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ROMANIA’S EU PRESIDENCY: A GLANCE BACK SPECIAL REPORT | JULY 2019 https://eurac.tv/9Qwz ROMANIA’S EU PRESIDENCY: A GLANCE BACK SPECIAL REPORT | JULY 2019 https://eurac.tv/9Qwz Romania held its first rotating presidency of the Council of the EU between January and June. How did the country perform during its six months at the helm? This special report outlines its main outcomes and successes. Contents How Romania’s EU presidency survived its baptism of fire 4 Strategic success from the Sibiu summit 6 Disinformation in the EU presidency’s crosshairs 8 Signed, sealed, delivered: Important files closed by Romania 10 Romania’s shift at the helm of the Council 13 4 JULY 2019 | SPECIAL REPORT | ROMANIA’S EU PRESIDENCY: A GLANCE BACK | EURACTIV How Romania’s EU presidency survived its baptism of fire By Sam Morgan | EURACTIV.com Romanian parliament staff workers make final adjustments, prior to the conference dedicated to European Day of Data Protection, 28 January 2019. [Photo: EPA-EFE/ROBERT GHEMENT] he world of tennis was stunned surprise from expert observers, presidency. The Romanians structured on 13 July, when Romania’s particularly as Bucharest was mired in their programme into four pillars: TSimona Halep won the first a domestic political crisis. Europe of Convergence, Safer Europe, Wimbledon title for her country. But it Like Estonia, Bulgaria and Austria Europe as a stronger global actor, wasn’t the country’s only international before it, Romania kicked off its Europe of common values. success this year – just two weeks presidency six months earlier than The presidency also pledged to put earlier, Romania brought the curtain planned, after the United Kingdom cohesion at the heart of the decision- down on its maiden six months at the voted in 2016 to leave the EU and gave making for the following six months. helm of the EU’s rotating presidency. up its stint in charge. Prime Minister Viorica Dăncilă At a glitzy opening ceremony and President Klaus Iohannis both The presidency stint has also in Bucharest on 10 January, the EU prompted reactions of positive welcomed in the new year and its new Continued on Page 5 JULY 2019 | SPECIAL REPORT | ROMANIA’S EU PRESIDENCY: A GLANCE BACK | EURACTIV 5 Continued from Page 4 The Pole also said there was Rutte said Romania is “not going in the “good progress” made in talks on right direction” to join, citing rule of attended the gala event, with the the EU’s next long-term budget, the law concerns. former’s government services driving multiannual financial framework. His Romanian counterpart, the presidency work and the latter Romanian President Iohannis told Dăncilă, retorted that her country acting as the holder’s figurehead. the same press conference that the “met the technical criteria for joining Bucharest was aware that the presidency “was very important for the Schengen area as early as 2011”, as months to come would not lack us” and highlighted the sheer amount recognised in a Council decision. challenges, and Dăncilă said at the of work officials had got through, After these six months the outset that ”we are fully aware of the stressing also that the Council’s Romanians have earned a lot of stakes, especially in this changing strategic agenda for the next five years credit during their presidency and a European landscape”. “reflects entirely” the points adopted deal on membership could be in the She said Romania was “firmly under the Sibiu Declaration. offing during the first part of the next committed to contributing, as a That text was agreed at May’s legislative cycle in Brussels. facilitator of consensus, through Future of Europe summit in the “The presidency was proof that concrete actions, to the promotion of Transylvanian city of Sibiu. Initially Romania is an honest member of the a more united and cohesive Europe”. billed as the first major meeting after EU and a serious contender for getting It ended up being a baptism of fire, Brexit, the event took on more of a the permanent membership of the given that Brexit was meant to happen reflective tone when the UK requested Schengen zone,” according to a review on 29 March and crucial EU elections an extension to its leaving deadline. of the presidency written by the Center were held at the end of May. Tusk actually labelled the summit for Global & Strategic Studies, an There were also a large number of as “one of the most memorable events international think tank. legislative files still on the negotiating of my political career” and said, in Finland is the second member of table, on topics as diverse as climate remarks made in passable Romanian, a trio of member states that will helm change and transport emissions to that “the whole of Europe is in love the presidency over an 18-month- social rights and the Banking Union. with Sibiu”. period, with Croatia the last of the set, In the first 100 days