 den Antrag, die Beschwerde abzuweisen. Zu den in der mündlichen Verhandlung ausgehändigten Länderfeststellungen gab der Beschwerdeführer innerhalb der eingeräumten Frist keine Stellungnahme ab. II. Das Bundesverwaltungsgericht hat erwogen: 1. Feststellungen: Der Beschwerdeführer ist irakischer Staatsangehöriger, gehört der Volksgruppe der Araber an und ist Sunnit. Der Beschwerdeführer wurde in Bagdad geboren und ist dort aufgewachsen. Er hat ca. neun Jahre die Schule besucht. Der Beschwerdeführer verließ gemeinsam mit seinem Vater XXXX , geb. XXXX , Zl. L524 2139557-1, ca. im Februar 2015 den Irak. Danach reisten der Beschwerdeführer und sein Vater illegal in das österreichische Bundesgebiet ein, wo sie jeweils am 27.05.2015 einen Antrag auf internationalen Schutz stellten. Die vom Beschwerdeführer vorgebrachten Fluchtgründe werden den Feststellungen nicht zugrunde gelegt. Es kann nicht festgestellt werden, dass der Beschwerdeführer im Irak vor seiner Ausreise einer individuellen landesweiten und systematischen Verfolgung durch staatliche Organe oder durch Dritte ausgesetzt war oder er im Falle einer Rückkehr in den Irak der Gefahr einer solchen ausgesetzt wäre. Zur Lage im Irak werden folgende Feststellungen getroffen: 1. Politische Lage Innenpolitik: Die derzeitigen Anti-IS-Operationen sind zwar insofern erfolgreich, als sie den IS schwächen, gleichzeitig verschärfen sie aber die politische Instabilität. Die vom Iran unterstützten schiitischen Milizen haben gemeinsam mit der Partei des Ex-Premiers Nouri al-Maliki dem amtierenden Premier Abadi gedroht, ein Misstrauensvotum gegen ihn auszusprechen. Abadi steht in Gefahr sein Amt zu verlieren, und muss Zugeständnisse gegenüber den Milizen machen. Abadi war es beispielsweise auch nicht möglich, die Milizen davon abzuhalten, ihre Operationen in Tal Afar wieder aufzunehmen (ISW 7.2.2017). Zusätzlich dazu hat das irakische Parlament im November 2016 die Volksmobilisierungseinheiten (Popular Mobilisation Forces/Hashd al-Shaabi) – jene Milizen, die wie die irakischen Sicherheitskräfte gegen den IS kämpfen – rechtlich der Armee gleichgestellt. [ ] Die meisten dieser Milizen sind schiitisch, etliche davon sind vom Iran abhängig, sind radikal und werden der Verbrechen an Sunniten beschuldigt. [ ] Diese rechtliche Gleichstellung ist ganz nach dem Geschmack von Expremier Nuri al-Maliki, der zurück an die Macht will und dessen neue politische Hausmacht die Milizen sind (Standard 28.11.2016). Maliki gelingt es auch zunehmend mit Misstrauensanträgen gegenüber Abadis Ministern die Regierung zerbröckeln zu lassen. Der Verteidigungsminister und der Finanzminister wurden im Jahr 2016 bereits entlassen (Standard 23.9.2016). Über die Sommermonate 2016 wurden mit derartigen Methoden bereits fünf Minister erfolgreich abgesetzt (AA 7.2.2017). Auch für die Region Kurdistan im Irak ist die Frage, ob Maliki zurück an die Macht kommt, von großer Bedeutung. Massoud Barzani, der Präsident der Kurdischen Regionalregierung [Amtszeit bereits abgelaufen - er befindet sich aber nach wie vor Amt], hat immer wieder mit Ankündigungen, die Unabhängigkeit Kurdistans erklären zu wollen, aufhorchen lassen. Falls Maliki zurückkehren würde, würde er dies in die Tat umsetzen, so Barzani (Ekurd Daily 23.1.2017). www.ris.bka.gv.at Seite 2 von 27 Bundesverwaltungsgericht 09.11.2017 Insbesondere auch im Süden des Irak regt sich verstärkter Widerstand gegen Malikis Vorhaben, an die Spitze der Macht zurückkehren zu wollen. Die Anhänger der Sadr-Bewegung wollen mittels Demonstrationen die Hoffnung Malikis auf eine Rückkehr verhindern. Ein inner-schiitischer Konflikt zwischen Sadristen und Maliki- Anhängern ist spürbar, auch wenn diesbezügliche militärische Auseinandersetzungen unwahrscheinlich sind (Al Monitor 26.12.2017). Am 11. Februar kam es in Bagdad allerdings zu schiitisch-schiitischen Zusammenstößen. Sicherheitskräfte der schiitisch dominierten Regierung schossen auf schiitische Demonstranten der regierungskritischen Sadr-Bewegung. Dabei wurden mindestens 6 Personen getötet, weitere hunderte wurden verletzt, außerdem wurden dabei Raketen in die "Green Zone" (ehemalige internationale Zone, in der sich viele Regierungs- und Botschaftsgebäude befinden) geschossen. Gerichtet war die Demonstration v.a. gegen den konfessionell-ethnischen Proporz in der irakischen Politik. Die Sadr-Bewegung richtet sich zwar v.a. auch gegen eine Rückkehr Malikis, gerade diesem könnte jedoch der Aktivismus Sadrs nutzen, da er den amtierenden Premier Abadi zusätzlich schwächt (MEE 12.2.2017, vgl. Standard 13.2.2017). Die letzten nationalen Wahlen, die im April 2014 stattfanden, gewann der ehemalige Premierminister Nouri al- Maliki. Da es auf Grund seines autoritären und pro-schiitischen Regierungsstils massive Widerstände gegen Maliki gab, trat er im August 2014 auf kurdischen, internationalen, aber auch auf innerparteilichen Druck hin zurück (GIZ 6.2015). Es wird ihm unter anderem vorgeworfen, mit seiner sunnitisch-feindlichen Politik (Ausgrenzung von sunnitischen Politikern, Niederschlagung sunnitischer Demonstrationen, etc.) deutlich zur Entstehung radikaler sunnitischer Gruppen wie dem IS beigetragen zu haben (Qantara 17.8.2015). Maliki‘s Nachfolger ist der ebenfalls schiitische Parteikollege Haidar al-Abadi (beide gehören der schiitischen Dawa- Partei an), der eine Mehrparteienkoalition anführt, und der mit dem Versprechen angetreten ist, das ethno- religiöse Spektrum der irakischen Bevölkerung wieder stärker abzudecken (GIZ 6.2015). Allerdings gelang es Abadi bislang nicht, politische Verbündete für seine Reformpläne (insbesondere die Abschaffung des konfessionell-ethnischen Proporzes) zu finden. Er hat mit dem besonders Iran-freundlichen Ex-Premier Maliki (nunmehr Vorsitzender der Dawa-Partei) einen starken Widersacher innerhalb seiner Partei. Ein Problem Abadis ist auch die Macht der schiitischen Milizen, von denen viele vom Iran aus gesteuert werden (s. Abschnitt 3.1.). Diese Milizen - eher lose an die irakische Armee angeschlossen - sind für Abadi einerseits unverzichtbar im Kampf gegen den "Islamischen Staat" (Standard 5.1.2015), gleichzeitig wird deren Einsatz von der sunnitischen Bevölkerung aber als das "Austreiben des Teufels mit dem Beelzebub" gesehen. Die Sunniten fürchten das skrupellose
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