of its making its bow on 1 January 2020. presidency, the team in Brussels, in JUNCKER’S SCHENGEN coordination with the government WISH UNFULFILLED back home, managed to get as many as 90 legislative files off of its books, Romania, as well as Bulgaria and as well as numerous agreements on Croatia, want to join the borderless joint negotiating positions for the Schengen area. But a decision on next holder of the presidency baton, membership must be approved by Finland, to take over. unanimous vote in the Council. Agreement on a landmark climate In keeping with its self-styled role deal fell agonisingly short in June but as an ‘honest broker’, the Romanians political observers were impressed did not impose a vote in the Council that consensus among 24 member but that did not stop the presidents states had built so effectively under of the European Commission and the presidency. Parliament, Jean-Claude Juncker and Many climate experts had expected Antonio Tajani, from reiterating their that talks would have to extend long support for the country’s accession. past Romania’s time in charge but now the situation is teed up for the Finns to Juncker even hoped to see a deal broker a deal during their six months. reached under his stewardship. During a press conference at the But with the Luxemburger on June leaders summit in Brussels, course to vacate his job at the end of Council President Donald Tusk October that prospect looks uncertain. called it an “energetic and successful More so given that the Council looks presidency” and said the number in no mood to add new members to of legislative files closed was Schengen. “impressive”. In May, Dutch Prime Minister Mark 6 JULY 2019 | SPECIAL REPORT | ROMANIA’S EU PRESIDENCY: A GLANCE BACK | EURACTIV Strategic success from the Sibiu summit By Sam Morgan | EURACTIV.com All eyes were on Sibiu on 9 May for the Future of Europe summit. [Photo: Shutterstock] n 9 May, EU leaders gathered Romanian presidency of the EU. the same, really”. in the Transylvanian city of After Britain successfully lobbied Juncker explained at the Sibiu OSibiu to discuss the future of for an extension to the original 29 summit that his September 2017 Europe. What conclusions did heads March Brexit date, the summit shifted proposal to hold a meeting in the town of state and government reach in the its focus away from the purely post- was because “I wanted you to fall in Romanian hills? And what will be the UK stock-take that was envisaged to a love with this place”. summit’s legacy for the EU in the years broader, future-gazing affair. The spell seemed to work its to come? UK Prime Minister Theresa May magic on Council chief Donald Tusk, did not make the Transylvanian trip who said that it was “one of the most The Sibiu gathering was meant and although European Commission memorable events of my political to be the first major summit after the boss Jean-Claude Juncker said “I miss career”, adding that “the whole of United Kingdom’s departure from the her”, he also said that, whether Britain bloc but fate had other plans for the was in attendance or not, “it’s almost Continued on Page 7 JULY 2019 | SPECIAL REPORT | ROMANIA’S EU PRESIDENCY: A GLANCE BACK | EURACTIV 7 Continued from Page 6 which the broader document was der Leyen’s appointment, it’s safe to adopted, President Iohannis said it say that Sibiu was the cradle where a Europe is in love with Sibiu”. “reflects entirely the 10 points under decision on the EU’s leadership first Indeed, several leaders were the Sibiu Declaration, the ‘Spirit of saw the light of day. visibly pleasantly surprised by the Sibiu’ as I call it”. The programme that will influence welcome they received in the city, The strategic agenda prioritises the work of the next Commission with hundreds of the locals gathering defence and migration, economic president was first sketched out at the outside the meeting venue to wave EU stability, climate action and improving Transylvanian summit, meaning that flags and chant messages of support. Europe’s standing on the global stage. the meeting’s legacy will definitely On the nitty-gritty details, Juncker It is set to guide the work of the EU influence the future of Europe as said the summit was “one of the easiest institutions for the next five years. intended. I’ve ever attended. First, because the Angela Merkel said after the The Sibiu summit will ultimately be Romanian Presidency, in particular summit that “it was important for us fondly remembered for being the first President Klaus Iohannis, prepared today to define our role in the world, to informal summit held on Europe day this council in the best possible way.” say once more that we are fighting for by one of the EU’s newest members, at “Secondly, because there was no a Europe of values and everybody, or a time when the bloc sorely needed to urgent decision to take.
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